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THE

JAPANESE EXPEDITION

TO

FORMOSA

BY

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TOKIO

1875

## CHAPTER II.

SLAUGHTER OF RIU KIUANS—RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND RIU KIU—ANNEXATION OF THE LATTER—PROMPT ACTION FOR REDRESS—CLAIMS UPON CHINA—POLICY OF SOYEZIMA—ANCIENT JAPANESE RULE IN FORMOSA—SOYEZIMA IN PEKING—EFFECTIVE BUT IMCOMPLETE DIPLOMACY—OBJECTIONS OF IWAKURA—THE PROJECT APPARENTLY ABANDONED.

In the month of December, 1871, a large fishing and trading vessel belonging to one of the islands of the Miyako group, which lies east of Formosa, was wrecked near that part of the coast occupied by the Botans—at times allies of Tokitok, but not always subject to his rule. Fifty-four of the crew were murdered;\* others escaped and carried the tidings to their people, who, like all the islanders under the authority of the Riu Kiu officials, are a mild and perfectly peaceful community. The event was wholly unprecedented in their experience. Seldom venturing far from their own shores, and knowing no adjacent lands except those of their own countrymen, to the northward, they had never conceived the possibility of a catastrophe of this description. In their first panic they applied at once for protection to the only government with which they were acquainted, that of Shuri, in the principal island of the Riu Kiu cluster. The authorities of this place were almost as timid and unsophisticated as themselves. For more than two centuries they had exercised their simple functions without much independent responsibility of action, confiding implicitly in the superior strength of the Japanese feudal lords of whom they were tributary vassals.† Apart from the fact that Riu Kiu is peopled by the same race as

\* See Appendix, E.

† See Appendix, A.

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that of the islands of Japan, its little history has always been closely interwoven with that of the southern provinces of the Empire. That Riu Kiu was directly settled from Japan is extremely probable, and it is certain that since the twelfth century it has been steadily under the strong influence, if not the absolute control, of the Japanese. In the early part of the seventeenth century its last vestiges of independence were destroyed by the daimio of Satsuma, who sent one of the warriors of his family to subdue it and demand its submission to his dominion. This expedition is famous in Japanese annals, not more on account of the importance of the conquest than of the valor and strategetic ingenuity which are said to have been displayed by the leader. The conditions imposed by the victors were not severe. An annual tribute was required to be paid to the lord of Satsuma, and certain commercial advantages were secured; but the family of the sovereign were allowed to retain their hereditary privileges and even their nominal rank. The present Governor is the direct descendant of the ruler of that day. The habits and characteristics of the people were found to be so precisely similar to those of the Japanese that the change of authority involved no social inconveniences. The language was the same—differing only in local idioms and in certain peculiarities of pronunciation.

From the time of the Satsuma invasion until the visit of Commodore Perry in 1853, the subsidiary kingdom of Riu Kiu ceased to have a history. The government tranquilly fulfilled the few necessary forms of state, and the people followed, in successive generations, the quiet avocations of usage and tradition, and devoted their ample leisure to the study of letters, in the gentle rivalries of which they are said to have made themselves distinguished. When the local authorities of the capital of Riu Kiu were appealed to by the terrified inhabitants of Miyako Sima, they naturally turned for relief to the provincial Court of Satsuma. But events had just occurred in Japan which made it necessary to transfer their application to a higher tribunal. The great change in the political system of the Empire

had taken place a few months before, and the feudal rights of the daimios had been surrendered to the central government. Satsuma was powerless to deal with the question, and it was suggested that a commission be sent directly from Riu Kiu to Tokio, (Yedo) to consider and discuss not only this subject, but also the whole matter of the relationship of the tributary kingdom toward the newly re-organized nation. In the summer of 1872 a deputation consequently arrived, including among its members the King's son, and the principal Ministers of State. They were treated with the greatest possible consideration and kindness. It was agreed that Japan should undertake to afford full and efficient protection to the inhabitants of Riu Kiu and all its dependencies. The territory was to be considered as properly belonging to the Japanese Empire. The ruler, from obvious necessity, would be required to relinquish his sovereign title and dignities, but should receive in exchange those of a "Kuazoku," or hereditary noble of the nation. Moreover, the administration of the local government should remain in his family—a privilege granted to none of the old daimios. Those who are acquainted with the course of recent political events and with political nomenclature in Japan will understand the exact nature of the position accorded to Riu Kiu, when it is stated that while all the other provinces were converted to "ken," it alone was allowed to remain a "han."<sup>\*</sup>

