Q1)

We know our message m is 224 bit number. Thus, if we check the number of bits of maximum valued number with power e, we can see that it is much less than modulo n.

```
Maximum number with 224 bits: 26959946667150639794667015087019630673637144422540572481103610249215

Maximum number of bits when the 17th power is taken: 3808

n bit length: 4096

c bit length: 3809

e bit length: 5
```

3808 bits << 4096 bits.

Therefore, we can say that $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{m}^{\mathbf{e}}$ or $\mathbf{c}^{\mathbf{e}}(1/\mathbf{e}) = \mathbf{m}$ directly from RSA equations.

Firstly, I tried to use second equation which is $c^{(1/e)} = m$ to find message. However, I could not take the power of cipher. I make some research and find different algorithms which implement this power problem. Then, I realized our maximum 224 bit number's 17^{th} power's length is smaller than c which shows an **inconsistency** with the problem.

The maximum number in 224 bits = 2**224 - 1

However, even its 17th power is not close to cipher bit length. Therefore, I decided use pow(2, 224) check whether it is given correct bit length or not.

Surprisingly, pow(2, 224) is giving the same cipher when it is encoded.

```
upper_bound = pow(2,224)
lower_bound = pow(2,223)

for i in range(upper_bound, lower_bound, -1):
    if pow(i, e,n) == c:
        print("We found it!")
        break

print("Message:", i)
print("Message number of bits: ", i.bit_length())
```

Output:

```
We found it!
Message: 26959946667150639794667015087019630673637144422540572481103610249216
Message number of bits: 225
```


Thus,

Message:

26959946667150639794667015087019630673637144422540572481103610249216

Q2)

Part A:



Part B:

Since we showed if we know c_p or c_q values, we can factorize n to find p and q values. I followed below simple algorithm steps:

```
n = 1801696747726890556388586992423725831869469433661682966355995166715425415350566907236623817747326344055800049299153637253721328
e = 65537

cp = 986782016050004825543163892795029444288885745280201735645350541631009180800660514585614546374307414257312119957188330368713468
cq = 140485344653223065453253541357793353734644094796221306042212463008486867889142210276208096483328329570105315597285881500662659

cm = 531014076826388911268676698266348523272414732277954807833668971962310073834447607178348718953370311072128032122169756314494284

p = gcd(cp, n)
q = gcd(cp, n)
phi_n = (p-1)*(q-1)
d = modinv(e, phi_n)
print("p:", p)
print("d:", d)

m_ = pow(cm,d,n)
print("d:", d)

m_ = pow(cm,d,n)
print("in")
print(m_.to_bytes((m_.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big'))
print("\nReversed?")
print("\nReversed?")
print(m_.to_bytes((m_.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big')[::-1])
```

I found following outputs:

```
p:
1199302732515557018914438656103841586242382978767613363937161782462995511627868006777147553342782891780
1510289750404223229701629147193478981396104833918769523779028200040832893773214897823674498882945580531
7131463975046055458079676401458858459875408623620213779402719981577151373623133961315903667304164470941
1502286869594470344578651227627578988983411351747535802265197299364148798856468036250584028733593172765
2240089700759586284159276555614383368547282964953761556317875540977701804226203947739420146028657413400
8694903061107333297745254965399860501649477941055078921560253459041595993847649331523364464138152624691
6270488597113485008570316113064797366237503747865988186766848308224688084399816986917337177319493809843
1028769190526438683689792711654335227191149962209866300216545885210418689891952091446811010246933450241
8230206079465976560764687131158163736739224960949981759580151298265064440774195718641469007127046775968
8803237371176205262061290109860141168664791801423936724869715694524800843073117424997863995723152346903
4000456883741724933432030076839162331333261088538499089244072482314028630825130719393387248973179010674
15031408266803106934152582618190295917563474281596238973386044351366121957141992545954130513638623673
b".rotcaf namuh eht tnuocca otni nekat ton evah llits uoy eveileb etiuq t'nac I tub ,smis lautca
gnihctaw era ew won dna ,snoitalumis retupmoc eht tuoba draeh lla ev'eW ?won suoires teg ew naC"
b"Can we get serious now? We've all heard about the computer simulations, and now we are watching
actual sims, but I can't quite believe you still have not taken into account the human factor.
```

Answer: "Can we get serious now? We've all heard about the computer simulations, and now we are watching actual sims, but I can't quite believe you still have not taken into account the human factor."

Q3)

We know that we can use correlation attack in Geffe generator where LFSR1 and LFSR3 correlated with the output sequence.

