

FOREWORD BY
ROBIN D. G. KELLEY
WITH A NEW PREFACE

CEDRIC J.

BY THE AUTHOR

BLACK MARXISM





BY ROBIN D. G. KELLEY

WITH A NEW PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR

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For Leonard and Gary, for whom there was not enough time



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THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND AFRICAN LABOR

Fifteenth-century "Portugal," the singularly ambitious historical agent one encounters in countless scholarly studies, is a metaphor. It is, as we have already seen, largely a convenience, an appropriately deceptive categorical referent to what in actuality was a mixture of political and economic forces, both national and supranational in origins. The term "Portugal," while symbolizing a nation, has as well obscured these forces and their significance for what was a little nation of less than one million people. Moreover, Portugal was to play a critical role in exploiting the transfer of African labor to the New World. Consequently, for those concerned with the slave trade and its ultimate significance for Black people, a better understanding of the Portuguese nation is imperative. This is so, as I shall argue, because the same but not identical interests and dynamics that slowly formed Portugal into "an important pawn on the chessboard of European history," were also implicated in the transformation of African labor into capital. For this reason, it is worth our time to review and identify these elements as they appeared in Portugal's history.

There were several very real agencies whose interests and activities have been glorified as Portugal's national concerns in the general histories of the modern Western academy. Too often, however, the nature and identities of those agencies have been inadvertently disguised by the rather grander levels of generalization that have accompanied the search to capture their ethos. For some students of the era, the motives for European expansion were material and physical: "What western Europe needed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries," Wallerstein writes, "was food . . .

and fuel." Braudel, on the other hand, has suggested that western Mediterranean overpopulation was the key to expansion. There are also those who have argued, like Livermore, that the motivation was organizationally systemic, that the militaristic machinery of the *Reconquista* required new "targets of opportunity" if it were not to be turned inward. Others, as we have noted earlier, with more attention to ideology, have supposed the real issue was the defeat of the Muslims and the revitalization of Christendom. No single such explanation seems entirely correct or sufficiently specific, though all have been persuasively presented. The result is that at the grand level of reconstruction, the analysis of fifteenth-century Portugal and its historical role would appear to have no satisfactory measure for distilling this multiplicity of needs, actors, and historical forces. Still, though their number might be confusing, reconstruction of the actual power relations between these actors may simplify the task of their identification and assessment.

One generally unrecognized but crucial relationship, when we speak in strictly political terms, involved a relatively weak but native feudal ruling class and its more powerful extra-national ruling-class allies. Specifically, this amounted to an alliance between Portugal's House of Avis, with its neodynastic nobility and bourgeoisie,⁶ and a strain of capitalistic aristocracy that had been bred in England by war and civil war, political chaos, and economic recession, and a close connection to an emerging British bourgeoisie. In fifteenth-century England, Postan has surmised:

The great breeding season of English capitalism was in the early phases of the Hundred Years War, the time when the exigencies of Royal finance, new experiments in taxation, speculative ventures with wool, the collapse of Italian finance and the beginning of the new cloth industry, all combined to bring into existence a new race of war financiers and commercial speculators, army purveyors and woolmonopolists.⁷

Historically, the relationship between the maturing ruling classes of Portugal and England had been sealed at the end of the fourteenth century with the Treaty of Windsor (1386), which secured the Portuguese throne from the ambitions of Castile's monarchy, and was itself closed by the marriage between Joao of Avis and Philippa of Lancaster, the daughter of John of Gaunt. This alliance was one that the English had believed would ultimately lead to the acquisition of the throne of Castile.8 The designs of the English on Castile were never fulfilled. The conclusion of the Hundred Years War, with its disastrous results on English territorial interests on the continent, a civil war in England and Spain's own national vigor at the end of the century, extinguished those interests. But the relationship with Portugal would prove to be one so valuable that it is still celebrated by English historians. In our own century, for example, Carus Wilson has written:

Portugal's relations with England were consistently friendly. These two states were naturally disposed to be allies, since neither of them was on good terms with Castile. There was also kinship between their dynasties, and the men of both

countries were born seamen and adventurers. . . . The friendship . . . lasted on in spite of temporary ruptures through acts of violence and changes of dynasty in England; and throughout the fifteenth century the provisions made in this charter of commerce [the Treaty of Windsor] were confirmed, and the kings of both countries were pledged to punish infractions of it.9

As C. R. Boxer would have it, these Portuguese "kings" were, of course, "half-English princes." War had brought these two nobilities together. War had indeed been the very basis of their existence. War, finally, had so enlarged their political alliance until it achieved what could pass for historical proportions, surviving several centuries despite "temporary ruptures." Regardless, in the fifteenth century—when the necessary conditions for the Atlantic slave trade were being laid down—the link between the emerging bourgeoisies resident in (but not always native to) the two countries provided the basis for a North Atlantic commerce and the mercantilisms that would dominate their economies for the next three hundred years. This would prove no small matter for the directions in which the slave trade would develop.

The Genoese Bourgeoisie and the Age of Discovery

Even more important than these political relations, however, and certainly more directly germane to our interests in the Portuguese as the historical force that laid the basis for the Atlantic slave trade, were the merchants and bankers of Italian origins who colonized Portugal (and the Spanish kingdoms) during this period. Though Verlinden's use of the term "nation" is more figurative than political, his characterization of the historical significance of these capitalists is helpful:

Italy was the only really colonizing nation during the middle ages. From the beginning of the crusades onwards, Venice, Pisa, Genoa, later Florence, and southern Italy under the Angevins as well as under the Aragonese, were interested in the Levant and in the economic and colonial possibilities offered there by the gradual waning of the Byzantine Empire. It is also at about the same time that Italian merchants appear in the Iberian peninsula, and obtain an influence that will persist until far into the modern period, both in European and colonial economy.¹⁰

Virginia Rau notes that "[t]he earliest documental references we have concerning the activities of Italian merchants in Portugal date from the XIIIth century. When they come to our notice, they had already boldly found their way into the Portuguese money market.")11 These "Italian merchants" were in fact (in order of importance) Genoese and the sons of Piacenza, Milan, Florence, and Venice.¹² Further, we learn from Rau that by the fourteenth century, whose beginnings were appropriately marked by the appointment by King Diniz of a Genoese (Manuel Pezagno)¹³ to the Portuguese admiralty in 1317, Lisbon had become "the great centre of Genoese trade."14 With Lisbon and Oporto as bases of operation, the Genoese merchantcapitalists ensconced themselves into the entire structure of Portuguese power: serving as creditors to the monarchy, financiers for the state's ambitions and adventures, monopolists under royal charters of security, and ultimately Portuguese nobles by a series of events including royal decrees, marriage into the native nobility, and participation in military projects organized by the state.¹⁵ Precisely as Rau's example of the Lomellini family would suggest—beginning with the appearance of Bartholomeu Lomellini, the merchant, in Portugal in 1424 and ending with integration of his heirs and relatives into the landed aristocracy of Madeira and the peninsular nobility by the end of the century—the Genoese merchant princes proved to be far more successfully adaptable than their countrymen (i.e., Italian) competitors. Unlike the arrogant Venetians, the Genoese made themselves available to their hosts financially, intellectually and fraternally. As Wallerstein has observed:

To the extent that [the Portuguese bourgeoisie] lacked the capital, they found it readily available from the Genoese who, for reasons of their own having to do with their rivalry with Venice, were ready to finance the Portuguese. And the potential conflict of the indigenous and foreign bourgeoisie was muted by the willingness of the Genoese to assimilate into Portuguese culture over time. 16

While the Venetians continued to concentrate on the domination of the Mediterranean, and the Florentines on their banking and wool trade in continental and north Atlantic commerce, the Genoese positioned themselves to take advantage of the trade that eventually would progress from the Maghreb, to the mid-Atlantic and finally to the trans-Atlantic.¹⁷ By the middle of the fifteenth century, it was their capital that determined the direction and pace of "discovery." Verlinden remarks:

Lagos [Portugal] became, from about 1310, an important harbor on the route of the Italian convoys to northwestern Europe. If one remembers that Lagos, much more than Sagres, was the starting point of the first Portuguese discoveries, the importance of the bonds, established there with Italian seamen and businessmen, grows evident.¹⁸

Moreover, it was the favored status of these Italians in Portugal that facilitated Portuguese claims at Rome resulting in Papal Bulls sympathetic to Portuguese commerce and state imperialism,¹⁹ and it was Genoese capitalists who sustained the links between the English and Portuguese ruling classes by assuming a relationship to English trade and the state directly complementary to their presence in Portugal.²⁰

In England, as in Portugal, Genoese made up the bulk of the Italian merchants who in turn composed the majority of alien merchants in that kingdom during the fifteenth century.²¹ There, too, they won royal exemptions from commercial taxes and restrictions, and managed to monopolize imported goods as diverse as the foreign medicines (like medicated treacle) and other drugs in vogue during that century,²² and Portuguese cork and sugar at whose points of origin they had already contracted exclusive monopolies.²³ Finally, in England, too, as creditors for its kings, as fac-

tors and merchants for royal monopolies, they came to occupy special positions in English trade:

In vain the English petitioned against the lavish privileges obtained with a great sum by these merchants from needy kings whose financiers they had become, begging that they might be restricted to bringing goods of their own manufacture; unable to vie with the mighty Italian cities in wealth, the little English towns received scant attention.²⁴

In an England rent by civil war, court intrigues, and a fractious aristocratic class, the financial support of the Italians along with their trade and concomitant sources of intelligence could be decisive. The English monarchy, with its Italian and other foreign commercial and financial collaborators, for the time being secured an independence from its native aristocratic and bourgeois classes.

It was in this way that Italian capitalists situated themselves to play a critical role in determining the pace, the character, and the structure of the early trans-Atlantic slave trade of the next century. Without them and the complicity of part of the English aristocracy and of the Portuguese and English merchant classes, and, of course, the clerical nobility of Rome, it is doubtful that a Portuguese Empire would ever have come into existence. Without that empire, nothing would be as it is.