In regard to the atrocities of the Formosans the Japanese were prepared to take prompt action. The first question to be considered was whether any recognized government either exercised or claimed positive jurisdiction over these wild tribes. The circumstance that the western part of the island was occupied by the Chinese afforded some ground for a belief that that nation might assume the task of keeping the eastern coast in order. The necessary representations were made without delay. Just at this time the Japanese had an especial claim upon the attention of the Chinese government. They had released a number of coolies from a Peruvian bark,

\* See Appendix, F.

the "Maria Luz" under circumstances of great difficulty and embarrassment to themselves, and had volunteered to send them back to the homes from which they had been decoyed or abducted. The Peking officials were full of expressions of gratitude, and the moment seemed as propitious as any that could have been selected for an appeal on behalf of the injured inhabitants of the southernmost dependency of Japan. But in the negotiations that followed the Chinese allowed it to be very clearly apparent that they were not disposed to assume any responsibility in the affair. They pointed to the limits of the territory over which they held control, and plainly declared that beyond that boundary they could neither inflict punishment for past depredations nor undertake to prevent them in the future.

About this time General Le Gendre, who was undoubtedly more familiar with the local details of Eastern Formosa than any other foreigner, was passing through Japan on his way home from Amoy. He was naturally able to supply the Tokio authorities with much interesting information, and he delayed his departure in order to put them in possession of the latest intelligence from the scene of the massacre. He had again visited the chief Tokitok, and had learned in the course of his inquiries that there was reason to believe that the fifty-four Japanese who had been murdered had been mistaken for Chinese, and that the Chinese-speaking inhabitants of the south-western coast were in some way implicated in the work of destruction.\* It was, therefore, in every way probable that nothing could be hoped for from Chinese intervention. The hostility of the natives would make them insensible to amicable appeals, and the government had neither the desire nor the means of applying force. It was then that the idea first began to be entertained, by certain high Japanese officials, of undertaking the settlement of the question on their own account. In point of fact there was hardly an alternative. The good faith of the

\* See Appendix, G.

government was pledged, and it was impossible to pass unnoticed the outrage of the winter of 1871. It only remained to determine the means by which the purpose should be carried into effect.

The most vigorous and daring member of the Cabinet, at that period, was Soyezima Taneomi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. While most of his colleagues were content to simply accept the necessity of teaching the Botans a lesson of humanity, he speedily saw the way to the possible execution of a series of bold enterprises, which, in his belief, would lead to results of the highest advantage to Japan, and which, if successful, would certainly distinguish his administration of the Foreign Department in a way that would make his name forever eminent in his country's annals. He satisfied himself by tolerably close examination that the Japanese had at one time not only held possession of all the islands lying east of Formosa, but had also occupied and controlled the best part of Formosa itself. The historical question is, of course, one that can be absolutely determined only by a more thorough acquaintance with Asiatic records than foreigners have yet gained. There is no doubt that the Japanese were great explorers and colonizers in ancient days. There are abundant traces of their settlements even as far south as the Philippines, where their descendants still continue to live. The outlying islands about Formosa are strictly Japanese in every respect. That great numbers of these people inhabited Formosa two and three centuries ago is well attested. The chronicles of the Jesuits show that the early Dutch settlements were established under permission from the Japanese authorities who held the Western shores, and that tributes were sent from Holland to the Siogun at Yedo for the privileges granted by his officials. Soyezima, and those who adopted his views, maintained that in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Japanese were in dominant force there, and that the gradual re-occupation of the island would be nothing but the resumption of a temporarily alienated territory.\* They held that the

\* See Appendix, C.

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establishment of a trustworthy and responsible Power on the eastern coast would be an obvious benefit to the world at large, and that the substitution of Japanese control for the barbarous misrule of the rude tribes would be universally welcomed. By their own processes of reasoning they arrived at the same conclusions as those of Admiral Bell—namely, that there could be no security without the existence of a recognized authority along the shores.

The scheme was undoubtedly a vast one, especially when considered in connection with other and kindred projects which need not here be detailed, since subsequent events rendered their execution unnecessary. It naturally met with a great deal of opposition, and the majority of the advisers of the government shrank from engaging in an undertaking entailing such heavy expense, and promising, at least for a long time to come, such inadequate recompense. But Soyezima was a man of unusual energy and resolution, and his influence was paramount. The arrangements for executing the plan steadily progressed. In the Spring of 1873, while still holding the office of Foreign Minister, he went as Ambassador to Peking chiefly to lay his designs before the Chinese government, and to obtain their views upon that and other proposed Japanese projects. His public diplomatic successes during this mission are matters of common notoriety. It was, in fact, through him that the long unsettled question of Imperial audiences was brought to a prompt solution. His success in the more private negotiations, hitherto unrevealed, was not less complete, from his own point of view, but it was afterward generally admitted that although he obtained a distinct declaration from the Chinese of their irresponsibility for the acts of the savages, and of their acquiescence in the right of Japan to send a mission to regulate the affair independently, he was unfortunate in not requiring from the evasive and crafty officials a formal expression of this avowal, in writing. The absence of documentary evidence in these particulars was at a later date treacherously turned to the disadvantage of Japan, and it was only by the

