

DISEC

President: Jorge Quintero



CERVMUN X
UNLOCK THE VISION, BUILD THE LEGACY



INDEX

- I. Letter from the DISEC committee president.
- II. About the DISEC committee.
- III. TOPIC A: The Emerging Threat of Military Expansion on the Moon.
 - a. Introduction.
 - b. Historical Background.
 - c. Current Situation.
 - d. Approach and expectations of the debate.
 - e. Delegates position
 - f. Guiding questions.
- IV. TOPIC B: The Increasing Role of Autonomous and Remote-Controlled Weapons in Warfare
 - a. Introduction.
 - b. Historical Background.
 - c. Current Situation.
 - d. Approach and expectations of the debate.
 - e. Delegates position
 - f. Guiding questions.
- V. Glossary
- VI. Bibliography

COORDINACIONES

PBX: 3784172 - 3784173 - 3784174 - 3784175
Cra. 51B N° 87-99 | Barranquilla, Colombia
www.liceodecervantes.edu.co



I.

LETTER FROM THE DISEC COMMITTEE PRESIDENT

Esteemed delegates,

I am very pleased that you have chosen DISEC for this edition of CERVMUN. It is truly an honor for me to preside over a committee that has been essential to my journey in MUN. When I first participated, I never imagined that one day I would have the privilege of chairing this amazing committee. DISEC has taught me so much, and I desire to share that knowledge with all of you.

Since sixth grade, MUN has been a life-changing experience for me. Each conference has provided me with lots of knowledge and has helped me to develop my understanding of critical global issues and how the world actually works. It has allowed me to make friendships and know people that I admire and will always remain in my heart. Every conference has taught me something new and helped me grow, both as a delegate and as a person.

Every MUN is a new opportunity to give our best, to push our limits, and to better understand ourselves. Over the next two days, you will have the opportunity to represent a nation and work toward building a better future for humanity. You will uphold the principles of diplomacy and contribute solutions that may one day improve our global society.

For this reason, I encourage you to take full advantage of this experience. Take your country's role, deeply research, and give your very best during the debate. As your Chair, I am committed to hopefully exceeding your expectations. I will be at your disposal throughout the committee to help you strengthen your ideas and guide the debate effectively.

I can't wait to see you at CERVMUN X.

Sincerely,
-Jorge Quintero Peréz
jorge.quintero@liceodecervantes.edu.co
3046448708



II.

ABOUT THE DISEC COMMITTEE

DISEC, which stands for Disarmament and International Security Committee, is one of the main bodies of the General Assembly, enforces disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons. In other words, it deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.

It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.



United Nations
General Assembly
1st Committee (DISEC)



III.

TOPIC A: The Emerging Threat of Military Expansion on the Moon.

INTRODUCTION

The renewed space race has shifted from scientific achievements to strategic competition. It's about dominance. Countries such as the United States and China, alongside private actors like Space X, are planning long-term missions to establish bases on the moon and eventually Mars. With very limited legal frameworks in place, there are growing concerns about the militarization of these celestial bodies. In general, militarization of celestial bodies refers to the deployment, construction, or use of military infrastructure, personnel, or weaponry on outer space objects such as the Moon, Mars, or asteroids. It includes both state and private actions aimed at gaining strategic or defense advantages beyond Earth's atmosphere.

This can involve:

- Establishing military bases or outposts on the Moon or Mars
- Deploying conventional or directed-energy weapons in space
- Using celestial bodies for surveillance, intelligence, or missile systems
- Integrating military technology into civilian space missions (dual-use)

These developments are a rising concern because there are existing legal treaties like the Outer Space Treaty (1967) Lack the prohibition of conventional weapons, terraformation or military infrastructure. Moreover, there is not a clear legal mechanism for private actors such as Space X.

Current missions raising concern include the Artemis Program, the ILRS (International Lunar Research Station) by China and Russia, India's Chandrayaan and LUPEX, and private ambitions like Elon Musk's proposal to terraform Mars using nuclear weapons as he once posted, "*Nuke Mars!*"

If left unchecked, the militarization of space could lead to an arms race beyond earth, threatening the peaceful use of this commonwealth and marginalizing less-developed nations. For this reason, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) must urgently consider how to strengthen legal frameworks, regulate private actors, and preserve celestial bodies for peaceful, cooperative exploration.



HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Since the beginning of space exploration, the possibility of militarizing outer space has sparked international concern. The launch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union in 1957 not only began a space race but also raised fears among the international communities that the earth's orbit, celestial bodies such as the Moon and Mars could become an area of military contention. What began as a race for scientific achievement soon developed deeper strategic and military ambitions, which continue evolving today.

1957

The Soviet Union (USSR) launches the Sputnik 1, the world's first artificial satellite. This marks the beginning of the space race between the USSR and the United States during the Cold War. Military concerns instantly rise over the potential of using space technology for missile delivery and surveillance.

1967

The Outer Space Treaty (OST) is signed by the United States, USSR and 98 other countries. It prohibits the displacement of mass destruction on orbit And bans any claim of sovereignty in outer space. However, it does not ban conventional weapons or military installations, lacks enforcement mechanisms and does not regulate the private sector.

1979

The moon agreement is introduced, aiming to prevent military activities on the Moon and regulate resource sharing and exploitation. Leading powers in space exploration such as the United States, USSR and China refused to ratify the treaty, making it ineffective.

1980s

The United States proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as "Star Wars". It envisions space-based missile systems, intensifying fears of space weaponization. Although it was never fully realized, it demonstrates the military potential of outer space.

1990-2000s

Private companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin begin forming, with a long term vision of exploring and settling Mars and the Moon. These companies operate in legal grey zones, as treaties do not clearly define rules for the private sector in space.

2007

China conducts its first successful Anti-Satellite (ASAT) missile test, destroying one of its own weather satellites. This is interpreted by many people as a demonstration of military capabilities on space, triggering global concern over the growing weaponization of orbital zones.



2019

The United States formally established the U.S. Space Force, the first dedicated military branch focused on space operations. This move publicly defines outer space as a warfighting domain, shifting global perceptions about peaceful space activity.

2020s

NASA's Artemis program officially begins, aiming to return humans to the moon and establish a long-term presence. Supported by defense contractors and space agencies with military ties, Artemis generates discussions on safety zones and national interest in lunar territory.

2023

Elon Musk, CEO of SpaceX, reignites controversy by tweeting “*Nuke Mars!*” referencing an idea to terraform the planet using nuclear explosions. Although not a government plan, the statement highlights growing concerns over private double use missions and militarization over celestial bodies.






CURRENT SITUATION

The current state of lunar and Martian exploration is marked by a significant increase in missions and accompanied by a strategic competition between global powers and private companies. The United States, with its Artemis Program, aims to return humans to the moon and establish a long term presence near the lunar south pole. An area believed to have valuable resources like water and ice. Simultaneously, China and Russia are jointly developing the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), intended to be the competition for western-led initiatives. Countries like India and Japan are also advancing in Lunar missions, such as Chandrayaan-3 and LUPEX which, while scientific in appearance, have growing strategic and dual-use potential.

Beyond national programs, entities in the private sector like Space X play a significant role. Elon Musk's plan to colonize and even terraform Mars, as suggested in his infamous "Nuke Mars!" X post. Highlights the challenges posed by insufficient regulation in addressing the expanding ambitions of private space actors. These Actions take place in a legal gray zone, as the Outer Space Treaty does not address conventional weapons, military installations or regulations for the private sector.

Most importantly, the creation of the U.S. Space Force, together with Russia and China, reflects a shift in perception about the use of space. Space is no longer seen only as a scientific domain but also as a potential battlefield. This growing militarization, in combination with outdated treaties and the absence of enforcement mechanisms, increases the probability of a conflict beyond earth.

As nations race to take claims on the Moon and prepare missions to Mars, the lack of international regulation on weaponization, territorial disputes, and dual use missions poses a serious threat to global stability. Without urgent action, outer space may become the next theater of geopolitical confrontation.



Forbes



Nuke Mars!



