

Secure Federated Learning With Fully Homomorphic Encryption for IoT Communications

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Abstract—The emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) has revolutionized people's daily lives, providing superior quality services in cognitive cities, healthcare, and smart buildings. However, smart buildings use heterogeneous networks. The massive number of interconnected IoT devices increases the possibility of IoT attacks, emphasizing the necessity of secure and privacy-preserving solutions. Federated learning (FL) has recently emerged as a promising machine learning (ML) paradigm for IoT networks to address these concerns. In FL, multiple devices collaborate to learn a global model without sharing their raw data. However, FL still faces privacy and security concerns due to the transmission of sensitive data (i.e., model parameters) over insecure communication channels. These concerns can be addressed using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), a powerful cryptographic technique that enables computations on encrypted data without requiring them to be decrypted first. In this study, we propose a secure FL approach in IoT-enabled smart cities that combines FHE and FL to provide secure data and maintain privacy in distributed environments. We present four different FL-based FHE approaches in which data are encrypted and transmitted over a secure medium. The proposed approaches achieved high accuracy, recall, precision, and F-scores, in addition to providing strong privacy and security safeguards. Furthermore, the proposed approaches effectively reduced communication overhead and latency compared to the baseline approach. These approaches yielded improvements ranging from 80.15% to 89.98% in minimizing communication overhead. Additionally, one of the approaches achieved a remarkable latency reduction of 70.38%. The implementation of these security models is nontrivial, and the code is publicly available at <https://github.com/Artificialleap-MBZUAI/Secure-Federated-Learning-with-Fully-Homomorphic-Encryption-for-IoT-Communications>.

Index Terms—Cognitive cities, federated learning (FL), homomorphic encryption (HE), Internet of Things (IoT), security.

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I. INTRODUCTION

THE Internet of Things (IoT) is a rapidly growing field that is revolutionizing how people interact with technology. The IoT is a network of interconnected devices, sensors, and other objects that are embedded with software and sensors that enable them to communicate and exchange data with each other and with other systems over the Internet. This technology could revolutionize various industries and applications, ranging from healthcare and transportation to agriculture and manufacturing [1].

One of the most promising areas for the IoT is in the development of smart cities. Smart cities are urban areas that leverage IoT technologies to improve the quality of life of their citizens by optimizing city services and infrastructure. By integrating IoT devices and systems into city infrastructure, smart cities can improve traffic flow, reduce energy consumption, enhance public safety, and provide a connected and efficient urban environment [2].

Despite its potential, the IoT presents significant challenges, particularly concerning privacy and security. The proliferation of IoT devices generates large volumes of sensitive data, making these devices vulnerable to cyberattacks and privacy breaches. For instance, smart cities gather data from various sources, including traffic sensors, surveillance cameras, weather sensors, and public transportation systems [3]. Similarly, IoT devices such as smart home devices, and industrial sensors generate vast amounts of data. The interconnected network of devices, sensors, and data in smart cities exacerbates security risks, magnifying their potential impact. Therefore, it is essential to address these issues effectively to maximize the potential of IoT and smart cities [4].

FL is a decentralized ML technique introduced by Google in 2017 [5]. It enables multiple participants to collectively train a shared model without sending their data to a central server. Instead, in FL, the data remain distributed and securely stored on each participant's device. FL has emerged as a promising solution to address the privacy and security challenges in smart cities associated with the proliferation of IoT devices and applications. By distributing the training process across multiple devices, FL eliminates the need to transfer sensitive data to a central server, thus reducing the risk of data breaches [6].

In the FL framework, each user trains the model using their own data and then transmits the updated model to a central server. The server aggregates the model updates from all

users and computes an updated version of the model. Next, the server returns the resulting updated model to each user. This iterative process continues until the model converges [1], [6]. FL has been applied in various domains, including image classification [7] and healthcare [8]. Its potential is particularly evident in IoT systems, in which data are generated by numerous heterogeneous devices and privacy is a significant concern [6]. In addition to its privacy protection benefits, the FL approach offers advantages over the centralized approach in terms of overhead. First, it reduces the amount of data that needs to be transferred over the network, which can be created a significant bottleneck in large-scale ML applications [9]. In addition, it reduces the communication overhead between nodes by allowing model parameters to be sent instead of the original training data. Finally, it effectively utilizes the computing resources of each node to disperse the computing and storage overhead. These advantages enable sensitive data from IoT applications to be shared securely [10].

Despite its potential benefits, FL also presents several challenges in IoT and smart city settings. These include the heterogeneity of devices, communication limitations, and the necessity for resilient and secure model aggregation mechanisms [11]. Moreover, despite its ability to preserve privacy, FL remains vulnerable to various attacks that could compromise its security and effectiveness. Addressing these challenges and mitigating these risks are critical to fully realizing the potential of FL in IoT and smart city applications [10]. The literature proposes multiple solutions to address the privacy concerns of FL, such as differential privacy [12], homomorphic encryption (HE) [13], and secure multiparty computation. These solutions aim to enhance the privacy and security of FL by incorporating techniques like noise injection, encryption, and secure computation, thereby safeguarding sensitive data during the model training process [14].

HE is a cryptographic technique that allows computations to be performed on encrypted data without decrypting them. This technique has several types, including partially homomorphic encryption (PHE), somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE), and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), with varying levels of computational capabilities. PHE allows only one type of operation (either addition or multiplication) to be performed on encrypted data, and the operation can be applied an unlimited number of times [15]. SHE permits addition and multiplication operations to be executed on encrypted data, but there is a limitation on the number of times these operations can be performed. Meanwhile, FHE enables an unrestricted number of addition and multiplication operations to be carried out on encrypted data without any limitations. HE is a powerful tool for data security in various domains, including cloud computing, data sharing, and ML [16].

As mentioned earlier, FHE is a cryptographic technique that allows computations to be performed on encrypted data without decrypting them. It was first introduced by Rivest et al. in 1978 [17], but practical implementations were not made available until several decades later. The first actual FHE scheme was proposed by Gentry in 2009 [18]. FHE enables secure data processing while maintaining data privacy, making it a crucial technology for various applications, such as cloud computing,

data sharing, and ML. Unlike traditional encryption methods that allow only limited operations on encrypted data, FHE enables unlimited computations on ciphertexts, making it a powerful tool for achieving secure and private data processing [19]. Therefore, FHE is a promising solution for secure data sharing in IoT and smart city applications.