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exercise of great firmness and spirit that the Chinese were ultimately compelled to abide by the language they had used in these early discussions.\* The explanation of the omission to secure a permanent record of their declarations is simple. The fact of their neither exercising nor claiming control over the savage region was so commonly recognized that nothing beyond a verbal allusion to it was regarded as essential. The official chart published by the Chinese government defines the district under their jurisdiction as "bounded by moutains in the rear"—the territory of the aborigines being thus excluded. All inquiries by persons interested in an explanation of the question had led to the same conclusions. Mr. Burlingame, while investigating the "Rover" affair, had discovered that the "savages were not Chinese, but outlaws of another race, who from time immemorial had been a sort of wrecking banditti." To demand a written acknowledgment of what was accepted as an established truth appeared both unnecessary and injudicious; and it has since been placed beyond reasonable doubt that the introduction of this issue as a disturbing element in later negotiations was a foreign inspiration, and was suggested by disingenuous, and, as the event proved, unskilful advisers of the Chinese councillors.

During the residence of the Embassy in Peking, a second Formosan outrage was reported, which, although less flagrant in character, touched the Japanese even more nearly than the first, the victims in this case being inhabitants of one of the principal provinces in the island of Kiu Siu. A small vessel from the village of Kasiwasima, in Bichiu, was wrecked upon the south-eastern coast, and the crew, four in number, were stripped and plundered immediately upon landing. Their lives were spared, but the incident naturally added to the determination of the government to prosecute the demands for satisfaction.

After Soyezima's return to Tokio, the movement was pressed with all

\* See Appendix, B.

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possible vigor, and in the course of a few months everything would have been prepared for a combination of enterprises which, whatever their consequences, would have attracted a far greater attention and a more vivid interest than any previous Eastern events of modern times. But the return of the Embassy, under Iwakura, which had been travelling for upwards of a year in America and Europe, changed in a few weeks the entire aspect of affairs. In what precise manner the second Minister of the Crown succeeded in overthrowing the elaborate projects which had been matured during his absence it is not necessary here to inquire. He came with the prestige of an extensive foreign experience, and his rank and official position enabled him to interpose obstacles which could not be surmounted. Many of the principal Ministers resigned, Soyezima at their head. A new Cabinet was formed, and for a time nothing more was heard of the plans for the chastisement or subjugation of the Formosa marauders.

## CHAPTER XIV.

ARRIVAL OF GENERAL SAIGO—FRESH STORES AND RE-ENFORCEMENTS—UNEXPECTED VISIT OF TWO CHINESE SHIPS OF WAR—A FRIENDLY MISSION—INTERVIEWS OF COURTESY—LETTER FROM THE VICEROY OF FU KIEN—FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHINESE CLAIM OF AUTHORITY—THE QUESTION OF FUTURE CONTROL DEFERRED—NATIONAL SALUTATIONS—CHINESE AWKWARDNESS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF HEAVY GUNS—FIRST INEFFECTUAL RESULTS OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE—ITS SUBSEQUENT SUCCESS—CHINESE INERTIA CONTRASTED WITH JAPANESE ACTIVITY.

WHILE the skirmish of the 22d was going on, several large ships entered and anchored in Liangkiao Bay. The earliest to arrive was the "Takasagu Maru" which brought General Saigo, the Commander in Chief, with his staff, and fifteen hundred soldiers and laborers. She was followed by a second transport, the passengers in which increased the entire available force of fighting men to about thirteen hundred. Before the disembarkation commenced, two other vessels approached from a different direction, the nationality of which was at first doubtful, but which presently proved to be a Chinese frigate and gunboat. The arrival of these ships of war excited much curiosity, for, up to this time, we, in Formosa, had received no definite or trustworthy intelligence of the views of the Chinese government, since the commencement of the efforts of foreign Ministers to divert them from the true issue, and great uncertainty was felt as to the course of action they might adopt. It was a relief to find, on visiting these newcomers, that their visit was in no respect unfriendly, for not only were all anxieties as to Chinese interference thus allayed, but conclusive proofs were

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afforded of the falseness of the grounds upon which the mischief-makers at Tokio and Peking had based their irritating proceedings. According to these messengers, the government of China had never yet objected in any degree to the Japanese movement, and one of the special errands of the ships was to communicate with the natives of the Liangkiao valley and to assure the chiefs personally, and the people by posted proclamations, that the Japanese were here to do a good work, that the Chinese authorities were in sympathy with them, and that it should be the duty of all the inhabitants to assist them in every way that lay in their power. Making due allowance for the high-flown extravagance of some of their declarations, it was abundantly clear that, up to this time, no hostile sentiments had been generally diffused among the Chinese officials ; and indeed, evidence was afterward supplied that the Admiral in command at Amoy had reiterated the familiar assertions that his government was not responsible for and had no jurisdiction over the savage population, some days after the first party of Japanese had actually reached Formosa.

