



Incident handler's journal

Instructions

As you continue through this course, you may use this template to record your findings after completing an activity or to take notes on what you've learned about a specific tool or concept. You can also use this journal as a way to log the key takeaways about the different cybersecurity tools or concepts you encounter in this course.

Date: 7/24/2023	Entry: 1 <i>"Document an incident with an incident handler's journal"</i>
Description	NIST Incident Response Lifecycle Phase: Detection and Analysis, Containment, Eradication, and Recovery. Ransomware attack occurred on a small U.S. health care clinic. Targeted phishing emails were used to deploy malicious malware onto machines, escalate privilege, and encrypt critical patient files.
Tool(s) used	Not Applicable.
The 5 W's	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Who: An organized group of unethical hackers who target organizations in healthcare and transportation industries.● What: A ransomware attack was conducted on critical patient files, causing business operations to shut down.● When: Incident occurred on Tuesday at 9:00 a.m.● Where: Incident occurred at a small U.S. health clinic specializing in delivering primary-care services.● Why: The incident occurred because the organized group of unethical hackers were able to gain privileged access by conducting a campaign of targeting phishing emails on employees. Once the employees ran the malicious program in the email, the hackers were able to escalate their privileges to view and

	encrypt patient files, rendering the business inoperable. The attacker's goal was to profit as the ransom note demanded a large sum of money and in return, they will provide the decryption key for the files.
Additional notes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Note: Deploy security awareness training for all emails. Email phishing campaigns can appear legitimate but often they can be flagged with common sense. 2. Question: Can some organizations reverse the encryption and decrypt themselves? Drawback of this would be time and money expended but maybe there are some scenarios (like a good tool or team) where this is feasible. 3. Question: They must pay the ransom or report it to law enforcement, correct? Then maybe law enforcement can expend their resources to help?

Date: 7/26/2023	Entry: 2 <i>"Analyze your first packet"</i>
Description	NIST Incident Response Lifecycle Phase: Detection and Analysis. As a security analyst, it is important that I analyze network traffic to better understand the type of traffic that is being sent to and from the systems on the networks. I will further develop my skills in packet analysis by leveraging Wireshark, a valuable tool in the cybersecurity arsenal. While I have experience in this area from previous cybersecurity courses and self-motivated pursuits, I find immense pleasure in refining this skill through this course.
Tool(s) used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wireshark – a network protocol analyzer that uses a graphical user interface.
The 5 W's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who: Not applicable. • What: Not applicable. • When: Not applicable. • Where: Not applicable.

- Why: Not applicable.

Additional notes

Screenshots:

Wireshark interface showing a packet capture of an ICMP Echo (ping) request and response. The packet list shows a ping request from 192.168.1.100 to 192.168.1.1. The packet details show the ICMP Echo (ping) request with sequence number 1. The packet bytes show the raw ICMP Echo (ping) request data.

Wireshark – Analyze ICMP

Wireshark interface showing a packet capture of an ICMP Echo (ping) request and response. The packet list shows a ping request from 192.168.1.100 to 192.168.1.1. The packet details show the ICMP Echo (ping) request with sequence number 1. The packet bytes show the raw ICMP Echo (ping) request data.

Wireshark – Analyze Basic Filter

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture of an HTTP GET request. The packet list on the left shows packet 64, which is an HTTP GET request to 192.204.1.139. The packet details pane on the right shows the structure of the packet, including the Ethernet II header, Internet Protocol Version 4 header, and Transmission Control Protocol header. The packet bytes pane on the right shows the raw data of the packet.

Packet 64: 74 bytes on wire (592 bits), 74 bytes captured (592 bits) on interface 0

Ethernet II, Src: 42:01:ac:15:eb:02 (42:01:ac:15:eb:02), Dst: 42:01:ac:15:eb:03 (42:01:ac:15:eb:03)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.204.1.139, Dst: 192.204.1.139

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49052, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 8, Len: 0

Source Port: 49052

Destination Port: 80

[Stream index: 1]

[Conversation completeness: Complete, HTTP_DATA (31)]

[TCP Segment Len: 0]

Sequence Number: 8 (relative sequence number)

Next Sequence Number: 8 (relative sequence number)

Acknowledgment Number: 0

Acknowledgment Number: 0

Window: 65535

Options: (20 bytes), Window segment size, SACK permitted, Timestamps, No-Operation (NOP), Window scale

Internet Protocol (lower 4 bits), 20 bytes

Packets: 200 / Displayed: 16 (8.0%)

Wireshark – Analyze ip.addr Packets Dst Port 80

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture of an HTTP GET request. The packet list on the left shows packet 64, which is an HTTP GET request to 192.204.1.139. The packet details pane on the right shows the structure of the packet, including the Ethernet II header, Internet Protocol Version 4 header, and Transmission Control Protocol header. The packet bytes pane on the right shows the raw data of the packet.

Packet 64: 74 bytes on wire (592 bits), 74 bytes captured (592 bits) on interface 0

Ethernet II, Src: 42:01:ac:15:eb:02 (42:01:ac:15:eb:02), Dst: 42:01:ac:15:eb:03 (42:01:ac:15:eb:03)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.204.1.139, Dst: 192.204.1.139

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49052, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 8, Len: 0

Source Port: 49052

Destination Port: 80

[Stream index: 1]

[Conversation completeness: Complete, HTTP_DATA (31)]

[TCP Segment Len: 0]

Sequence Number: 8 (relative sequence number)

Next Sequence Number: 8 (relative sequence number)

Acknowledgment Number: 0

Acknowledgment Number: 0

Window: 65535

Options: (20 bytes), Window segment size, SACK permitted, Timestamps, No-Operation (NOP), Window scale

Internet Protocol (lower 4 bits), 20 bytes

Packets: 200 / Displayed: 16 (8.0%)

Wireshark – Analyze eth.addr Packets Protocol TCP

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture of an HTTP GET request. The packet list on the left shows packet 64, which is an HTTP GET request to 192.204.1.139. The packet details pane on the right shows the structure of the packet, including the Ethernet II header, Internet Protocol Version 4 header, and Transmission Control Protocol header. The packet bytes pane on the right shows the raw data of the packet.

Packet 64: 74 bytes on wire (592 bits), 74 bytes captured (592 bits) on interface 0

Ethernet II, Src: 42:01:ac:15:eb:02 (42:01:ac:15:eb:02), Dst: 42:01:ac:15:eb:03 (42:01:ac:15:eb:03)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.204.1.139, Dst: 192.204.1.139

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49052, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 8, Len: 0

Source Port: 49052

Destination Port: 80

[Stream index: 1]

[Conversation completeness: Complete, HTTP_DATA (31)]

[TCP Segment Len: 0]

Sequence Number: 8 (relative sequence number)

Next Sequence Number: 8 (relative sequence number)

Acknowledgment Number: 0

Acknowledgment Number: 0


Window: 65535

Options: (20 bytes), Window segment size, SACK permitted, Timestamps, No-Operation (NOP), Window scale


Internet Protocol (lower 4 bits), 20 bytes

Packets: 200 / Displayed: 16 (8.0%)


Wireshark – Analyze DNS Packets



Wireshark – Analyze tcp.port Packets TTL



Wireshark – Analyze tcp.port Packets Frame Length





Wireshark – Analyze tcp.port Packets Header Length

The top screenshot shows a Wireshark packet capture of a TCP connection. The packet list on the left shows a packet from 192.168.1.101 to 169.254.169.254. The packet details pane on the right shows the TCP header and payload. The payload is a raw TCP segment with a sequence number of 4281 and a destination port of 80.

