
"If your brother becomes poor and cannot maintain himself with you, you shall support though he were a stranger and a sojourner, so that he shall live with you." (Leviticus 25)

# Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization

Accepted to AAAI'25 ©

Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann, Avinatan Hassidim, Erel Segal-HaLevi



Selection

over selections



Agents'
utility functions
over selections

# Welfare objectives

Utilitarian

Maximize the sum of agents' utilities.



**Egalitarian** 

Maximize the **minimum** utility.

Leximin

Maximize the minimum utility.

subject to this, maximize second-smallest utility;

subject to this, maximize third-smallest utility;

and so on.

# Welfare objectives - Computation



**Utilitarian** 

Maximize the sum of agents' utilities.

Egalitarian

Maximize the minimum utility.

Leximin

Maximize the minimum utility.

subject to this, maximize second-smallest utility;

subject to this, maximize third-smallest utility;

and so on.

# Welfare objectives - Complexity



**Example: Allocating Indivisible Goods Among Agents With Additive Utilities** 

**Utilitarian** 

Poly: greedily assign each item to the agent who values it most.

**Egalitarian** 

NP-hard
Approximation algorithms exist (e.g. Bansal and Sviridenko, 2006).

Leximin

⇒ NP-hard.We are not aware of any approximation algorithms.

# **Our Contribution**

Leximin
Utilitarian

For any social choice problem with utilities  $\geq 0$ :

- If you give us a black-box that computes a utilitarian-optimal<sup>1</sup> selection in polytime –
- then we give you a polytime algorithm that computes a leximin-optimal (in expectation) lottery over selections.

#### Our reduction is robust:

- If your black-box is  $\alpha$ -approximately utilitarian-optimal -
- then our lottery is  $\alpha$ -approximately leximin-optimal<sup>2</sup>.
- 1. for weighted (non-normalized) utilities.
- 2. for an appropriate definition of 'approximately leximin-optimal'.

# Previous Work (Kawase & Sumita, 2020)


#### **Problem**

Stochastic Allocation of Indivisible Goods.

The output is a lottery over the set of (deterministic) allocations.

**Theorem:** Given an  $\alpha$ -approx. alg. for utilitarian

one can obtain an  $\alpha$ -approx. alg. for egalitarian in polynomial time.



# Our Work (2024)

#### **Problem**

Any social choice problem with utilities  $\geq 0$ .

• The output is a lottery over the set of (deterministic) selections.

<u>Theorem</u>: Given an  $\alpha$ -approx. alg. for utilitarian one can obtain an  $\alpha$ -approx. alg. for leximin in polynomial time.




# Our Work (2024)

#### **Problem**

Any social choice problem with utilities  $\geq 0$ .

The output is a lottery over the set of (deterministic) selections.

Theorem: Given an  $\alpha$ -approx. alg. for utilitarian one can obtain an  $\alpha$ -approx. alg. for leximin in polynomial time.



### **Applications**

#### Stochastic Indivisible Allocation<sup>1</sup>

- Additive utilities ⇒ Exact
- Submodular utilities  $\Rightarrow$  0.5-approx (det)
- Submodular utilities  $\Rightarrow \left(1 \frac{1}{e}\right)$ -approx (rand)

#### Participatory Budgeting Lottery<sup>2</sup>

An FPTAS for leximin

#### **Giveaway Lotteries**<sup>3</sup>

An FPTAS for leximin

- 1. On the Max-Min Fair Stochastic Allocation of Indivisible Goods. Kawase and Sumita, 2020.
- 2. Fair Lotteries for Participatory Budgeting. Aziz, Lu, Suzuki, Vollen, and Walsh, 2024.
- 3. Fair and Truthful Giveaway Lotteries. Arbiv and Aumann, 2022.

