

## CLEAR II

### Analytic Philosophy

Packet by Sam Braunfeld

1. Using the example of someone who never builds a squirrel house, Davidson introduced the “pure” form of this concept, countering his earlier analysis of it. In a counterexample to theories explaining this concept by its causal effects, a climber releases another climber due to nervousness, forming a deviant causal chain. In Grice's theory of meaning, the speaker must have this concept with respect to the hearer recognizing a prior instance of this concept. In an example identifying the actions of turning on a light and alerting a prowler, Davidson noted whether an action has this property may change with description, and then analyzed this concept as a way to describe actions in terms of their reasons. This concept “in action” is one of three uses of it distinguished at the beginning of a namesake text by Anscombe. For 10 points, name this property of actions that are planned.

ANSWER: **intention** [accept **reason** after “turning” and before mention]

2. This theory is challenged by Mele's zygote argument. Lewis accused an argument against this theory of conflating two types of counterfactuals concerning changes in natural laws. An argument for this theory claims the real question is whether we can give up reactive attitudes for objective ones. A hierarchical mesh version of this theory was presented in a paper comparing three drug addicts, including a wanton, by their second-order desires. An argument for this theory considers a case where Jones's brain could be controlled, yet need not be because he independently acts as the controller wishes, and so the principle of alternative possibilities is denied in that Frankfurt case. For 10 points, the Consequence argument against what theory uses the fixity of natural laws, of the past, and determinism to contradict free will?

ANSWER: **compatibilism**

3. If whenever a condition C obtains, this concept holds with respect to C, then C is luminous, and an argument that only trivial conditions are luminous depends on the safety condition of this concept on nearby possible worlds. The accuracy, adroitness, and aptness assessments of performance were developed to analyze this concept. That people accrue credit for the virtues they display is one solution to the value problem of this concept. Stanley and Williamson have argued against a distinction between two types of this concept, which was argued for by claiming the absence of one type would require considering infinitely many propositions before taking action, and was proposed by Ryle. One definition of this concept was challenged by an example using the false proposition “Jones owns a Ford” in a Gettier problem. For 10 points, name this concept sometimes defined as justified, true belief.

ANSWER: **knowledge**

4. The “full-blooded” form of this theory doesn't privilege any single universe, instead advocating plenitude. One argument against this theory advocates structuralism, and claims there can be no objects with only structural properties. Another argument against this theory is that the non-causal objects it posits cannot account for the reliability of its subject. Frege argued for this theory by claiming that for statements to be true, the singular terms appearing in them must exist, similar to the Putnam-Quine indispensability thesis argument for this theory. Formalism, which directly opposes this theory, claims its subject proceeds purely by syntactic transformations, as exemplified by Hilbert's treatment of geometry. For 10 points, name this theory claiming mathematical objects exist, so named because its description of them is similar to its namesake's theory of forms.

ANSWER: **Platonism** [or mathematical **realism**]

5. Contextualists such as DeRose resolve the problem posed by this theory by claiming standards change with conversational context. Dretske argued against this theory with an example considering whether zebras in a zoo were really mules. That argument against this theory was expanded on by the non-justified-true-belief definition of knowledge in Nozick's tracking theory, in which certain claims track truth but their entailments need not, and so denies the deductive closure principle. One argument against a formulation of this theory used the causal theory of reference to argue that words would refer to objects-in-the-image, and thus this claim couldn't even be properly formulated. The “Here is one hand” argument by Moore was meant to refute this theory with respect to the external world. For 10 points, name this theory positing doubt about our ability to know common-sense things.

ANSWER: **skepticism** [accept **closure** (or more specific forms) before mention; accept **idealism** after “Here is”; anti-prompt on “brain in a vat”]

6. Forbes claimed that without essentialism, this concept could hold without supervening on anything, which he called its “bare” type. Geach argued against Quine that when applying this concept under sortals, only a relative form exists. Frege gave the paradigmatic example of parallelism of lines for a criterion of this concept. Arguing that this concept only holds at a given instant, Lewis claimed that intrinsic changeable properties vanish if perdurance theory is denied. There are several puzzles concerning how to apply this concept to Tibbles the cat and the tail-complement Tibs. The counterpart relation aims to replace this relation between objects in possible worlds, and contrasts by being non-transitive. The ship of Theseus problem asks whether a ship bears this relation to the resulting ship after all the parts have been replaced. For 10 points, name this relation of sameness.

