# Homework #3

Due date: 26 November 2021

#### Notes:

- For Question 5, you can use a Python module for arithmetic in GF(28).
- You are expected to submit your answer document as well as the Python codes you used.
- Zip your programs and add a readme.txt document (if necessary) to explain the programs and how to use them.
- Name your winzip file as "cs411 507 hw03 yourname.zip"
- 1. (10 pts) You are in a job interview, and you were given the following RSA parameters:

C=

 $21000202784665228236404895052572788342254876258143969814982532821954936\\ 40367632414901866601611030793241685730477419473507311190940215876219605\\ 68992564251499575153695010352276351424008748971409946951098601517468716\\ 12968786725786196380163877362337513482433638170770214772432995708021921\\ 92093103420652939359741759068556271288862908012816502348800235533259918\\ 74310497676417671135535823121979117339520847820264954549100267870376726\\ 28893171835588445525167559613346276025954740271946011695869017100396289\\ 86085787895096899294580498390533337572059767829455424943511035813633079\\ 12166755386987973685164853834583531209150315638560160174994069597269429\\ 85803728450806902572479261565515904585380720764427396714868810685366733\\ 37462683356233212594721433039278161283184382964225806397802344898418328\\ 97953928274712924887560685975172164724444045948993850479815287161644772\\ 54952160524473824260276330759495551998024615539930721545947311060583151\\ 12677901229368375168009859683369385012524321503008887679722582310123171\\ 82800441928577419507189904989872944869947373385462904190716225171693307$ 

## CS 411-507 Cryptography

99305887915917505982513696010753820504785696894665705120622810313910372 98369888256

 $e = 2^4+1$ 

You are asked to retrieve the plaintext "M" using only these given parameters, the plaintext is a 224-bit number.

(**Hint**: M << N) Show your work.

**2. (20 pts)** Alice encrypts the private factors of the modulus using her public key. In order to increase security, she multiplies them with a random integer *k* (a process called blinding). Namely, she performs the following operations

 $c_p = (kp)^e \mod n$  and  $c_q = (kq)^e \mod n$ ,

#### where:

n =

18016967477268905563885869924237258318694694336616829663559951667154254 15350566907236623817747326344055800049299153637253721328398852948471122 98934415070718037497994987901057024834445360039881326605869504515689214 85304029859205942961337503869882361605623121993326145107472663215509236 90859424172665179765204844084148761662222708803978630071030127595680427 73433414147374890267703683035733691623498609428609058257948201518389640 69214466547295717749202921921883501704394777572542253453842979793225488 82895223302425219597319124605217762070912435239286501893859858247497583 9794084019278727267278105611462802519248548604231 e = 65537

- **a.** (10 pts) Explain why this is not secure as anyone who obtains  $c_p$  or  $c_q$  can factor n.
- **b.** (10 pts) Factor *n* assuming

 $c_p =$ 

 $986782016050004825543163892795029444288885745280201735645350541631009 \\ 180800660514585614546374307414257312119957188330368713468391535529328 \\ 305705433922418657570849716762294906328900289163319406932056840710653 \\ 722386482118408045189085908826847482666326911671663732450399154333046 \\ 256787673529560916423829458985417864495069525985371090831680587439606 \\ 951598183522363038901585650937936426933477871635741523943988158837140 \\ 019635535298989662229750637821587570030339534955432609996593857534808 \\ 796327777368126655811080085382675645814611516277504237808251898719871 \\ 9244527931248529407936517480053439914000262764515874170885567089$ 

 $c_q =$ 

140485344653232305453253541357793353734644094796221306042212463008486 867889142210276208096483328329570105315597285881500662659086635261398  $443067377767076093757227153830106938300278798793373699966020065909456\\722039790524852202466196247254192511739897825946433464711577525755039\\777294504202544756726064388700840696445149734752437885742480806227783\\619420121086163506676892917625075927337438013330173446517514997106470\\475425697415313033568912140628155188167270039696438820747157339456501\\943472541922448841484481633265820448818049183612239036547890769484404\\49087391682096234090950225916257119515328501420323582955047875300$ 

and decrypt the following ciphertext

 $c_m =$ 

 $531014076826388911268676698266348523272414732277954807833668971962310\\073834447607178348718953370311072128032122169756314494284204288117190\\422438510764513279016218123337535786170972809550717384798816391717581\\485975593412194590682972595418863988620421820667934763737807791704838\\548868611739551969299729646869586176563745077172924371197728715717082\\750727129873004911058732002225784984510612987022760899569965068787981\\947855610299498625772813932344427342036437407237131596635528693560677\\634086942386606453592552799727788449224649069428861520090111591170505\\3893536184781927590935953156270349338459654278881122216658517446$ 

and print out the plaintext message.

**3.** (**16 pts**) Consider the Geffe generator of three LFRSs (LFSR<sub>1</sub>, LFSR<sub>2</sub>, and LFSR<sub>3</sub>) with the following connection polynomials:

$$C_1(x) = x^7 + x^5 + 1$$
  
 $C_2(x) = x^{13} + x^7 + x^3 + 1$   
 $C_3(x) = x^{11} + x^2 + 1$ 

You also observed the following output sequence of the Geffe generator:

```
z = [0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0]
```

Can you find the initial states of LFSR<sub>1</sub>, LFSR<sub>2</sub>, and LFSR<sub>3</sub>?

**4. (5 pts)** We challenge you to get the plaintext of a ciphertext C that was calculated using an RSA setting, however, we lost the decryption keys, we only have the following:

```
N = 237540380304900134239
C = 226131284405640469226
e = 2^16+1
```

(RSA Encryption: me mod N | Decryption: Cd mod N)
Can you retrieve the message using only these information? If yes, show how.

## CS 411-507 Cryptography

- Once you find the message, send it to your TA "Anes", the first one to solve it and send the message to the TA would receive an extra 5 pts.
- You are not allowed to use external tool (including online tools).
- **5.** (**14 pts**) Consider GF( $2^8$ ) used in AES with the irreducible polynomial p(x) =  $x^8+x^4+x^3+x+1$ . You are expected to query the server using  $get\_poly()$  function which will send you two binary polynomials a(x) and b(x) in GF( $2^8$ ). Polynomials are expressed as bit strings of their coefficients. For example, p(x) is expressed as '100011011'. You can use the Python code "client.py" given in the assignment package to communicate with the server.
  - **a.** (7 pts) You are expected to perform  $c(x) = a(x) \times b(x)$  in  $GF(2^8)$  and return c(x) as bit string using *check\_mult()* function.
  - **b.** (7 pts) You are expected to compute the multiplicative inverse of a(x) in  $GF(2^8)$  and return  $a^{-1}(x)$  using *check\_inv()* function.
- **6. (35 pts)** Consider ten digests in the attached file "rainbow\_table.py", each of which is the hash of a six-character password. Your mission is to find those passwords using the rainbow table given in the attached file "rainbowtable.txt". Complete and submit the Python code in the file "rainbow\_table.py" such that it finds and prints out the ten passwords corresponding to the digests.