Firstly, I found all possible states for the LFSR1 after defining my connection polynomials as following way: (Code is taken from stackoverflow with simple modifications)

```
22  v def find_all_states(n, i):
23          all_states = list(map(list, itertools.product([0, 1], repeat=n-1)))
24          return all_states
25
```

Then, I count the number of coincidences with output sequence (z) for each possible initial states with the following algorithm:

```
def coincidence_count(n, temp,C,z):
    count_list = []
    all_states = find_all_states(n,temp)
    for k in all_states:
        key = []
    count = 0
    # print("State:", k)
    # print("Polynom:", C)
    for i in range(len(z)):
        key.append(LFSR(C,k))
    # print("State: ", k)
    # print("Key:", key)
    for m in range(len(z)):
        if key[m] == z[m]:
        count += 1
    count_list.append(count)
    return count_list
```

The initial state which gives the most coincidence count is more likely to be the initial state of the LFSR1. I found following result which is interesting:

```
Length of z: 90

Number of possible states for LFSR1 = 128

Maximum coincidences for LFSR1: 90

Corresponding state: [0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0]
```

We can say that our output sequence can be determined by just looking to LFSR1 with above initial state.

Then, I did the same operation for the LFSR3:

```
Number of possible states for LFSR3 = 2048
Maximum coincidences for LFSR3: 62
Corresponding state: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
```

Then, I combined these two LFSR1 and LFSR3 with these initial states to find LFSR2. To do this, I used my Geffe generator to match with output sequence (z).

```
45 ▼ def geffe(s1, s2, s3):

46 z_test = (s1 and s2) ^ (s2 and s3) ^ s3

47 return z_test
```

Following output for LFSR2 initial state:

```
Number of possible states for LFSR2 = 8192
WOW [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]
```

Then, I wanted to prove these initial states are giving our output sequence (z) with the following algorithm:

```
result = []
for i in range(len(z)):
    result.append(geffe(key1[i], key2[i], key3[i]))
    if result == z:
        print("Proved!")

print("LFSR1 initial state: ", S1)
print("LFSR2 initial state: ", S2)
print("LFSR3 initial state: ", S3)
```

```
Proved!

LFSR1 initial state: [1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0]

LFSR2 initial state: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]

LFSR3 initial state: [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0]
```

```
Thus,

LFSR1 initial state: [1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0]

LFSR2 initial state: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]

LFSR3 initial state: [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0]
```

Q4)

Simplest thing to do is finding factors of n. Since n is not too large, I used simple algorithm to find factors of n. However, if the n was larger, I would use stronger methods such as Quadratic Sieve method.

After finding my p and q values, I did normal RSA decryption and found the following message.

```
Our p: 13882590739
Our q: 17110666501
Corresponding message: Bingo
```

Message: Bingo

Q5)

For this question, I just simply used the BitVector library functions to find results:

```
##SOLUTION

a_vec = BitVector(bitstring = a)

b_vec = BitVector(bitstring = b)

poly = BitVector(bitstring = '100011011')

check_mult(a_vec.gf_multiply_modular(b_vec, poly, 8))

check_inv(a_vec.gf_MI(poly, 8))
```

I got the following outputs:

```
{'a': '01010001', 'b': '00111010'}
Congrats
Congrats
```

Q6)

I tried to follow rainbow attack steps which we have seen in the lecture. Firstly, I checked whether Case 1 applies or not where we only make one reduction with given digest.

After Case 1 failure, I started to repeatedly hash and reduce to see any correspondence in rainbow table for the last column. When I found the correspondence, I recorded the initial block of the password. Then, I started to make chain from this initial state to find same digest value with our digest to find our password:

NORMALLY, we just have to regenerate as many blocks as we created. HOWEVER, It does not work for this case. I could not find any reason for that. Therefore, my code just running from initial state to until finding the same digest value (It does not stop until finding ②). I know this is not correct method, but I would rather to show some correct passwords than finding all wrong passwords with our lecture methods.

Normal Algorithm (did not work): After finding Case 2 correspondence in the rainbow table's second column. Start from its initial block and create as many we produced earlier -1 to find corresponding password.

Thus, I did not create as many as produced. I let it run all the way:

However, this method is taking too long to find passwords even though I used two different computers. I found some of the passwords as following, the rest is not available because of my limited time.