The Portuguese Empire did come into being, however, and from the middle of the fifteenth century and for the next one hundred years—to the good fortunes of both its national and expatriate sponsors—its mixture of greed, piety, savagery, militarism, cultural arrogance, and statescraft swept across the world. Not surprisingly, given the long-standing preoccupations of medieval long-distance merchants, the winds of commercial interests blew the empire first to the south and east: Senegambia, Elmina, and Luanda along the west coast of Africa; Safala, Mozambique and Mombasa on the African east coast; Hormuz in the Persian Gulf; Goa on the Malabar coast of India; Malacca in Malay; and Ternate in the Moluccas. And if their several motives still perplex us, at least to some of them the issue was clear:

When the Portuguese finally came ashore at Calicut, some astonished Tunisian traders in the crowd asked them what the devil had brought them so far. "Christians and spices," was the answer allegedly given by da Gama's men. . . . This close association between God and Mammon formed the hallmark of the empire founded by the Portuguese in the East, and, for that matter, in Africa and in Brazil as well.²⁵

Once the Portuguese had rounded what was for them the Cape of Good Hope (and perhaps even before they reached that point), these voyagers had become actually an analogue of the Chinese who preceded them: we refer, of course, to the "seven massive" imperial expeditionary fleets commanded by the Muslim admiral Cheng Ho between 1405 and 1434 (Cheng Ho died that year) that had already confidently assayed these waters for trade and plunder.²⁶ The Chinese ventures that with their fleets of

junks carrying sometimes as many as 40,000 people, amounted to convoys of "impressive intercontinental missiles" according to William Appleman Williams.²⁷ With its fleets the Chinese Empire successfully challenged the Arab and Muslim traders who had already grown accustomed to their own domination of the East African and Indian Ocean commercial trades. This did not please the former masters of the trade of these seas, but it did not seem to matter. Whatever the weight of their resistance it never amounted to enough to be included among the reasons speculated to underlie the apparently sudden imperial decision to forego further adventures in the area.²⁸ The withdrawal would seem to have been an affair internal to the Chinese Empire.

The Portuguese, less audaciously but necessarily more cunning,²⁹ accomplished the displacement of the area's "resident" tradesmen at the end of the century and the beginnings of the next. Momentarily, the maritime markets most coveted by Europeans were in the hands of the Portuguese/Italians-the African and south Atlantic trades with their gold, salt, malagueta pepper, gum, cork, cereals, sugar, and slaves; and the trade with the East with its spices, wools, and dyes.³⁰ This Portuguese monopoly was, however, not entirely uncontested in Europe.³¹ In the Atlantic region, Castile's commercial strata had shadowed its rival's ventures along the Guinea coast from at least as early as 1453-54, laying claims through the Castilian crown to both Guinea and the Canary Islands.³² The controversy between the "two Catholic kings" continued even beyond its formal resolution by the Treaty of Toledo (1480) and into the following century. It was punctuated by raids by each of the other's merchant shipping and trading posts, and by claims and counterclaims to ancient or papal privileges.³³ Though their defeat would prove to be only a temporary setback, the point is that the monarchal claimants of Spain lost. With the south Atlantic closed to them for legitimate merchant exploitation, the Spanish Crown and its native and Italian partners began to explore the possibilities of an entirely different route to the East.³⁴

Genoese Capital, the Atlantic, and a Legend

For Spain, the key to its achievement of a western route to the "East" was, as it had been for the Portuguese Empire of the Indies, the Genoese. In particular, in Seville in 1492, the experience, energies, and ambitions of the Genoese became concentrated in the figure of Cristofolo Colombo (Christopher Columbus). Still it was not a simple or straightforward event, there were some elements of even this relationship between the Spanish and the Italians that in retrospect seem almost entirely fortuitous.

Although much of his background before his journey to Seville in 1485 will probably always remain obscure, Columbus was in many ways a natural if not typical bourgeois creation of Genoese capital, trade, and manufacturing. Born around 1451 of parents whose origins appear to have been in the Ligurian Republic, Columbus, at fourteen years of age, first took up his father's trade: wool weaving. 35 Notwithstanding the fictional constructions of his past that Columbus, his son Ferdinand, and Las

Casas would perpetrate, it appears he remained a weaver into his early twenties, taking part in occasional voyages in that capacity to Genoese possessions in the Mediterranean.³⁶ Around 1476, the documents of his contemporaries place him on a voyage to England undertaken by the bankers Giovanni Antonio di Negro and Nicolas Spinola. This trip was intercepted by French pirates, and the survivors, Columbus among them, found refuge in Lisbon.³⁷ Columbus settled in Lisbon and like some other notable Genoese bourgeoisie, he eventually married into Portuguese nobility. In his case, Felipa Moniz Perestrello, whose family had property on the island of Porto Santo near Madeira, became his wife and his entree into the stream of Portuguese overseas expansion.38

By all rights, the credit for Columbus's rediscovery of the "new world" beyond the ocean should have attached to the Portuguese throne. Columbus had taken up residence in Lisbon in 1477 and five years later had made his first attempt at petitioning for state sponsorship (and the grant of feudal privileges) at the royal court of Portugal. Interestingly enough, it is still not clear what Columbus had in mind at this stage for what he would persist in describing as his divinely appointed mission. It is very possible that Columbus's initial petition (1482) concerned islands in the Atlantic rather than the search for a mainland, but by 1484, a second submission spoke of Cipango (Japan) and Cathay (China).39 Apparently, Columbus's application was clumsily constructed (Davies believed that Columbus had no command of written Latin until 1489 and never mastered the writing of Italian or Portuguese), his calculations unpersuasive, and his use of cosmographies authority suspect.⁴⁰ The court's Mathematical Junta, after a year of study of Columbus's proposal and consultation with Martin Behain, 41 the Nuremberg cartographer, convinced King Joao II to reject Columbus's project on the grounds that Joao had "information regarding the western lands more positive than the visions of Columbus."42 If Joao's technical commission now appears to have been a bit dismissive of Columbus's scheme, the same could be said of Castile, the more enthused but still cautious Andalusian dukes of Medina-Sidonia and Medina-Celi, and the English Crown (in England, Columbus had been represented by his brother, Bartolomeo)—all of whom rejected the Genoese's petitions for support between 1485-89.

The Portuguese, however, seemed to have been on fairly firm ground, for at least by 1486 there is some indication that some of their seamen had sighted land west of the Azores. Verlinden is confident enough of this to conclude: "What is certain is that in 1486 the talk was no longer of one Island of the Seven Cities, but of the possibility of an archipelago or even a continent. Clearly, then, the period of the hypothetical or legendary island had passed."43 For some at court, the western route across the seas to Cipango and Cathay—a distance calculated by the Florentine mathematician and cosmographer Toscanelli to be 5,000 miles and by Columbus as 3,500 miles appeared to be a distinct possibility.⁴⁴ Thus, in 1487, the same year that (Verlinden points out) saw Pero da Covilhao and Afonso da Paiva pursuing Portuguese interests in India, Arabia, and Ethiopia, and Bartolomeu Dias round the Cape of Good Hope

(all three contributions to the Portuguese commitment to the African route to the East), the Portuguese Crown had authorized its own exploration of a western route.⁴⁵ Since the bourgeoisie dominating the Genoese colony of Lisbon were unwilling to show any tangible interest in a western route, the Portuguese Crown's participation in the project mounted (and paid for) by the Flemish Azoresian Ferdinand van Olmen (Bartolome de las Cases would refer to him as Hernan de Olmos)⁴⁶ and the Portuguese Madeiran, Joham Afomso do Estreito, was limited to the ceding of jurisdictional powers and territorial rights in the new land. The Crown was apparently incapable of much more than that when it sought to act independently of its major commercial partners. Unfortunately for the Portuguese monarch, neither van Olmen nor Estreito ever returned from their winter excursion.

Columbus was a bit luckier than either of his predecessors in the Atlantic, for at least he had their example to profit from. Verlinden is convinced that "Columbus must have learned of the voyage in Seville, for there was active communication between the Italian colony of Lisbon and that of the great Andalusian port."⁴⁷ This would, of course, imply that the Genoese families, their joint-stock companies, and their banks were in the habit of exchanging or sharing information that might be of value to their commercial interests. Whatever the case might be, Columbus did find something of value in Seville:

Italian bankers, much of whose activities were blocked by the Turks, were the financiers for a big part of ocean-borne trade. There was a Genoese commercial colony in Seville and local links with the Italian banking house of Spinola and Di Negri, Columbus's old employer. Francesco Pinelli, a Genoese banker of Seville and co-director of the Santa Hermandad, the Spanish state police, guaranteed a loan for the Columbus plan. Pinelli's fellow police director was none other than Luis de Santangel, the royal treasurer.⁴⁸

With the support, at least, of these two highly placed Genoese, and several forms of assistance from the powerful Pinzon family, which dominated the port of Palos de la Frontera,⁴⁹ Columbus now had a project worthy of the Spanish Crown's official support. And if we recall that Columbus's appearance before Ferdinand and Isabella coincided historically with that moment when the Spanish Crown was intent upon its self-appointed mission to unify Spain, centralize state authority, vanquish its rivals among its own aristocracy, and acquire an independent source of capital for itself, Columbus and his Genoese collaborators and countrymen were an almost perfect instrument.

Italian support was unquestionably well received, at least by the rulers. Ferdinand the Catholic, in particular, understood admirably the contribution Italian capital and techniques could make at that crucial time to his kingdom. Coming from the east of the peninsula, he was accustomed to look to the Mediterranean and Italy and considered economic relations with that country as obvious and natural. This

attitude of mind dictated a similar policy in Andalusia, in the Canary Islands, and in America, when destiny put control of these areas into his hands.⁵⁰

Here was a resourceful community whose very existence rested on the persistence of its interdependence with the state. The colonial trade that the Genoese (and Italian) community dominated, the capital that it commanded, the inventory of science and culture that it possessed, all were Spanish at the pleasure of the state—no matter how independently powerful and significant they might appear to be. And for the moment it was the state's pleasure to balance the Italians (and also—but not for long—the Jews) against its own bourgeoisie and its still militaristic aristocracy.⁵¹ Columbus's luck was holding.

