

Foreign Relations
of the
United States
Diplomatic Papers

The Conferences
at Cairo and Tehran
1943



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2. Capabilities

If given adequate United Nations air support, China might be able to defend her major strategic areas against a Japanese offensive and might be able to execute a very limited objective offensive.

3. Intentions

The Chinese probably intend to remain generally on the defensive, pending the re-equipping and training of their army for offensive action at a later date.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

C. C. S. 390/1

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "Iowa",]

18 November 1943.

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Reference: CCS 390¹

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff realize that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into the details of various operations, but do not agree, however, that only matters of grand strategy should be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The QUADRANT decisions (C. C. S. 319/5, paragraph 58)² state that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater. This is construed as requiring decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to which of several courses of action are to be undertaken, and their sequence and timing.

3. Since the United States cannot furnish the required assistance for FIRST CULVERIN, it is agreed that Operation BUCCANEER should be mounted as early as practicable. However, we believe it may prove possible to conduct additional land, sea, and air operations in order to pin down Japanese forces in South Burma. We therefore recommend that the CinC, Southeast Asia, be directed to explore this subject, and to submit recommendations thereon to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

¹ Not printed herein.

² Not printed herein. The records of the First Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

J. C. S. Files

*Minutes of the President's Meeting With the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
November 19, 1943, 2 P. M., Admiral's Cabin, U. S. S. "Iowa"¹*

SECRET

2. COMMAND

With regard to the memoranda dated 17 November 1943 submitted to him by Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,² THE PRESIDENT said he liked proposal "A" but did not like proposal "B". On the other hand, he said he may have to compromise. We should, however, definitely go after "A". He said he would take up the matter with the Prime Minister at the earliest time. He felt we should definitely try to go ahead with plan "A", although we may have difficulty.

ADMIRAL KING observed that in his personal opinion, in that OVERLORD is only a part of the whole, the position set forth in memorandum "A" is completely logical and should appeal favorably to the British. He said the logic was as much on our side for memorandum "A" as was the logic on the side of the British for a unified command in the Mediterranean.³

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that while memorandum "A" may be completely logical, the Prime Minister may feel that under his form of government he could not accept such a proposal.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the principle of unified command already existed in General Eisenhower's theater. He felt that even though the British should point out that they would have difficulty in accepting the proposal in memorandum "A" because of their defense point of view, it should be pointed out to them that the "best defense is a vigorous offense." Certainly memorandum "A" made for the best offensive command setup.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Mediterranean unified command decision be postponed until after the over-all command matter is settled.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he could not entirely agree with Admiral Leahy. He referred to the setup in the Middle East where Mr. Casey of Cairo was supposed to act in the position of an intermediary, between the British and U. S. commanders in that theater, the result of which would leave three commanders trying to get an agreement on a committee basis. He felt that any such arrangement could never prove satisfactory and added that they had failed over a period of a

¹ Present were Roosevelt, Hopkins, Leahy, Marshall, King, Arnold, Brown, and Royal.

² *Ante*, p. 203.

³ See *ante*, p. 150.

year and a half to come to satisfactory agreements. He believed that a committee setup was not a proper form of military command.

ADMIRAL KING commented on the relationship of Mr. Churchill to the British War Cabinet and **GENERAL MARSHALL** pointed out that at times the British Cabinet has overridden Mr. Churchill's decisions.

In reply to a question from the President as to what total forces the U. S. and United Kingdom would have at home and abroad by the first of January 1944, the consensus of opinion seemed to be about as follows:

Total Military Forces

U. S.—11,000,000

U. K.—4,500,000

Overseas

U. S. Army—2,500,000—2,600,000

U. S. Navy—about one million

United Kingdom

Army—About 2,700,000 total fighting men

Navy—About one million

THE PRESIDENT observed that we are definitely ahead of the British as regards the total number of men we have overseas at the present time and that we will soon have as many men in England for OVERLORD as the total British forces now in that place.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt we were already ahead of the British in England. There are only five British operational divisions in England. We have now as many men in England as can be deployed as have the British. The British have the problems of breaking down divisions in order to provide service troops and reorganize new troops.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Prime Minister told him last June that the British had about one million men in the Middle East at that time, including Syria, Egypt, Persia, and so forth. He added that he would like to have the figures on deployment of total of U. S. forces versus British forces, and **GENERAL MARSHALL** undertook to obtain those figures for the President.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that with regard to the air, we have passed the British rapidly. By 1 January 1944 we will have over 12,000 operational planes, while the British will only have about 8,000.

THE PRESIDENT said he was concerned in the total number of U. S. forces engaged in the war against Germany, and much interested in the total air forces. He said he did not like memorandum "B".

ADMIRAL KING observed that a supplementary memorandum * regarding a particular British officer for command was only proposed in the event that it is indicated that memorandum "B" is the only one that can be accepted.

* *Ante*, p. 209.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that this particular British officer mentioned is well known in the United States. He understands us and is presumably a man of stature in Britain. He sticks to the point and does not permit himself to be pushed around.

THE PRESIDENT referred to the last paragraph of memorandum "A" wherein it was stated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could override the decisions of the proposed Supreme Allied Commander.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that that paragraph had been put in so that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have the option of negative action. The idea was to get away from the "committee" command system. The proposed Supreme Allied Commander would have complete command control and make command decisions. Of course, he would submit his plans to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have never taken away from General Eisenhower his military command prerogatives. They do, however, take "means" away from General Eisenhower or add to his "means." Our General Eisenhower makes his own plans and carries out his own operations. He decides where and when to bomb certain points.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that there had originally been another sentence included in this paragraph to the effect that either the U. S. Chiefs of Staff or the British Chiefs of Staff could effect the relief of the Supreme Allied Commander on request. He said that this had been deleted, however, on Admiral Leahy's suggestion, in that it was pointed out that the relief of the Supreme Allied Commander would be a matter for decision by the Chiefs of State.

In reply to a question from the President as to the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding General Alexander as Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean, Italy and the Balkans, GENERAL MARSHALL said that if the Supreme Allied Commander should be a United States officer, he felt that General Alexander would be satisfactory for Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, if the Supreme Allied Commander should be a British officer, General Eisenhower should become Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT said that he understood at Quebec that it was the opinion that General Eisenhower should stay until his mission was completed, that is, until he reached the Ancona line.⁶

GENERAL MARSHALL said he had not known definitely about this until the last afternoon of QUADRANT but that he understood that General Eisenhower was to remain until he reached a point north of Rome.

ADMIRAL KING recalled that was the agreement at QUADRANT but said he believed that the decision had been taken with the understand-

⁶ For the decision under reference, see Matloff, pp. 224-228.

ing that German resistance would be less than had actually been offered.

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that the decision at QUADRANT had been for General Eisenhower to remain in command in Italy until north of Rome and in a defensive position.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the name of the particular British officer for Supreme Allied Commander had been suggested in order to throw the British into a position where they could not back out in the acceptance of memorandum "A". He pointed out that the Prime Minister had said to him (General Marshall) that it would be well for him to be the OVERLORD commander in that the Prime Minister was in England from where the operation would be launched whereas the President would be in the United States—in other words, General Marshall would act as the President's direct representative on the spot.

THE PRESIDENT asked for an opinion as follows: if we do not get a Supreme Allied Commander as proposed in memorandum "A", do the Chiefs of Staff believe that the British would accept General Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander for the Mediterranean? The opinion of the Chiefs of Staff to this question was emphatically in the affirmative.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether General Eisenhower in Italy and General Wilson in the Aegean had really ever gotten together, GENERAL MARSHALL said that they had had one meeting, that he knew of, but that they had definitely separate commands.

ADMIRAL KING observed that both memoranda "A" and "B" accepted unified command in the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that it would be satisfactory if General Eisenhower became commander in chief of the Mediterranean. However, there might be some danger should General Alexander take over the Mediterranean command and then be dominated by the Prime Minister.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had accepted the contingency of General Alexander being dominated by the Prime Minister. On the other hand, the desirable condition of one command in the Mediterranean would exist. Naturally, executive direction would come from the British Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that evidently General Marshall thinks we should accept the British proposal for an Allied Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean and Middle East now. He (Admiral Leahy) did not feel that we should accept this until we have fought out the matter of a Supreme Allied Commander.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that it would be illogical not to accept a Mediterranean commander in chief as proposed by the British

immediately. He felt that it would be more logical and show good faith to accept the British proposal forthwith.

ADMIRAL KING said he was inclined to agree with General Marshall, and felt that the Mediterranean command should be dealt with on its merits forthwith.

ADMIRAL LEAHY, on the other hand, said that to agree to the over-all Mediterranean command immediately would certainly not help the situation now in the Dodecanese.

THE PRESIDENT felt that the over-all Mediterranean command proposed by the British might have resulted from an idea in the back of their heads to create a situation in which they could push our troops into Turkey and the Balkans.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Mediterranean commander in chief would be under the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that whoever the Commander in Chief might be he would necessarily have to seek approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for any changes in his over-all strategic plans.

THE PRESIDENT observed that even if General Alexander should become commander in chief and desire to use U. S. troops and landing craft against the Dodecanese, the President could say no.

ADMIRAL KING observed that dispositions, allocations, lines of campaign of the commander in chief, Mediterranean, would be subject to decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of State.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that the British would point out that they had suffered last week as the result of the lack of unified command in the Mediterranean. He said that a commander, in a position such as General Eisenhower, was always conservative regarding the sending of reinforcements to another command that was not his own responsibility. On the other hand, an over-all commander who had responsibility for an enlarged theater would feel differently toward bolstering up any weakened position in the theater for which he was responsible. He cited a recent command situation in Alaska as an example.

GENERAL MARSHALL said if General Eisenhower had had responsibility for the Middle East, the British doubtless feel, and perhaps rightly so, he would have influenced the attitude of Generals Tedder and Spaatz towards additional air support in the Dodecanese and the situation might have been different.

THE PRESIDENT asked, why Leros, why Cos? He said the Prime Minister had been upset as regards the United States attitude regarding the Dodecanese. He asked whether we knew of the details of the British operations in the Dodecanese initiated by the Middle East command before those operations began? The general consensus of opinion of the Chiefs of Staff was that the United States had not been informed in advance of the proposed operations in the Dodecanese.

However, GENERAL MARSHALL said he believed possibly he had seen a British pink dispatch regarding their movements against these islands. He added that the British always regarded the Dodecanese as of greater importance than have we in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT stated that before any change is made in the principle set forth in the command setup proposed in memorandum "A" there should be another meeting between himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added that we could agree to a unified command in the Mediterranean but not at the same time as we took up the matter of the Supreme Allied Commander.

MR. HOPKINS observed that in discussing the matter of the Supreme Allied Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean, we were discussing a matter of principles rather than of personalities.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether it was felt the British would put General Wilson under General Eisenhower before General Eisenhower reached Rome, GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING said yes.

3. SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY IN GERMANY— EUROPE-WIDE "RANKIN"

THE PRESIDENT observed that in the memorandum he received from Admiral Leahy on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* asking for guidance regarding spheres of influence as a result of a European-wide RANKIN, the paper makes certain suppositions without actually saying so. He felt that whatever territorial dispositions were made should conform to geographic subdivisions of Germany. He said that the Soviet Government will offer no objection to breaking up Germany after the war, that practically speaking there should be three German states after the war, possibly five. He said (1) we might take southern Germany, Baden, Wurtenburg [*Württemberg*], Bavaria, everything south of the Rhine [*Main?*]. This area forms a sort of southern state. (2) Take everything north and west of that area, including Hamburg and Hanover, and so forth, up to and including Berlin to form a second state, and the northeastern part, that is, Prussia, Pomerania, and south, to form a third state. He believed these general divisions were a logical basis for splitting up Germany. Especially was this so because the first or southern state was largely Roman Catholic; the northwestern portion is Protestant, while it might be said that the religion of the northeastern part is Prussianism. He felt that Marshal Stalin might "okay" such a division. He believed that the Chiefs of Staff would want to make a European RANKIN conform to such a division. Actually the British wanted the northwestern part of Germany and would like to see the U. S. take France

* Not printed herein.

and Germany south of the Moselle River. He said he did not like that arrangement. We do not want to be concerned with reconstituting France. France is a British "baby." United States is not popular in France at the present time. The British should have France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtenburg. The occupation of these places should be British. The United States should take northwest Germany. We can get our ships into such ports as Bremen and Hamburg, also Norway and Denmark, and we should go as far as Berlin. The Soviets could then take the territory to the east thereof. The United States should have Berlin. The British plan for the United States to have southern Germany, and he (the President) did not like it.⁷

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that the matter should be gone into again. He said the proposals in the paper before the President had devolved from a consideration of the United States concentration on the right of the OVERLORD line from England. The conceptions for occupation were primarily based on military considerations of OVERLORD. He said he saw a frank approach to the matter in the paper from three points of view: (1) a normal OVERLORD; (2) a partial OVERLORD, with some fighting; and (3) RANKIN Case "C" (total collapse of Germany before OVERLORD got underway).

ADMIRAL KING observed that if OVERLORD should be underway when Germany collapsed, we would necessarily have a cross-over of our forces under the President's plan. Particularly would this be so if we should have reached the line of the Seine.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that when OVERLORD was launched we must have U. S. forces on the right from a logistics point of view.

ADMIRAL KING observed that while the President's idea regarding areas of occupation did not present insuperable difficulties, nevertheless there was a problem which would have to be worked out.

GENERAL MARSHALL said if a break comes, we could split our forces into two parts.

THE PRESIDENT observed that there were no ports south of Hamburg and Bremen until the Dutch ports are reached.

ADMIRAL KING felt that the military plans for OVERLORD were so far developed that it would not be practicable to accept any change in OVERLORD deployment.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the whole matter goes back to the question of ports in England. If we stick to OVERLORD we must have a scheme for disengaging OVERLORD at any stage of development in order to comply with the political considerations of occupation outlined by the President.

⁷ For reference to a map on which Roosevelt sketched his idea of these occupation zones, see last paragraph of this document and footnote 14.

THE PRESIDENT said it was his idea we should use as many troops from the United States in the occupation of Germany as possible. These can go around Scotland.

ADMIRAL KING felt that we must have a special occupational army, in a particular command, earmarked for occupation of northwest Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the OVERLORD conception was that the United States forces would be progressing on the right and those should be the divisions first to come home.

THE PRESIDENT said he felt that the divisions now in North Africa, Sicily and Italy should be the divisions first to be sent back to the United States. He said one reason for the political "headache" in France was that De Gaulle hoped to be one mile behind the troops in taking over the government. He felt that we should get out of France and Italy as soon as possible, letting the British and the French handle their own problem together. There would definitely be a race for Berlin. We may have to put the United States divisions into Berlin as soon as possible.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed it would be easy to go directly into northwest Germany. The problem of occupational troops proceeding to northwest Germany would certainly be less difficult than their fighting their way there across the intervening territory from northwestern France.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that it was most important to keep commands in homogeneous control.

THE PRESIDENT said he envisaged a railroad invasion of Germany with little or no fighting.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he assumed there would be a difficult lack of rolling stock and the land advance would have to be largely made on a motor truck basis.

MR. HOPKINS suggested that we be ready to put an airborne division into Berlin two hours after the collapse of Germany.

In reply to a question from the President as to Admiral Leahy's opinion of the occupational area divisions, from a State Department point of view, ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt we should definitely get out of France as soon as possible. We should accept any difficulties in order to get out of France at the earliest possible time. If we want to let De Gaulle have France, all well and good. However, whatever troops there are in France at the time of German collapse will certainly have to stay in order to supervise any elections. General De Gaulle wants to start the French Government right now. Possibly there will be civil war in France. The British should clear up such a condition. On the other hand, it would be much easier for the United States to handle conditions in Germany. The Germans

are easier to handle than would be the French under the chaotic conditions that could be expected in France.

THE PRESIDENT said he personally envisaged an occupational force of about one million United States troops. He expanded on the policy of "quarantine." He said that the four United Nations by their police power could, if necessary, maintain order in Europe by the "quarantine" method. For instance, we do not want to use our troops in settling local squabbles in such a place as Yugoslavia. We could use the Army and Navy as an economic blockade and preclude ingress or egress to any area where disorder prevailed.

In reply to a question from General Marshall as to how long the President contemplated it would be necessary to maintain one million men in Europe, THE PRESIDENT replied for at least one year, maybe two.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that there will certainly be civil wars in many parts of Europe when the Germans let go. If the French divisions could be properly controlled, they could doubtless put down civil war in France. If De Gaulle could control the troops, he could put down the civil war—but what then? France will require food and munitions. THE PRESIDENT said we may definitely have to keep certain divisions in France. He felt that Holland was no problem. The Queen will return there and all will be well. On the other hand, Belgium is a big question—it is a two-language country. Possibly a buffer state between Germany and France will be necessary. This buffer state could run from northern France, say, Calais, Lille, and Ardenne[s], through to Alsace and Lorraine—in other words, from Switzerland to the seacoast. This would be a single buffer state.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that this was also at one time a German proposal and called the interdicted zone.

THE PRESIDENT observed that if we take the RANKIN paper proposed by COSSAC,⁸ the British would undercut us in every move we make in the southern occupational area proposed for the United States. He said that it was quite evident that British political considerations were in the back of the proposals in this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the paper in the President's hands as regards occupational zones works out logically. There would be less entanglement in forces, supply lines would be shorter and more direct. The paper was worked out on that basis.

ADMIRAL KING said that it was evident from any stage of OVERLORD it is imperative to plan for what operations should be necessary in order to switch to the occupation areas proposed by the President.

* For a summary, see *post*, p. 786.

5. PROPOSED AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCES WITH GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL AND MARSHAL STALIN

With regard to Item 1 *b* of Enclosure "A", "Chinese attitude towards Russian participation,"^{*} GENERAL MARSHALL questioned whether it would be wise to discuss this matter with the Generalissimo.

THE PRESIDENT said the Chinese desire equal rights with Russia in Outer Mongolia. Chiang Kai-shek wants Manchuria back. Unquestionably a discussion of this subject will cause trouble. The matter might be worked out, however, on the basis of "free zones". The Generalissimo desires a trusteeship over Korea, administered by Russia, China and the United States as trustees.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the Soviets want Kuzan [*Pusan?*] in that it is close to Japan.

ADMIRAL KING said the Soviets want a nice big port and communication to Dairen.

MR. HOPKINS observed that the Generalissimo might ask the President for a discussion of all operations contemplated against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he will tell the Generalissimo in *general* these operations, but did not propose to be specific or mention dates. THE PRESIDENT said undoubtedly the Generalissimo will inquire about the matter of tonnage over the hump.

In reply to a question from the President as to how Admiral McKean's [*McCain's*] plan for the bombing of Japan was coming along, ADMIRAL KING replied that it was being worked out and they were having rehearsals now from which experience will be gained.

THE PRESIDENT said he will not bring up the question of a Supreme Commander in the Pacific.

With regard to item 1 *b* [*d*] of enclosure "A", "Importance of Chinese assistance to operations in North Burma" THE PRESIDENT said he thought it might be desirable to bring General Somervell into the discussion of this matter.

GENERAL MARSHALL then told about the organization of 3,000 U. S. volunteers, organized as a special brigade for long-range penetration groups to precede the Chinese forces. He said that great efforts had been made to organize this United States unit. They had been provided with special equipment and special planes.

In reply to a question from the President as to what had been heard regarding the training of Chinese troops in Yunnan, GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Stilwell, in a recent dispatch, said that Chinese troops lacked equipment, lacked food, suffered from malnutrition, and that he had only received a very small percentage of the troops that were needed. The Chinese divisions each consist of from

* *Ante*, p. 245.

four to five thousand troops. They are all new men and underfed, and must first be brought into suitable physical condition before their training can commence. He added that the British were despondent regarding the matter of Yunnan forces.

GENERAL MARSHALL added he thought it would be a serious error to clamp down additional United States troops between the Chinese, British and Indian troops. We are already sending 4,000 additional troops to India in order to build airfields. We also have a battalion in this area constructing a railroad.

In reply to a question from the President as to whatever happened about the Generalissimo's request for a regiment of marines near Ichang, which would result in making some 200,000 Chinese really fight, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF and MR. HOPKINS stated that they had never heard of such a request.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that any such proposition as putting a large unit of U. S. troops in the vicinity of Ichang would result in increasing the difficulty of the supply problem over the hump.

In reply to a question from the President as to how the tonnage over the hump was getting along, GENERAL ARNOLD said that by means of night flying and thus avoiding Japanese fighter opposition and other improved methods, he hoped to attain a figure of about 10,000 tons this month. He added that we will step up the tonnage as rapidly as possible. He pointed out, however, that we must have American troops in China in connection with this supply route. As far as he knew the pipeline project was up to schedule.

