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### Criminal Use of Information Hiding (CUIng) Initiative

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# CUING.ORG

eCrime Symposium 2016 6th – 7th October, 2016 in Bratislava, Slovakia



# Panel - Criminal Use of Information Hiding (CUIng) Initiative

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# Information hiding (IH): inspiration

- Information hiding is part of a wide spectrum of methods that are used to make secret data difficult to notice for the curious third party observers
- Steganography is one of the most well-known subfields of information hiding and aims to cloak secret data in a suitable carrier
- They have proved very handy and have been utilized and mastered by humankind throughout the ages
- Inspiration for such mechanisms is strongly related to phenomena observable in nature as they have their roots in nature



# Money laundering via Twitter? – The case of: *The Innocent five kittens posing in a garden*

- First tweet 2015 contained a transaction worth \$12m USD via Twitter
- Second tweet in mid-November 2015 the transaction was worth more than \$100m USD.

### Follow the money?






Summary		Transactions		
Address	1M8s2S5bgAzSSzVTeL7zruvMPLvzSkEAuv	No. Transactions	11	
Hash 160	dcdf2f9892bfa1cb086530354eab3ba078a2f090	Total Received	500,000.90367963 BTC	
Tools	Taint Analysis - Related Tags - Unspent Outputs	Final Balance	0 BTC	




# Follow the money (2) – Bitcoin transactions via proxy (12 months)





# Modern information hiding (IH)




### Many possible carriers exist – hard to monitor all of them!

Other types of information hiding are also possible:

- Traffic type obfuscation techniques
- Local covert channels
- Etc.

#### Distribution of information hiding-capable malware



Group 1: malware that embeds secret data by modifying a digital image file's structure

Group 2: malware that embeds secret data by using digital media steganography


Group 3: malware that injects secret data into network traffic



# Information concealment in networks




# What can be subjected to hiding in communication networks?






### Traffic type obfuscation techniques




- Traffic type obfuscation hides the nature of the network traffic flows by obfuscating the underlying network protocol
- It modifies the patterns and contents of network traffic between two network entities so that a third entity is not able to reliably identify the type of their communication i.e. the network protocol

## Characteristic malware traffic can be discovered






# Traffic impersonation example





# Network steganography

- The newest trend in information hiding
- Steganographic methods that utilizes as a hidden data carrier network protocols (PDUs and/or the way they are exchanged) and/or the relationships between them
- Steganographic opportunities in networks come from the increasing complexity and redundancy of protocols/services
- To provide undetectability:
  - Use of popular carriers
  - Use of anomalies that happen in the networks
  - Imitate behavior specific to certain types of traffic / protocols / services / users (mimicry)





# Aim of network steganography

- Network steganography techniques create covert (steganographic) channels for hidden communication but such covert channels do not exist in communication networks without steganography
- The main aim of the network steganography is to hide secret data in the normal transmissions of users without significantly altering the carrier used
- The scope of network steganography is limited to all information hiding techniques that:
  - can be applied to the network traffic to hide the exchange of data by creating covert communication channel(s)
  - are inseparably bound to the transmission process (carrier)
  - do not significantly alter the carrier



### Recent Example: SYNful Knock (data breaches)

- SYNful Knock is a type of persistent malware that allows an attacker to gain control of a device and compromise its integrity with a modified Cisco IOS Software image (via FireEye).
- SYNful Knock is a router implant different modules that are enabled via the HTTP protocol (not HTTPS) and controlled by crafted TCP packets sent to the device.
- Even the presence of the backdoor was difficult to detect as it uses non-standard packets as a form of pseudo-authentication.
- It was implanted via poorly configured routers (weak / default credentials).
- Attackers gain full control of the router and the traffic passing through it.
- A total of 199 unique IP Addresses have been identified worldwide as affected [via Shadowserver]
- No vulnerabilities appear to have been used in the spread of this implant.



#### Information hiding in the "DDOS scene"


#### ST Common architecture

- Front-end, public face (portal): bratistresser.com
  Bullet proof front-end hosting: Cloudflare?
- Means to get paid: from paypal to bitcoins
- Set of servers able to spoof traffic: BlazingIO, Ecatel/Quasi/Novagara,
   Verdina...
- "Add-ons" infrastructure: Ampl. Scanners, Open Proxies, Compromised servers/stations, IoT gadgets



### IoT botnets (1)

- 8th September 2016 VDOS take down
- Recorded > 600 Gbps at Akamai/Prolexic, 1
   Tbps at OVH
- 24<sup>th-</sup>26<sup>th</sup> September 2016. Multiple attack vectors L3-4, L7 and GRE
- Malware was first spotted in May 2016. DdoS.87.
- GayFgt, Lizkebab, Torlus or BashLite, BashOday, Bashdoor.
- > 1 Million devices infected → rather in the 300K for Mirai
- 30<sup>th</sup> September source released