With only the barest of exaggeration, then, it might be said that Columbus's achievements of 1492—beginning with the extraordinary concessions he acquired from his royal partners in April of that year at Santa Fe, and ending with the arrival of the ships under his command in the West Indian islands in October-amounted to one more level on the extraordinary financial scaffold that Genoese and other Italian capitalist families had been constructing in the Iberian peninsula for nearly 300 years. When Columbus came to terms with Ferdinand and Isabella, the road had been paved for him by Genoese admirals who had served Portuguese and Spanish kings for centuries; by Genoese, Piacentine, and Florentine merchants who had assumed the primary financial risks in colonizing the Portuguese Azores and Madeiran islands, and Spain's Canary Island group; by Italian factors and money lenders who had strung their capital from Algiers and Ceuta in north Africa, to Elmina and Luanda on the west coast of that continent, and east to the Moluccas and Nagasaki; and by an Italian bourgeoisie whose financial and technical character and business affairs had become totally assimilated to the interests of the Spanish and Portuguese states and their most adventurous aristocracies.⁵² Whether Columbus was the extraordinary seaman that Samuel Eliot Morison has persisted in making him,⁵³ whether his obsessive personality and religious zeal were so compelling as to have cast a spell over Isabella and her religious advisers,54 are all of secondary significance to the single fact of his origins and the legacy to which he was heir as a Genoese. This was the structural means of his accomplishment: the two-centuries-long apogee of Genoese influence in Spain and Portugal.⁵⁵ Thus, when Columbus and the others with him (and those who followed) came face to face with the Arawaks, the Tainos, the Aztecs, the Mayans, the Quechuas, and all the other inhabitants of the western hemisphere, it was this complex mixture of feudal authority and privilege, comingled with the appetites of emergent merchant capitalism, national ambitions, and missionary compulsions that stood at their backs.

African Labor as Capital

The use of slave labor in the New World of the sixteenth century by the Spanish Crown (and soon after the Portuguese) and its merchant concessionaires was conse-

quently a most natural step. Slave labor had been a basis for colonial trade in the Mediterranean,⁵⁶ Africa, and the Indies; it was already the foundation of colonization in the Canaries, the Azores, and the Madeiran islands. At first, the relationship between capitalism, colonization, and slave labor had appeared almost coincidental. To some it still does. Philip Curtin, for example, has written:

The choice between freedom and slavery . . . depended on European institutions and *habits of mind*. . . . One was the Mediterranean tradition of filling the gaps between the demand and supply of people by importing alien slaves. The Venetians used that device in their east Mediterranean colonies, where imported slave labor played an important role in agricultural development in Crete, Cyprus, and Chios. This *institutional habit* was no doubt reinforced by the fact that Venice was a city-state, not a large territorial unit with abundant population resources to be mobilized and sent overseas as colonists.⁵⁷

Notwithstanding Philip Curtin's rather casual language in describing the process, we should remember that it was in Venice's affairs of trade that Oliver Cox situated "the first capitalistically organized commerce in human beings." 58 Still, at first as we have noted before, the slave trade had been more significant to Venetian commerce than slave labor.

As Italian capitalism matured, however, this emphasis on trade was to change for three reasons. Briefly, they were the expansion of the power of the Ottoman Turks in the eastern Mediterranean in the fifteenth century, the extension of sugar-cane cultivation from Asia Minor to Cyprus, Sicily, and the Atlantic islands (Madeira, Cape Verde, and the Azores) at the end of that century, and the collaboration of Genoese capitalists with the ruling classes of Iberia. These events transformed the incidental relationship between capitalism and slave labor into the very foundation of New World enterprise.⁵⁹

Madeira, as it turned out, was the physical and historical juncture where these processes congealed. Sidney Greenfield observes:

[W]ith the introduction of sugar cane and its commercial success . . . Canary Islanders and Moors—followed by Africans—as slaves, performed the necessary physical labor that enabled the upwardly mobile settlers of Madeira to develop a life style, derived from the tradition of the continental nobility but based upon the physical efforts of slaves producing commercial crops for sale on the markets of the continent, that characterized the emerging social institution of the slave plantation.⁶⁰

The "Admiral of the Ocean Sea" was the embodied connective. Columbus, a son of Genoa, an agent of the Spanish Crown, an ambitious merchant who had married into one of the families of lesser Portuguese nobility which had acquired its new wealth from the early colonization of Madeira and the cultivation of sugar there, and the founder of Spain's Caribbean colonies had also brought sugar to the New World.⁶¹ In England, where envy of Spain's monopoly was tempered by the Spanish Empire's

seapower for at least the next century and a half, it was all said quite simple. Columbus's "West Indies" became known by English merchants as the "Sugar Islands." 62

However, for the time being—that is the better part of the sixteenth century—Italo-Portuguese enterprise dominated the European trade with the Atlantic coast of Africa. This meant that African labor for the colonial plantations of Sao Tome, Cape Verde, the Azores, Madeira, and the West Indies, and the mines of New Spain and Peru was supplied by these merchants. "Until 1570," Leslie Rout Jr. maintains in an almost absolute consensus with other students of the trade, "the Portuguese had the lucrative slave trade entirely to themselves."63 And as the colonies grew, so did their appetites for piezas de Indias,64 "captives of just war." For Angola, as early as 1530, Jan Vansina calculates, "the annual export figures were from four to five thousand slaves a year-and if there were no more, this was due only to the lack of ships to carry them."65 No wonder Affonso, the Catholic king of the Kongo and collaborator in the trade with the Portuguese Crown, had been shaken enough to write to his "partners" in 1526: "There are many traders in all corners of the country. Every day people are enslaved and kidnapped, even nobles, even members of the king's own family."66 It seems the trade was already exceeding the boundaries of its commercial origins. Even the conquest of Portugal by Spain in 1580 did not retard the acceleration of the trade. Indeed, the Spanish left the trade to their Portuguese underlings to administer.⁶⁷ That relationship persisted until the Portuguese regained national independence in 1640. By 1650, it is estimated that 500,000 Blacks were living in Spanish America. More than 220,000 Africans had been transported to the ports of Cartagena and Veracruz by Portuguese merchants during the first 45 years (1595–1640) of their Spanish trade. Enriqueta Vila writes:

It is undoubtedly the Portuguese era that marks the African ethnic influence in the new continent. It was the Portuguese who, by creating a vast network of traders, factors, and middlemen, and by profiting from the drop in the Indian population, achieved a market capable of absorbing such enormous quantities. . . . I believe that the Portuguese period was a special era for the slave trade, which was never repeated. 68

"For Brazil," Inikori writes, "the first reliable census . . . in 1798 . . . showed that there were 1,988,000 negroes in that country by this time." (By the eighteenth century, of course, Portugal's monopoly in the Atlantic slave trade had been superseded first by the Netherlands, and was now the business of the merchants and ruling classes of England and France.)

The Ledgers of a World System

The historiography of the Atlantic slave trade is immense and is still growing. Consequently, at least the outlines of the trade and the characteristics of those economies and societies that required slave labor are fairly well known. In any case, even the barest review of the literature would entail volumes in its own right and perhaps

deflect us from our primary purpose here, to ascertain the material, social, and ideological foundations for the emergence of a Black radical tradition. Our attention, then, will be centered on the work that most directly bears on this problem.

The significance of African labor for the development and formation of the commercial and industrial capitalist systems can be only partially measured by numbers. This is the case because, first, the numbers we have are questionable, but more disconcerting, the relationship between the growth of capitalism and slave labor has persistently been in dispute. At least one influential "school" of historiography has denied this relationship, challenging the volume of the slave trade, its profitability, and in some instances even arguing for the benevolence of the trade and slavery. As Roderick McDonald puts it, "The shadows of Adam Smith and Ulrich B. Phillips loom large and dark over the profitability question, and their perspectives continue profoundly to influence the debate." Still it is not quite the case, as McDonald terms it, that "you pays your money and you takes your pick."

With respect to the volume of the *piezas de Indias* transported to the New World, Philip Curtin's work is at the center of the storm. In 1969, Curtin authoritatively calculated that between 1451 and 1870, 9,566,000 African workers were brought to the Western Hemisphere. He further concluded that "it is extremely unlikely that the ultimate total will turn out to be less than 8,000,000 or more than 10,500,000."⁷¹ This significantly lowered the figure most commonly used, 50,000,000. In 1976, however, I. E. Inikori published a critique of Curtin that took him to task for the casualness of his methodological and statistical computations, his shallow historicity and, in a subsequent debate, for the peculiarities of his logic and ideology.⁷² Inikori's argument

related to slave population and slave import figures in the Americas; slave smuggling and the inaccuracy of official slave export data in Portuguese African territories (Angola and Mozambique); understatement by the customs records of the volume and value of commodities employed by English merchants in the purchase of slaves on the African coast, as well as the number or tonnage of shipping employed.⁷³

Inikori's treatment of customs records, contemporary censuses of slave populations, descriptions of population fluctuations due to epidemic and the varying conditions of work, and the studies of Eltis, Anstey, Daget, Peytraud, and Davis, would appear to support an upward revision of Curtin's figures by at least one-third.⁷⁴ A preliminary summation of Inikori's figures for only the major periods of the slave trade comes to 15,399,572.⁷⁵ Still, whatever the actual number was, the volume of the trade was enormous. The work of Inikori, McDonald, D. R. Murray, and others, however, serves to underscore dramatically Curtin's remark that before the nineteenth century the number of Africans crossing the Atlantic each year exceeded that of Europeans.⁷⁶ Moreover, as we shall see momentarily, the relative decline of European colonists to African populations from the end of the seventeenth century—and in some instances the decline of the Europeans was absolute—may have helped to confuse the issue of the profitability of the slave system.

With respect to the significance of African labor for the development of European-

directed economies on both sides of the Atlantic, the literature again is substantial. We have already noted Marx's assessment in his letter to Annenkov in 1846, and his later treatment of the same issue in the first volume of Capital. For Marx, slavery had been "the chief momenta of primitive accumulation," "an economic category of the highest importance."77 First, African workers had been transmuted by the perverted canons of mercantile capitalism into property. Then, African labor power as slave labor was integrated into the organic composition of nineteenth-century manufacturing and industrial capitalism, thus sustaining the emergence of an extra-European world market within which the accumulation of capital was garnered for the further development of industrial production.