Interest in using FHE for ML applications has increased in recent years. The combination of FHE and FL could enable secure and privacy-preserving distributed learning on sensitive data. It allows multiple parties to collaborate in training a model while keeping their data encrypted, thus ensuring privacy and security [20], [21]. However, integrating FHE and FL is complex and requires the exploration and development of advanced cryptographic techniques and ML techniques [22]. Despite existing challenges, the potential benefits of FHE and FL for secure and privacy-preserving ML make them a promising area of research with significant implications for the future of data-driven technologies.

This article describes the design of an efficient and secure approach by utilizing FL and FHE to address the privacy and security issues associated with IoT-enabled smart cities. The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows.

- 1) This study presents a new efficient and secure approach for addressing privacy and security issues in IoT-enabled smart cities by utilizing FL with FHE.
- 2) This work describes the design of a flexible approach that is adaptable to different IoT environments, resulting in four distinct scenarios that can be selected based on each use case's specific security and privacy needs.
- 3) Four scenarios are evaluated for security and efficiency using a benchmark IoT data set. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the scenarios in IoT environments.
- 4) This article concludes with a discussion and analysis of a case study.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II presents a review of related works. The methodology and proposed approach, consisting of four different scenarios, are described in detail in Section III. In Section IV, we present the experimental results conducted to evaluate the security and efficiency of the proposed scenarios in IoT environments using a benchmark IoT data set. Furthermore, we discuss a case study in Section V to demonstrate the practical applicability of the proposed approach. Finally, we conclude our work and suggest future research directions in Section VI.

II. RELATED WORK

FL and FHE are two techniques that can help improve the privacy and security of ML. In this section, we overview various approaches that have been proposed for using FL and FHE. McMahan et al. [5] proposed a communication-efficient learning technique for deep networks from decentralized data, which uses a form of FL called federated averaging (FedAvg). The authors also provided empirical results showing the effectiveness of their approach on real-world data sets. In another study, Rey et al. [23] suggested a privacy-preserving framework for detecting IoT malware. It utilizes FL to train and evaluate supervised and unsupervised models while avoiding

sharing sensitive data. This framework is intended to be implemented in network nodes that provide access to IoT devices on various networks like WiFi, 5G, or B5G. This will help offload the computation from IoT devices.

Numerous research studies have been published on FHE. For example, Gentry [18] introduced the first FHE scheme in his Ph.D. thesis, which Brakerski et al. later improved [24] to enable computation without bootstrapping. The proposed scheme is based on the learning with errors assumption and uses a novel approach called “modulus switching” to mitigate the noise accumulation problem inherent in FHE schemes. This scheme offers a promising alternative to bootstrapping-based FHE schemes and can be used in secure computation applications. Meanwhile, Cheon et al. [25] proposed a method for constructing an HE scheme that enables approximate arithmetic operations on encrypted messages. The method includes a rescaling procedure that truncates ciphertext into a smaller modulus, resulting in the rounding of plaintext and the addition of noise to the plaintext for security purposes. In addition, the proposed batching technique preserves the precision of plaintext after encoding. Unlike previous methods, the proposed method requires a ciphertext modulus of a linearly growing size and does not result in a significant precision loss during evaluation.

FL and HE are two promising techniques allowing privacy-preserving ML on decentralized and sensitive data. Recently, significant interest has been given to integrating these two techniques to enable privacy-preserving ML on sensitive and decentralized data. One of the earliest works on the integration of FL and HE was proposed by Fang and Qian [26]. This article proposed a multiparty privacy-preserving ML framework, called Paillier federated multilayer perceptron (PFMLP), which utilizes HE and FL to enable multiple users to perform ML without compromising their private data. The algorithm can train common models even when data is isolated, thereby providing an effective privacy data protection solution. PFMLP algorithm experiments demonstrate that a model trained by PFMLP is comparable to a model trained using all data on a single machine. In the process, all parties transmit the gradient data, and homomorphic operations are employed on the central computing server to fuse the gradients and update the learning model.

In another study [27], Zhang et al. proposed a weighted average algorithm determined by data quality to replace the common weight assessment method based on the amount of data. They also proposed a novel masking scheme based on HE and secure multiparty computation for FL. The proposed scheme aimed to achieve privacy-preserving FL in IoT-based healthcare applications with reduced computational overhead and increased security. Wang et al. [28] introduced a privacy-preserving FL scheme called blockchain-based privacy-preserving federated learning (BPFL) which is based on blockchain technology. The scheme uses Multi-Krum and HE to enable model aggregation and filtering at the ciphertext level, ensuring the privacy of local models while providing verifiability. A reputation-based incentive mechanism was also developed to encourage participation and honesty among users of the Internet of Vehicles. Security analysis and performance

evaluations show that the proposed scheme meets security requirements and improves the performance of the FL model.

There is a substantial amount of ongoing research in this field, and new techniques and methods are being proposed regularly. Our approach differs from previous work in the following ways. First, we use a clustering method to distribute the user into clusters to reduce the amount of communication between users and the server. Thus, each user does not need to send their individual encrypted weights to the server; instead, weights are aggregated at the cluster level and then sent to the server. Second, we employ four scenarios and conduct extensive empirical evaluations that demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in preserving privacy while achieving high accuracy on real-world data sets. Overall, our approach represents a significant advancement in privacy-preserving FL, with potential applications in fields such as IoT-enabled smart cities.

The proposed research aims to combine the strengths of FL and FHE to enhance communication efficiency and privacy preservation for distributed ML. The proposed method uses FHE to encrypt the model updates before sending them to the central server to reduce the number of communication rounds required for the FL process. This approach is expected to significantly reduce the communication overhead while maintaining the privacy and security of the model updates.