APPROACH AND EXPECTATIONS FOR THE DEBATE

As delegates of DISEC, you are expected to engage critically with the complex and evolving issue of the militarization of outer space, specifically the Moon and Mars. This debate goes beyond simple space exploration and dives into pressing concerns such as arms control, sovereignty, technological regulation, and the role of private actors in international security.

Key approach:

Delegates should approach this topic with a clear understanding that:

- Outer space, while traditionally a domain for peaceful exploration, is rapidly becoming a strategic frontier.
- The legal void surrounding celestial militarization poses real risks for geopolitical tension and conflict.
- Both state and non-state actors (private companies) must be considered in policy proposals.
- Solutions must respect the principles of sovereignty, peaceful cooperation, disarmament, and international law, while addressing modern technological realities.

Expectations:

During the debate, delegates are expected to:

- Present well researched positions rooted in current national policies, legal frameworks, and real-world missions (Artemis, ILRS, SpaceX initiatives).
- Propose creative yet feasible solutions, such as treaty reforms, international verification systems, regulations for private actors, or mechanisms for peaceful resource sharing.
- Engage diplomatically with other delegations, seeking alliances and common ground, especially with countries that may have competing space ambitions.
- Make reference to existing treaties (such as the Outer Space Treaty, Moon Agreement, and UN COPUOS) and suggest specific improvements or replacements.
- Debate the ethical and legal implications of dual-use technologies, safety zones, and the potential for conflict escalation beyond Earth.



DELEGATES POSITION

| <u>Delegation</u> | <u>Position</u> |
|-------------------|--|
| United States | Supports dual-use missions, increase military presence in space via Space Force and Artemis |
| Russia | Opposes U.S. dominance; supports militarization in response to perceived threats |
| Canada | Advocates for peaceful use of space, supports existing treaties and non-militarization |
| United Kingdom | Supports peaceful use, but aligned with U.S. on space defense cooperation |
| France | Advocates for space as a peaceful domain. has its own space military command but cautious |
| China | Engaged in dual-use missions, military-controlled space program, strategic lunar interests |
| Japan | Primarily focuses on peaceful exploration, recognizes strategic importance, and rising defense involvement |
| India | Strongly focuses on peaceful exploration, recognizes strategic importance, and has rising defense |
| Brazil | Strongly advocate for peaceful use, aligns with international treaties against weaponization |



| | |
|----------------------|--|
| United Arab Emirates | Supports peaceful use, with a space program geared toward diplomacy and science |
| México | Supports non-militarization. aligns with UN principles of peaceful use |
| Iran | Developing space capabilities with military involvement, strategic ambitions likely dual-use |
| North Korea (DPRK) | Military-driven space ambitions, limited transparency, strong pro-militarization stance |
| Switzerland | Completely opposes militarization of space, strong promoter of peaceful use and treaty reform. |
| Israel | Has a space program with defense ties, likely supports dual-use under national security grounds |
| South Africa | Supports peaceful use, emphasizes equitable access and legal regulation |
| Germany | Supports peaceful space use, opposes weaponization, promotes cooperation, transparency, and fair resource sharing. |
| Ukraine | Historically peaceful stance, but recent conflict may influence interest in strategic technologies |
| Pakistan | Advocates for peaceful use but has growing interest in space for defense purposes |
| Elon Musk | Promotes Mars colonization. has floated nuclear terraforming ideas; not officially militaristic but controversial |



| | |
|-------------|---|
| Bill Nelson | As NASA Administrator, supports peaceful exploration, but recognizes defense partnerships like with Space Force |
|-------------|---|

GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. What gaps exist in current international treaties regarding the militarization of celestial bodies such as the Moon and Mars?
2. How can the international community distinguish between peaceful space exploration and activities that may have military or dual-use purposes?
3. What role should private actors (such as SpaceX) play in space governance, and how can their actions be regulated to prevent militarization?
4. In what ways could the deployment of weapons or military infrastructure on the Moon or Mars threaten international peace and security?
5. What diplomatic or legal measures could be developed to ensure the peaceful use and equitable access to extraterrestrial territories for all nations?



IV.