The bottom screenshot shows a Wireshark packet capture of a curl request. The packet list on the left shows a packet from 192.168.1.101 to 169.254.169.254. The packet details pane on the right shows the HTTP header and body. The body is a raw HTTP request with a GET method and a destination of https://www.googleapis.com.

Date: 7/26/2023	Entry: 3 <i>"Capture your first packet"</i>
Description	NIST Incident Response Lifecycle Phase: Detection and Analysis. As a security analyst, I must understand how to capture and analyze network traffic using <code>tcpdump</code> from a Linux virtual machine. In this activity, I have identified the network interfaces to capture network packet data, used <code>tcpdump</code> to filter live network traffic, captured network traffic using <code>tcpdump</code> , and filtered the captured

	<p>packet data. Although I am familiar with using the command-line interface for Linux commands, using it to capture and filter network traffic was new to me. I encountered a few obstacles, but after some time I was able to complete this activity and add <code>tcpdump</code> to my tool belt.</p>
Tool(s) used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <code>tcpdump</code> – a network protocol analyzer that's accessed using the command-line interface.
The 5 W's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who: Not applicable. • What: Not applicable. • When: Not applicable. • Where: Not applicable. • Why: Not applicable.
Additional notes	<p>Screenshots:</p>  <pre>analyst@3843705cfb5f:~\$ sudo ifconfig eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1460 inet 172.17.0.2 netmask 255.255.0.0 broadcast 172.17.255.255 ether 02:42:ac:11:00:02 txqueuelen 0 (Ethernet) RX packets 618 bytes 13658595 (13.0 MiB) RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0 TX packets 450 bytes 38975 (38.0 KiB) TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0 lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536 inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0 loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback) RX packets 57 bytes 8381 (8.1 KiB) RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0 TX packets 57 bytes 8381 (8.1 KiB) TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0</pre> <p><i>tcpdump – ifconfig</i></p>  <pre>analyst@3843705cfb5f:~\$ sudo tcpdump -D 1.eth0 [Up, Running] 2.any (Pseudo-device that captures on all interfaces) [Up, Running] 3.lo [Up, Running, Loopback] 4.nflog (Linux netfilter log (NFLOG) interface) 5.nfqueue (Linux netfilter queue (NFQUEUE) interface)</pre> <p><i>tcpdump – Interface Options</i></p>


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analyst@3843705cfb5f:~$ sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -v -c5
tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
19:53:08.148139 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 23195, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 113)
    3843705cfb5f.5000 > nginx-us-east1-c.c.qwiklabs-terminal-vms-prod-00.internal.35656: Flags [P.], cksum 0x588e (incorrect -> 0x02dd), seq 270396947:27
0397008, ack 750879717, win 501, options [nop,nop,TS val 1299370470 ecr 2796834067], length 61
19:53:08.148456 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 63, id 26117, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 52)
    nginx-us-east1-c.c.qwiklabs-terminal-vms-prod-00.internal.35656 > 3843705cfb5f.5000: Flags [.], cksum 0xb13 (correct), ack 61, win 507, options [nop
,nop,TS val 2796834193 ecr 1299370470], length 0
19:53:08.158882 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 23196, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 146)
    3843705cfb5f.5000 > nginx-us-east1-c.c.qwiklabs-terminal-vms-prod-00.internal.35656: Flags [P.], cksum 0x58af (incorrect -> 0x3b46), seq 61:155, ack
1, win 501, options [nop,nop,TS val 1299370481 ecr 2796834193], length 94
19:53:08.159232 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 63, id 26118, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 52)
    nginx-us-east1-c.c.qwiklabs-terminal-vms-prod-00.internal.35656 > 3843705cfb5f.5000: Flags [.], cksum 0xba9f (correct), ack 155, win 507, options [no
p,nop,TS val 2796834204 ecr 1299370481], length 0
19:53:08.180552 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 32375, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 69)
    3843705cfb5f.49582 > metadata.google.internal.domain: 19030+ PTR? 2.0.21.172.in-addr.arpa. (41)
5 packets captured
8 packets received by filter
0 packets dropped by kernel

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tcpdump – Inspect Network Traffic

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analyst@3843705cfb5f:~$ sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -nn -c9 port 80 -w capture.pcap &
[1] 12757
analyst@3843705cfb5f:~$ tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
curl opensource.google.com
<HTML><HEAD><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<TITLE>301 Moved</TITLE></HEAD><BODY>
<H1>301 Moved</H1>
The document has moved
<A HREF="https://opensource.google/">here</A>.
</BODY></HTML>
analyst@3843705cfb5f:~$ 9 packets captured
10 packets received by filter
0 packets dropped by kernel
ls -l capture.pcap
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1445 Jul 26 19:55 capture.pcap
[1]+  Done                  sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -nn -c9 port 80 -w capture.pcap

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tcpdump – Capture Network Traffic

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analyst@3843705cfb5f:~$ sudo tcpdump -nn -r capture.pcap -v
reading from file capture.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet)
19:55:32.884023 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 30453, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 60)
    172.17.0.2.50778 > 142.251.162.101.80: Flags [S], cksum 0xdda2 (incorrect -> 0xae806), seq 1332339331, win 65320, options [mss 1420,sackOK,TS val 3648
303479 ecr 0,nop,wscale 7], length 0
19:55:32.885223 IP (tos 0x60, ttl 126, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 60)
    142.251.162.101.80 > 172.17.0.2.50778: Flags [S.], cksum 0xaad9 (correct), seq 4096032782, ack 1332339332, win 65535, options [mss 1420,sackOK,TS val
3092582331 ecr 3648303479,nop,wscale 8], length 0
19:55:32.885291 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 30454, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 52)
    172.17.0.2.50778 > 142.251.162.101.80: Flags [.], cksum 0xd9a (incorrect -> 0xd77e), ack 1, win 511, options [nop,nop,TS val 3648303480 ecr 30925823
31], length 0
19:55:32.885358 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 30455, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 137)
    172.17.0.2.50778 > 142.251.162.101.80: Flags [P.], cksum 0xdddf (incorrect -> 0x4632), seq 1:86, ack 1, win 511, options [nop,nop,TS val 3648303480 e
cr 3092582331], length 85: HTTP, length: 85
    GET / HTTP/1.1
    Host: opensource.google.com
    User-Agent: curl/7.64.0
    Accept: */*
19:55:32.885615 IP (tos 0x60, ttl 126, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 52)
    142.251.162.101.80 > 172.17.0.2.50778: Flags [.], cksum 0xd828 (correct), ack 86, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 3092582331 ecr 3648303480], length
0
19:55:32.887280 IP (tos 0x80, ttl 126, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 634)
    142.251.162.101.80 > 172.17.0.2.50778: Flags [P.], cksum 0x9001 (correct), seq 1:583, ack 86, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 3092582333 ecr 3648303
480], length 582: HTTP, length: 582
    HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
    Location: https://opensource.google/
    Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: cross-origin
    Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
    X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
    Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2023 19:55:32 GMT
    Expires: Wed, 26 Jul 2023 20:25:32 GMT
    Cache-Control: public, max-age=1800