ANSWER: identity

7. Lewis introduced a distinction between attitudes involving one of these expressions and attitudes “de dicto.” An argument against direct reference theories of these expressions used the example of a shopper circling a store while spilling sugar, and introduced the “essential” type of these expressions. A logic for these expressions handles the non-pure type of them using a function transforming descriptions to directly referential terms in its LD structures, and that function is the Dthat operator introduced by Kaplan. If these expressions require speaker intention or pointing gestures to fix content, they are true demonstratives. For 10 points, name these expressions having an invariant character and a context-dependent content, such as “today” and “I”.

Answer: indexicals [accept demonstratives before mention]

8. Dummett used this property to disprove strict finitism in “Wang's Paradox”. Williamson has argued that if this property can be iterated twice, it can be iterated indefinitely, while discussing its “higher order” form. By examining a proof parallel to Kripke's refutation of contingent identities, where this property plays the role of contingency, Evans argued that objects could not have this property. Considering the propositions “The blob is pink” and “The blob is red”, Fine argued that penumbral truths cannot be respected by a truth-value account of this property, and, like Russell, used supervaluationism, claiming propositions with this property might be neither true nor false. The epistemic view claims that predicates with this property have an unknowable threshold. For 10 points, name this property exemplified by “being a heap” in the Sorites paradox, possessed by predicates with borderline cases.

ANSWER: vagueness

9. Topic-neutral analyses were introduced to explain secondary qualities in this theory. In a paper arguing for this theory, it was claimed epiphenomenal states would be “nomological danglers” off of normal causal chains. Lewis put forth a form of this theory where mental concepts are non-rigid after claiming the usual form of this theory accounts for mad, but not Martian, pain. Since anomalous monism is non-reductive, it is an example of the “token” type of this theory. The third lecture of *Naming and Necessity* presents the modal argument against this theory, claiming it requires contingent equality of rigid designators. The argument against this theory from multiple realizability led to it being largely replaced by functionalism. For 10 points, the claim that pain is just C-fibers firing is an example of what theory claiming mental states are just brain processes?

ANSWER: mind/brain identity theory [or physicalism; or materialism]

10. The “active” form of this principle was introduced using the example of Otto, who must consult his notebook to find a museum. The compatibility of this principle with self-knowledge has been argued both for and against by slow-switching arguments, which require that somebody unknowingly changes worlds. In one argument for this principle, Jane claims to have arthritis in her thigh, despite really having tharthrititis. Another paper, arguing for the semantic rather than content form of this principle, introduces division of linguistic labor to explain an example about the inability to distinguish a beach from an elm, which appears after an example that uses the fact that “water” is a rigid designator, and thus doesn't refer to XYZ. For 10 points, name this principle argued for in the Twin Earth thought experiment, summarized as “meanings just ain't in the head”.

ANSWER: externalism [accept more specific answers]

11. These propositions are treated as anaphors in van der Sandt's adoption of binding theory. These propositions were defined to be satisfied at some point if they would be left-redundant when added at that point, in a paper classifying embeddings as plugs, holes, or filters. Gazdar defined the potential type of these propositions, which might not become the actual type due to cancellation. The accommodation of these propositions occurs when one is

added to the common ground, thus requiring an update to the context set of possible worlds. The projection problem is to determine the rules for inheritance of these propositions, and their preservation under operators such as negation distinguishes them from entailments. For 10 points, name these propositions taken for granted in a conversation.

ANSWER: **presuppositions**

12. One theory of this device accounts for its mixed form by claiming it points to an expression in use. That theory by Davidson claimed this device functions as a demonstrative pointing to a particular expression-token. The reason this device introduces an opaque context can be explained by the theory that it gives a proper name of an expression, but that theory doesn't account for the similarity between the name and the expression named. A formula is evaluated before applying this device in Quine's "corner" form of it. This device is generally taken to show an expression is mentioned, rather than used. For 10 points, name this device used to refer to a sequence of characters contained between namesake punctuation, rather than whatever those characters may mean, such as when saying what someone else has said.

