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2d Session. }

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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# NARRATIVE

OF

## THE EXPEDITION OF AN AMERICAN SQUADRON

TO

### THE CHINA SEAS AND JAPAN,

PERFORMED IN THE YEARS 1852, 1853, AND 1854,

UNDER THE COMMAND OF

### COMMODORE M. C. PERRY, UNITED STATES NAVY,

ORDER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

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VOLUME II—WITH ILLUSTRATIONS.

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WASHINGTON:  
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1856.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

FEBRUARY 14, 1855.

*Resolved*, That the Secretary of the Navy be requested to communicate to this House a copy of the report of Commodore M. C. Perry on the subject of the late Expedition to Japan ; and if said report shall not be completed before the expiration of the present session of Congress, then to deliver the same to the Clerk of the House during the recess.

*Resolved*, That 10,000 extra copies of the said report, together with the maps, charts, and drawings, be printed and bound in the style of Lieutenant Gillis's report, for the use of the members of the present House of Representatives, and five hundred additional copies for the use of the said Commodore M. C. Perry.

## REMARKS OF COMMODORE PERRY

UPON THE EXPEDIENCY OF EXTENDING

### FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT TO AMERICAN COMMERCE IN THE EAST.

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IN the general increase and extension of the commerce of the world, and the necessity of employing the constantly accumulating capital which the mines of California and Australia are annually yielding, it is important that the government of the United States should turn its attention to the expediency of opening new avenues of trade, by the accomplishment of treaties of amity and commercial intercourse with those people of the East, who are, wholly or in part, independent of the control of the powers of Europe, and are looked upon as of sufficient importance to be entitled to sovereign rights.

Though England and the government of the Netherlands, as principals, and France, Spain, and Portugal, in a more limited degree, have extended their sway over large portions of the territories of the East, there are still left, in comparative independence, extensive areas of cultivated and populous lands, which have so far escaped the grasping policy of those powers ; and though these lands are ruled over by half-civilized despots, nature has given to them advantages which, if properly directed, would render them available in contributing by their products to the general resources of commerce.

With the flourishing kingdoms of Japan, Lew Chew, and Siam, we have recently negotiated treaties, from which important benefits will undoubtedly be obtained. Though up to this time but little interest has been manifested by our government in availing itself of the means thus placed at its disposal, the day will however arrive, and at no distant period, when political events, and the unanimous and urgent appeals of our commercial men, will make it obligatory on the United States to look with greater solicitude to our eastern commerce, and to extend the advantages of our national friendship and protection, as well to Japan and Lew Chew as to other powers but little better known to western nations.

I may refer to Siam, Cambodia, Cochin China, parts of Borneo and Sumatra, and many of the islands of the eastern archipelago, and more especially to the island of Formosa.

It may be interposed as an objection to my proposition, that either one or more of the European governments already mentioned may claim jurisdiction over these countries, and consequently the native princes would be excluded from any right to enter into treaty relations with us. But the right of sovereignty should, in these enlightened days, be admitted only upon proof of the power of the sovereign claiming jurisdiction to enforce his assumed prerogative, the same as with respect to the belligerent right of blockade, which should be recognized in national law only when it can be sustained by competent force ; and I maintain that the government of the United States cannot justly be debarred from entering into treaty stipulations with either one or all of the native governments or communities of the East that are known to be *de facto* independent of any other established power.

It should not be admitted, because England, Holland, or Spain may hold an insignificant part of a kingdom or province, that their lawful sovereignty should extend by consequence over the whole country. And so in regard to Borneo and Sumatra; have we not the same right to negotiate with the native princes as England and Holland claim to have?

But, deferring for the present any further remarks upon those islands, let us speak of Siam, Cambodia, Cochin China, and Formosa—the three former independent sovereignties, and the latter a nominal dependency of China.