THE PRESIDENT said if Germany should be cleaned up, we must study how many bombers could be operated from the vicinity of Vladivostok.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that General Bradley's plan had proposed the operation of 100 bombers maximum by supply from Alaska.¹⁰

With regard to item 2 c (1), subject "Post-war Problems—Chinese participation in the occupation of Japan"—THE PRESIDENT said the Chinese will undoubtedly want to take part in the occupation of Japan.

With regard to item 2 c (3), "Military and naval bases for mutual assistance"—THE PRESIDENT said it was contemplated that the Mandated Islands would be under the composite sovereignty of the United Nations. The Chinese want Formosa and the Bonins. The military bases required in the Mandated Islands would be occupied by the United States. There might be an over-all civilian control of the entire group and civilian control of the smaller islands. Certainly we would not want to occupy the smaller islands in the Mandates.

¹⁰ The plan under reference, advanced by Major General Follett Bradley in 1942, concerned the flying of planes to Russia via Alaska and the development of Siberian bases. See Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell: *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953) in the series *United States Army in World War II*, pp. 343-346.

MR. HOPKINS felt that if it was believed that Formosa would be an important place for a base, the Generalissimo would be glad to give base rights to the United States.

THE PRESIDENT agreed but said that these base rights in Formosa should not be given on a permanent basis in that the Generalissimo would not agree to any permanent bases.

With regard to Enclosure "B", "Proposed agenda for the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister"¹¹—THE PRESIDENT said that Mr. Churchill is still interested in working for a European economic federation. He said that we should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence. We do not want to be compelled, for instance, to maintain United States troops in Yugoslavia.

In reply to a question from General Marshall as to whether there would be any compromise in the Prime Minister's proposal, he (THE PRESIDENT) said that the United States would not act initially but could send air or naval forces.

In regard to U. S. policy on non-participation in operation of eastern Mediterranean-Balkan area, THE PRESIDENT said we must be concerned with the Soviet attitude in this matter.

GENERAL MARSHALL said we must see the question of this Balkan matter settled. We do not believe that the Balkans are necessary. To undertake operations in this region would result in prolonging the war and also lengthening the war in the Pacific. We have now over a million tons of supplies in England for OVERLORD. It would be going into reverse to undertake the Balkans and prolong the war materially. It would certainly reduce United States potentialities by two-thirds. GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that commitments and preparations for OVERLORD extend as far west as the Rocky Mountains in the United States. The British might like to "ditch" OVERLORD at this time in order to undertake operations in a country with practically no communications. If they insist on any such proposal, we could say that if they propose to do that we will pull out and go into the Pacific with all our forces.

THE PRESIDENT said that we could tell the British that they have lots of troops in the Middle East, close to the Balkans, why not send them to the Far East? He pointed out that the Soviets are now only 60 miles from the Polish border and 40 miles from Bessarabia. If they cross the Bug River, which they might do within the next two weeks, they would be on the point of entering Rumania. The Soviets might say, "If someone would now come up from the Adriatic to the Danube, we could readily defeat Germany forthwith."

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 246.

GENERAL MARSHALL said we will have to be ready to explain to the Soviets the implications of any such move. If the Soviet forces get to the Bug River, we can then throw in our air to assist them. We could force the issue from England. He felt that we should not bring up the matter of asking the Soviets for their plans until we are committed to our own plans. Then we could give them air support.

In this connection GENERAL MARSHALL inquired of the President what sort of an organization he contemplated for doing business with the U. S. S. R. on a military basis. He felt that we should come to the Soviets on specific problems and should definitely have a Soviet officer know what we are doing.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that we should not forget about the control commission in London.¹² This commission will undoubtedly ask for a military committee as a part of that setup.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that the control commission in London will mean nothing but trouble for us.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that if Turkey entered the war it would result in drawing away supplies and troops from other operations. He asked whether it would be possible to have another conference like this before meeting with the U. S. S. R.

THE PRESIDENT indicated in the affirmative.

GENERAL ARNOLD said the Soviets should give us advance notice of what air facilities would be available for bases and operations against Japan. It was important to get this information as soon as possible.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that Burma, Sumatra and Akyab were not on the list for the President to discuss with the Prime Minister. He said that the Prime Minister was in favor of operations against Sumatra, or the Andaman Islands.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that by now the Prime Minister may be somewhat "fed up" with that idea.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the British say that without more help from us they can only do the Andaman Islands operation, which is certainly a case of marking time.

THE PRESIDENT said he was much annoyed about the Azores matter.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that it was perfectly proper to be annoyed and that the British could be of more help regarding the Azores if they wanted to.

ADMIRAL KING observed that recent naval ships and planes which entered the Azores were well treated by the Portuguese and British.

GENERAL ARNOLD said our first transport plane will arrive in the Azores tomorrow.

ADMIRAL KING observed that the airfields in the Azores were much better than had been expected.

¹² Presumably the European Advisory Commission, the establishment of which had been agreed upon at the Moscow Conference.

GENERAL MARSHALL thought that what we really should have had was a "go-getter" in Lisbon. From the attitude of our representative there he felt it was a wonder we have anything.

With regard to Item 1 *a* of Enclosure "C", "Proposed agenda for the President's meeting with Marshal Stalin"¹³ regarding the topic, "Soviet collaboration in Strategic Bombing, including use of Soviet Bases by U. S. Forces"—THE PRESIDENT said that the Soviets would like to have our planes but not our personnel.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he believed the Soviets were softening in their point of view regarding this matter.

With regard to the Italian fleet and Italian shipping, ADMIRAL KING said he did not believe the Soviets were in a position to *demand* Italian ships.

THE PRESIDENT said it would be better to let the U. S. S. R. have one-third of the ships as a token of good-will. No transfer of title was contemplated. He said we should not be concerned about the Italian attitude in this matter. The idea was to retain the Italian ships in the possession of the Allies and allocate them for best use as necessary. We will certainly prevent any future Italian Navy. After using these ships to our heart's content we can talk about the matter of eventual title. Then we could give back a few of the ships to the Italians. He felt that it would be all right for the ships given to the U. S. S. R. to be manned by Soviet personnel if a reasonable proposition for the use of them is made by the Soviets.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that the conference had been of great benefit to the Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRESIDENT then reiterated his idea of a U. S. occupational zone for Germany and drew out the proposed line of demarcation on a map. This map had been obtained from Rear Admiral Brown and was handed to General Marshall at the conclusion of the meeting.¹⁴

¹³ *Ante*, p. 247.

¹⁴ The map is printed in Matloff, facing p. 341.

Enclosed Paper: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

Ankara reports on November 18 that Numan obtained approval of Party Leaders to reply to Eden that Turks have now decided in principle to enter the war. Numan agreed that military assistance to Turkey is now the prime consideration and political question of Rus-

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room to Grew at Oran, apparently via military channels.

at this meeting has been found. See, however, the editorial note on the Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, *ante*, p. 307.

**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 23, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
 General Marshall
 Admiral King
 General Arnold
 Lieutenant General Stilwell
 Lieutenant General Somervell
 Vice Admiral Willson
 Rear Admiral Cooke
 Rear Admiral Bieri
 Rear Admiral Badger
 Major General Stratemeyer
 Major General Wheeler
 Major General Handy
 Major General Fairchild
 Major General Wedemeyer
 Brigadier General Kuter
 Brigadier General Hansell
 Brigadier General Tansey
 Captain Doyle
 Colonel Roberts
 Colonel O'Donnell
 Captain Freseman
 Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
 Air Chief Marshal Portal
 Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
 Field Marshal Dill
 Lieutenant General Ismay
 Admiral Mountbatten
 General Riddell-Webster
 Lieutenant General Carton de Wiart
 Captain Lambe
 Brigadier Sugden
 Air Commodore Elliot
 Brigadier Cobb
 Brigadier Head
 Brigadier McNair

PRESENT FOR THE LAST ITEM ONLY

General Shang
 Lieutenant General Lin
 Vice Admiral Yang
 Lieutenant General Chou
 Major General Chu
 Major General Tsai
 Major General Chennault

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
 Captain Royal
 Colonel McFarland
 Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE 127TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 127th Meeting. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments.

¹ C. C. S. 128th meeting.

2. THE ROLE OF CHINA IN THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN (C. C. S. 405)²

GENERAL STILWELL informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he had received a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he did not wish any proposals for Chinese action laid before the Combined Chiefs of Staff until he had had a further consultation with the President and General Marshall.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it appeared that the operations set out in subparagraphs 2 *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* of C. C. S. 405 were acceptable. The remaining proposals appeared unrealistic, particularly in view of the logistic difficulties which General Marshall had mentioned at a previous meeting. He could not see how Formosa could be attacked from the mainland of China without any landing craft.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's views. Subparagraphs 2 *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff; the remaining proposals were matters for the future, requiring detailed examination, particularly in view of the serious logistic implications. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should so inform the Chinese representatives.

GENERAL MARSHALL reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that up till now the Generalissimo's sole interest had been in the provision of a large United States Air Force in China and a large number of transport aircraft. He had taken each step in the direction of the formation of ground forces with reluctance. Months had passed before he would agree to the training of the Chinese troops at Ramgarrh [*Ramgarh*]. More months had passed before he agreed to an increase in their numbers. Negotiations with the Indian government had necessitated further delay. Yet another period had passed before the Generalissimo would agree to the habilitation of the Yunnan force. Now, for the first time, the Generalissimo had shown an active interest in and an admission of the importance of the formation and employment of Chinese ground forces. He (General Marshall) personally had confidence in the value of Chinese troops provided they were properly led. Their powers of endurance should prove immensely valuable in the type of warfare in which they were to be employed. He considered that the Generalissimo's new proposals should be given the most careful and sympathetic consideration. These factors and the value of China once Germany had collapsed and the flow of supplies to the East had increased, should be borne most carefully in mind when considering the Generalissimo's plan.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Generalissimo's proposals must be considered in relation to the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan.

² Post, p. 370.

He agreed with General Marshall as to the importance of the change of heart shown by the Generalissimo in his latest proposals, and felt that he should not be discouraged if it could possibly be avoided.

GENERAL ARNOLD mentioned the problem of the employment of some two thousand heavy bombers which would be available on the defeat of Germany. Available bases in the Aleutians, Maritime Provinces, and the Islands³ were all of limited capacity.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that this great force might be used against shipping.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the bases he had mentioned would in fact be used by heavy bombers employed against shipping. His point was that only by using them out of China could the heart of Japan itself be attacked. Attacks on Japanese oil resources and shipping, while valuable, would not produce the final result.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's views with regard to the employment of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.

GENERAL STILWELL said he believed that the Generalissimo would be satisfied if we could guarantee naval security in the Bay of Bengal.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that it would be right to say that we should have general control of the Bay of Bengal but he could not absolutely guarantee its complete security. He believed that the Prime Minister intended in due course to inform the Generalissimo of the British naval forces to be employed in the Bay of Bengal but felt that this information should be imparted by the Prime Minister himself and not by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that in discussing amphibious operations with the Generalissimo in Chungking, he had pointed out that it was intended to launch an amphibious operation in the spring, probably to synchronize with the Burma land operations. From the air bases made available by the amphibious operation it was hoped to be able to interfere with seaborne supplies, both through Rangoon and Bangkok. He believed that the Generalissimo was in fact interested in this action rather than in the actual provision of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

- a. That the operations proposed in paragraph 2 *a* to *d* inclusive, of C. C. S. 405 are, in general, in consonance with the present concept of operations against Japan as expressed in C. C. S. 397, Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944.⁴

³ Presumably those islands in the Pacific Ocean which were in Allied hands.

⁴ This paper as revised is printed *post*, p. 779.

b. That the operations proposed in paragraphs 2 e to h inclusive, of C. C. S. 405 go beyond the present concept of operations in China and require detailed examination and study with particular reference to logistic difficulties.

c. That the study indicated in b above, together with an examination of the employment for the defeat of Japan of the heavy bombers that would become available when Germany has been eliminated from the war, should be included in the general study of the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan now being conducted by the Combined Staff Planners.

3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—PACIFIC-FAR EAST (C. C. S. 300/2)⁵

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there appeared to be minor discrepancies with regard to the estimate of enemy forces available, which could be discussed by the Combined Intelligence Committee. In other respects the paper could be accepted as an estimate of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted and noted for future information the estimate of the enemy situation, 1944—Pacific-Far East, set out in C. C. S. 300/2.

4. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 390/1)⁶

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he noted that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not able to provide the forces necessary for CULVERIN. With regard to BUCCANEER, he would like to defer consideration of this operation until the Conference was further advanced.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Japanese forces in CULVERIN had increased from one to three divisions. He was, however, prepared to accept a risk and to undertake Operation CULVERIN with smaller forces if this should be considered necessary. His chief concern was to be in a position to cut the Japanese lines of communication into Burma and to obtain an air base from which he could attack the Malacca Straits, Rangoon, and Bangkok. BUCCANEER, though not providing so many airfields, was approximately the same distance from Bangkok as was CULVERIN, and so offered almost equal strategical advantages; it could be undertaken with the forces now available to him. He would propose to launch BUCCANEER probably some two to three days after the launching of the land campaign in North Burma. This would disperse the Japanese air effort. The Burma operations

⁵ *Ante*, p. 232.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 243.

and BUCCANEER each had a considerable effect on the other and had been planned and considered together.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Approved C. C. S. 390/1 but agreed to suspend final decision regarding Operation BUCCANEER until later in the SEXTANT Conference in order to allow the operation to be considered in relation to the other operations to be undertaken.

5. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF
(C. C. S. 406)⁷

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would like further time to consider the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given only very brief consideration to this matter but had felt that it would be valuable to outline a possible course of action before pressure was exerted from any quarter to widen the membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL KING said that, as he saw it, the United Chiefs of Staff would consist of one representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation who would act as spokesman. This proposal would reduce the difficulties to their simplest possible terms if the issue were to be forced upon the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Agreed to defer action on this paper.

6. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then entered into a general discussion of the situation in the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN, in reply to a question, explained that the grounding of a vessel carrying spare aircraft engines would result in a deficit in air lift over the "hump" for December of some 2,100 tons. The backlog thus caused had not been included in his calculations and he suggested that the Combined Planners should look into this question. His plans were not made on wide margins of safety and did not make allowance for acts of God since he realized fully that too heavy demands from his theater would have direct repercussions on the operations in other theaters. In reply to a further question, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that his Royal Air Force transports were being used to the full. They were not being employed in China since there were insufficient numbers to train his parachute troops and long range penetration groups. It had been necessary for United States aircraft to fly in supplies to the British units in Fort Hertz.

⁷ Post, p. 379.

GENERAL STRATEMEYER asked if it was possible for the Royal Air Force to provide old bombers which were not operationally fit, for use as transport aircraft.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he did not feel that worn-out aircraft, even if available, could be used for this task. Manpower also was short and the production of British bombers was a direct measure of the weight of attack on Germany.

In further discussion of the possibility of interrupting Japanese communications, **SIR CHARLES PORTAL** pointed out that air bombing alone could not completely stop the use of enemy ports.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN agreed with this view but explained that he had great hopes that heavy bombing of Japanese occupied ports would result in strikes of dock labor and a resulting slowing up in the flow of supplies.

GENERAL ARNOLD felt that our present calculations with regard to air transport possibilities had been wrongly based on a 100 percent figure of accomplishment. This figure was never achieved, and it would be safer to "lower our sights" with regard to target figures and accept as a bonus any increase on this lower figure.

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, **ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN** said that the airport at Blair in BUCCANEER had a 1,650 yard runway and was capable of operating three squadrons.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the above statements.

(At this point General Shang Chen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan Ch'eng, Lieutenant General Chou Chih Jou, Lieutenant [Major] General Chu Shih Ming, Major General Tsai Wen Chih and Major General Chennault entered the meeting.)

SIR ALAN BROOKE, in welcoming the Chinese Representatives, said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were very pleased to have this opportunity to meet with them and discuss around the table plans for future operations in China. These discussions should lead to definite conclusions. Admiral Mountbatten had that morning put forward his plans and he suggested that the Chinese Representatives should ask any further questions that they might wish and put forward their own suggestions with regard to these plans.

GENERAL CHU, on behalf of General Shang Chen, explained that the Chinese Representatives had not had sufficient time to study these plans and would prefer to discuss them on the following day.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN suggested that the Chinese Representatives should give an outline of the state of readiness of the Yunnan Force and of the detailed plans for its employment. He pointed out that the success of our efforts to open the land route to China was dependent

on the successful operation of the Yunnan Force in coordination with the British attacks.

GENERAL STILWELL then outlined in detail the Chinese Forces available and their state of readiness. There were, at present, certain shortages of personnel which were being rapidly made good. The ten assault divisions would first be brought up to strength and any deficiencies in pack transport would be compensated for by the use of manpower.

With the aid of a map⁸ GENERAL STILWELL outlined the three co-ordinated attacks which would be made by the Yunnan force. He believed that sufficient tactical air forces were available to support these operations.

GENERAL CHENNAULT and GENERAL STRATEMEYER explained the arrangements which had been made for the coordination of the air effort with that of the ground forces.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Took note with interest of the above statements.
- b. Agreed to meet again with the Chinese Representatives at 1530 hours on 24 November.

⁸Not found with the source text.

ROOSEVELT-CHIANG DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 1943, 8 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESIDENT

United States

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang
Dr. Wang

Editorial Note

No official American record of the substance of this conversation has been found and apparently none was prepared. In response to an inquiry from the editors in 1956, the Chinese Ambassador at Washington (Dr. Hollington Tong) ascertained that the Chinese Government had in its files a summary record of this conversation in the Chinese language. The Chinese Government kindly prepared an English translation and granted permission for its publication in this volume (023.1/5/21/87). In view of the paucity of authoritative information respecting the Roosevelt-Chiang discussions at Cairo, the Chinese memorandum is reproduced below.

The information set forth above respecting the meeting and the participants is taken from the Chinese record of the conversation.

Accepted the conclusions of the 119th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

3. OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that instructions should be issued to the Combined Staff Planners to have the Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan, now under study by them, completed prior to the return of the Combined Chiefs of Staff from Jerusalem. This date should be assumed to be about 1 December.*

4. "OVERLORD" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Discussed the subject of "Overlord and the Mediterranean" in closed session.

* The plan is printed *post*, p. 285.

ROOSEVELT-CHIANG MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 1943, 5 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Colonel Roosevelt

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The time and place of the meeting are indicated in the Log, *ante*, p. 298, which indicates that tea was served.

Elliott Roosevelt, p. 158, says that Madame Chiang described her plans for future improvements in China, particularly in the matter of literacy. According to the same source, Roosevelt and Chiang again referred to the question of unity in China, "specifically as regarded the Chinese Communists" (see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 323).

Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 65, indicates that operations in the China-Burma-India theater were also discussed and that Chiang "reversed himself on every point." The points in question were those set forth in C. C. S. 411/2 (*post*, p. 430), to which Chiang apparently had agreed in a meeting with Churchill and Mountbatten earlier the same day. See also *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 246.

In a message to Roosevelt, dated March 27, 1944, Chiang wrote: "In the course of our conversations at Cairo I told you that as soon

as the British began large scale amphibious operations along the Burma coast, our main forces would launch a vigorous attack on Burma with all their might." *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 308. See also *post*, p. 874.

It was probably at this meeting that Roosevelt gave Chiang the promise (referred to in Churchill, p. 328) "of a considerable amphibious operation across the Bay of Bengal within the next few months." According to Ehrman (vol. V, p. 165), this promise was given before November 26. Alanbrooke (p. 63), recollects the promise as having been given "on the first day of our Cairo meetings," but this appears unlikely.

Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 64, gives an account of a meeting of Marshall and Stilwell with Roosevelt immediately preceding Roosevelt's meeting with Chiang. At the earlier meeting Roosevelt had promised to speak to Chiang "at once" about granting Stilwell more power over Chinese troops.

For other subjects which were discussed by Roosevelt and Chiang at Cairo and which may have been discussed in whole or in part at this meeting, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 366.

ROOSEVELT THANKSGIVING DINNER PARTY, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
8 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESIDENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden
Admiral Leahy	Lord Moran
Ambassador Winsor	Mr. Martin
Ambassador Steinhardt	Commander Thompson
Ambassador Harriman	Mrs. Oliver
Minister Kirk	
Major General Watson	
Brer Admiral Bruce	
Brer Admiral Nimitz	
Colonel Roosevelt	
Major Boettiger	
Mr. Robert Hopkins	

Editorial Note

Accounts of this dinner party, at which President Roosevelt was host, are given in the Egg, *ante*, p. 298; Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 159-160; Sherwood, p. 775; Churchill, pp. 340-341; and Leahy, p. 201. Leahy mentions Lord Leathers rather than Lord Moran as being present. There are no indications that substantive problems were discussed.