ANSWER: **quotation**

13. Strawson argued Austin's definition of this concept had a type-error, since one of the terms in a relation he used could not be things in the world. Dummett claimed the realist/anti-realist debate concerns a property of this concept. By showing how an infinite regress of premises, each explaining how to apply the previous ones, would be required for any argument, Quine challenged Carnap's conventionalist view of this concept. Since reference is more remote than this concept when performing radical interpretation, Davidson suggested meaning should be based on a theory of this concept instead, particularly on the Convention T of Tarski's inductively-defined semantic theory, which holds open-quote Snow is white close-quote has this property if and only if snow is white. For 10 points, correspondence theories hold a proposition has what property if it matches the state of the world?

ANSWER: **truth**

14. Peacocke argued against one theory of this phenomenon using an example of two trees at different distances. This phenomenon is analogized to fame in a theory claiming it occurs from probes elevating certain content. An objection to one theory of this phenomenon asks why rocks do not obtain it when someone has a belief about them, and is meant to counter the "higher order" theory of it. Transparency of experience is used to argue this phenomenon is fully exhausted by representational properties. A criterion for one type of this phenomenon is reportability, and that "access" type is available for use in reasoning, as opposed to the "phenomenal" type. The "explanatory gap" is the inability to explain this phenomenon from physical facts, and "What is It Like to Be a Bat" used its subjectivity to argue against physicalist theories of it. For 10 points, name this phenomenon, sometimes defined as self-awareness.

ANSWER: **consciousness**

15. This concept's namesake Markov condition gives a nice factorization of any distribution generated by an acyclic model with appropriate error terms. Woodward gave conditions for when fixing the value of a variable gives an intervention, which is used to correct problems with the notion of free agency used in manipulability theories of this phenomenon. Many theories of this phenomenon have preemption counterexamples, where one agent's actions precede and negate another's. Another theory of this phenomenon uses comparative similarity to define the "closer to actuality" relation, and excludes the use of backtracking counterfactuals, where the consequent occurs before the antecedent. For 10 points, by that theory of Lewis, E1 bears what relation to E2 if, were E1 not to occur, then E2 would not occur either?

ANSWER: **causation**

16. Prior proposed a solution to this problem by taking the disjunction of two types of statements, considering an example about tea-drinking in England and shooting New Zealanders. Hare's argument against one solution to this problem uses the example of a baseball game to claim rules require a game to be played, so those rules don't apply outside the game itself. That solution to this problem was Searle's, and considers the promise of Smith to pay \$5 dollars, claiming that promises tautologically create obligations. Naturalist solutions to this problem were refuted by the open question argument, which claimed the statement "A is good" is unanalyzable, and so the obligation to do good is insufficient. For 10 points, name this problem, sometimes called Hume's guillotine, of deriving prescriptive statements from descriptive ones.

ANSWER: is-ought problem [or ought-is problem; accept Hume's guillotine before mention]

17. The extrinsicness problem for this phenomenon arises under externalism because states can represent different things when embedded in different contexts. One problem about this phenomenon for role functionalism is that that theory would contradict Hume's dictum by positing necessary effects. The dual explanandum account of this phenomenon is challenged by Kim's supervenience argument. That argument is an extension of another against accounts of this phenomenon, which shows the completeness of physics and nonoverdetermination lead to epiphenomenalism. The exclusion argument could be resolved by identity theory, since then this phenomenon reduces to purely physical interactions. For 10 points, name this phenomenon by which the mind affects the world.

ANSWER: mental causation

18. Kripke claimed to resolve a critique of this theory by distinguishing between speaker's reference and semantic reference. Using the examples of a detective seeing the corpse of Smith, and seeing a man on trial for Smith's murder, Donnellan claimed this theory could only explain attributive, rather than referential, use. Strawson critiqued this theory for conflating expressions and their use, and for entailing, rather than presupposing, existential statements. Another critique of this theory considers the idea that Godel may have been a fraud, and points out that the central expressions are not rigid, unlike names. This theory used quantifiers in the logical form of negative existentials to explain how we seem to refer to non-existent objects. For 10 points, name this theory suggesting "the author of Waverley" be substituted for "Scott", presented in "On Denoting" by Russell.