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tcpdump – Filter the Captured Packet Data, Verbose

	<pre> analyst@3843705cfb5f:~\$ sudo tcpdump -nn -r capture.pcap -X reading from file capture.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet) 19:55:32.884023 IP 172.17.0.2.50778 > 142.251.162.101.80: Flags [S], seq 1332339331, win 65320, options [mss 1420,sackOK,TS val 3648303479 ecr 0,nop,wscale 7], length 0 0x0000: 4500 003c 76f5 4000 4006 e652 ac11 0002 E..cv.0.0..R.... 0x0010: 8efb a265 c65a 0050 4f69 e283 0000 0000 ...e.Z.POI..... 0x0020: a002 f42a dba2 0000 0204 058c 0402 080a (.....t.x 0x0030: d974 b177 0000 0000 0103 0307 U..... 19:55:32.885223 IP 142.251.162.101.80 > 172.17.0.2.50778: Flags [S.], seq 4096032782, ack 1332339332, win 65535, options [mss 1420,sackOK,TS val 30925823 31 ecr 3648303479,nop,wscale 8], length 0 0x0000: 4560 003c 0000 4000 7e06 1ea8 8efb a265 E'.K.0.~.....e 0x0010: ac11 0002 0050 c65a f424 800e 4f69 e284 P.Z.S..Oi.. 0x0020: a012 ffff aad9 0000 0204 058c 0402 080a (.....t.x 0x0030: b855 0fbb d974 b177 0103 0308 U...t.w.... 19:55:32.885291 IP 172.17.0.2.50778 > 142.251.162.101.80: Flags [I.], ack 1, win 511, options [nop,nop,TS val 3648303480 ecr 3092582331], length 0 0x0000: 4500 0034 76f6 4000 4006 e659 ac11 0002 E..4v.0.0..Y.... 0x0010: 8efb a265 c65a 0050 4f69 e284 f424 800f ...e.Z.POI...\$. 0x0020: 8010 01ff dd9a 0000 0101 080a d974 b178 (.....t.x 0x0030: b855 0fbb U.. 19:55:32.885358 IP 172.17.0.2.50778 > 142.251.162.101.80: Flags [P.], seq 1:86, ack 1, win 511, options [nop,nop,TS val 3648303480 ecr 3092582331], length 85: HTTP: GET / HTTP/1.1 0x0000: 4500 0089 76f7 4000 4006 e603 ac11 0002 E...v.0.0..... 0x0010: 8efb a265 c65a 0050 4f69 e284 f424 800f ...e.Z.POI...\$. 0x0020: 8018 01ff d3ef 0000 0101 080a d974 b178 (.....t.x 0x0030: b855 0fbb 4745 5420 2f20 4854 5450 2f31 .U..GET./HTTP/1 0x0040: 2a31 0d0a 486f 7374 3a20 6f70 656e 736f .l.Host:openso 0x0050: 7572 6365 2a67 6f6f 676c 652e 636f 6d0d urce,google.com. 0x0060: 0a55 7365 722d 4167 656e 743a 2063 7572 .User-Agent:cur 0x0070: 6e2f 372e 3634 2a30 0d0a 4163 6365 7074 1/7.64.0.Accept 0x0080: 3a20 2a2f 2a0d 0a0d 0a :/*/*.... 19:55:32.885615 IP 142.251.162.101.80 > 172.17.0.2.50778: Flags [I.], ack 86, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 3092582331 ecr 3648303480], length 0 0x0000: 4560 0034 0000 4000 7e06 1ef0 8efb a265 E'.4.0.~.....e 0x0010: ac11 0002 0050 c65a f424 800f 4f69 e2d9 P.Z.S..Oi.. 0x0020: 8010 0100 d828 0000 0101 080a b855 0fbb (.....U.. 0x0030: d974 b178 t.x 19:55:32.887280 IP 142.251.162.101.80 > 172.17.0.2.50778: Flags [P.], seq 1:583, ack 86, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 3092582333 ecr 3648303480], length 582: HTTP: HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently 0x0000: 4580 027a 0000 4000 7e06 1ea8 8efb a265 E..Z.0.~.....e 0x0010: ac11 0002 0050 c65a f424 800f 4f69 e2d9 P.Z.S..Oi.. 0x0020: 8018 0100 9001 0000 0101 080a b855 0fbd (.....U.. </pre> <p><i>tcpdump – Filter the Captured Packet Data, Hexadecimal and ASCII</i></p>
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Date: 7/25/2023	Entry: 4 <i>“Investigate a suspicious file hash”</i>
Description	<p>NIST Incident Response Lifecycle Phase: Detection and Analysis.</p> <p>An employee opened a malicious spreadsheet sent to them via email. The spreadsheet was locked, and the password was provided in the email. The employee downloaded the spreadsheet and opened the file with the password. Then a malicious payload was executed. Upon further investigation using VirusTotal, this is a trojan virus called Flagpro.</p>
Tool(s) used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SHA256 file hash – used to verify file integrity. • VirusTotal – used to investigate the file hash and analyze the malicious file.
The 5 W's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who: The incident is caused by unknown threat actors. The employee initiated the attack unwittingly.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● What: A malicious payload was sent to an employee in an email. The employee executed the file. The SHA256 file hash is: 54e6ea47eb04634d3e87fd7787e2136ccfbcc80ade34f246a12cf93bab527f6b. ● When: 1:11 p.m. the employee received the email. By 1:20 p.m. the IDS detects the payload and sends out an alert to the SOC. ● Where: The incident happened at a financial services company. The employee's computer was compromised via a malicious file download from an email. ● Why: The incident occurred to deploy a malicious payload. Upon further investigation, the payload was determined to be "trojan.flagpro/jaik". The file is flagged by 56 security vendors and 2 sandboxes as malicious. The intent of this trojan is to gain access to install a backdoor into the system for an unknown malicious objective in the future.
Additional notes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Note: Deploy security awareness training for all emails. Email phishing campaigns can appear legitimate, but often times they can be flagged with common sense. 2. Question: Are there certain tools that can reside on to scan email servers for files sent and block those files from being delivered to the employee? This can help in case the employee training does not prevent the incident. 3. Question: What goals can occur after the backdoor is created? Endless possibilities? What is the likelihood that the backdoor could be stumbled upon by an employee?