**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 26, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
 General Marshall
 Admiral King
 General Arnold
 General Eisenhower
 Lieutenant General Somervell
 Vice Admiral Willson
 Rear Admiral Cooke
 Rear Admiral Bieri
 Rear Admiral Badger
 Major General Sutherland
 Major General Stratemeyer
 Major General Wheeler
 Major General Handy
 Major General Fairchild
 Major General Wedemeyer
 Brigadier General Kuter
 Brigadier General Hansell
 Brigadier General Tansey
 Captain Doyle
 Colonel Jenkins
 Colonel O'Donnell
 Colonel Roberts
 Captain Freseman
 Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
 Air Chief Marshal Portal
 Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
 Field Marshal Dill
 Lieutenant General Ismay
 General Riddell-Webster
 Admiral Cunningham
 Air Chief Marshal Tedder
 General Wilson
 Air Chief Marshal Douglas
 Vice Admiral Willis
 Major General Whiteley
 Major General Lewis
 Brigadier de Rhé-Philippe
 Captain Power
 Colonel Lascelles
 Captain Lambe
 Brigadier Sugden
 Air Commodore Elliot
 Brigadier Head
 Brigadier McNair

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
 Captain Royal
 Colonel McFarland
 Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes²

SECRET

**1. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND
(C. C. S. 411 and 411/1)³**

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the amendments to C. C. S. 411 set out in C. C. S. 411/1 and directed that the amended paper, subsequently published as

¹ C. C. S. 131st meeting.

² The source text is evidently a revised version of the minutes, for it incorporates in item 1 a change agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs at their 133d meeting; see *post*, p. 669.

³ Neither printed herein.

C. C. S. 411/2, should be forwarded to the Generalissimo via the Supreme Commander S. E. A. C. without delay.⁴

2. REPORTS FROM COMMANDERS IN CHIEF

a. Report by Commander in Chief, AFHQ

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked General Eisenhower to give his views with particular reference, firstly, to the question of centralization of command in the Mediterranean, and secondly, to the best ways and means of prosecuting the war in the Mediterranean area.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that with regard to the first question, he regarded centralization of command as being absolutely essential. In practice, the air and naval commands were already centralized and he considered the whole command must similarly be coordinated and controlled from one headquarters. With regard to future operations in the Mediterranean, he considered that these had to be looked at under two different assumptions. Firstly, that there would be a full-out effort in the Mediterranean throughout the winter. On this assumption, taking into consideration the Russian advances and the effect of POINTBLANK, Italy was, in his view, the correct place in which to deploy our main forces and the objective should be the Valley of the Po. In no other area could we so well threaten the whole German structure including France, the Balkans and the Reich itself. Here also our air would be closer to vital objectives in Germany. The seven divisions for OVERLORD had all left his theater so that, to implement his suggested course of action, only additional landing craft were needed. It was necessary to keep all that he now had and certain others would be required for certain phases of his operations. His build-up must go on continuously. In addition, it was essential to have enough landing craft to insure that one amphibious division can be always ready to attack. With regard to the timing of operations, it would be quite impossible to reach the Po by 15 January, a date which he believed had been suggested. The fighting was particularly bitter and it was necessary to keep fresh infantry divisions in the front line. Amphibious operations, it must be remembered, depended on weather conditions and therefore the timing of the advances could not be exactly predicted. The next best method of harrying the enemy was to undertake operations in the Aegean. There are sufficient forces in the Mediterranean to take action in this area provided it is not done until after the Po line has been reached. It could then be undertaken while the forces in Italy were reorganizing for thrusts either to the east or west. When the Aegean operations

⁴ C. C. S. 411/2 is printed *post*, p. 480. It was apparently discussed with Chiang at the meeting of the Heads of Government later the same afternoon; see the editorial note, *post*, p. 366.

were undertaken it would be necessary to bring Turkey into the war. The French High Command were most anxious to undertake operations into the south of France but these were ruled out since all available landing craft were required for the Italian campaign.

Turning to operations in the Mediterranean, based on the assumption that only limited means were available, **GENERAL EISENHOWER** considered that only the line north of Rome could be achieved and that after that he would have to maintain a strategic defensive with strong local offensive action. Lack of landing craft would prevent him from amphibious turning movements designed to cut off enemy forces. The time to turn to the Aegean would be when the line north of Rome had been achieved. German reactions to our occupation of the islands had clearly proved how strongly they resented action on our part in this area. From here the Balkans could be kept aflame; Ploesti would be threatened and the Dardanelles might be opened. Sufficient forces should be used for operations in the Aegean and no unnecessary risks run. He considered that the earlier British occupation of the islands had been right and justified, but the position was now different and strong German reactions could be expected. In either of the two assumptions it was essential to bring Turkey into the war at the moment that the operations in the Aegean were undertaken.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the date of 15 January had been suggested, not for the capture of the Po line but for that of the Pisa-Rimini line. He asked for General Eisenhower's views with regard to action in Yugoslavia.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that on the assumption that he would advance to the Po line, he would propose action to establish small garrisons in the islands on the eastern coast of the Adriatic from which thrusts as far north as possible could be made into Yugoslavia and the Patriots furnished with arms and equipment. If only the Rome line was reached, it would not be possible to thrust as far up the Adriatic as he would have liked.

GENERAL EISENHOWER then outlined the program for the build-up of his forces in Italy. He confirmed that the ground forces available to him should be sufficient to reach the Po line. His present strength was the maximum which the poor lines of communication could maintain. It must be remembered that there was no good port north of Naples until Leghorn was reached. With regard to his air force build-up, **GENERAL EISENHOWER** said he would like it clearly understood that all of this was not for use in **POINTBLANK** but much of it took an active part in assisting the land battle. This air force, based in Italy, was twice as effective as if it had remained in Tunisia. Only the initial build-up of the air force was a costly business since, once established, six groups could be maintained for the same tonnage as two divisions.

GENERAL EISENHOWER stressed the vital importance of continuing the maximum possible operations in an established theater since much time was invariably lost when the scene of action was changed, necessitating, as it did, the arduous task of building up a fresh base.

With regard to supply of equipment to the Yugoslavian guerrillas, one officer had now been placed in charge of these operations and arms captured in North Africa and Sicily were being sent in. Italian equipment captured in Italy was at present being used to equip one Italian parachute division, which was believed to be of good fighting quality, and a further division would possibly also be equipped. He believed that all possible equipment should be sent to Tito since Mikhailovitch's [Mihailović's] forces were of relatively little value.

SIR JOHN CUNNINGHAM agreed that everything in our power should be done to support Tito, who had some hundred thousand men under his control. The Germans would have great difficulties operating against the guerrillas since their lateral communications were immensely difficult and there was only one poor railway. They would have largely to supply their forces by sea. It would be impossible, therefore, for them to rapidly concentrate against Tito's forces. He believed that by air and naval action, their seaborne lines of communication could be cut, and in fact, he hoped shortly to be operating destroyers in the Venice-Trieste-Pola area. He questioned whether it would be possible or right to continue to supply Italian equipment since this was rapidly running short.

AIR MARSHAL TEDDER said that the present system of air operations into the Balkans worked reasonably well. The tactical commander in Italy was given his targets from the Middle East. He agreed with Sir Charles Portal that when the joint staff under the officer responsible for operations in the Balkans had been set up, coordination of effort would be more satisfactory.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he believed that given 50 percent good weather, he would, once his air forces were firmly established in Italy, be able to almost completely cut the seven German lines of communication into Italy and keep them cut.

b. Report by Commanders in Chief, Middle East

GENERAL WILSON, referring to operations in the Aegean, said that it was essential to cut the German iron ring which included Rhodes, Scarpanto, Crete, and Greece. Rhodes was the key to the situation and to capture this, additional equipment would be required from the western Mediterranean. Once Rhodes had fallen, these resources could be returned and the remainder of the operations in the Aegean carried out with the resources available in the Middle East. All of this was based on the assumption that Turkey had entered the war on our side.

For Rhodes, one British division including two assault loaded brigades with previous amphibious experience would be required. These could be withdrawn after the capture of Rhodes. The additional forces required included one armored brigade and one parachute brigade, which were available from the Middle East. He considered that Turkey should be asked to take other islands of the Dodecanese. This he felt should be within their power with the possible exception of Lemnos, which the Germans were using as a base and had reinforced. The commitment to Turkey to protect them against air attack, i. e., Operation HARDIHOOD, could be met, with the exception of certain administrative units, without affecting Aegean operations.

AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that he would require some 17 to 20 squadrons and these could be provided with certain assistance which Air Marshal Tedder could provide. With this, Smyrna and Constantinople could be protected, Rhodes captured, and convoys to the Dardanelles given adequate cover. He considered that the capture of Rhodes was a prerequisite to running convoys since without it unacceptably heavy losses must be expected.

Most of the airports required in Turkey were already completed with the exception of two in the neighborhood of Rhodes, on which steel mats were now being laid. Negotiations were being undertaken with the Turks to enable us to put into Turkey the necessary equipment to provide R. D. F. cover and operation rooms. Only one of the airfields was situated to the west of the Bosphorus, and he believed the Turkish forces, including the two divisions in the neighborhood of airdromes opposite Rhodes were adequate to protect them even against airborne attack.

GENERAL WILSON stressed the importance of action in support of the guerrillas as far north as possible in Yugoslavia. The islands on the eastern Adriatic would be a valuable stepping stone to the mainland and would assist in the maintenance of guerrillas. Operations in northern Yugoslavia would constitute a serious threat to the Germans' rear.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, GENERAL WILSON said that the Turks had not got the necessary resources for a full-scale amphibious attack but that he believed that with the assistance of air attack and seaborne bombardment and by using local craft and small landing craft, some of which might have to be provided from the western Mediterranean, the Turks could stage the short shore-to-shore assault required for the capture of certain of the islands.

With regard to Rumania, GENERAL WILSON said that he was in touch with resistance groups and that a wireless station had been established in Bucharest. The resistance groups, however, were fearful of the Germans and were taking little action. His knowledge of resistance

in Bulgaria was small but he believed this resistance to be growing. He had discussed with General Donovan the possibility of further efforts being made to establish contact with this country.

In reply to a question by General Arnold, AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that the airfields in Turkey would be ample for the forces he was able to deploy, and consisted of about eight fighter airdromes and six bomber airdromes. Sites had been selected at a reasonable distance back from the coast and all were equipped with hard surfaces except those in the neighborhood of Rhodes, on which work was now in hand.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of the statements of the Commanders in Chief, North African and Middle East Theaters, and of the resulting discussion.

(At this point General D. D. Eisenhower, Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, General Sir H. Maitland Wilson, Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Vice Admiral Sir A. U. Willis, Major General J. F. M. Whiteley, Major General R. H. [G.?] Lewis, Brigadier R. [A. T.] de Rhe Phillippe [*de Rhé-Philippe*], Captain M. L. Power, R. N., Colonel J. H. Lascelles and Colonel R. E. Jenkins, U. S. A. withdrew from the meeting.)

3. APPROVAL OF DECISIONS OF C. C. S. 130TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 130th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments.

4. "OVERLORD" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

A. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1944—Europe (C. C. S. 300/3)⁵

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the "Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1944—Europe," presented by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 300/3 (*SEXTANT*).

B. "OVERLORD" and the Mediterranean (C. C. S. 409, 410⁶ and 387⁷)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff tentatively accepted the proposals for action in the Mediterranean contained in paragraph 6 of C. C. S. 409 as a basis for discussion with the Soviet Staff.

It was the understanding of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the British proposals would include the opening of the Dardanelles

⁵ *Ante*, p. 214.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 409 and 411, respectively.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 150.

and the capture of Rhodes for which the retention of landing craft in the Mediterranean was essential but that the retention of these landing craft would in no way interfere with the carrying out of Operation BUCCANEER.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that BUCCANEER would not be interfered with provided the date for OVERLORD was put back. The British Chiefs of Staff had prepared a detailed examination of the relationship of OVERLORD, Mediterranean and Aegean operations, and BUCCANEER.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the United States Chiefs of Staff tentatively accepted the British proposals for negotiations with the Soviets. He understood that these proposals implied the capture of the Rimini-Pisa line, the capture of Rhodes and the retention of the 68 landing craft until its capture. He understood that Operation BUCCANEER would not be interfered with and that further discussion would take place on these proposals when the Combined Chiefs of Staff returned to SEXTANT.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if the capture of Rhodes and Rome and Operation BUCCANEER were carried out, the date of OVERLORD must go back.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he quite understood this point. He was of the opinion that it was essential to do Operation BUCCANEER, for the reasons that firstly, not only were the forces ready but the operation was acceptable to the Chinese; secondly, it was of vital importance to operations in the Pacific; and, thirdly, for political reasons it could not be interfered with.

In the course of a full discussion the following points were made:

a. SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it might be necessary to consider earnestly the possibility of putting off Operation BUCCANEER since by so doing the full weight of our resources could be brought to bear on Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an end at the earliest possible date. The matter should be looked at from a purely strategical aspect.

b. SIR CHARLES PORTAL felt that the Russians might well say that not only did they agree with the proposed course of action outlined by the British Chiefs of Staff and tentatively accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff but also that they required Operation OVERLORD at the earliest possible date. In this case we must surely consider the possibility of putting off Operation BUCCANEER. He did not believe this operation essential to the land campaign in Burma.

c. ADMIRAL KING considered it unsound to bring back landing craft from BUCCANEER. In his view the land campaign in Burma was not complete without Operation BUCCANEER. Our object was to make use of China and her manpower and the delay of a year in achieving this object must most certainly delay the end of the war as a whole.

d. GENERAL MARSHALL stressed the U. S. contribution to the war in Europe. He believed that the suggestion that putting off the Operation BUCCANEER would shorten the war was an overstatement. The

United States Chiefs of Staff were most anxious that BUCCANEER should be undertaken. They had gone far to meet the British Chiefs of Staff views but the postponement of BUCCANEER they could not accept.

e. ADMIRAL LEAHY said he wished it clearly understood that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to agree to the abandonment of Operation BUCCANEER. This could only be decided by the President and the Prime Minister.

(At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff continued the meeting in closed session.)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean as outlined in C. C. S. 387, and that this unification of command should be made effective forthwith.

b. Tentatively accepted paragraph 6 b, c, d, e, and f (modified) of C. C. S. 409 as a basis for discussion with the Soviets, subject to the following understandings and modifications:

(1) That these proposals necessitate a delay in the target date for OVERLORD.

(2) That paragraph 6 e includes the capture of Rhodes and the retention of certain landing craft in the Mediterranean.

(3) That in paragraph 6 f the words "do everything possible to" in the second line be deleted.

(4) That the United States Chiefs of Staff could not accept the abandonment of the BUCCANEER operation; also that if further discussion should show the postponement of BUCCANEER to be desirable, this would need to be taken up with the President and the Prime Minister.

c. Took note of the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff on the effect of weather on Operation OVERLORD. (C. C. S. 410).

5. COLLABORATION WITH THE U. S. S. R.

(C. C. S. 407)⁸

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted C. C. S. 407, with certain amendments as a basis for the agenda at the forthcoming conference with the U. S. S. R. [The amended paper, in which are incorporated the conclusions on this subject reached at C. C. S. 129th Meeting,⁹ has been published as C. C. S. 407 (Revised).]¹⁰

⁸ Regarding C. C. S. 407, see *post*, p. 426, footnote 1.

⁹ See paragraph 4 b of the minutes of the 129th meeting, *ante*, p. 338.

¹⁰ Bracketed sentence appears in the source text. C. C. S. 407 (Revised) is printed *post*, p. 426.

Hopkins Papers

Memoranda by the Chinese Government¹

[CAIRO, November 24, 1943.]

**ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOUR-POWER COUNCIL OR A COUNCIL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS**

I. Pending the formation of a Council of the United Nations, the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and China should establish at the earliest practicable date a Four-Power Council for the discussion of questions connected with the Four-Power Declaration.²

II. The Council shall maintain a Permanent Standing Committee in Washington. The Committee may, as occasion arises, hold meetings in London, Chungking, or Moscow.

III. The Council is charged with the duty of organizing a Council of the United Nations.

IV. As regards the organization of the Council of the United Nations, the Chinese Government endorses the proposed scheme of the Government of the United States: viz., Eleven of the United Nations shall form an executive body, with the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and China acting as a Presidium.³

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

I. The United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and China should establish an Inter-Allied Military Technical Commission to consider all military questions concerning the organization and maintenance of international security.

II. For the successful organization and maintenance of international security, a certain number of International Naval and Air Bases will be established. Such Bases should be located at strategic points all over the world, the selection of which should be based upon the opinion of experts and subject to the consent of the States wherein such Bases are to be situated.

¹ Handed by Wang to Hopkins by direction of Chiang, for transmission to Roosevelt—not as formal proposals but as an indication of the problems which, the Chinese felt, might suitably be discussed, and “as reference material for the committee responsible for the drafting of the communique”. This footnote is based on, and the quoted words are taken from, a letter of May 21, 1957, from the Chinese Ambassador at Washington (Tong) to the Historical Office, Department of State (023.1/5-2157). It does not appear that any committee was appointed to draft the communique; see *post*, pp. 399-404.

² For the text of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943, and issued November 1, 1943, see *Decade*, p. 11.

³ The “proposed scheme” was apparently a reflection of the Draft Constitution of International Organization, dated July 14, 1943; see Notter, p. 473.

EUROPEAN QUESTIONS AND THE SURRENDER OF GERMANY

Any discussion on European questions among the United Nations should be communicated forthwith to the Chinese Government. China should be invited to participate in any decision concerning the surrender of Germany.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE FAR EAST**I. Formation of a Far Eastern Committee.**

China, Great Britain, and the United States should set up a Far Eastern Committee to facilitate joint consultation on political problems arising from the progress of the war in the Far East. The participation of the U. S. S. R. in this Committee is welcomed at any time.

II. Creation of a Unified Command.

With a view to unifying the strategy and direction of the war of the United Nations against the enemy in the Far East, the existing Anglo-American Council of Chiefs-of-Staff in Washington should be enlarged to be a tripartite council, that is, a Council of Chiefs-of-Staff of China, the United States, and Great Britain; or in the alternative, a Sino-American Council of Chiefs-of-Staff should be established for the direction of the Chinese and American forces in the Far East.

III. Administration of Enemy Territory and Enemy-held Territories following Allied Occupation.

(A) On the occupation of the territory of the enemy, the army of occupation shall exercise the powers of military and civil administration. However, if the army of occupation should be neither Chinese nor British nor American, then all political problems concerning the said territory shall be settled by a specially created Joint Council, wherein China, Great Britain, and the United States, even though without an army in the said territory, shall fully participate for the control of the said territory.

(B) On the liberation of any part of the territory of China, Great Britain, or the United States, the powers of military administration shall be exercised by the army of occupation; and the powers of civil administration, by the State which rightfully has sovereignty over the territory in question. Matters touching on both the military and the civil administration shall be settled by consultation between the army of occupation and the civil administrative organ of the said State.

(C) On the liberation of any part of the territory of other United Nations, the powers of military administration shall be exercised by

the army of occupation; and the powers of civil administration, by the State which rightfully has sovereignty over the territory in question, subject, however, to the control of the army of occupation. (In other words, China endorses the proposed scheme of Great Britain and the United States regarding the administration of liberated territories in Europe.⁴)

IV. Settlement with Japan upon Her Defeat.

(A) China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree upon certain guiding principles for the treatment of Japan after her defeat—principles similar to those adopted by the Tripartite Conference in Moscow regarding the treatment of defeated Italy.

(B) China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree upon a program for the punishment of the leaders in Japan responsible for the war and of the officers and men of the Japanese armed forces responsible for the atrocities perpetrated during the war,—a program similar to the one adopted by the Tripartite Conference in Moscow for the punishment of Nazi war criminals.⁵

(C) China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree to recognize the independence of Korea after the war. The adherence of the U. S. S. R. to this agreement for the recognition of Korea's independence is welcomed at any time.

(D) Japan shall restore to China all the territories she has taken from China since September 18, 1931. Japan shall also return Dairen and Port Arthur, and Formosa and the Pescadores Islands to China.

(E) For the settlement of questions relating to territories in the Pacific, China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree upon certain basic principles and also establish a Committee of Experts to make recommendations for the settlement of these questions. If such a Committee is not established, its work shall be undertaken by the projected Far Eastern Committee.

(F) All Japanese property in China, private as well as public, and the Japanese mercantile fleet shall be taken over by the Chinese Government as indemnification in part for the losses sustained by the Chinese Government and people in the war. For the maintenance of peace in the Far East after the war, Japan's ammunition and war materials, her war vessels and her aircraft, which may still remain at the end of hostilities, shall be placed at the disposal of the Joint Council of Chiefs-of-Staff of China, the United States, and Great Britain, or in the alternative, of the projected Far Eastern Committee.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 382, footnote 4.

⁵ Declaration of German Atrocities, November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 13.

Roosevelt Papers*American Draft of the Communiqué, With Amendments by the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹***DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUÉ**

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. The time, place, and scope of our joint offensives in this area cannot now be disclosed, but Japan will know of their power.