A treaty with Siam has recently been arranged, and it may not be out of place here to refer briefly to the resources of that country, which, unlike China, has been rather inclined to encourage foreign commerce, though certainly under restrictive regulations. The government of Siam has at this day many well-equipped ships, and other square-rigged vessels, which trade to the neighboring countries. I met one ship at Ceylon, and two at Hong Kong, and in the course of time we may expect to see the Siamese flag flying in our own waters.

The soil of Siam is exceedingly fertile, producing bountifully and in great perfection all those fruits of the earth which are common to intertropical latitudes.

The principal staples, however, are sugar and rice; but cotton, tea, coffee, tobacco, indigo, pepper, and various other valuable products, are grown with but little labor, as also the most delicious fruits.

Various descriptions of drugs, ivory, beautiful fancy woods, and teak timber, are exported in vessels chiefly belonging to the Siamese king and nobles, who monopolize all the foreign trade, employing vessels mostly built and equipped after the European fashion; and in this respect the Siamese are in advance of the people of China, who still adhere to their misshapen, unwieldy junks, which are incapable of making any way against the prevailing monsoons, and they rarely, if ever, venture the attempt.

Cambodia and Cochin China (the latter, if not both, sometimes called by the general name of Annam\*) are the intermediate kingdoms between Siam and China proper; and though capable of sustaining by their products and other resources a flourishing commerce with strangers, have little trade beyond a limited intercourse with the ports of Siam, Singapore, and those of China. Though some feeble attempts have heretofore been made by England and France to establish a friendly understanding with these countries, they have met with indifferent success, and probably by reason of injudicious diplomacy; and, to make matters worse, two French frigates, in 1847, came into armed collision with the authorities at Touron bay, by which the native flotilla was destroyed, with the loss of the greater number of their crews; and though Sir John Davis, then governor of Hong Kong, visited, with two British ships of war, the same place shortly after the occurrence of this event, in the hope of effecting for England some friendly arrangement with the Annamese government, he was obliged, after a disagreeable and perplexing delay, to depart without being admitted to an audience, or allowed even to visit Huè, the capital.

Now, the evident causes of the failures to bring these prejudiced and conceited people into any terms promising useful results, may be chiefly ascribed to the course of mistaken policy pursued by the western powers, whose agents invariably approach them as superiors, demanding *nolens volens*, and with little ceremony, concessions in the way of trade, the free exercise of religion, &c., &c.; of the advantages or disadvantages, or ultimate bearing and consequences of

\* Sir John Davis, in his account of China, remarks: "It might be as well if the latter unmeaning designation, (Cochin China,) the authority for which is very obscure, were abandoned, and the true name, Annam, adopted."

which the native princes must necessarily be ignorant ; and in the fear of granting too much, or even admitting amongst them strangers, of whose grasping propensities and love of encroachment they have full knowledge, they adopt the extreme course, and doggedly refuse all communication whatever ; and in their failure to recognize those rules of diplomatic courtesy which are held sacred by more enlightened nations, and which they have never been made to comprehend and appreciate, some unwonted and perhaps unintentional insult is given, and then follow collision and shedding of blood, and the door is more firmly closed against peaceful negotiation. Besides, these people are too sagacious to be influenced by specious arguments or propositions of friendship, unless those professions are accompanied by corresponding acts.

It is not intended here to speak of the treaty relations of the western nations with those of the East, with which treaties do exist ; all the world knows how frequently these compacts have been violated ; but it will not be amiss to argue the possibility of these people being brought into a more liberal and friendly intercourse, by a system of policy based as well upon *practical* as professional good faith. We Christian people, claiming for ourselves greater advantages of civilization and moral cultivation, seek, unasked of them, commercial and social intercourse, upon the principles which inculcate reciprocity of rights, and recognize the contracting parties as equals, and yet we practically treat them as inferiors ; and if perchance difficulties arise, growing out of local disturbances, mistakes, or misinterpretation of treaties, or causes probably originating with ourselves, we immediately force upon them the alternative of submission to our view of the case, or chastisement.