It was, however, apparent that the promptings of the foreign advisers had already produced the seeds of that opposition which afterward grew to such menacing proportions. That the Chinese did not themselves understand the nature of the steps they were about to take was evident from the discrepancy between the tone of their verbal assurances and the documents to which they now for the first time committed themselves. And, as the documents were ambiguous, while their personal declarations were clear and undisguised, the former were looked upon, for the moment, as being mere matters of precautionary record, and not calculated to bear directly upon the movements now in progress. Under any circumstances, the written communication brought by the messengers could not have affected the course of General Saigo's operations, inasmuch as they opened a question which, if it required discussion at all, could be settled only by diplomatic agencies, with which he was neither authorized nor inclined to interfere. What this

communication was, may be explained in a few words.

Fukusima Kunari, on first landing at Amoy, had delivered a letter from General Saigo to Li Wo Nen, the Viceroy of Fu Kien, notifying him of the departure of the expedition for Formosa, as the sequel of the conferences between Soyezima Taneomi and the members of the Tsung li Yamen, in the spring of 1873; conveying anew the desire of the Japanese government to maintain the most cordial relations with that of China, and asking that he, the Viceroy, would use his efforts to prevent both his own subjects and foreigners from giving aid to the savages by supplying them with arms and ammunition or other materials of war. As a matter of fact, there was no necessity for the transmission of any such letter; but the circumstance of its having been written and sent again exhibits the determination of the Japanese officials to act frankly and unreservedly in all the arrangements of their share in the business. The intentions of General Saigo were openly avowed. The entire absence of suspicion that the Chinese would now offer objections was demonstrated by the request that the authority of the highest official of Fu Kien should be used to prevent the aborigines from being strengthened by outside assistance. The methods employed on this occasion were as straightforward and sincere as were those of every other detail of the movement, from beginning to end.

To bring the Viceroy's answer to this despatch was another of the duties undertaken by the Chinese ships. At a later period, they chose to represent it as the principal if not the sole object of their visit, and to declare that their conversational avowals were mere complimentary fictions. But, at the time, they held a very different tone, and declared that the letter was to be taken only as a response to the direct subjects mentioned in General Saigo's first communication, while, on the broader and more general topics of interest between the two nations they were authorized to convey the true sentiments of friendship entertained by the Viceroy and his court. If it were true, as has since been alleged, that the Japanese Com-

mander in Chief was misled by their intentional duplicity, it would be no special discredit to him. As a soldier, he probably makes no pretence to skill in the detection of Chinese craft. But it does not appear to be true. At this period, the Chinese had only begun to be influenced in a direction adverse to the Japanese movement. The feeling, such as it was, was limited to a very few officials. The representatives of the United States were not yet aware of it, and many Chinese of the highest station still openly held to the theory that their government would assume no control over the aboriginal regions of Formosa.\*

But the Viceroy's letter did affirm that China would claim authority over that part of the island, and expressed the wish that the Japanese general should withdraw his troops. These announcements were so unexpected and extraordinary that Saigo gave his first attention to the reception of the visitors, with the view of ascertaining more clearly, if possible, the meaning of the despatch which they brought. A meeting took place on the morning of the 23d, in a tent pitched, for the purpose, close to the beach. On the part of the Chinese little was said beyond the formal expression of the amicable feeling previously indicated on board their vessels. They were asked to explain the purport of the Viceroy's letter, which conflicted entirely with the position previously taken by all the Chinese authorities. They did not hesitate to interpret it as having reference to the future. The Viceroy's desire, according to them, was that the troops should withdraw after having accomplished the task assigned to them. In other words, the Viceroy was willing that the Japanese should undertake the work of punishing the savages and restoring order and security in the

\* Mr. Williams, the U. S. Chargé at Peking writing on the 29th of May, said that the authorities of the Chinese capital did not at that time consider the action of the Japanese, in visiting Formosa, to be warlike. Mr. Henderson, the U. S. Consul at Amoy, wrote, June 1st and 3d, that the Chinese had not thitherto "pretended to claim that part of the island where the savages reside, or in any manner be responsible for their conduct," and that he had been so informed by "a high officer in the Chinese service."