We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan's specific and definite pledge not to so militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever, and the territory² they have³ so treacherously stolen from the⁴ Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the earliest possible moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.

We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our three countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan.

The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madam Chiang Kai-shek, who took part with the Generalissimo in several of the conferences with our military leaders.⁵

¹ The draft as typed is the same as the draft submitted to Roosevelt (*supra*) except for the addition, on a separate sheet, of the last three paragraphs naming the conference participants. The handwritten amendments by Hopkins were made prior to the revised version of November 25, 1943 (*infra*).

² In the margin, near this point and perhaps intended to be associated with the phrase "territory . . . stolen", are the words "all conquered" and the words "violence & greed". Both these groups of words are in Hopkins' handwriting.

³ At this point Hopkins inserted the words: "occupied belonging to the Dutch".

⁴ At this point were inserted the words "Dutch and the", in a handwriting which has not been identified.

⁵ These words were apparently stricken out by Hopkins. Beneath this sentence appear the following words, in Hopkins' handwriting: "We are determined that Japan shall give up all her conquests past & present in addition to mandates."

The conference was attended on behalf of the United States by: Admiral William D. Leahy; General George C. Marshall; Admiral Ernest J. King; General H. H. Arnold; Lt. General B. B. Somervell; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Rear Admiral Ross McIntire; Mr. Harry Hopkins; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman; Ambassador J. G. Winant; ^{*}Mr. L. Douglas; Mr. J. J. McCloy.

British representatives were: General Sir Alan Brooke; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal; Admiral Sir A. Cunningham; Lord Leathers; Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay.

The Chinese mission included:¹ General Shang Chen; Dr. Wang Chung-hui; Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan-chen [*Hsuan-ch'eng*]; and Lt. General Chow [*Chou*] Chih-jou.

^{*}At this point Hopkins added the name "Steinhardt".

^{*}At this point the words "amongst others" were added in Hopkins' handwriting.

Roosevelt Papers

Revised American Draft of the Communiqué¹

DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUÉ.

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. They issued the following joint statement:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for continuous and increasingly vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy

¹This revised draft was dictated by Hopkins to Warrant Officer Cornelius on the morning of November 25, 1943 (letter from Albert M. Cornelius to the Historical Office of the Department of State, 023.1/3-257). A typewritten notation on one of the carbon copies of this draft reads "11/25/43 edition".

by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. Japan will know of its power.

"We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan's specific and definite pledge not to militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever.

"The territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. All of the conquered territory taken by violence and greed by the Japanese will be freed from their clutches.

"We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the proper moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.

"We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan."

The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madam Chiang Kai-shek.

The conference was attended on behalf of the United States by Admiral William D. Leahy; General George C. Marshall; Admiral Ernest J. King; General H. H. Arnold; Lt. General B. B. Somervell; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Rear Admiral Ross McIntire; Mr. Harry Hopkins; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman; Ambassador J. G. Winant; Ambassador Steinhardt; Mr. L. Douglas; Mr. J. J. McCloy.

British representatives were General Sir Alan Brooke; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal; Admiral Sir A. Cunningham; Lord Leathers; Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay.

The Chinese mission included, among others, General Shang Chen; Dr. Wang Chung-hui; Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan-chen [*Hsuan-ch'eng*]; and Lt. General Chow [*Chou*] Chih-jou.

Roosevelt Papers

*British Draft of the Communiqué¹*10, Downing Street.
London.PRESS COMMUNIQUE

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, ^{Such as} ~~including particularly Manchuria and Formosa,~~ ^{in Pescadores,} shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, ⁱⁿ ~~at war with Japan~~, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

¹ The handwriting appears to be that of Churchill. Date and authorship not indicated, but the text as amended is very similar to the final version printed post, p. 448.

informed that the subject of the inquiry would be discussed with the British Minister in Jidda; and the American Minister Resident did discuss it with the British Minister on a date which cannot be stated exactly without reference to records in Jidda, but which may have been November 16 or November 17, 1943.

A noteworthy feature of Mr. Jordan's telegram is that his concern over apparent lack of collaboration did not lead him to refer to his American colleague to verify the completeness or accuracy of his information before reporting to the Foreign Office, nor did he mention it when discussing arms with the American Minister Resident on or about November 16, 1943. It is also worthwhile to note that the British Foreign Office (or Ministry of State) attributed sufficient importance to this point of procedure to refer it to the highest authority.

CAIRO, November 30, 1943.

J[AMES] S. M[OOSE] JR.

B. THE COMMUNIQUÉ AND ITS RELEASE

Cairo Legation Records

Final Text of the Communiqué¹

PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other terri-

¹This is the agreed text as it was given by Hopkins to Kirk on the afternoon of November 26, 1943; see the memorandum by Kirk, *infra*. For earlier drafts of the communiqué, see *ante*, pp. 399-404. The communiqué was released to the press by the White House on December 1, 1943, and was printed, with slight editorial variations, in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, December 4, 1943, p. 393.

tories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

Cairo Legion Bureau

Memorandum by the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

SECRET

CAIRO, November 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

On this afternoon Mr. Harry Hopkins handed me a copy of the communiqué to be issued in regard to the Anglo American Chinese talks in Cairo and asked me to hold it pending the receipt of instructions from Tehran as to its release. Mr. Hopkins said that the matter of the release had not been decided upon and that I would be given 24 hours notice so that the release by the three interested countries might be simultaneous. Mr. Hopkins added that I should notify the Chinese¹ when I got instructions from Tehran. At the conclusion of the conversation I said that it seemed that all I was to do was to see that the U. S. correspondents in Cairo got the communiqué through O. W. I. and Mr. Hopkins replied in the affirmative.

A[LEXANDER] K[IRK]

¹I. e., the Chinese Legation at Cairo.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins), Temporarily at Tehran²

[CAIRO] 28 November 1943.

Immediate and urgent for Harry Hopkins signed Kirk.

With reference to document which you gave me for safe keeping pending instructions from Tehran I learn from Ryan of Ministry of Information that British have communicated text in code through British Embassy here to Foreign Office in London preparatory to release upon notification flash from your party. Ryan states such

²Send via Army channels.

III. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

HARRIMAN-CLARK KERR-MOLOTOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
MIDNIGHT, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
Mr. Harriman	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Foreign Commissar Molotov

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. According to a letter of May 25, 1954, from Harriman to the Historical Office of the Department of State (023/5-02554), Molotov asked Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who was at Tehran) to call on him. He told Harriman and Clark Kerr, on the basis of information which had reached him, that Roosevelt's presence at Tehran was known to German agents there, that these agents were planning a "demonstration", that this might involve an attempt at assassination, and that Stalin therefore urged Roosevelt to move to either the British Legation or the Soviet Embassy. A house in the Soviet Embassy compound was being made ready for Roosevelt's occupancy. Harriman, on returning to the American Legation, discussed the matter with Connolly and Reilly and the three of them agreed to recommend to Roosevelt that he should move to the proffered residence in the Soviet Embassy compound. Roosevelt agreed, and the move took place on the afternoon of the following day. See the Log, ante, p. 463. For a subsequent reference by Roosevelt to his primary motivation in making the move, see post, p. 867.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1943

**MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 11:30 A. M., AMERICAN LEGATION**

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Captain Royal,
Secretary

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said he understood that the British felt our forces in Italy could advance to the Pisa-Rimini line. He believed that as we push north into Italy, the Germans will retire behind the Alps.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said as he saw it we could do either of two things: (1) Undertake OVERLORD, or (2) go after Italy and Rhodes, and then OVERLORD would revert to the status of an operation of opportunity such as RANKIN.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if our forces advance as far as the Ancona line and the Rhodes operation should be undertaken in February, it would mean postponing OVERLORD probably until about 15 June, possibly July. He said the British want to do Rhodes earlier unless the Andaman operation is thrown out. The British propose to undertake Rhodes in lieu of the Andaman operation. The means which would be sucked in for the accomplishment of the Rhodes operation would be considerable. He pointed out that the Soviets probably want a more immediate operation than OVERLORD. He said we could probably increase the pressure in Italy and expedite General Eisenhower's advance. The British are very anxious to bring Turkey into the war and undertake the Rhodes operation. They state that this will result in opening the Straits. General Somervell believes that even should Turkey enter the war, it might be six to eight months thereafter before the Dardanelles could be opened. This consideration is predicated largely on the fact that in order to undertake operations in the Aegean, a change of base will be required, and it always takes considerable time to shift from one base to another.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the British had explained the total number of men they have in the Middle East.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the Prime Minister realizes and desires to deploy these troops. The main problem as regards collaboration with the Soviets is that they desire pressure exerted within the next two months. If, on the other hand, the Soviets decide that they do not really need immediate assisting operations, it might be possible to complete the operation north of Rome, undertake Rhodes, and delay OVERLORD until about 15 June. The British Chiefs of Staff are in an embarrassing position with regards to giving up BUCCANEER. The Prime Minister claims that if Turkey entered the war and we undertake the Dodecanese operation, Bulgaria and Rumania would immediately fall.

THE PRESIDENT inquired, "Suppose we can get the Turks in, what then?"

GENERAL MARSHALL said the requirements will be difficult to provide for Aegean operations. The British idea is to have the Turks hold the Straits.

ADMIRAL KING added that the British furthermore consider that Rhodes and certain other islands in the Aegean must be taken. He pointed out that we can not do Rhodes before sometime in February.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he believed that we should buck up General Eisenhower without effecting any undue delay in OVERLORD.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that the Soviets should know better than anyone else about the situation in Bulgaria, whether or not that country could be expected to fall if Turkey entered the war and the Dardanelles were opened.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that General Wilson had stated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff he did not know very much regarding the conditions in Bulgaria.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Germans already know considerable about the land and air build-up in the U. K. in preparation for OVERLORD—also about the concentration of landing craft in the U. K. and they are conscious of the definite gathering of force in the U. K. He added that it looks as though a delay in OVERLORD would certainly be necessary if we undertake additional commitments in the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT said that he understood there were now some 21 German divisions in the Balkans and the Dodecanese. What should we say if the Soviets inform us that they will be in Rumania soon, and inquire what can the United States and Britain do to help them?

GENERAL MARSHALL said that we could certainly do more along the east coast of the Adriatic by opening up small ports and getting supplies in to the Tito forces. He pointed out that communications inland from the coast are very bad. He believed, however, that it would not be difficult to get in munitions, foodstuffs and other supplies for the guerrilla forces. He said that it had been agreed with the British that the Adriatic should be made a separate command under one officer. He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had also agreed to a unified command in the Mediterranean, subject to the President's approval. It was believed that we could put ships into the Eastern Adriatic Coast and assist in supporting Tito.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that General Eisenhower feels that if he can get far enough north in Italy he can push into the northeast toward Austria.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that he could also push with a left wing toward Southern France. These two movements, together with the

limited operations on the Adriatic Coast, could hold several German divisions.

THE PRESIDENT made the suggestion that certain special 2,000-ton merchant ships constructed for the U. S. Army be converted to LSI(L)'s.

GENERAL MARSHALL said delays would be caused largely by vehicular transportation facilities. LST's would not be the bottleneck in such a movement. On the other hand, LST's are a bottleneck as regards overseas transportation. One LST is equivalent to about six or seven LCT's. He believed that the Prime Minister would use every wile to cut out BUCCANEER. He pointed out that the United States have constructed suitable landing fields on captured islands in as short a period as twelve days.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that control of the Andaman Islands would make it possible to cut, by air, supply lines from Bangkok. He said we are obligated to the Chinese to carry out the amphibious operation BUCCANEER.

MR. HOPKINS observed that the Prime Minister considers that as between Rhodes and BUCCANEER, the former is the more important.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that as an alternative to withdrawing means for the carrying out of BUCCANEER, withdrawal of certain shipping earmarked for OVERLORD had been suggested.

THE PRESIDENT observed that the Generalissimo had been told that the British would build up their fleet in the Indian Ocean. The question was, of what value would the fleet be there unless some operation were carried out?

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that only a small portion of naval strength would be involved in the Burma operation.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Prime Minister told the Generalissimo orally what ships would be available to support the Burma Command. The only place for the use of landing craft is the Andaman Islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the British had observed that they can not decide about BUCCANEER versus Rhodes until after they have talked to the U. S. S. R. They feel they should not be pressed to carry out an operation for political reasons until the military considerations are proven sound. He, GENERAL MARSHALL, considered that BUCCANEER is sound. He said he had talked to Admiral King regarding this matter. As regards the feasibility of constructing only one landing strip in the Andamans, GENERAL MARSHALL said he did not believe it.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the United States would have more experience with opening up and holding occupied territory.

ADMIRAL KING said the British idea is that if they take Rhodes, the Turks will take all other islands. The Allies will have to give material, ships, and supplies for opening up the Dardanelles.

THE PRESIDENT felt that the British would probably say after Rhodes was taken, "Now we will have to take Greece." . . . If we should get the Andaman Islands, where would we go? He felt that small groups of commandos, operating in support of Tito along the Adriatic Coast, had great possibilities. Another suggestion would be for a small force to penetrate northward from Trieste and Fiume. He said he was much more favorably inclined towards operations from the Adriatic rather than from the vicinity of the Dodecanese.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that in order to put forces into Trieste and Fiume, we should have to push the German Army further north into Italy; otherwise they would be on the left flank of the penetrations from Trieste.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that the Germans should be pushed on toward the Alps. He thought it would be a good idea to go around the ends into France and Austria. He pointed out that during the last war the Austrians required Germans to help them. He believed that if we push far enough north into Italy, the Germans will retreat behind the mountains.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the Chiefs of Staff were being pressed by the French to go into Southern France, ADMIRAL KING replied in the affirmative. He added that if Turkey comes into the war, we certainly will be involved in the Dodecanese.

In reply to a question from the President as to the value of air-fields in the vicinity of Smyrna should Turkey come into the war, GENERAL ARNOLD said we could use certain of these fields for heavy bombers and we would be able to help by using other airfields in Turkey for both heavy and medium bombers.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the British had talked about a landing in the vicinity near Salonika, THE CHIEFS OF STAFF replied in the negative.

ADMIRAL KING observed that neither General Wilson nor General Donovan think the Bulgars will quit.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not have the conscience to urge the Turks to go into the war.

In reply to a question from the President, GENERAL ARNOLD stated that the Germans have now about 700 planes in the Balkans; furthermore, the Turks have no really modern planes, all are obsolete.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the British originally planned to give the Turks 27 fighter squadrons; they finally gave them 17, but more fighter squadrons would have to be given to the Turks.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that one of the difficulties in the Italian campaign is lack of equipment for troops due to lack of shipping.

There are divisions sitting in North Africa now with insufficient equipment due to lack of shipping. These divisions could be used if the equipment were available. He pointed out that the real issue is, what do the Soviets mean by "immediate help"? The U. S. S. R. evidently wants Turkey into the war as a cold-blooded proposition. The Soviets definitely want something, and we should find out what it is.

THE PRESIDENT thought that by January we could mount commando group operations in the Adriatic and the Aegean.

GENERAL MARSHALL questioned whether it would be feasible to undertake very many commando raids. He questioned whether these operations would conflict with planned operations in Italy.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that his idea was that a commando raid should be on a small scale, say with about 2,000 men to a group. These small groups would not require landing craft on the same scale as larger operations.

In connection with a remark from the President regarding retention of landing craft for OVERLORD, **ADMIRAL KING** pointed out another factor which should be given consideration with regard to the number of landing craft planned to return to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD. He said we won't get the 67 retained in the Mediterranean into the U. K. due to the fact that they will have been used in action operations and there will certainly be considerable attrition. He added that all landing craft production after March is earmarked for the Pacific. If there is a delay of one month in OVERLORD, the one month's increased production can be diverted to OVERLORD.

THE PRESIDENT observed that we must tell the Soviets that we get just so much production per month. All this production is earmarked for definite planned operations. In order to transfer means such as landing craft, it is necessary to take them away from one place in order to add to the means at another. There is no pool available.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that when General Eisenhower has one command of the entire Mediterranean, better use of landing craft may be effected.

ADMIRAL KING observed that destroyers and other craft could be utilized for commando raids.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the Prime Minister believes he could control the Mediterranean if he could get his own man, General Alexander, in as Commander in Chief.

THE PRESIDENT observed that we must realize that the British look upon the Mediterranean as an area under British domination.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the British were wedded to committeeism. Unity of command would expedite operations. **GENERAL MARSHALL**

explained to the President the relationship between General Eisenhower's and General Wilson's command, and the attitude of General Eisenhower's subordinate commanders in chief versus the independent commanders with General Wilson and the effects of this at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting last Friday.¹ He pointed out that while the United States perhaps does not do committee work as well as the British, nevertheless they (the British) have certainly had a very serious time in the Middle East due to the lack of unity of command.

THE PRESIDENT said he was afraid that Marshal Stalin will ask just how many German divisions could be taken off the Soviet Western Front immediately. He said he did not intend to get involved in a discussion as between the relative merits of the Dodecanese and the Andamans.

GENERAL ARNOLD observed that the flow of planes through the Azores has already begun as of yesterday. He said it was planned to pass 147 through in December and as many as 154 in January.

In reply to a question from the President as to how many squadrons of planes were operating in antisubmarine work out of the Azores, ADMIRAL KING replied about three squadrons.

¹ See *ante*, p. 359.

ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 3 P. M.²
ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

PARTIES³

United States

President Roosevelt
Mr. Boettch

Soviet Union

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Farber

²The British minutes list the meeting as having begun at 3 p. m. According to the Log, ante, p. 464, the meeting began at 3:15 p. m. According to Forrest Davis ("What Really Happened at Teheran," *Saturday Evening Post*, vol. 238, May 13 and May 20, 1944), Roosevelt discussed with Stalin at Teheran two additional subjects besides those covered in the official record as given here, namely, the structure of the Federal system in the United States and the "good neighbor" policy of the United States toward Latin America. The Davis article was based on an "off-the-record" conversation with Roosevelt in March 1944. (Roosevelt Papers).

³The listing of those present is based on the British minutes. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 175, appears to have misunderstood some remarks of his father respecting Boettch's presence at the meeting.

MARSHAL STALIN replied, "there is no need to speak at the present time about any Soviet desires, but when the time comes, we will speak."

Although the discussion between Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister remained friendly, the arguments were lively and Stalin did not let up on the Prime Minister throughout the entire evening.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1943

**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 30, 1943,
9:30 A. M., BRITISH LEGATION¹**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Captain Freeman

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

SIR ALAN BROOKE began by saying that the problem was to arrive at an agreed basis for discussion with the Soviets at this afternoon's Plenary Meeting. He then went on to consider operations in the Mediterranean from west to east. It had always been agreed that some operation should take place against the South of France. In Italy he felt that it was agreed we should not stay in the position now reached and must advance farther. For political and other reasons, it was important to get Rome, and he thought it was probably generally accepted that we should advance as far as the Pisa-Rimini line. For operations in Italy it was clear that landing craft would be wanted. General Eisenhower had asked for the retention of the landing craft due to return to OVERLORD until 15 January.² This would have a repercussion on the OVERLORD date.

¹This was the 132d meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their first meeting during the Conference at Tehran.

²See Harrison, p. 118.

In Yugoslavia it was important to give all possible help to the Partisans and there was general agreement regarding this. As regards Turkey and operations in the Aegean, agreement was much more in question. If Turkey were to be brought into the war, it would be desirable to open the Dardanelles and operations in the Aegean would be necessary. If Turkey were not to come into the war, the operations in the Aegean would not be called for.

If examination showed the operation against the South of France to be feasible, sufficient landing craft might be provided for the purpose. The sequence would then be Italian campaign, Rhodes (only if Turkey comes into the war), South of France, landing craft from Rhodes returning in time for the South of France. The date for the South of France operation would therefore be affected by the undertaking of the Rhodes operation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the problem seemed to be a straightforward one of the date of OVERLORD. The Russians wanted OVERLORD on a fixed date in May. They also wanted an expedition against the South of France at the same time, or perhaps a little earlier or a little later. As far as he could see, the date of OVERLORD was the only point confusing the issue. If this matter was settled, everything would be settled. If OVERLORD was to be done by the date originally fixed, other operations could not be carried out. It was entirely agreed, he felt, that the operations in Italy must be carried on. On the U. S. side it was felt that this could be done without interfering with OVERLORD and, indeed, the U. S. Planners were of the opinion that the operation against the South of France could be undertaken as well, without interfering with OVERLORD. If the landing craft were to be kept in Italy until 15 January, the U. S. calculation was that they could still be back in time for OVERLORD.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this was not thought by the British to be the case. Landing craft would need repair and there were also training demands. According to British calculations, even the date of 15 December for returning landing craft to OVERLORD was rather tight and it would be a great help if U. S. repair facilities could be made available for the British landing craft returning.

