



CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY



BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT
FUND GIVEN IN 1891 BY
HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE

Cornell University Library
PA 4279.P2 1894

Parmenides of Plato /




3 1924 026 679 393

off, ave?

DATE DUE





Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO

PUBLISHED BY
JAMES MACLEHOSE AND SONS, GLASGOW,
Publishers to the University.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LONDON AND NEW YORK.
London, . . . Simpkin, Hamilton and Co.
Cambridge, . . . Macmillan and Bowes.
Edinburgh, . . . Douglas and Foulis.

MDCCCXCIV.

One hundred and fifty copies printed.

No. 6

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO

AFTER THE PAGING OF THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPT

WITH

INTRODUCTIONS, FACSIMILES, AND NOTES

WILLIAM WARDLAW WADDELL

M. A., GLASGOW AND OXFORD

GLASGOW

JAMES MACLEHOSE AND SONS

Publishers to the University

1894

PA
4279
P2++
1894

P R E F A C E.

THE author first studied the Parmenides in college days long ago, as an exercise in metaphysics; but all such occupations had to be renounced when he took up the practical duties of his calling. As time passed, however, the speculative interest revived, the subject was resumed, and he found himself most unexpectedly committed to publication before he had realized what such a step involved. In the meantime he had become satisfied that the highest manuscript authority for the text was accessible at Oxford, and his leisure moments had now to be given to palaeography. With the zeal of a beginner he decided to reproduce the form of the manuscript, a resolution rendered feasible by the condition of the text. This fixed for him the size of his page; and that in turn suggested facsimiles and a regard to outward appearance. Metaphysics, palaeography, aesthetics—such was the writer's downward course: it remains to hope that the result may justify the undertaking. So far as contents are concerned the work errs both by excess and by defect, and that largely through circumstances. It was compiled in spare hours, at long intervals, while the writer was, if he may so speak, in bondage under the elements of the world. During its progress effort was occasionally misdirected, notes lost their first significance, standpoints had to be abandoned, and the literature of the subject proved unmanageable. And in the end, with no mere affectation of humility, the writer feels that he presents little upon philosophy save *τὰ δεδημευμένα περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά*, while his contributions to palaeography have still to be tested by the


experts. At most he can but rank with the untrained boxers of Aristotle, who *περιφερόμενοι τύπτουσι καλὰς πληγάς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης.*

A commentator on Plato must beware of two dangers. If he does not detect in his author the latest developments of metaphysics he may be adjudged ignorant of these; if he does he may be taxed with a want of the 'historic sense.' The dilemma is not an agreeable one. The writer is perhaps imperfectly informed upon recent metaphysical theories, but his ignorance is not proved by a failure to read all Hegel into the Parmenides. In a parallel case, he might know little of renaissance architecture in Italy, but that could not be properly inferred from his inability to find a place on the Acropolis for half the public buildings of Vicenza. On the other hand, if Plato himself escapes being a Hegelian, it must be granted that the comments of his Neoplatonic followers have a strangely modern character. It is part of the wonderful suggestiveness of Plato's contributions to philosophy that they act contagiously upon the imagination of readers; and even the Parmenides, perhaps the most 'sawdustish' among them, is no exception.

Toward previous workers in the same field, many of them critics and scholars of the highest rank, the writer is not consciously chargeable with discourtesy or disingenuousness. But if any expression should be thought wanting in respect, or any view appear to be appropriated without acknowledgment, he sincerely desires to recall the one and give up the other. Among his brightest memories will be the days of lovely autumn weather which his work led him to pass, from time to time, among the quiet and impressive surroundings of great libraries. It is no less a pleasure than a duty to acknowledge here the very great consideration and kindness shown him by the authorities of all these noble institutions. In particular, he will always remember with gratitude that at Tübingen the time of the officials was drawn upon and the rules of the library were relaxed to oblige him, and that from Venice, through the personal kindness of Count Soranzo, a photographic negative was received within a fortnight of the date on which the

request for it was posted in Scotland. His thanks are also due for obliging communications from Mr. Warner of the British Museum, and from Professor Mahaffy. While the character of the letterpress is such as to demand most attentive revision, the protracted and fitful progress of the volume made it impossible to ask assistance from friends in looking over the proofs. The printed authorities consulted are all named from time to time in the course of the work, but Professor Schanz calls for special recognition in connection with the manuscripts. The writings of some commentators could not be had separately, and are quoted from the variorum edition of Valpy. Others, cited in turn by these, could not be procured at all. Such are the disadvantages of living in a provincial town. Of English editions of the dialogue the only one used is that of Thomson, published more than a century ago. The writer remembers seeing, when a student, a small modern edition; but he did not note the author's or publisher's name, and has tried in vain to obtain a copy since. He owes very much to all these sources of information. Now that the work is ended, he is satisfied that the standard aimed at is deserving of respect; but when he thinks of the extent to which learning in all branches has latterly become specialized, and of the many pitfalls lying in the path of imprudent amateurs, his satisfaction is tempered with anxiety, and he is almost ready to say with Thomson, 'nec laudem quaero, sed pro laude veniam.'

STIRLING, October 12, 1894.



CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Introduction—	
PART FIRST—	
I. AUTHORSHIP OF THE WORK,	i
II. SEQUENCE OF THE WORK,	xix
III. ITS CHARACTER AND CONTENTS,	xxxiv
PART SECOND—	
I. SOURCES OF THE TEXT,	lxxiii
II. THE CHIEF MANUSCRIPTS,	xciv
Text,	I
Notes—	
I. TEXTUAL,	41
II. EXPLANATORY,	75
Index,	177
Facsimiles—	
I. LAST PAGE AND SUBSCRIPTIO OF CLARKE MS.,	<i>facing p.</i> cxvi
II. SPECIMEN OF VENICE t MS.,	,, <i>p.</i> cxxii
III. PAGE 154 OF CLARKE MS.,	,, <i>p.</i> cxxviii

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION.

I.

IN writing an introduction to the Parmenides of Plato it is unfortunately necessary, AUTHORSHIP OF THE WORK. in view of modern controversies, to begin by discussing the authenticity of the work. So far as Antiquity is concerned, no doubt upon the subject would appear to have arisen. The best manuscripts give the dialogue without hinting a suspicion; and these can be traced back, with reasonable certainty, to a common fountain dating from the first thirty-six years of our era. Within that period one Thrasylos or Thrasylus drew up an arrangement of all those Platonic writings held by him to be genuine, which seems to be the source of most or all of our existing texts. According to Diogenes iii. 56-61. Laërtius this arrangement took the form of tetralogies, and was as follows:—

I. Euthyphro.	Apologia.	Crito.	Phaedo.
II. Cratylus.	Theaetetus.	Sophista.	Politicus.
III. Parmenides.	Philebus.	Symposium.	Phaedrus.
IV. Alcibiades I.	Alcibiades II.	Hipparchus.	Anterastae.
V. Theages.	Charmides.	Laches.	Lysis.
VI. Euthydemus.	Protagoras.	Gorgias.	Meno.
VII. Hippias major.	Hippias minor.	Io.	Menexenus.
VIII. Clitopho.	Respublica.	Timaeus.	Critias.
IX. Minos.	Leges.	Epinomis.	Epistolae.

καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὕτω διαιρεῖ καὶ τίνες. It is indeed indicated by Diogenes in another ix. 37. place that Thrasylos had doubts about one of these dialogues; but that was the Anterastae, not the Parmenides.

Immediately after giving this list, however, Diogenes goes on to record a second How far can we trace it back? of a much earlier date. "Ἐντοι δέ, says he, ὁν ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικός, εἰς τριλογίας ἐλκουσι τοὺς διαλόγους. According, then, to Aristophanes the grammarian, called 'of Byzantium,' whose prime we may place between 220 and 190 B.C., the order of the dialogues should be this:—

I. Respublica.	Timaeus.	Critias.	III. Leges	Minos.	Epinomis.
II. Sophista.	Politicus.	Cratylus.	IV. Theaetetus.	Euthyphro.	Apologia.
V. Crito.	Phaedo.		Epinomis.		

τὰ δ' ἄλλα καθ' ἐν καὶ ἀτάκτως. In the trilogies, it will be observed, the Parmenides does not appear; and we have to consider whether it was likely to be found among 'the remainder which were placed not in groups but singly.' The ordering of the Platonic

writings would seem to have been almost an industry in itself among the scholars who flourished after the founding of the great libraries. First we have Thrasylos *kai τινες*, next ἔνιοι and Aristophanes; while immediately after the word ἀτάκτως Diogenes goes on ἀρχονται δὲ οἱ μέν, ὡς προείρηται (*i.e.* the ἔνιοι), ἀπὸ τῆς Πολιτείας· οἱ δ' ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ μείζονος· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Θεάγους· ἔνιοι δ' (Thrasylus and his followers) Εὐθύφρονος· ἄλλοι Κλειτοφῶντος· τινὲς Τιμαίου· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Φαίδρου· ἔτεροι Θεατήτου· πολλοὶ δὲ Ἀπολογίαν τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιοῦνται. His final remark is as follows, continuing from ποιοῦνται: νοθεύονται δὲ τῶν διαλόγων ὁμολογουμένως Μίδων ἢ Ἰπποτρόφος, Ἐρυξίας ἢ Ἐρασίστρατος, Ἀλκυών, Ἀκέφαλοι ἢ Σίσυφος (some read ἀκέφαλοι ἢ Σίσυφος), Ἀξιόχος, Φαίακες, Δημοδόκος, Χελιδών, Ἐβδόμη, Ἐπιμενίδης· ὃν ἢ Ἀλκυών Δέοντός τινος εἶναι δοκεῖ, καθά φησι Φαβωρῶνος ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων. Thus we have got before us a complete deliverance by Diogenes Laërtius upon the canon of Plato's works. Now in the course of this connected and detailed statement he (1) gives a long list of dialogues held to be genuine and arranged by Thrasylos: (2) a shorter list of those arranged by Aristophanes, after which he says, 'the rest' were placed one by one: (3) enumerates other arrangements; some of which as will be observed, begin from dialogues named in (1) although not named in (2): (4) gives the names of those dialogues, 'the' dialogues, which were 'declared to be spurious by common consent' (the translation is Grote's): and lastly (5) indicates the great importance which was attached to the ordering of these works by the scholars of antiquity. In a word he has the subject fully present to his mind in all its bearings. And the question comes to be—if Aristophanes had omitted from his list the Parmenides, or any dialogue included in the list of Thrasylos, would Diogenes under these circumstances have failed to say so? That does not seem probable, more particularly since he treats the work as genuine in his Lives of Parmenides and Zeno; and we may thus infer that the Parmenides existed among 'the rest' of Aristophanes at—let us say—210 B.C. We have, moreover, the following very comprehensive decision ascribed by Diogenes to an author who lived half a century or so later than Aristophanes, πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνας, etc. This verdict may not include the νοθευόμενοι, but cannot well exclude any others.

It may perhaps be asked at this stage—those copies of Plato's works which formed the text for all this deliberation and arrangement, where were they to be seen? to whom did they belong? Although the conclusion is not based upon positive testimony, it is very generally assumed that the copies were those contained in the Alexandrian, and perhaps in the Pergamene, library. The year 283 B.C. marks the point at which the throne of Egypt passed from the First Ptolemy to the Second; and it appears to be accepted that by this date the library at Alexandria had taken definite form. While owing its origin to the tastes and munificence of the Ptolemies, that great collection seems to have been much indebted for its actual character and contents to Demetrius of Phalerum. Of this man—born in Attica shortly after Plato's death, for years conspicuous and popular at Athens, an orator, a voluminous author, a student of philosophy, and finally a protector of Plato's successor Xenocrates—we do not indeed know, but may with every right assume, that he

was familiar with Plato's Academy when Xenocrates was its head (B.C. 339-314), and that when in later life he had the ear and support of Ptolemy Soter he would be at pains to secure for Alexandria the best copy which care, skill, and money could command of all the Platonic writings. Exclusive of Demetrios, Aristophanes the grammarian, mentioned above, was fifth curator of the Alexandrian collection ; and his period of office might date from, we shall suppose, his fiftieth year—that is, from about 210 B.C.

We have just seen what an object of study the Platonic writings were to scholars of this age, and we are at the same time entitled to hold that a copy of them, and that a careful one, existed at Alexandria as early at least as 250 B.C. Plato died in the year 347 B.C., or about a hundred years before. How do we bridge over the interval? Although passages are quoted to prove that Plato despised written, as compared with oral, instruction in philosophy, he was certainly a voluminous author ; and both from the style of his works and from familiar anecdotes recorded about him,¹ we are justified in saying that he was a most careful and critical one. He also in middle life founded an institution at the Academy which would have many points in common with a University. Here he lectured to numerous and enthusiastic students ; and here beyond all rational doubt would be collected, as they were written, the series of his published works. This would seem to give a greater initial probability of careful transmission than could be affirmed in the case, for example, of Herodotus or Thucydides. But further : on its founder's death the institute passed under the charge of a nephew, Speusippus, and thereafter, as we have seen, of a disciple, Xenocrates ; the consecutive presidency of whom brings us to the year 314 B.C. Nor does the career of the Academy seem to have been broken or its abode disturbed until the time of Sulla. On what precise material the works at the Academy when complete were engrossed may be uncertain, but there can be no extravagance in assuming that it was capable of lasting for a century ; and if, as seems highly probable, the full list was made up under Speusippus by the year 340 B.C., we would thus have it carried safely down within the period during which Demetrios could have it transcribed for Ptolemy. Few who have read the vicissitudes which have been survived by the Clarke MS. would find any difficulty in accepting the assumption, that at least two well authenticated copies of all Plato's works existed at the year 200 B.C., one at Athens and one at Alexandria. Nay—to judge from the remark of Diogenes in his Life of Democritus, that Plato was persuaded not to burn the works of Democritus, because 'many had copies'—the number was probably much greater.