Date: 7/25/2023	Entry: 5 <i>"Use a playbook to respond to an attack"</i>
Description	NIST Incident Response Lifecycle Phase: Detection and Analysis.


	<p>An alert ticket, A-2703, has been generated with the message, “SERVER-MAIL Phishing attempt possible download of malware” and an alert severity of medium. The HR department received an email with the subject “Re: Infrastructure Egnieer Role” from an email account by the name of “Def Communications”, email address “76tguyhh6tgftrt7tg.su”, and IP address “114.114.114.114”. The contents of the email express interest in the engineer role posted online signed by “Clyde West”. The attachment provided in the email is said to be a resume and cover letter and to be password protected. The password is provided in the email and the filename is “bfsvc.exe”. In the email subject, there is a grammatical error, the name of sender does not match email address, and the email address is unusual. The filetype is also an executable with uncommon naming conventions.</p> <p>Having previously investigated the hash file for the downloaded file (see Entry #2), I have confirmed this is a malicious file. I have changed the status of this ticket to “Escalated” for further action by SOC analyst level II.</p>
Tool(s) used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alert ticket – used to track ticket details and change ticket status. • Phishing Playbook – used to determine if file is malicious and if escalation is needed. • Phishing Flowchart – used to determine if file is malicious and if escalation is needed. • SHA256 file hash – used to verify file integrity. • VirusTotal – used to investigate the file hash and analyze the malicious file.
The 5 W's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who: The incident is caused by threat actors Misecure and BlackTech. The HR employee initiated the attack unknowingly. The email address used was “76tguyhh6tgftrt7tg.su”. • What: A malicious file was sent to an HR employee in a phishing email. The employee executed the file. • When: At 9:30 a.m. the phishing attempt was sent to the HR department. At 1:11 p.m. an HR employee opened the email. By 1:20 p.m. the IDS detects the payload and sends out an alert to the SOC.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Where: The incident happened at a financial services company. The employee's computer was compromised via a malicious file download from an email. ● Why: The incident occurred to deploy a malicious payload. Upon further investigation, the payload was determined to be "trojan.flagpro/jaik". The file is flagged by 56 security vendors and 2 sandboxes as malicious. The intent of this trojan is to gain access to install a backdoor into the system for an unknown malicious objective in the future.
Additional notes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Note: Deploy security awareness training for all emails. Email phishing campaigns can appear legitimate, but often times they can be flagged with common sense. ● Question: Are there certain tools that can reside on to scan email servers for files sent and block those files from being delivered to the employee? This can help in case the employee training does not prevent the incident. ● Question: What goals can occur after the backdoor is created? Endless possibilities? What is the likelihood that the backdoor could be stumbled upon by an employee?

Date: 7/25/2023	Entry: 6 <i>"Review a final report"</i>
Description	<p>NIST Incident Response Lifecycle Phase: Post Incident Activity.</p> <p>An employee received an email from an outside source. The sender provided evidence of collected customer PII and financial data and presented a ransom note in cryptocurrency payment of \$50,000. After investigating, the attacker used a forced browsing attack on the e-commerce web application to obtain order information for approximately 50,000 customers.</p>

Tool(s) used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Incident Final Report – used to review the full incident as part of the lessons learned & post incident review.
The 5 W's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Who: An attacker who conducted a forced browsing attack on the e-commerce web application. ● What: An employee received an email from an outside source. The sender claimed they stole customer data, then requested a payment of \$25,000 in cryptocurrency. The sender claimed they stole customer data, then requested a payment of \$25,000 in cryptocurrency. On December 28, 2022, the same sender provided evidence of the collected data and increased the ransom to \$50,000. From a vulnerability in the e-commerce web application, the attacker conducted a forced browsing attack, a form of injection attack, to view customer transaction data. The attacker modified the order number within the URL string of a purchase confirmation page. The incident was so severe, the Public Relations department was brought in to help disclose the data theft to its customers. Free identity protection was offered to affected customers. This individual gained unauthorized access to customer PII and financial information. Approximately 50,000 customer records were affected. ● When: At 3:13 p.m. PST, on December 22, 2022, an employee received an email from an outside source. On December 28, 2022, the same sender provided evidence of the collected data and increased the ransom to \$50,000. On that same day, at 7:20 p.m., the incident was sent to the security team to begin their investigation. The investigation occurred between December 28, 2022, through December 31, 2022. ● Where: At a mid-sized retail company that conducts 80% of its business online. ● Why: The incident occurred due to a vulnerability in the e-commerce web application. The web application was vulnerable to forced browsing attacks. The incentive of the attacker was strictly monetary, as a ransom note for \$50,000 in cryptocurrency was sent to an employee.
Additional notes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Note: Implement secure coding practices. Dynamic and static code analysis of the e-commerce website can help identify vulnerabilities.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Question: Is the company forced to pay this amount in this scenario? Or is the data released, and the company performs damage control? Perhaps it is which is less expensive, damage control of leaking data vs paying the \$50,000 of cryptocurrency.
--	---

Date: 7/26/2023	Entry: 7 <i>"Explore signatures and logs with Suricata"</i>
Description	<p>NIST Incident Response Lifecycle Phase: Detection and Analysis, and Post Incident Activity.</p> <p>As a security analyst, I reviewed custom rules in Suricata, ran them, and examined the output logs in the <code>fast.log</code> file. Additionally, I examined the additional output that Suricata generated in the standard <code>eve.json</code> log file. With Suricata, I was able to gain new technical skills and knowledge required to be effective in monitoring and analyzing network traffic for potential security threats.</p>
Tool(s) used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suricata – an open-source intrusion detection system (IDS), intrusion prevention system (IPS), and network analysis tool.
The 5 W's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who: Not Applicable. • What: Not Applicable. • When: Not Applicable. • Where: Not Applicable. • Why: Not Applicable.
Additional notes	<p>Screenshots:</p>  <p><i>Suricata – Review Custom Rule</i></p>

```
analyst@e9d44daa418a:~$ ls -l /var/log/suricata
total 0
analyst@e9d44daa418a:~$ sudo suricata -r sample.pcap -S custom.rules -k none
26/7/2023 -- 17:59:58 - <Notice> - This is Suricata version 6.0.1 RELEASE running in USER mode
26/7/2023 -- 17:59:59 - <Notice> - all 2 packet processing threads, 4 management threads initialized, engine started.
26/7/2023 -- 17:59:59 - <Notice> - Signal Received. Stopping engine.
26/7/2023 -- 17:59:59 - <Notice> - Pcap-file module read 1 files, 200 packets, 54238 bytes
analyst@e9d44daa418a:~$ ls -l /var/log/suricata
total 16
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1418 Jul 26 17:59 eve.json
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 292 Jul 26 17:59 fast.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3239 Jul 26 17:59 stats.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1512 Jul 26 17:59 suricata.log
analyst@e9d44daa418a:~$
```