### IoT botnets (2)

- Mirai Botnet has a few large building blocks
- Scanner/Brute forcer
- Server side:
  - Reporter (collects passwords)
  - Loader (push malware into device)
  - Command and control (control of attacks)





#### Hiding communication channels

- Communication with command and control is done by same port that the heavy scanning service 23,2323.
- Communication protocols are advertised as ASCII but turned out to be binary protocols

# IoT botnets (3)

Username/Password	Manufacturer	Link to supporting evidence		
admin/123456	ACTi IP Camera	https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory		
root/anko	ANKO Products DVR	http://www.cctvforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=44250		
root/pass	Axis IP Camera, et. al	http://www.cleancss.com/router-default/Axis/0543-001		
root/vizxv	Dahua Camera	http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=5192.0		
root/888888	Dahua DVR	http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=5035.0		
root/666666	Dahua DVR	http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=5035.0		
root/7ujMko0vizxv	Dahua IP Camera	http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=9396.0		
root/7ujMko0admin	Dahua IP Camera	http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=9396.0		
666666/666666	Dahua IP Camera	http://www.cleancss.com/router-default/Dahua/DH-IPC-HDW4300C		
root/dreambox	Dreambox TV receiver	https://www.satellites.co.uk/forums/threads/reset-root-password-plugin.101146/		
root/zlxx	EV ZLX Two-way Speaker?	?		
root/juantech	Guangzhou Juan Optical	https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11114012		
root/xc3511	H.264 - Chinese DVR	http://www.cctvforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=56&t=34930&start=15		
root/hi3518	HiSilicon IP Camera	https://acassis.wordpress.com/2014/08/10/i-got-a-new-hi3518-ip-camera-modules/		
root/klv123	HiSilicon IP Camera	https://gist.github.com/gabonator/74cdd6ab4f733ff047356198c781f27d		
root/klv1234	HiSilicon IP Camera	https://gist.github.com/gabonator/74cdd6ab4f733ff047356198c781f27d		
root/jvbzd	HiSilicon IP Camera	https://gist.github.com/gabonator/74cdd6ab4f733ff047356198c781f27d		
root/admin	IPX-DDK Network Camera	http://www.ipxinc.com/products/cameras-and-video-servers/network-cameras/		
root/system	IQinVision Cameras, et. al	https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory		
admin/meinsm	Mobotix Network Camera	http://www.forum.use-ip.co.uk/threads/mobotix-default-password.76/		
root/54321	Packet8 VOIP Phone, et. al	http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:W1phozQZURUJ:community.freepbx.org/l/packet8-atas-phones/411		
root/00000000	Panasonic Printer	https://www.experts-exchange.com/questions/26194395/Default-User-Password-for-Panasonic-DP-C405-Web-Interface.html		
root/realtek	RealTek Routers			
admin/1111111	Samsung IP Camera	https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory		
root/xmhdipc	Shenzhen Anran Security Camera	https://www.amazon.com/MegaPixel-Wireless-Network-Surveillance-Camera/product-reviews/B00EB6FNDI		
admin/smcadmin	SMC Routers	http://www.cleancss.com/router-default/SMC/ROUTER		
root/ikwb	Toshiba Network Camera	http://faq.surveillixdvrsupport.com/index.php?action=artikel&cat=4&id=8&artlang=en		
ubnt/ubnt	Ubiquiti AirOS Router	http://setuprouter.com/router/ubiquiti/airos-airgrid-m5hp/login.htm		
supervisor/supervisor	VideoIQ	https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory		
root/ <none></none>	Vivotek IP Camera	https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory		
admin/1111	Xerox printers, et. al	https://atyourservice.blogs.xerox.com/2012/08/28/logging-in-as-system-administrator-on-your-xerox-printer/		
root/Zte521	ZTE Router	http://www.ironbugs.com/2016/02/hack-and-patch-your-zte-f660-routers.html		

Sample Miria hijacked IOT logins



- BGP hijacks used to inject spam
- Increase of routing hijacks related to Stress Testing Services / DDOS
- Nullrouting victim → Nullrouting attackers servers

Hiding interception(1)



- Backconnect AS203959 hijacks hidden servers from VDOSS where spoofed traffic was generated. Hijack is < 1h</li>
- More route hijacks in the last six months (brief and prepending ASPATH to hide the hijacker)

# Hiding interception (2)



- Three lessons learned
- Command control protocols inside DDOS or Scanning Activity
- Hijacking traffic in the name of other ASNs
- Daisy chaining (free) CDNs solutions.

How the hide?