With such an argument as this—indeed it is substantially his—Grote is perfectly satisfied. He considers that few if any authors of the Greek classic age have the authenticity of their writings placed upon so substantial a foundation ; and unhesitatingly adopts the entire Thrasylean series, rejecting only the works which in Alexandrian times were 'declared to be spurious by common consent.' And surely his verdict is weighty. Few have had better means of knowing the amount of evidence on which the facts of Greek history depend. It is worth adding that the Scholiast on Aristotle's

¹ Dionys. Halicarn. 'De Compos. Verborum,' ed. Schaefer, Leipzig. 1808, p. 243. Also comp. Quint. viii. 6, 64.

ix. 40.

Aristotle,
Berlin Edit., vol.
iv. 786 a. top.

Metaphysics—though, of course, he is comparatively late—speaks of τὸν ἐπιγραφόμενον Παρμενίδην ἢ περὶ ἵδεων τοῦ Πλάτωνος διάλογον. And other passages might be cited. This topic of the spurious dialogues, however, calls for some investigation. With such guarantees for authenticity, how did spurious works come to exist at all? Unless Plato himself left authoritative testimony that he had published all he wrote, or at least had destroyed anything which he did not wish published, it might well enough be affirmed after his death, if any one had an interest in advancing such an assertion, that some hitherto unpublished work had been discovered. A student in the Academy or a contemporary of Plato might do so, if either desired to attack some statement by Speusippus about his uncle's views. But even more unworthy reasons were not wanting.

Galen on Hippocr. de nat.
hom. i. 92; and
Bentley, Phalar. init.

The passage usually cited in this connection since Bentley's time is from Galen: πρὸν γὰρ τοὺς ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τε καὶ Περγάμῳ γενέσθαι βασιλεῖς ἐπὶ κτήσει βιβλίων φιλοτιμθέντας οὐδέπω ψευδῶς ἐπεγέγραπτο σύγγραμμα· λαμβάνειν δὲ ἀρξαμένων μισθὸν τῶν κομιζόντων αὐτοῖς σύγγραμμα παλαιοῦ τινὸς ἀνδρὸς οὕτως ἥδη πολλὰ ψευδῶς ἐπιγράφοντες ἐκόμιζον. Galen certainly lived (130-200+ A.D.) long after the date to which he makes reference: still he was born at Pergamus, which favours the idea that he had local tradition in support of his assertion, while the motive assigned for forgery is unhappily only too probable. Later writers also, unless they derived their authority from this passage, confirm Galen's statement, and even give some details upon the subject.

Arist. Berlin.
Ed., vol. iv. 28 a.
See also notes of
Ammonius and
Simplicius at the
foot.

Thus David when commenting upon the works of Aristotle, says, ἐν οἷς ἔγινεν καὶ τὸ γνήσιον διὰ τὴν γιγνομένην νοθείαν νοθεύονται γὰρ τὰ βιβλία πενταχῶς and proceeds to specify these. It will be observed that Galen dates forgeries from the time when libraries had already become recognized channels of royal expenditure. Perhaps it is on this ground that Grote would hold the rejected dialogues to have been set aside simply because of their late admission into the libraries. 'It is the transmission, the externally attested authenticity, of these works that we doubt'—so he seems to make the librarians speak—'and our doubts are based on the fact that our catalogues were completed before they appeared. With their internal character—the presence or absence in them of a "Platonisches Gefühl"—we take no concern.' And this may possibly be so. Nay, the date at which these dialogues appeared might perhaps be brought within narrower compass by the reference of Diogenes quoted above to the judgment of Panaetius. The inference from the words of Panaetius, who died before 133 B.C., would seem to be that he either did not concur in the rejection of the spurious dialogues, or else knew nothing of them—that they had appeared after his death. In this way Aristophanes also would know nothing of them, nor does Diogenes say anything to contradict this. But on the other hand what is to be said of the following? Διεβάλλετο δὲ ὁ Αἰσχίνης (pupil of Socrates) καὶ μάλισθ' ὑπὸ Μενεδίμου τοῦ Ἐρετριέως ὡς τοὺς πλείστους διαλόγους ὅντας Σωκράτους ὑποβάλλοιτο, λαμβάνων παρὰ Ξανθίππης ὃν οἱ μὲν καλούμενοι ἀκέφαλοι σφόδρ' εἰσὶν ἐκλελυμένοι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιφαίνοντες τὴν Σωκρατικὴν εὐτονίαν οὖς καὶ Πεισίστρατος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἔλεγε μὴ εἶναι Αἰσχίνου. καὶ τῶν ἐπτὰ δὲ τοὺς πλείστους Περσαῖός φησι

Πασιφῶντος εἶναι τοῦ Ἐρετρικοῦ, εἰς τὸν Αἰσχίνου δὲ κατατάξαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένους τόν τε μικρὸν Κῦρον καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν ἐλάσσων καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ἐσκευώρηται. οἱ δὲ οὗν τῶν Αἰσχίνου τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ἥθος ἀπομεμαγμένοι εἰσὶν ἐπτά· πρῶτος Μιλτιάδης, διὸ καὶ ἀσθενέστερόν πως ἔχει· Καλλίας, Ἀξίοχος, Ἀσπασία, Ἀλκιβιάδης, Τηλαύγης, Ρίνων. φασὶ δ' αὐτὸν δι' ἀπορίαν ἐλθεῖν εἰς Σικελίαν πρὸς Διονύσιον, καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν Πλάτωνος παροφθῆναι, ὑπὸ δὲ Ἀριστίππου συσταθῆναι [others συστῆναι]. δόντα τέ τινας τῶν διαλόγων δῶρα λαβεῖν... Τούτου τὸν διαλόγους καὶ Ἀριστίππος ὑπώπτευεν. ἐν γοῦν Μεγάροις ἀναγιγνώσκοντος αὐτοῦ φασὶ σκῶψαι εἰπόντα, “πόθεν σοι, ληστά, ταῦτα;”.... Πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸν Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφῶντος, Ἀντισθένους, Αἰσχίνου διστάζει δὲ περὶ τῶν Φαίδωνος (Ueberweg makes the strange mistake of supposing this to be the dialogue called Phaedo, instead of the dialogues written by the person of that name) καὶ Εὐκλείδου, τὸν δὲ ἄλλους ἀνατρεῖ πάντας:—to which we may add for completeness διαλόγους τοίνυν ^{iii. 48.}

φασὶ πρῶτον γράψαι Ζήνωνα τὸν Ἐλεάτην Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ ποιητῶν Ἀλεξανδρείαν Στυρέα ή Τίγιον, ὡς καὶ Φαβωρίνος ἐν ἀπομνημονεύμασι. δοκεῖ δέ μοι Πλάτων ἀκριβώσας τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα δικαίως ἀν ωσπερ τὸν καλλους οὕτω καὶ τῆς εὑρέσεως ἀποφέρεσθαι. From these passages it would seem clear (1) that dialogues existed before Plato was born: (2) that about the time of Socrates' death, there sprang up a perfect literature of them purporting to be his or to embody his teaching: (3) that plagiarism existed and was exposed at the time, in connection with these dialogues: (4) that the tests by which this exposure was effected were—both then and in the time of Diogenes—internal not external: (5) and, finally, that in comparing the list given here with that given above, of the spurious Platonic works, we find that there are certain names common to both, and that a reference to ἀκέφαλοι διάλογοι and ἐπτὰ occurs in each list. From all this it will be seen that a shadow falls upon the argument given but now for the authenticity of the writings ascribed to Plato. Accordingly, in modern times, and more especially since Schleiermacher made his great attempt to construct a self-consistent scheme of reasoned truth from those writings, the whole question of their reliability has been reconsidered. In arriving at a judgment, the tests applied have been both external or historic, and internal or literary and speculative.

On the historic side, the great question has been, Can we find evidence for the existence of Plato's works prior to the time of Aristophanes the grammarian? which again, for practical purposes, resolves itself into the other question, Can we find references to them in the works of Aristotle? It is obvious that an authentic reference gleaned from such a source would be of great authority. At the same time the subject is not without difficulties; for the text of Aristotle is less fully assured than Plato's own. Besides the facts already enumerated in support of Plato's text, we have the further circumstance, that according to the testimony of Hermann and Zeller as quoted by Ueberweg 'in der gesammten alten Literatur, soweit sie uns erhalten ist, keine gesicherte Beziehung auf ein Platonisches Werk sich findet, ^{Ueberweg, Untersuchungen ueber die Echtheit etc. Platon. Schriften, p. 131-2.}

welches heute nicht mehr existirte'; so that we now possess at least all the genuine works of Plato, whatever those may be. No such affirmation can be made in the case of Aristotle. In the Berlin Edition, among the fragments, quite a considerable list

v. 1474 etc.

is given of works referred to in ancient writers as by Aristotle, which have not come down to us. Again a considerable quantity of what actually appears under his name

Zeller,
Plato, etc., p. 54,
note 22, Eng. Tr.

is doubtful, either absolutely or else in the precise form in which we find it. Zeller gives a list of references to Plato in Aristotle which he holds to be discredited on this ground.

i. 2, 404 b, 16.

Let us now take two cases in which clear references do occur. In De Anima we have *τὸν αὐτὸν ὃς τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ*, with which compare Timaeus 35 A.

ii. 1, 1263 a, 4.

Again in the Politics we find *ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλους, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος*, with which compare Republic, Book v.

iv. 2, 122 b, 26.

In the case of both these dialogues, references might be multiplied. For us the problem is, Can any similar reference be quoted of which the Parmenides is the object? There can not. But it might, of course, happen that Aristotle, while really having in his eye a work by Plato, might be less precise in the form of his allusion, trusting that, from the context or other circumstances, those for whom he wrote would understand his real intention. Accordingly, we find many alleged references to Plato which range through all the grades of likelihood from practical certainty downwards. Here for example is one which has given rise to discussion: in the Topics, Aristotle says, *ὡς Πλάτων ὅριζεται φορὰν τὴν κατὰ τόπουν κίνησιν*. No work is cited by name in this instance: but in the Parmenides we find *κινούμενόν γε [τὸ ἐν] ἡ φέροιτο ἡ ἀλλοιότο ἄν, αἴται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. Ναί.... Καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἵτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἡ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἐτέραν ἐξ ἐτέρας.... Ἄλλα δὴ χώραν ἀμείβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;.... Κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἐν ἀκίνητον*.

138 c-139 a.

Undoubtedly the sense of the two passages is the same, but there is no verbal identity, while on the other hand there is another similar passage in the Theaetetus *ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖται, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἡ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται; "Εγωγε. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δὲ... ἡ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιώται, ἄρα οὐκ ἀξιον ἐτερον εἶδος φάναι κινήσεως; "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. 'Αναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὴ λέγω τούτω εἶδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν.*

Untersuch. 150,
176.

Ueberweg is not sure that any more is meant than a reference to some statement made orally at the Academy; but if a work is alluded to, he thinks that a reference

Platon. Parmen-

ides cura Godofr. to the Parmenides is 'etwas weniger ungenau.' Again, Stallbaum, in his copious and learned introduction to the dialogue, cites various passages from Aristotle, which clearly seem to treat of questions within Aristotle's knowledge, very closely resembling those which are discussed in this dialogue. Of these we may quote two. Controverting

Stallbaumi, Lip-

Siae, 1848, pp. 339-40.

Sopist. Elench.

the distinction between *λόγοι πρὸς τοῦνομα* and *πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν*, Aristotle says, *Εἰ δὴ τις πλείω σημαίνοντος τοῦ ὄντος οἷοιτο ἐν σημαίνειν, καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος—οἷον ἵστις τὸ δὲ ἡ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν Ζήνων ἐν οἰόμενος εἶναι ἡρώτησε, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος δῆτι ἐν πάντα—οὗτος πρὸς τοῦνομα ἔσται ἡ*

10, 2, 170 b, 20.

πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου διειλεγμένος. And again, near the end of the same work, he says, *Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῦτὸν σημαίνειν τὸ δύν καὶ τὸ ἔν oī δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λόγουσι διὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς φάναι τὸ ἔν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ δύν.* Undoubtedly there is a strong resemblance here to the course of our dialogue pp. 127-9: but unfortunately neither the dialogue nor its author is named, and the reference is not so close as to satisfy us without that additional security. All that we can do is to point out, as Zeller is careful to do, that allusions in themselves uncertain gain in force from the circumstance that 'the Platonic writings are the only writings of the Socratic school to which he ever refers. This circumstance makes it extremely probable that Aristotle really intends to ascribe all the writings quoted by him in this form (here however the quotation is what is doubtful) to Plato.'

