

You're Going to Connect to the Wrong Domain Name

@erbbysam

DEFCON 25 PACKET HACKING VILLAGE

whoami

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DC23, DC24 black badge (Badge Challenge, Co9)



The opinions expressed here are my own &
no one was phished in the creation of this presentation



Typosquatting

Humans are not perfect, we mistype domain names. A malicious person can register these mistyped domain names.

Only 2 of the 61 1-keyboard letter off variants of americanexpress.com are unregistered.

Example:

qmericanexpress.com

Expires:2018-01-06T00:00:00 Created:2008-01-06T00:00:00 Updated:2017-01-06T00:00:00

Registrar:ABOVE.COMPTYTLTD.

americanexpress
snweuxsbwzoewaa
wjrtov**w**mrcltrdd
qks**d**j dqhss dsee
z dfkfzjdd fdww

XX

ZZ

Bitsquatting

A form of typosquatting, but one where the computer gets the domain name wrong by flipping a bit.

eoogle-analytics

011001**0**1 01101111 01101111 01100111 01101100 01100101 00101101 01100001 01101110 01100001 01101100 01111001 01110100 01101001 01100011 01110011
011001**1**1 01101111 01101111 01100111 01101100 01100101 00101101 01100001 01101110 01100001 01101100 01111001 01110100 01101001 01100011 01110011

google-analytics

Bitsquatting - Searching for Domains

foogle-analytics.com Expires:2017-09-14T00:00:00 Created:2011-09-14T00:00:00 Updated:2016-08-13T00:00:00 Registrar:MARKMONITORTINC.

eeogle-analytics.com no record

Bitsquatting - Example

Registered eoogle-analytics.com

Used Let's Encrypt to get a TLS certificate

Found a misconfigured server, but within 24 hours saw 2 “hits”

```
HTTPServerRequest(protocol='http', host='www.eoogle-analytics.com',
method='GET', uri='/r/_utm.gif?[removed]', version='HTTP/1.1',
remote_ip='[removed]', headers={'Accept-Language': 'ja-JP, en-US;q=0.8', 'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate', 'X-Wap-Profile': 'http://[removed].com/[removed].xml', 'X-Getzip': 'supported', 'Host': 'www.eoogle-analytics.com', 'User-Agent': '[removed]', 'Accept-Charset': 'utf-8, iso-8859-1, utf-16, *;q=0.7', 'Connection': 'keep-alive', 'X-Requested-With': 'com.android.browser', 'Referer': 'http://[removed].net/823.html', 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache', 'Cookie': 'VisitorID=[removed]&Exp=11/12/2018 9:13:02 AM'})
```

```
HTTPServerRequest(protocol='https', host='www.eoogle-
analytics.com', method='GET', uri='/analytics.js',
version='HTTP/1.1', remote_ip='[removed]', headers={'Save-Data':
'on', 'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.8', 'Accept-Encoding':
'gzip, deflate, sdch, br', 'Host': 'www.eoogle-analytics.com',
'Accept': '*/*', 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.0.2;
P01V Build/LRX22G) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/58.0.3029.83 Safari/537.36', 'Connection': 'keep-alive',
'Referer': 'http://www.[removed].lk/channel/'}))
```

```
174 <script type="text/javascript">
175 var gaJsHost = ((https:" == document.location.protocol) ? "https://ssl." : "http://www.");
176 document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='" + gaJsHost + "eoogle-analytics.com/ga.js' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E"));
177 </script>
178 <script type="text/javascript">
179 try {
180 var pageTracker = _gat._getTracker("");
181 pageTracker._trackPageview();
182 } catch(err) {}</script>
183
```

Bitsquatting - gTLD

.got

01100111 01101111 011101**00**
01100111 01101111 011101**10**

.bom

0110001**0** 01101111 01101101
0110001**1** 01101111 01101101

.gov

.com

IDN Homoglyphs

IDN = “Internationalized domain name”, stored as punycode (xn--*)

Homoglyphs are 2 characters that look the same

Example:

xn--ggle-55da.com = **google**.com

xn--e1anr4f.com = **TIME**.com

Depending on the IDN and your browser,
you may see:

xn--ggle-55da.com

Or

google.com

IDN Homoglyphs - Identification

I wanted to conduct a survey of existing homoglyphs in IDN domain names against popular .com domains...