It would seem to be more consistent if the western governments were to set the example of national probity before undertaking to coerce those of the East, with whom we have treaty relations, into a subserviency to our demands.

It is true that, in all negotiations with China and other eastern nations, the display of a respectable armed force is necessary to satisfy those people of the power of the foreign contracting party to protect its rights and enforce its just claims ; but, in most cases, the mere presence of such force will answer all the purposes desired ; and being thus backed by this *mediatorial power*, the negotiator may, with befitting grace, prosecute his object with a greater degree of kindness and liberality—a course of diplomacy always calculated to beget reciprocal good will and confidence.

But in any aspect of negotiation, humanity as well as sound policy enjoin that all peaceful means of equitable arrangement should be exhausted before taking the dernier resort of hostile action ; and when once this alternative is adopted, there should be no peace until the object for which hostilities have been commenced shall be attained ; for it is plain that, upon every principle of humanity and positive expediency, whether brought about by peaceful or hostile means, these vast territories should be opened to a more general and enlightened intercourse with the world, and the great aim should be to accomplish these inevitable results by a course in all respects just and honorable.

I cannot bring myself to believe that the Chinese and their neighbors are entirely devoid of generous impulses and honest convictions ; and though it is their wont to practise deception in their relations with strangers, no one who has mingled much with them can truthfully say that they do not possess many redeeming qualities, and especially are these favorable traits observable in the conduct of the more respectable classes engaged in trade.

It has been generally conceded that the operations of the English in what has been called the "opium war," though brought about by causes not to be commended, yet in their consequences

have resulted greatly to the benefit of China and the whole commercial world; and it may truly be asserted that England, when possessed of unbounded control over the destinies of that singular nation, retired from the contest without availing herself of the advantages which the fortunes of war had thrown into her hands. This forbearance, more generous than wise, redounds certainly to the humanity of the then ministry and the officers in command; but it would have been the more sagacious course, and perhaps tending to mercy in the end, if the occasion and opportunity had been seized upon to establish throughout the empire a more liberal form of government, and to insist upon the unconditional recognition of those reciprocal interchanges of just and friendly intercourse which subsist between all civilized nations in time of peace—the admission of foreign ministers at the court of Pekin; protection of the persons and property of foreigners throughout the empire; the free exercise of civil and religious rights, when not conflicting with the reasonable laws of the land, &c., &c. All this could have been accomplished by a continuance of the war another year, and probably without additional bloodshed; and all this *is yet to be done*, as a measure of paramount necessity, in view of the suppression of the terrible state of anarchy which at present distracts the whole land, and the ultimate reorganization of the political condition of the empire; and inasmuch as the government of the United States and those of the European powers generally would be equally interested in the consummation of a measure alike beneficial to China and the civilized world, it would be the undoubted policy of all to unite in bringing about a revolution, civil and military, (and it might be a bloodless one,) which would place China upon a footing with the most favored nations.

China proper, once disenthralled, Japan, Lew Chew, and the other countries already mentioned in this paper, would enter of necessity into this new family of commercial, or, at least, trading nations; and the commerce of the East would be improved ten-fold by the impulse thus given to the advance of civilization and the industrial arts; and the benefits resulting from such change—religious, moral, and political—could not be correctly estimated. The end would therefore unquestionably justify the means; and if ever an armed interference of one or more nations with the political condition of another could be fully justified, it would be, as I have stated, in bringing by force, if such result were necessary, the empires of China and Japan into the family of nations, upon the basis of equal international *duties* as well as rights.

