| Method | Expected Social Utility Performance |
|---|---|
| Black's | |
| Copeland-Borda | |
| Stable Voting | |
| Copeland-Minimax | |
| Ranked Pairs | |
| Nanson | |
| Beat Path | |
| Split Cycle | |
| Minimax | |
| Copeland | |
| Borda* | |
| Baldwin | |
| Raynaud | |
| Benham | |
| Woodall | |
| Condorcet IRV | |
| Daunou | |
| Condorcet Plurality | |
| Approval* | |
| Coombs* | |
| Bucklin* | |
| Instant Runoff* | |
| Plurality with Runoff* | |
| Plurality* | |

Expected Social Utility Performance