TOPIC B: The Increasing Role of Autonomous and Remote-Controlled Weapons in Warfare

INTRODUCTION

In the 21st century, the nature of armed conflicts is undergoing a profound transformation. Technological advancements have given rise to autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and remotely-operated military technologies, including drones, robotic vehicles, and AI-powered targeting systems. These tools, once seen as futuristic, are now being actively deployed on modern conflict zones.

While some states highlight their strategic benefits, such as minimizing troop casualties and improving operational efficiency, others raise serious ethical, legal, and humanitarian concerns. Questions surrounding accountability, proportionality and compliance with international and humanitarian law remain largely unsolved.

As their deployment expands in ongoing conflict zones such as the ones in Ukraine, Gaza and Yemen, and new technologies emerging from military-industrial complexes in the United States, China and Russia, the international community faces a critical challenge; how to regulate, restrict, or redefine the role of machines in decisions with serious humanitarian consequences.

If not addressed properly, the deployment of autonomous and remote-controlled weapon systems could redefine the nature of modern conflict, raising various ethical, legal, and humanitarian concerns. Growing reliance on such technologies, operating with limited international oversight mechanisms risks posing challenges to transparency and responsibility in armed conflict, increasing civilian harm, and creating imbalances between technologically advanced and less-equipped nations. For this reason, the DISEC committee must critically examine the implications of these systems, promote transparent regulations, and explore international mechanisms to ensure that technological advancements remain aligned with international humanitarian law and global peace.



HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1916

The British military experimented with the first remote-controlled aircraft, known as the Aerial Target, during World War I. Though it never reached the battlefield, it marks the beginning of interest in remotely operated systems.

World War II (1939–1945)

Germany deploys the Goliath tracked mine, a small remote-controlled demolition vehicle. The United States and Soviet Union also began exploring pilotless aircraft and torpedoes.

1959

The United States develops the Ryan Firebee, an early reconnaissance drone. It became a prototype for many future UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) systems.

2001

The United States conducts the first lethal drone strike in Afghanistan using an MQ-1 predator drone equipped with Hellfire missiles. This sets a precedent for remote-controlled precision strikes.

2010

Drone warfare escalates in regions like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Legal debates begin over civilian casualties, sovereignty violations, and rules of engagement.

2017

The United Nations begin formal discussions on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). A global divide emerges whether to ban such systems or continue development.

2020

A UN report on Libya suggests that an autonomous drone may have carried out an attack without human input, potentially marking the first AI-generated kill in warfare history.


2022

During the Ukraine-Russian conflict, drones are used in an unprecedented scale. Both sides deploy commercial and military UAVs for surveillance, strikes, and logistical support. Civilian technology is rapidly militarized.



2023

Nations like Turkey, Iran, and Israel export advanced drone technologies to proxy states and non-state actors. The international community grows increasingly concerned about the proliferation of autonomous weapons without regulatory safeguards.






CURRENT SITUATION

In today's geopolitical landscape, autonomous and remote-controlled weapon systems such as drones, loitering munitions, and robotic surveillance units, are no longer futuristic concepts, but active tools of warfare. From targeted strikes in conflict zones to surveillance missions across international borders, these technologies are increasingly deployed by both state and non-state actors. The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and data integration has further expanded the capacity of such systems, enabling them to operate with minimal or no human intervention.

Recent conflicts have demonstrated the decisive role of autonomous and remote-controlled weapons systems in military outcomes. In the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, drones have been used widely for reconnaissance, artillery targeting, and direct combat. Similarly, loitering munitions, often described as "kamikaze drones" have played a pivotal role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and operations in Gaza. Non-state actors have also adopted such technologies, sometimes repurposing commercial drones into improvised weapons, raising urgent concerns over proliferation and accessibility.

Despite their increasing use, there is no comprehensive international legal framework governing the deployment, or accountability of autonomous weapons. The dual-use nature of these systems complicates regulation, as many platforms serve both civilian and military purposes. Ethical questions have also emerged; emphasising decision-making in lethal force, potential Unintended discriminatory patterns in targeting algorithms, and the challenge of attributing responsibility when humans are no longer directly involved in these operations.

National approaches remain divided. Countries such as the United States, Russia and China continue to invest heavily in the research and advancement of these technologies as strategic assets. In contrast, nations such as Switzerland, Austria and South Africa advocate for a preventive ban on fully autonomous weapons, citing the need for meaningful human control. While the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) has hosted discussions on the matter, consensus remains elusive.