Admitting, however, the absence of a clear reference, we are still entitled to plead, that, as was mentioned above, we do not possess Aristotle's works in a perfect form. Thus we find in the list of lost works tabulated in the Berlin Edition *τὰ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν γραφέντα αὐτῷ δύο βιβλία, ἀλλα ὅντα πυρὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔκτὸς τῆς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ συντάξεως* (Michael Ephesius in Metaph. N. VI. and others). Had we but these two books, the apparent silence of the Metaphysics might cause no anxiety. But taking matters at their worst—assuming that he never did refer to the Parmenides—we might still meet the difficulty by parallel cases. Thus Zeller, who has carefully treated the question, says, 'Aristotle is not passing judgment on Plato's works as a literary historian who is bound to furnish a complete catalogue of them, ... Nor does he deal with them as a modern writer of the history of Philosophy, whose object it is to combine their whole philosophic content ...; he only mentions them when occasion offers... He owes his knowledge of the Platonic doctrines in the first place to verbal communication and personal intercourse; in the second place only, to the writings of Plato.... The metaphysical bases of the system ... are ... searchingly criticised, ... but in by far the greater number of cases on the ground of Plato's discourses ... Only one of the many passages from which we derive our knowledge of the theory of ideas is quoted by him [Phaedo, 100 B sq. in Met. I. 9, XIII. 5, Gen. et Corr. II. 9]; he makes no allusion to what is said on the subject in the Republic, Timaeus, Symposium, Phaedrus, and Theaetetus; nor to the explanations of the Sophist, Parmenides, and Philebus, though there was abundant opportunity for it.... It is certainly surprising that Aristotle should assert that Plato never enquired wherein the participation of things in ideas consists; while in the Parmenides [130 E sqq.] the difficulties with which this theory has to contend are clearly pointed out. But it is not more surprising than that he should assail the doctrine of ideas with the question: "Who formed the things of sense after the pattern of the ideas?" [Met. I. 9, 991a, 20], though it is distinctly stated in the Timaeus [28 c sq.] that the Creator of the world did this in looking on the eternal archetypes. Nor again that he should maintain, notwithstanding the well-known explanation in the Phaedo [100 B etc.], often alluded to by himself,—..... that

the final cause is not touched by the ideas [Met. I. 9, 992a 29 οὐδὲ δὴ ὁ περὶ ... οὐθὲν ἀπτεται τὰ εἴδη]. We should have expected that in attacking Plato about the *τρίτος ἀνθρωπος* Aristotle, had he been acquainted with the Parmenides, would have referred to the fact that in that dialogue the same objection is raised. But might we not also have expected after the further stricture, "Plato ought then to assume ideas of art productions, mere relations, etc., which he does not," some such remark as this: "In his writings he certainly does speak of such ideas?" Nor is such unexpected forgetfulness confined to Aristotle. Diogenes Laërtius enumerates among certain other facts peculiar to Plato—in whose case, as has been seen, we do not hear of lost works—that *πρῶτος τε ἀντειρηκὼς σχεδὸν ἀπασι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἤγειται διὰ τί μὴ ἐμνημόνευσε Δημοκρίτου*. The illustration seems very pertinent: it is impossible to suppose that Plato was not well acquainted with the tenets of a man of great celebrity who was his contemporary for some sixty years.

But something further may be urged in relation to the question. Thus in his commentaries upon Aristotle's Physics Simplicius says, *τάχα λέγομεν ὅτι πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ τῷ Παρμενίδῃ παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένα ἀπετείνατο νῦν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν ὑποτιθέμενον τὸν Παρμενίδην καὶ ἀποδεικνύντα θαυμάζειν ἔοικεν ὁ Πλάτων*. The words of Phys. i. 9, 191 b, Aristotle to which Simplicius is referring are *ἡμμένοι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτεροι τινές εἰσιν αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς γενέσεως or μεταβολῆς], ἀλλ' οὐχ ικανῶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ὃ Παρμενίδην ὀρθῶς λέγειν*. Simplicius has said that the commentators regard this as a reference to the historical Parmenides, and then makes the remark which

Mullach Frgm. of we have quoted. Certainly Parmenides rejected *τὸ μὴ ὄν* entirely, and contended for Parmen. 59-64. a being which had no γένεσις, φθορά, or μεταβολή—ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνάλεθρόν

ἐστιν—τίνα γὰρ γέννην διῆσται αὐτοῦ; πῇ, πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἐάσω φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν. We may observe also that Aristotle puts the words Παρμενίδην λέγειν under the government of *ἔτεροι ... ὁμολογοῦσιν*, and that the process of becoming and change is discussed more than once in the Parmenides, particularly in the argument marked in our marginal summary, III. iii., where the language used is in conformity with Aristotle's observation. We shall venture, however, to take a wider sweep in our reflections. It is conceded that the Parmenides is a very important dialogue in connection with the characteristic Platonic doctrine of ideas. It alone has the word Ideas included in its title, and some objectors can hardly be alive to the blank which would be caused in our conception of the ideal theory had this work not come down to us. They first read into that theory all the light this dialogue sheds, and then extinguish it, but without forgetting what it has shown them. Let us now, bearing this in mind, reflect for a moment upon the character of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In composing the treatise of which that work represents all that we possess, Aristotle was perforce led to dwell at length upon the views of Plato, because Plato was in strictness the first of the metaphysicians. His predecessors, with partial exceptions, were more properly investigators of physical facts and causes. Accordingly we find that the doctrines of Plato upon ideas are discussed pointedly and in detail in a

passage which is twice repeated, and that they are over and over again referred to in other parts of the work. And yet, throughout the whole, only two dialogues are named—the Hippias, which is surely not of vital consequence, and the Phaedo. It will not be maintained that the Phaedo is the only dialogue to which a reference would under the circumstances be expected. Even it is referred to only in connection with a special point, and the argument which precedes and follows contains no allusion of a similar nature. Suppose the Parmenides dropt from view for the moment, still why have we no citation from the Meno, the Cratylus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Timaeus—to say nothing of the Sophistes and Politicus, which, like the Parmenides, are suspect? Surely, to repeat the contention of Zeller, with such a series of works unmentioned, the argument from silence loses much of its force. And if we consider the substance of Aristotle's criticisms in the passages just indicated, we are justified in contending that no dialogue which Plato ever wrote would form a more natural and obvious text for them than the Parmenides. Apart now from its controversial portions, what is the character of Aristotle's treatise as a whole? It is not very artistically compacted, but it exhibits several well marked features. (1) It handles repeatedly the conceptions $\epsilon\nu$, $\delta\nu$, $\alpha\rho\iota\theta\mu\circ\delta$. For these we may refer to the Parmenides at large. (2) It defines or describes certain terms liable to be misunderstood, prominent among which—besides $\epsilon\nu$ and $\delta\nu$ —stand $\alpha\rho\chi\circ\delta$, $\tau\alpha\tau\circ\tau\circ\delta$, $\alpha\pi\tau\kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$, $\pi\rho\circ\tau\circ\pi\alpha$ and $\mathring{\iota}\sigma\tau\circ\pi\alpha$, $\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha$, $\mathring{\iota}\xi\iota\pi$, $\pi\alpha\theta\circ\pi\alpha$, $\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\pi\alpha$, $\mu\epsilon\rho\alpha$, $\delta\lambda\circ\lambda\alpha$, $\gamma\epsilon\nu\alpha$. Let any one for a moment consider the part played by these ideas in the Parmenides. (3) It emphatically presses, *& plusieurs reprises*, the vital importance of the law of contradiction to metaphysical inquiries, although the natural place for such insistence would be a treatise on deductive logic. Now a prominent objection urged by Grote against the arguments advanced in the Parmenides is, that they constantly violate this law—the one 'is and is not,' 'moves and is still,' 'is like and unlike,' 'one and many.' The law of contradiction had hardly received definite form before Plato's time; but Aristotle might feel all the more bound to give it prominence in view of the—under our supposition—conspicuous instance in which neglect of it in metaphysical investigations had been exemplified. (4) Let any one glance at the vocabulary of the Metaphysics and mark the employment of such words as $\alpha\kappa\rho\beta\epsilon\circ\delta$, $\nu\circ\mu\alpha$, $\pi\alpha\rho\circ\delta\epsilon\iota\mu\gamma\alpha$, $\pi\alpha\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\epsilon\circ\theta\alpha\iota$, $\pi\alpha\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\epsilon\alpha$, $\mathring{\iota}\pi\alpha\pi\pi\mu\alpha$, $\kappa\in\eta\pi\alpha$, $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\circ\lambda\alpha$, taking along with it the well known statement $\epsilon\pi\iota\ \delta\epsilon\ \mathring{\iota}\ \delta\epsilon\ \mathring{\iota}\ \alpha\kappa\rho\beta\epsilon\circ\delta\pi\pi\alpha\ \tau\alpha\ \lambda\circ\gamma\alpha\ \mathring{\iota}\ \mu\epsilon\ \tau\alpha\ \pi\alpha\ \tau\alpha\ \pi\alpha\ \iota\delta\epsilon\alpha$, and then compare the text of this dialogue. It is not meant, by this line of argument, that the Metaphysics is a polemic directed against the Parmenides alone—in that case the dialogue would have been named—but it is meant that the substance of the Parmenides is distinctly included with that of such dialogues as the Republic, Phaedo, and Philebus, in Aristotle's mental picture of Plato's views, and forms a prominent feature in his controversial allusions; and that but for the existence of the Parmenides, the polemic of Aristotle would lose half its point and value.

Yet, probable as these arguments may be, so long as actual demonstration is not reached objections may be raised. The chief of these is that, while the points of relation between the Parmenides and the Metaphysics are undoubtedly striking, they are due, not to the fact that the author of the latter had the former in his mind, but rather to a very different cause, to wit that the author of the former had either read the latter or had heard Aristotle lecturing, and so could not be Plato. This objection and any answers that may be made to it rest not upon historical but upon internal evidence. In reply we may argue thus—referring to the notes for details.

Does it look
earlier than
Aristotle?
133 C-E.

141 C.

Cat. 7, 61, 36.

138. Comp.
Phys. iii. 1 etc.
Met. x. 9.
144 E-145. Comp.
Met. iv. 26, 1024a
1.. 146 C.

1. Had the author of the Parmenides been a student of Aristotle he would in discussing, as he does, ideas of relation have naturally called them ideas *πρός τι*, which is their technical name in Aristotle's works. He does not do so. But he uses the preposition *πρὸς* in a less formal way—*πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἴσιν, πρὸς αὐτάς, πρὸς τὰ παρ' οἷμαν*, and so on—a way which suggests that, while the technical phrase was yet unselected, we may have here the very source from which it was drawn. Again, we find scattered through the work such names for the ideas as *αὐτὴν ὁμοιότης, αὐτὸν τὸ ἔν, αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη*. But we do not find the *αὐτὸν* coalescing with the following word in the manner which is familiar to readers of Aristotle, in such words as *αὐτοάνθρωπος, αὐτοξῶν, αὐτοδιπλάσιον, αὐτοδόξα*. Here also the technical terminology of Aristotle seems unknown to the writer of this work. Similarly in the passage where *πρεσβύτερον* is said to be opposed as a *διαφορότης* to *γεώτερον*, and to that alone, there is no allusion to the well-known technical phraseology of the Categories, in the chapter upon *πρός τι*, with regard to *τὰ οὐκείως ἀντιστρέφοντα*.

2. And as with the terminology, so with the conceptions, of the dialogue—they seem less developed and analysed than similar conceptions in the works of Aristotle. Thus the discussion of *κίνησις*, which is begun in the first argument and resumed in other parts of the work, does not reveal a logical division of the subject as clear as that which we find in the Physics. The same seems to hold good in regard to the relations of *πᾶν* to *δλον* when compared with the treatment of them in the Metaphysics. Nor could the argument *ἔτερωθι δν ergo ἔτερον* have been employed by anyone who was familiar with the Sophistici Elenchi, particularly chapter v.

But specific evidence is produced, chiefly by Ueberweg, which tends to show that statements in the Metaphysics are irreconcilable with the Platonic authorship of this dialogue.

Untersuchungen
176.

Met. i. 6, 987 b 9.