III. METHODOLOGY

This research aims to present a secure approach by utilizing FL and FHE to address privacy and security issues in IoT-enabled smart cities. The proposed approach consists of five main phases. First, users are randomly distributed into clusters to reduce the communication overhead between the users and the server. Second, each user conducts a local model training process using their local data. The third phase involves encrypting the weights of the local model using a public key cryptography scheme to maintain the privacy of users' data and model parameters (encryption takes place locally on the user's side). In the fourth phase, the server aggregates the encrypted model weights using FedAvg to compute the updated global model parameters, which are then returned to the users. Finally, the users decrypt the global model parameters and update their local model parameters accordingly for the next iteration.

The proposed approach leverages the security of public key cryptography and the encrypted model weight aggregation to maintain the privacy and security of the users' data and model parameters. The general approach is illustrated in Fig. 1. The general approach serves as the baseline methodology. In this scenario, each user initiates the training process by utilizing their respective local data sets and training their local models. These model weights are subsequently encrypted to ensure privacy and security. Users then transmit their encrypted weight updates directly to a centralized server. Upon receiving the encrypted weight updates from the users, the centralized server performs an aggregation process to combine and consolidate these updates.




Fig. 1. Overview of the general approach.

The server utilizes the FedAvg algorithm, which computes the average of the received weights, to update the global model parameters. The updated global model parameters are then transmitted back to the users. Upon receiving the updated global model parameters, users decrypt the weights to restore their original values. These decrypted weights are then used to update the parameters of their local models for the subsequent iteration of the training process. This ensures that each user's local model aligns with the most recent global model representation.

This scenario is implemented and evaluated using four different approaches. First, we present a comprehensive overview of the four approaches to highlight their differences. Then, we thoroughly analyze and discuss each approach, focusing on privacy and security issues in IoT-enabled smart cities. In the first approach, each user trains their local model using their own data. After that, users transfer weight updates to the global matrix. The users then apply encryption to the entire matrix before transmitting it to the server. At the server, the server aggregates the encrypted weights and computes the federated average to update the global model. Then, the server returns the updated global model to all users. Upon receiving the updated global model, the users decrypt the updated weights and incorporate them into their respective local models for the next iteration.

In the second approach, each user trains their local data and encrypts their model's weights. Subsequently, the users transmit the encrypted model weights to the global matrix. The server receives the encrypted global matrix, aggregates it, calculates the federated average, and updates the global model. Afterward, all users receive the disseminated updated global model. Upon receiving the updated global model, the users decrypt it and incorporate the decrypted weights into their respective local models, effectively aligning them with the global model.

In the third approach, we initially group the users into clusters. Every user in each cluster sends weight updates to

TABLE I
NOTATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS

Notation	Descriptions
N	Number of users
K	Number of clusters
D	Dataset, $D = \{D_1, D_2, \dots, D_N\}$
U	Set of users, $U = \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_N\}$
C	Set of clusters, $C = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_K\}$
T	Number of iteration
p	Number of users in each cluster, $p = N/K$
GM	Global model
LM	Local model
$\theta(0)$	Random initial values of model parameters
GCM	Global cluster matrix
Fed_Avg	Federated average
Enc_FHE	FHE encryption function
Dec_FHE	FHE decryption function
Enc_GCM	Encrypted global cluster matrix
Dec_GM	Decrypted global model parameters

the corresponding cluster matrix without applying encryption. The cluster matrices are encrypted before being sent to the server. Then, the server aggregates the weight updates from the cluster matrices and computes the federated average to modify the global model. Subsequently, the users receive the distributed updated global model from the server and update their local models accordingly.

In the last approach, the users are initially clustered into groups. Each user then trains on their local data, encrypts their updated weights, and transmits them to the cluster matrix to which they belong. After this, all cluster matrices are encrypted and sent to the server for aggregation, computing the federated average, and updating the global model. The server subsequently returns the updated global model to all users. Finally, each user decrypts the updated weights and adjusts its local model accordingly.

A. Proposed Approaches

This section outlines the four approaches, each of which involves five main stages: 1) definitions and initialization; 2) local training; 3) encryption; 4) global aggregation; and 5) local update. While the definitions and initialization and local update stages are consistent across all four approaches, there are differences in the local training, encryption, and global aggregation stages. Table I summarizes the notation and a description of how it is used in the four proposed approaches. The four approaches are described in detail in the following paragraphs.

1) *First Approach*: The one unencrypted cluster matrix (OUCM) approach starts with definitions and the initialization phase, where U is a set of users, and C is a set of clusters. Each user U_i has its own data set of size D_i , which is not shared with other users, where $D_i \cap D_j = \emptyset, \forall i \neq j$, where $i, j \in N$. The global model parameters $GM_{\theta(0)}$ are randomly initialized, the users are randomly distributed into clusters using a function f , and each cluster contains p users.

$f(U, K) = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_K\}, C_i = \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_p\}$. In the local training phase, each user uses the current global model parameters $GM_{\theta(0)}$ as the starting point to train their current local model $LM_{\theta_i(t)}$ on D_i using




Fig. 2. Overview of the OUCM approach.

a convolutional neural network (CNN) algorithm. The updated local model parameters $LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)$ are then computed as:

$\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) = LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) - LM_{\theta_i}(t)$, and the local model update is sent to the global cluster matrix GCM , where $GCM = \Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)$, for $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$. The entire matrix GCM is then encrypted using the FHE algorithm to obtain the encrypted weight update Enc_GCM as follows:

$Enc_GCM = Enc_FHE(GCM)$. In the global aggregation phase, the server aggregates and computes the FedAvg for Enc_GCM and updates the global model parameters $GM_{\theta}(t+1)$ as follows:

$GM_{\theta}(t+1) = (1/N) \sum Enc_GCM$, which are returned to all users. Once the users receive the updated global model parameters $GM_{\theta}(t+1)$, they decrypt the updated weights and update their local model for the next iteration as: $LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) = Dec_FHE(GM_{\theta}(t+1))$. This approach is demonstrated in Fig. 2.