Marx, however, was not the first to recognize the existence of a relationship between Britain's economic growth and the business in slaves. Williams reminded us that in eighteenth-century Liverpool, "the red brick Customs House was blazoned with Negro heads."78 In 1788, to Bristol, which had preceded Liverpool in the slave trade, "The West Indian trade was worth . . . twice as much as all her other overseas commerce combined."79 Even contemporary English writers were prescient enough to match the signs and lexicon of the streets. In 1839 at Oxford, Herman Merivale had anticipated Marx when he lectured:

We speak of the blood-cemented fabric of the prosperity of New Orleans or the Havanna: let us look at home. What raised Liverpool and Manchester from provincial towns to gigantic cities? What maintains now their ever active industry and their rapid accumulation of wealth? The exchange of their produce with that raised by the American slaves; and their present opulence is as really owing to the toil and suffering of the negro, as if his hands had excavated their docks and fabricated their steam-engines. Every trader who carries on commerce with those countries, from the great house which lends its name and funds to support the credit of the American Bank, down to the Birmingham merchant who makes a shipment of shackles to Cuba or the coast of Africa, is in his own way an upholder of slavery: and I do not see how any consumer who drinks coffee or wears cotton can escape from the same sweeping charge.80

A century later, Eric Williams, as we have noted, made the point again. So, too, has McDonald more recently:

Labour was the key to the development of the Americas; initially land was plentiful, capital was available to "prime the pump," and labour was provided by African and Afro-American slaves. The source of all value is labour; the value of the New World, the fabulous wealth of St. Domingue, Brazil, Jamaica and Cuba, created by slaves, was enjoyed not only by planters and in the colonies, but by the mother country. It was reinvested, purchased power and position, and stimulated development in commercial and industrial spheres.81

These assertions of Merivale, Marx, and McDonald, and the political economy of Williams's analysis can be buttressed in a myriad of ways. One writer indicates that

quite early "England's colonies had begun to pay off, and by the middle of the seventeenth century, of a population about five and a half million it is estimated that about fifty thousand were at sea."82 Moreover, the wealth of the plantations drew together the commercial bourgeoisie and the state, implicating them in behaviors and institutions entirely dependent on the existence of slavery and long-distance trade. In Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and England, the immensity of the profits to be made spawned extensive corruption as its tell-tale mark. The English and French colonists and planters were slower than their Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch contemporaries to come to sugar but when they did—that is when tobacco ended its reign of wealth⁸³—they, too, displayed their venality. For one, the colonies had helped to transform England into a bourgeois democracy with a capitalist and commercial trading economy. At the end of the seventeenth century, mercantile elements of the Christian nation had circumvented the religious prohibitions against usury, institutionalizing their financial freedom with the official establishment of the Bank of England in 1694. The rise of the English bourgeoisie of course occasioned the beginnings of the overturning of English society. The leading members of this mercantile clique had been associated with "republicanism, treason and Dutch connections" in the previous decade. "This was exactly the background," P. G. M. Dickson suggests, "that contemporaries expected plans for a national bank to have."84 In France, the maritime bourgeoisie were forced into a much more dangerous game:

The slave-trade and slavery were the economic basis of the French Revolution. "Sad irony of human history," comments Jaures. "The fortunes created at Bordeaux, at Nantes, by the slave-trade, gave to the bourgeoisie that pride which needed liberty and contributed to human emancipation." Nantes was the center of the slave-trade. . . . Nearly all the industries which developed in France during the eighteenth century had their origin in goods or commodities destined either for the coast of Guinea or for America . . . upon the success or failure of the traffic everything else depended.⁸⁵

The demonstration of the relationship between slavery and the development of Western Europe, however, need not end here.

One other sort of direct evidence respecting the profitability of slave labor can be found in the later work of Richard Pares, a scholar who earlier on, McDonald reminds us, had questioned the relationship between capitalism and slavery.⁸⁶ Discussing the wealth of the planters themselves, Pares wrote in 1960:

The absentee sugar planters were, with the East India Nabobs, the most conspicuous rich men of their time. Other absentee planters were nothing to them. There were some coffee and indigo absentees in France, but the tobacco planters of Virginia and even the rice planters of Carolina could not afford to behave in England like the sugar planters. They might go to England for their education but, unlike the sugar planters, they returned home when it was over; for in Virginia and Maryland, unlike the islands, life was tolerable and a real local patriotism came

more easily to the planters; besides, their estates were mostly too small to support an absentee owner for the whole of his life. Yet they lived a luxurious life at home.⁸⁷

Another clue, also drawn from Pares, was the source of the capital that edged planters into the indebtedness for which they were notorious:

The money came, in the last resort, from the planters themselves. . . . The money which was received from one planter was lent again, either to him or to another planter. . . . Thus it was the planter who was paying, so to speak, for his own enslavement. The profits of the plantations were the source which fed the indebtedness charged upon the plantations themselves. In this sense Adam Smith was wrong: the wealth of the British West Indies did not all proceed from the mother country; after some initial loans in the earliest period which merely primed the pump, the wealth of the West Indies was created out of the profits of the West Indies themselves, and, with some assistance from the British tax-payer, much of it found a permanent home in Great Britain.88

Even the fabled decline of European merchants in the New World in the eighteenth century provides little support to the thesis that the slave system was of marginal economic significance to metropolitan development. Here again the later Pares intervenes. He maintains that the explanation of this phenomenon lies both in K. G. B. Davies's assertion that the merchants had been displaced by planters engaged in entrepreneurship and the fact that Europeans were being displaced by Africans. "As the white populations diminished in most of the British islands, and were replaced by slaves who were hardly allowed to consume anything, the market for European goods must have fallen off quite considerably. (Incidentally, this reduction in the number of their customers helps to account for the decline of the class of resident merchants.)"89 Finally, one might add the testimony of contemporaries. The comments come from widely different moments in the business of slavery but their sources, their specifics, and their timing all describe the enthusiasm with which the system of slavery was undertaken. From the archives of the first "large-scale introduction of Africans" into the New World, Vila discovers:

In a report about the asientos taken to the Junta in 1612 it was affirmed that, should the trade be lost, not only would the income produced by it be lost, but also the sales tax (alcabala) and the export-import tax (averia) on the money that arrived from the Indies. . . . Moreover the buying and selling of slaves was one of the most important and lucrative sources of the Alcabalas.90

Almost 200 years later, on 20 February 1793 to be exact, Bryan Edwards wrote to Henry Dundas from Jamaica:

Our harbours are full of Guineymen [African slave ships], yet the price keeps up enormously. Mr. Shirley gave £100 a head for a pick of 20 Koromantees out of a ship of Mr. Lindo's, and so long as the notion continues that the trade will be abolished, people will buy at any price, even to their own ruin, and the destruction of half the negroes, for want of provisions. (Meaning that the planters are not in general provided with sufficient means to support so great an influx of newly imported negroes on a sudden.)⁹¹

From whatever vantage point one chooses, the relationship between slave labor, the slave trade, and the weaving of the early capitalist economies is apparent. Whatever were the alternatives, the point remains: historically, slavery was a critical foundation for capitalism.

The Column Marked "British Capitalism"

We may now have sufficient grounds for saying that in the New World, the British (and French) entrepreneurs—following the models provided by the Portuguese, Spanish, and the Dutch—substantially substituted human capital for commodities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We will follow this British trade for the moment because it seems the best documented, because it so firmly seats slavery in the movement from mercantile to industrial capitalism, and because many of the clearest tracings of a Black radical tradition lead back to it.

To be sure, the leaders of the colonizing efforts of Britain had begun by exporting those colonized peoples to whom they had immediate access, that is the Irish. We have already made mention of that fact as well as the collateral uses of labor from Germany and Great Britain itself. It appears that the earliest investors in the colonies-lord proprietors, politicians, and merchants according to Pares-had economic designs that at first could be met by a modest labor pool. As independent venturers, the landed rich seemed most frequently to anticipate that their colonies would produce an income resembling in form the manorial dues to which they were accustomed in England.92 The joint companies, in which some lords along with merchant and public representatives of the bourgeoisie also took an interest, were typically more trade oriented. These companies were promoted for the colonial cultivation of cotton, tobacco, indigo, ginger, and the production of extractive industries such as timber, glass, iron, and precious metals.⁹³ Thus, until the arrival of sugar in the early 1640s, and the development of large plantations, labor was adequately supplied by Europeans: indentured peasants, political outcasts produced at varying times by national and civil wars, and poor or orphaned females (only some of whom possessed "bad reputations").⁹⁴ As Richard B. Moore reiterates, their lots were oppressive:

Somewhat less onerous [than African slavery], but still quite oppressive, was the system of indentured slavery of Europeans, forced in one way or another into the colonies whether on the mainland or in the islands. Writing of this, the Jesuit priest, Joseph J. Williams, relates how Irish peasants were "hunted down as men hunt down game, and were forcibly put on board ship, and sold to the planters of Barbados."95

Between 1624 and 1634, tobacco became the main staple of the colonies, earning in that period profits that attracted more and more English and French planters to it. By the end of this period, a glut of tobacco had hit the market and prices declined. The resultant long depression of the late 1630s and early 1640s compelled the search for a new staple, despite the lingering expectations that tobacco would recover.96 In England, an additional strain was being generated: "harried by depression and the ever growing threat of civil war, Englishmen left their homeland in such numbers during the 1630s that their exodus was called the 'Great Migration,' "97 Batie tells us. Many of these newcomers settled in the West Indies, and particularly Barbados, which only made the attempt to locate a substitute for tobacco more desperate. The cunning of history then intervened, cutting off Europe's supply of New World sugar as one result of the wars for the possession of Brazil between the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the Luso-Brazilians.98

The cultivation of sugar in the English colonies began consequently in the late 1630s. Once the techniques of sugar cultivation and refining were mastered, it rapidly displaced the less profitable crops of tobacco, indigo, and ginger in the islands. With the massive demands for labor that sugar production engendered, the appetite of colonial production for labor increasingly outpaced supply. Having already decimated those aboriginal populations they had encountered in the West Indies, the English mercantile and planter bourgeoisie found it necessary and expedient to expand their Irish (and homeland) strategy to West Africa. As they did so, the scale of their enterprise grew beyond anything seen in English history.