OUTPUTS:

Digest 0:

```
YES CASE 2 APPLY
Corresponsing Initial block: GNMCYA
Corresponding Password: WZIOJF
```

Digest 1:

One of my pc is stucked here **(!)**. Actually, it is not stucked, it is taking too long time!

Digest 2:

```
In [3]: runcell(0, '/home/ozgur/Downloads/temp.py')
YES CASE 2 APPLY
Corresponsing Initial block: MOAAML
Corresponding Password: PGNXND
```

Digest 3:

```
In [4]: runcell(0, '/home/ozgur/Downloads/temp.py')
YES CASE 2 APPLY
Corresponsing Initial block: ZYBDRM
Corresponding Password: FHJOLG
```

Digest 4:

```
In [5]: runcell(0, '/home/ozgur/Downloads/temp.py')
YES CASE 2 APPLY
Corresponsing Initial block: JKJAFR
Corresponding Password: LKHWUE
```

Digest 5:

```
In [1]: runcell(0, '/home/ozgur/Downloads/temp.py')
YES CASE 2 APPLY
Corresponsing Initial block: KPVBXT
Corresponding Password: THSBIG
```

Digest 6:

```
In [2]: runcell(0, '/home/ozgur/Downloads/temp.py')
YES CASE 2 APPLY
Corresponsing Initial block: CQSRMQ
Corresponding Password: HHNKTB
```

Digest 7:

The other pc is also stucked in here **!**.

CODES

Question 1)

```
import math
from sympy import *
import math
import random
import warnings

n = 54850990214586797322771539095341831801335980218725680233852488227557954793476012532940972263082585064048139749457819917
c = 21000020784665228236404895052572788342254876258143969814982532821954936403676324149018666016110307932416857304774194731
e = 17

max224bit = pow(2,224)-1
print("Maximum number with 224 bits: ", max224bit)
print("Maximum number with 224 bits: ", max224bit)
print("nbit length: ",n.bit length())
print("rbit length: ",n.bit length())
print("c bit length: ",e.bit_length())
print("c bit length: ",e.bit_length())

print("bit length: ",e.bit_length())

for in range(upper_bound, lower_bound, -1):
    if pow(i, e, n) = c:
        print("Message:", i)
        break

print("Message:", i)
print("Message:", i.bit_length())
```

Question 2)

```
Unless b==0, the result will have the same sign as b (so that when b is divided by it, the result comes out positive).
             a, b = b, a%b
        return a

▼ def egcd(a, b):
       x,y, u,v = 0,1, 1,0
while a != 0:
q, r = b//a, b%a
m, n = x-u*q, y-v
            m, n = x-u*q, y-v*q
b,a, x,y, u,v = a,r, u,v, m,n
        gcd = b
        return gcd, x, y

▼ def modinv(a, m):
             a = m+a
      gcd, x, y = egcd(a, m)
if gcd != 1:
              return None # modular inverse does not exist
  n = 180169674772689055638858699242372583186946943366168296635599516671542541535056
  e = 65537
  cp = 98678201605000482554316389279502944428888574528020173564535054163100918080066
cq = 14048534465323230545325354135779335373464409479622130604221246300848686788914
  cm = 53101407682638891126867669826634852327241473227795480783366897196231007383444
  p = gcd(cp, n)
   q = gcd(cq, n)
  phi_n = (p-1)*(q-1)
  pni_n = (p-i) (q-i)
d = modinv(e, phi_n)
print("p:", p)
print("q:", q)
print("d:", d)
  m_ = pow(cm,d,n)
print("\n")
print(m_.to_bytes((m_.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big'))
   print("\nReversed?")
   print(m_.to_bytes((m_.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big')[::-1])
```

Question 3)

```
C1 = [0] * 8

v for i in [0,5,7]:
        C1[i] = 1
C2 = [0] * 14

v for i in [0,3,7, 13]:
        C2[i] = 1
C3 = [0] * 12

v for i in [0,2,11]:
       C3[i] = 1
  print("Length of z: ",len(z))
state_list1 = find_all_states(8,1)
   print("Number of possible states for LFSR{} = {}".format(1,len(state_list1)))
   count_list1 = coincidence_count(8, 1,C1,z)
  print("Maximum coincidences for LFSR1: ", max(count_list1))
print("Corresponding state: ", state_list1[count_list1.index(max(count_list1))])
   state_list3 = find_all_states(12,3)
  print("Number of possible states for LFSR{} = {}".format(3,len(state_list3)))
count_list3 = coincidence_count(12, 3,C3,z)
  print("Maximum coincidences for LFSR3: ", max(count_list3))
print("Corresponding state: ", state_list3[count_list3.index(max(count_list3))])
   state_list2 = find_all_states(14,2)
   print("Number of possible states for LFSR{} = {}".format(2,len(state_list2)))
count_list2 = coincidence_count(14, 2,C2,z)
  S1 = [0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0]
key1 = []
▼ for i in range(len(z)):
        key1.append(LFSR(C1,S1))
  S3 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
key3 = []

for i in range(len(z)):
        key3.append(LFSR(C3,S3))
```