- 2) *Second Approach:* The process of the one encrypted cluster matrix (OECM) approach is similar to that of the OUCM approach but contains a slight difference. After the definitions and initialization phase are applied, each user trains its local data and updates the local model parameters as in the first approach. Then, each user encrypts their local model using the FHE algorithm to obtain the encrypted weight update and send it to the global cluster matrix GCM as follows:

$$Enc_LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) = Enc_FHE(\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1))$$

$$GCM = Enc_LM_{\theta_i}(t+1).$$

The encrypted global matrix GCM is sent to the server for aggregation, and the FedAvg is calculated to update the global model parameters $GM_{\theta}(t+1)$, which are then returned to all users as follows:

$$GM_{\theta}(t+1) = (1/N) \sum GCM.$$

After receiving the updated global model parameters $GM_{\theta}(t+1)$, the user decrypts them and utilizes the updated weights to update its local model for the




Fig. 3. Overview of the OECM approach.




Fig. 4. Overview of the MUCM approach.

subsequent iteration, as in the first approach. This approach is shown in Fig. 3.

- 3) *Third Approach:* The many unencrypted cluster matrices (MUCMs) approach follows the definitions and initialization phase and builds upon the local training and model update steps of the previous approaches. Then, the users transmit their updated local model weights (without encryption) to the relevant cluster matrices CM_r as:

$$CM_r = \Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1), r = 1, 2, \dots, K.$$

The cluster matrices CM_r are first encrypted using the FHE algorithm before being sent to the server, thus updating the encrypted weight $Enc_CM_r = Enc_FHE(CM_r)$, $r = 1, 2, \dots, K$. These encrypted cluster matrices Enc_CM_r are then sent to the server, which aggregates and computes the FedAvg of the encrypted weights from all clusters. The server updates the global model parameters GM as follows:

$GM_{\theta}(t+1) = (1/N) \sum Enc_CM_r$, which are returned to all users. Finally, after receiving the updated global model parameters from the server, each user decrypts the weights and updates their local model accordingly,




Fig. 5. Overview of the MECM approach.

as in the previous approaches. This approach is depicted in Fig. 4.

- 4) *Fourth Approach*: The many encrypted cluster matrices (MECMs) approach follows a process similar to the third approach, with a slight difference. The definitions and initialization phase are the same as the previous approaches. After the users train their local models and update the weights, they encrypt the updated weights using the FHE algorithm to obtain the encrypted weight, they send it to the cluster matrix to which the user belongs, CM_r :

$$CM_r = \text{Enc_FHE}(\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)), r = 1, 2, \dots, K.$$

The cluster matrices CM_r are then sent to the server for aggregation and the computation of the FedAvg to update the global model parameters, which are then returned to all users. Once the users receive the updated weights from the server, they decrypt the weights and update their local models for the next iteration following the same process as in the aforementioned approaches.

This approach is illustrated in Fig. 5.

One of the main advantages of FHE is that it allows computations to be performed on encrypted data without the need for decryption, thus ensuring the privacy of the data. In the context of FL, this means that the server can perform FedAvg on encrypted data, which reduces the amount of communication needed between the server and the users and maintains the privacy of the data. The decryption process is performed on the user side, allowing the local data to be trained on the updated global model parameters while preserving the data's privacy.

Overall, each approach has tradeoffs and is better suited than the other approaches for specific scenarios depending on the privacy, security, and computational constraints. The most appropriate approach depends on the application requirements and data characteristics. Furthermore, research on FL is ongoing, and new methods and techniques are continually being developed to improve performance and privacy preservation. The pseudocode of the proposed approaches is given in Algorithms 1–4. The code is available in the GitHub [29].

Algorithm 1 OUCM

```

1: Input:  $D = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, y\}$ ,  $U = \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_N\}$ ,
    $C = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_K\}$ ,  $T$ .
2: Output: Secure approach by utilizing FL with FHE.
3: Split  $D$  into  $(D_{train})$  and  $(D_{test})$ 
4: for  $z$  from 1 to  $T$  do
5:   Distribute the users into clusters:
    $C_i = \{U_i, U_{i+1}, \dots, U_{i+p-1}\}$ 
6:    $\forall U_i$  trains  $D_{train_i}$  on  $LM_{\theta_i}(t)$ 
7:    $\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) = LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) - LM_{\theta_i}(t)$ 
8:    $\forall U_i$  send  $\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)$  to  $GCM$ :
    $GCM = \{\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)\}$ 
9:    $Enc\_GCM = Enc\_FHE(GCM)$ 
10:  Send  $Enc\_GCM \Rightarrow server$ 
11:  At server:  $GM = Fed\_Avg(Enc\_GCM)$ 
12:  Send  $GM \Rightarrow U_i$ 
13:   $\forall U_i$ :  $Dec\_GM = Dec\_FHE(GM)$ 
    $LM_i = Dec\_GM$ 
14: end for

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Algorithm 2 OEMC

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1: Input:  $D = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, y\}$ ,  $U = \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_N\}$ ,
    $C = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_K\}$ ,  $T$ .
2: Output: Secure approach by utilizing FL with FHE
3: Split  $D$  into  $(D_{train})$  and  $(D_{test})$ 
4: for  $z$  from 1 to  $T$  do
5:   Distribute the users into clusters:
    $C_i = \{U_i, U_{i+1}, \dots, U_{i+p-1}\}$ 
6:    $\forall U_i$  trains  $D_{train_i}$  on  $LM_{\theta_i}(t)$ 
7:    $\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) = LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) - LM_{\theta_i}(t)$ 
8:    $Enc\_LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) = Enc\_FHE(\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1))$ 
9:    $GCM = Enc\_LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)$ 
10:  Send  $GCM \Rightarrow server$ 
11:  At server:  $GM = Fed\_Avg(GCM)$ 
12:  Send  $GM \Rightarrow U_i$ 
13:   $\forall U_i$ :  $Dec\_GM = Dec\_FHE(GM)$ 
    $LM_i = Dec\_GM$ 
14: end for