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island, after which the territory should revert to Chinese rule,—he, Li Wo Nen, to reap the advantages of whatever sacrifice of treasure and life might be made by Japan. This view of the matter was one which General Suigo was not disposed to consider in any way. His instructions contained no reference to the question of the future control of the island. He had received orders only to investigate the circumstances of the original murderers, to enforce retribution and to take measures to prevent the recurrence of such deeds. He was therefore perfectly content to accept the present position as it appeared to be understood by the Chinese messengers. He would proceed with his own work, and leave the other matters to be decided by those within whose province they lay. And with this conclusion, the Chinese expressed themselves equally satisfied. There is no reason to doubt, even now, that they were satisfied. The hostile feelings that ultimately required to be dealt with in an extremely resolute manner were of a later birth. They did exhibit some inclination to take part in the operations projected against the aborigines, and spoke of the expediency of a joint expedition,—China to send a force to second the Japanese proceedings. But this proposition was very firmly, though politely, discouraged. After several hours, during which repeated interchanges of courtesy and good will took place, and the Chinese officials carried out their idea of representing to the Liangkiao inhabitants that they approved of the existing state of affairs—which announcement, it may be mentioned, was received with the utmost indifference inasmuch as the people of this quarter refuse to recognize Chinese authority—the vessels of war departed. On the afternoon of the 23d, their flag was formally saluted by the frigate “Nishin” and the compliment was duly returned, with all honors. The manner in which this little ceremony was carried out afforded some amusement. It would be supposed that the simple task of discharging twenty-one guns was one that might be executed with promptness and precision by the least skilful ship’s company that could be gathered together. But after the reports from the Japanese

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vessel had ceased, there came a long delay, finally broken by an irregular peal of six guns, at intervals varying from a couple of seconds to half a minute. Then followed silence for at least three minutes, after which, six more ill-timed flashes and detonations, these again interrupted by a pause of certainly five minutes. Had any accident happened? Some of the Japanese thought this probable, and a boat was about to put off from the "Nishin" to make inquiries when the salute was renewed, and, with another long intermission after the next six discharges, carried through to the end. It was presently discovered that the frigate had only six available guns, and that the successive lapses were caused by a want of expertness in reloading. From that moment, the performances of Chinese artillery became, justly or unjustly, a jesting by-word in the camp of the Japanese and on board their ships.

It would be an affectation, however, to conceal that this visit, with its manifestations of good feeling, which were undoubtedly sincere enough in their way, at that time, afforded much satisfaction. The machinations that had been on foot ever since the plan of the expedition had become partially known; the open and secret efforts of certain foreign Ministers to interfere in every obstructive way, and the undisguised attempts to arouse the jealousy of the Chinese and stimulate them to hostile action had awakened a sense of uneasiness that was now, for the moment, completely allayed. At this stage of proceedings—perhaps at any stage—nothing could have deterred the Japanese from resolutely pursuing their project in one way or another, but they were naturally gratified to find that what might have been a formidable impediment, if it had been a fact, had really no existence except in the imagination of the credulous or the invention of the malicious. The whole ground upon which the assumed right to interfere was based was now seen to be visionary, and apparently, had no more existence in the minds of the Chinese than in the judgment of Japan. There remained not the shadow of an excuse for the

interruptions which had so long delayed and embarrassed the action of the Japanese government, and the effects of which threatened at one time to be as ruinous as they really were costly and annoying. This was the state of things at the end of May. It is true that, a month later, a certain amount of success crowned the efforts of the instruments of mischief and ill-will. They did at last goad the Chinese into a false position of jealous irritation, from which the only possible extrication was by a road of humiliation and material acknowledgment of error. All that the interference of the foreign representatives ever effected was the abasement of China, which the Japanese themselves had never intended or contemplated. They forced the government of Peking to assume an attitude which it could not maintain, and which one of them, at least, had finally to advise it to retire from, at whatever sacrifice of dignity and consistency. Up to the end of May, I repeat, nothing had occurred on the part of either of the two nations directly concerned, to warrant the first accusation of hostile sentiment or design. The idea existed only in the conception of those who, upon principles which, let us hope, they can explain satisfactorily to themselves, used a power that rested in their hands to bring to a direful realization the fictitious creation of their own fancies.