ANSWER: theory of definite descriptions [or Frege-Russell theory; or descriptivism]

19. A critique of this theory, in which new evidence that murder suspect Mr. Dunnit has a twin removes an alibi, tried to show its namesake concept is not truth-conducive. One philosopher addressed the objection that this theory requires an infinite regress of metabeliefs with his Doxastic presumption, and introduced cognitively spontaneous beliefs to answer the isolation objection that this theory could endorse a system with no experiential grounding. The alternative systems objection notes there may be several systems for which this theory's namesake value is equal. In introducing virtue epistemology, Sosa compared this theory to a raft, as opposed to the pyramid of foundationalism. This theory dissolves the regress problem for justification by denying it makes sense to justify individual beliefs. For 10 points, name this theory that a set of beliefs is justified based on how well they support each other.

ANSWER: coherentism

20. This concept undergoes revision via a partial meet contraction of remainders in the AGM model. Playing on the name of this concept, Gendler introduced a related concept that directly activates behavioral responses, with examples such as the unwillingness to drink from a new bedpan. This concept is completely based on a tarot reading in Lehrer's gypsy-lawyer counterexample to causal accounts of the basing relation, which holds between an instance of this concept and the reason for it. A paper titled after this concept argues that certain problems for Millianism also appear for definite descriptions, by using translation and disquotation in place of substitution, and considers the proposition "Londres est jolie". In Quine's scientific holism, the rules of logic occupy a central place in our "web of" this concept. For 10 points, the scientific method was claimed by Peirce to be the best method for the "fixation of" what concept?

ANSWER: belief

1. The realizer form of this theory identifies mental states with physical events, while the role form identifies mental states with relational properties. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this theory that mental states are defined by their relations with each other and with physical behavior.

ANSWER: functionalism

[10] In *What Psychological States are Not*, Block and Fodor presented this type of argument against functionalism, imagining that another state, e.g. itches, were related to behavior and other mental states the same way pain is.

ANSWER: inverted qualia [or qualia inversion; or inverted spectrum; or spectrum inversion]

[10] That paper critiqued an early form of functionalism, in which mental states were taken to be the states of one of these formalizations of computers, which transition between states based on an input tape and their instruction set.

ANSWER: Turing machines

2. Michael Devitt accounts for one critique of this theory by claiming that repeated confrontations with an object can cause reference shift after the initial baptism. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this theory of reference that claims names refer due to a chain of speakers intending to use the name in the same way as other speakers they have heard.

ANSWER: **causal**-historical theory of reference

[10] This philosopher noted that the causal theory couldn't account for reference change due to error, using the example that "Madagascar" originally referred to part of the mainland, but was misunderstood by Marco Polo.

ANSWER: Gareth **Evans**

[10] This philosopher used the example that people could successfully refer to Feynman, and differentiate him from Gell-Mann, when presenting the causal theory in his lectures published as *Naming and Necessity*.

ANSWER: Saul **Kripke**

3. Dummett's acquisition and manifestation arguments against the realist position that the properties of the world are mind-independent starts by arguing mental states with this property cannot affect meaning. For 10 points each:

[10] Wittgenstein argued there cannot be a language for recording facts about mental states with this property, which are only knowable to their subject.

ANSWER: epistemic **privacy**

[10] This argument of Putnam against metaphysical realism uses the completeness and the Lowenheim-Skolem theorems to show that an ideal theory cannot be wrong.

ANSWER: **model-theoretic** argument

[10] Another version of Putnam's model-theoretic argument is based on permuting reference assignments, leading to a strong form of the inscrutability of reference, which is part of this philosopher's indeterminacy of translation.

ANSWER: Willard van Orman **Quine**

4. Since constructive empiricism holds that a theory only needs to be empirically adequate to be accepted, it only requires ontological commitment to these types of objects. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this type of object of which we have some sort of sensory experience. Constructive empiricism requires this experience be unaided, and so, for example, electrons are not this type of object.