APPROACH AND EXPECTATIONS FOR THE DEBATE

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is expected to approach this topic with a balance of technological understanding, ethical awareness, and geopolitical sensitivity. Autonomous and remote-controlled weapons (Autonomous weapons operate independently after activation, while remote-controlled weapons require continuous human operation) represent a transformative shift in modern warfare, raising urgent questions about legality, accountability, and the future of armed conflict.

Key approach:

Delegates should approach this topic with a clear understanding that:

- The rise of autonomous weapons (such as drones, loitering munitions, and AI-enabled targeting systems) is transforming the nature of warfare and global security.
- There is currently no international legal framework specifically regulating these technologies, leaving room for ethical, legal, and strategic ambiguity.
- The use of these systems raises serious questions about accountability, human oversight, proportionality, and civilian protection in conflict zones.
- Resolutions must strike a balance between military innovation and the protection of international humanitarian law and human rights.

Expectations:

During the debate, delegates are expected to:

- Present evidence-based national positions, including military alliances or internal debates about the use of autonomous weapons and remote-controlled systems.
- Suggest practical solutions, such as new international protocols, transparency mechanisms, moratoriums, or AI ethics frameworks.
- Consider the differences in military advancement between countries with advanced military technology and those without, promoting inclusive governance and security equity.
- Reference existing treaties or legal principles, such as the UN Charter, or proposals from bodies like the CCW (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).
- Debate the risks of algorithmic warfare, the blurring of lines between combatants and civilians, and the need for human-in-the-loop requirements.



DELEGATES POSITION

| <u>Delegation</u> | <u>Position</u> |
|-------------------|--|
| United States | Leading developer and user of autonomous weapons, strongly prioritizes national security and strategic deterrence. |
| United Kingdom | Advocates for international humanitarian law and ethical AI use in defense, moderate stance. |
| France | Favors strong oversight and ethics in military AI development, involved in NATO initiatives. |
| China | Rapidly developing AI and autonomous weapons, emphasizes sovereignty and strategic parity with the U.S. |
| Japan | Cautious development for defense purposes, advocates strict control and transparency. |
| India | Developing AI-based defense technologies, calls for balance between security and ethical concerns. |
| Brazil | Prefers peace-oriented frameworks and limits on military tech, supports inclusive multilateral negotiations. |
| Argentina | Supports disarmament and peaceful tech use, backs limits on lethal autonomous systems. |



| | |
|----------------------|--|
| United Arab Emirates | Supports the development of advanced defense technologies, while advocating for international norms to ensure stability and ethical use. |
| México | Strong advocate for humanitarian approaches and regulation of lethal autonomous weapons. |
| Iran | Developing unmanned systems, supports military innovation but rejects Western-led restrictions. |
| North Korea (DPRK) | Claims peaceful development but focuses on asymmetric military technologies, lacks transparency. |
| Switzerland | Neutral and peace-oriented, advocates international governance of AI in warfare. |
| Israel | Leading user of defense AI and autonomous systems, prioritizes security over international limits. |
| South Africa | Peace-focused, supports multilateral regulation of military tech to ensure equity. |
| Yemen | Severely impacted by drone warfare, advocates stronger controls and accountability. |
| Pakistan | Developing AI-enhanced systems, expresses concern over asymmetric tech used by larger powers. |
| Ukraine | Actively using drones and semi-autonomous systems, seeks protective regulation and accountability for aggressors. |



| | |
|-----------|--|
| Germany | Advocates strict humanitarian law and ethical oversight for autonomous weapons, supporting EU/NATO-led multilateral agreements that balance defense needs with disarmament and transparency. |
| Palestine | Victim of autonomous systems, demands bans and accountability for state and private military actors. |



GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. What international legal frameworks currently exist to regulate the use of autonomous and remote-controlled weapons, and are they sufficient to address emerging technologies?
2. How can the international community ensure accountability and ethical responsibility when lethal decisions are made by autonomous systems without direct human intervention?
3. What role should the United Nations and DISEC play in developing binding or voluntary norms for the development, deployment, and export of these weapons?
4. How can we balance military innovation and national defense with the need to prevent escalation, misuse, or mass destruction through autonomous systems?
5. What measures can be implemented to reduce technological asymmetries and ensure that autonomous weapon systems do not disproportionately empower specific states or actors?