Suricata – Run Custom Rule

```
analyst@e9d44daa418a:~$ cat /var/log/suricata/fast.log
11/23/2022-12:38:34.624866  [**] [1:12345:3] GET on wire [**] [Classification: (null)] [Priority: 3] (TCP) 172.21.224.2:49652 -> 142.250.1.139:80
11/23/2022-12:38:58.958203  [**] [1:12345:3] GET on wire [**] [Classification: (null)] [Priority: 3] (TCP) 172.21.224.2:58494 -> 142.250.1.102:80
analyst@e9d44daa418a:~$
```

Suricata – Examine fast.log

```
analyst@e9d44daa418a:~$ cat /var/log/suricata/eve.json
{"timestamp": "2022-11-23T12:38:34.624866+0000", "flow_id": 1083659243911317, "pcap_cnt": 70, "event_type": "alert", "src_ip": "172.21.224.2", "src_port": 49652, "dest_ip": "142.250.1.139", "dest_port": 80, "proto": "TCP", "tx_id": 0, "alert": {"action": "allowed", "gid": 1, "signature_id": 12345, "rev": 3, "signature": "GET on wire", "category": "", "severity": 3}, "http": {"hostname": "opensource.google.com", "url": "/", "http_user_agent": "curl/7.74.0", "http_content_type": "text/html", "http_method": "GET", "protocol": "HTTP/1.1", "status": 301, "redirect": "https://opensource.google/", "length": 223}, "app_proto": "http", "flow": {"pkts_toserver": 4, "pkts_toclient": 3, "bytes_toserver": 357, "bytes_toclient": 788, "start": "2022-11-23T12:38:34.620693+0000"}}
{"timestamp": "2022-11-23T12:38:58.958203+0000", "flow_id": 310000344012020, "pcap_cnt": 151, "event_type": "alert", "src_ip": "172.21.224.2", "src_port": 58494, "dest_ip": "142.250.1.102", "dest_port": 80, "proto": "TCP", "tx_id": 0, "alert": {"action": "allowed", "gid": 1, "signature_id": 12345, "rev": 3, "signature": "GET on wire", "category": "", "severity": 3}, "http": {"hostname": "opensource.google.com", "url": "/", "http_user_agent": "curl/7.74.0", "http_content_type": "text/html", "http_method": "GET", "protocol": "HTTP/1.1", "status": 301, "redirect": "https://opensource.google/", "length": 223}, "app_proto": "http", "flow": {"pkts_toserver": 4, "pkts_toclient": 3, "bytes_toserver": 357, "bytes_toclient": 797, "start": "2022-11-23T12:38:58.955636+0000"}}
```

Suricata – Examine eve.json Raw Content


```
analyst@e9d44daa418a:~$ jq . /var/log/suricata/eve.json | less
{
  "timestamp": "2022-11-23T12:38:34.624866+0000",
  "flow_id": 1083659243911317,
  "pcap_cnt": 70,
  "event_type": "alert",
  "src_ip": "172.21.224.2",
  "src_port": 49652,
  "dest_ip": "142.250.1.139",
  "dest_port": 80,
  "proto": "TCP",
  "tx_id": 0,
  "alert": {
    "action": "allowed",
    "gid": 1,
    "signature_id": 12345,
    "rev": 3,
    "signature": "GET on wire",
    "category": "",
    "severity": 3
  },
  "http": {
    "hostname": "opensource.google.com",
    "url": "/",
    "http_user_agent": "curl/7.74.0",
    "http_content_type": "text/html",
    "http_method": "GET",
    "protocol": "HTTP/1.1",
    "status": 301,
    "redirect": "https://opensource.google/",
    "length": 223
  },
  "app_proto": "http",
  "flow": {
    "pkts_toserver": 4,
    "pkts_toclient": 3,
    "bytes_toserver": 357,
    "bytes_toclient": 788,
    "start": "2022-11-23T12:38:34.620693+0000"
  }
}
```


Suricata – Examine eve.json Improved Format

```
analyst@e9d44daa418a:~$ jq -c "[.timestamp,.flow_id,.alert.signature,.proto,.dest_ip]" /var/log/suricata/eve.json
["2022-11-23T12:38:34.624866+0000",1083659243911317,"GET on wire","TCP","142.250.1.139"]
["2022-11-23T12:38:58.958203+0000",310000344012020,"GET on wire","TCP","142.250.1.102"]
```

Suricata – Examine eve.json Extract Specific Event Data

	<pre>analyst@e9d44daa418a:/var/log/suricata\$ jq "select(.flow_id==310000344012020)" /var/log/suricata/eve.json { "timestamp": "2022-11-23T12:38:58.958203+0000", "flow_id": 310000344012020, "pcap_cnt": 151, "event_type": "alert", "src_ip": "172.21.224.2", "src_port": 58494, "dest_ip": "142.250.1.102", "dest_port": 80, "proto": "TCP", "tx_id": 0, "alert": { "action": "allowed", "gid": 1, "signature_id": 12345, "rev": 3, "signature": "GET on wire", "category": "", "severity": 3 }, "http": { "hostname": "opensource.google.com", "url": "/", "http_user_agent": "curl/7.74.0", "http_content_type": "text/html", "http_method": "GET", "protocol": "HTTP/1.1", "status": 301, "redirect": "https://opensource.google/", "length": 223 }, "app_proto": "http", "flow": { "pkts_toserver": 4, "pkts_toclient": 3, "bytes_toserver": 357, "bytes_toclient": 797, "start": "2022-11-23T12:38:58.955636+0000" } } analyst@e9d44daa418a:/var/log/suricata\$</pre> <p><i>Suricata – Examine eve.json flow_id</i></p>
--	---

Date: 7/26/2023	Entry: 8 <i>“Perform a query with Splunk”</i>
Description	NIST Incident Response Lifecycle Phase: Detection and Analysis. As a security analyst at the e-commerce store Buttercup Games, I have explored failed SSH logins for the root account on the mail server. I have determined that failed SSH login attempts to the root account on the mail server occurred. The incident followed a