Agents

$$N = \{1, \dots, n\}$$

Selections 
$$S = \{s_1, ..., s_{|S|}\}$$
 (deterministic outcomes)

Solutions 
$$X = \left\{ x = (x_1, ..., x_{|S|}) \in \mathbb{R}^{|S|}_{\geq 0} \mid \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j = 1 \right\}$$

Utilities

$$u_i: S \to \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \quad \forall i \in N$$

(a value oracle)

Expected Utilities

$$E_i: X \to \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \quad \forall i \in N$$

$$E_i(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j \cdot u_i(s_j)$$

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Expected Utilities

$$E_i(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j \cdot u_i(s_j)$$

# Utilitarian Opt.

A solution  $x^{uo} \in X$  s.t  $\forall x \in X$ :

$$\sum_{i=1}^{|S|} E_i(x^{uo}) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{|S|} E_i(x)$$

Agents

$$N = \{1, \dots, n\}$$

Selections 
$$S = \{s_1, ..., s_{|S|}\}$$
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Solutions 
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(a value oracle)

Expected Utilities

$$E_i(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j \cdot u_i(s_j)$$

# Weighted Utilitarian Opt.

Given n constants  $c_1, ..., c_n \ge 0$ .

A solution  $x^{uo} \in X$  s.t  $\forall x \in X$ :

$$\sum_{i=1}^{|S|} \mathbf{c_i} \cdot E_i(\mathbf{x}^{uo}) \geq \sum_{i=1}^{|S|} \mathbf{c_i} \cdot E_i(\mathbf{x})$$

Agents

$$N = \{1, \dots, n\}$$

Selections

$$S = \{s_1, ..., s_{|S|}\}$$
 (deterministic outcomes)

Solutions

$$X = \left\{ x = (x_1, \dots, x_{|S|}) \in \mathbb{R}^{|S|}_{\geq 0} \mid \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j = 1 \right\}$$

Utilities

$$u_i: S \to \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \quad \forall i \in N$$

 $E_i: X \to \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \quad \forall i \in N$ 

(a value oracle)

Expected Utilities

$$E_i(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j \cdot u_i(s_j)$$

# Leximin Opt.

A solution  $x^* \in X$  s.t  $\forall x \in X$ :

$$(E_1(x^*), \dots, E_n(x^*)) \geqslant (E_1(x), \dots, E_n(x))$$

$$v^{\uparrow} \qquad \text{v sorted in weakly-increasing order}$$

Leximin order  $v \geqslant u$ 


if (1) 
$$oldsymbol{v}^{\uparrow} = oldsymbol{u}^{\uparrow}$$

or (2) 
$$\exists 1 \leq k \leq n$$
 s.t

$$(2.1) v_i^{\uparrow} = u_i^{\uparrow} for i < k$$

$$(2.2) \ v_k^{\uparrow} > u_k^{\uparrow}$$


- Leximin is a multi-objective problem.
- Algorithms are usually:
  - Iterative, solve one program in each iteration




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




- Leximin is a multi-objective problem.
- Algorithms are usually:
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  - When t = 1, solve egalitarian:




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- Leximin is a multi-objective problem.
- Algorithms are usually:
  - Iterative, solve one program in each iteration
  - When t = 1, solve egalitarian:

max 
$$z$$
  
 $s.t.$  (1)  $x \in X$   
(2)  $E_i(x) \ge z$   $\forall i = 1, ..., n$ 

Each iteration uses the opt. values from previous iteration as constants.



#### (Ogryczak & Sliwinski, 2006)

- For t = 1, ... n:
  - Solve:

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^{t} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_{i}$$


$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_{j} = 1$$

$$(P1.2) \quad x_{j} \ge 0 \qquad j = 1, \dots, |S|$$

$$(P1.3) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_{i} \quad \forall \ell \in [t-1]$$

- Let  $x^t$  be the solution, and  $z^t$  be its objective value.
- Return  $x^n$

 $E_{i}^{\uparrow}(x)$  The *i*-th smallest expected-utility at solution x



- For t = 1, ... n:
  - Solve:

max 
$$\sum_{i=1}^{t} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_{i}$$
 (P1)
$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \quad \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_{j} = 1$$
 (P1.2)  $x_{j} \geq 0$   $j = 1, \dots, |S|$  (P1.3) 
$$\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \geq \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_{i} \quad \forall \ell \in [t-1]$$

- Let  $x^t$  be the solution, and  $z^t$  be its objective value.
- Return  $x^n$

Theorem (Ogryczak & Sliwinski):

Given an <u>exact</u> solver for P1, the alg. output is <u>leximin-optimal</u>.