3 options to gather domain names:

- 1) zone files (hard/impossible to acquire)
- 2) Certificate Transparency
- 3) Third party lists (\$\$\$)

Google “pilot” CT log contains
~100 million certificates

- 400GB (compressed)
- ~96.5 million domain names
- searchable (crt.sh)
- A great source of utilized domain names

IDN Homoglyphs - Identification Continued

Another reason for using Certificate Transparency - if a certificate was registered, the domain was more likely to be used

Let's build a pipeline:

[Google CT Pilot log] → [parse CN, SAN domains] → [filter punycode .com domains (xn--*.com)]

Cross Reference:

- 1) Pipeline list, rendered as unicode, passed through the python unidecode package (ex. P → P)
- 2) Alexa top 1 million domains

End result:

1,938 CT certificates containing impersonating domains, modified Chromium unit test for punycode display status

https://github.com/erbbysam/IDN_imitators

IDN Homoglyphs - Cross Referenced Results

κ, 22, 0x138, "LATIN SMALL LETTER KRA"

96074858, 1509667199, xn--faceboo-jhb.com, faceboK.com , κ, [facebook.com](#), 3, 1

86142753, 1507679999, xn--autodes-jhb.com, autodesK.com , κ, [autodesk.com](#), 697, 1

ł, 5, 0x142, "LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH STROKE"

94011919, 1524055021, xn--ppe-8ka60c.com, àłe.com , àł, [apple.com](#), 69, 1

94724468, 1500291180, xn--sack-01a.com, słack.com , ł, [slack.com](#), 205, 1

ı, 100, 0x131, "LATIN SMALL LETTER DOTLESS I"

18331655, 1488327078, xn--reddt-q4a.com, reddit.com , ı, [reddit.com](#), 7, 1

95900673, 1500493680, xn--t-fka.com, tı.com , ı, [ti.com](#), 3235, 1

84518766, 1497998760, xn--gml-kua34j.com, gmàı.com , àı, [gmail.com](#), 22463, 1

95900424, 1500493860, xn--fat-jua.com, fıat.com , ı, [flat.com](#), 54102, 1

94504694, 1509148799, xn--curacao-egamng-hgc.com, curacao-egamıng.com , ı, [curacao-egaming.com](#), 524456, 1

94724500, 1500493920, xn--suzu-kza.com, uısuзу.com , ı, [isuzu.com](#), 866480, 1

ѝ, 25, 0xec, "LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH GRAVE"

95900680, 1500670920, xn--twtr-7raz.com, twittér.com , iè, [twitter.com](#), 11, 1

85019386, 1507161599, xn--polonex-3ya.com, polonięx.com , i, [polonix.com](#), 1595, 1

83724035, 1497798600, xn--gma-pma40b.com, gmaıl.com , il, [gmail.com](#), 22463, 1

IDN Homoglyphs - More Cross Referenced Results

2 interesting domains observed bypasses Chromium checks by using only cyrillic characters:

07022746, 1443571199, xn--80aac5cct.com, **taobao**.com , таобао, taobao.com, 10, 1

10303999, 1461542399, xn--e1anr4f.com, **tiMe**.com , тиме, time.com, 817, 1

IDN Homoglyphs - Results Contd

A breakdown of the unicode blocks observed:

89 LATIN

25 CYRILLIC

16 HEBREW

14 GREEK

8 KATAKANA

4 ARABIC

3 HANGUL

2 HIRAGANA

1 RUNIC

1 MALAYALAM

1 CANADIAN SYLLABICS

IDN Homoglyphs - Canadian Aboriginal Syllabics

Firefox & Chromium IDN checks were bypassed(punycode value was not displayed) for the following sample domains. Firefox & Chromium security bugs were reported.

http://xn--youtue-084a.com/ -- youtube.com -- example domain

http://xn--youtube-z72a.com/ -- youtUbe.com -- example domain

http://xn--uny-8wq.com/ -- Punny.com -- example domain

http://xn--oor-hxq.com -- ddoor.com -- example domain

http://xn--ego-73q.com/ -- LLego.com -- example domain

http://xn--fc-lym.com/ -- fc2.com -- example domain

http://xn--ulu-7sr.com/ -- Hulu.com -- example domain

http://xn--acebook-yp9a.com/ -- Facebook.com -- example domain

Chromium - CVE-2017-5076

Firefox - CVE-2017-7764

IDN Homoglyphs - Policy to the Rescue

While a domain name may render in a browser, you may not be able to register it!

<https://www.verisign.com/assets/idn/idn-canadian-aboriginal.html>

The screenshot shows a web page from Verisign. At the top left is the Verisign logo. Below it is a blue header bar with the text "BACK TO VERISIGN, INC. <". The main title "Registration Rules" and subtitle "Canadian Aboriginal" are centered in a large blue section. Below this, there is a table with three rows of information:

Registry	Verisign Inc.
Script	Canadian Aboriginal
Version	1.0

Personal Mitigations

Don't click links

Use a password manager

Certificate Transparency Fun - Graph of Key Types

Key Types Observed Over Time



Certificate Transparency Fun - Most Common Key Types

RSA2048	78019787
secp256r1	9556582
RSA4096	9447685
RSA1024	484262
RSA3072	45921
secp384r1	39336
RSA512	3026