During the seventeenth century as a whole, Curtin claims, 60 percent of the slave trade in the New World "went to the Hispanic colonies." This may, or may not have been the case, since Curtin's figures have been shown to have a rather erratic authority and accuracy. Here, at least, he has consistently maintained some caution (in the wrong direction)100 and even, on occasion, admitted to error (again toward lessening the numbers of Africans impressed into slavery). 101 The more immediate concern, however, is that by the last quarter of that century, English merchants supplying slaves primarily to the British Caribbean had surpassed the Portuguese and the Dutch, their predecessors in the trade. Curtin's approximations reveal that while imports by the Portuguese and Dutch merchants during the first half of the century exceeded the English trade by a substantial margin (a combined 327,000 for the Dutch and Portuguese as compared to 20,700 for English traders), by the third quarter, the English territories had overtaken the Spanish colonies in labor imports. By the last 25 years of the seventeenth century, English merchants had more than doubled their performance in human trading for the previous quarter (69,000 for the earlier period versus 174,000) thereby besting their commercial contemporaries. 102 This achievement, again, was largely due to the demands of sugar production.

By the end of the eighteenth century and the abolition of the legal British slave trade in 1807, British factors, merchants, and traders alone were to account for the transportation of 3,699,572 more Africans to the New World. 103 If we were to accept Curtin's argument concerning the levels of death in transit during this period, then perhaps as many as 400,000 or more of these people never saw the western end of the Atlantic.¹⁰⁴ They died "in transit," and thereby produced one profoundly tragic measure of the extent to which the development of the capitalist world system depended on labor its metropolis could not produce.

The Africans were, however, not the only ones to be so unfortunately used in the slave trade. The greed of the English and European merchants easily overran their racial and national sympathies. Thus it was that the crews of their slaving ships died at rates perhaps even higher than their human cargoes. In time, English seamen sang about their fate in graphic terms:

Beware and take care Of the Bight of Benin: For one that comes out, There are forty go in.¹⁰⁵

After the 1680s, Jamaica consistently began to exceed Barbados and the Leeward Islands in sugar exports. By the early 1700s, Jamaica's slave population followed suit, reflecting the island's preeminent role in British colonial commerce. By the end of the English trade in slaves, something like 38 percent of the slave labor force transported by English shippers had been relocated to Jamaica. ¹⁰⁶

In almost equal parts, the origins of these Africans had been along the routes that fed into the slave ports at the Bight of Biafra, the Gold Coast, Central Africa, the Bight of Benin, and Sierra Leone. This ethnic distribution, however, was not the result of consistent or regular patterns of recruitment. Initially, Orlando Patterson concludes, the predominant groups were the "Coromantees" (Kormantin was a port about 70 miles west of Accra), the Akan, and Ga-Andangme peoples. After 1675, and for the rest of the century, the British trade for Jamaica shifted to Angola and the Ewespeaking peoples of Dahomey. Between 1700 and 1730, the Slave Coast and Ghana became the favorite sources only to be succeeded themselves in the years between 1730 and 1760 by the Niger and Cross deltas. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Congo once again became the dominant region, followed successively by the Niger and Cross deltas, the Gold Coast and (by a much smaller order) the Windward Coast. 107

In many ways the Jamaican trade followed a pattern established by the European mercantile predecessors of the English. They, too, had deposited the majority of their African labor in the islands of the Greater and Lesser Antilles. Both tobacco and sugar had something to do with this since the islands possessed the ideal climate for the production of these crops. The Portuguese, with the lush tropical fertility of their Brazilian territories, had been the exception—an exception that Curtin maintains accounted for approximately 38 percent of the total number of African peoples brought to the New World. 108

To the North American colonies it can be estimated that the British merchants sent approximately 20 percent of their slave cargoes in the eighteenth century. Surpris-

ingly, perhaps, to many present-day North Americans, this amounted to less than 5 percent of the total number of Africans brought to the New World by European merchants. Curtin's best estimate is that 399,000 Africans were brought to the English colonies during the entirety of the slave trading period (another 28,000, he suggests, came to the continent by way of French traders supplying the Louisiana region). ¹⁰⁹ Inikori, however, warns us that "meaningful import estimates for the United States are yet to be made." ¹¹⁰ This African population, however, differed from that distributed in Jamaica in that at least a quarter of these peoples had originated from Angolan ports. Nearly as many came from the Bight of Biafra, half as many from the Gold Coast and Senegambia, followed by ever decreasing proportions from the ports of Sierra Leone, the Bight of Benin, and Central Africa. ¹¹¹

In South Carolina, Blacks made up 60 percent of the colony's population in the eighteenth century. In Virginia, the comparable figure was 40 percent. They were used as laborers on the tobacco farms, and, later, on the cotton plantations, but they also worked "in mines, salt- and rope-works; and they trained as shipwrights, black-smiths, and as various kinds of woodworkers, including carpenters, coopers, wheel-wrights, and sawyers." Those who were imported directly from Africa were termed "outlandish" to distinguish them from what their masters called the "new negroes" of the fields and the supposed deracinated, acculturated artisan slaves with whom they were more "comfortable." As Gerald Mullin has demonstrated, these distinctions were for the colonists practical considerations:

In sample runs of the South Carolina *Gazette* in the early 1750s and 1771 there was clear evidence of tribal cooperation in advertisements for the return of four "new Gambia men"; three Angolans, "all short fellows"; six other Angolans . . . and four men from the "Fullah Country."¹¹³

The invention of the Negro was proceeding apace with the growth of slave labor. Somewhat paradoxically, the more that Africans and their descendants assimilated cultural materials from colonial society, the less human they became in the minds of the colonists. Just as instructive, the rebels among these Africans and "negroes" were described as "runaways," a term that has endured in the historiography of the period. It should be remembered, however, that it was from the efforts of men and women such as these that the Black settlements of Virginia's piedmont and the Afro-Creek "Exiles of Florida" (the Seminoles) would consist. 114 In similar fashion, the maroon peoples of the Caribbean and South America would be formed. They were as well, at the end of the eighteenth century, among the estimated 55,000 who fled to the British forces and the loyalist settlements when the colonists pursued the logic of the fear of their own enslavement to the point of revolution. 115

Still, enough of the African laborers remained in the colonies of North America and the Indies to play a significant role in the development of the English imperial economy. The "triangular trade" in slaves, as Eric Williams asserted, broadened the "home market" by stimulating the production of British manufactures that English merchants exchanged in Africa for Black workers. Once in place, these workers

formed the labor for British tropical production, craft work, and extractive industries. The end result was capital accumulation for the advance of productive forces in England and Europe (the Industrial Revolution), for the growth of staple industries in northern America (fisheries, food crops, etc.), for timber, ship-building, and textiles, and for the expansion of colonization and settlement. The concomitant, however, was the degradation of these African peoples and their social institutions when touched by that trade, and, as Walter Rodney has argued, the underdevelopment of Africa's economies.¹¹⁶

This trade, this movement of Black workers, though, did not end with slavery's legal termination in the nineteenth century. Leopold's Congo, Harry Johnston's Central Africa, Cecil Rhodes's southern Africa, Lugard's West Africa, Portuguese Africa, and French Africa as well as the New World's slave descendants all contributed to the further development of the capitalist world system. As peasants, as tenant farmers, as migrant laborers, as day laborers, as domestic servants, and as wage labor, their expropriation extended into the present century. Even in the destruction of the means of production, the wars that Marx and Engels had stipulated as inevitable in capitalism, Black labor was pressed into service. They were exempt from no aspect of exploitation.

or 'hypocritical' character of Muhammad's claim to prophesy, while he was an ambitious schemer, a bandit and a lecher; the emphasis on Islam as a falling short of Christianity, a sum of heresy, particularly in connection with the Trinity; preoccupation with the Qur'anic teaching of Christ; the general lines, if not all the details, of the most unflattering biography of Muhammad, and particularly the weight given to the influence of Sergius and other guides upon him; the enormous Importance given to two moral questions, the public reliance on force and the supposed private laxity in sexual matters; the ridicule and contempt of the Qur'anic Paradise; the suspicion of determinist and predestinarian ethics; the interest in Islamic religious practices, the admission of some Islamic practice as a good example, but the treatment of the cult in general in vain; all these, with some differences in emphasis, but with great continuity in the attitude of intellectual contempt, long dominated Christian and European thought." Islam and the West, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1960, p. 276. (See also pp. 144–46.)

- 120. Norman Daniel, The Arabs and Medieval Europe, Longman, London, 1979, p. 115.
- 121. Ibid., pp. 327-28.
- 122. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture, op. cit., p. 94.
- 123. "The Philosophy of Aristotle had such an authority in sixteenth and seventeenth century Spain, that any attack on him 'was regarded as a dangerous heresy,' and the *Politics* enjoyed a *respecto casi supersticioso*." Mavis Campbell, "Aristotle and Black Slavery: A Study in Race Prejudice," *Race* 15, no. 3 (January 1974): 285–86.
 - 124. Ibid., p. 286.
 - 125. Ibid., pp. 290-91.
- 126. William Westermann, *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity*, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1955, p. 156.
 - 127. Trevor-Roper, Rise of Christian Europe, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
- 128. Abbas Hamdani has recalled: "The word India in the middle Ages,' says Charles Nowell, 'had no exact geographical meaning to Europeans; it was a convenient expression denoting the East beyond the Mohammedan world." "Columbus and the Recovery of Jerusalem," Journal of the American Oriental Society 99, no. 1 (January–March 1979): 39. Later Hamdani observes, "George Kimble in his Geography in the Middle Ages (London, 1938, 128 n.), observes that the term 'Indies' is 'a vague term, for in the Middle Ages there were at least three Indias, viz., India Minor, India Major and India Tertia, i.e. Sind, Hind and Zinj of the Arabs. The first two were located in Asia, the last in Africa (Ethiopia)." Ibid., p. 46 n. 11.
- 129. G. K. Hunter, "Elizabethans and Foreigners," in Awardyce Nicoll (ed.), Shakespeare in His Own Age, Shakespeare Survey 17, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964, p. 40.