In some situations, solving P1 <u>exactly</u> is <u>NP-hard</u> (even for t = 1)

E.g., stochastic allocation of indivisible goods among agents with <u>submodular</u> utilities

Theorem (Kawase & Sumita 2020): Optimal Egalitarian is NP-hard.

- ➤ On Direct Methods for Lexicographic Min-Max Optimization. Ogryczak and Sliwinski, 2006.
- > On the Max-Min Fair Stochastic Allocation of Indivisible Goods. Kawase and Sumita, 2020.

- For t = 1, ... n:
  - Solve:

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$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j = 1$$

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Approximations?

- For t = 1, ... n:
  - Solve:

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$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \quad \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j = 1$$

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- Let  $x^t$  be the solution, and  $z^t$  be its objective value.
- Return  $x^n$

#### **Solving P1 Approximately**

For t = 1:

The alg. of Kawase & Sumita is an approximate solver for (P1).



For t > 1:

Their technique no longer works (due to subtraction in objective)



- For t = 1, ... n:
  - Solve:

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^{t} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_i$$

$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j = 1$$

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- Let  $x^t$  be the solution, and  $z^t$  be its objective value.
- Return  $x^n$

#### What we do:

Define a new type of solver for P1 (even weaker than the approx. one)
- A shallow solver -

Provide a shallow solver for P1 that requires only a <u>black-box</u> for utilitarian.

#### Prove:

Given a <u>shallow</u> solver for P1, the alg. output is <u>leximin-approx</u>.

# **Leximin Approximation**

#### Leximin Optimal

A solution 
$$x^* \in X$$
 s.t  $\forall x \in X$ : 
$$\left(E_1(x^*), \dots, E_n(x^*)\right) \geqslant \left(E_1(x), \dots, E_n(x)\right)$$

Since leximin has <u>multiple objectives</u>, defining leximin-approximation is not a trivial task.<sup>1</sup>

In this work we use the following definition:

# Leximin Approx

$$0 < \alpha \le 1$$

A solution 
$$x^A \in X$$
 s.t  $\forall x \in X$ : 
$$\left(E_1(x^A), \dots, E_n(x^A)\right) \geqslant \alpha \cdot \left(E_1(x), \dots, E_n(x)\right)$$

#### What we do:

Define a new type of solver for P1
(even weaker than the approx. one)
- A shallow solver -

Provide a shallow solver for P1
that requires only
a <u>black-box</u> for utilitarian

Prove:

Given a <u>shallow</u> solver for P1, The alg. output is <u>leximin-approx</u>.

- For t = 1, ... n:
  - Solve:

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^{t} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_i$$

$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j = 1$$

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- Let  $x^t$  be the solution, and  $z^t$  be its objective value.
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
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
Provide a shallow solver for P1 that requires only a <u>black-box</u> for utilitarian.


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Given a <u>shallow</u> solver for P1, The alg. output is <u>leximin-approx</u>.



## **Reduction Flow**







#### Lemma 5.2 in paper

Given an  $\alpha$ -shallow-solver for P1, the output of Ordered Outcomes Alg. is  $\alpha$ -leximin-approx.

## An $\alpha$ -Shallow Solver: Definition





solutions using  $\leq \alpha$  probability<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We assume there is a <u>dummy selection</u> that gives all agents utility 0.

## An $\alpha$ -Shallow Solver: Definition


```
returns x^t \in F(P1) (feasible for P1)
  Solver
                obj(x^t) \ge obj(x) for any x \in F(P1)
  Exact
                \operatorname{obj}(x^t) \ge \operatorname{obj}(x) for any x \in F(P1) \cap X_{\alpha}^-
\alpha-Shallow
                                                  \alpha = 0.9 solutions using \leq 0.9 probability<sup>1</sup>
                                                                                                   (instead of 1)
         Feasible
         Solutions
         F(P1)
                     F(P1) \cap X_{\alpha}^{-}
```

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We assume there is a <u>dummy selection</u> that gives all agents utility 0,  $s_d \in S$ .