In other respects this brief mission from China was of slight importance. Certain civil officers of high rank had been deputed to take part in it, but the magnates of that overgrown empire move slowly, and the vessels sailed while they were getting their baggage ready. By way of compensation, some of the higher authorities of Taiwan Fu—the principal Chinese city of Formosa, were brought down to add what weight they might to the representations of the Viceroy's special messenger and the naval officers. It may not be inappropriate to mention that their assurances of satisfaction with the operations in progress were mingled with expressions of unfeigned wonder that a nation should make such vast preparations and go to such enormous expense merely to punish the murderers of two or three dozen of

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its lowest subjects. The observation illustrates, in a simple way, one of the most essential points of difference between the national character of the Chinese and that of the Japanese. It needed the powerful impulse given by Japan, in the case of the "Maria Luz" coolies, to stir the authorities of China to effective measures for the repression of a traffic that had desolated their seaports for scores of years. On the other hand, from the moment of the first intelligence of the outrage on the shipwrecked sailors of Miyako Sima, the Japanese had been busily engaged in concerting plans for the punishment of the marauders and for security against the recurrence of such aggressions.

## CHAPTER XXX.

STORM ON THE FORMOSA COAST—HASTY FLIGHT—INVOLUNTARY TRIP TO AMOY—PANIC AMONG THE CITIZENS—ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES' OFFICERS—LETTER FROM THE VICE ROY AT FU KIEN—CHINESE DREAD OF AMERICAN CO-OPERATION—FALLACY OF CLAIMS OF JURISDICTION—REPEATED OFFICIAL DENIALS.

EARLY in July, I had a practical experience of the irresistible violence of the Formosa Channel storms at this season of the year. On the afternoon of the 6th, I went on board the steam-ship "Takasago-Maru" to prepare for a final departure from the Japanese Camp in Formosa; which promised little, from that time, in the way of attraction, and which, though the danger was not then suspected, presently became a scene of wretchedness and desolation through the ravages of an epidemic from which hardly an individual of the party escaped entirely unharmed.

Toward the evening, a heavy westerly wind set in, which rendered landing next to impossible. On the following morning an attempt was made to send a steam-launch on shore, but the little craft soon became unmanageable and was obliged to anchor half way between the ship and the beach. A little after noon, the "Takasago's" anchors were found to be dragging, and the vessel driving upon the low rocks that fringe the insecure roadstead. The cables were slipped, and the steamer started away as speedily as might be in the direction of the Pescadores Islands, one of which contains an excellent harbor. But as the night advanced the gale increased to such an extent that it was thought imprudent to search for this refuge, and the course was shaped for Amoy, at which port we arrived

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in due season, after a great deal of discomfort, but, I presume, no particular danger. The "Takasago" was formerly the Peninsular and Oriental Steamship "Delta," an old but serviceable vessel, which the Japanese might have been glad to possess, if they had wanted any of the sort at all. But they did not. She was purchased under pressure of circumstances occasioned by the action of the United States' Legation, at Tokio. It was one of the compulsory bargains which the stoppage of the steamship "New York" at Nagasaki, in April, had rendered inevitable.

This involuntary visit to Amoy afforded the opportunity of examining the real state of feeling among the inhabitants, and of inquiring as to the causes that might have led to the Consul's action in issuing the notification heretofore mentioned. In regard to the former, it appeared that the reports of a partial panic, among the lower classes, if not among some of the higher, were not without foundation. I am by no means sure that it was not, to an extent, shared by the local authorities. At any rate, no official attempt appeared to have been made toward arresting it. Not a few of the populace had really gone into the interior, and it was said to be perfectly true that numbers of merchants had suspended their traffic, in anticipation of the necessity for sudden flight. A single incident served to show the current of popular feeling. One of the servants attached to the American Consulate was so confident of the impending invasion that he petitioned Mr. Henderson to be allowed to bring his aged father and mother under the protection of the United States, and lodge them, for a time, in one of the outbuildings of the establishment. In Taiwan Fu, the principal city of Formosa, the trepidation was said to be even greater, and junk-loads of fugitives were coming over to the main land each week. If all this was as represented,—and much of it undoubtedly was,—the unusual preparations of the Chinese were probably the real cause. So much bustle and confusion, and so much pretence of military concentration, had not been known in this part of China for generations.

With regard to the action of the United States' officials at or near Amoy, I am strongly inclined to the belief that it was purely formal, up to this time, and in one sense merely nominal. I found no reason to change the opinion formed during an earlier visit, respecting Mr. Henderson's views upon the subject of the chastisement of the savages by the Japanese. And I could not help reminding myself, although I certainly was not directly reminded by him, that the notification before quoted was issued "by instruction from the Chargé d'Affaires at Peking." The Consul informed me that his attention was first seriously called to the matter by a communication from the Viceroy at Fu Kien, the mere transmission of which showed how deeply the official mind of China had at last become impressed by current events, inasmuch as direct epistolary intercourse between a Viceroy and a foreign Consul was almost, if not entirely, without precedent. The little Japanese enterprise had already broken down Chinese traditions in more than one respect. As an example of the style of this new order of correspondence, I was permitted to copy a translation of the Viceroy's letter, which is herewith reproduced, with the exception of a few opening lines of courteous greeting :—