GENERAL MARSHALL then said that the paper submitted the day before by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operation against the South of France³ had been produced at Cairo but was based on logistic and other data prepared in detail before SEXTANT. He said that four questions had been put to the U. S. Planners. Firstly,

³ Not found, but presumably similar to an unnumbered draft dated November 29, 1943, in the J. C. S. Files. For the approved paper on this subject, see C. C. S. 424, December 5, 1943, *post*, p. 797.

assuming that the operations against the South of France, set out in the paper in question, were undertaken, could OVERLORD take place on 15 May? In this connection the answer had been that, with the possible exception of transport aircraft, this date would still be possible for OVERLORD. There was reasonable expectation that the transport aircraft would be available from elsewhere. It was possible, moreover, that an airborne division might be brought from the U. S. by cargo ship infiltration, thus making it unnecessary to bring an airborne division from the United Kingdom.

As regards the timing of the operation against the South of France, he considered that it should not be carried out more than two to three weeks before OVERLORD.

The second question asked the U. S. Planners was how long the 68 LST's could remain in the Mediterranean and still arrive in time for an OVERLORD date of 15 May. The U. S. calculation was that the landing craft must be released 2½ months before OVERLORD in order both that the necessary repair of craft could be effected and that the craft might be available for training purposes. This gave a date of 1 March. The time for training might be reduced by using more fully the craft already in the United Kingdom. It was clear that all U. S. resources must be used to assist in the repair of the landing craft returning late from the Mediterranean.

The U. S. calculation was that, after allowing for losses, the landing craft remaining in the Mediterranean after the departure of the 68 LST's for OVERLORD would be sufficient to lift 27,000 troops and 1,500 vehicles.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the British felt that 100 days were necessary instead of the 2½ months calculated by the U. S. This put 15 February as the latest date to which the landing craft could be retained.

ADMIRAL KING agreed and said that therefore it should be safe to leave the landing craft in the Mediterranean until 1 February.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that this also might allow for some small refits * to be carried out in the Mediterranean before returning to the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL then went on to the third question which had been asked the U. S. Planners, which was that if the Rhodes operation had to be undertaken as well as the operation against the South of France, how would OVERLORD be affected? It was difficult to get an answer to this question. In the first place, the dates were quite uncertain. Rome had not yet been taken and the date of the

* Repairs.

amphibious operation in Italy must be dependent on land operations. Moreover, in an amphibious operation such as might be carried out in the Italian campaign maintenance across the beaches might be necessary, which would delay accordingly the availability of landing craft. It was understood, however, that the amphibious operation contemplated was such that the main forces would join up quickly with it. Assuming that the Rome operation would have been completed by the end of January, the landing craft required for Rhodes could be in the Middle East by 15 February; the Rhodes operation could take place then on 21 March. Allowing a month for the operation, the landing craft could return to Corsica on 21 April, arriving 30 April. A month would probably be necessary for the repair of landing craft before the operation against the South of France which could, therefore, be undertaken at an earlier stage [*at the earliest, say?*]—15 July. Moreover, the total landing craft available would be barely sufficient for operations against the South of France, and this was not allowing for any losses that might occur.

The Planners were also asked how long OVERLORD would be delayed if the 68 LST's were never returned to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD. The answer to this was that these craft represented a three months' production and, in consequence, three months' delay to OVERLORD. As the landing craft could be made available alternatively only by withdrawing them from allocations to the Pacific, operations there would also be put back by three months.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the only landing craft that had not been mentioned were those allocated to Operation BUCCANEER, in which 20 LST's and 12 LSI(L)'s were involved. He then read certain extracts from NAF 492,⁵ giving General Eisenhower's views on operations against the South of France.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed himself as being opposed to an early date for the attack against the South of France in advance of the OVERLORD date. He was more inclined to a simultaneous operation.

ADMIRAL KING considered that D-day should be the same for both operations and that this would provide a much better basis for planning. This met with general agreement.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then referred to the U. S. paper on the operation against the South of France⁶ and said that the paper would need careful examination as to the number of divisions that were available

⁵ Telegram from Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, October 29, 1943 (J. C. S. Files). The telegram stated, among other things, that an assault on the German forces in northern Italy might prove a more valuable help to OVERLORD than an attack on southern France, and that the making of an assault on southern France should therefore be considered as only one of various alternative methods of assisting OVERLORD. See also Harrison, p. 125.

⁶ See *ante*, p. 556, footnote 3.

from Italy for such an operation, and the number that would need to be retained for the operations in Italy.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the figure of four British divisions represented garrison requirements in Italy outside the immediate zone of operations.¹

SIR ALAN BROOKE thought the figure of 10 divisions and an amphibious lift of 2 divisions, available from Italy for the South of France operation, to be too high.¹

ADMIRAL KING stressed the importance of insuring that landing craft were employed for the purposes for which they were designed and not diverted to other uses for convenience. This had happened in the Pacific and no doubt also in the Mediterranean and it was necessary to be firm in view of the importance of the landing craft factor.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed and said that once the assault was over and ports were open, all landing craft should be withdrawn for refit for the next operation. It was true that although in the Mediterranean the Commanders were alive to the situation and had tightened up matters considerably, there was still some misuse of landing craft.

In this connection, **SIR CHARLES PORTAL** referred to the tendency to be too conservative in the build-up. He referred particularly to the large stocks that had been accumulated in Sicily as an insurance. Probably there was a tendency to over-insure.

There was general agreement on the above considerations and some discussion ensued in which two extremes were quoted, one, in which the 8th Army landing in Sicily had taken a bare minimum of transport and in consequence had been delayed in their subsequent advance; and the other, in the planning for OVERLORD in which so many vehicles had been put down to accompany the leading formations, that the whole operation would tend to be hampered thereby.

As regards relief work, **ADMIRAL KING** considered that it was necessary to be hard-hearted and to cut out anything that was being taken across beaches which was not absolutely necessary. There was general agreement regarding this.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then referred to the aspect of fighter cover for the operation against the South of France. He said he was not satisfied that the range from the available air bases would allow of adequate air support and thought the matter would need to be examined carefully. In AVALANCHE two alternative plans had been considered and one of these had had to be turned down because fighter cover could not be insured. Salerno had been 180 miles from available fighter strips in North Sicily. Marseilles was 190 miles from the

¹These figures refer to estimates in the United States planning paper.

nearest part of Corsica and 225 miles from the eastern side on which the best air bases were sited. We might want to go farther than Marseilles.

ADMIRAL LEAHY questioned as to why we should need to go as far west as Marseilles. There were good beaches at various places along the coast.

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that the whole question would have to be studied very carefully. He stated that the estimates in the U. S. draft paper on operations against Southern France had been based on the use of long-range fighter aircraft.

ADMIRAL KING then asked whether he was correct in understanding that, should all other operations be dropped, the landing craft would not be available for OVERLORD to take place on 1 May.

SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that this was the case and that if the landing craft due to return to OVERLORD did not leave the Mediterranean until 15 January, 1 June would be the earliest date possible for OVERLORD because of the need for repairing the landing craft and using them for training purposes.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the U. S. figures did not agree with this and that if the landing craft were retained until 15 February, OVERLORD would still be possible by 15 May.

ADMIRAL KING said that any U. S. facilities available for the repair of landing craft would be placed at the disposal of the Commander of OVERLORD for this urgent task.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then made the suggestion that [if?] an amphibious lift of one division were left in Italy until the capture of Rome and one division with its amphibious lift were kept mounted in the Middle East until the middle of February, by then it would be known whether Turkey would come in. If Turkey did not come in, the division could be dismounted and the landing craft made available for OVERLORD.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said, in reply to this, that he felt that the landing craft that would be required for this division for the Aegean were already being used for the Italian campaign.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that if the proposed operation were to take place after 15 February, this would surely delay OVERLORD.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed but suggested that we might have two alternative dates for OVERLORD—the one if Turkey were to come into the war, and the other if Turkey were not to come in.

ADMIRAL KING made it clear that whereas the operations against Rhodes and the Dodecanese were contingent upon Turkey entering the war and were not concerned with OVERLORD, the operations against the South of France and in Italy were completely interlocked with

OVERLORD. It should be possible for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to work out roughly on these bases two alternative dates for **OVERLORD**, as suggested by Sir Charles Portal.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that while he agreed with Admiral King, he could not accept that the entry of Turkey into the war would have no effect on **OVERLORD**.

GENERAL MARSHALL then said that disregarding the question of postponing the date for **OVERLORD** and considering the matter of landing craft only, it seemed to him that the suggestion of Sir Charles Portal would involve the dividing of the resources of landing craft available in the Mediterranean so that no real strength would be left anywhere. This, he thought, was serious as it would be splitting the most potent means of influencing the war. It would reduce correspondingly the effort in Italy and might have serious consequences. General Eisenhower's views were different from those expressed formerly, and he now talked of a two division amphibious lift whereas formerly he had only asked for one.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt, moreover, that there was the chance that the landing craft so withdrawn to the Aegean, to which Sir Charles Portal referred, might never be used. He said that he agreed completely with the Prime Minister as to the importance of keeping a tighter hold on supply. There was general agreement in this connection.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the **OVERLORD** plan should be coordinated with the plans for a Russian offensive. No Russian offensive had ever started before the end of May. Marshal Stalin clearly, and quite reasonably, would like us to draw the German strength away from the Russian front before the Russian offensive started.

A general discussion then ensued as to the answer that could be given to the Russians regarding the date on which it would be possible to undertake **OVERLORD**.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that unless we could give the Russians a firm date for **OVERLORD**, there would be no point in proceeding with the Conference. As far as he could see, we could do **OVERLORD** in May if we did not undertake other operations. Sir Alan Brooke said that he did not think that 1 May would be possible although 1 June might be. This brought us back to the **BUCANEER** operation to which, of course, there was a political background.* He still thought that it would be better to use the landing craft allocated to **BUCANEER** for this main effort against the Germans. In response to a question of Admiral Leahy as to whether the **BUCANEER** landing craft would help **OVERLORD** at all, SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that it would, as it could

* See *ante*, p. 365.

be used both in the Aegean and against the South of France. Moreover, the amphibious lift for OVERLORD was itself all too small. It was even smaller than it had been at Salerno.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that this affected the validity of the whole of the OVERLORD plan.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that if OVERLORD were delayed it would make more landing craft available.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that whatever operations were undertaken in the European theater, the OVERLORD operation would undoubtedly be helped indirectly.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that unless BUCCANEER landing craft were to be used, it would not be possible, except at the expense of OVERLORD, to have more than a one-division lift for the South of France operation, a lift which, in his opinion, was not sufficient.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Prime Minister had laid great stress on the importance of keeping actively employed all forces now in the Mediterranean. He agreed with this in principle but drew attention to the 2½ months' inactivity that would ensue for 35 divisions in the United Kingdom if the OVERLORD date was postponed from 1 May to 15 July. He had always felt that the OVERLORD operation was the way to break the back of Germany.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM questioned the 2½ months referred to by Admiral King, saying that the earliest date possible for OVERLORD would be 1 June. Both ADMIRAL KING and ADMIRAL LEAHY then said that this came to them as a complete surprise as 1 May was the date agreed upon.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked Sir Alan Brooke whether he believed that the conditions laid down for OVERLORD would ever arise unless the Germans had collapsed beforehand.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he firmly believed that they would and that he foresaw the conditions arising in 1944, provided the enemy were engaged on other fronts as well.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was still in the balance as to whether we would overcome the German increase in fighter production. The success of the combined bomber offensive had not been as complete as had been hoped for. The Germans were making tremendous efforts and were aiming at a production of 1,600 to 1,700 fighters per month. If they succeeded, the OVERLORD operation might be faced by a very strong fighter force acting against it.

GENERAL ARNOLD then said how important it was to examine carefully the whole question of air strengths throughout the world in order to ensure that our great air superiority could be applied to best advantage.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL expressed his opinion that from the air point of view a June or July date for OVERLORD would seem to be better, as regards weather, than one in May.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Russians would not refuse a 1 June date for OVERLORD but that we would have to be firm about it.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the date would have to be fixed earlier than 1 June because of the need to retain landing craft for Italy until 15 January. It would be possible to fix a RANKIN date for 1 May when probably an attack could be made across the Channel with about two-thirds the strength now envisaged for OVERLORD. It was generally felt that the Russians would not understand the RANKIN operation if it were put to them. He reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 1 May had been settled at TRIDENT as the date for OVERLORD by splitting the difference between the U. S. suggestion of 1 April and the British suggestion of 1 June. It had not been based on any particular strategic consideration.

GENERAL ISMAY said that at Moscow the Russians had been told that the operation was scheduled for some time in May. They had not been told 1 May.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that we might tell the Russians that OVERLORD could be undertaken not later than 1 June but that we would expect, in that case, the Russian offensive to take place also not later than 1 June.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed that 1 June could be adhered to.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Marshal Stalin's statement that the Russians would enter the war against Japan when Germany had been defeated, seemed to alter the whole relative importance of the war in Europe and the Pacific, and to shift the emphasis rather towards Europe for the time being.

There was some further discussion in which the dependence of the attack upon moon and tide and weather conditions was considered, and also the desirability of giving a bracket of dates instead of a fixed target date for the operation.

* THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That we should continue to advance in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini line. (This means that the 68 LST's which are due to be sent from

* An undated typewritten page in the Hopkins Papers appears to be a first version of that portion of this minute which begins at this point and runs to the end of the minute, including the two-paragraph "Note" at the very end. The page referred to contains two headings, one reading "Conclusions of the C. C. S. 132d Meeting", and the other reading "(The minutes are being processed and will be distributed later.)". It corresponds to the text printed here, except that (1) in paragraph c, it reads "by 1 June" where this text reads "during May", and (2) there are minor differences in spelling (e. g., "L. S. T." in place of "LST's").

the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD must be kept in the Mediterranean until 15 January.)

b. That an operation shall be mounted against the South of France on as big a scale as landing craft permit. For planning purposes D-day to be the same as OVERLORD D-day.

c. To recommend to the President and Prime Minister respectively that we should inform Marshal Stalin that we will launch OVERLORD during May, in conjunction with a supporting operation against the South of France on the largest scale that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time.¹⁰

NOTE:¹¹ The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to inform each other before the Plenary Meeting this afternoon of the decisions of the President and Prime Minister respectively on the above point.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were unable to reach agreement on the question of operations in the Aegean until they had received further instructions from the President and Prime Minister respectively.

¹⁰ The Roosevelt Papers contain an undated document, without any descriptive heading, which may be the recommendation (or a draft of the recommendation) referred to here. On it, there are typewritten (1) the word "Agreed:—" and (2) a paragraph reading "To inform Stalin that we will launch OVERLORD by June 1st and will simultaneously make the biggest attack on Southern France that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time." The words "by June 1st" are crossed out, and in their place there is written, in Roosevelt's handwriting, "during the month of May". The words from "and will simultaneously" to the end of the paragraph are also crossed out, and in their place there is written, in an unidentified handwriting, possibly Leahy's, "in conjunction with a supporting operation in Southern France of the largest scale that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time". See also Churchill's telegram 536, January 7, 1944, *post*, p. 865, and Churchill, pp. 448-449.

¹¹ This two-paragraph note appears as part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WITH THE SHAH OF IRAN,
NOVEMBER 28, 1943, NOON, ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET
EMBASSY

PARTIES

United States

President Roosevelt.
General Marshall
Mr. Doolittle
Colonel Roosevelt

Iran

Shah Pahlevi
Prime Minister Shafiq
Foreign Minister Sayyid
Mazaghchi
Mr. Ali

Editorial Note

No official minutes of this meeting have been found. Apparently the principal subjects discussed were Iran's economic problems and the

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT
AND CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 4, 1943, 11 A. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
(in the chair)
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Captain Royal

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said that he must leave Cairo on Monday morning. It was therefore necessary that all reports of the Conference should be signed by Sunday night. Apart from the question of Turkish participation in the war, which he felt should be brought about at some date between 15 February and 1 April, the only outstanding problem seemed to be the comparatively small one of the provision of about 20 landing craft or their equipment. It was unthinkable to be beaten by a small item like that, and he felt bound to say that it *must* be done.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not wish to leave the Conference in any doubt that the British Delegation viewed the early separation of the SEXTANT Conference with great apprehension. There were still many questions of first-class importance to be settled. Two decisive events had taken place in the last few days. In the first place, Marshal Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet would make war on Japan the moment Germany was defeated.¹ This would give us better bases than we could ever find in China, and made it all the more important that we should concentrate on making OVERLORD a success. It would be necessary for the Staffs to examine how this new fact would affect operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The second event of first-class importance was the decision to do OVERLORD during May. He himself would have preferred the July date, but he was determined nevertheless to do all in his power to make the May date a complete success. OVERLORD was a task transcending all others. A million

¹ See *ante*, p. 489.

Americans were to be thrown in, and 500,000–600,000 British. Terrible battles were to be expected on a scale far greater than anything that we had experienced before. In order to give OVERLORD the greatest chance of success, it was necessary that Operation ANVIL should be as strong as possible. The critical time would come at about the thirtieth day, and it was essential that every possible step should be taken by action elsewhere to prevent the Germans from concentrating a superior force against our bridgeheads. As soon as the OVERLORD and ANVIL forces got into the same zone, they would come under the same Commander.

Reverting to ANVIL, THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the view that it should be planned on the basis of an assault force of at least two divisions. This would provide enough landing craft to do the outflanking operations in Italy and also, if Turkey came into the war soon, to capture Rhodes. But he wished to say at once that, in the face of the new situation, Rhodes had no longer the great importance which he had previously attached to it.

ADMIRAL KING intervened to remark that a two-division lift for ANVIL was in sight.

THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said that operations in Southeast Asia must be judged in their relation to the predominating importance of OVERLORD. He was astounded at the demands for BUCCANEER which had reached him from the Supreme Commander.² Although there were only 5,000 Japanese in the island, 58,000 men were apparently required to capture it. As he understood it, the Americans had been fighting the Japanese successfully at odds of two and a half to one. In the face of Marshal Stalin's promise that Russia would come into the war, operations in the Southeast Asia Command had lost a good deal of their value; while on the other hand their cost had been put up to a prohibitive extent.

THE PRIME MINISTER concluded by observing that there were still very large differences of opinion between the British and American Delegations, and that it was of the first importance that these differences should be cleared away.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at all the previous Conferences there had been a number of military meetings, as a result of which reports had been submitted from time to time to the President and Prime Minister. The last stage of the Conference had always been the submission of a final report, followed by an examination of ways and means. SEXTANT had been a very different affair. In the first place there had been meetings with the Generalissimo. Then after a short interval, the principal members of both delegations had gone to Tehran where there had been a number of Plenary Conferences on

² Admiral Mountbatten.

political as well as military matters. Thus the Combined Chiefs of Staff had so far had very few opportunities of discussion at *SEXTANT*. The following matters were still outstanding: First, an examination of the landing craft position, without which it was impossible to say what operations could or could not be undertaken; second, the long term plan for the defeat of Japan, which in its turn was affected by the decisions to undertake operations in Upper Burma next March.³ The plan was also seriously affected by Marshal Stalin's promise to make war on Japan as soon as Germany was finished. It seemed essential that these problems should be resolved before the Combined Chiefs of Staff separated. The Mediterranean was of the greatest importance. It would be fatal to let up in that area. We should go on hitting the Germans as hard as we possibly could, and in every place that we could. Finally, the question of *ANVIL* was still under examination and it was essential to decide how the necessary resources could be provided.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM observed that, on a preliminary examination, our naval resources in cruisers, escort carriers, destroyers, and escorts were not adequate to undertake more than two amphibious operations at the same time, namely *OVERLORD* and *ANVIL*. It might be possible to arrange for some of the naval forces employed in *BUCANEER* to get back in time for *ANVIL*, but a large proportion of them would have to remain in the Indian Ocean.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that, according to his information, there was only one good airfield in the Andamans. This was capable of operating squadrons of heavy bombers. There was another site which had been cleared by blasting the top off a hill, and a few strips might be made on the beach. Thus the value of the Andamans as a base for long distance bombing was strictly limited.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed agreement with General Brooke's observations. There was no question that there were a number of important points to be settled. It was impossible to say how long this settlement would take; and thereafter there would be the business of surveying ways and means.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he himself would at any rate be leaving on Tuesday. Would it not be possible for the Staffs to stay for two or three days and work out their problems together?

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that two or three days would not suffice for what they had to do, since the detailed problems to be worked out would take at least one or two weeks.

ADMIRAL KING remarked that the staffs were unlikely to reach agreement on certain problems which could only be resolved by the President-Prime Minister level.

³ See *ante*, pp. 312, 338, 347, 430, and *post*, p. 765.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo under the impression that we were going to do BUCCANEER. The new facts were, firstly, that the Soviet had declared themselves ready to go to war with Japan immediately Germany collapsed; secondly, that it had been decided to do OVERLORD in May; and, thirdly, that ANVIL was also to be undertaken. He added that he was very anxious lest the Russian promise should leak out.