1. Thus Ueberweg quotes the following remark made by Aristotle when speaking of the manner in which, according to Plato, things participate in the ideas *κατὰ μέθεξιν γὺρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων τοῖς εἴδεσιν. Τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοῦνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὺρ Πινθαγόρειοι μημάσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τοῦνομα μεταβαλών. Τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἡ τὴν μίμησιν, οἵτις ἀν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφεῖσταν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.* The objection here hinges on the sense of the last clause. Ueberweg gives no verbal translation of the words: but in order to make out a case from them the rendering would need to be that Plato and the Pythagoreans

'were at one in omitting to investigate' the nature of *μέθεξις* and *μίμησις*. The opening part of the Parmenides being in express terms a discussion of *μέθεξις*, the objection comes to a bearing instantly. Now in making this statement mere inadvertent error on Aristotle's part is perfectly possible. A man busy with his own great and somewhat hostile speculations does not always keep in mind all that an opponent has said and done. Any modern philosophic controversy in a magazine might illustrate this. Again such an argument might seem effective if it stood alone, yet be perceptibly weakened by repetition. We would not willingly surrender three dialogues on such a ground; and as a fact Ueberweg has that difficulty to face. Aristotle explicitly states that Plato never investigated the genesis of concrete things, like flesh or bones, but confined himself to that of *στοιχεῖα*; which is contradicted by Timaeus 73—a work which Ueberweg places first on the list of those authenticated by Aristotle, because of the number of his allusions to it. Here Ueberweg extricates himself thus: 'theils betrifft dies eine Frage von geringerer Bedeutung, so dass ein Uebersehen leichter erklärlich wäre, (surely to Plato it would be a question of *μέθεξις* in both places) theils bestimmt Aristoteles im Folgenden seine Meinung näher dahin, dass mit Ausnahme des Demokrit keiner seiner Vorgänger etwas wissenschaftlich Bedeutsames darüber gesagt habe.' Again, the nature of *μέθεξις* is discussed in the Philebus, 'worin,' however, pleads Ueberweg, 'Aristoteles noch kein *ζητεῖν* finden Phil. 15 B. mochte.' Probably he is contending for a foregone conclusion. But the argument may be attacked on closer grounds. The words *ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν* may possibly be made to bear the meaning above given to them; at the same time one cannot but feel that another is preferable. Aristotle, if fairly understood, simply means that the Pythagoreans and Plato were not wedded to a particular view on this matter. They held the doctrine, believed that it contained the key of their problem, and tried to make their meaning intelligible; no doubt. Yet they acknowledged the overwhelming difficulty of the subject and 'left the matter as an open question to be investigated in common' by philosophers. 'In medio reliquerunt' says the Index of Bonitz under *κοινὸς* (though a different view would seem to be taken under *ἀφιέναι*), and it is satisfactory to find that Dr. Jackson in one of his very able articles translates the passage thus, 'but what this participation or imitation was to be, both Plato and the Pythagoreans left an open question.' With such a rendering there is no difficulty about Plato's discussing *μέθεξις* in the Parmenides or elsewhere; he may and does discuss it, but he is far from satisfied with his conclusions, and would welcome fresh light from any friendly quarter. Appeal might be made to the Phaedo, especially 100 D, *ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸς καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωνία, εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη* (he had already said διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ) *οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά,* etc. The objection, in fact, cannot be sustained.

2. Again, it is contended very plausibly by Ueberweg that an argument which is put forward in the Parmenides against the tenability of the ideal theory is Read 132 A-B.

Index Aristotelici
cūs sub voc.

simply an adaptation of what is called the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* confutation employed by Aristotle, and must therefore have been employed by some forger who had read Aristotle—not by Plato. In Bonitz we find the following cases in which Aristotle makes use of or refers to this argument.

Met. i. 9, 990 b
17.

(1) "Ἐτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων (*i.e.* of those in which *τὰ εἴδη* are maintained) οἱ μὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιουσιν ιδέας, ὃν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν.

Met. xii. 4, 1079 a
13.

(2) Which we place next as a mere repetition of the previous one—"Ἐτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστατοι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιουσιν ιδέας, ὃν οὐ φασιν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τ. τ. ἀ. λ.

Met. vi. 13,
1039 a 3.

(3) "Ολως δὲ συμβαίνει, εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ δσα οὕτω λέγεται, μηθὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἶναι μηθενὸς οὐσίαν, μηδὲ χωρὶς ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν μηδὲν ἐν ἄλλῳ, λέγω δὲ οἷον οὐκ εἶναι τι ζῶν παρὰ τὰ τινά, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐθέν. Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερὸν ὅτι οὐθὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἔστι, καὶ ὅτι οὐθὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῆς κατηγορούμενων τόδε τι, ἄλλα τοιόνδε. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ συμβαίνει καὶ ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.

Met. x. 1, 1059 b
2.

(4) Τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον. "Ομως δὲ ἀπορίαν ἔχει, κανεν εἶναι τις αὐτὰ θῆ, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐχ ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, οὗτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃν ἔστιν εἴδη. Λέγω δὲ ὅτι τὰ μαθηματικὰ μὲν μεταξύ τε τῶν εἰδῶν τιθέασι καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οἷον τρίτα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τε καὶ τὰ δεῦρο τρίτος δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἵππος παρ' αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἔκαστον.

Sophist. Elench.
22, 278 b 36.

(5) "Ἐτι δὲ καὶ οἵτι εἰσὶ τούτων τῶν λόγων—namely, among others—Καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις τρίτος ἄνθρωπος παρ' αὐτὸν (*i.e.* the idea) καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἔκαστον. This he goes on to interpret.

(6) Alexander commenting upon (1) says, after illustrating how the argument may be conducted, τῇ μὲν οὖν πρώτῃ τοῦ τ. ἀ. ἔξηγήσει ἄλλοι τε κέχρηνται καὶ Εὔδημος σαφῶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ λέξεως, τῇ δὲ τελευταίᾳ αὐτὸς (*i.e.* Aristotle) ἐν τε τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ιδεῶν καὶ ἐν τούτῳ (Met. I.) μετ' ὀλίγον.

Now by any one looking over these passages it will probably be admitted that we have not discovered the origin of the name. The fourth is the only one in which Aristotle speaks in terms which look as if he were making use of the name or the argument for the first time; yet he can hardly be doing so, for this is in the tenth Book, and we see that it already appears in the first and sixth. And in these (we may bracket I. and XII.) he speaks of 'the' τ. ἀ. as of a method of reasoning well known, while in (5) he refers to it as being used quite commonly in a sophistical manner; and finally Alexander says it was used by others as well as by Aristotle. Perhaps however Alexander, in saying it was used by others, is simply adopting the language of the passage (1) on which he is commenting. It is hard to understand how anyone reading Met. I. 9 could assume that the argument called τ. ἀ. originated with Aristotle. It is an argument of general bearing, to which a particular application has given a pithy name. The name may be due to Aristotle, although his existing works seem to give no proof that it is; but of the thing he expressly declares ἔτι δὲ

οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων... τὸν τρίτον ἀνθρωπον λέγοντιν. True, the use of the argument in the Parmenides is a use with the eyes open to its consequences—not a use which is unconsciously self-destructive, and the destructiveness of which is left for Aristotle to point out. But Aristotle says nothing which should render that an objection; and, as we shall presently see, it applies to other works besides the Parmenides. Accordingly we may meet Ueberweg's objection thus:

a. If the *τ. ἀ.* argument occurs in the Parmenides it does not follow that it was derived from Aristotle, since he speaks of that argument as known independently of him.

β. We might even, as has been hinted above, find in the words *οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων* the missing reference of Aristotle to the Parmenides—certainly no more correct description of the dialogue could be given than these words convey; and Dr. Jackson holds that there is no doubt upon the matter. In connection with the expression used by Aristotle it may perhaps be interesting to quote from the dialogue^{P. 255.} the following phrases: *πολὺ αὐτὸν (τὸ γένος ἐπιστήμης) ἀκριβέστερον, ... ἀκριβεστάτην 132 A-B.* *ἐπιστήμην ... ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία ... ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη.* In other respects also the Parmenides meets the case. Aristotle declares that these *λόγοι* of which he is speaking acknowledge the existence of ideas *τῶν πρός τι*, and the definition given of *πρός τι* in the Categories enables us to determine that the ideas of *δμοιότης, μέγεθος, δεσποτεία, στάσις* and *κίνησις*, of which this dialogue speaks, are all ideas of that class.

γ. But we may go further: if the Parmenides contains the argument in question so does the Republic. Plato is arguing about the construction of *κλῖναι* by God and^{x. 597 c.} says, *δύο δὲ τουάται ή πλείους οὔτε ἐφυτεύθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ φυῶσιν ... Οτι ... εἰ δύο μόνας ποιήσει, πάλιν ἀν μία ἀναφανείη, ης ἐκεῖναι ἀν αὐτὸν ἀμφότεραι τὸ εἶδος ἔχοιεν, καὶ εἴη ἀν δὲ ἔστι κλίνη ἐκείνη, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ δύο.* So likewise in the Timaeus^{Tim. 31 A.} *à propos* of the question whether there are several heavens or one—*εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται* there must be but one, *τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα, ὅπόσα νοητὰ ξῶα, μεθ' ἔτερον δεύτερον οὐκ ἀν ποτ' εἴη πάλιν γὰρ ἀν ἔτερον εἶναι τὸ περὶ ἐκείνω δέοι ξῶον, οὐ μέρος ἀν εἴτην ἐκείνω, καὶ οὐκ ἀν εἴτι ἐκείνουιν ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ περιέχοντι τόδ' ἀν ἀφωμοιωμένον λέγοιτο ὁρθότερον.* Here, as before, the argument is weakened by repetition. We might surrender the Parmenides; are we to give up the Republic or Timaeus with it? Fortunately it is not incumbent on us to do so. Already a clear reference to each of them from Aristotle as genuine has been cited, and they stand at^{p. vi. above.} the head of Ueberweg's list as being more frequently and clearly referred to by Aristotle than any other Platonic works. And if they stand, then, so far as this argument is concerned, the Parmenides may stand with them.

Admitting, however, that the work is not proved to be of a date more recent^{Could Plato have written it?} than Aristotle, scholars still maintain on various grounds that it at least could not have been written by Plato. Thus Socher, as Stallbaum points out, considers the work spurious on the ground that while it treats of a subject eminently Platonic, it does so in a trenchantly destructive spirit. "So derb geht doch wohl kein Schriftsteller sich selbst zu Leibe!" (Socher). This is a plausible argument. To anyone who

seeks to arrange the works of Plato so as to give a complete and self-consistent scheme of philosophic reasoning, a criticism such as he is here found directing against the basis of his system cannot but cause some embarrassment. And Stallbaum's explanation of the difficulty must be regarded as unsatisfactory. According to him Plato here criticises not the actual theory of ideas but merely something which to an inattentive reader might be mistaken for it. But that Plato should allow views so like his own, yet not his, to appear as if rejected by himself, without clearly indicating their points of divergence, seems very improbable, and amounts almost to deliberate trifling with the convictions of those who were his pupils and devoted followers.

It may be pointed out that there is no exceptional keenness, nothing like *animus*, in the phraseology of the *Parmenides*. It is simply a discussion of the difficulties arising out of a theory of ideas, and an acknowledgment of their gravity. In the *Theaetetus* Plato exhibits as untenable every definition of knowledge; yet he believed in knowledge and in knowledge of ideas. In such a case we must take account of the mental detachment, the humorous sense of self-depreciation, which shows itself at intervals in all Plato's writings. We hear of the irony of Socrates; and no doubt much that Plato writes is written artistically in character. But his artistic success arises largely from personal sympathy with the feeling delineated. Moreover he had a remarkably developed dialectical faculty, and no thinker so gifted could reach middle life without being forcibly impressed by the conviction that in the last resort metaphysical questions must be dropped with a sigh, rather than argumentatively set

Works of T. H. Green, III. cxxvi. at rest. 'I thought,' says Prof. Green, an earnest metaphysician if ever one existed, 'I had got hold of a key which I find now will not unlock so much as I fancied it would.' And just as Socrates in the course of conversation playfully made light of his own knowledge, so Plato, when impressed by a sense of metaphysical failure, gives this feeling from time to time ample but also playful expression. If, on the other hand, conviction is strong within him it asserts itself by rising above conscious defects of argument in great declamatory bursts—'I know that my redeemer liveth'—