```

Algorithm 3 MUCM

```

1: Input:  $D = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, y\}$ ,  $U = \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_N\}$ ,
    $C = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_K\}$ ,  $T$ .
2: Output: Secure approach by utilizing FL with FHE
3: Split  $D$  into  $(D_{train})$  and  $(D_{test})$ 
4: for  $z$  from 1 to  $T$  do
5:   Distribute the users into clusters:
    $C_i = \{U_i, U_{i+1}, \dots, U_{i+p-1}\}$ 
6:    $\forall U_i$  trains  $D_{train_i}$  on  $LM_{\theta_i}(t)$ 
7:    $\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) = LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) - LM_{\theta_i}(t)$ 
8:    $\forall U_i$  sends  $\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)$  to  $CM_i$ :
    $CM_i = \{\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)\}$ 
9:    $Enc\_CM_i = Enc\_FHE(CM_i)$ 
10:  Send  $Enc\_CM_i \Rightarrow server$ 
11:  At server:  $GM = Fed\_Avg(Enc\_CM_i)$ 
12:  Send  $GM \Rightarrow U_i$ 
13:   $\forall U_i$ :  $Dec\_GM = Dec\_FHE(GM)$ 
    $LM_i = Dec\_GM$ 
14: end for

```

B. Evaluation and Assessment

Various measures—including accuracy, recall, precision, F-score, loss function, communication overhead, latency, and security cost—are utilized to assess the performance of each approach. The accuracy, recall, precision, and F-score measures are determined using the confusion matrix.

A loss function is used to evaluate the performance of ML models and optimize them during training. The lower the loss function value, the better the model's predictions. The CrossEntropyLoss function is commonly used for classification problems and measures the difference between predicted probabilities and actual labels. We used the CrossEntropyLoss

Algorithm 4 MECM

```

1: Input:  $D = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, y\}$ ,  $U = \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_N\}$ ,
    $C = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_K\}$ ,  $T$ 
2: Output: Secure approach by utilizing FL with FHE
3: Split  $D$  into  $(D_{train})$  and  $(D_{test})$ 
4: for  $z$  from 1 to  $T$  do
5:   Distribute the users into clusters:
    $C_i = \{U_i, U_{i+1}, \dots, U_{i+p-1}\}$ 
6:    $\forall U_i$  trains  $D_{train_i}$  on  $LM_{\theta_i}(t)$ 
7:    $\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) = LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) - LM_{\theta_i}(t)$ 
8:    $Enc\_LM_{\theta_i}(t+1) = Enc\_FHE(\Delta LM_{\theta_i}(t+1))$ 
9:   Send  $Enc\_LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)$  to the  $CM_K$ :
10:   $CM_K = \{\Delta Enc\_LM_{\theta_i}(t+1)\}$ 
11:  Send  $CM_K \Rightarrow server$ 
12:  At server:  $GM = Fed\_Avg(CM_K)$ 
13:  Send  $GM \Rightarrow U_i$ 
14:   $\forall U_i$ :  $Dec\_GM = Dec\_FHE(GM)$ 
    $LM_i = Dec\_GM$ 
15: end for

```

function from the torch package to measure the loss function.

The communication overhead metric is important for assessing the amount of data that needs to be transmitted during the FL process. Minimizing the communication overhead is crucial for improving the efficiency of the FL process. We adhere to a procedure similar to that described in [30] and [31], in line with our methodology. This metric is calculated based on several factors, including the size of the weights (in bytes) of the encrypted local model SELM and global model SEG, the number of users participating in the FL process N , the number of clusters used in the FL process K , and the total number of training iterations T , as shown in

$$comm_overhead = [(SELM * K) + (SEG * N)] * T. \quad (1)$$

Latency is the time it takes for data to travel from the source (e.g., a sensor or device) to the destination (e.g., a cloud or server) and back. In other words, it is the time between the moment data are generated by a device and the moment they are processed, including encryption and decryption. Reducing the latency in IoT applications often involves optimizing the network infrastructure and communication protocols, as well as using edge computing and distributed processing. FL can also reduce latency by performing ML tasks on distributed devices. Latency is a crucial factor in many real-time and mission-critical applications. Therefore, reducing latency is essential for ensuring the reliability, responsiveness, and efficiency of these systems.

We compute the security cost following a similar process to that outlined in [32] in addition to a slight modification that we made to the equation, which is that we took into account the ground truth. Based on the Capital One data breach [33], misclassifying an attack can lead to a cost or loss of 100 million dollars. In contrast, correctly detecting an attack and taking the necessary countermeasures is estimated to cost 2 million dollars per attack. The false classification of benign samples was discouraged by assuming a high cost of 10 million dollar for misclassifying them. Meanwhile, correctly classifying benign samples costs 1 million dollars to maintain the system. The cost associated with the model outcomes are as follows: True Negatives (ζ_{TN}) cost \$1 million, True Positives (ζ_{TP}) cost \$2 million, False Positives (ζ_{FP}) cost \$10 million, and

TABLE II
DESCRIPTION OF INSTANCES IN N-BaIoT DATA SET BY IOT DEVICE

Device type	No.of benign	No.of Bashlite	No.of Mirai	No.of Attacks	Attacks + benign
IoT_1	175,240	312,723	610,714	923,437	1,098,677
IoT_2	88,648	633,050	652,100	1,285,150	1,373,798
IoT_3	13,113	310,630	512,133	822,763	835,876
IoT_4	226,781	1,258,797	1,893,455	3,152,252	3,379,033
IoT_5	52,150	323,072	0	323,072	375,222
Total	555,932	2,838,272	3,668,402	6,506,674	7,062,606

False Negatives (ζ_{FN}) cost \$100 million. We utilize these cost values in our sample data set to calculate the security cost, as shown in the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
& Security_cost \\
&= \frac{TP_{\zeta_{TP}Act_P} + TN_{\zeta_{TN}Act_N}}{TP_{\zeta_{TP}Act_P} + FN_{\zeta_{FN}Act_P} + FP_{\zeta_{FP}Act_N} + TN_{\zeta_{TN}Act_N}} \quad (2)
\end{aligned}$$

where Act_P and Act_N are the actual positive and actual negative (e.g., ground truth) in the confusion matrix.