THE PRESIDENT agreed, and added that it was impossible to tell the Chinese. Continuing, he said that 18-20 additional landing craft must be provided by hook or by crook. As for the BUCCANEER assault, he thought that 14,000 instead of 58,000 men would be ample. The Supreme Commander in the Far East should be told that he must do his best with the resources which had already been allocated to him. It should be possible for the staffs to settle their problems in principle, leaving the details to be worked out afterwards. They appeared already to have reached agreement on the objectives.

SIR ALAN BROOKE demurred. Many questions, such as shipping, landing craft, and naval resources would have to be examined in detail, as would the relation between ANVIL and BUCCANEER. The former was being examined on the basis of a two-division assault, whereas it might be found that the proper strategy was to divert landing craft from BUCCANEER to the Mediterranean and to increase this to say a three-division assault.

ADMIRAL KING said that landing craft and assault shipping for a two-division assault was already in sight, subject to certain complications. He added that, so long as the target date for OVERLORD was 1 May, it had been necessary to arrange for landing craft to be in the U. K. by 1 March. Consequently, the intention had been to send all new construction of landing craft after that date to the Pacific. Now that it had been decided to postpone OVERLORD by 2-4 weeks, this new construction would come to the U. K. Nothing would be sent to the Pacific.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that this was a fruitful contribution. Some discussion followed on the subject of LSI(L)'s. Would it not be possible, asked **THE PRIME MINISTER**, to adapt merchant ships for this purpose instead of building special vessels?

ADMIRAL KING said that conversions of this character were in progress. The U. S. Navy used ships of 6,000-10,000 tons for this purpose, the monster liners being reserved for transportation of large bodies of troops across the Atlantic.

Some discussion followed about the increase of Japanese fighter strength in Southeast Asia, and, in connection with this matter, **ADMIRAL KING** pointed to the interrelation between the attack on

Rabaul and BUCCANEER. The Japanese air force was going to be in difficulties at two widely separated points.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that if it could be decided :

- a. that ANVIL should go ahead on the basis of a two-division assault ; and,
- b. that Admiral Mountbatten should be instructed to do the best he could with the resources already allocated to him;

the picture would begin to be filled in. Of course, if Admiral Mountbatten said that he could do nothing, some of his resources could be taken away from him for other purposes.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that BUCCANEER might be left until after the monsoon ; in fact this solution of the problem might be forced upon us by facts and figures.

ADMIRAL KING said that there was a definite commitment to the Generalissimo that there should be an amphibious operation in the spring.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled that at the Plenary Meeting with the Generalissimo, the latter had said that it was essential that an amphibious operation should be undertaken simultaneously with TARZAN. He (THE PRIME MINISTER) had said quite firmly that he could not agree.⁴ The Generalissimo could be under no illusion about this.

THE PRESIDENT suggested the following plan of action :

- a. Accept OVERLORD and ANVIL as the paramount operations of 1944.
- b. Make every effort to get the additional 18-20 landing craft for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- c. Let Admiral Mountbatten be told that he could keep what he has got, but is going to get nothing else; and that he must do the best that he can.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that ANVIL had only come seriously into the picture last week. At the present, nobody knew whether a two-division assault would, or would not, be enough. It was merely a yardstick for the planning staffs to work on. It might well be that the proper strategy would be to get a lift for at least another division out of the Southeast Asia Command.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that for OVERLORD the assault was only 3½ divisions; and for ANVIL only a two-division assault was at present contemplated. Surely it would be better to employ all the BUCCANEER resources to strengthen up the European front.

ADMIRAL LEAHY entirely agreed with the idea of strengthening up the European front, but observed that BUCCANEER had been decided on a higher level than the Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed to the great military advantages that

⁴ See *ante*, p. 315.

were to be gained by operations in the Aegean. If Turkey entered the war, there would be great political reactions. Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary might all fall into our hands. We ought to make these German satellites work for us.

MR. EDEN thought that Russia would probably agree to postponing the date for the Turkish entry into the war from 31 December 1943 to about 15 February 1944. As for Rumania, the Russians had, in the first place, refused to have anything to do with the feelers put out by Maniu, except on the basis of unconditional surrender. Maniu had now said that he was prepared to send a representative to negotiate on that basis. It was true that he did not represent the Government of Rumania, but there was always the possibility of a *coup d'état*.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed to the great advantages that were to be gained by Rumania's entry into the war. If we could get a grip on the Balkans, there would be a tremendous abridgement of our difficulties. The next Conference might perhaps be held at Budapest! All this would help OVERLORD. He himself was not apprehensive about the landing; but the critical period would be at about the 30th day. It was therefore essential that the Germans should be held at every point, and that the whole ring should close in together.

There followed some discussion of the conduct of the political conversations with President Inonu.

THE PRESIDENT, summing up the discussion, asked whether he was correct in thinking that there was general agreement on the following points:

- a. Nothing should be done to hinder OVERLORD.
- b. Nothing should be done to hinder ANVIL.
- c. By hook or by crook we should scrape up sufficient landing craft to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey came into the war.
- d. Admiral Mountbatten should be told to go ahead and do his best with what had already been allocated to him.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from BUCCANEER in order to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL.

THE PRESIDENT said that he could not agree with this. We had a moral obligation to do something for China and he would not be prepared to forego the amphibious operation, except for some very great and readily apparent reason.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this "very good reason" might be provided by OVERLORD. At present the assault was only on a 3½ division basis, whereas we had put 9 divisions ashore in Sicily on the first day. The operation was at present on a very narrow margin.

FIELD MARSHAL DILL thought it was impossible for us to be strong at both OVERLORD and ANVIL.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that, from the military point of view, there was everything to be said for strengthening up OVERLORD and ANVIL at the expense of other theaters; but there were serious political issues at stake.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed with Field Marshal Dill and Admiral Leahy. He pointed out, however, that the difficulties in abandoning or postponing BUCCANEER were not merely political. If BUCCANEER was cancelled, the Generalissimo would not allow Chinese forces to take part in TARZAN. There would be no campaign in Upper Burma, and this would have its repercussion on the operations in the Pacific. There would be a revulsion of feeling in China; the effect on Japan would be bad, and the line of communication between Indochina [*India and China?*] would be at hazard.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that he had never committed himself to the scale or timing of the amphibious operation in the South-east Asia Theater. Perhaps it might be advisable to revert to Akyab or Ramree.^{*}

THE PRESIDENT said that the Generalissimo was anxious that we should secure a base from which the supply line from Bangkok could be bombed.

ADMIRAL KING, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that he had no fear of the Japanese being able to retake the Andamans once we had occupied them. He added that any increase in the scale of BUCCANEER was out of the question.

The meeting concluded with an injunction from the President and Prime Minister to their respective staffs to meet together and try to reach agreement on the points at issue in the light of the discussion which had taken place.

* For previous plans for limited operations against Akyab and Ramree, see Matloff, pp. 78, 79, 139 ff., and 234 ff.

METING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 4, 1943, 2:30 P. M., MEA HOUSE¹

PRESIDENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

¹ C. C. S. 1943b meeting.

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF CONCLUSIONS OF C. C. S. 134TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 134th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.³

2. DRAFT AGREEMENT BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
(C. C. S. 423 and 423/1)⁴

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them draft agreements prepared by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he felt that the United States Chiefs of Staff paper expressed better the views put forward at the Plenary Session of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Prime Minister.⁵ The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that Operation TARZAN and a simultaneous amphibious operation were essential. The Supreme Commander⁶ must be told to do his best with the amphibious forces available to him. The British Chiefs of Staff paper, on the other hand, visualized the abandonment of the amphibious operation. If no agreement could be reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff it would be necessary for the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to submit their different views to the President and Prime Minister.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement militarily and only in disagreement on the political aspects of the operations in Southeast Asia.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he did not think this was the case. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that the abandonment of the amphibious operation would mean either the failure or the abandonment of TARZAN. In the latter case, there would be serious military repercussions throughout the Pacific. In his opinion, the military implications of the abandonment of the amphibious operation were therefore equally as important as the political implications. He considered that the enemy must be engaged in Burma, since unless this were done, they would be able to stop the supply route to China.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he did not believe this would be the case, since if there was no land battle, the whole Allied air force could be directed against the Japanese air instead of supporting the troops.

³ The minutes as amended are printed *ante*, p. 681.

⁴ Neither printed herein. The agreed memorandum (C. C. S. 423/2) for the President and the Prime Minister is printed *post*, p. 796.

⁵ See *ante*, pp. 675 ff.

⁶ Admiral Mountbatten.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that if there were no land operations the Japanese could put more air forces into their many fields out of range of our fighters.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL reminded General Arnold that the ferry route was now being flown at night. Though our fighters might not be able to reach the Japanese airfields, our bombers could, and this form of attack would prove increasingly effective with the good weather now prevailing. In Sicily it had been possible completely to defeat the German air effort by intensified bombing.

GENERAL ARNOLD said he agreed that more could be done with better weather, but it must be remembered that the Japanese were on interior lines and had a very large number of airfields available.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he considered that it was not only a question of cutting the air line; there was also the Japanese ground effort to be considered. The appointment of Admiral Mountbatten⁷ with its consequent publicity had resulted in large Japanese reinforcements to the area. If Operation TARZAN were not carried out, this large Japanese force would take the initiative and could not be stopped by the use of long range penetration groups only. The Japanese could carry out a ground campaign against our lines of communication to China. The Chinese might well be better in defensive operations than in the offensive, but their task would be a difficult one. We had provoked an increased Japanese garrison, and to take no action against it would have serious results in relation to our supply line to China. Further, extraordinary efforts had been made to increase our forces in the area, and these increased forces would now remain immobile. All this was based on the assumption that if no amphibious operation took place, Operation TARZAN would also not take place. This in turn was based on the assumption that the Chinese would not advance unless the amphibious operation took place. There were therefore strong military reasons why the amphibious operation should take place, and there would be serious military implications if it did not take place, particularly in the Southwest Pacific. If it were possible to abandon the amphibious operation and still to do the North Burma campaign, he personally would not be seriously disturbed. He did not believe, however, that without the amphibious operation, there would be any Burma campaign.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked if it was considered that the amphibious operation was essential on purely military grounds.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the personal view that it would be of assistance but was not vital.

⁷ In August 1943.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then drew attention to paragraph 7 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper. Had the implications of the proposal that the Supreme Commander should be told that he must do his best with the resources already allocated to him been fully considered? He had now put forward his requirements, which were in excess of the resources he now had. There seemed two courses open to him; either to carry out the operation with these smaller resources and risk a reverse, or to ask to be relieved of the task.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that there was no insistence on Operation BUCCANEER. He could, for example, undertake the amphibious operation against Ramree instead. He recalled that prior to Guadalcanal, the commanders had felt that the operation was impossible of achievement without additional resources, yet it had been undertaken and had been successful.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that there were admittedly advantages in the taking of the Andaman Islands. They would form a base not only for reconnaissance, but to some extent for bombing Bangkok and the Japanese lines of communication. They would also form a good stepping-off place for a further advance on Sumatra. Their seizure would, however, produce for ourselves a very heavy commitment in maintenance. They were a thousand miles away from our nearest base. They were surrounded by Japanese air and it would be difficult to supply them to an extent which would make their use possible. In his opinion, the capture of the Andamans was not worth the candle, except as a stepping-stone to a southward advance. In this connection, however, it had been agreed that the main effort should be made in the Pacific, and therefore neither amphibious operations against the Andamans nor against Ramree were worthwhile.

ADMIRAL KING said that all were agreed that the capture of Ramree would not give us much. He realized that the abandonment of BUCCANEER might fit in with the British view that it would be best to withdraw the Eastern Fleet to the Mediterranean.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM denied this suggestion.

ADMIRAL KING, continuing, said that he felt that the commander of the Eastern Fleet⁸ would feel more secure if he had an air base in the Andamans. He (ADMIRAL KING) was much concerned over the success of TARZAN. He had always felt that the Andaman operation was the most useful one with the means available, far better, for instance, than CULVERIN. On purely military grounds he considered that Operation BUCCANEER was as much a part of TARZAN as ANVIL was of OVERLORD.

⁸ Admiral Sir James Somerville.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he felt that the military implications had been overstated. If Operation BUCCANEER were not undertaken, the Chinese forces might withdraw from TARZAN, but they were, even at present, an unknown factor, and reports suggested that their troops now in action were not too promising. With regard to the security of the air route to China, he did not believe that this would be seriously threatened. The Assam airfields could be protected and Japanese air bases bombed. An offensive-defensive should hold the Japanese forces, coupled as it would be by a serious threat. We had, in fact, by our preparations in the Southeast Asia Command, built up an ideal cover plan which would hold the Japanese forces away from the Pacific front. He did not regard Operation BUCCANEER as a justifiable diversion from our main object.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the 14th Air Force was operating "on a shoestring." They were operating at only 50% of their strength, through lack of supplies. Transport aircraft were being shot down, and for each one of these lost, 3 aircraft must stay on the ground. If our aircraft were grounded, the Japanese could then attack Kunming, and knock out our aircraft on the ground.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that if the Chinese troops refused to advance from Yunnan, then we should be relieved from the need to supply them with 3,000 tons per month by air, and this tonnage could be diverted to the use of the 14th Air Force.

ADMIRAL KING felt that it would, on the other hand, be necessary to give more to the Chinese in order to assist them to defend the Kunming base.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that as he saw it, there were three threats: firstly, the air threat against our bases in Assam; secondly, the air threat to the transport line itself, which was difficult to contend with, since the Japanese airfields were numerous and well scattered, and full use was made of dispersal; thirdly, the threat to Kunming both by ground and more particularly air action.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked if it was agreed that if BUCCANEER was abandoned and the amphibious lift of 35,000 men was transferred to Europe, it would be of the greatest assistance to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

ADMIRAL KING said that on this basis it might be suggested that resources should be given up from the Pacific to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this consideration too, ought not to be ruled out. The British Chiefs of Staff felt no doubt that the abandonment of BUCCANEER must increase the chances of success of OVERLORD and ANVIL and must therefore be accepted. We could not afford to take chances with either of these two operations. The abandonment of BUCCANEER would give far greater military advantages to

the war as a whole than the disadvantages entailed in its postponement.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to put forward a memorandum to the President and Prime Minister setting out the various points of agreement and disagreement (subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 423/2).⁹

**3. INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE
EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA**
(C. C. S. 400,¹⁰ 400/1¹¹ and 400/2¹²)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Took note of the alterations proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff to the draft directive proposed by them in C. C. S. 400/2.
- b. Agreed to defer action on these papers.

4. DIRECTIVE FOR UNIFICATION OF COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
(C. C. S. 387/1 and 387/2)¹³

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean on the basis of C. C. S. 387/2. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed to in this paper.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted C. C. S. 387/2 as amended in the course of the discussion (subsequently circulated as 387/3).

5. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE
(C. C. S. 424)¹⁴

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to consider C. C. S. 424 at their meeting to be held at 1500 that afternoon.¹⁵

**6. DIRECTIVE FOR INTENSIFICATION OF SUPPORT OF PARTISAN FORCES IN
YUGOSLAVIA**
(C. C. S. 425)¹⁶

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Approved the draft directive to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in North Africa¹⁷ with regard to Balkan support, and

⁹ Post, p. 796.

¹⁰ Ante, p. 228.

¹¹ Ante, p. 432.

¹² Post, p. 787.

¹³ Neither printed herein, but see C. C. S. 387, ante, p. 150, and C. C. S. 387/3, post, p. 794.

¹⁴ Post, p. 797.

¹⁵ See post, p. 723.

¹⁶ C. C. S. 425 (not printed herein) was the report by the Combined Staff Planners submitting the text of the draft directive referred to in this paragraph.

¹⁷ General Eisenhower.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to include this directive in the main directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, now being issued.¹⁸

¹⁸ The directive, as amended, became Appendix B to C. C. S. 387/3, *post*, p. 795.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 5, 1943, 11 A. M.¹ ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
(in the chair)
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Captain Royal

Brigadier Hollis

J. C. S. Files

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SECRET

THE PRESIDENT read out to the Conference a report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff³ on operations in the European Theater. The point at issue between the two staffs was Operation BUCCANEER, and on this agreement still remained to be reached. He would like to have had a document to which signatures could be affixed.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the difficulty might be overcome if the date of BUCCANEER could be advanced. Would it be possible to do it, for example, in January?

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this would not be possible.

THE PRESIDENT inquired what date Admiral Mountbatten had given for the operation.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that Southeast Asia Command were working to a date in the middle of March.

¹ According to the Log, *ante*, p. 658, the meeting began at 11:30 a. m.

² For a statement made by King apparently at this meeting, in addition to the statements recorded in these minutes, see *post*, p. 720.

³ *Post*, p. 796.

ADMIRAL LEAHY remarked that if a mid-March date was adopted, the landing craft could not be returned to the European Theater till the beginning of May.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was disturbed at the growth in the forces required for BUCCANEER. If a superiority of 10 to 1 was required, this, in fact, made the conduct of war impossible. Could not BUCCANEER be postponed till after the monsoon and the Generalissimo be informed that, as a result of developments arising from the discussions with the Russians, we could not carry out BUCCANEER as originally contemplated? TARZAN would, of course, be carried out as arranged.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo quite clearly under the impression that an amphibious operation would be carried out simultaneously with TARZAN.⁴ He, the President, was a little dubious about putting all our eggs in one basket. Suppose Marshal Stalin was unable to be as good as his word; we might find that we had forfeited Chinese support without obtaining commensurate help from the Russians.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that BUCCANEER would not really influence Chinese continuation in the war. This would depend much more upon the supplies she received over the "hump."

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether, if BUCCANEER took place on 1 March, landing craft and naval forces could leave the Indian Ocean for ANVIL?

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM did not think this would be possible. A considerable portion of the naval forces would have to remain in the vicinity of BUCCANEER, perhaps up to a month, after the assault.

ADMIRAL KING agreed that the follow-up for BUCCANEER might take up to four weeks before the ships in any numbers could be released. This would leave no margin at all for fitting them in to OVERLORD or ANVIL, even assuming that these operations took place in late May.

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether the Combined Staffs had examined the adequacy of a two-divisional assault for ANVIL.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this question had not yet been examined in detail.

THE PRIME MINISTER, reverting to BUCCANEER, said that there was no question of providing any additional forces. When Admiral Mountbatten was told this, he would be quite likely to say that he could not do BUCCANEER and revert to BULLFROG. This was an operation which found favor with no one. The next step would be to discuss the possibilities of an amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater with the Force Commanders.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 347, 350.

SIR JOHN DILL inquired as to the earliest date for OVERLORD. It was generally agreed that no specific date had been set.

A discussion followed regarding the phases of the moon in May 1944. It was finally ascertained that the full moon would be on 8 May and the new moon on 22 May.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that ANVIL might take place at the same time as OVERLORD or possibly a week later.

MR. HOPKINS said as far as he could see, the situation was about as follows:

There were probably sufficient landing craft for a two-division lift for ANVIL; there were also landing craft available for BUCCANEER and landing craft provided for OVERLORD on the scale now planned, although possibly inadequate in the latter case for an additional lift which might be hoped for. Unless the Chiefs of Staff have ascertained that there are sufficient landing craft for the *required* assault on Southern France, then there would definitely not be enough landing craft for these operations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that while it was apparent that there was sufficient lift for two divisions for ANVIL it was unquestionably true that a greater lift would be more likely to insure the success of the operation. He felt that if the Generalissimo could be induced to put his forces into TARZAN without accomplishing BUCCANEER, it might be a good thing.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he felt there were a good many new, revolutionary ideas recently injected as regards the relationship between BUCCANEER and TARZAN.

MR. HOPKINS inquired as to whether it was not a question that OVERLORD and ANVIL are of such great importance that they should be augmented if possible.

MR. ANTHONY EDEN said that it was unfortunate that we cannot separate BUCCANEER and TARZAN and continually have to consider them connected.

ADMIRAL KING said that if the BUCCANEER operation was postponed, he believed there would be no operations in Burma after the monsoon except possibly as a part of other incidental operations.

GENERAL BROOKE said if we do TARZAN and then run on into the monsoon we cannot sit still; we must go on. There are two further steps. The next operation is to go down to Mandalay and the Irrawaddy. The subsequent operation is to continue on to Rangoon.

The PRIME MINISTER observed that operations on land such as TARZAN would not cut into OVERLORD or ANVIL.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL inquired whether it would not be possible to substitute some form of amphibious operations in lieu of BUCCANEER.

The Generalissimo had made a special point of naval operations. It might be possible to organize commando groups and make a descent on some part of the coast. He considered that commando raids supported by naval forces would fulfill the Generalissimo's requirements. He believed that operations of this sort would be suitable without making a definite commitment which we will have to continue further. He also believed that the Generalissimo might be told that amphibious operations on a large scale could be carried out after the monsoon.