ANSWER: **observables**

[10] This philosopher's foundationalist epistemology was based on knowledge by acquaintance, such as knowledge of sense-data or of one's own mental states. This man also co-authored the *Principia Mathematica* with Whitehead.

ANSWER: Bertrand **Russell**

[10] These higher-order sentences eliminate unobservable terms from a theory by existentially quantifying out over them. They were used by one of their sometimes-namesakes to define mental states in functionalism.

ANSWER: **Ramsey-Lewis** sentences [or **Ramsifications**; or **Ramseyifications**; accept anything mentioning **Ramsey** or **Lewis**]

5. Fine criticized identifying these properties with necessary ones by considering membership in singleton sets, and Quine argued against these properties by considering a cyclist who was also a mathematician. For 10 points each:

[10] Name these properties inherent to the very identity of objects, which are contrasted with accidental properties.

ANSWER: **essential** properties

[10] Kripke posited that belonging to the group, supposedly found in the world, designated by one of these terms is an essential property. Examples include a given species, such as tigers, or a given element, such as gold.

ANSWER: **natural kind** terms

[10] Kripke used natural kind terms to give examples of facts, such as "Water is H<sub>2</sub>O", that are necessary, but lack this property. Facts with this property, such as "All bachelors are unmarried", are knowable without experience.

ANSWER: **a priori** [or **analytic**]

6. This philosopher's namesake "Puzzle" concerns the opacity of identity and propositional attitude statements, and can occur in the *de dicto* contexts of Quine. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this philosopher. An example, due to Quine, of his namesake "Puzzle" is the difference between, "Lois Lane believes Superman flies" and, "Lois Lane believes Clark Kent flies".

ANSWER: Gottlob **Frege**

[10] In Frege's Puzzle, names for which this notion, the object represented, is the same cannot be substituted, leading Frege to posit the idea of "sense", the mode of presentation of this notion, in a work titled "On Sense and" this notion.

ANSWER: **reference** [or **Bedeutung**; or **meaning**; or **extension**; or **denotation**]

[10] This principle can fail in Frege's puzzle. It roughly states that the meaning of an expression is determined by its structure and the meaning of its parts, and explains how people can understand novel expressions.

ANSWER: **compositionality**

7. Schaffner critiqued Nagel's model of this process by noting that the target theory may need to be modified for it be carried out. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this process in which the terms of one field are expressed in the terms of another, supposedly simpler field. One example is the *Principia Mathematica*'s attempt to express arithmetic as logic.

ANSWER: theory **reductionism**

[10] A paper by Fodor subtitled "The disunity of" this field "as a working hypothesis" argues against reductionism. Arguments for the unity of this field frequently claim every other subfield reduces to physics.

ANSWER: **science**

[10] An account of reduction, particularly in biology, can be based on these concepts. A paper titled "Thinking about" these concepts by Machamer, Darden, and Craver defines them as activities that produce regular changes from start to termination conditions.

ANSWER: **mechanisms**

8. Montague semantics uses this operator for functional abstraction, using it, for example, to translate adjectives as functions from predicates to predicates. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this operator that produces anonymous functions. The ability to express any computable function using this operator is part of the Church-Turing thesis.

ANSWER: **lambda**

[10] The identification in Montague semantics of noun phrases with the set of individuals satisfying them lead to the "generalized" type of these things. In first-order logic, they include "for all" and "there exists".

ANSWER: **quantifiers**

[10] These sentences served as counterexamples for how Montague semantics used quantifiers, leading to discourse representation theory. The paradigmatic example states that every farmer who owns the namesake animal beats it.

ANSWER: **donkey** sentence

9. Kripke notably proposed that this argument offered a skeptical solution in the style of Hume, and that the private language argument followed as a corollary. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this argument, starting with the statement that no action could be determined by the namesake concept, because any action could be made to accord with that concept.

ANSWER: **rule following** argument

[10] Kripke claims Wittgenstein is being a skeptic with regards to this concept, which Wittgenstein elsewhere identifies with a word's use. Quine argued against defining synonymy in terms of identity for this concept.