#### Lemma 6.1

- (a) Approx. black-box for utilitarian
- (b) An arbitrary  $x_{init} \in F(P1)$

- ⇒ A shallow-solver for P1
- (c) Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1



#### Lemma 6.1


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
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- (c) Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

#### Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1 (Definition)

Given a candidate objective value  $z_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ , returns one of the following:

- $z_t$  is a feasible objective-value:
- $\exists x \in F(P1)$  with objective value  $\geq z_t$ . In this case, returns such x.
- $z_t$  is an infeasible objective-value for solutions using  $\leq \alpha$  probability  $\nexists \ x \in F(P1) \cap X_{\alpha}^-$  with objective value  $\geq z_t$ .






Weak = not mutually exclusive

#### Lemma 6.1

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#### Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

Given  $z_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$  returns one of:

- Feasible objective
- Infeasible objective for sol. using  $\leq \alpha$  prob.

Approx
Black-Box
for Utilitarian

Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1 Shallow Solver for P1

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
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#### Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

Given  $z_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$  returns one of:

- Feasible objective
- Infeasible objective for sol. using  $\leq \alpha$  prob.

1. Bound the maximum objective value



Approx Black-Box for Utilitarian

Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1 Shallow Solver for P1

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
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Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

Given  $z_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$  returns one of:

- Feasible objective
- Infeasible objective for sol. using  $\leq \alpha$  prob.

1. Bound the maximum objective value



2. Perform a binary search

Approx
Black-Box
for Utilitarian

Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1 Shallow Solver for P1

Lemma 6.1

- (a) Approx. black-box for utilitarian
- (b) An arbitrary  $x_{init} \in F(P1)$
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
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Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

Given  $z_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$  returns one of:

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- Infeasible objective for sol. using  $\leq \alpha$  prob.

1. Bound the maximum objective value



2. Perform a binary search

For each  $z_t$ , use the Weak Feasibility-Oracle:

- If 'Feasible' go right (higher values)
- otherwise go left (lower values)

## An $\alpha$ -Shallow Solver for P1

Approx Black-Box for Utilitarian

Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1 Shallow Solver for P1

Lemma 6.1

- (a) Approx. black-box for utilitarian
- (b) An arbitrary  $x_{init} \in F(P1)$
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A shallow-solver for P1

Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1


Given  $z_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$  returns one of:

- Feasible objective
- Infeasible objective for sol. using  $\leq \alpha$  prob.

**Output of utilitarian** 

black-box

1. Bound the maximum objective value



For each  $z_t$ , use the Weak Feasibility-Oracle:

• If 'Feasible' go right (higher values)

Max

obj

- otherwise go left (lower values)
- 3. Return the largest value for which the answer is 'Feasible'.
  - $\rightarrow$  It is maximum w.r.t. all solutions that use  $\leq \alpha$  probability.

#### Lemma 7.1

$$\frac{1}{\alpha}$$
-Approx-Optimal Solver for P2



 $\alpha$ -Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^{t} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_i$$

$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j = 1$$

$$(P1.2) \quad x_j \ge 0 \qquad j = 1, \dots, |S|$$

$$(P1.3) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_i \quad \forall \ell \in [t-1]$$

#### Lemma 7.1

$$\frac{1}{\alpha}$$
-Approx-Optimal Solver for P2



 $\alpha$ -Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

P2 is derived from P1 and a <u>candidate</u> objective-value  $z_t$ :

1. Remove the objective function

$$\frac{1}{\max} \sum_{i=1}^{t} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_i \qquad (P1)$$

$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \quad \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j = 1$$

$$(P1.2) \quad x_j \ge 0 \qquad j = 1, \dots, |S|$$

$$(P1.3) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_i \quad \forall \ell \in [t-1]$$

#### Lemma 7.1

$$\frac{1}{\alpha}$$
-Approx-Optimal Solver for P2



 $\alpha$ -Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

- 1. Remove the objective function
- 2. Add a constraint to ensure that the objective  $\geq z_t$

$$\frac{1}{\max} \sum_{i=1}^{t} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_{i} \qquad (P1)$$

$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_{j} = 1$$

$$(P1.2) \quad x_{j} \ge 0 \qquad \qquad j = 1, \dots, |S|$$

$$(P1.3) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_{i} \quad \forall \ell \in [t-1]$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{t} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_{i} \ge z_{t}$$