In further illustration of my argument, I may briefly quote from two communications of mine, published a few weeks since in the New York Courier and Enquirer: “The equivocal and unsettled relations of all Christian nations with the government of China, notwithstanding the obligations of existing and pending treaties, render intercourse with that empire unstable and difficult to be managed. The weakness of the reigning dynasty, the insurrectionary spirit of the people, and the consequent injuries inflicted upon the agricultural and manufacturing interests of the country, tend greatly to the derangement of its outward trade; and it requires the talents and energies of strong-minded men (and such are *most* of the American and English merchants resident in China) to comprehend the mysteries and overcome the obstacles which stand in the way of all mercantile transactions with a people well enough inclined, but so stultified by national forms and prejudices as to make them, in many essentials, obstinate and impracticable; and even when disposed to act fairly and aboveboard, their government has not the power to protect them from the extortions of the provincial officials, or the

depredations of the myriads of pirates who swarm upon the coasts of the empire ; and hence the necessity of providing suitable vessels of war for the protection of its foreign commerce."

Again : "The foreign commerce of China, under its modern aspects, has as yet been but imperfectly developed, nor will it be established upon any satisfactory basis until its government is compelled, either by its own efforts or aided by other powers, to enter into a just and liberal intercourse with its sister nations to receive at its capital diplomatic representatives, and to protect throughout its vast dominions whomsoever may, for business or pleasure, visit its cities and provinces."

"The unsocial, I may almost say insolent, exclusiveness which its people have hitherto practised with regard to strangers, should no longer be tolerated. They should be made to understand, as have been the Japanese, that their beautiful country was not intended to be closed forever to the people of other nations, with whom a free and untrammelled intercourse could not but contribute to their advantage."

"Such large and productive portions of the earth could never have been designed for *their* exclusive benefit ; and though it is not pretended that strangers have any positive right to encroach upon their privileges, social or political, it is maintained that all foreign nations would be fully justified in *constraining* the governments of China and Japan to recognize the great essentials and fundamental requirements of international law."

"Whatever may have been the justice or morality of the English war with China, it resulted in comparative benefit to both nations ; and the only mistake was, that it did not continue until those ignorant and besotted people had been made more fully satisfied of their own weakness, and the consequent folly of assuming to be superior to all the rest of the world."

"China should be more thoroughly Europeanized. The people do not want for civilization in *their* way, but they require a more practical form of government, and, as before remarked, a less restricted intercourse with the world. Until these desirable ends can be brought about, it would seem to be the interest, indeed the duty, of all commercial nations, to urge upon them, in such manner as will prove effectual, the necessity of a more enlightened policy."

"The existing treaties of the United States and France with China are imperfect ; and though they are based upon the one with England, and are quite as advantageous as could have been expected under the circumstances in which they were negotiated, they require revision, and should be remodelled on the first favorable occasion ; and in all future treaty arrangements there should be provision made for the mutual enforcement (if need be, by armed intervention) of all the stipulated obligations and conceded rights of the contracting parties."

"Diplomatic representatives should reside at Pekin, and consuls be received at all the principal ports. The property and personal safety of aliens and strangers guaranteed, and the same privileges conceded to foreigners residing in, or visiting China, as are granted to them in Europe and America."

It is idle to suppose, that because the policy of the United States has hitherto been to avoid, by all possible means, any coalition, or even connexion with the political acts of other nations, we can always escape from the responsibilities which our growing wealth and power must inevitably fasten upon us. The duty of protecting our vast and rapidly growing commerce will make it not only a measure of wisdom, but of positive necessity, to provide by timely preparation for events which must, in the ordinary course of things, transpire in the east. In the developments of the future, the destinies of our nation must assume conspicuous attitudes ; we

cannot expect to be free from the ambitious longings for increased power, which are the natural concomitants of national success. The annexation of one country or province, whether by conquest or purchase, will only tend to increase the desire to add another and another, and we, as a nation, would have no right to claim exemption from this universal vice, and in this view we should be prepared to meet the inevitable consequences of our own ambitious tendencies.