Plato etc., ii. pp. 393-4 on Theaet. or again by taking refuge in the dogmatism of a professor. As Grote says, 'Plato is occasionally, abundant in his affirmations: he has also great negative fertility in starting objections: but the affirmative current does not come into conflict with the negative. His belief is enforced by rhetorical fervour, poetical illustration, and a vivid emotional fancy. These elements stand to him in the place of positive proof; and when his mind is full of them, the unsolved objections, which he himself had stated elsewhere, vanish out of sight. Towards the close of his life (as we shall see in the Treatise *De Legibus*), the love of dialectic, and the taste for enunciating difficulties even when he could not clear them up, died out within him. He becomes ultradogmatical, losing even the poetical richness and fervour which had once marked his affirmations, and substituting in their place a strict and compulsory orthodoxy.' And what is here truly said of Plato's life and speculation as a whole is equally applicable to any dialogue wherein destructive criticism is followed by a constructive

effort. When the latter begins the drama ceases, and the conversation becomes as uninteresting as a catechism. Drop the questions from the catechism of the Westminster Divines and you leave a treatise: omit the answers from the latter portions of the Republic or Parmenides and you have a treatise likewise. Nor must we overlook the fact that while Plato's interest in philosophy was undoubtedly profound, his feeling for and delight in literary expression was a keen rival to it, and perhaps from time to time even took control of the argument. This may be called an external way of putting the case, and it may be urged that in Plato the form is the necessary counterpart of the matter, that the two compose an organism which cannot be severed into its elements. It is doubtful whether this alters the question very much. Philosophic enunciation in early times, partly from its fragmentary and inspired character, partly from the undeveloped state of prose composition, was either aphoristic or poetical. Its next form, during the generation prior to Plato, became in the main that of the dialogue. Plato with his great natural genius had almost no philosophic reading except verse, and for years witnessed the dialogue in the most picturesque and lively operation. The result in his hands was a sort of poetic apotheosis of the dialogue. Yet, soon afterwards, this form of expression ceased from the domain of speculation. That Plato was not straining his convictions when he claimed that dialogue, and even spoken dialogue, was the only true vehicle for speculation we may quite believe. But, on the other hand, Plato we can imagine was sometimes quite aware of his ability to write dialogue, and occasionally, as we cannot but think, must have felt dialogue an artificial encumbrance. At times dialogue runs away with him. At times again he gives us not dialogue but a narrative of dialogue at second, third, or even fourth hand. If at such times his expression is the essential clothing of his thought then at such times his thought must have been itself rather artificial. Let us be frank on this matter. The difficulty that is found in arranging his works may in part be due to the fact that he lectured constantly but published only portions of his views. That, however, does not meet the whole case. Professors do not usually give to the world of their worst. As a rule they publish what has been most carefully matured and has produced in their experience the deepest impression, perhaps even what old pupils urge them to put in a permanent form. Plato may not have done this; but assuredly he was no child in authorship. His works are voluminous, of brilliant ability, and carefully polished. Yet while he is often as detailed as any philosopher who ever lived, and while his works give much more than mere fragments of his views, he has seen fit to leave his writings to the world as if they were in the main mere detached and fortuitous conversations between groups of persons whom accident threw together. Socrates conversed at random. Granted: but Plato was not conversing. Yet his works are in such a state of mutual detachment, that it needs a cumbersome literary finesse in order to allude to one in the other, and after all we are left in doubt which is the referring dialogue and which the object of the reference. Surely if we are

now at issue about the order of his writings and the growth of his views, this is, at least in part, but the penalty justly incurred by Plato the philosopher to Plato the literary man. It is not meant that he was often or consciously sophistical; but it is meant that he was not infrequently artificial. Carlyle in like manner, though pronounced to be ‘terribly in earnest,’ had a very artificial habit of omitting to specify the persons whose views he was controverting, and of affecting to quote from Sauerteig and Our earnest friend. Leaving this slightly uncongenial argument on one side, then, and accepting Plato as also ‘in earnest,’

Boswell, by Hill, although Johnson does not admit that in regard to Greek thinkers, we have still to
iii. 20.

remember that his works do not represent even to his own mind an elaborate ‘system of reasoned truth,’ in which every step is a logical necessity logically made good, where there are no defects and no excrescences, known or unknown to the author, and where the end is clearly in view from the beginning: but that rather they exemplify the lifelong growth of a great mind, which had indeed a prevailing bias and aspiration, but little demonstrable certainty about systematic details, which was always feeling after the truth, yet often confessed that it had failed to find it, which sometimes contradicted itself, sometimes ironically gave up its quest, and sometimes under new circumstances lost faith in old conclusions, which was as much sceptical as it was dogmatic, which was influenced by literary as well as philosophic impulses; but which always strove to be found ‘on the side of the angels.’ It is a truism to say that no theory of the universe has yet met all objections. Plato might well be sensible that objections could be raised to his, yet cling to it as still on the whole the best; nay, even as an anchor of his soul, although entering into that which was

Mod. Paint. IV.
xii.

within the veil. ‘Behold the cloud,’ and again ‘behold the cloud,’ says Ruskin when called on to explain the ultimate character of geological forces; but he does not therefore dispute the reality of their action. ‘The true eye for talent presupposes

Past and Present,
Bk. I. v. 40.

the true reverence for it—O Heavens, presupposes so many things!’ exclaims Carlyle; yet he does not therefore cease to hold that heroes are to be found, and therefore to be sought. We do not then admit that the Parmenides is spurious because it controverts doctrines elsewhere urged by Plato; on the contrary we conclude by citing, in addition to the Theaetetus, other passages indicating a similar tone of mind. In

pp. 246-48.

the Sophistes, he contrasts materialists with idealists as two opposing schools, each of which is extreme—the latter *μάλα εὐλαβώς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται* (against the former), *νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι*. He certainly calls them *ήμερώτεροι* than their opponents; yet all along he speaks of them critically as from without. Nevertheless, the soundest explanation of the passage is, that he is criticising his own views. The same thing recurs

Phaedo, 100-101.

in the Politicus. Again, in the Phaedo he clearly shows that his arguments in favour of the ideas have not laid his doubts to rest. Having already had occasion to quote the striking language in which he there admits his speculative anxieties, we need cite here only the closing words—*οὐ γὰρ ἔπι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι*

τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά ... Τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφῆς ἀν χαιρειν, παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδώς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκιάν, καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἔχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὐτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν: and so on. Hereafter we shall discuss in more detail the relation in which the self-criticism of the Parmenides stands to Plato's system as a whole. Apart from this difficulty, there appears to be no good reason of an internal character for doubting the authenticity of the work. It is a philosophical discussion bearing upon a subject intimately associated with Plato's name. In point of importance and character, it is eminently worthy of his reputation. Nor is this a small matter: we can imagine an inferior writer trying to gain currency for a second rate work by assigning it to a great author, but who that could rival Plato would consent to remain unknown? As Mr. Jowett says: 'Shorter works are more likely to have been forged than longer ones ... while, perhaps, there is no instance of an ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines great excellence with considerable length. A really great writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the "literary hack" of Alexandria or Athens, the Gods did not grant original genius.' Again, it is in Plato's style, by which are meant several things. Not only is it a dialogue—and no philosophic dialogues have come down to us with any name but Plato's—the type of dialogue likewise, and the characters, are Platonic. It begins in a lively dramatic fashion, such as might be paralleled in many of his works, then, when the theme proper has been introduced, the dramatic character, as was said above, becomes subordinate and ceases to be an essential feature of the composition. So in the Republic; when preliminaries are settled, and constructive work begins, what importance have the answers of Glauco or Adimantus? They simply confirm Socrates, give him an opportunity for restating an argument, save the work from being a mere treatise, and furnish the chief speaker with an ἀνάπαντα. Such is the service done by Aristoteles in the Parmenides. Even the artificiality of the narrative may be made an argument in its favour. An imitator would hardly be likely to make his work a report of a report of a report.

Plato, 2nd Edit.,
vol. ii. pp. 413-15.

Having now dealt with most of the objections which are raised, let us conclude Does Plato elsewhere refer to it? by asking whether there are any traces in Plato's other works of a reference to the Parmenides. Such references can, as we have seen, be only indirect. Bearing that fact in mind we may place side by side the following passages:—

PHILEBUS, 14C-15.

Σ. Τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ... τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν. ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ράδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι. Π. Ἀρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ, Πρώταρχον, ἔνα γεγονότα φύσει,

d

PARMENIDES, 129.

Σ. Οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸς εἰδός τι δόμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὐτῷ ὅλῳ τι ἐναντίον, δέστιν ἀνόμοιον ... εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὅντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ ἀντοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; ... ἀλλ' εἰ δέ

πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος ... τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία; Σ. Σὺ μὲν ... εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημεύμενά τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά ... ὅταν τις ἑκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ—.... Π. Σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα ... ἔτερα λέγεις ...; Σ. Ὁπόταν, ὡς παῖ, τὸ ἐν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται ... ὅταν δέ τις ἔνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τιθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἔνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων ... ἡ πολλὴ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται. ΙΙ. Πῶς; Σ. Πρῶτον μὲν ἔι τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὕσας· εἰτα πῶς αὖτας μίαν ἑκάστην οὗσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ... δύμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖτας καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονοῦντα θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρὶς, δὴ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνονται ἄν, ταύτον καὶ ἐν ἄμα ἐνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι To this might perhaps be added Sophist. 251.

What does the reader think here? Zeller holds that we have a reference directly designed. 'I have already supported this in my Platon. Stud. 194, by the argument that the first part of the Parmenides is as good as directly cited in the Philebus, and this reason I still think is quite valid. Schaarschmidt (Sammel. d. plat. Schr. 277) also agrees with me; he, however, makes use of this supposition in a different direction'—to discredit both dialogues.

Again, turning to the Phaedo we may make a further comparison:

PHAEDO, 102 B.

Καὶ ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τὰλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν... ἢ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαιδρος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; ... οὐ γάρ πον πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίᾳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει δὲ τυγχάνει ἔχων.

PARMENIDES, 130 E.

Δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἶναι εἰδη ἄττα ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαβόντα δύμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα ... γίγνεσθαι. See also the previous quotation.

Under Plato's somewhat affected literary assumption, that the Philebus, the Phaedo, and the Parmenides are all independent colloquies between different groups of persons, could references from one to the other be more direct than these are; does not the wording seem to indicate that the reference is designed? There are but two more quotations of this nature that need detain us:—

THEAETETUS 183 E.

Σ. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὄμήρου, αἰδοῖός τε μοι ἄμα δεινός τε. συμπροσέμιξα γάρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γεννάδον.

SOPHISTES, 217 C.

Σ. Πότερον εἴωθας ἥδιον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξέναι λέγων τοῦτο, ὃ ἀν ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ βουληθῆσθαι, ἢ δί' ἑρωτήσεων, οἶνον ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὦν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὅντος πρεσβύτου; also 237 A.

The parallel could hardly be more complete.

On the question of authenticity, then, our argument may be summed up thus:

1. There is good ground for believing that this dialogue existed, and was accepted as genuine, in the arrangement of Plato's works made by Aristophanes of Byzantium. Nor does any scholar in antiquity raise an objection to it.

2. While it cannot be proved that Aristotle names the Parmenides, it seems at least very probable that the arguments of the dialogue are controverted by him; and they appear to bear internal evidence of priority when compared with his works.

3. There is no reason to doubt the Platonic character of the views and language which the work exhibits, and there is strong reason to believe that Plato alludes to this dialogue in other portions of his writings which are admitted to be genuine.

II.

WHEN we pass from the sufficiently complex problem of authenticity to consider the SEQUENCE OF THE WORK. position which the work is to hold in the series of Plato's writings, the first difficulty is to conquer a feeling akin to despair. What can we say upon this question? What has not been already said? Are we to be launched upon that *πολὺ πέλαγος* the task of ordering Plato's collective works? Ήῶς χρὴ διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος

PARMENIDES, 127 B.

Τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι σφόδρα πολιόν, καλὸν δὲ κάγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα· ... Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον.

137.

Π. Κάγω μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι, πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὅντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος λόγων· ... Τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἵκιστα γάρ ἀν πολυπραγμοῖ, καὶ ἡ οὔεται μάλιστ' ἀν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἄμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλ' ἀν εἴη ἡ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις.

127 D.

$\lambda\circ\gamma\omega\nu$; At the outset we are troubled by the consciousness that a work whose authenticity has been gravely questioned is not likely to have its date or sequence very clearly defined. We know, indeed, that it was written after 403 B.C., since the narrator describes Aristoteles, one of the interlocutors, as $\tau\circ\nu\tau\hat{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\tau\pi\acute{a}kou\tau\alpha\tau\gamma\epsilon\nu\mu\epsilon\nu\nu$. And as Cephalus does not mention any attempt to get from Socrates personally a verification of details—a circumstance with which the opening of the Theaetetus may be contrasted—we are left to infer that Socrates was dead. This, however, does not carry us far. Every one would be prepared to assume that the work was of later date than 399 B.C. The field for speculation being thus unrestricted, we have such a crop of theories that even their enumeration would fatigue. To take representative cases: Schleiermacher regards the Parmenides as a rude, unfinished effort of Plato's youth; Zeller holds it to be the 'Philosopher' dialogue which is promised as a sequel to the Sophist and Statesman; while, in a series of articles already referred to, Dr. Jackson contends that it must be placed extremely late, as embodying its author's final views on the ideal theory. Each of these scholars has his following, while other writers adduce reasons for choosing intermediate dates. The disturbing feature in the case is that, as Henry Esmond puts it, 'each has a story in a dispute, and a true one, too, and both are right or wrong as you will.' The various conclusions rest mainly on one or other of three argumentative foundations—that of the style and language of the dialogue, that of what may be called its scenery or setting, and that of its philosophic contents.

Arguments from
Style.