Question 4)

```
n = 237540380304900134239
  c = 226131284405640469226
  e = pow(2,16) + 1
▼ for i in range(1,n,2):
      if n%i == 0:
         print("Found a factor!", i)
          if isprime(i) == True:
              if isprime(int(n/i)) == True:
                          p = i
                          q = int(n/i)
              break
 print("Our p: ", p)
print("Our q: ", q)
  phi_n = (p-1) * (q-1)
  d = modinv(e, phi_n)
  m_{-} = pow(c, d, n)
  print("Corresponding message:", m_.to_bytes((m_.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big').decode()[::-1])
```

Question 5)

```
import random
  import requests
  from BitVector import *
  API_URL = 'http://cryptlygos.pythonanywhere.com'
  my_id = 25331
▼ def get_poly():
   endpoint = '{}/{}/{}'.format(API_URL, "poly", my_id )
    response = requests.get(endpoint)
    a = 0
   b = 0

▼ if response.ok:

     res = response.json()
     print(res)
      return res['a'], res['b']
      print(response.json())
 def check mult(c):
    endpoint = '{}/{}/{}/{}'.format(API_URL, "mult", my_id, c)
    response = requests.put(endpoint)
    print(response.json())
def check_inv(a_inv):
    response = requests.put('{}/{}/{}/`.format(API_URL, "inv", my_id, a_inv))
    print(response.json())
  a, b = get_poly()
  ##SOLUTION
  a_vec = BitVector(bitstring = a)
  b_vec = BitVector(bitstring = b)
  poly = BitVector(bitstring = '100011011')
  check_mult(a_vec.gf_multiply_modular(b_vec, poly, 8))
check_inv(a_vec.gf_MI(poly, 8))
```

Question 6)

```
for org_digest in digestt:
                     seq = 0
                     seq = 0
seq = 0
seq = 0
for i in range(len(Rainbow_Table)):
    if temp == Rainbow_Table[i][1]:
        print("YES CASE 1 APPLY")
        initial_pwd = Rainbow_Table[i][0]
                                     seq2 = 0
print("Corresponding Initial Block: ", initial_pwd)
                                     for k in range(t-1):

hash = SHA3_256.new(initial_pwd.encode('utf-8')) # hash it

temp_digest = int.from_bytes(hash.digest(), byteorder='big') # convert the hash into an integer

initial_pwd = Reduction(temp_digest%pwd_space, Alphabet, pwd_len, seq2)
                                            seq2 +=
                                     hash = SHA3_256.new(initial_pwd.encode('utf-8')) # hash it
temp_digest = int.from_bytes(hash.digest(), byteorder='big') # convert the hash into an integer
                                     print("PROVING!")
if org_digest == temp_digest:
    print("Corresponding Password: ", initial_pwd)
                     seq = 0
pwd = Reduction(org_digest%pwd_space, Alphabet, pwd_len, seq)
                    myflag = True
while myflag:
    myflag2 = True
    hash = SHA3_256.new(pwd.encode('utf-8'))
    hash = SHA3_56.new(pwd.encode('utf-8'))
                             digest = int.from_bytes(hash.digest(), byteorder='big')
                             seq += 1
                            seq += 1
pwd = Reduction(digest%pwd_space, Alphabet, pwd_len, seq)
for i in range(len(Rainbow_Table)):
    if pwd == Rainbow_Table[i][1]:
        initial_pwd = Rainbow_Table[i][0]
        print("YES CASE 2 APPLY")
        print("Corresponsing Initial block: ",initial_pwd)
        myflag = False
        for seq in range(nwd_space):
94
                                             for seq in range(pwd_space):
    hash = SHA3_256.new(initial_pwd.encode('utf-8'))
    digest = int.from_bytes(hash.digest(), byteorder='big')
                                                     if digest == org_digest:
                                                             print("Corresponding Password: ", initial_pwd)
                                                     initial_pwd = Reduction(digest%pwd_space, Alphabet, pwd_len, seq)
```