



NOTE

Beyond Infringement: Rethinking DMCA § 1202 for
Generative AI
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Abstract. With the emergence of large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT, scholars and courts have fervently debated whether LLMs' training on and reproduction of copyrighted materials amounts to fair use. But in a recent series of cases, a lesser-known challenge to LLMs has reared its head: § 1202 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. This provision requires that when a work is copied, its associated copyright management information (CMI)—such as its license or terms of use agreement—is copied with it. The requirement was originally intended to modernize copyright for the Internet by ensuring all users would be aware of the terms of their use. Now, § 1202's unintended overbreadth threatens to block LLM development and use as it swallows questions of infringement and fair use entirely.

This Note argues that § 1202 is broader than traditional copyright infringement in three critical respects: It allows liability without any showing of copyrightability, provides no fair use defense, and permits disproportionate statutory damages. While § 1202 includes an intent requirement, that requirement is so minimal that it fails to meaningfully limit the statute's reach—especially in the LLM context, where the act of violating § 1202 may itself satisfy the mental requirement.

In response to these concerns, this Note proposes that courts adopt an identicality requirement for § 1202 claims against LLMs. This requirement would cabin liability to outputs that exactly match training data—cases where the removal or alteration of CMI is both clear and technically avoidable. The approach mirrors Congress's existing accommodation of technological limitations for broadcasters in cases of technical infeasibility or financial hardship. A similar understanding for LLMs would preserve § 1202's core purpose, resolve a growing district court split, and ensure the most consequential copyright question raised by generative artificial intelligence is answered on its merits—not sidestepped by a statute never designed to decide it.

[†] [Acknowledgment Text]

On the other side of the split, courts and commentators have held that something less than identicality is sufficient to show that CMI was removed from a “copy.”¹³¹ In one case, a district court held that “superficial alterations” to a work—alterations that in at least some courts on the other side of the split would lead to a dismissal for lack of identicality—justified a denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss.¹³² The court held that “there is no justification, based on congressional intent, before the Court for adding the extra term of ‘identical’ to the DMCA’s plain language.”¹³³

Though some courts do not specify a standard beyond a rejection of identicality,¹³⁴ others have specifically stated that the correct standard is “substantial similarity” between the allegedly infringing and original works.¹³⁵ One Ninth Circuit case abided by a slightly different standard: “striking similarity.”¹³⁶ This standard is imported directly from copyright infringement doctrine,¹³⁷ emphasizing courts’ confusion between copyright infringement and

¹³¹ Oracle Int’l Corp. v. Rimini St., Inc., No. 2:14-CV-01699-MMD-DJA, 2023 WL 4706127, at *82 (D. Nev. July 24, 2023) (rejecting defendant’s argument “that a work that removes copyright management information must be an exact copy of the original work.”); ADR Int’l Ltd. v. Inst. for Supply Mgmt. Inc., 667 F. Supp. 3d 411, 428 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (“Specifically, the Court is persuaded by the reasoning of courts that have found that the DMCA may properly apply even when the allegedly infringing work is not identical to the original.”); Nimmer On Copyright, *supra* note 25 § 12A.10(C)(1) (“[T]o be actionable, the removal must be from a work that is at least substantially similar to the copyrighted work in question . . . But there is no warrant to conclude, as did *dictum* in one case, that ‘no DMCA violation exists where the works are not identical.’”); *New Parent World, LLC v. True To Life Prods., Inc.*, No. CV-23-08089-PCT-DGC, 2024 WL 4277865, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 24, 2024) (Other courts have held that an infringing work need not be an identical copy to violate the DMCA . . . The Court finds these cases persuasive.”).

¹³² ADR Int’l Ltd. v. Inst. for Supply Mgmt. Inc., 667 F. Supp. 3d 411, 428 (S.D. Tex. 2023).

¹³³ *Id.*

¹³⁴ *Real World Media LLC v. Daily Caller, Inc.*, 744 F. Supp. 3d 24, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2024) (“Ultimately, the Court agrees with a leading treatise that the arguments requiring perfect identity under these circumstances “fail[] to withstand scrutiny.” Nimmer on Copyright, *supra* note 25 § 12A.10. Hence, the Court rejects Daily Caller’s categorical argument that exact copies of portions of a video can never support a DMCA claim.”); ADR Int’l Ltd. v. Inst. for Supply Mgmt. Inc., 667 F. Supp. 3d 411, 425 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (“The DMCA is not limited to CMI conveyed in connection with identical copies of a work.”).

¹³⁵ *Enter. Tech. Holdings, Inc. v. Noveon Sys., Inc.*, No. 05-CV-2236 W (CAB), 2008 WL 11338356, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2008) (finding the defendant violated the DMCA by altering CMI from “transportation management software” he programmed “that was ‘substantially similar’” to the allegedly infringed software.); Nimmer On Copyright, *supra* note 25 § 12A.10(C)(1) (“[T]o be actionable, the removal must be from a work that is at least substantially similar to the copyrighted work in question . . . But there is no warrant to conclude, as did *dictum* in one case, that ‘no DMCA violation exists where the works are not identical.’”).

¹³⁶ *Friedman v. Live Nation Merch., Inc.*, 833 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2016).

¹³⁷ *Friedman v. Live Nation Merch., Inc.*, 833 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2016) cites *Baxter v. MCA, Inc.*, 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987) for its standard on striking similarity. *Baxter*