But, after all, these events in the history and fate of nations are doubtless directed by an overruling Providence, and probably we could not, if we would, change their course, or avert our ultimate destiny. It only belongs to us to endeavor to act justly and honorably in all our foreign relations, and I cannot but believe that we should be just to ourselves and to the world, to encourage whatever practical measures might be suggested to change for the better the political and civil condition of China and Japan, and the countries more to the south; and especially with respect to Formosa. The United States alone should assume the initiative. This magnificent island, though nominally a province of China, is practically independent. The imperial authorities maintaining a feeble and precarious footing only in isolated parts of the island; a large portion being in possession of independent tribes, and yet such is its productiveness in minerals, drugs, and the more valuable products of those genial regions, that at this time a revenue, estimated at a million of dollars, is collected, though little or none of it goes into the imperial treasury.

The inhabitants of the island may be divided into two classes: the first composed of those at present submitting to the authority of China, whether of native or Chinese blood; and the other, and probably the more numerous portion, of natives, yet in their unconquered and primitive state. The whole population has been estimated at two, and by some, as high as three millions; and looking to the peculiar abstemiousness of the people of the east, who rarely indulge in any other than vegetable food, it may reasonably be supposed that an island of the extent of Formosa, and of such fertility, could subsist even a larger number.

It may, I think, be safely assumed that an American settlement at Kelung would be looked upon with favor by the Chinese, for reason of the advantages of protection that would be secured to them by the presence and co-operation of the more warlike settlers, in the defence of the port and its neighborhood from the depredations of the numerous rebels and pirates who infest the whole island and its coasts.

Grants of land and important privileges, including the advantages of working the coal mines, could, doubtless, be obtained by purchase at nominal cost, and without looking to any other protection from the government at Washington than that which would be rendered by the occasional presence of one or more of the vessels of the China and Japan squadron, a flourishing community of Americans might soon be established, which would contribute greatly to the convenience and advantages of our commerce in those seas.

Kelung would become a port of general resort for vessels of all nations. The settlers might not only direct the working of the mines, already fully described in this volume, but the products of the land could be largely increased by the introduction of those improvements in agriculture and the mechanic arts which have been hitherto unknown to the Chinese, who are deficient neither in sagacity, ingenuity, or industry, or incapable of profiting by foreign instruction. Indeed, they may be looked upon as remarkable for their industrious habits; and consequently there would be no want of laborers, at very moderate compensation. In fact, we find the Chinese established at most of the European settlements in the east, not far remote from their native country, where they form themselves into communities and practice their own

domestic and religious customs, giving due obedience to the laws of the country in which they reside. These people chiefly belong to the laboring and mechanical classes, though many of them engage in trade, and with considerable success. They are singularly provident in their habits of saving, and it is not unusual to find amongst them persons of considerable means, their aim being to accumulate sufficient to enable them to return to their homes.\*

An American settlement, once firmly established in Formosa, would gradually increase its social and political power, its area of landed possessions, and consequently its wealth and usefulness. Neither of the European governments could reasonably object to its advancement. On the contrary, it would be their policy to foster and protect it, because those of their subjects trading in the east would equally benefit by the advantages which it would offer to the general commerce of those seas.

In a communication of mine to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Madeira, December 14, 1852, and published in Senate Ex. Doc. No. 34, of 33d Congress 2d session, I endeavored at that early period to impress upon the government the importance of adopting timely measures for securing an influence in that part of the world. I quote:

"When we look at the possessions in the east of our great maritime rival, England, and of the constant and rapid increase of their fortified ports, we should be admonished of the necessity of prompt measures on our part.

"By reference to the map of the world it will be seen that Great Britain is already in possession of the most important points in the East India and China seas; and especially with reference to the China seas.

"Singapore commanding the southwestern, while Hong Kong covers the northeastern entrance, with the island of Labuan on the western coast of Borneo, (an intermediate point,) she will have the power of shutting up at will, and controlling the enormous trade of those seas, amounting, it is said, in value to 300,000 tons of shipping, carrying cargoes certainly not under £15,000,000."†

"Fortunately the Japanese and many other islands of the Pacific are still left untouched by this gigantic power, and as some of them lay in a route of a commerce which is destined to become of great importance to the United States, no time should be lost in adopting active measures to secure a sufficient number of ports of refuge, and hence I shall look with much anxiety for the arrival of the Powhatan, and the other vessels to be sent to me."