Chapter Five

- 1. Alan Manchester, British Preeminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline, Octagon Books, New York, 1964, p. 1.
- 2. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, Academic Press, New York, 1974, p. 42; see also Boxer, *Four Centuries*, op. cit., p. 9.
 - 3. Wallerstein, ibid., p. 47.
- 4. "According to the chroniclers, the idea of carrying on the Reconquest in North Africa was suggested by the need to find useful employment for those who had lived on frontier raids for almost a quarter of a century, and by the desire of John's sons to be armed knights in a real conflict such as the older generation had known." H. V. Livermore, "Portuguese History," in H. V. Livermore (ed.), *Portugal and Brazil*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 59. Partially cited in Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 46.
 - 5. See pp. 118ff, chapter 4; and especially Francis Rogers op. cit., pp. 54ff.
- 6. Livermore states: "With the passing of the old dynasty some of the older nobility had clung to Castile and disappeared from Portugal. Their places had been taken by a new nobility formed of John of Avis's supporters, almost all new men, recently enriched, ambitious, and loyal." Livermore, "Portuguese History," op. cit., p. 60. Wallerstein provides an interesting characterization of the Portuguese bourgeoisie: "The interests of the bourgeoisie for once did not conflict with those of the nobility. Prepared for modern capitalism by a long apprenticeship in long-distance trading and by the experience of living in one of the most highly monetized areas of Europe (because of the economic involvement with the Islamic Mediterranean world), the bourgeoisie too sought to escape the confines of the small Portuguese market." Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 51–52. His interpretation of the relationship between this bourgeoisie and its Genoese colleagues differs from mine (see text below) and is uncharacteristically lacking in cited scholastic authority.
- 7. M. Postan, "The Fifteenth Century," *Economic History Review* 9, no. 2 (May 1939): 165. In this short essay, Postan recounts the deterioration of English domestic production—agricultural as well as manufacturing—and foreign trade in the fifteenth century.
- 8. Livermore, "Portuguese History," op. cit., pp. 58-59. Livermore is most likely referring to the Treaty of Windsor not Westminster. See Manchester, op. cit., p. 2, see also Carus Wilson, "The Overseas Trade of

Bristol," in Eileen Power and M. M. Postan (eds.), Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1951, p. 220.

- 9. Carus Wilson, op. cit., p. 220. Alan Manchester notes that in the seventeenth century "British merchants in Lisbon [submitted] . . . a complaint against the non-execution of privileges justly theirs, with certain papers showing the nature of these privileges. Arranged chronologically, these documents were: a charter dated August 10, 1400, by which D. Joao I conceded to the English the same privileges as had been conceded to the Genoese; a charter dated October 29, 1450, by which D. Affonso V conceded to the English the right to a special judge in all commercial cases which should arise between them and the Portuguese; a charter dated March 28, 1451, by Affonso V, granting the right to Englishmen to live and move about at will within the Portuguese kingdom; and the letter patent, dated February 7, 1495, by which D. Manuel granted special privileges to merchants from certain German cities." Manchester, op. cit., p. 5. Unlike Manchester, Wilson makes no attempt to reconcile the fact of this linkage between the two "states" with his predilection for the nation as a unit of historical analysis. This serves him badly when, in a few pages on (ibid., pp. 222–24), he must deal with piracy between the "Portuguese and English." It should have occurred to him that he was dealing with different entrepreneurial factions, some quite reconciled to mutual collaborations and shared interests, others, unaffected by treaties of alliance and still quite comfortably mutually antagonistic and piratically competitive.
- 10. Charles Verlinden, "Italian Influence in Iberian Colonization," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 33, no. 2 (May 1953): 199; and Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 49ff.
- 11. Virginia Rau, "A Family of Italian Merchants in Portugal in the XVth Century: The Lomellini," in *Studi in Onore di Armando Sapori*, Instituto Editoriale Cisalpino, Milano, 1957, 1:717.
- 12. Verlinden comments: "After the appearance of Florentines in the Portuguese records in 1338... only Milanese, Piacentines, and Lombards are mentioned, and more often Genoese. But one must not think that the Venetians did not play an active role in Portugal.... Nevertheless, the position of the Genoese and Piacentine merchants seems to have been more important, especially in Lisbon itself." Verlinden, "The Italian Colony of Lisbon and the Development of Portuguese Metropolitan and Colonial Economy," in Verlinden, *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization*, op. cit., p. 101.
- 13. About the Pezagno (Pessagno) family, Verlinden writes: "The merchant Salveto Pessagno, a member of a Genoese family which played a large part in Atlantic trade—particularly with England—and which provided Portugal with a series of admirals from 1317 on, died in Famagusta toward the end of the century." Verlinden, "Some Aspects of Slavery in Medieval Italian Colonies," op. cit., p. 89; see also Verlinden, "The Italian Colony of Lisbon," ibid., pp. 98–99 n. 3.
 - 14. Rau, op. cit., p. 718.
- 15. See H. V. Livermore, "Portuguese History," op. cit., pp. 60–61; Rau, op. cit., passim; and Verlinden, "The Italian Colony of Lisbon," op. cit., p. 110.
 - 16. Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 52.
- 17. See Verlinden, "The most frequently mentioned of the Italian merchants in Portugal is Bartolomeo Marchionni. The one who appeared in 1511 among the outfitters of the ship "Bretoa" is another Bartolomeo Marchionni, presumably a relative of the man encountered around 1443 in connection with the coral agreement. No doubt it was the second of these namesakes who was given the task of supplying Pero da Covilhao and Afonso de Paiva with money during the course of their voyage in search of India and Prester John. "The Italian Colony in Lisbon," op. cit., p. 107.
 - 18. Verlinden, "Italian influence in Iberian Colonization," op. cit., pp. 202-3.
- 19. Verlinden, "Navigateurs, marchands et colons italiens au service de la decouverte et de la colonisation portugaise sous Henri le Navigateur," *Le Moyen Age* 64, no. 4 (1958): 468–70.
- 20. See Montague Guiseppi, "Alien Merchants in England in the Fifteenth Century," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, new ser., vol. 9 (1895): 88–90; W. I. Haward, The Financial Transactions between the Lancastrian Government and the Merchants of the Staple from 1449 to 1461," in Eileen Power and M. M. Postan, op. cit., p. 315; and Martin Holmes, "Evil May-Day, 1517," *History Today* 15, no. 9 (September 1965): 642–43.
 - 21. Guiseppi, op. cit., p. 94.
- 22. Thrupp, "The Grocers of London, A Study of Distributive Trade," in Eileen Power and M. M. Postan, op. cit., pp. 250, 290.
- 23. Rau, op. cit., p. 723; Carus Wilson, op. cit., p. 221; and Verlinden, "The Italian Colony of Lisbon," op. cit., pp. 104–5.
- 24. Carus Wilson, op. cit., p. 225; see also Guiseppi, op. cit., pp. 90, 93; and Verlinden, "The Italian Colony of Lisbon," op. cit., p. 111.
 - 25. Boxer, Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, op. cit., p. 14.
- 26. C. A. Curwen records: "In the third year of [Yung Lo's] reign (1405) began that remarkable series of seven maritime expeditions which rank among the great feats of seamanship of all time. They were commanded by a Chinese Muslim, a court eunuch called Cheng Ho. On the first voyage his fleet consisted of sixty-three ships, constructed with watertight compartments, the largest of which are said to have been

over 400 feet long and 180 feet wide, with four decks. The total complement was 27,560, including troops, officials, and officers, and 180 doctors. This expedition reached India. In subsequent voyages Cheng Ho's ships visited more than thirty countries in the Indian Ocean and archipelago, the Persian Gulf, Aden, and the east coast of Africa." Curwen, "China," in Douglas Johnson (ed.), *The Making of the Modern World: Europe Discovers the World*, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1971, 1:341–42. See also Wallerstein's discussion of the Chinese empire's long-distance trade in Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 52ff.

- 27. William Appleman Williams, "Empire as a Way of Life," The Nation, 2-9 August 1980, p. 104.
- 28. It is interesting to contrast Williams's use of the Chinese example with Wallerstein's defense of what he terms "materialist arguments." Williams writes: "The Chinese came, they traded, they observed. They made no effort to create an empire or even an imperial sphere of influence. Upon returning home, their reports engendered a major debate. The decision was made to burn and otherwise destroy the great fleets. . . . The point is not to present the Chinese as immaculately disinterested, or whiter than white. It is simply to note that we now know that the capacity for empire does not lead irresistibly or inevitably to the reality of empire." Williams, op. cit., p. 104. Wallerstein, on the other hand, appears utterly convinced that the voluntaristic explanation is both sufficient and too indeterminate. His argument seems to be that the Chinese imperial structure acted as a political, technological, and ideological constraint on the development of a bourgeoisie-prematurely developed? he wonders aloud-identified with the further development of capitalism in China and colonial expansion. He concludes: "So China, if anything seemingly better placed prima facie to move forward to capitalism in terms of already having an extensive state bureaucracy, being further advanced in terms of the monetization of the economy and possibly of technology as well, was nonetheless less well placed after all. It was burdened by an imperial political structure. It was burdened by the 'rationality' of its value system which denied the state the leverage for change (had it wished to use it) that European monarchs found in the mysticality of European feudal loyalties." Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 63.
- 29. Boxer recounts that: "After rounding the Cape of Good Hope, and calling at various Arab-Swahili ports along the east coast of Africa, da Gama reached Malmdi, where he received the help of Ahmad-Ibn-Madjid, the most famous Arab pilot of his age, and one who knew the Indian Ocean better than any other man living. Thanks to his guidance, the Portuguese were enabled to reach Calicut, the major emporium of the pepper trade. . . . Not unnaturally, Ibn Madjid's memory is still execrated by the majority of his fellow countrymen and co-religionists; and he himself bitterly bewailed in his old age what he had done." Boxer, op. cit., pp. 13–14.
- 30. Of the sixteenth century, Fernand Braudel has written: "The commercial activity of the sea, concentrating more and more in the West, tipped the balance, spelling the inexorable decline of the eastern basin which had for so long been the source of wealth. The shift brought little joy to Milan, but brought Genoa and Florence to prominence. Genoa for her share, and a lion's share it was, acquired the Spanish and American trade. . . . In the second half of the century, Genoa took the lead. . . . Foreign catchment was the most important, and it was by this means that Florence and Genoa gained control of all the economically backward regions, whether in Eastern Europe or southern Italy, in the Balkans, France, or the Iberian peninsula." Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, op. cit., 1:393.
- 31. One should be aware, as Robert Knecht reminds us that in "the Indies . . . the superiority of the Europeans was confined to the sea." Knecht, "The Discoveries," in Douglas Johnson, op. cit., p. 27.
- 32. John William Blake in his documentary history of Europeans in West Africa, 1450–1460, vol. 1 (Kraus, Nendeln, 1967), asserts that the records he has gathered "show that between 1453 and 1480 Andalusian seamen and traders sent many ships to the West African coast, and that the government of Castile claimed exclusive possession of Guinea" (p. 186, see also p. 189).
- 33. Ibid., p. 191; see also Edgar Prestage, "Vasco da Gama and the Way to the Indies," in Arthur Percival Newton (ed.), the *Great Age of Discovery*, University of London, London, 1932, p. 49.
 - 34. Hans Koning, Columbus: His Enterprise, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1976, pp. 13-14.
 - 35. Arthur P. Newton, "Christopher Columbus and his First Voyage," in Newton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 76ff.
 - 36. See Newton, op. cit., p. 77; and Koning, op. cit., p. 22.
 - 37. Newton, op. cit., p. 78.
- 38. Koning believes that Felipa's family was of Italian origins, op. cit., p. 25. On the other hand, Newton's reconstruction of her family's history makes it very clear that her genealogy contained Italian elements as well as Portuguese lesser nobility, op. cit., p. 79.
- 39. Arthur Davies, "Origins of Colombian Cosmography," in *Studi Colombiana*, Stabilimento Arti Grafiche ed Affini, Genova, 1952, 2:59–62.
 - 40. Ibid., p. 61.
- 41. Ibid., p. 62. Martin Behain (or Behaim) is described by Verlinden as a German knight, who, at least by 1486, was living on Fayal in the Azores. At this later time he is supposed to have been enlisted by the Portuguese court in an ill-fated attempt to cross the Atlantic (see text below). Behain, as it turned out, missed the boat. See Verlinden, "A Precursor of Columbus: The Fleming Ferdinand van Olmen (1487)," in Verlinden, *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization*, op. cit., pp. 190–91; also see Newton, op. cit., pp. 90–91.

