

# Verifying functional correctness of message-passing programs in Coq

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# Type checking message-passing programs using session types

## Example program:

```
let (c, c') = new_chan () in
fork {let x = recv c' in send c' (x + 2)};
send c 40; recv c
```

## Session types:

$c : !N. ?N.\text{end}$     and     $c' : ?N. !N.\text{end}$

## Properties obtained:

- ✓ Type safety / session fidelity
- ✗ Functional correctness

# How to prove functional correctness of message-passing programs

Combine

- ▶ **Session Types** [ [Honda et al., ESOP'98](#) ]
  - ▶ Type system for channels
  - ▶ Example:  $!N.?N.end$
  - ▶ Ensures safety automatically through static type checking
- ▶ **Concurrent Separation Logic** [ [O'Hearn & Brooks, CONCUR'04](#) ]
  - ▶ Logic for reasoning about concurrent programs with mutable state.
  - ▶ Example:  $\{x \mapsto a * y \mapsto b\} \text{ swap } x \ y \ \{x \mapsto b * y \mapsto a\}$
  - ▶ Establish functional correctness through interactive or semi-automated proofs

A concurrent separation logic for proving **functional correctness** of programs that combine message passing with other programming and concurrency paradigms

- ▶ New notion of **dependent separation protocols** for reasoning about message passing in separation logic
- ▶ Integration with **Iris** and its existing concurrency mechanisms
- ▶ Verification of feature-complete programs including a variant of map-reduce
- ▶ A full mechanization of all of the above in Coq with tactics for interactive program proofs

## Dependent separation protocols

### Dependent separation protocols:

Example:

$$!(x : \mathbb{N}) \langle x \rangle \{10 < x\}. ? \langle x + 2 \rangle \{\text{True}\}. \text{end}$$

### Session types:

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$$!N. ?N. \text{end}$$

# Dependent separation protocols

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Example:

$$!(x : \mathbb{N}) \langle x \rangle \{10 < x\}. ? \langle x + 2 \rangle \{\text{True}\}. \text{end}$$

Protocols:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prot} &\triangleq ! \vec{x} : \vec{\tau} \langle v \rangle \{P\}. \text{prot} \\ &\quad | ? \vec{x} : \vec{\tau} \langle v \rangle \{P\}. \text{prot} \\ &\quad | \text{end} \end{aligned}$$

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$$!N. ?N. \text{end}$$

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$$\begin{aligned} \text{st} &\triangleq !T. \text{st} \\ &\quad | ?T. \text{st} \\ &\quad | \text{end} \end{aligned}$$

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Duality:

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{! \vec{x} : \vec{\tau} \langle v \rangle \{P\}. \text{prot}} &= ? \vec{x} : \vec{\tau} \langle v \rangle \{P\}. \overline{\text{prot}} \\ \overline{? \vec{x} : \vec{\tau} \langle v \rangle \{P\}. \text{prot}} &= ! \vec{x} : \vec{\tau} \langle v \rangle \{P\}. \overline{\text{prot}} \\ \overline{\text{end}} &= \text{end} \end{aligned}$$

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# Proof rules for dependent separation protocols

## Dependent separation protocols:

$\{\text{True}\}$   
 $\text{new\_chan } ()$   
 $\{(c, c'). c \multimap \text{prot} * c' \multimap \overline{\text{prot}}\}$

$\{c \multimap !\vec{x}:\vec{\tau} \langle v \rangle \{P\}. \text{prot} * P[\vec{t}/\vec{x}]\}$   
 $\text{send } c (v[\vec{t}/\vec{x}])$   
 $\{c \multimap \text{prot}[\vec{t}/\vec{x}]\}$

$\{c \multimap ?\vec{x}:\vec{\tau} \langle v \rangle \{P\}. \text{prot}\}$   
 $\text{recv } c$   
 $\{w. \exists \vec{t}. (w = v[\vec{t}/\vec{x}]) * c \multimap \text{prot}[\vec{t}/\vec{x}] * P[\vec{t}/\vec{x}]\}$

## Session types:

$\text{newchan } () : st \otimes \overline{st}$

$\text{send} : (!T.st \otimes T) \multimap st$

$\text{recv} : ?T.st \multimap (T \otimes st)$



## Example – Dependency between messages

**Example program:**

```
{True}  
  let (c, c') = new_chan () in  
  fork {let x = recv c' in send c' (x + 2)};  
  send c 40; recv c  
{w. w = 42}
```

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### Dependent separation protocols:

$$c \mapsto !(\ell : \text{Loc})(x : \mathbb{N}) \langle \ell \rangle \{ \ell \mapsto n \}. ? \langle () \rangle \{ \ell \mapsto (x + 2) \}. \text{end}$$
$$c' \mapsto ?(\ell : \text{Loc})(x : \mathbb{N}) \langle \ell \rangle \{ \ell \mapsto n \}. ! \langle () \rangle \{ \ell \mapsto (x + 2) \}. \text{end}$$

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# Soundness of Actris

If  $\{\text{True}\} e \{v. \phi(v)\}$  is provable in Actris then:

- ✓ **Type safety/session fidelity:**  $e$  will not crash and not send wrong messages
- ✓ **Functional correctness:** If  $e$  terminates with  $v$ , the postcondition  $\phi(v)$  holds

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Obtained by modeling Actris as an embedded domain-specific logic in **Iris**



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your own domain specific higher-order separation logics with  
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- ▶ **Powerful:** supports reasoning about intricate concurrent programs



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- ▶ **Modeling logics:** can be used to model domain-specific logics
- ▶ **Tactics in Coq:** for interactive correctness proofs of programs



# Implementation and model of Actris in Iris

## Approach:

- ▶ Implement `new_chan`, `send`, and `recv` as a library using lock-protected buffers
- ▶ Define  $c \rightsquigarrow \textit{prot}$  using Iris's invariant and ghost state machinery
- ▶ Prove Actris's proof rules as lemmas in Iris

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- ▶ Implement `new_chan`, `send`, and `recv` as a library using lock-protected buffers
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- ▶ Prove Actris's proof rules as lemmas in Iris

## Benefits:

- ✓ Can readily reuse all powerful reasoning mechanisms of Iris
- ✓ Can readily reuse Iris's support for interactive proofs in Coq
- ✓ Actris's soundness result is a corollary of Iris's soundness
- ✓ Very small Coq mechanization  
(200 lines for channel implementation and proofs, 1000 lines for the definition and proof rules of  $c \rightsquigarrow \text{prot}$ , 450 lines for Coq tactics specific for message passing)



# Demo in Coq