	<p>recurring pattern, happening daily over the course of a week at the same time. Over 100 failed SSH login attempts occurred (346 in total).</p>
Tool(s) used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Splunk Cloud – upload data, perform searches on the data.
The 5 W's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who: Unknown attacker targeting the root account on the mail server. • What: Failed SSH login attempts to the root account on the mail server occurred. The incident followed a recurring pattern, happening daily over the course of a week at the same time. Over 100 failed SSH login attempts occurred (346 in total). • When: Daily, from 2/27/2023 and 3/6/2023 failed SSH login attempts occurred at 1:39 a.m. exactly. • Where: The incident occurred on the mail server of an e-commerce store, Buttercup Games. • Why: The incident occurred as an attempt to gain privileged access on the mail server via SSH. The intents behind this are unclear but we can safely assume the intentions of this was malicious as a large amount of failed SSH logins can be an indicator that someone is attempting a password attack (e.g., brute force, rainbow table, dictionary, etc.).
Additional notes	<p>Screenshots:</p>  <p>The screenshot shows the Splunk Cloud web interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with 'splunk-cloud', 'Apps', 'Messages', 'Settings', 'Activity', and a search bar. Below this is a 'Add Data' section with a progress bar showing 'Select Source', 'Input Settings', 'Review', and 'Done'. A green 'Start' button is visible. The main content area displays a green checkmark and the message 'File has been uploaded successfully.' with a link to 'Configure your inputs by going to Settings > Data Inputs'. Below this are four buttons: 'Start Searching' (green), 'Add More Data', 'Download Apps', and 'Build Dashboards', each with a brief description and a 'Learn more' link.</p> <p><i>Splunk Cloud - Upload Data</i></p>

splunk>cloud Apps 2 Messages Settings Activity Find Splunk Cloud Admin

Search Analytics Datasets Reports Alerts Dashboards Search & Reporting

New Search

Index=main All time

109,864 events (before 7/26/23 2:59:23.000 PM) No Event Sampling Job

Events (109,864) Patterns Statistics Visualization

Format Timeline Zoom Out Zoom to Selection Deselect 1 hour per column

List Format 20 Per Page

Hide Fields All Fields

SELECTED FIELDS
host 5
source 8
sourcetype 3

INTERESTING FIELDS
AcctID 100+
bytes 100+
clientip 100+
Code 14
date_hour 24
date_mday 8
date_minute 60
date_month 2
date_second 60
date_wday 7
date_year 1
date_zone 1
file 14
ident 1
index 1
ipaddr 14

i	Time	Event
>	3/6/23 6:24:02.000 PM	[06/Mar/2023:18:24:02] VendorID=5036 Code=B AcctID=6024298300471575 host = vendor_sales : source = tutorialdata.zip./vendor_sales/vendor_sales.log : sourcetype = vendor_sales
>	3/6/23 6:23:46.000 PM	[06/Mar/2023:18:23:46] VendorID=7026 Code=C AcctID=8702194102896748 host = vendor_sales : source = tutorialdata.zip./vendor_sales/vendor_sales.log : sourcetype = vendor_sales
>	3/6/23 6:23:31.000 PM	[06/Mar/2023:18:23:31] VendorID=1043 Code=B AcctID=2063718909897951 host = vendor_sales : source = tutorialdata.zip./vendor_sales/vendor_sales.log : sourcetype = vendor_sales
>	3/6/23 6:22:59.000 PM	[06/Mar/2023:18:22:59] VendorID=1243 Code=F AcctID=8768831614147676 host = vendor_sales : source = tutorialdata.zip./vendor_sales/vendor_sales.log : sourcetype = vendor_sales
>	3/6/23 6:22:48.000 PM	[06/Mar/2023:18:22:48] VendorID=1239 Code=K AcctID=5822351159954740 host = vendor_sales : source = tutorialdata.zip./vendor_sales/vendor_sales.log : sourcetype = vendor_sales
>	3/6/23 6:22:32.000 PM	[06/Mar/2023:18:22:32] VendorID=7033 Code=E AcctID=4390644811207834 host = vendor_sales : source = tutorialdata.zip./vendor_sales/vendor_sales.log : sourcetype = vendor_sales
>	3/6/23 6:22:16.000 PM	91.205.189.15 - - [06/Mar/2023:18:22:16] "GET /oldlink?itemId=EST-14&JSESSIONID=SD6SL7FF7ADFF53113 HTTP 1.1" 200 1665 "http://www.buttercupgames.com/oldlink?itemId=EST-14" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/536.5 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/19.0.1084.46 Safari/536.5" 153 host = www2 : source = tutorialdata.zip./www2/access.log : sourcetype = access_combined_wcookie

index=main (all times)

splunk>cloud Apps 2 Messages Settings Activity Find Splunk Cloud Admin

Search Analytics Datasets Reports Alerts Dashboards Search & Reporting

New Search

Index=main host=mailsv All time

9,829 events (before 7/26/23 3:04:49.000 PM) No Event Sampling Job

Events (9,829) Patterns Statistics Visualization

Format Timeline Zoom Out Zoom to Selection Deselect 1 day per column

List Format 20 Per Page

Hide Fields All Fields



SELECTED FIELDS
host 1
source 1
sourcetype 1


INTERESTING FIELDS
date_hour 1
date_mday 8
date_minute 1
date_month 2
date_second 1
date_wday 7
date_year 1
date_zone 1
index 1
linecount 1
punct 9
splunk_server 1

i	Time	Event
>	3/6/23 1:39:51.000 AM	Thu Mar 06 2023 01:39:51 mailsv1 sshd[5276]: Failed password for invalid user appserver from 194.8.74.23 port 3351 ssh2 host = mailsv : source = tutorialdata.zip./mailsv/secure.log : sourcetype = secure-2
>	3/6/23 1:39:51.000 AM	Thu Mar 06 2023 01:39:51 mailsv1 sshd[1039]: Failed password for root from 194.8.74.23 port 3768 ssh2 host = mailsv : source = tutorialdata.zip./mailsv/secure.log : sourcetype = secure-2
>	3/6/23 1:39:51.000 AM	Thu Mar 06 2023 01:39:51 mailsv1 sshd[5250]: Failed password for invalid user testuser from 194.8.74.23 port 3626 ssh2 host = mailsv : source = tutorialdata.zip./mailsv/secure.log : sourcetype = secure-2
>	3/6/23 1:39:51.000 AM	Thu Mar 06 2023 01:39:51 mailsv1 sshd[21881]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user nsharpe by (uid=0) host = mailsv : source = tutorialdata.zip./mailsv/secure.log : sourcetype = secure-2
>	3/6/23 1:39:51.000 AM	Thu Mar 06 2023 01:39:51 mailsv1 sshd[1165]: Failed password for apache from 194.8.74.23 port 4604 ssh2 host = mailsv : source = tutorialdata.zip./mailsv/secure.log : sourcetype = secure-2
>	3/6/23 1:39:51.000 AM	Thu Mar 06 2023 01:39:51 mailsv1 sshd[3760]: Failed password for invalid user mongodb from 194.8.74.23 port 2472 s sh2