I. It is pointed out that the form of the dialogue is artificial—that of a conversation reported at fourth hand; and the inference drawn is that it is later than those which are more direct and natural; indeed one of the latest of all, inasmuch as there are none whose form deviates more from that of simple dramatic treatment. Well, the 'fourth hand' may by possibility indicate that Plato does not wish to be committed to the historic accuracy of the details, or seeks to give the work the air of an echo from the past, but it gives little clue to the date. The Symposium is at third, the Republic at second, and the Timaeus at first hand: we need say no more. Nay, one might rather ask, would an old man endure the constraint involved in writing large part of a work in complicated *oratio obliqua*? Again, regard may be directed to style in a stricter sense. It is maintained that as a youthful style is revealed by immaturity and stiffness, or by crude exuberance of language, and by the placing of pictorial and dramatic vividness in the foreground, the Parmenides could not be a youthful work, but might rather, from its command over language, coupled with its comparative indifference to pictorial display, be ranked among the later writings—an elderly man ceasing to think of style and attending more to substance. But answer is plausibly made that Plato is here adopting for the time the style of Zeno and the Megarians, with whose views he is dealing. Independently of that, arguments from style need tender handling. Up to at least middle life a man's mode of writing may vary pretty widely through mere temporary causes, or in conformity with varying subject matter, without any inference about age being worth serious consideration. Even the discovery

that greater conformity to scientific method is to be found, as compared with the freedom of conversational discourse, is no necessary proof of age. It testifies to the mood of the author's mind, if to anything, or may even be explained by the greater or less connection of a given work with Plato's professorial instruction at the Academy.

A further step is taken when vocabulary and turns of expression are put to the proof. Professor Campbell has gone with some minuteness into the question of vocabulary in Plato's writings. He treats the Timaeus, Critias, and Laws as admittedly late, and tests the other works by comparison with these. As a result he gives for each 'approximately the numerical ratios ... according to the number of words at once common and peculiar to each with' the works just named. In this list the dialogue which stands nearest to the three is the Politicus, with a ratio of $1\frac{3}{11}$. The Parmenides, with $\frac{1}{2}$, ranks very low, having, besides others, the Cratylus, Protagoras, Theaetetus, Philebus, Symposium, Phaedo, Republic, Sophistes, Phaedrus, and Politicus, in that order above it. But when we perceive that the only works which are apparently less associated than our own with the three latest are the Charmides, Alcibiades I., and the Meno, while the Laches and Lysis are about one-half nearer, we are constrained to conclude that the list contributes little which can be of service to us. Indeed, it is difficult even to weigh the significance of the evidence. Are we to assume that Plato began authorship with a minimum of unusual terms and gradually advanced to a maximum? Clearly the subject matter would fall to be considered. Professor Campbell himself admits that 'the position of the Parmenides in this list, like that of the Phaedrus, is partly accounted for by exceptional circumstances.' But by what circumstances?

Another attempt in the same direction is that of W. Dittenberger of Halle, who, after a few separate objections to the authenticity of our dialogue on linguistic grounds, which are referred to in the notes, seems inclined to regard it as doubtful upon a comparison of the use of a series of characteristic phrases—*καὶ μήν, ἀλλά μήν, τέ μήν; γε μήν*, and others—in the various works of Plato. The result of his investigation is to throw the works into two great groups—an earlier, with few signs of these expressions; and a later in two divisions, with many. (It ought to be said that, besides rejecting ten dialogues in addition to the spurious seven, he excludes from comparison such as contain small proportions of conversation.) The Parmenides stands in the later division of the second group along with the Philebus, Sophistes, Politicus, and Laws, and is very heavily weighted for its size. He follows the inquiry up in other directions with much ingenuity and learning. One result which arrests the attention of a reader is that the Phaedo stands in the earliest group, while the Lysis forms, with the Symposium, Phaedrus, Republic, and Theaetetus, the first division of the later. The argument has been criticised by A. Frederking, who shows that by dealing with the subject in more minute detail, while employing the same materials, individual books of the Republic and Laws may be made to stand in different groups. Further, by taking account of the isolated use of the particle *τέ*—in such phrases as *σὸν τῶνδε τέ*

Sophistes and
Politicus, Gene-
ral Introd. §§ 6-7.

Hermes, xvi.,
321, 1891.

Fleckeisen,
Jahrbücher, No.
125, p. 534, 1882.

ἔργον—he succeeds in placing the Parmenides, which has but few cases, in a very early position, while he makes the Phaedrus almost take rank with the Timaeus. A distinction of Frederking's between *εἰπον* and *ἔφην* is discussed in the notes. With results so conflicting to deal with, it must appear to most readers that the treatment of statistics in language, as in other fields, requires extreme caution, and has not thus far afforded much assistance towards the solution of the question under discussion.

Arguments from
dramatic Setting.

2. Of the argument from scenery or setting one branch is that which deals with the position assigned to Socrates in the several dialogues. It is contended that Socrates has a more prominent rôle in the earlier works, or rather that those works in which he plays such a part are earlier; while his presence tends to become less and less important as Plato's memory of him is effaced by time and by original development. Undoubtedly this seems a reasonable contention, and one in harmony with what would independently appear to be the proper order of many dialogues. But here likewise the question of subject matter might well influence Plato's action. In any case the position of the Parmenides in regard to the argument is peculiar. Socrates does not, indeed, occupy the foremost place throughout, but he does hold that position during the very important introductory part, while he is referred to by no means as a thinker whose period had gone by, but rather as one for whom great things were still in store.

An interesting train of inference, which deals with the Parmenides alone, is based upon consideration of the time which may be assumed to have passed between the various stages suggested to us in the construction of the dialogue—between the original conversation, that is, and the narrative of this by Cephalus, which constitutes the dialogue as we have it. This estimate of time may be viewed either, with Steinhardt, from the final point backward, as suggesting that Plato seeks to make us 'look far back into other years'; or, with Ueberweg, from the starting point forward, as involving a late date for the composition of the work. As Plato might at any period in his literary life feel the boyhood of Socrates to be remote from himself, it is clear that only the latter form of the inference has much practical bearing on our present inquiry. Ueberweg reasons thus. The point of departure is the original conversation, which, on the assumption that Socrates was twenty-five at the time, must have occurred in 446-5 B.C. This point we shall hereafter see reason for placing as early, at least, as 451 B.C. Then comes the period which comprised the repeated rehearsals of the conversation by Pythodorus to Antiphon, until the latter had committed it to memory. Conjecture alone can determine the length of this interval, and Ueberweg makes no estimate of it beyond suggesting that it must be considerable. It seems unlikely that it could exceed half a century; for Pythodorus had been the host of Parmenides, so that he might have been thirty or so at the time, and fifty years more would make him an old man. This, then, may bring us to 400 B.C. Next comes the narrative by Antiphon to Cephalus and his Clazomenian friends, which, as we have seen, Ueberweg places later than 399 B.C. from the circumstance that Cephalus does not think of going

Untersuchungen,
222-224.

direct to Socrates. Once more we have the interval which extends between that and the repetition of the narrative by Cephalus himself; and finally, says Ueberweg, the space elapsing between this last and the composition of the written work. He makes no attempt to fix the duration of either period, further than by saying that they cannot be very short, since to make them consist of one, or of a very few years 'wäre eine zu auffallende Ungleichmässigkeit' when compared with the preceding half-century. Accordingly he concludes for a 'very late date'—always assuming, which however he does not believe, that the work is genuine. This reasoning might convince, if the whole lapse of time involved were optional. But it is not. The period between the original conversation—if it ever occurred—and the death of Socrates is not subject to Plato's control. To say, therefore, that the remaining intervals must be conceived upon a corresponding scale is tantamount to saying that Plato is by some overmastering necessity forbidden to make allusion in the framework of a dialogue to such an (assumed) historic event until time has passed sufficient to form a second or third interval artistically proportioned to the first. Further, Ueberweg postulates that the narrative by Cephalus is one thing and the written dialogue another. But they purport to be the same—the narrative of Cephalus *is* the dialogue. The truth is that the period between the youth and the death of Socrates is a historical one, and one to which Plato is free to allude when and how he thinks fit. The facts before us are simple. Cephalus after 399 B.C. hears from Antipho a narrative which he on a subsequent occasion repeats, and this repetition constitutes our dialogue. That is the sum total of our information; and despite Ueberweg's ideas of proportion, 'nur eine oder ganz wenige Jahre' are sufficient to include it all. Once again, therefore, we are deprived of any authoritative basis for determining the date of which we are in search.

3. We have only the philosophic contents of the work to fall back upon, then, as a guide in our inquiry; and, alas, it precisely is from these contents that inferences so widely divergent as those of Schleiermacher, Zeller, and Jackson have been drawn. Of the first of these, the author of which seems to have been governed by procrustian theories about the order of Plato's works, it will be enough to say with Stallbaum—'neque enim Schleiermacheri iudicio licet acquiescere, qui eum (the Parmen. Introd. dialogue) a juvene Platone paullo ante Socratis obitum vel non ita multo post^{289.} (though this is a question of degree) scriptum esse statuit, adeoque habuit pro opere paene rudi et tantummodo inchoato.' The Parmenides certainly is not written by a mere beginner; and the probability is that it is later by several years than 399 B.C. The authority of Zeller on Platonic questions is such that greater weight may perhaps be attached to his view, in the case before us, than intrinsically belongs to it. One may go a long way with him in associating the Parmenides with the subject matter of the Sophistes and Politicus; but to say that it is the 'Philosopher' dialogue promised in p. 217 of the former, and at the beginning of the latter, is a startling pronouncement. These two works are direct and avowed attempts to discover and define the Sophist and the Statesman respectively, and each receives its title

Arguments from
Contents.

Parm. 130 c-d.

from that circumstance. To this there is nothing analogous in the Parmenides. That Plato entertains a deep veneration for Parmenides as a philosopher is quite true; and that Parmenides is introduced discoursing of the discipline necessary to all philosophic progress, is equally so. But the method of the work differs fundamentally from that of the others, nor is any conclusion arrived at such as that to which each of them directly leads. If Plato meant this dialogue to be the promised Philosopher why should he not have said so, and coupled it as clearly with the Politicus as he does the latter with the Sophistes? In regard to subject matter one might almost as well pitch upon the Timaeus as the missing work. It is possible that our dialogue represents all that Plato ever wrote as a substitute for the Philosopher; but, if so, his plan has been altogether changed. With regard to the very suggestive argument of Dr. Jackson, in which he views the Parmenides as an exposition of Plato's final and much modified views, it seems to rest in large measure upon a misunderstanding. It assumes that Socrates had held at one time that there were ideas for 'man, fire, water,' and even for 'hair, mud, filth,' just as there were ideas for 'one, like, good'; but that he had now renounced this hypothesis, and even fled from it as from destruction. The Republic and Phaedo are taken as examples of the views renounced, and the conclusion is drawn that the Parmenides must be a late work. Surely this perverts the sense of the passage appealed to? Socrates in answer to Parmenides describes, not a past and discarded hypothesis, but a present belief. Parmenides tells him that by and by, when he grows older and becomes less sensitive to criticism, he will not be afraid to entertain the thought of ideas for even the most undignified objects—that he will learn to call nothing common or unclean. And this state of mind, predicted as in store for Socrates, is the one which the Republic and Phaedo exemplify; so that these works are later, if not necessarily than the dialogue as a whole, at least than the state of mind depicted in the passage upon which Dr. Jackson relies. He pushes his contention even further, however, maintaining that while the Phaedo reveals no sense of a difficulty about the nature of $\muέθεξις$, or the method according to which objects participate in the ideas, the Parmenides which forcibly presses that difficulty must on that ground be a later work. Is this really a possible contention in view of that remarkable passage in the Phaedo, already quoted above, which contains one of the most candid avowals in all Plato's writings, to the effect that, despite the almost overwhelming difficulty which surrounds the doctrine of $\muέθεξις$, he nevertheless despairingly clings to it $\acute{α}πλως καὶ \acute{α}τέχνως καὶ \acute{ι}σως εὐήθως?$

Phaedo, 100.