78019787 RSA2048	10 RSA2050	2 RSA4000	1 RSA3819
9556582 secp256r1	10 RSA2028	2 RSA3957	1 RSA3817
9447685 RSA4096	9 RSA511	2 RSA3925	1 RSA3779
484262 RSA1024	9 RSA3120	2 RSA3892	1 RSA3629
45921 RSA3072	9 RSA3000	2 RSA3210	1 RSA3400
39336 secp384r1	9 RSA2078	2 RSA3092	1 RSA3336
3026 RSA512	8 RSA4906	2 RSA2890	1 RSA3228
2429 RSA8192	8 RSA3087	2 RSA2481	1 RSA3224
1847 RSA2432	8 RSA2304	2 RSA2400	1 RSA3200
418 DSA2048	7 RSA4192	2 RSA2222	1 RSA3163
314 RSA4056	7 RSA2043	2 RSA2182	1 RSA3132
229 RSA1023	7 RSA1280	2 RSA2148	1 RSA3124
226 RSA3248	6 RSA8000	2 RSA2142	1 RSA3103
217 RSA2560	6 RSA4100	2 RSA2136	1 RSA3102
213 RSA2084	6 RSA3073	2 RSA2128	1 RSA3100
195 RSA2047	6 RSA2612	2 RSA2098	1 RSA3098
184 RSA2056	6 RSA2040	2 RSA2087	1 RSA3070
166 RSA2049	5 RSA3584	2 RSA2086	1 RSA3052
153 secp521r1	5 RSA3456	2 RSA2060	1 RSA3049
153 RSA4092	5 RSA3333	2 RSA2042	1 RSA3047
146 RSA3096	5 RSA3192	2 RSA2038	1 RSA3028
131 RSA4048	5 RSA2176	2 RSA2014	1 RSA2999
129 RSA4098	5 RSA1234	2 RSA1924	1 RSA2942
127 RSA16384	4 RSA8092	2 RSA1825	1 RSA2857
124 RSA4086	4 RSA4089	2 RSA16348	1 RSA2685
118 RSA4069	4 RSA4068	2 RSA1204	1 RSA2642
110 RSA1536	4 RSA4024	2 RSA1026	1 RSA2600
72 RSA1048	4 RSA3600	1 RSA9216	1 RSA2580
68 RSA768	4 RSA3128	1 RSA8888	1 RSA2549
65 RSA2058	4 RSA3071	1 RSA8184	1 RSA2344
64 RSA2408	4 RSA3027	1 RSA8182	1 RSA2342
63 RSA2096	4 RSA2066	1 RSA8172	1 RSA2319
52 RSA3024	4 RSA2052	1 RSA7168	1 RSA2291
41 RSA4095	4 RSA2051	1 RSA7094	1 RSA2240
37 RSA3076	4 RSA2045	1 RSA7024	1 RSA2220
30 RSA4046	4 RSA1369	1 RSA5487	1 RSA2190
27 RSA4196	4 RSA1042	1 RSA5192	1 RSA2175
24 RSA8096	4 RSA1034	1 RSA5096	1 RSA2160
23 RSA2064	4 RSA1028	1 RSA5048	1 RSA2146
22 RSA2046	3 RSA4090	1 RSA5001	1 RSA2111
21 RSA5120	3 RSA3702	1 RSA5000	1 RSA2094
21 DSA1024	3 RSA3172	1 RSA500	1 RSA2088
20 RSA2345	3 RSA3080	1 RSA4608	1 RSA2068
20 RSA2024	3 RSA30720	1 RSA4321	1 RSA2059
19 RSA8196	3 RSA3050	1 RSA4198	1 RSA2057
19 RSA4094	3 RSA2536	1 RSA4099	1 RSA2053
19 RSA3768	3 RSA2480	1 RSA4080	1 RSA2044
19 RSA2736	3 RSA2054	1 RSA4076	1 RSA2039
17 RSA2080	2 RSA9192	1 RSA4072	1 RSA2018
16 RSA1025	2 RSA8392	1 RSA4065	1 RSA2010
15 RSA4088	2 RSA8191	1 RSA4013	1 RSA16383
14 RSA6144	2 RSA7680	1 RSA4007	1 RSA16318
14 RSA4097	2 RSA6095	1 RSA4006	1 RSA1548
14 RSA15360	2 RSA5012	1 RSA3983	1 RSA1506
13 RSA3048	2 RSA4611	1 RSA3972	1 RSA13999
12 RSA4028	2 RSA4444	1 RSA3971	1 RSA1027
12 RSA15424	2 RSA4114	1 RSA3931	1 RSA10240
11 RSA2948	2 RSA4084	1 RSA3904	1 RSA1000
11 RSA1212	2 RSA4082	1 RSA3889	1 DSA512
10 RSA2848	2 RSA4042	1 RSA3875	

Questions?

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