Index=main host=mailsv (all times)

	phishing.
The 5 W's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Who: The WHOIS for <code>signin.office365x24.com</code>: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Country: ZZ Organization: [n/a] Contact Email: [n/a] <p>However, the VirusTotal Context provided more information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> City: New Delhi Country: IN Email: 9a6229aeb54b0cc2s@kamtrononline Organization: Kamtron Systems Pvt. Ltd. <p>The sibling domain is <code>login.office365x24.com</code>, and the resolved IP addresses are 40.100.174.34 and 104.215.148.63.</p> What: A phishing campaign was successful, as evidenced by POST log data in the "Timeline" section of Chronicle. POST information tells us that data was sent to the domain that is being investigated, suggesting a successful phishing attack. There were two occurrences of the successful phishing attack on asset identifiers <code>emil-palmer-pc</code> and <code>ashton-davidson-pc</code>. Under the Resolved IPS, 40.100.174.34, for the <code>signin.office365x24.com</code> domain, there are three occurrences of the POST request to asset identifiers <code>ashton-davidson-pc</code>, <code>emil-palmer-pc</code>, and <code>warren-morris-pc</code>). Additional affected assets are: <code>amir-david-pc</code>, <code>ashton-davidson-pc</code>, <code>bruce-monroe-pc</code>, <code>coral-alvarez-pc</code>, <code>emil-palmer-pc</code>, <code>jude-reyes-pc</code>, <code>roger-spence-pc</code>, and <code>warren-morris-pc</code>. The additional domains associated with this IP address are: <code>signin.office365x24.com</code> and <code>signin.accounts-google.com</code>. The severity of this phishing campaign is medium, and the category is "Drop site for logs or stolen credentials". When: The ET Intelligence Rep List indicates that the domain was active from 12/18/2018 through 1/8/2019. The timeline for the domain shows that the POST incidents occurred between 1/31/2023 and 7/9/2023.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Where: The phishing campaign occurred at a financial services company.● Why: This incident occurred to obtain logs or stolen credentials. The intent behind this is malicious. The attacker likely wanted to gain an understanding of the logs to gain a better understanding of our security posture and any attack vectors to take. Additionally, stealing credentials would allow the attacker to facilitate another educated attack in tandem with the log data obtained.
Additional notes	<p>Screenshots:</p>  <p><i>Chronicle – Home Page</i></p>  <p><i>Chronicle – Search for Domain</i></p>



Chronicle – Search Results



Chronicle – Resolved IPS, Sibling Domains, ET Intelligence Rep List

2023-07-26T15:56:00.000

office365x24.com

SEARCH

SHOWING ALL TIME

12 Distinct Assets

COLLAPSE ALL

TIMELINE

Search Rows

ashton-davidson-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: July 09,

ashton-reyes-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: January

bruce-monroe-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: July 09,

bruce-spence-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: January

coral-alvarez-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: July 09,

coral-palmer-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: January

emil-monroe-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: January

emil-palmer-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: July 09,

jude-alvarez-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: January

jude-reyes-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: July 09, 2023

roger-davidson-pc

First accessed: January

Last accessed: July 09,

DOMAIN

office365x24.com

Procedural Filtering

→

Detections

IoCs

Graph

Attribution

4

/ 88

4 security vendors flagged this domain as malicious

office365x24.com

Registrar

PDR Ltd. d/b/a

PublicDomainRegistry.com

Creation Date

8 years ago

Last Updated

3 years ago

Full report

VT Graph

SECURITY VENDORS SCANNING RESULTS

Sedotlookup: **malicious**

CyRadard: **malicious**

CMC Threat Intelligence: **Undetected**

Xotium Verdict Cloud: **malicious**

Forcepoint ThreatSeeker: **malicious**

WHOIS LOOKUP

Admin City: New Delhi

Admin Country: IN

Admin Email: 9a0229aeb54b0ec2@kamtrononline.com

Admin Organization: Kamtron Systems Pvt. Ltd.

Admin Postal Code: 110019

Admin State/Province: Delhi

Creation Date: 2015-04-05T08:47:39Z

DNSSEC: unsigned

DNSSEC: unsigned

Domain Name: OFFICE365X24.COM

Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited

Name Servers: DNS119.PARKPAGE.FOUNDATIONAPI.COM

Name Server: DNS111.PARKPAGE.FOUNDATIONAPI.COM

Name Servers: dns118.parkpage.foundationapi.com

Chronicle – Top Domain VirusTotal Context

2023-07-26T15:56:00.000

office365x24.com

SEARCH

SHOWING ALL TIME

12 Distinct As

COLLAPSE ALL

TIMELINE

post

ashton-davidson

ashton-reyes-pc

bruce-monroe-pc

bruce-spence-pc

coral-alvarez-pc

coral-palmer-pc

emil-monroe-pc

emil-palmer-pc

jude-alvarez-pc

jude-reyes-pc

roger-davidson

roger-spence-pc

WHOIS LOOKUP

Admin City: New Delhi

Admin Country: IN

Admin Email: 9a6229aeb54b0cc2s@kamtrononline.com

Admin Organization: Kamtron Systems Pvt. Ltd.

Admin Postal Code: 110019

Admin State/Province: Delhi

Creation Date: 2015-04-05T08:47:39Z

DNSSEC: Unsigned

DNSSEC: unsigned

Domain Name: OFFICE365X24.COM

Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited

Name Server: DNS10.PARKPAGE.FOUNDATIONAPI.COM

Name Server: DNS11.PARKPAGE.FOUNDATIONAPI.COM

Name Server: dns10.parkpage.foundationapi.com

Name Server: dns11.parkpage.foundationapi.com

Registrant City: 2aeb9d9962e0b3be

Registrant Country: IN

Registrant Email: 9a6229aeb54b0cc2s@kamtrononline.com

Registrant Fax Ext: 3432650ec337c945

Registrant Fax: 3432650ec337c945

Registrant Name: d95c285284d5fe9e

Registrant Organization: 15c8c5cf895e59d0

Registrant Phone Ext: 3432650ec337c945

Registrant Phone: 1243a69d4af274b1

Registrant Postal Code: 68160ae4f08e2d65

Registrant State/Province: 693482d3384ace39

Registrant Street: 7ffb20d1c833d2dc

Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse-contact@publicdomainregistry.com

Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.2013775952

Registrar IANA ID: 303

Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2020-04-05T08:47:39Z

Registrar URL: http://www.publicdomainregistry.com

Registrar URL: www.publicdomainregistry.com

Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.PublicDomainRegistry.com

Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.publicdomainregistry.com

Registrar: PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com

Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry

Registry Domain ID: 1916633013_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN

Registry Expiry Date: 2021-04-05T08:47:39Z

Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry

Registry Tech ID: Not Available From Registry

Tech City: New Delhi

Tech Country: IN

Tech Email: 9a6229aeb54b0cc2s@kamtrononline.com

Tech Organization: Kamtron Systems Pvt. Ltd.