ANSWER: **meaning**

[10] This frequent collaborator of Bob Hale has distinct arguments for Wittgenstein-as-skeptic, but is better known for starting Neologicism using Hume's principle and 2<sup>nd</sup>-order logic in *Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects*.

ANSWER: Crispin **Wright**

10. Yablo has suggested defining the conceptual form of this notion using the truth of the narrow content of a proposition. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this notion whose conceptual form arises from truth by virtue of the meaning of terms, which is stricter than its metaphysical form. Equalities of rigid designators can be used to separate those two forms of this concept.

ANSWER: **necessity**

[10] One argument for narrow content, which, unlike broad content, doesn't account for externalism, is that a given person should have privileged access to the mental content of this person, which may be false if all content is broad.

ANSWER: the **self**

[10] In this approach to possible world semantics, intensions are generalized by distinguishing between different possibilities for the actual world. Chalmers has defined narrow content using the diagonals of arrays it produces.  
ANSWER: **two-dimensional semantics**

11. Norton has claimed that this method is just picturesque embellishment of standard arguments, while Brown's platonistic view is that this method can yield a priori knowledge of the world. For 10 points each:

[10] Notable examples of this method in physics include Galileo considering how a cannonball and musket ball tied together would fall, and Einstein's consideration of an elevator in free fall.

ANSWER: **thought experiment** [or **gedankenexperiment**]

[10] Metaphilosophical debate about thought experiments has concerned the relation of this property with possibility. An argument that it doesn't entail possibility claims both Goldbach's conjecture and its negation have this property.

ANSWER: **conceivability**

[10] The relation between conceivability and possibility is central to discussion of these hypothetical people, used to argue against physicalism. These people lack qualia or consciousness, and were popularized by Chalmers.

ANSWER: philosophical **zombies**

12. Nagel's early work in ethics contained a critique a simple theory of this behavior, claiming that we need to consider motivated as well as unmotivated desires. For 10 points each:

[10] That simple theory of this behavior claims this behavior is rationalized by a desire and a belief that this behavior will achieve that desire.

ANSWER: **action**

[10] That critique appeared in Nagel's book titled for the "possibility of" this type of action. In biology, this type of action is defined as one that raises another organism's fitness, while lowering the agent's.

ANSWER: **altruism**

[10] Along with Stevenson, Nagel helped popularize this term, describing how we may hold someone morally responsible, even though much of what they are judged for is beyond their control.

ANSWER: **moral luck**

13. The belief and knowledge norms for this speech act require that the speaker believe or know, respectively, the proposition expressed. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this speech act of claiming a proposition to be true. According to Stalnaker's seminal model, this speech act must express a proposition that is not presupposed, but doesn't contradict what has been presupposed.

ANSWER: **assertion**

[10] Stalnaker's theory of assertion is a classic example of a theory of this type, in which expressions update some global context. In theories of this type, meaning is commonly described as "context change potential".

ANSWER: **dynamic**

[10] The belief-norm is similar to Grice's submaxim of quality, part of Grice's project in this subfield of philosophy of language that focuses on speaker meaning, as opposed to the focus on sentence meaning of semantics.

ANSWER: **pragmatics**

14. The speckled hen argument argues against the existence of objects named for this type of data, since then there may exist an object with an indeterminate number of spots. For 10 points each:

[10] This type of data describes mind-dependent objects we are directly aware of and that have exactly the properties they appear to have. Austin critiqued Ayer's theory of this type of data in a work titled "[This word] *and Sensibilia*".

ANSWER: **sense** data

[10] This concept names an approach to the problem of perception stating experience isn't relational, so there is no need for an object of experience. This concept, popularized by Brentano, is the mind's ability to represent things.

ANSWER: **intentionality**

[10] This argument against physicalism considers Mary the vision scientist, and asks what she learns if she finally sees colors. One response is that she merely gains a representationalist view of facts she already knew.

ANSWER: the **knowledge** argument

15. Kripke proved the completeness one of these systems called S5, later giving a semantics of possible worlds in Kripke frames, while Salmon used a Sorites construction to argue the inconsistency of the weaker S4. For 10 points each:

[10] Name these formal systems whose modal type includes operators for necessity and possibility.