No observations upon Platonic chronology would be complete which failed to reckon with the arguments of Teichmüller in his 'Literary Feuds.' They are of a nature so striking, and are advanced with such confidence and ability, as to claim special and connected notice, in place of being distributed piecemeal under the various divisions which have just been engaging our attention. Dealing with Plato's writings as a whole, Teichmüller contends that they are for the most part directly contro-

Arguments of
Teichmüller.—
Literarische Feh-
den im vierten
Jahrhundert vor
Chr. Gustav
Teichmüller,
Breslau, 1881.

versial, and are to be dated chiefly from a consideration of the writings of men like Xenophon, Isocrates, and Lysias to which they refer, or which in turn refer to them. And such cross references he detects in abundance. On this point much that is of great interest is advanced which it would be impossible justly to controvert, or even to appraise, without a minute and extensive knowledge of the entire literature and literary history of the Platonic era. Such a knowledge we do not possess, and accordingly can only say that all allusions, or seeming allusions, of this nature are suggestive and captivating till we see those that make against the theory. An expert could doubtless collect such. Fortunately the Parmenides is not one of the works which Teichmüller has dealt with by this line of argument. Another point on which, theoretically—though, in the work before us, not practically—he lays much stress, as an internal evidence of date, is the progress which may be detected in Plato's views upon the question of *μεθεξις* or *παρουσία*. Undoubtedly this is a weighty subject; at the same time our author's conclusions in regard to it appear to be of a somewhat sanguine character. He seems to find in Plato's works a very complete and satisfying elaboration of the doctrine; a result not altogether in harmony with the language just quoted from the Phaedo, but certainly in accord with his own finding upon the philosophic position of Aristotle—to wit, that Aristotle derived most of his conceptions complete from Plato and other predecessors, and deserves credit chiefly for his power of methodizing what these thinkers had supplied. A cardinal feature in Teichmüller's argument is the use which he makes of the statement at the opening of the Theaetetus with regard to the composition of that work. The professed author of it, Euclid of Megara, says that he has purposely left out such phrases as *καγώ ἔφην*, *συνέφη*, *οὐχ ὠμολόγει*, and adds that he represents Socrates as actually conversing with Theaetetus and others, rather than as describing his conversation with them. This course is adopted *ἴνα ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις*, and it is represented as receiving the hearty assent of Terpsion. Here, says Teichmüller (following out to some extent, it would seem, a previous hint of Schleiermacher's), we see on Plato's part a new step in authorship. Till now he had followed the method of Socrates in giving his dialogues at second hand by means of *διήγησις*—conspicuous examples of the method being the Republic and Phaedo. Hereafter there may be some brief prefatory narrative of that kind, but the bulk of each work will purport to be a first hand reproduction of the discussion as it took place. The announcement of this intended change is put into the mouth of Euclid designedly, as an acknowledgement of indebtedness in the matter to the Megarian school. Accordingly we are to understand that as the Theaetetus is later than all such works as the Republic, so all works which follow its method are in turn later than it. Among those thus marked out as later stands the Parmenides, 'denn dass z. B. im Euthydem die Disputation erzählt, im Parmenides aber dramatisch behandelt wird, kann doch ein Jeder leicht bemerken.' The first thing which strikes one is that the author is disposed to use this argument in too uncom-

promising a manner. If taken as evidence of a fresh tendency in Plato's mind it may be welcomed. But if we are to accept as binding on us the idea that Plato, after so speaking in the Theaetetus, never could recede from the position thus taken up, we feel that much is expected of us. Plato might appropriate the language and doctrine of King Jamie—'We are a free King,' and not 'thirled' to any system involving mechanical uniformity of style. He was at liberty to write with variety, and to make dramatic apology, as he does in more places than one, for the tediousness of dry details. But granting the most conclusive force to this argument, even so the position of the Parmenides towards it, as towards some others, is exceptional. It is true that in the larger or second part of the dialogue the direct dramatic form is adopted, and that with no such preliminary warning as is given in the Theaetetus. But in the first part, which is nearly one third of the whole, and which consists of a very weighty and careful discussion of the ideal theory, not only are phrases such as 'said he' inserted, but they are inserted at third hand, so that they stand not in the indicative but in the infinitive mood—and, as one might say, in the second degree of that. Thus we have *τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὐ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι* and *οὕτω, φάναι τὸν Ζῆνωνα*. Nay, such and so embarrassing is the artificial character of the style that it sometimes fairly breaks down, and we have *καὶ πῶς ἄν, εἰπεν*, instead of *εἰπεῖν*, while every now and then the *εἰπεῖν* is involuntarily dropped, as in *ἴουκεν: τὸ ποῖον*; If, then, we are to place the Parmenides after the Theaetetus on this ground, we must assume that Plato's Socratic conscience, so to speak, is pricking him, and that he allays his qualms for abandoning his master's method by the penance of walking nearly a third of his prescribed journey with peas in his shoes. But, again, Teichmüller expressly accepts the mention made of Parmenides in the Sophistes as an allusion to the Parmenides dialogue. That being so, what is to be made of the allusion, equally specific, contained in the Theaetetus, and given at length in part I. above? The date of the Parmenides is not, however, discussed by Teichmüller in detail, as those of some other works are; all that we find are incidental allusions to the matter. Thus he holds that it precedes the Laws, and we have seen that he puts it before the Sophistes. Again, he dwells—as Ueberweg also does—upon the appearance of Aristoteles as an interlocutor, and is strongly disposed to assume that we have here an indirect but intentional allusion to the philosopher Aristotle. This leads to the inference that the work must be later than 367 B.C., when Aristotle became known to Plato; and that it was written about 365-65 B.C. With this is intended to accord his assumption that Plato refers to himself when he makes Parmenides plead age as a reason for excusing himself from entering upon a protracted argument. Such a view presents much that is attractive; and we must concede that *τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἀν ἔχοι τις ἐνδεξασθαι ὅτι ψεύσεται*. At the same time he weakens his case by going on to affirm that this is the work *περὶ ψυχῆς* from the reading of which by Plato all are said to have withdrawn except Aristotle. By common consent, and in accordance with the title, that work is assumed

183 F.
see p. xix.

ii. 24-5.

136 D-K.

to have been the Phaedo, a work which Teichmüller places relatively early in Plato's life. Again, as Plato was born about 427 B.C. his age at 366 B.C. would not be very advanced; at all events his activity in authorship lasted considerably longer—on Teichmüller's own showing, he had still to write at least the Sophistes, Politicus and Laws, or about a fourth of his collective works. It must be admitted, however, as a noticeable circumstance, that his age would not fall far short of that assigned to Parmenides in the dialogue. But the assumption that Aristotle is glanced at in the person of the young Aristoteles is surely open to great doubt. Aristoteles is declared to have been one of the thirty tyrants, and we know that Plato introduces more than one public character of that type into his writings—Critias, for example, and Alcibiades. If, then, it had not happened that Plato's greatest scholar proved to be likewise called Aristotle, should we have found anything to attract attention in this circumstance? Had Shakespeare survived till 1645—and he would not in that case have lived much longer than Plato—who would not have maintained, in discussing moot points in his works, that the famous words 'Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition!' had a very different reference from the ostensible one? Again, if Plato meant to refer to the philosopher here, he has not assigned him a very appropriate position. Socrates, although 'very young,' plays a part of great importance in the dialogue: but Aristoteles is a mere lay figure. He elicits nothing, he maintains nothing, he controverts nothing; but merely, by interjecting formal verbal replies, prevents the dialogue from becoming an essay. How Plato could treat a young man whom he viewed as giving promise of ability, we know from the Theaetetus and Charmides; and that is not how he treats Aristoteles. Nay, it would be a fair contention to affirm that he would not so have represented anyone called Aristoteles had he known the historic Aristotle at the time.

Another argument advanced by Teichmüller is the following, 'Ich erwähne hier ^{ii. 360.} noch, dass der Timaios . . . bei der Erörterung des Begriffs der Zeit eine spätere Untersuchung verspricht, die wir im Parmenides (151 E bis 157 B) vorfinden. Es folgt daraus von selbst die Priorität des Timaios?' The Timaeus gives a promise which the Parmenides fulfils, therefore the latter is the later work. If the premises hold the conclusion is uncontested. But we are entitled to expect that the promise given should be definite and the fulfilment reasonably to the point. The passage referred to in the Timaeus as pièce justificative is one in which, after a reference to Time in ^{38 B.} various relations, the remark is made *περὶ μὲν οὐν τούτων τάχ' ἀν οὐκ εἴη καιρὸς πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι.* This is all; and from this 'it follows of itself' that because time is discussed in the Parmenides that discussion is a fulfilment, the fulfilment, of the 'promise' made in the words just given. Surely a conclusion like this seems predetermined. And while inherently weak it has to overbear conflicting appearances of some weight. Plato has written much upon ethics and politics, and not a little upon physics and metaphysics: and if we are to take the Laws as his last utterance on the former, it seems at least as clear that the Timaeus

gives the furthest development of his views on the latter. It is one long, earnest, almost desperate attempt to elaborate *μέθεξις*, to bridge over the chasm between *εἰδον* and *αἰσθητὰ* which in the Parmenides is left yawning. Nor is this Teichmüller's only sanguine inference. He places the Phaedo, as we have seen, considerably earlier than the Parmenides. One of his arguments we have already given: here is another. Finding reason for considering the Symposium a comparatively early work he lays it down that the Phaedo follows closely upon it. Everyone will recall the inimitable humour with which the Symposium closes. All the other banqueters being 'under the table,' Socrates is left demonstrating to the almost insensible Agathon and Aristophanes that it is the function of the same poet to write both tragedy and comedy: they cannot follow him and drop asleep. Teichmüller regards this as a promise on Plato's part that as he had written a comedy in the Symposium he would supplement it by a tragedy; that tragedy is none other than the Phaedo, which accordingly we ought to place in the following year. While thus reading promises and specific statements into scraps of artistic by-play, he seems to treat very distinct declarations with but slight regard. The only specific indications which Plato personally supplies in reference to the sequence of his writings are those which mark the intimate connection between the Theaetetus, Sophistes, and Politicus on the one hand, and the Republic, Timaeus, and Critias on the other. These indications Teichmüller would appear to set almost entirely aside. No one who studies his arguments can fail to be impressed by their brilliancy and power, but his key 'will not unlock as many things as he thinks it will.'

Must our conclusion be, then, that no satisfactory data exist from which a reasonable estimate may be formed of the position which the Parmenides should occupy among Plato's writings? Some attempt must certainly be made to reach at least an approximate solution of the question: but the undertaking is entered upon in anything but a dogmatic spirit, and with a full consciousness of the conditions—*caedimus inque vicem praebemus crura sagittis*. To enter at this stage upon a detailed analysis of the dialogue would be to anticipate the natural order of inquiry. Some reference, however, to the contents of the work is indispensable to our present object.

The dialogue opens with a statement upon the ideal theory which is afterwards subjected to scrutiny. In connection with this opening statement it seems impossible to overlook the emphatic intimation of the youth of Socrates by which it is accompanied. He is described as 'extremely young,' and Parmenides treats him as a promising lad who at present is deterred, through boyish fear of established views, from accepting conclusions to which his reason seems to point, and who has, with youthful impetuosity, plunged into metaphysical speculation before passing through such a course of training as alone would fit him for the undertaking. It may, no doubt, be said that Socrates must be represented as young if any regard is to be paid to the assumed date of the meeting between him and Parmenides. But Plato

ii. 307-9.

Reasons which
should weigh
with us.

127 C.

128 E.

135 C-D.

was not tied down to such a method of dealing with the personality and doctrines of Parmenides: the method was of his own choosing. Further, as Socrates never held the views here ascribed to him, we are entitled in the youthful Socrates to perceive the youthful Plato, and to regard the opening statement of the dialogue as an intentional notification by Plato of the character of his own early theorizing upon metaphysical questions. It is consistent with this assumption that the only method urged here as a means of arriving at the conviction that ideas exist is the Socratic one, of generalization from the world of experience.^{132 A.} That was the path which had led Plato onward, and hence the present allusion to it. Again, while the ideas are treated as realities of some kind affecting our sensible sphere, the first attempt clearly to define their nature is that in which they are called *νοήματα* whose abode is ^{132 B.} οὐδαμοῦ ἀλλοθὶ ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς. Is not this a natural course for one to pursue who had just come from the school of 'general definitions' which Aristotle directly ascribes to Socrates—what could such definitions be but *νοήματα*? We have before us, in fact, *τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὄριξεσθαι καθόλου* as Aristotle describes them. And ^{Arist. Met. xi} when the writer, driven from this, goes on to exclaim that now he thinks he has the⁴ clue,—that the ideas are patterns set up in nature; we seem to find the decisive step taken which Aristotle proceeds to ascribe to 'those who first pronounced for the existence of ideas,' ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει, οὐδὲ τὸν ὄρισμούς οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἴδεας προστηγόρευσαν. Looking next to this first sketch of the ideal sphere we find its scope to be at once restricted and imperfectly defined. The speaker cannot bring himself to recognize the existence of ideas for physical objects, but only for abstract mental and moral conceptions; and even these exist confusedly, without being dominated by any regulative principle. Here the new doctrine stands forth just such as it might have sprung from the unsystematic moral speculations of the historic Socrates. This then, while not the point finally reached in the dialogue, is the condition of things with which the dialogue goes on to deal; and may be described as a somewhat hasty and crude *χωρισμός* of the results reached in the Socratic speculation. It is the treatment which this opening statement receives, to which, if to anything, we must look for assistance in determining the problem before us. Thus far all that we have gathered is that Plato's early views were of a certain character, while we may infer from what follows that they had been exposed to some public criticism.

I. The first comment which Parmenides, or Plato in his person, makes upon the theory put before him, and he makes it indirectly in passing, is that it is incomplete. He implies that it might have been expected to include and account for physical objects, as well as moral or intellectual conceptions; that it will not be complete until it does include such objects, even the most insignificant of them; and that he looks forward to a time when Socrates will so far gain the victory over his boyish aversion as to make that important stride in speculation. If this is a just interpretation to put upon the language of the text it would seem to follow that the^{130 A.E.}

dialogue can at least be no later than any of those in which ideas for physical objects are accepted by Socrates. Were we to push the argument to its utmost we might even infer that the Parmenides is prior to all such dialogues, inasmuch as it looks forward to a consummation which they embody; and it is obvious that if it be later than none of them it must of necessity be prior to the majority of them. Now all students of Plato's works are aware that those ideas are accepted without hesitation in such works as the Cratylus, Republic and Phaedo. In the Cratylus we have

Cratylus, 387 etc. ὁ ἔστιν ὄνομα, κέρκις, τρύπανον, ὕφασμα, so that even objects of art and manufacture are included, which the human maker fashions πρὸς τὸ εἶδος βλέπων. In the Republic occur among others the well known cases of the κλίνη and τράπεζα; and in the Phaedo repeated reference is made to ideas for various physical objects.