ADMIRAL KING said that Sir Charles Portal probably meant some sort of "hit-and-run" operations.

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether or not the Chiefs of Staff would get any further if they sent Admiral Mountbatten a wire. He inquired whether the Chiefs of Staff would recommend against the whole business if Admiral Mountbatten said he could not accomplish BUCCANEER with the means available. Would the Chiefs of Staff still tell Admiral Mountbatten to go ahead and do what he could with what he had?

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that both OVERLORD and ANVIL were known to be of great importance and will be seriously affected by a diversion such as BUCCANEER.

MR. HOPKINS said he understood there was nothing in any C. C. S. paper to the effect that landing craft were not available for either OVERLORD or ANVIL. On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff had never stipulated that there should be a six-division assault for OVERLORD or a three-division assault for ANVIL.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the Southeast Asia Command had 50,000 men against 5,000 Japs and were now asking for more.

MR. HOPKINS said it made no difference in the number of landing craft whether 30,000 men or 50,000 men were being used for BUCCANEER because the size of the initial assault was gauged by the number of landing craft. He asked if Lord Mountbatten's landing craft were made available in the Mediterranean, how many more men could be lifted?

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM replied that Admiral Mountbatten's lift is about 25,000 men. In other words, these landing craft meant an additional lift of about one division for ANVIL. He also believed that the landing craft from the Indian Ocean could get to OVERLORD in time if necessary.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the difficulty in lifting additional troops in the initial assault for OVERLORD was a function of the ports available. There was already considerable port congestion anticipated in England with a lift of the 4½ divisions contemplated. He further observed that his understanding was that the number of

troops in the initial ~~OVERLORD~~ assault was predicated on what could properly be used on the available landing front in France.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, in his view, the landing could be extended and use made of other beaches.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the LSI (L)'s could be more economically employed in the longer Mediterranean hauls than in the short cross-Channel haul.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that while he did not feel committed to an amphibious operation on any specific date in Southeast Asia, he realized the difficulty which faced the President with regard to the Generalissimo. Either Admiral Mountbatten should plan for BUCCANEER with the existing resources or start sending back the forces at once. He favored TARZAN going ahead. He had not realized that the amphibious operation was directly related to and bound up with TARZAN.

Continuing, THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the Generalissimo should be informed that Admiral Mountbatten had now said that he wanted more forces than had been contemplated when he, the Generalissimo, had been in Cairo. It was therefore proposed to postpone BUCCANEER until after the monsoon. Meanwhile, TARZAN would go forward. The postponement of BUCCANEER would not effect [*affect?*] TARZAN. If the Generalissimo expressed surprise and threatened to withhold the Yunnan forces, we should say that we would go on without them. Alternatively, we could say that the inaction of the Yunnan forces would allow more supplies to go over the "hump."

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if the Yunnan forces were to be withdrawn from TARZAN, the whole plan would need recasting.

ADMIRAL KING said that the two-divisional lift for ANVIL was already in sight and it might even be possible to improve on this. He explained, however, that the two-divisional lift entailed keeping back one month's production of landing craft output from the Pacific. Nothing at all was going to the Pacific now.

THE PRESIDENT said he would like the possibility of a series of "hit-and-run" raids to be examined.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, said that the naval force for BUCCANEER would include battleships, cruisers, destroyers and one or two big carriers. No great difficulty should be encountered in doing a raid or raids. He remarked that Admiral King had promised to help by providing American naval forces for ANVIL.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that assuming that the President and United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to extend their time at Cairo for a day or so, it would be necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to get to work on the problems which had emerged from

the discussion. First came ANVIL. A more detailed study was required of the strength to be employed in the assault and in the follow-up. Next, we ought to deal with the Turks. He had in mind a program on the following lines: At the end of January the Turkish airdromes should be fitted out with Radar and anti-aircraft defenses. At the beginning of February the U. S. and British squadrons should be ready to move in to Turkey, and medium bombers should start a softening process from airfields in Cyrenaica. By 15 February the bombing attacks on the islands should be intensified. By this time we should expect some reactions from Germany, but as they grew progressively stronger, the Turks would have to face up to greater risks.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that, as far as the United States Chiefs of Staff were concerned, they were quite right to leave the Turkish program to the British Chiefs of Staff to decide upon.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the adjustment of resources to plans, including particularly shipping, could not yet be worked out. The adjustment of resources depended on the decision about BUCCANEER and ANVIL. As regards the former operation, the right thing seemed to be to take what was required for the European Theater, and then see what could be done with what was left in Southeast Asia.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that Admiral Mountbatten should be asked what he could do as an alternative to BUCCANEER assuming that the bulk of his landing craft and assault shipping was to be withdrawn at once. We could not get away from the fact that we should be doing wrong strategically if we used vital resources such as landing craft on operations of comparatively insignificant importance, instead of using these resources to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL, where it looks like we are working to a dangerously narrow margin.

GENERAL ARNOLD explained the possibilities and capabilities of the very long range aircraft which would operate from the four airfields at Calcutta.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired how the construction of these airfields was progressing. He called for a special report, to be followed by weekly progress reports.

THE CONFERENCE:—

a. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to initiate further studies concerning the scope of OVERLORD and ANVIL with a view to increasing the assaults in each case.

b. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to consult with the Force Commanders of BUCCANEER and thereafter to ask Admiral Mountbatten what amphibious operations he could do on a smaller scale than

BUCCANEER if the bulk of landing craft and assault shipping were withdrawn from Southeast Asia during the next few weeks.

c. Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should prepare a statement for presentation to the Turks showing what assistance they would receive if they entered the war.

ROOSEVELT-INONU MEETING, DECEMBER 5, 1943, 3 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

United States

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Stimson

Turkey

President Ismet
Foreign Minister Memetoglu
Mr. Akgulca
Mr. Andertman
Mr. Kavur
Mr. Harper

Editorial Note

No minutes of this meeting have been found. The information set forth above is from the Log, *ante*, p. 658. At the beginning of the tripartite meeting, *infra*, Roosevelt summarized what he had said at this meeting with Inonu.

SECOND TRIPARTITE MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT,
DECEMBER 5, 1943, 3 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT¹

United States

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Stimson

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Churchill²
Foreign Secretary Eden³
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen
General Wilson
Air Chief Marshal Dowding
Air Vice Marshal George
Mr. Heitz

Turkey

President Ismet
Foreign Minister Memetoglu⁴
Mr. Akgulca
Mr. Andertman⁵
Mr. Kavur
Mr. Turgut Memetoglu

¹ According to the Log, *ante*, p. 658, Vinogradov also was present, but the reference to him in the fourth paragraph of those minutes makes this seem unlikely.

² Present during a part of the meeting.

³ Referred to as Mr. Noyes in the minutes.

⁴ Andertman acted as interpreter.

3. Do you consider operations of this kind feasible? If so, telegraph urgently fresh estimate of resources you would require.
4. Your reply must be received by 1000 G. M. T. 6th December.^{**}

^{**} For Mountbatten's reply, see post, p. 815.

**ROOSEVELT MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
DECEMBER 5, 1943, 5 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA**

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Admiral Leahy
Admiral King
General Arnold
Captain Royal

Editorial Note

This meeting was called at the request of the President and was not considered a formal meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The meeting was apparently brief and no official minutes were prepared. The information given above regarding the time and place of the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 658. Leahy (p. 213) and King (p. 525) give the date of the meeting as December 6, but the Log entry appears to be accurate. Matloff (p. 372) supports the view that the meeting took place on December 5.

From the accounts in Leahy and King it appears that the President called in the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to inform them of his decision to stop further argumentation in favor of Operation BUCCANEER as scheduled for the spring of 1944. Churchill (pp. 411-412) states that on the afternoon of December 5 "the President, in consultation with his advisers, decided to abandon the Andaman Islands plan" and that the President sent him a laconic private message reading, "'BUCCANEER' is off." No copy of this message has been found in United States files.

According to Leahy and King, President Roosevelt expressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his reluctance in making this decision and indicated his intent to offer a substitute to Chiang Kai-shek. The alternative offer to Chiang was drafted by Roosevelt and Hopkins, presumably at the conclusion of Roosevelt's meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was submitted to Churchill in the form of a memorandum (*post*, p. 803).

In explaining his decision to Stilwell and Davies on the following day Roosevelt is reported by Stilwell to have said: "I've been stubborn as a mule for four days but we can't get anywhere, and it won't do

for a conference to end that way. The British just won't do the operation, and I can't get them to agree to it." (*The Stilwell Papers*, p. 251.) The Davies notes on this conversation indicate that Roosevelt also emphasized in this connection that he had fought at Tehran, with Stalin's support, and that Churchill had finally given in. This was presumably a reference to the argument about fixing the date of OVERLORD; see *ante*, pp. 521, 538, 547, 551, 561-564.

HOPKINS-EDEN-MENEMENCIÖGLU MEETING, DECEMBER 5, 1943,
6 P.M., EDEN'S VILLA

PRESENT

United States	United Kingdom	Turkey
Mr. Hopkins Mr. Steinhardt	Foreign Secretary Eden Sir Alexander Cadogan Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen General Wilson Air Chief Marshal Douglas Air Vice Marshal George Brigadier Shaylor Mr. Bates	Foreign Minister Numan Menemenciöglu ¹ Mr. Agcaoglu Mr. Andermann Mr. Kavur Mr. Turgut Numan Menemenciöglu ²

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United States-United Kingdom Agreed Minutes

MOST SECRET

Mr. EDEN opened the meeting by suggesting that Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas should explain what was proposed since he had a feeling that the Turks were under a wrong impression.

Mr. NUMAN thanked Mr. Eden. He said he would be glad to listen. He must however make it clear that he could not commit himself on military matters which were the concern of the experts and on which he was not competent.

Sir SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that he was not going to deal with technicalities. He was merely going to make a general *exposé* to show why we wanted advance infiltration. In this there were two main objects: the first to provide adequate defence for the most vulnerable points, and the second to provide a force for offensive operations in the Aegean. As regards the first, the vulnerable points were Istanbul, Izmir and Zonguldak. For these it was proposed to send in 17 squad-

¹ Referred to as Mr. Numan in the minutes.

² Turgut Menemenciöglu acted as interpreter.

TURKEY

President Inönü
Foreign Minister Münzir
Metinoglu
Mr. Anderson

SISTER COUNTRIES

Mr. Vinogradov
Mr. Mikhailev

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the Log, note, p. 658. No official record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Leahy, p. 214, writes:

"The next night, December 5, it was Churchill's turn to entertain at dinner for Inönü. Same scene. Same cast. Almost the same lines except that the Turkish President talked a little more freely and impressed me with his direct approach to the question. He made it clear that before Turkey could come into the war, he would have to have enough planes, tanks, guns, etc., to make a strong resistance against invasion by the Nazis.

"It was most interesting to watch the dinner-table maneuvers of the Prime Minister as he pleaded, coaxed, and almost threatened the soldier President of the once powerful Ottoman Empire in an effort to commit him to taking his people into the war. Inönü was told he would have to come in eventually if he was to have a place at the peace table. The Americans did not urge the Turks as vehemently as did the British."

MONDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1943¹

**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 6, 1943,
11 A. M., MENA HOUSE²**

PRESENT**UNITED STATES**

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Sutherland
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Major General Laycock
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier McNair
Colonel Cornwall-Jones

¹ According to Churchill, p. 418, Roosevelt—"on the day before his departure from Cairo" (i. e., on December 6)—stated, during a ride to the Pyramids, that he had decided to appoint Eisenhower to command OVERLORD. No official record of the conversation has been found.

² C. C. S. 137th meeting.

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

Brigadier Redman
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF CONCLUSIONS OF C. C. S. 135TH AND 136TH MEETINGS**THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—**

Accepted the conclusions of the 135th and 136th C. C. S. meetings and also the minutes of the 4th Plenary Session held at the Kirk Villa. The detailed records of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.³

2. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND**ALTERNATIVE TO "BUCCANEER"**

(C. C. S. 427)⁴

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the report by the Combined Staff Planners (C. C. S. 427) should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the Appendix would require revision in the light of the decisions taken.⁵

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of C. C. S. 427.

b. Agreed that the forces to be left in the Indian Ocean or to be withdrawn for the European Theater should be decided later.⁶

3. CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN N. W. EUROPE AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(C. C. S. 400,⁷ 400/1⁸ and 400/2⁹)

At the request of General Arnold,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer consideration of C. C. S. 400, 400/1 and 400/2 until their meeting on Tuesday, 7 December.¹⁰

³ The minutes of these meetings, as amended, are printed *ante*, pp. 699, 705, 719.

⁴ *Post*, p. 800.

⁵ Reference presumably is to the decision described *ante*, p. 725.

⁶ See also section 6 of these minutes.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 228.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 432.

⁹ *Post*, p. 787.

¹⁰ See *post*, p. 757.

**4. OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
(C. C. S. 417 and 417/1¹¹)**

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt no final decision could be taken on these papers pending decisions on operations to be undertaken in Burma and the Bay of Bengal.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it would assist the Combined Staff Planners in their further studies if the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan could be accepted in principle as a basis for further work.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he considered that in their further study, the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to prepare a plan of campaign for the China Theater proper, together with an estimate of forces required. He did not agree with the amendment suggested in paragraph 4 of the Enclosure to C. C. S. 417/1 and preferred the original wording of paragraph 14 of C. C. S. 417.¹²

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM asked if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were prepared to approve the general concept that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING said that he agreed with this concept in principle.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved in principle C. C. S. 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a plan of campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.

**5. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944
(C. C. S. 397 (Revised))¹³**

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that this paper should be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff less any references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944 set out in C. C. S. 397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.

¹¹ C. C. S. 417/1 proposed certain amendments to C. C. S. 417. The latter is printed *post*, p. 765, as amended and approved.

¹² Paragraph 4 of the enclosure to C. C. S. 417/1 suggested a revision of paragraph 14 of C. C. S. 417 which would have presented more explicitly Mountbatten's reservations as to a commitment to recapture the whole of Burma.

¹³ Post, p. 779.

6. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 427)¹⁴

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard to decisions covering operations in the Southeast Asia Command, as follows:

a. Delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to **BUCANEER** to Operations **ANVIL** and **OVERLORD**.

b. Make all preparations to conduct **TARZAN** as planned, less **BUCANEER**, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of **TARZAN**; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,

c. Postpone **TARZAN**, increase to a maximum with planes available the air lift to China across the "hump," and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29's to be brought to bear on the enemy.

d. The choice between alternatives *b* and *c* above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.¹⁵

7. DRAFT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C. C. S. 426)¹⁶

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 426). Certain additions and amendments were considered and agreed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (amended paper subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 426/1).¹⁷

8. RELATION OF RESOURCES TO PLANS

It was pointed out that though no final decision could be taken on operations in Burma pending replies to the messages sent to the Generalissimo¹⁸ and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia

¹⁴ *Post*, p. 800.

¹⁵ For Chiang's messages of December 9 and 17, 1943, regarding this matter, see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 74-77. For Mountbatten's message of December 6, 1943, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this matter, see *post*, p. 815. For a summary of the subsequent military developments which, in a sense, superseded both alternatives mentioned here, see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, chapters 3-5.

¹⁶ Not printed herein.

¹⁷ *Post*, p. 810.

¹⁸ See *post*, pp. 803 and 804, footnote 3.

Command,¹⁹ the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation with the shipping authorities, might well proceed with their examination of the extent to which the resources of the United Nations would meet the requirements in the light of decisions already taken. In this examination they should take into account the fact that the amphibious resources previously allocated to BUCCANEER would now be available for operations in Europe.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to instruct the Combined Staff Planners to proceed as proposed above.

9. MESSAGES TO MARSHAL STALIN AND THE GENERALISSIMO

GENERAL MARSHALL read out draft messages which he had prepared which might be sent by the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo.²⁰ General Marshall undertook to circulate copies of these messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

10. FUTURE BUSINESS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to meet on Tuesday, 7 December 1943, and to include on their agenda the discussion of the Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean, and Facilities for U. S. Forces in the Azores.²¹

¹⁹ See *ante*, p. 724, and *post*, p. 815.

²⁰ For the message to Stalin as sent after it had been modified, see *post*, p. 820. It was decided not to send the message to Chiang; see *post*, p. 749.

²¹ See *post*, pp. 757, 760.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, DECEMBER 6, 1943,
1:15 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

United States

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Colonel Roosevelt

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the conversation during this luncheon meeting has been found. The Log, *ante*, p. 619, does not mention Colonel Roosevelt as a participant, but from Elliott Roosevelt, p. 206, it appears that he was there and that the principal topic of conversation was the language of the proposed communiqué to the press respecting

18th February. Allies ask permission to "fly in".

If reply negative.

Allies direct all resources to another theatre and must abandon hope of wartime cooperation with Turkey.

If reply "Yes".

1. Continuation at fullest speed of programme of import munitions for army and air.
 2. Opening of the sea route to Turkey.
 3. Reinforcement by British anti-tank and armoured units.
 4. Execution of agreed plan with full force of Allies and Turkey.
-

**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 7, 1943,
11 A. M., MENA HOUSE¹**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Sutherland
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Roberts
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Major General Laycock
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier McNair
Brigadier Head
Colonel Cornwall-Jones
Lieutenant Colonel Mallaby

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

Brigadier Redman
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF CONCLUSIONS OF C. C. S. 137TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 137th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.²

¹ C. C. S. 138th meeting.

² The minutes, as amended, are printed *ante*, p. 734.

**2. INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE
EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA
(C. C. S. 400,³ 400/1⁴ and 400/2⁵)**

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them C. C. S. 400/2 as amended by the corrigendum issued on 7 December.⁶

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff to the proposals had already been stated and to these views he had nothing to add. He recognized, however, that the new directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff was designed to meet some of the objections which had been put forward. The British Chiefs of Staff could not signify their approval of the proposals, but recognized the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to issue such directives to their own air forces as they might see fit. If the new directive were issued, he, for his part, was prepared to assume the responsibility laid on him by this directive, and to carry it out to the best of his ability. He would suggest, however, that before implementing the new policy, General Arnold should, if possible, hear the views of General Eisenhower, General Wilson, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder.

GENERAL ARNOLD said he was anxious to implement the proposals as soon as possible. He would, however, discuss the matter as suggested by Sir Charles Portal before taking final action.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Accepted C. C. S. 400/2.
- b. Took note:

(1) that although the British Chiefs of Staff do not agree in principle with C. C. S. 400/2, the United States Chiefs of Staff have decided to issue the directive giving effect to their proposals;

(2) that before issue of the directive, the Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces would consult General Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder and General Wilson;

(3) that the Chief of the Air Staff undertook to carry out the duties laid upon him by the directive contained in C. C. S. 400/2 (as corrected by corrigendum of 7 December).

**3. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ALTERNATIVE TO
“BUCCANEER”
(C. C. S. 427 and 427/1)⁷**

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a telegram from Admiral Mountbatten (C. C. S. 427/1).

³ *Ante*, p. 228.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 432.

⁵ *Post*, p. 787.

⁶ See *post*, p. 788, footnote 2.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 800 and 815.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that no decisions should be taken until the views of the Generalissimo were known.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given brief consideration to the subject that morning. In general, their views were that since BUCCANEER had been postponed, the trained forces earmarked for this operation would be available for use elsewhere. Some might be required for commando operations, if these were decided upon. The service troops might be used to assist in overcoming the logistic difficulties in Calcutta and Assam. The combat troops might be used as a reliable reserve in the rear of the Chinese forces operating on the Ledo Road. He was most anxious to ensure that our Assam bases and the pipeline should not be lost. The report received with regard to the bad morale of the Chinese forces^{*} had, he felt, been given too much weight. It was a report from one officer only, who was not in contact with the troops. The reactions of the Generalissimo could not be foretold, but if Operation TARZAN was called off he felt that the operations outlined by Admiral Mountbatten might well be undertaken with an additional advance by the Chinese forces on the Ledo Road with the United States long range penetration group of 2,500 to 3,000 men operating ahead of them, and with some of the British forces released from BUCCANEER forming a reserve.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he was in general agreement with the views which had been expressed. If the Generalissimo did not agree to the undertaking of Operation TARZAN, but preferred an additional air lift over the "hump," then a new directive might be given to Admiral Mountbatten, giving him as his objective the assurance of the Assam lines of communication and instructing him that the combat forces released from BUCCANEER should be used in active offensive operations to achieve the object while the non-fighting troops released should be used to assist in overcoming logistics difficulties and in the construction of the facilities required for the operations of the B-29's. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should inform General Wedemeyer of these views, telling him that they should form a basis for future planning, but could not be taken as a firm instruction until a reply from the Generalissimo had been received. In the meantime, a draft directive could be prepared for Admiral Mountbatten on the assumption that the Generalissimo would prefer the postponement of TARZAN.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

- a. That a new directive along the lines indicated in the above discussion should be issued to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia

* This may have been the report summarized in Stilwell's *Command Problems*, p. 69.