- 42. Arthur Davies, op. cit., p. 63.
- 43. Verlinden, "A Precursor," op. cit., p. 189.
- 44. See Arthur Davies, op. cit., pp. 62–64; and Knecht, op. cit., pp. 29–30.
- 45. Verlinden, "A Precursor," op. cit., p. 194.
- 46. Ibid., p. 193.
- 47. Ibid.
- 48. Hans Koning, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
- 49. The brothers, Martin, Francisco, and Vincente Pinzon, were, according to Las Casas, the dominant force in Palos de la Frontera (See Newton, op. cit., pp. 87-88). Martin, after a business trip to Rome, which included a visit to the Papal Court in 1491, had returned to Palos with detailed information on an Atlantic route that he had gathered from the Papal library. He shared this material with Columbus and helped to arrange with Pinelli and Santangel for a police fine against Palos to be redirected for support of Columbus's project. Martin and Vincente sailed with Columbus as captains of the Pinta and Nina. Martin, however, died during this first voyage. The family subsequently entered into a prolonged legal attempt to secure from Columbus what they presumed was their share of the wealth he secured from the New World.
- 50. Charles Verlinden, "Italian Influence on Spanish Economy and Colonization during the Reign of Ferdinand of Castile," in Verlinden, The Beginnings of Modern Colonization, op. cit., p. 130.
- 51. Ibid., pp. 114-20. Americo Castro concluded: "The Italians" form of life had more points of contact with the Jews than with the Spanish Christians. In the Middle Ages there were dynasties of great Genoese traders . . . ; the Genoese continued to engage in banking negotiations between Spain and her American dominions when there were no Jews to do this." Castro, op. cit., p. 513 n. 98.
- 52. Verlinden, "Italian Influence in Iberian Colonization," op. cit., p. 210; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean, op. cit., 1:364-65.
- 53. Samuel Eliot Morison, "Columbus as a Navigator," in Studi Colombiani, op. cit., 2:39-48; and Admiral of the Ocean Sea, 2 vols., Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1942.
 - 54. Newton, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
- 55. "Genoa . . . operated the most sophisticated credit machinery of the Middle Ages. A detailed study has shown that the city was already modern, ahead of its time, in the fifteenth century, daily handling endorsements of bills of exchange and ricorsa agreements, an early form of kite-flying, to use modern barkers' jargon. Genoa's early role as intermediary between Seville and the New World, her official alliance with Spain in 1523 did the rest: she became the leading financial city of the world, in the period of rising inflation and prosperity that characterized the second half of the sixteenth century—the century of Genoa, the city where commerce was beginning to appear a rather inferior activity." Braudel, The Mediterranean, op. cit., 1:321.
- 56. Jacob Streider concluded: "The Italian city states developed a colonial system in the Mediterranean, a system which was a precursor and a prototype for Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and even for Holland in the seventeenth." (Cited by Oliver C. Cox, The Foundations of Capitalism, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, p. 85 n. 36.)
- 57. Philip Curtin, "Slavery and Empire," in Vera Rubin and Arthur Tuden (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 292, 27 June 1977, p. 3.
 - 58. Oliver C. Cox, The Foundations of Capitalism, op. cit., p. 70.
- 59. Sidney M. Greenfield, "Madeira and the Beginnings of New World Sugar Cane Cultivation and Plantation Slavery: A Study in Institution Building," in Rubin and Tuden (eds.), op. cit., p. 545.
 - 60. Ibid., pp. 541-42.
 - 61. Ibid., p. 548.
- 62. J. H. Parry, The Establishment of the European Hegemony: 1415-1715, Harper and Row, New York,
- 63. Leslie R. Rout, Jr., The African Experience in Spanish America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, p. 28.
- 64. The term "pieza de Indias" (or peca de Indias)—piece of the Indies—became a common or standard measure of slaves in the late sixteenth century. Just how early it became standardized is unclear but its general meaning and use has been clarified by Enriqueta Vila and C. R. Boxer. Vila writes: "It can be seen from the account books of the royal treasury officials [of Spain] that at times, when counting small blacks of less than 12 years of age, known as muleques, it was customary to count two of them as one when it came to the payment of duties. Also suckling infants, known as crias or bambos, were considered free of duties and formed one 'piece' together with their mothers. All this was applied in an arbitrary manner, with no fixed standards. The oldest royal decree found so far, regulating the payment of duties on these blacks, is a cedula of 12 July 1624, addressed by Felipe IV to all the authorities of the Indies, in which are included some basic rules for general application: a muleque of seven years old should be counted as half a slave, and duty should not be charged on those of less than that age." Vila, "The Large-Scale Introduction of Africans into Veracruz and Cartagena," in Rubin and Tuden (eds.), op. cit., p. 270. On the other hand, Boxer asserts:

"[T]he peca de Indias... was defined in 1678 as being 'a Negro from fifteen to twenty-five years old; from eight to fifteen, and from twenty-five to thirty-five, three pass for two; beneath eight, and from thirty-five to forty-five, two pass for one' sucking infants follow their mothers without accompt; all above forty-five years, with the diseased, are valued by arbiters." Boxer, *The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695–1750*, University of California Press, Berkeley 1962, p. 5.

65. Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1966, p. 53 (cited by J. E. Inikori, "Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Rejoinder by J. E. Inikori," *Journal of African History* 17, no. 4 [1976]: 613).

66. Ibid., p. 52.

67. K. G. Davies, *The Royal African Company*, Atheneum, New York, 1970, p. 13; Enriqueta Vila, op. cit., passim.

68. Vila, op. cit., p. 275; Walter Rodney reported that "Most of the slaves imported into Mexico and Central America during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were from the upper Guinea coast." Rodney, "Portuguese Attempts at Monopoly on the Upper Guinea Coast, 1580–1650," *Journal of African History* 6, no. 3 (1965): 309.

69. J. E. Inikori, "Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: An Assessment of Curtin and Anstey," *Journal of African History*, 17, no. 2 (1976): 204–5.

70. Roderick MacDonald, "The Williams Thesis: A Comment on the State of Scholarship," *Caribbean Quarterly*, 25, no. 3 (September 1979): 63.

71. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, op. cit., p. 87.

72. Inikori's criticisms are important enough to warrant quotation. Of Curtin's statistics Inikori writes: "All the computations required by the formula employ only two slave population figures—the figure at the beginning and the figure at the end of the given period. While this poses no problime for compound interest calculations. . . the same is not true for a slave population that was subject to considerable hazards (which may have had no regular pattern) affecting the year-to-year movement of the total population and import figures." "Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: An Assessment," op. cit., p. 198. Respecting Curtin's historical sensitivities, Inikori states: "The amount of historical evidence supporting my argumentin this aspect of my original paper is really so substantial that only Curtin's ignorance of the historical data can make him write in the way he does. General statistical theory of random error does not take precedence over historical data. . . . Arguments about the inaccuracy of official records based on a large amount of historical data can only be countered with opposing historical data, not with vague theories of random error. . . . In fact, all the statements made by government officials which I quoted in my original paper were based on actual investigations." "Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Rejoinder," op. cit., p. 617. Finally, of Curtin's logic of defense, Inikori cautions: "The key to a proper understanding of Curtin's comments is his statement that what I said deliberately falsified the estimates so as to minimize the size of the trade. Ordinary error without a political or other bias would be more random; . . . With this misconception it apparently became an emotional issue for Curtin to defend his 'honor' at all cost. . . . The logic that runs through Curtin's paper is that only 'a political or other bias' can skew the frequency of error in a set of estimates in one direction. . . . The naivety of this logic is too obvious to warrant much comment. Suffice it to say that the frequency of error in a set of estimates can be skewed in any direction for several reasons that have nothing to do with 'a political or other bias.' And, for that matter, a man can have a political motive and yet produce an accurate estimate." Ibid., pp. 609-10.