The experience of my recent cruise did but serve to strengthen the opinion expressed in this letter, and to confirm the policy of my oft repeated suggestions, that commercial settlements in the China and Pacific seas will be found to be vitally necessary to the continued success of our commerce in those regions.

So long as such a settlement as I propose does not become a fortified place, and of sufficient strength to excite the jealousy of other powers, it should be looked upon as a port of resort for all nations.

It would therefore be unadvisable to have any other defences than enough to protect the port from the attacks of pirates and common marauders, of which there are very many in the

\* The natives of China who are sent away as coolies are of the very worst of the population, mere vagabonds; and most of those emigrating to California are of this character; but those who are found in the countries bordering the China seas and Indian ocean are of a better class.

† See Governor Crawford's opinion in "The Expedition to Borneo," by her Majesty's ship "Dido," chapter 24, published by Harper & Brothers, New York, 1846.

Chinese seas. In truth, it would be the wiser policy if the European powers were to leave their least important colonies undefended, as in such condition they would not in time of war be otherwise molested than by occasional visits of the enemy for refreshments and supplies, which would in most cases be paid for. As fortified places, their possession would be seized upon when practicable as were the strongholds of Europe in former wars by contending forces. The troops of either one or the other of the belligerents forcibly occupying and holding them as garrisons, regardless of the interests or safety of the proper residents. But in later times the inhabitants of many of those cities, profiting by experience, have, wherever they have had the power, thrown down their defences, and thus rendered them untenable for military purposes. And so it would be the policy of England and France to demolish the defences of their minor colonies, withdraw the garrisons and leave the inhabitants dependent on their own resources; and free, if they should desire it, to secure by negotiation their neutrality in time of hostilities.

The constantly ameliorating changes which have transpired in latter times in the laws and customs of war, will no longer justify those measures of coercion and cruelty which were practised in former days. The world will never again countenance rapine and murder; the wanton destruction of edifices of religion and learning, of works of art, and defenceless private property; wars will hereafter be conducted in a manner more honorable and magnanimous; and that nation will deservedly receive the execrations of all good men, who shall henceforth allow of the perpetration of those acts of barbarity which have been of common occurrence *even* in recent times.

The geographical position of Formosa renders it eminently suited as an entrepôt for American trade, from which communications might be established with China, Japan, Lew Chew, Cochin China, Cambodia, Siam, the Philippines, and all the islands situated in the adjacent seas; and it recommends itself more strongly from the fact of its capability of furnishing abundant supplies of coal, which, in the present and increasing use of steam for purposes of commerce, will prove of vast importance to the eastern trade.

Up to the present time the greater part of the vast quantities of coal consumed by the numerous war and commercial steamers which navigate the waters of the east is brought from England, at enormous cost of freight, the mines of Labuan supplying only an insignificant portion of that which is required.

Another recommendation may be found in the advantages of its naval and military position, situated as it is directly in front of many of the principal commercial ports of China. It covers, and might be made with a sufficient naval force to command, not only those ports, but the northeastern entrance of the China seas, precisely as Cuba, in the hands of a powerful maritime nation, might command the American coast south of Cape Florida and the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico; and from the extent and fertility of soil of Formosa, it might be made capable of furnishing, in addition to its home consumption, large quantities of agricultural and other products for exportation.

The establishment of a commercial entrepôt, unshackled by the restrictions of duties upon foreign or domestic commerce beyond some trifling municipal impost, would draw to its ports vessels of all nations, and it would not be long before it would rival the great commercial marts of Hong Kong and Singapore.