#### Lemma 7.1

$$\frac{1}{\alpha}$$
-Approx-Optimal Solver for P2



 $\alpha$ -Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

- 1. Remove the objective function
- 2. Add a constraint to ensure that the objective  $\geq z_t$
- 3. Remove Constraint (P1.1)

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^{t} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_{i}$$

$$s.t. \quad (P1.1) \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_{j} = 1$$

$$(P1.2) \quad x_{j} \geq 0 \qquad j = 1, \dots, |S|$$

$$(P1.3) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \geq \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_{i} \quad \forall \ell \in [t-1]$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{t} E_{i}^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_{i} \geq z_{t}$$

#### Lemma 7.1

$$\frac{1}{\alpha}$$
-Approx-Optimal Solver for P2



 $\alpha$ -Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

- 1. Remove the objective function
- 2. Add a constraint to ensure that the objective  $\geq z_t$
- 3. Remove Constraint (P1.1)
- 4. Add new obj: minimize the sum of probabilities

min 
$$\sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j$$
 (P1)

s.t.  $(P1.1) \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j = 1$ 
 $(P1.2) x_j \ge 0$   $j = 1, \dots, |S|$ 
 $(P1.3) \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_i \quad \forall \ell \in [t-1]$ 

$$\sum_{i=1}^{t} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} z_i \ge z_t$$

#### Lemma 7.1

$$\frac{1}{\alpha}$$
-Approx-Optimal Solver for P2



 $\alpha$ -Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

- 1. Remove the objective function
- 2. Add a constraint to ensure that the objective  $\geq z_t$
- 3. Remove Constraint (P1.1)
- 4. Add new obj: min the sum over  $x_j$

$$\min \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j \quad s.t.$$

$$(P2.1) \quad x_j \ge 0 \qquad \qquad j = 1, \dots, |S|$$

$$(P2.2) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_i \qquad \forall \ell \in [t]$$

#### Lemma 7.1

$$\frac{1}{\alpha}$$
-Approx-Optimal Solver for P2

#### $\Rightarrow$

 $\alpha$ -Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

 $\alpha$ -Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1 Given  $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ -Approx. solution to P2,  $x^A$ :

- If its objective value  $\leq 1$ :
  Assert that  $z_t$  is feasible, return  $x^A$ .
- · Otherwise:

Assert that  $z_t$  is infeasible for solutions using  $\leq \alpha$  probability.

min 
$$\sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j \quad s.t.$$

$$(P2.1) \quad x_j \ge 0 \qquad \qquad j = 1, \dots, |S|$$


$$(P2.2) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} E_i^{\uparrow}(\mathbf{x}) \ge \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_i \qquad \forall \ell \in [t]$$

#### Weak Feasibility-Oracle for P1

Given  $z_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$  returns one of:

- Feasible objective
- Infeasible objective for sol. using  $\leq \alpha$  prob.

# An $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ -Approx-Optimal Solver for P2



#### Lemma 8.1

$$\frac{1}{\alpha}$$
-Approx-Optimal Solver for linear P3

min 
$$\sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j$$
 s.t. (P3)  
(P3.1)  $x_j \ge 0$   $j = 1, ..., |S|$   
(P3.2)  $\ell y_{\ell} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} m_{\ell,i} \ge \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_i$   $\forall \ell \in [t]$ 

(P3.3) 
$$m_{\ell,i} \ge y_{\ell} - \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_j \cdot u_i(s_j) \quad \forall \ell \in [t], \ \forall i \in [n]$$


(P3.4) 
$$m_{\ell,i} \ge 0$$
  $\forall \ell \in [t], \ \forall i \in [n]$ 

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{\alpha}$$
 -Approx-Optimal Solver for P2

- A <u>Linear Program</u> which is <u>Equivalent</u> to P2:
  - $x^A$  is a solution for P2  $\Leftrightarrow$  it is part of a solution for P3
  - Auxiliary variables are used to "linearize" the constraints
  - (technique based on Ogryczak and Sliwinski)

• P3 Cannot be solved directly: exp. number of variables.