73. Inikori, "Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Rejoinder," op. cit., p. 615.

74. D. Eltis, "The Direction and Fluctuation of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 1821—43: A Revision of the 1845 Parliamentary Paper," unpublished paper presented at the Mathematical Social Science Board Seminar on the Economics of the Slave Trade, Colby College, Waterville, Maine, 20—22 August 1975; Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760—1810, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.; and idem., "The Volume and Profitability of the British Slave Trade, 1761—1807," in Stanley Engerman and Eugene Genovese (eds.), Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975, pp. 3—31; Serge Daget, "La Repression Britannique sur les Negriers Français du Traffic Illegal: Quelques conditions generales ou specifiques," unpublished paper presented at Maine, 20—22 August 1975; Lucien Peytraud, L'Esclavage aux Antilles Français avant 1789 d'apres des documents inedits des Archives Coloniales, These Presentee a la Faculte des Lettres de Paris, Paris, 1897; and Ralph Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973.

75. Inikori does not present a total for the Atlantic slave trade. This figure was arrived at by totalling the amounts for the French West Indies, Brazil, and the English colonies which appear in Inikori's two essays, and interpolating an amount for Spanish America consistent with Inikori's treatment of pre-nineteenth-century Brazil's slave population. From Inikori's first essay ("Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: An Assessment," op. cit.), the numbers for the French West Indies are 3,000,000. For the English colonies in the eighteenth century and Brazil in the first half of the nineteenth century, the numbers are 3,699,572 and 3,700,000 respectively ("Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Rejoinder," op cit., pp. 623–24).

76. For Curtin's statement see note 52, chapter IV. I or D. R. Murray's critique of Curtin's figures, see

"Statistics of the Slave Trade in Cuba, 1790—1867," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 3, no. 2 (November 1971): 131—49. Richard Pares concurs with Curtin on this matter: "M. Debien has observed that the trickle of indentured peasants . . . dried up at various times in the second half of the seventeenth century: after 1666 few more such servants were sent to French St. Christopher; after 1685 few more to Guadeloupe. The same contrast can be seen between the older settled sugar colonies, like Barbados, which soon ceased to demand the services of any white men from Europe besides specialists, and the newer settlements, like Jamaica, which still, for a time, welcomed unskilled white labourers. Specialists—tradesmen, coachmen, refiners, private tutors—were still sent out to the plantations for another century; but the peasant, with his two hands and nothing much else, was no longer in demand. His place had been taken by an African." Pares, *Merchants and Planters*, Economic History Review Supplement, no.e, 1960, p. 19.

- 77. See note 47, previous chap.
- 78. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, op. cit., p. 63.
- 79. Ibid., p. 61.
- 80. Herman Merivale, Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, London, 1861 (repr. by Augustus Kelley, New York, 1967), p. 302.
 - 81. Roderick McDonald, op. cit. pp. 65-66.
 - 82. James Burke, Connections, Little, Brown, Boston, 1978, p. 192.
- 83. Robert Carlyle Batie, "Why Sugar, Economic Cycles and the Changing of Staples on the English and French Antilles, 1624–54," *Journal of Caribbean History* 8 (November 1976): 4–13.
 - 84. P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, Macmillan, London, 1967, pp. 55-56.
 - 85. C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
 - 86. Roderick McDonald, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
 - 87. Richard Pares, op. cit., p. 38.
 - 88. Ibid., p. 50.
- 89. Ibid., p. 33. The Davies piece to which Pares refers is K. G. B. Davies, "The Origin of the Commission System in the West India Trade," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., vol. 2 (1952): 89–107.
 - 90. Viva, op. cit., p. 277 n. 9.
- 91. Cited by Roderick McDonald in his "Measuring the British Slave Trade to Jamaica, 1789–1808: A Comment," *Economic History Review* 33, no. 2 (May 1980): 257–58.
 - 92. Pares, op. cit., pp. 2-6.
 - 93. Ibid., pp. 11, 63 n. 54; and Batie, op. cit., p. 1.
 - 94. Pares, op. cit., p. 16.
- 95. Richard B. Moore, "On Barbadians and Minding Other People's Business," *New World Quarterly 3*, nos. 1 and 2, Dead Season and Croptime (1966/1967): 69.
- 96. Batie, op. cit., pp. 4–13; and Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–1713, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1972, p. 203.
 - 97. Batie, op. cit., p. 16.
 - 98. Ibid., pp. 15, 19.
 - 99. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, op. cit., p. 126.
 - 100. Ibid., pp. 118-26.
 - 101. See Inikori, "Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Rejoinder," op. cit., p. 619.
- 102. Curtin's figures are used here not for their accuracy but for their relative weights. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, op. cit., p. 119.
 - 103. Inikori, "Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Rejoinder," op. cit., pp. 612-15.
- 104. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, op. cit., chap. 10. This figure, it must be recalled, is only an "estimate" of the number of deaths associated with the British slave trade in the eighteenth century. For France, during the same century, Robert Stein, who (without attribution) puts the French slave trade at 1,150,000, also claims that "no fewer than 150,000 died before reaching the New World, and many more died within a year or two of arrival." Stein, "Mortality in the Eighteenth-Century French Slave Trade," *Journal of African History* 21, no. 1 (1980): 35.
- 105. Curtin, ibid., p. 282. For the period 1714–78, Stein puts the death "rate" of crews in the French slave trade at 13 percent and argues: "crew mortality was on the average higher than slave mortality at least along the coast and on the Middle Passage." Stein, "Mortality in the Eighteenth-Century French Slave Trade," op. cit., pp. 36–37.
 - 106. Curtin, ibid, pp. 139-40.
- 107. Orlando Patterson, *The Sociology of Slavery*, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, Rutherford, 1969, pp. 134–44.
 - 108. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, op. cit., pp. 91-2.
 - 109. Ibid., pp. 83, 268.
 - 110. Inikori, "Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: An Assessment," op. cit., p. 222.
 - 111. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, op. cit., pp. 144, 156-58.
 - 112. Gerald Mullin, Flight and Rebellion, Oxford University Press, New York, 1972, p. 7.

113. Ibid., p. 43.

114. For the background of the Black maroon settlements of seventeenth-century Virginia and the Afro-Indian (Seminole) settlements of eighteenth-century Florida, see chapter 7. An early account of the Seminoles is given by Josh Giddings (1858).

115. See Nwabueze F. Okoye, "Chattel Slavery as the Nightmare of the American Revolutionaries," William and Mary Quarterly, 37 (January 1980): 3–5; Jeffrey Crow, "Slave Rebelliousness and Social Conflict in North Carolina 1775–1802," William and Mary Quarterly, ibid., p. 89; C. L. R. James, "The Atlantic Slave Trade," in James, The Future in the Present, Lawrence Hill, Westport, 1977, p. 246.

116. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Howard University Press, Washington D.C., 1972.

117. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader*, W. W. Norton, New York, 1978, p. 478.

Chapter Six

- 1. Cabral, "National Liberation and Culture," in *Return to the Source*, Africa Information Service, 1973, pp. 42–43.
- 2. Michael Craton, "Proto-Peasant Revolts?: The Late Slave Rebellions in the British West Indies 1816–1832," Past and Present 85 (November 1979): 120–21. Robert Lacerte's work on the first four decades of Haitian independence, despite a tendency toward questionable assertions and presumptions (he persists in designating France as Haiti's "mother country" and declares that the presence of "whites" was indispensable for Haiti's post-revolutionary economic recovery), supports Craton's characterization of African peasant predispositions regarding plantation agriculture and land tenure. See Lacerte, "The First Land Reform in Latin America: The Reforms of Alexander Petion, 1809–1814," Inter-American Economic Affairs 28, no. 4 (Spring 1975): 77–85; and "Xenophobia and Economic Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820–1843," The Americas 37, no. 4 (April 1981): 499–515.
 - 3. John Blassingame, The Slave Community, Oxford University Press, New York, 1972, pp. 189-216.
 - 4. Ibid., p. 197.
 - 5. Ibid., p. 201.
 - 6. Ibid., p. 213.
- 7. On more than one occasion, Blassingame contends that: "It is no accident that the Sambo of Southern novels and plays was usually a house servant. Because the planters often had little contact with field hands, in white autobiographies it is almost always the house servant who is portrayed as the epitome of loyalty.... One reflection of the faithfulness of house servants and the low level of contact between field hands and whites is that, in an overwhelming majority of the cases where masters manumitted individual slaves, they were house servants." (Ibid., pp. 200-201.) On the other hand, Owens reminds us that: "Masters tortured and murdered some domestics, and house slaves killed slaveholders. Many acts against domestics went unpunished. . . . It is not easy to generalize about house slaves. They were a diverse class of bondsmen who helped to shape and reshape the character of their servitude in the Big House. In some respects theirs was a special kind of enslavement marked by privileges that most field hands never experienced, at least not in the same way. They did not, however, give in to it." Leslie Howard Owens, This Species of Property, Oxford University Press, New York, 1976, p. 120. Furthermore, Kenneth Stampp in *The Peculiar Institution*, Vintage Books, New York, 1956, states that at least a quarter of the American slave population in the nineteenth century were claimed by slaveholders "who had at their command as few as a half dozen fieldhands.... Lacking skilled craftsmen in their small slave forces, they still found it necessary to perform certain specialized tasks such as carpentering and repairing tools; and in an emergency (a crop rarely went from spring planting to fall harvesting without a crisis of some kind) they temporarily forgot their pride . . . a master often had to choose between losing his crop and pitching in with his slaves" (p. 35).
 - 8. Blassingame, op. cit., pp. 190ff.
 - 9. Owens, op. cit., p. 78.
- 10. "At the core of such behavior was the slave's lack of accommodation to much that confronted him in bondage. Bondage continually worked against the bondsman, though he never left its functioning untempered with. The frustration was enormous." Ibid., p. 93.
 - 11. Ibid., pp. 79-96.
 - 12. Ibid., p. 103.
 - 13. Ibid., p. 96.
 - 14. Ibid., p. 103.
- 15. "The Southern planter suffered, not simply for his economic mistakes—the psychological effect of slavery upon him was fatal. The mere fact that a man could be, under the law, the actual master of the mind and body of human beings had to have disastrous effects. It tended to inflate the ego of most planters beyond all reason; they became arrogant, strutting, quarrelsome kinglets; they issued commands; they made laws; they shouted their order; they expected deference and self-abasement; they were choleric and