The formula presented in (2) allows us to calculate the security cost of each classification outcome by multiplying the TPs, TNs, FPs, and FNs with the actual positives or actual negatives. This cost-based approach enables us to evaluate the performance of a classification model beyond accuracy, considering the specific costs associated with each type of classification outcome. When misclassifying an attack is much costlier than correctly identifying it, accuracy alone may not be a suitable evaluation metric. By computing the total cost based on specific cost values assigned to each classification outcome, we can evaluate the overall performance of a classification model in a more nuanced and context-specific way. This can help make informed decisions about deploying a model in a real-world setting, where misclassification errors can have significant consequences.

IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

This section presents the results of the experiments performed on the N-BaIoT data set to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approaches. The N-BaIoT data set [34] is a benchmark data set obtained from the University of California at Irvine ML repository [35]. It represents a real IoT network comprising various IoT devices. For convenience, we assigned symbols to these devices: the baby monitor is represented by IoT_1, doorbells by IoT_2, the thermostat by IoT_3, security cameras by IoT_4, and webcam by IoT_5. Furthermore, we conducted a case study to analyze and compare the performances of the four proposed approaches and determine the most effective one. A detailed description of the data sets used in the experiments is provided in Table II.

A. Experiments

The evaluations and experiments were carried out under consistent settings to ensure fair comparisons. A computer with 2 x AMD EPYC 7742 CPUs (128 cores in total with 256 threads) and 256-GB RAM was used for the experiments. The Anaconda Python framework version 3.9.12 was employed

TABLE III
BASELINE PERFORMANCE RESULTS

Devices	Accuracy	Recall	Precision	F1_score	Loss	Latency (Sec)
IoT_1	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.009	180.398
IoT_2	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.998	0.011	185.703
IoT_3	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.008	176.426
IoT_4	0.996	0.996	1.000	0.998	0.027	219.404
IoT_5	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.010	168.522




Fig. 6. Average latency of IoT devices.

to implement all approaches. The reliability of the results was ensured by repeating each experiment 30 independent times and reporting the average results. Furthermore, the experiments were performed with a fixed number of epochs of 30, a learning rate of 0.01, a momentum of 0.9, 100 users, and five clusters.

We evaluated the effectiveness of the four proposed approaches by measuring various performance metrics. For comparison, we also evaluated a baseline approach in which all the users sent their data to a centralized server. The experimental results show that the proposed approaches demonstrate a notable reduction in communication overhead, enhancing the privacy and security of the training process. Moreover, these improvements are achieved while maintaining similar levels of accuracy compared to the baseline approach.

- 1) *Baseline Approach*: In this scenario, the users directly send their own encrypted weight updates to a centralized server. The server then aggregates the updated weights from the users to update the global model parameters, which are returned to the users in order to update their local models accordingly. Table III shows the performance results of this approach. The table reports the accuracy, recall, precision, F1-score, loss, and latency (in seconds) for five IoT devices. The results show that the accuracy ranges from 0.996% to 0.998%, which indicates that the baseline approach performs well in terms of accuracy. All devices achieved high recall and precision, resulting in high F1-scores. Additionally, the loss values for all devices remain consistently low, indicating that the model is effectively optimized across the participating devices. Figs. 6 and 7 present the latency and communication overhead, respectively. The communication overhead is relatively high, requiring a total of 104 MB of data to be transmitted between the server and users. Furthermore, the latency ranges from




Fig. 7. Average overhead of IoT devices.

TABLE IV
OUCM PERFORMANCE RESULTS

Devices	Accuracy	Recall	Precision	F1_score	Loss	Latency(Sec)
IoT_1	0.840	1.000	0.840	0.912	0.693	155.852
IoT_2	0.936	1.000	0.936	0.967	0.692	161.156
IoT_3	0.985	1.000	0.985	0.992	0.693	151.261
IoT_4	0.933	1.000	0.933	0.965	0.693	196.186
IoT_5	0.860	1.000	0.860	0.924	0.693	143.873

168 to 220 s per epoch, which is quite high and could impact the real-time performance of the system.

- 2) *OUCM Approach*: Table IV shows the performance results of the OUCM approach, in which users are first clustered into groups. After updating their weights, each user transmits them to the global cluster matrix without encryption. The global cluster matrix is encrypted before being sent to the server for aggregation. The obtained results indicate a lower accuracy than the baseline approach, ranging from 0.840% to 0.985% across different IoT devices, with an average of 0.911%. The recall was consistently high at 1.000% across all devices, indicating that the approach correctly identified all true positives. The precision was also generally high. The F1-score, which is a weighted average of precision and recall, ranged from 0.912% to 0.992%, with an average of 0.949%. These results suggest that the OUCM approach can accurately detect anomalies in IoT devices. Figs. 6 and 7 illustrate the latency and communication overhead. However, the OUCM approach exhibits a considerably lower accuracy compared to the baseline approach. Nonetheless, the OUCM approach significantly reduced the communication overhead, as only 1.04 MB of data was transmitted between the server and the users. Furthermore, the OUCM approach shows a lower latency than the baseline approach, with a range of 144–197 s per epoch. Overall, the OUCM approach demonstrates promising potential in mitigating communication overhead and latency and detecting anomalies in IoT devices. However, further enhancements are required to improve the accuracy of this approach.
- 3) *OECM Approach*: In the second approach, users are grouped into clusters, and their weights are encrypted

TABLE V
OECM PERFORMANCE RESULTS

Devices	Accuracy	Recall	Precision	F1_score	Loss	Latency (Sec)
IoT_1	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.998	0.028	181.592
IoT_2	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.998	0.011	186.546
IoT_3	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.008	176.571
IoT_4	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.998	0.011	220.580
IoT_5	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.010	169.553

before being sent to the global matrix. This encrypted global matrix is then sent to the server for aggregation and updating, and the updated global model parameters are returned to the users.