# An $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ -Approx-Optimal Solver for P3



### Corollary 9.1 + Lemma 10.1

 $\alpha$ -Black-box for Utilitarian



 $\frac{1}{\alpha}$  -Approx-Optimal Solver for P3

$$\min \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_{j} \quad s.t. \tag{P3}$$

$$(P3.1) \quad x_{j} \geq 0 \qquad j = 1, \dots, |S|$$

$$(P3.2) \quad \ell y_{\ell} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} m_{\ell,i} \geq \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_{i} \qquad \forall \ell \in [t]$$


$$(P3.3) \quad m_{\ell,i} \geq y_{\ell} - \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_{j} \cdot u_{i}(s_{j}) \quad \forall \ell \in [t], \ \forall i \in [n]$$

$$(P3.4) \quad m_{\ell,i} \geq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t], \ \forall i \in [n]$$

$$\max \sum_{\ell=1}^{t} q_{\ell} \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_{i} \quad s.t.$$
(D3.1) 
$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} u_{i}(s_{j}) \sum_{\ell=1}^{t} v_{\ell,i} \leq 1 \quad \forall j = 1, \dots, |S|$$
(D3.2) 
$$\ell q_{\ell} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_{\ell,i} \leq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t]$$
(D3.3) 
$$-q_{\ell} + v_{\ell,i} \leq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t], \ \forall i \in [n]$$
(D3.4) 
$$q_{\ell} \geq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t], \ \forall i \in [n]$$
(D3.5) 
$$v_{\ell,i} \geq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t], \ \forall i \in [n]$$

- We approximate P3 with its Dual Program and a variant of the ellipsoid method (for approx)
- The utilitarian solver is used inside the (approx) separation oracle for the Dual.

# An $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ -Approx-Optimal Solver for P3



### Corollary 9.1 + Lemma 10.1

 $\alpha$ -Black-box for Utilitarian

$$\Rightarrow$$

 $\frac{1}{\alpha}$  -Approx-Optimal Solver for P3

$$\min \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_{j} \quad s.t. \tag{P3}$$

$$(P3.1) \quad x_{j} \geq 0 \qquad j = 1, \dots, |S|$$

$$(P3.2) \quad \ell y_{\ell} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} m_{\ell,i} \geq \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_{i} \qquad \forall \ell \in [t]$$

$$(P3.3) \quad m_{\ell,i} \geq y_{\ell} - \sum_{j=1}^{|S|} x_{j} \cdot u_{i}(s_{j}) \quad \forall \ell \in [t], \ \forall i \in [n]$$

$$(P3.4) \quad m_{\ell,i} \geq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t], \ \forall i \in [n]$$

$$\max \sum_{\ell=1}^{t} q_{\ell} \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} z_{i} \quad s.t.$$

$$(D3.1) \sum_{i=1}^{n} u_{i}(s_{j}) \sum_{\ell=1}^{t} v_{\ell,i} \leq 1 \quad \forall j = 1, \dots, |S|$$

$$(D3.2) \quad \ell q_{\ell} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_{\ell,i} \leq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t]$$


$$(D3.3) \quad -q_{\ell} + v_{\ell,i} \leq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t], \quad \forall i \in [n]$$


$$(D3.4) \quad q_{\ell} \geq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t]$$

$$(D3.5) \quad v_{\ell,i} \geq 0 \qquad \forall \ell \in [t], \quad \forall i \in [n]$$

- We approximate P3 with its Dual Program and a variant of the <u>ellipsoid method</u> (for approx)
- The utilitarian solver is used inside the (approx) separation oracle for the Dual.

## **Reduction Flow**





# **Open Questions**

1. Social choice problems with utilities  $\leq 0$  (e.g. fair allocation of chores, facility location)



- 2. Nash welfare objective = Maximize the product of utilities.
  - Sweet-spot between utilitarian and egalitarian.
  - Often as hard as egalitarian.
  - Is there an analogous reduction for Nash welfare?
- 3. Best of both worlds: Can we guarantee any ex-post fairness?

Please contact us for any question and any answer!

• erelsgl@gmail.com

• <a href="mailto:eden.r.hartman@gmail.com">eden.r.hartman@gmail.com</a>