Now, it is evident that whatever may benefit the commerce of the United States will also contribute to the advantage of other commercial nations, and the extension of American territory cannot but result advantageously to other powers, as offering new markets for the disposal

of their products, whether manufactured or otherwise ; and viewing these settlements, not as fortified positions, ever to act on the aggressive, but merely as trading establishments, they could in no possible way excite the suspicion or jealousy of other nations, but, as before remarked, would rather contribute to their convenience and profit.

In conclusion, I may make one more quotation, and from another published paper of mine :

*"Objections to an American colony considered."*—We proceed now to consider briefly another point. What are the objections, let us inquire, which may be interposed to the establishment of an American settlement or colony such as we have described ? Can they be sustained by any national argument ? I think not. In truth, colonies are almost as necessary to a commercial nation as are the ships which transport from one country to another the commodities in the interchange of which commerce subsists.

"The objections hitherto advanced by our wisest men against the admission of detached and distant colonies into our federative organization cannot apply to small and distinct settlements established merely for purposes of trade or some religious or moral object. If once a few Americans determine to congregate and sit down together, whether in the western wilds or upon some remote island in the Pacific, there must be some insurmountable obstacle, indeed, which will ever prevent the accomplishment of their designs ; and carrying with them, as such adventurers would, the elements to constitute a useful and happy government, it would not be long before their infant colony would grow into a flourishing settlement ; and though, according to the theory of our institutions, it would not at first, if separated from our recognized territory, meet with much countenance from the government at Washington, yet the very circumstance of the settlers being thrown upon their own unassisted resources would prompt them to extraordinary exertions, and when fairly established in their new home they would themselves determine upon a congenial form of government, and elect their own rulers.

A general idea prevails that the possession of settlements abroad, however insignificant, involves the necessity of their defence against the combined forces of an enemy. This is only true to a certain extent, and with strongholds vitally essential to the prosperity and safety of the institutions of the nation to which they belong ; but in regard to minor places, such as can have no influence upon the results of a war between two great nations, they should be considered neutral, so long as they shall keep aloof from any part in the struggle. It is not to be supposed, in these enlightened times, that the barbarities practised in former wars are to be any longer tolerated. The extraordinary improvements in the means of destruction in battle, both by sea and land, will render partisan warfare contemptible, and hence there would be little of honor or advantage in making forays upon small isolated colonies, to whatever nation belonging. They should be left undisturbed, and for the very good reason, that if thus regarded, they might be resorted to by the vessels of either of the belligerents in cases of extremity.

In the late war of the United States with Mexico, the Americans held for a long time many of the principal cities and towns, and all the seaports of the enemy, but so far from molesting the inhabitants of those places, they were actually protected from the exactions of their own rulers ; private property was considered sacred, everything required for our use not belonging to the Mexican government was scrupulously paid for, and no private building was occupied without a just compensation to the owner ; such were the facts within the sphere of my observation, and I believe the same liberal policy was pursued co-extensively with all the operations of the Americans pending the war.

It may, therefore, be assumed that a few small settlements, scattered through the Pacific

ocean, and subject to their own local laws, will sooner or later be established as measures of necessary expediency and convenience to our growing commerce.

The moment a vessel at the present day leaves the American shores upon a foreign voyage, go where she will, her officers and men, in entering port, become subject to laws often oppressive and generally at variance with the spirit of our institutions.

Whatever of prejudice there may be in the minds of many of our rulers to these proposed settlements, their coming into existence cannot be prevented, nor can the onward spirit of our people be stayed by any laws that could be made, consistent with the conservative elements of our Constitution. The people *will* emigrate and settle in remote places, and the notice and sympathies of the country will be drawn toward them; and in this way we shall have foreign settlements, even if they are not established by positive enactment.

They may not be considered strictly as colonies, but all such settlements would very soon, if composed of our countrymen, make their own constitutions and local laws. They would be offshoots from us rather than, strictly speaking, colonies; and it would be hard to say how they could be prevented by any government.

M. C. P.