The results of this approach are presented in Table V, which shows high accuracy levels ranging from 0.997% to 0.998%, with an average of 0.997%. The precision and recall measures also indicate excellent performance for all devices. The F1-score is also high, ranging from 0.998% to 0.999%, with an average of 0.998%. The communication overhead in the OECM approach is higher than in the OUCM approach due to the initial clustering of users and sending of encrypted weights to the global cluster matrix before aggregation. A total of 2.06 MB of data is sent between the server and users. However, the OECM approach has a higher latency, ranging from 170 to 221 s per epoch, which is higher than the latency of the OUCM approach. Figs. 6 and 7 provide visual representations of the latency and the communication overhead. Compared to the previously discussed approaches, the OECM approach achieves the highest accuracy levels and excellent precision and recall measures, indicating its superior performance in terms of model training and inference. However, the relatively high latency may limit the applicability of this approach in time-sensitive applications.

- 4) *MUCM Approach*: In this approach, users are grouped into clusters, and each user sends their unencrypted weight updates only to their corresponding cluster matrix. The cluster matrices are encrypted before being sent to the server for aggregation and the updating of the global model parameters. After updating the global model parameters, the server returns the encrypted global model parameters to the users.

The performance results of the MUCM approach, as shown in Table VI, indicate high accuracy, ranging from 0.997% to 0.998%, with an average of 0.998%. The approach also demonstrates high precision, recall, and F1-score. Compared to the previous approaches, the proposed approach shows significant improvements in reducing communication overhead and latency. The total communication overhead is 1.2875 MB, which is lower than in the OECM approach. The latency ranges from 37 to 91 s per epoch, which is lower than the OUCM and the OECM approaches. Visual representations of the latency and the communication overhead are shown in Figs. 6 and 7. Overall, the MUCM approach shows promising results in terms of accuracy, F1-score, precision, and recall, while

TABLE VI
MUCM PERFORMANCE RESULTS

Devices	Accuracy	Recall	Precision	F1_score	Loss	Latency(Sec)
IoT_1	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.998	0.013	49.646
IoT_2	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.998	0.025	54.258
IoT_3	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.008	44.932
IoT_4	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.998	0.011	90.173
IoT_5	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.011	36.644

TABLE VII
MECM PERFORMANCE RESULTS

Devices	Accuracy	Recall	Precision	F1_score	Loss	Latency(Sec)
IoT_1	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.008	182.911
IoT_2	0.997	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.011	187.720
IoT_3	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.019	178.524
IoT_4	0.995	0.995	1.000	0.997	0.015	223.719
IoT_5	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	0.010	169.296




Fig. 8. Security cost.

significantly reducing the communication overhead and improving the latency compared to the previous approaches.

- 5) *MECM Approach*: The fourth approach involves clustering users into groups, followed by the encryption of their updated weights before being sent to the corresponding cluster matrix. All cluster matrices are then sent to the server for aggregation and updating of the global model parameters, which are subsequently returned to the users to update their local models. Table VII presents the performance results of the MECM approach. The obtained results reveal high accuracy, with values ranging from 0.995% to 0.998%, with an average accuracy of 0.997%. The F1-score, precision, and recall are also high. Visual representations of the latency and communication overhead are presented in Figs. 6 and 7, respectively. However, the communication overhead and latency in this approach are higher than in the MUCM approach. Specifically, the total communication overhead is 2.06, and the latency ranges from approximately 170 to 224 s per epoch. Although the MECM approach shows similar accuracy values as the OECM approach, the former has a higher communication overhead and latency. Meanwhile, compared to the MUCM approach, the MECM approach shows slightly lower accuracy values but higher communication overhead and latency.

TABLE VIII
COMPARISON BETWEEN PROPOSED APPROACH AND PREVIOUS WORKS

Approach	Accuracy	Recall	Precision	F1-score	FL	Encryption technique
Baseline	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.998	Yes	Yes
OUCM	0.911	1.000	0.911	0.952	Yes	Yes
OECM	0.998	0.998	1.000	0.999	Yes	Yes
MUCM	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.999	Yes	Yes
MECM	0.997	0.997	1.000	0.998	Yes	Yes
[36]	0.760	0.834	0.834	0.789	No	No
[38]	1.000	0.999	0.999	0.999	Yes	No
[37]-RNN	0.644	-	-	-	No	No
[37]-LSTM	0.683	-	-	-	No	No
[39]-MEDNN	0.904	-	-	-	Yes	No
[39]-FCNN	0.904	-	-	-	Yes	No
[40]	0.751	0.751	0.751	-	Yes	No

Overall, the proposed approaches have demonstrated high accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score in detecting anomalies in IoT-enabled smart cities while also providing better privacy and security protection. The results indicate that these approaches can effectively maintain data privacy and security while also achieving high performance in detecting anomalies. Additionally, compared to the baseline approach, the proposed approaches exhibit significant improvements in communication overhead and latency. Therefore, the proposed approaches offer a practical solution to the challenges associated with securing data in IoT-enabled smart cities.

Fig. 8 shows the security scores of five different IoT devices evaluated using the four approaches and a baseline approach. The security score measures the approach's effectiveness in addressing security concerns related to IoT devices. The results indicate that all four approaches outperform the baseline approach in terms of security score for most IoT devices. The MECM approach consistently outperforms the three other evaluated approaches in terms of security score across all IoT devices, suggesting that this approach is a dependable and effective method for enhancing the security of IoT devices. While the OUCM, OECM, and MUCM approaches also demonstrated good security scores for specific IoT devices, the MECM approach outperformed them. The baseline approach exhibited lower security scores than the other approaches for all IoT devices, indicating its limited reliability for securing IoT devices.

Of note, the security score should not be the sole determining factor when selecting an approach to secure IoT devices. Other factors, such as communication overhead and latency, should also be considered. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of different approaches based on multiple criteria is essential to determine the most suitable approach for a specific use case. Overall, the results show that the four proposed approaches effectively address security concerns in IoT devices and outperform the baseline approach.

B. Comparison Between the Proposed Approach and the Literature

This section compares the proposed approaches (OUCM, OECM, MUCM, and MECM) with previous work in the

literature in terms of accuracy, recall, precision, and F1-score. Table VIII shows that the proposed approaches outperform most previous methods in terms of all four considered measures. Specifically, OECM, MUCM, and MECM achieved high accuracy, recall, precision, and F1-score (all above 0.997%), while OUCM achieved an accuracy of 0.911%.