V. GLOSSARY

- 1. Militarization of Outer Space:** The process of placing military infrastructure, personnel, or weapons in outer space, especially on celestial bodies like the Moon or Mars.
- 2. Weaponization of Space:** The use of space for military conflict, such as placing weapons in orbit or targeting satellites from space.
- 3. Dual-Use Technology:** Technology that has both civilian and military applications, for example, rockets or satellites used for exploration but also capable of military surveillance or strikes.
- 4. Outer Space Treaty (1967):** The main international agreement regulating space activities. It bans nuclear weapons in space but allows for conventional weapons and lacks regulation for private actors.
- 5. Moon Agreement (1979):** A treaty aiming to prevent military activity and ensure shared benefits of lunar resources. It remains weak due to lack of ratification by major space powers like the U.S., China, and Russia.
- 6. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI):** A 1980s U.S. plan to develop space-based missile defense, nicknamed “Star Wars.” Though never fully realized, it increased global concern over the militarization of space.
- 7. Private Space Actor:** A non-governmental entity like SpaceX or Blue Origin involved in space activities. These actors often operate in legal gray areas due to outdated international treaties.
- 8. Legal Grey Zone:** A situation in which international law is unclear, outdated, or insufficient to address modern issues, such as the actions of private companies in space.
- 9. Arms Race:** A competition between countries to develop the most advanced or powerful weapons. In this context, it refers to countries rushing to militarize or dominate the Moon or Mars.



10. Sovereignty in Space: The idea of owning territory in space, which is currently forbidden by treaties but increasingly challenged by national or private claims.

11. Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS): Weapons that can independently identify and engage targets without human intervention. These include AI-powered drones and robotic strike systems.

12. Remote-Controlled Weapons: Military equipment, such as drones or ground robots, operated by a human from a distance, often used for surveillance or precision strikes.

13. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS): A subset of autonomous weapons that can apply lethal force without human input. These are highly controversial in global disarmament discussions.

14. Human-in-the-Loop: A principle requiring that humans remain involved in decisions made by machines about the use of force, especially lethal force.

15. Loitering Munitions: Often called “kamikaze drones,” these are weapons that hover in a target area and attack when a target is identified.

16. Artificial Intelligence (AI): Computer systems designed to simulate human intelligence. In warfare, AI can be used for target recognition, battlefield analysis, and autonomous control of weapons.

17. Algorithmic Warfare: Combat strategies or operations that rely on algorithms and AI to make decisions or execute actions, raising concerns about ethics and accountability.

18. Asymmetric Warfare: Conflicts between groups with unequal military power, often involving unconventional tactics. Drones and autonomous weapons can give weaker actors a technological advantage.

19. Non-State Actor: A group or individual not officially representing a state—such as terrorists, insurgents, or corporations—that may use autonomous weapons in conflicts.

20. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW): A UN treaty aiming to ban or restrict weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. It hosts ongoing debates on whether to ban autonomous weapons systems.



VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. (1967). *Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.*
<https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html>
2. European Space Policy Institute. (2023). *The role of private actors in space: Legal and policy challenges.* <https://www.espi.or.at/publications>
3. NASA. (2021). *Artemis program overview.* <https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis/>
4. Secure World Foundation. (2023). *Global counterspace capabilities: An open source assessment.* <https://swfound.org/counterspace/>
5. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2023). *Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS).*
<https://www.un.org/disarmament/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/>
6. International Committee of the Red Cross. (2021). *Autonomous weapons: Implications for humanitarian law and ethics.*
<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapons-humanitarian-ethics-legal>
7. Human Rights Watch. (2020). *Stopping killer robots: Country positions on banning fully autonomous weapons and retaining human control.*
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots>
8. Boularin, V., & Verbruggen, M. (2017). *Mapping the development of autonomy in weapon systems.* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
<https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/mapping-development-autonomy-weapon-systems>