#### Criminal Use of Information Hiding (CUIng) Initiative



- Criminal Use of Information Hiding (CUIng) Initative is set up in cooperation with the Europol European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) – launch in June 2016 and here @ Bratislava
- By working jointly and combining experiences from experts from academia, industry, law enforcement agencies, institutions etc. it may be possible to tackle the information hiding problem while it is still not so widely-deployed
- We are open for new members from academia, industry, LEAs and institutions. If you are interested please contact us using: info@cuing.org

Website: <a href="mailto:cuing.org">cuing.org</a>



# The main objectives of CUIng

- Raise Awareness: inform about the threat that information hiding techniques can pose. Increase sensitivity to cybercriminals' information hiding potential exploitation e.g. in companies
- **Track Progress:** monitor sophistication and complexity of information hiding techniques found in the wild used by cybercriminals, terrorists, spies, etc.
- Threat Intelligence: bring together security professionals from institutions, academics and industry to distribute information and share experience from different angles
- Work Jointly: cooperate and benefit from joint potentials to develop effective countermeasures and integrate it on a global scale (or at least EU level)
- Educate & Train: make law enforcement agencies, companies, institutions, individuals etc. ready and fully prepared to react to potential cybercriminals' information hiding exploitation



# Requirements/prerequisites for success

- **Propagate information** about the initiative widely among potentially interested stakeholders (security professionals, academics, law enforcements, companies, institutions etc.) to get their attention and to create a "critical mass"
- Create coordinated joint platform that is easily accessible and intuitive which will serve as a hub to transfer/share experience, information and knowledge and to document the progress of steganography exploitation for malicious purposes
- Acquire funding various stakeholders interested in developing effective countermeasures e.g. security products vendors or financial institutions can be interested in funding grants to support initiative activities. This initiative can form also a consortium to propose a project e.g. for H2020 programme (EU)
- Meetings organization of events (e.g. conferences) at which networking, brainstorming and direct transfer of the experience, information and knowledge would be possible
- **Training** organization of trainings related to information hiding. This can be also treated as a potential source of funding. If a "critical mass" is formed then it will be possible to develop trainings directed to different types of stakeholders (e.g. financial institutions, LEAs, agencies, companies, forensic investigators, etc.)



## Our current activities

- We are using <u>Europol Platform for Experts EC3 SPACE</u> as our working & contact space
- We have started collecting relevant reports, publications and documents on criminal use of information hiding techniques
- We gather & share the following information:
  - General information on information hiding: provides general overview on the subject
  - Scientific publications: relevant scientific publications (mostly surveys) which present current state-of-the-art in information hiding in academia
  - Steg-capable malware: analyses of real-life malware that is utilizing information hiding techniques for its purposes. Reports are mostly delivered by security professionals mostly from anti-malware companies) and share specific details on the malicious software and its techniques



eCrime Symposium 2016 6th – 7th October, 2016 in Bratislava, Slovakia



# Panel - Criminal Use of Information Hiding (CUIng) Initiative

**Cuing.org** 

info@cuing.org





Consulting for business

purpose; better

possibility to evaluate

threats and risks

Consulting and

informing the public and

the industry reg.

threats/risks

Better understanding of

threats and risks

**Industry** 

Law-

enforcement

**Public** 

# Renefits matrix

predictions on future threats and risks as well as on application scenarios of IH.

Bring improved

countermeasures to the market

as fast as possible

Being able to prepare for future

**IH-based threats** 

Support for the free expression

of opinions in censored parts of

the Internet (e.g. as journalists

or political opposition)

PhDs.

Enhance the security

pipeline within the

enterprise or the

development pipeline of

products by means of well-

trained experts.

Make all the personnel

involved in court/trials more

aware of IH-based threats.

Make the public opinion

aware of such mechanisms,

which can definitely account

for a more wise perception

of the modern Internet.

CRIMINAL	USE OF INFORMATION HIDING		Deficition inaction		
Benefits	Better understanding of IH-based threats	Benefit of having improved countermeasures	Benefits of understanding how IH can be improved	Awareness/Training	
			Achieving advances in IH in academia before they are found		
Academia	Better opportunity to support industry, law-enforcement agencies and public	Providing Industry/LEAs/Public new countermeasures; improved view on detectability/preventability of	cybercriminals fosters the "fast" development of	Improve the awareness of future professionals / researchers by means of adhoc courses for students and	

selected hiding methods

Protection of sensitive business

data (data leakage protection,

DLP); protection against IH-

based malware; development

of new anti-malware and DLP

solutions (new market)

Protection of confidential information; Consulting and

informing the public and the

industry reg. countermeasures;

protection against IH-based

malware/foreign secret service's data exfiltration

Profit from better protected

industry and enhanced LEA

capabilities; improved security

of public information

infrastructure