"Now we have investigated this Formosa business, as well as the statements of the Taotai of Formosa and the captain of the *Yang-wu*, "to the effect that this expedition to the savages of Formosa has been "planned by the former Consul at Amoy, Le Gendre; also one Cassel and "many others were assisting. We have also examined and found that "Formosa has long belonged to China, and the savages are certainly under "Chinese jurisdiction, and other nations have nothing to do with them. On "this occasion, Japan has sent soldiers to punish the savages without previous consultation with the Foreign Office, and the Japanese Commander-in-chief, without awaiting a communication from me, on his own motion "took soldiers and formed a camp at Liangkiao, in entire violation both of "International Law and the Treaty between China and Japan. We twice

"sent communications to the Commander-in-chief, requiring him to take "back his soldiers, and twice sent communications to the Board of Trade "to be presented to your honorable self, to be examined and acted on; all "of which are on file. We have received your dispatch, in which you "show your desire to carry out Treaty obligations, and, in settling matters, "to preserve lasting peace and friendship, as well as your purpose to "perform your duties; for all which we desire to express our hearty thanks. "We have appointed Shen, second in the Board of Trade, and formerly "Acting Prefect of Fu Chao to go to Amoy, and also have sent a com- "munication to Li, Admiral at Amoy, telling him to await the coming of "Shen and then with him have a consultation with the U. S. Consul, and "together concert some plan of action. And in accordance with the "provisions of Art. I. of the Treaty of the 1st year of Hienfung (1858), "that the two countries shall mutually assist in preserving friendly relations, "we ask your honorable self to request the Commander to take his soldiers "back to Japan. And if in the vessels that have gone to Formosa there "are American citizens aiding the Japanese, we ask you to punish those "that are acting improperly, whether on land or sea, in accordance with "the 11th article of the Treaty and the laws of your country. From the "time when your honorable self arrived in China, you have always managed "affairs in strict accordance with right, so that the streets are full of "praises of yourself by rulers and people, and ourselves are truly thankful. "Now that there are affairs in Formosa, over which you are Consul, you "can show your friendly feelings by acting in accordance with the Treaty, "and by taking measures in connection with Admiral Li and Prefect Shen. "Thus can you show friendly feeling. We have sent a communication to "Admiral Li, and also one to Prefect Shen, ordering him to go to Amoy "and arrange the whole affair with you, for which purpose we give them "full powers. And we request you to act with these two, not only as "officials but as friends. Hoping thus, with best regards, etc., etc., etc."

In the interview which followed, all these subjects were discussed with greater freedom than would naturally have been possible in a series of letters. The Chinese appeared to be firmly of the opinion that if the Americans were withdrawn from the expedition the whole affair would fall through of itself. They could not have entertained a greater delusion. Whatever assistance may have been afforded by Americans in the execution of certain details, the entire spirit and resolution of the enterprise, from first to last, proceeded from the Japanese. But with a view to the removal of the former, the Chinese were extremely anxious that Mr. Henderson should himself visit Formosa, armed with all his authority—which he saw no sufficient reason for doing. Their anxiety for the despatch of the warning documents was not satisfied by the assurance that copies had already gone by the way of Takao. They desired to have duplicates, or additional notifications, specially sent; and offered to supply the means of carrying them across. This was the occasion of the circumstance which at the time seemed so extraordinary,—the arrival of a U. S. Deputy Marshal, on an official errand, in a Chinese man-of-war. The two functionaries appeared to be more acutely concerned about General Le Gendre's connection with the business than about any other detail. The fact that he had formerly been United States' Consul at Amoy, would, to their minds, warrant Mr. Henderson in taking particularly peremptory steps in his case. Mr. Henderson endeavored to show them that General Le Gendre's position differed in no way from that of any other citizen, similarly placed, but apparently failed to satisfy them. As regarded the legal aspect of the case he did not conceal his opinion that neither the act of 1818 nor that of 1860 was applicable in this instance, no war having been declared, and no hostile action against China having been committed by the Japanese; while the savage inhabitants of Formosa assuredly could not come under the designation of a nation with whom the United States are at peace. Of his convictions upon this subject, Mr. Henderson made no secret, in the middle,

or, to be more particular, on the 9th and 10th, of July. That he had communicated these convictions to the native authorities, he was perfectly free in stating. I am aware that his subsequent action, on the 6th of August, when he caused General LeGendre to be arrested, indicated a totally different state of feeling ; but this, as I have once before observed, is one of the mysteries of United States' official action upon which no sufficient light has yet been thrown. The explanations thus far afforded by the published correspondence upon the subject cannot certainly be regarded as sufficient.