Tech Postal Code: 110019

Tech State/Province: Delhi

Updated Date: 2020-04-05T09:35:06Z

Updated Date: 2020-04-06T07:15:16Z

Chronicle – Top Domain WHOIS

Chronicle – Sibling Domain VirusTotal Context

Chronicle – Timeline



2023-07-26T15:56:00.000

SHOWING ALL TIME

12 Distinct Assets

EXPAND ALL



TIMELINE

ASSETS

Search Rows

ashton-davidson-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: July 09, 2023

ashton-reyes-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: January 31, 2023

bruce-monroe-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: July 09, 2023

bruce-spence-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: January 31, 2023

coral-alvarez-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: July 09, 2023

coral-palmer-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: January 31, 2023

emil-monroe-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: January 31, 2023

emil-palmer-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: July 09, 2023

jude-alvarez-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: January 31, 2023

jude-reyes-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Last accessed: July 09, 2023

roger-davidson-pc

First accessed: January 31, 2023

Chronicle – Assets

2023-07-26T15:56:00.000

office365x24.com

SHOWING ALL TIME

37 Events

COLLAPSE ALL

WRAP TEXT

TIMELINE

ASSETS

Search Rows

2019-02-22	ASSET IDENTIFIER	FQDN
23:55:27	10.0.29.22	office365x24.com
GET /		
Port: [Unknown]	Resp. Code: 200	Resp. Size: 15,188 (bytes)
23:55:42	10.0.29.22	office365x24.com
POST /login.php		
Port: [Unknown]	Resp. Code: 200	Resp. Size: 15,188 (bytes)
23:56:19	10.0.31.46	office365x24.com
GET /		
Port: [Unknown]	Resp. Code: 200	Resp. Size: 15,188 (bytes)
23:58:25	10.0.28.232	office365x24.com
GET /		
Port: [Unknown]	Resp. Code: 200	Resp. Size: 15,188 (bytes)
23:59:02	10.0.30.34	office365x24.com
GET /		
Port: [Unknown]	Resp. Code: 200	Resp. Size: 15,188 (bytes)
2023-01-31		
09:40:40	roger-davidson-pc	office365x24.com

Chronicle – Timeline Expanded

2023-07-26T15:56:00.000

40.100.174.34

SHOWING ALL TIME

11 Events

EXPAND ALL

WRAP TEXT

TIMELINE

ASSETS

DOMAINS

Search Rows

2023-01-31	ASSET IDENTIFIER	DESTINATION
14:40:40	ashiton-davidson-pc	40.100.174.34
14:40:45	ashiton-davidson-pc	40.100.174.34
POST /login.php		
Port: [Unknown]	Resp. Code: 200	Resp. Size: 19,181 (b...
14:41:10	jude-reyes-pc	40.100.174.34
14:41:15	coral-alvarez-pc	40.100.174.34
14:42:14	emil-palmer-pc	40.100.174.34
14:42:45	emil-palmer-pc	40.100.174.34
POST /login.php		
Port: [Unknown]	Resp. Code: 200	Resp. Size: 19,181 (b...
14:43:49	bruce-monroe-pc	40.100.174.34
14:44:50	roger-spence-pc	40.100.174.34
14:49:15	amir-david-pc	40.100.174.34
14:50:14	warren-morris-pc	40.100.174.34
14:51:45	warren-morris-pc	40.100.174.34
POST /login.php		
Port: [Unknown]	Resp. Code: 200	Resp. Size: 19,181 (b...

IP ADDRESS

40.100.174.34

VT CONTEXT (0/88)

AS Name: MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK (8075)

Country: GB

Registrar: RIPE NCC

IP Subnet Range: 40.96.0.0/13

Reverse DNS: [n/a]

First / Last Seen: 6 months ago / 6 months ago

Destination IP: 40.100.174.34

Google Search

Visited by Selected Asset

Searched Time: 2023-07-26T15:56:00.000

Prevalence

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

Jan 31

Feb 20

Mar 12

Apr 01

Apr 21

May 11

May 31

Jun 20

Jul 10

Jul 26

ESET THREAT INTELLIGENCE

Category: Blocked

Confidence: High

Severity: High

Active until: 2023-02-23T21:50:16Z

Procedural Filtering

SEARCH

EXPAND ALL

RESET

HIDE ALL

ASSET NAMESPACE


EVENT TYPE

LOG SOURCE


NETWORK CONNECTION STATUS

TLD

Chronicle – Resolved IP Timeline POST Query



Chronicle – Resolved IP Assets



Chronicle – Resolved IP Domains

The screenshot displays the Chronicle SIEM interface. On the left, a '24 Events' timeline shows a list of events with columns for 'ASSET IDENTIFIER' and 'FQDN'. The event at 05:02:47 is highlighted. The main panel shows the 'NETWORK_HTTP' event details for the URL 'http://signin.office365x24.com/login.php'. The 'Raw Log' tab is selected, showing a detailed JSON log entry. The right sidebar contains 'Procedural Filtering' options, including 'EXPAND ALL', 'RESET', and 'HIDE ALL'.

Chronicle – Timeline POST Query, Assets, URL

Reflections/Notes

- **Were there any specific activities that were challenging for you? Why or why not?**

One specific activity that I found challenging was understanding Suricata. As a newcomer to IDS/IPS tools like Suricata, I initially followed the provided instructions, but I also attempted to explore and troubleshoot on my own. This independent exploration led to moments of confusion, but I persevered and eventually returned to the assignment's guidelines. Eventually, I successfully completed the assignment and later restarted the activity in the exemplar section, solidifying my understanding of Suricata's functionalities. I found that using `jq` to process JSON output can be a bit tricky, as I am not familiar with JSON formatting. However, with practice and more exposure to Suricata and other tools, it will become easier to use.

Another activity I found challenging was learning the differences and applications of Splunk and Chronicle. Splunk and Chronicle are both simple to use SIEM solutions, but they have their own unique ways of managing and querying data. Learning this took some time, but I know that being able to fully understand their capabilities is a valuable skill for a security analyst.

Lastly, `tcpdump` was a tool that I was not experienced using. Although I am familiar with using the command-line interface for Linux commands, using it to capture and filter network traffic was new to me. I encountered obstacles, but after some time I was able to complete this activity and add `tcpdump` to my tool belt.

- **Has your understanding of incident detection and response changed after taking this course?**

My understanding of incident detection and response has improved. With my CompTIA Security+ and CASP+ certificates, as well as my experience in performing IT audits, Segregation of Duties audits, Access Control audits, and SOC audits, my foundational understanding of incident detection and response has absolutely been improved upon. Taking this course provided me with more in-depth knowledge and practical experience, reinforcing what I already knew, and helping me to see how these concepts apply in real-world scenarios.

- **Was there a specific tool or concept that you enjoyed the most? Why?**

It's clear to me that I enjoyed investigating the hash, as it's a practical and relevant skill in cybersecurity. In addition, I love learning new tools, so learning how to effectively use Suricata, Splunk, and Chronicle, was a highlight. In addition to learning something new, having the opportunity to gain hands-on experience with these tools was extremely valuable for me.