ANSWER: **logics**

[10] A Kripke frame consists of a set of possible worlds together with this relation between them. When evaluating a sentence in a given possible world, modal operators are only taken to range over related worlds.

ANSWER: **accessibility** relation

[10] Kripke used Kripke frames and a forcing-esque relation to give a semantics for this logic developed by Brouwer. This logic is commonly used in constructive math, and lacks the law of the excluded middle.

ANSWER: **intuitionistic** logic

16. These utterances consist of a proposition endowed with illocutionary force, and Searle claimed a complete classification of them via seven aspects, such as direction of fit. For 10 points each:

[10] Name these utterances which Austin introduced with the claim that not all of them need to state some fact. Performative examples include declaring, predicting, promising, and apologizing.

ANSWER: **speech acts**

[10] Searle described this concept as an indirect speech act. In this concept's conversational form, the additional meaning is derived from context, while its conventional form is simply part of a statement's meaning.

ANSWER: **implicature**

[10] In his paper "The Logical Status of [this type of] Discourse", Searle used speech act theory to analyze it as pretending to make an assertion, and distinguishes it from lying, since the performer has no intention to deceive.

ANSWER: **fictional**

17. Substantivalists argue for an absolute notion of this concept, and Newton considered the concavity of the surface of water in a rotating bucket to support that view. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this concept that accounts for three of the four dimensions of the pseudo-Riemannian manifold used in models of general relativity.

ANSWER: **space**

[10] This argument against substantivalism in relativity considers automorphisms of spacetime that restrict to the identity outside a namesake neighborhood, forcing substantivalism to introduce indeterminism to the theory.

ANSWER: the **hole** argument

[10] The hole argument has been used to more generally analyze these types of transformations, generally taken to be ones that change the mathematical, but not physical, solution, and arise from extra degrees of freedom.

ANSWER: **gauge** transformation

18. Objectivists put constraints on these representations in addition to the laws of probability argued for by Dutch books, such as the principle of indifference, or requiring that these should maximize entropy. For 10 points each:

[10] Name these representations of degrees of belief before an update from new evidence.

ANSWER: **prior** distributions

[10] Dutch book arguments are used in this approach to epistemology in which priors are updated by conditioning on evidence, using its namesake's theorem that the  $P$  of  $B$  given  $A$  equals  $P$  of  $A$  given  $B$  times  $P$  of  $B$  over  $P$  of  $A$ .

ANSWER: **Bayesian** epistemology

[10] This generalization of ordinary conditionalization applies to cases where the evidence is not certain, although it may contradict the commutativity of observations.

ANSWER: **Jeffrey** conditionalization

19. C.L. Stevenson's form of this theory used two patterns of analysis for ethical statements, where the first pattern has the form, "I approve of this; do so as well". For 10 points each:

[10] Name this meta-ethical theory that holds ethical statements don't express propositions, but instead express the feelings of the speaker.

ANSWER: **emotivism** [or **expressivism**; prompt on "non-cognitivism"]

[10] A notable exposition of emotivism occurs in Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic*, which acquainted the English world with the work of this group of Logical Positivists, which included Carnap, Neurath, and Schlick.



ANSWER: **Vienna Circle**

[10] These counterexamples to emotivism use ethical statements as clauses of complex sentences, e.g. as the precedent and antecedent of a conditional.

ANSWER: **Frege-Searle-Geach** examples [accept any two of the underlined names; or **embedding** problem]

20. The “pessimistic meta” example of this form of reasoning claims that we should not believe our current scientific theories, since many scientific theories of the past have proven wrong. For 10 points each:

[10] Name this form of reasoning, whose namesake problem asks why we should believe something is true simply because it has repeatedly been true in the past.

ANSWER: **induction**

[10] Pessimistic meta-induction is an argument against this philosophy of science, which holds that we are ontologically committed to the unobservables of our best scientific theories.

ANSWER: scientific **realism**

[10] This type of realism claims that we are only committed to the mathematical relations between objects in our best theories. It comes in epistemic and ontic types, depending on its view of the existence of unobservables.

ANSWER: **structural** realism