Additionally, all the proposed approaches utilize FL and encryption techniques, which can enhance the privacy and security of an IoT system. Meanwhile, some previous works do not use these techniques [36] and [37] achieve lower performance scores, especially in terms of accuracy and F1-score. The technique in [38] achieved high accuracy, recall, precision, and F1-score. However, they do not use encryption techniques, which may compromise the privacy and security of the data. Overall, the proposed approaches (OUCM, OECM, MUCM, and MECM) perform well in IoT-based systems, with MECM being the best performing approach. Additionally, FL and encryption techniques can further enhance performance, while ensuring the privacy and security of the data. Therefore, these approaches offer practical solutions for addressing security concerns in IoT-based systems.

V. CASE STUDY

This case study aims to assess the effectiveness of four scenarios of the proposed approach in detecting general intrusions and injection attacks within the context of the Internet of Medical Things. The study uses various metrics, which were mentioned earlier (e.g., in the evaluation and assessment section), to measure the performance of the approach.

We conducted this study using the WUSTL-EHMS-2020 data set¹ [41], which was obtained from a real-time enhanced healthcare monitoring system (EHMS) test environment. This data set consists of 44 features, including 35 network flow metrics and eight biometric features of patients. The combinations of these two types of data makes this data set unique. The data set was collected at the University of New South Wales and includes man-in-the-middle attacks—specifically, spoofing and data injection attacks. Spoofing attacks involve an attacker eavesdropping on the communication between the gateway and the server, leading to a breach of patient data confidentiality, while data injection attacks involve an attacker altering packets in real time, compromising the data's integrity. The total numbers of benign and attack samples were 14 272 and 2046, respectively, [41] and [42].

The ground truths represent the correct classification of each sample. ML algorithms can generate either a binary classification output or a probability score indicating the likelihood of a sample being an attack or not. To assess the performance of the proposed approach, we map these probabilities to a class by setting a predetermined threshold. Then, during the prediction process, we compare the algorithm's output to the ground truths to determine whether the sample was classified correctly. In some cases, assigning different costs to different probabilities is necessary. In such instances, the security cost

¹<https://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/ehms/index.html>

TABLE IX
STATISTICS OF WUSTL-EHMS-2020 DATA SET

	Baseline	OUCM	OECM	MUCM	MECM
TP	352	359	361	366	370
TN	3772	3780	3778	3786	3787
FP	36	31	32	25	22
FN	31	21	20	14	12
Accuracy	0.984	0.988	0.988	0.991	0.992
F1-score	0.913	0.932	0.933	0.949	0.956
Attack error rate (FNR)	0.081	0.055	0.052	0.037	0.031
Benign error rate (FPR)	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.006
Security cost (general intrusions)	0.851	0.881	0.881	0.908	0.919
Security cost (injection attacks)	0.493	0.535	0.529	0.591	0.622

metric can be extended by considering the probability of each sample belonging to a particular outcome. For instance, if a sample has a prediction of 40% attack and 60% benign with the ground truth benign, then the sample's outcome probabilities would be $TN = 0.6$, $FP = 0.4$, $FN = 0$, and $TP = 0$. These probabilities would then be multiplied by outcome weights to calculate the sample's cost, considering the actual positive and negative values in CM.

The performance of the four approaches in detecting the general intrusion was evaluated using the same metrics and assumptions, while different assumptions were considered when evaluating injection attack detection. Consider a healthcare system that uses sensors to connect remote patients to clinics and transmits a patient's vital measurements, such as heart rate, over the network. This system enables doctors to monitor patients and recommend necessary treatments. However, these systems are vulnerable to injection attacks that can alter patients' biometrics and put them at risk. FNs, which arise when the ML algorithm fails to detect such an attack, and FNs, which occur when the ML algorithm declares an attack when one does not exist, can have serious consequences. While TNs and TPs may not be significant in terms of their potential impact, the cost associated with these outcomes can vary greatly. Consequently, the security cost weights were adjusted, with a higher cost assigned to FPs and FNs than to TNs and TPs. For example, if FPs and FNs are valued at \$100 million, while TPs and TNs are valued at \$1 million, the security cost weights can then be calculated based on these values.

The results in Table IX show how well the proposed approaches detected general intrusions and injection attacks on the WUSTL-EHMS-2020 data set. The results show that all approaches performed well in terms of accuracy and F1-score, with MECM achieving the highest scores for both metrics. FNR and FPR were also relatively low for all systems, indicating a good detection performance for both intrusion and benign traffic. Similarly, the MECM achieved the lowest security cost for both general intrusions and injection attacks, indicating that it is the most cost-effective system in terms of security. Overall, the results suggest that the MECM is the best performing system among the five evaluated systems for the WUSTL-EHMS-2020 data set in terms of accuracy, F1-score, attack error rate, benign error rate, and security cost.

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

In this article, we introduced four novel approaches, namely—OUCM, OECM, MUCM, and MECM—for implementing federated learning (FL) using FHE. FHE offers the ability to perform secure computations on encrypted data without requiring decryption, thus presenting a promising solution for preserving data privacy in distributed learning scenarios. We evaluated the effectiveness of these approaches by considering various factors, such as security cost, communication overhead, and latency. Then, we compared the outcomes of the proposed approaches to those of a baseline approach. The experimental results demonstrate that the four proposed approaches exhibited significant advancements. Specifically, we observed remarkable reductions in communication overhead of 89.98%, 80.15%, 87.71%, and 80.15% for the four approaches, compared to the baseline. These reductions highlight the efficiency of the proposed methods. Importantly, throughout our experimentation, we ensured that the key ML performance measures, including—accuracy, recall, precision, and F-score—remained uncompromised. Future work will optimize the proposed approaches by reducing communication overhead related to encryption and decryption. Additionally, the exploration of other privacy-preserving techniques, such as secure multiparty computation and differential privacy, in FL scenarios is planned. Furthermore, the proposed approaches will be evaluated using larger and more diverse data sets to ascertain their scalability and effectiveness in real-world applications.

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