Command regarding the campaign to be carried out in North Burma in 1944; and

b. That this directive should not be dispatched until the receipt of the Generalissimo's reply⁹ to the President's dispatch of 5 December¹⁰ on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.¹¹

**4. PROVISION OF MERCHANT SHIPPING TYPES FOR THE WAR AGAINST
JAPAN**
(C. C. S. 415/3)¹²

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet¹³ and the First Sea Lord,¹⁴ as set out in C. C. S. 415/3.

**5. RELATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO THE OPERATIONS DECIDED
UPON**
(C. C. S. 428)¹⁵

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the paper under consideration had been prepared in great haste as an interim report, and as such it could be accepted. Further work would have to be done in the light of the final decisions yet to be taken.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed with this view. He suggested certain amendments to the report, which were agreed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted in principle the relation of available resources to agreed operations outlined in C. C. S. 428 with the modifications approved in the course of discussion. (Amended paper subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 428 (Rev.)¹⁶)

⁹ For Chiang's reply of December 9, 1943, see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 74.

¹⁰ Post, p. 803.

¹¹ For subsequent developments, see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 73 ff.

¹² Post, p. 809.

¹³ Admiral Ernest J. King.

¹⁴ Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham.

¹⁵ Not printed herein.

¹⁶ Post, p. 828. The parenthetical reference to C. C. S. 428 (Revised) of December 15, 1943, was presumably added to these minutes of the meeting of December 7, 1943, later in the month, by the military editors of the minutes.

6. DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES (C. C. S. 270/13 and 270/14)¹⁷

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that there were two sides to this problem. Firstly, with regard to the political position, the latest information from Lisbon showed that Dr. Salazar was ready to allow the operation of United States anti-submarine forces and the ferrying of United States aircraft through the Azores on condition that acceptable formulae to cover these operations could be found. The British Chiefs of Staff memorandum (C. C. S. 270/14) suggested certain formulae. These were contained in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the paper. He would like to know if these were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had already put forward a draft memorandum for the President to send to the State Department with regard to the changing of the insignia on the United States aircraft to be used in the Azores.¹⁸

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he did not believe that this would now be necessary. It seemed to him that provided Dr. Salazar could be satisfied that the United States anti-submarine forces were operating on loan to His Majesty's Government under command of a British officer from a British base, and that the American transit aircraft were controlled by the British Air Transport Command, he, Dr. Salazar, would be satisfied.

With regard to the military aspects, it had been found necessary to obtain additional facilities; for instance, more land was required, and it was desired to run a pipeline to take the place of the long haul for gasoline by road. In this connection, it was proposed that the British Government should make a further approach to the Portuguese Government, asking for these additional facilities, on the ground that these were a natural development on the agreement already in force.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the formulae suggested by Sir Charles Portal were entirely acceptable to him, except for the proposal in the second half of paragraph 4 of C. C. S. 270/14 with regard to the second airfield. He suggested, therefore, that the British proposals with this exception should be accepted and that he and Sir Charles Portal should work out the necessary details.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved C. C. S. 270/14 with the elimination of the last sentence of paragraph 4.

¹⁷ Post, pp. 807 and 808.

¹⁸ Not printed herein. The draft memorandum was not sent to Roosevelt, on the basis presumably of Portal's thought set forth in the next paragraph of the minutes.

b. Agreed that details regarding the use of the Azores facilities by United States Army air forces should be settled directly between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal.

7. NEW COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the date on which the new Mediterranean Command¹⁹ should be set up, and the most suitable time for General Eisenhower to leave this theater and assume command of the Allied Expeditionary Force.²⁰

It was generally agreed that it was undesirable to publish the fact that unification of command in the Mediterrean had been set up, or to announce General Eisenhower's new appointment. In this latter case, however, it was accepted that for political reasons the announcement of this appointment would be necessary.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY put forward a draft memorandum covering these points.²¹ The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted this memorandum for submission to the President and Prime Minister.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed that the unification of Command in the Mediterranean shall take effect from 10 December.²² There should be no public announcement of this change of organization.

b. Agreed to recommend that General Eisenhower should hand over Command of the Mediterranean Theater on 1 January, or as soon after that date as General Eisenhower himself thinks desirable, having regard to the progress of the operations to capture Rome.²³

c. Agreed to recommend, that, if there is to be a public announcement of General Eisenhower's move from the Mediterranean to the U. K., his new appointment should be described as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.²⁴

d. Recommend that concurrently with the above, the announcement should be made of the new Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater.²⁵

¹⁹ Agreed to on December 5, 1943; see *ante*, p. 704.

²⁰ See *ante*, p. 734, footnote 1.

²¹ Not found. The memorandum presumably corresponded to some or all of the points contained in the lettered paragraphs which follow.

²² On December 9, 1943, Eisenhower was designated Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, as of December 10.

²³ Eisenhower departed from the Mediterranean Theater at the end of December 1943, going to Washington first before moving on to London. The Mediterranean Command was transferred to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson as of January 8, 1944.

²⁴ The public announcement was made on December 24, 1943.

²⁵ Wilson's designation was announced on December 24, 1943.

e. Took note that the approval of the President and Prime Minister would be sought to the above before transmission of the necessary instructions.²⁸

8. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 411/5²⁷)

The United States Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum (C. C. S. 411/5) setting out certain proposals with regard to the air lift to China.

After a brief discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C. C. S. 411/5.

9. EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH FORCES

SIR ALAN BROOKE reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that General Giraud had put forward a proposal for employing at least one French armored division from the United Kingdom.²⁸ He felt that in view of shipping limitations and the fact that Operation ANVIL had now been decided on, it would be better to maintain the principle that the main French effort should be made in the South of France.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed with this view. The training of a French armored division in the United Kingdom would prove difficult. It would be better that the French armored division and other French forces should if possible be given a period of active service in Italy, and then used for Operation ANVIL. It must be remembered of course that General Giraud did not know that this operation had been decided on. As he saw, it would probably be best for the ANVIL forces to be principally United States and the remainder French. The majority of the forces in Italy would then be British. It was most important that the French forces for ANVIL should have had experience in battle before this operation. There would, of course, have to be a token French force for Operation OVERLORD.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That for shipping and other reasons it was undesirable that a French armored division should be sent to take part in Operation OVERLORD.

²⁸ By December 9, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill had approved of points *a* and *b*, and Churchill had approved also of points *c* and *d*; message of December 9, 1943, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower (FAN 308), not printed herein. Roosevelt presumably approved of points *c* and *d* later.

²⁷ Post, p. 821.

²⁸ Not found. See, however, Eisenhower's memorandum of November 26, 1943, *ante*, p. 431.

b. That as a general policy:

(1) A French force should participate in ANVIL and only a token force in OVERLORD.

(2) It will probably be best to undertake the ANVIL operation with U. S. forces with French participation, and to continue the campaign in Italy with British forces.

c. That all French formations should be given battle experience in Italy.

10. FINAL REMARKS

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he would like to express on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff their deep gratitude for the way in which the United States Chiefs had met their views.

There was one other point he would like to mention. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their appreciation of the unstinting help given to the British and other Allies from American production. This aspect of United States assistance was not mentioned in the consideration of strategy, but nevertheless had the widest repercussions on all our plans, and was playing a great part in the successful development of the war. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their deep admiration of the stupendous efforts which the United States had made in the field of production.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he very much appreciated Sir Alan Brooke's gracious tributes. He felt that it was most important that during the next month or so the British and United States Chiefs of Staff should both study how best the magnitude of future conferences could be reduced. They would undoubtedly in future have to take place at shorter intervals.

ADMIRAL KING, in agreeing with this view, said that every effort should also be made to cut down the number of subjects discussed at these important conferences.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That it was desirable to cut down as much as possible the attendance at future U. S.-British Conferences.

b. That a study with this in view should be carried out within the next month.

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 5 December 1943.

C. C. S. 423/2

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

1. OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.

2. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.

3. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.

4. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

5. Every effort must be made by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.

6. The decisions made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference covering the bombing of German industrial targets and the destruction of the German air force, as set forth in paragraph 10 of C. C. S. 319/5,¹ are reaffirmed.

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THEATER

VIEWS OF U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

VIEWS OF BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

7. Political and military considerations and commitments make it essential that Operation TARZAN and an amphibious operation in conjunction therewith should take place. Apart from political considerations, there will be serious military repercussions if this is

7. We fully realize that there are political and military implications in the postponement of BUCCANEER. As regards the political implications, we must leave these to be taken into consideration by the President and Prime Minister. As regards the military

¹C. C. S. 319/5 was the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at the First Quebec Conference (August 1943). Paragraph 10 (printed in Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 8-9) gave the highest strategic priority to the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany as a prerequisite to the mounting of OVERLORD. The records of the First Quebec Conference are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

VIEWS OF U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF VIEWS OF BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
 not done, not only in Burma and China, but also in the Southwest Pacific.

8. The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be told that he must do the best that he can with the resources already allocated to him.

J. C. S. File

Report by the Combined Staff Planners¹

SECRET
C. C. S. 404

[CAIRO] 8 December 1943.

ANNUAL OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE

Reference: CCS Memo Directive

1 December 1943.²

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the agreed operations against the South of France on the following premises:

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions.

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of OVERLORD.

2. We have in addition assumed:

a. That operation ANVIL will approximately coincide with OVERLORD.

b. In Italy we have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and thereafter as strong pressure as possible is maintained consistent with the provision of forces for ANVIL.

c. The Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

3. We have made tentative estimates, in the absence of any detailed operational plan, of the resources which will be required for the operation under two hypotheses where these apply:

a. That the assault is carried out within range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

¹ Prepared with the collaboration of the Combined Administrative Committee. The text printed here incorporates the changes made by direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting of December 5, 1943, 3 p. m. (see entry, p. 722).

² Not printed heretofore.

3. The exact date for OVERLORD has not yet been decided upon, but it is to take place at the most suitable date during May 1944. You will be informed of the date once this has been decided, and operation ANVIL will be timed approximately to coincide with operation OVERLORD—the exact date to be determined in consultation with COSSAC.

4. You will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift for at least two divisions (each with two brigades in the assault).

5. You will inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of your requirements which cannot be met from the resources which will be at your disposal in the Mediterranean on that date. In assessing your resources you should assume that your forces have reached the Po-Rimini line and that as strong pressure as possible is maintained, consistent with the forces required for ANVIL; also that Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 5 December 1943.

C. C. S. 427

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ALTERNATIVE TO "BUCCANEER"

PROBLEM

1. On the assumption that the amphibious lift available for BUCCANEER is reduced in certain respects, to consider what minor amphibious operations or raids might be carried out in the Southeast Asia Theater, in order to harass Japanese communication, destroy Japanese installations and equipment, or alternatively to support the land advance on the Arakan coast and obtain airfields with which to support further operations in Burma.

RESOURCES AVAILABLE

2. An appendix is attached¹ showing a list of the resources which we assume will be left in Southeast Asia. This list is based on the assumption that the bulk of LST and LSI (L) will be withdrawn together with a proportion of the naval forces and escort carriers now allotted to BUCCANEER, as these are the resources which are chiefly required in the European Theater.

¹ Not printed herein.

3. With resources remaining in the Southeast Asia Theater it would be possible to land a force of one infantry battalion group up to one brigade group, depending on the scale of transport to be landed.

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS

4. Detailed study by the Force Commanders of intelligence maps and photographs is necessary before any definite opinion can be formed as to the practicability of any operations.

5. From a general survey of the possibilities however we consider that the following merit examination and might assist Operation TARZAN:

a. Amphibious operations along the Arakan coast in conjunction with the land advance of the 15th Army Group on Indin-Rathedaung-Kyauktaw, which is timed to start in mid-January and be completed in February.

b. An amphibious operation to capture and secure the northern tip of Ramree Island, prior to the beginning of the 1944 monsoon. This operation might be covered by shore-based aircraft at Maungdaw. Maintenance of a garrison in this area by sea might prove costly as convoys will be subject to air attack. It might be possible to extend air operations against Japanese communications in Burma, and to infiltrate on the Taungup-Sandaway [*Sandaway*] coast. The provision of fighter support to any such operations would have to be carefully balanced against the requirements of TARZAN.

6. Unless a target can be found to justify the landing of a raiding force, we do not believe that any raids should be attempted other than carrier-borne air raids.

Leaky Papers

The President's Chief of Staff (Leaky) to the President¹

[Cairo] 5 December 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Recognition of Rome as an Open City.

The question of declaring Rome an open city has again been discussed by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff with the British Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff are still of the opinion that, from a military point of view, such action is undesirable.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Admiral, U.S.Navy

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

¹ Hull's letter of November 21, 1943, to Roosevelt (ante, p. 286) was referred to Leaky earlier in the day on December 5, 1943, with a memorandum from Stimson reading: "The President requests that you discuss this matter with the British."

Hopkins Papers*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden), and Reply¹*

[CAIRO, December 5 (?), 1943.]

ANTHONY:—It looks like BUCCANEER is out & our military plans hence will be agreed to tomorrow

HARRY

If so, you have been very generous, but our chances next year will surely benefit.

President has been grand about it all.

Note reinforcements (Scotch) just came in!

¹ The exchange, which was handwritten on a single sheet of paper, presumably took place during the quadripartite dinner meeting, *ante*, p. 733.

Hopkins Papers*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill¹*

CAIRO, December 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRIME MINISTER

I propose to send over my signature the following message to the Generalissimo tonight. Do you concur in this action? ²

"Conference with Stalin involves us in combined grand operations on European continent in late spring giving fair prospect of terminating war with Germany by end of summer of 1944. These operations impose so large a requirement of heavy landing craft as to make it impracticable to devote a sufficient number to the amphibious operation in Bay of Bengal simultaneously with launching of TARZAN to insure success of operation.

"This being the case: Would you be prepared go ahead with TARZAN as now planned, including commitment to maintain naval control of Bay of Bengal coupled with naval carrier and commando amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with launching of TARZAN? Also there is the prospect of B-29 bombing of railroad and port Bangkok.

"If not, would you prefer to have TARZAN delayed until November to include heavy amphibious operation. Meanwhile concentrating all air transport on carrying supplies over the hump to air and ground forces in China.

¹ A facsimile of this document is printed in Sherwood, p. 801, where the first line of the text begins, as typewritten. "The President proposes to send over his signature", and handwritten changes (by Hopkins, according to Sherwood) make the text read as printed here.

² The paper is endorsed at the bottom by Churchill: "I agree. WSC 5.XII".

"I am influenced in this matter by the tremendous advantage to be received by China and the Pacific through the early termination of the war with Germany.["]"⁸

F[RANKLIN] D[ELANO] R[OSEVELT]

⁸ The telegram to Chiang was sent from Cairo at 11:05 p.m., December 5, 1943, Cairo time. It was sent to Washington and relayed to Chungking via military channels. On December 7, 1943, Stilwell (at Cairo) cabled Hearn (at Chungking) that Hearn should see Chiang and urge him to proceed with China's part in the campaign despite the cancellation of BUCCANEER; see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 74. Chiang's reply to Roosevelt is printed in the same publication, p. 74.

Roosevelt Papers

Madame Chiang to President Roosevelt

CONFIDENTIAL

CHUNGKING, December 5, 1943.⁹

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Generalissimo and I arrived in Chungking on the morning of December 1st. . . .

Immediately upon our return the Generalissimo consulted with Dr. Kung regarding the feasibility of the plan which you suggested in our conference regarding the alleviation of China's urgent economic situation. Dr. Kung has studied its possibilities with great care and he wishes me to tell you that, in his opinion, your suggestion is both generous and kind and he thinks some feasible procedure could be worked out with the aid of Secretary Morgenthau.¹⁰ He appreciates the interest and concern you have shown in helping us to fight aggression not only with the military machine, but with economic weapons as well. He is impressed with the fact that you see with such clear foresight and vision that, in order to continue resistance, methods and means must be evolved to hold intact China's economic security, a fact which you doubtless will remember that the Generalissimo emphasized was even more critical than the military.

The Generalissimo is now thinking of asking Dr. Kung or his appointee, empowered with full credentials, to go to Washington to discuss the details with the American Government and would like to know whether this is satisfactory to you. It would, of course, be best if Dr. Kung could go himself, but, failing that, he will send one of his trusted men to go in his stead.

⁹ Delivered to Roosevelt at the White House on December 22, 1943.

¹⁰ The plan, as suggested subsequently by Roosevelt to Morgenthau, involved the selling of dollar currency for rials to be remitted to China after the war at no profit to the United States Government. See *United States Relations With China*, p. 498.

V. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

United Chiefs of Staff

28. We have studied proposals for the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U. S. and the British. We have agreed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative in putting forward either of the above proposals. We feel that if the U. S. S. R. or China should raise the question, the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. It should then be pointed out that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such as Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT and SEXTANT, which are convened from time to time; and that the U. S. S. R. and/or the Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future, to take part in the discussion of any military problems with which they are specifically concerned.

NOTE

The matters still under study and decisions which have yet to be taken, notably in paragraphs 11, 15, 18, 21, 25, and 27, will be duly brought to your attention for approval.

J. C. S. Files : Telegram

*The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command
(Mountbatten) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

SEACOS 38¹

[NEW DELHI?] December 6, 1943.

Following for COS from Mountbatten

1. Your 051430 Dec.² para 2 we have examined proposal very carefully and consider that no small amphibious operation can be carried out for the following reasons:

a. In view of enemy's powers of concentration our seaborne air requirements will be the same whether the operation is large or small.

b. BUCCANEER was selected as objective for amphibious operation because it was the only worth while operation which could be carried out with the forces allotted.

¹ Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C. C. S. 427/1, December 6, 1943.

² Annex printed *ante*, p. 724.

c. There is no other objective which could be seized and held with the landing craft and assault shipping likely to be available under your para 1.

2. I am totally opposed to landing troops and withdrawing them since the psychological effect of such withdrawal is considerable and in this theater I regard this aspect as of the greatest importance.

3. Possibility remains of hit and run operations by carriers with a view to containing enemy air and possibly surface forces. This may reduce pressure on the SW Pacific and is being examined. Least force which would be necessary for operation of this type is Fleet carriers 2, Unicorn³ 1, Escorts 3.

4. The utility of extending inshore operations on the Arakan coast is being examined but they cannot be represented as amphibious operations or be considered to be of great significance. Such operations in order to be in any degree effective would require 12 LCI (L), 15 LCT (5), 6 LCS (M), 3 LCA Flotillas, 2 LCM Flotillas, 1 LCP Flotilla. Some of these forces might however be more profitably employed in some other theater other than SEAC.

5. Cancellation of BUCCANEER must inevitably lead to collapse of TARZAN since Generalissimo has only agreed to reduction in "hump" tonnage and cooperation on [of] Yunnan force if amphibious operation is staged at the same time. I have carried out a rapid examination of what could be done in the light of these circumstances and assuming that we could get the additional 25 first line transport aircraft promised by General Arnold in China a rough forecast is as follows:

a. That TARZAN in its original form will not be possible. In particular there will not be enough transport aircraft to fly in the 60th Parachute Brigade and the 26th Infantry Division to Indaw or to maintain them by air.

b. It will still be possible to employ all the LRPG's but in conjunction with

c. An advance by 4th Corps down the Kabaw Valley and through the Chin Hills on to the Kalemyo Kalawa [Kalewa] area.

d. The Arakan operations would remain as in TARZAN.

e. The Ledo force would still be available to advance if the Generalissimo gave permission and they prove capable of doing so.

7.⁴ It is realized that this new operation the code for which is given in my immediately following telegram⁵ will not enable me to achieve the QUADRANT Directive of opening up the land route to China⁶ but it has certain merits.

³This may refer to H. M. S. *Unicorn*, an aircraft maintenance ship.

⁴It does not appear that there was any paragraph 6 in this message.

⁵Not printed herein. The code word was GRIPFAST.

⁶See Ehrman, vol. v, p. 14.

- a. It enables the LRPG's to operate thus confusing the Japanese and helping to inflict casualties.
 - b. It will still produce a considerable amount of air fighting.
 - c. The capture of the Kalemyo Kalewa area will give us a starting point from which to begin land operations against Mandalay.
 - d. It does not necessarily commit us to further operations in the center of Burma.
8. The original plan was based on the high fighting qualities believed to be possessed by the Ledo Force. If, however, they fail to advance in accordance with the general program the fly in to Indaw would have to be cancelled even after the starting of TARZAN so as to avoid leaving the 26th Division entirely isolated in Central Burma.

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President²

[CAIRO, December 6 (T), 1943.]

Mr. President
 I didn't see the
 President else for five minutes
 to say good by - and only
him to be ready to go to war
Feb. 15. Too many people here

Hopkins

²This note was probably handed to Bennett toward the latter part of the tripartite meeting on December 6, 1943; see ante, p. 742.