As another evidence of the importance they attached to the co-operation of General Le Gendre, it may be mentioned that the provincial rulers of Fuchao had just caused a formal proposition to be transmitted to that gentleman, inviting him to desert the Japanese service, and enter theirs, upon pecuniary terms which they fancied would be sufficient to dazzle the eyes of any attaché and render him blind to a proper sense of integrity. Offering money and infamy with the same hand, they strove to outweigh the latter consideration by the vastness of the prize which they tendered. The communication was made through a former clerk of the United States' Consulate, and was received in Tokio about this date. In what manner it was received it is, of course, needless to say.

It was already evident that, by those who blindly opposed the movements of the Japanese, a strong point would be made of the assumption of Chinese authority, tardy as it was, over the whole island and people of Formosa. That this declaration was an after-thought, and a very late after-thought, there could be no question. The proofs were too clear and numerous. That it was not an after-thought of Chinese origin, but was prompted by foreign diplomatists, was the universal conviction, and this belief will in time be amply sustained by evidence, although the testimony is at present difficult of access. Meanwhile, let me invite a comparison of the positive statements of Commissioner Pan Wi, in his interview with General Saigo, and the concurrent assertion of the Viceroy at Fu Kien in his letter

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to Mr. Henderson—"the savages are certainly under Chinese jurisdiction"—with the avowals of a letter from the Fuchao Board of Trade to the U. S. Consul, in 1867, which I was shown in the records at Amoy. The subject under discussion was the case of the bark "Rover," in regard to which the Consul had endeavored to arouse the Chinese to a sense of their supposed responsibilities. The officers of the Board of Trade wrote (June, 1867) first to say that the Chinese would undoubtedly be obliged to make reparation in all cases where outrages were committed in Chinese territory or Chinese waters, and continued as follows:—"But as in the 'Rover' 'case the Americans were not murdered in Chinese territory or in Chinese Seas, but in a region occupied by the savages, relief cannot be asked for them under the Treaty. The savage territory does not come within the limits of our jurisdiction.' \* \* \* "We believe those savages to be "wild animals with whom any one would disdain to contend."

What more than this is needed to show the worthlessness of the sudden assumption of universal authority in Formosa, or to shatter the pretensions of those who endeavored to hold up the Japanese to obloquy as the invaders of established and acknowledged Chinese rights? If anything, then it can be found in a later despatch from the Board of Trade (January 12th, 1868) in which the officers of that institution and the Prefect of Fuchao united in making a distinct acknowledgment of the right of foreign nations to deal with the savages directly, and without Chinese intervention, and even advised the methods best to be adopted in thus dealing with them. The document is too long for transcription, but its terms are clear and unmistakeable, and apply as precisely to the Japanese expedition as they would to any visit by ships from European or American countries. And, if still further evidence were required, I am enabled to say upon Mr. Henderson's authority, that, as recently as the month of May, 1874, after the departure of the first ships of the fleet, and, unless I am greatly mistaken, after the arrival of the "Yuko-maru" in Liangkiao Bay,

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the Chinese Admiral at Amoy, in a conversation with the United States' Consul, reiterated the old denial of liability, and again declared that his government admitted no accountability for the deeds of the savage inhabitants of Formosa. The newly-assumed position, therefore, dated from a later period than the Japanese action against which it was intended to stand as a conclusive and substantial argument. It was an *ex post facto* inspiration of the most transparent description. And I repeat, that there was hardly a candid observer to be found who did not, and who does not still, believe that it was not the natural outgrowth of the established Chinese policy, but was suggested and developed by foreigners who acted upon the conviction that their interest lay in fomenting discord between these two nations of the east.

## APPENDIX.

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### A.

It is hardly essential, in this brief narrative, to introduce the complete historical evidence showing the connection between His Kins and Japan. In case of need, the fact that the dependency has existed for centuries could easily be established; but inasmuch as the Chinese themselves have renounced all claim to the partial authority with which foreigners formerly credited them, the question requires no further investigation.

### B.

In illustration of the absence of necessity for written declarations of so patent a fact as China's lack of authority over aboriginal Formosa, one of the members of the first Japanese delegation subsequently employed this comparison: "Until a recent time, the sovereigns of England called "themselves kings of France, and included the lilies of that country in "their arms. That was a far more direct nominal claim than China ever "assumed over Formosa. Yet an ambassador who should have asked "for a written declaration that England had no jurisdiction over France "would have been derided. A fact so universally known might indeed "have been touched upon in verbal discussions, but its documentary "acknowledgement would never have been required."

### C.

The records of Chardin, Ar Mailla, and many others, supply the fullest testimony of the sway of the Japanese in Formosa during the early