Rep. x. 596.
Phaedo, 65 D,
74-78, 100-106.

2. Nothing could be more abrupt than the severance which Parmenides and Socrates agree to recognize between the ideas and the world of sense. You may be led by generalization to approach gradually towards the conception of the idea; but when you find it you also find that between you and it there is a great gulf fixed. Nor is there so much as a hint of difference in this particular between one idea and another. Here is the sensible sphere, yonder is the ideal; even God cannot bridge the chasm that yawns between them. All the satisfaction vouchsafed to us in these circumstances is the admission that such a conclusion does appear to be paradoxical, and that it will need extreme skill to deal with that and similar difficulties. It does not seem an unfair inference to assume that on this point Plato was still unprovided with a definite theory, and that any dialogue in which a positive attempt is made to deal with the problem is later than the Parmenides. This would include all dialogues

Parm. 133-135 c.

Phaedo, 72-76.
Phaedrus, 249 c.
Meno, 81 c-82.

which discuss or accept the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις—for example the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Meno: possibly also those that speak of 'divine madness,' as the Phaedrus and Symposium. It would include the simile of the cave in the Republic, and all those attempts to construct a sort of Jacob's ladder, or graded means of descent from the higher sphere to the lower. Such attempts are to be found in the divided line of the Republic, the construction of ὑπόθεσις above ὑπόθεσις in the Phaedo, and the declaration in the Philebus that we must not proceed at once from the one to the unlimited πρὸς ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδη τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνός—whatever this description may be held to mean.

3. Neither in the opening sketch nor in the criticism brought to bear upon it is there any serious attempt to introduce gradation or method into the ideal sphere. The nearest approach to that is to be found in the various groups into which Parmenides throws the ideas in questioning Socrates; and between the two groups which the latter accepts the rationale of the distinction is not very obvious. Once more, then, it would seem a fair argument to maintain that the setting up of one or more dominant or master ideas must indicate a speculative advance in the theory. Now, even granting, which is doubtful, that the 'one' of this dialogue is designed as such a master idea, it would still seem that the ἀγαθὸν of the Republic and the small group of dominant

ideas—*δν, στάσις, κίνησις, ταντόν, θάτερον*—dwelt upon in the Sophistes, are much clearer cases of an attempt in that direction.

4. Near the beginning of the Parmenides we have an earnest wish expressed by Socrates to see the process ‘mingle, mingle, mingle,’ which prevails in the sensible sphere, made applicable to the ideal. Yet in throwing out such a suggestion there is not even a whisper of the restriction ‘ye that mingle may’—the expression rather is *τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην*. Nor is any such restriction enforced in the later progress of the argument. It does not appear unnatural to contend that works in which a discrimination on this point is revealed, in which distinctions are drawn between ideas that admit communion and those that reject it, indicate a later stage in the evolution of Plato's views. Here again the Phaedo and Sophistes are at once recalled to mind.

5. The type of argument which we have just been using may be developed somewhat further. We have above seen some reason to assume that the difference between any given conception in Aristotle and the corresponding one in Plato is largely a question of greater clearness, definiteness, precision. The view of Aristotle is in ‘precipitate’ what the view of Plato represents in ‘solution.’ It would naturally follow that if in different works Plato's views in regard to any conception seem to be at variance, the view which is the more clear and definite is the later. Now, in the Parmenides we have a somewhat vague and confusing use of the correlative terms ‘whole’ and ‘part.’ It is not clear whether the two represent merely a greater and a lesser portion of extended matter, or bear a more logical relation such as that of genus to species or body to member. In the Theaetetus we find a very definite distinction drawn between that which as a mere sum of parts is called *πᾶν* and that which as something distinct from such a sum is called *ὅλον*.
Theaet. 204.

6. We have seen above, and shall have occasion to see again, that faults appear from time to time in the reasoning. These faults resolve themselves largely into neglect of the law of contradiction and of logical division. We have in the Parmenides an indication of the nature of the law of contradiction, but by no means so clear a statement of it as is contained in the Sophistes—*ἐπιθεικύνουσιν αὐτὰς (τὰς δόξας)*
αὐταῖς δῆμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐναντίας. And while Parmenides insists strongly on the necessity of method in reasoning, the method of logical division is not consciously and persistently employed as it is in the same dialogue.
Parm. 155 b. Soph. 230 B. etc.

7. But on the question of reasoning a more important point arises. We have already had under review an argument by Teichmüller in which the Theaetetus was made a turning point, in consequence of a remark in it affecting the style of composition adopted. That argument is not unimportant, although it cannot be applied safely to the Parmenides. But there is a means of inference of an analogous character which will so apply. The great objection which Parmenides urges against Socrates and his action is the inconsiderate haste with which he—that is, Plato—had constructed his theory, without anything like the argumentative training which such an attempt re-

quired. Plato had, however, from his youth enjoyed the discipline of the 'Socratic elenchus.' Yet this was not sufficient; he must consent to sit at the feet of Zeno before he ventures upon constructive metaphysics. The point is pressed upon our attention in the utmost detail, and is obviously a question of much greater weight than that of reporting discussions at first or second hand. Here, if anywhere, we have the intimation of a new departure on Plato's part. And it comes in connection with a metaphysical problem. It would appear that while the methods of argument practised by the historic Socrates are sufficient to meet the wants of unsystematic ethical inquiries, they must be supplemented or elaborated if ethics and politics are to be built up firmly upon a basis of reason. And the inference would seem to be that such dialogues as deal firmly with these abstract questions without^o making special reference to the necessity for preliminary training are written after the experience described in the passage under discussion—after Plato had realized the necessity which he here points out. This would give a fresh reason for placing the Parmenides prior to the Timaeus, Politicus, Sophistes, Theaetetus, and Philebus, and to the metaphysical portions of the Republic. The feeling which Plato here indicates is in harmony with the statement of Aristotle about the methods and arguments of Socrates, where he says

διαλεκτικὴ γὰρ ἰσχὺς οὕπω τότ’ ἦν ὥστε δύνασθαι καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ τί ἐστι πάντα τία ἐπισκοπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰ δὲ αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην.

We do not contend that Plato henceforth was always just and faultless in his arguments—few even of the most expert dialecticians fail to reason badly at times—but simply that hereafter he was more searching and methodical. We could imagine the Republic, for example, begun upon Socratic principles and carried on so far as the point where advantage is taken of the argument from the analogy of a State, but thereafter becoming gradually modified and interpenetrated with fresh metaphysical matter which carried the speculation past the Socratic standpoint into regions of pure thought.

8. While Plato in this dialogue criticises his own early views, and assumes that his readers are more or less acquainted with them, he does not refer to them as matters of public notoriety. On the contrary the phrase used by Parmenides after hearing the opening statement of Socrates is interrogative—καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ διηρηγσαὶ ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα; Now that is not the sort of language used under similar circumstances in the Phaedo. On the contrary we have such expressions as ἀπερ ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε... οὐδὲν πέπανμαι λέγων.—εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα. And we have referred more than once already to the manner in which he alludes to objections which had been raised—τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι etc. It is not unnatural to view such expressions as pointing to a later date for the work in which they occur.

9. The suggestion that the ideas consist of παραδείγματα or patterns would seem to be thrown out here for the first time. Where it is mentioned elsewhere the reference is hardly of such a nature, but the subject is touched upon as a thing needing no introduction.

Arist. Metaph.
xii. 4.

Parm. 130 B.

Phaedo, 100 B etc.

132 D.

Is it not reasonable to infer that such allusions are of later date than this one? Here Rep. ix. 592 B.
again the Theaetetus and Republic at once occur to the memory. Theaet. 176 E.

10. Finally, what has been urged thus far seems to furnish a justification for putting upon the quotations given at the close of Part I. of this introduction, from the Phaedo, Theaetetus, and Sophistes, what is after all their most natural construction—for holding, that is, that they are references, as clear as Plato's mode of authorship will permit, from those dialogues to the Parmenides as a work already given to the public.

Such are some arguments which may be adduced in favour of the view that the ^{The work probably ranks early among the metaphysical dialogues.} Parmenides takes a distinctly early position in the ranks of Plato's metaphysical writings. Whatever may be thought of their force when viewed separately, it will be observed that they are largely cumulative, and present in that light no inconsiderable body of evidence, so that one is reminded of the Aristotelian dictum $\tau\hat{\omega} \mu\grave{e}v \gamma\grave{a}\rho \acute{a}\lambda\eta\theta\acute{e}\iota$ Arist. Eth. Nic. πάντα συνάδει τὰ ιπάρχοντα, $\tau\hat{\omega} \delta\grave{e} \psi\epsilon\nu\delta\acute{e}\iota \tau\alpha\chi\grave{n} \delta\iota\alpha\phi\nu\acute{e}\iota \tau\acute{a}\lambda\eta\theta\acute{e}\acute{s}$ —with a true theory all ^{i. 8.} the facts of experience harmonize, but with a false theory the truth of fact is speedily at discord. It is true that some discover in the substance of the Parmenides evidence of very late authorship, basing their contention largely on the prominence given in the work to number, in connection with references made by Aristotle to some relation ^{Met. xi.} which Plato came latterly to recognize between ideas and number. Undoubtedly the argument contained in the dialogue is throughout of an extremely subtle character. But is it more so than that of Zeno, from which it takes its rise? It is not clear that the scope of it exceeds what might fairly be looked for from the operation of the doctrine of Parmenides and the dialectic of Zeno upon a mind at once so delicate and so powerful as that of Plato. As for the question of number, is that such an exotic in the speculation of the Greeks as to excite suspicions? 'They thought in numbers for the numbers came': long before Plato's time every recess of numerical extravagance in philosophizing had been ransacked by the Pythagoreans. And surely it is sufficiently natural to discuss many points respecting number when the basis of the whole argument is the nature of One. Nor is there anything which can be called a mixing up of number with the ideas in the course of what is said. Our contention, then, is that on the whole it seems most consonant with evidence to assign to the Parmenides a very early place among Plato's ontological speculations: to place it, for example, earlier than the Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Phaedo, Philebus, and Timaeus, and at least not later than the more abstract discussions in the Republic. If scholars are right in speaking of a specially Megarian stage in Plato's intellectual development there is nothing to prevent this dialogue forming a representative product of that period. It is correct to say, as Dr. Jackson does, that the work marks a break in the continuity of Plato's views, and a reconstruction of his ideal system. But while Dr. Jackson represents Plato here as breaking with most of the opinions which we are in the habit of associating with his name, in favour of a theory for which we have little or no documentary evidence, it seems more natural to hold that Plato here parts company with an early

and immature conception, for which we have little or no documentary evidence, in favour of those more comprehensive and connected doctrines which we are in the habit of associating with his name.

III.

CHARACTER AND CONTENTS. WE come now to consider the character and contents of the work. The Parmenides purports to be a narrative by Cephalus of a conversation which occurred between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides at a former time, in a specified place. Is that meeting historical, and is the narrative authentic? Plato's account is certainly circumstantial. The transmission, too, of the narrative would seem to be guarded with the most jealous vigilance against the intrusion of foreign matter. But no one can profess a belief that Plato's works are to be judged by a severe historic standard. They may throw light upon historic events and personages, but they are not, by many removes, themselves history. Even in ancient times this was understood, as we learn from the anecdote, whether authentic or not,

D. L. iii. 35.

Athen. Deipn. xi. § 113 Tauchn.

recorded in Diogenes Laërtius, that Socrates on hearing Plato read the Lysis exclaimed, 'Ηράκλεις, ὡς πολλά μου καταψύχεται ὁ νεανίσκος οὗτος!' A similar remark is ascribed to both Gorgias and Phaedo by Athenaeus. It may, however, be urged that a basis of fact should be admitted in many dialogues, and that something beyond that may be looked for in those in which a serious profession of veracity is made by the author. There is such a profession here. Plato seems quite grave as he describes the meeting, and gives the respective ages and characteristics of those who were present: nay, as we have seen, he refers to the matter again in two of his other works. But with regard to the last point some deduction must be made. It has been mentioned that in Plato direct references from one work to another cannot occur. Accordingly we do not know whether these allusions constitute a reassertion of a fact, or simply a reference, as perspicuous as the circumstances permit, to a previously-written dialogue. If the latter be the case, then we have one assertion of fact, not three. Were we dealing with a professed historian this might mean little, but we are not. Scholars, however, seem inclined to think that Plato meant to be

Stallb. Parmen. historical here: Stallbaum, Mullach, Clinton, and Ueberweg are at one so far. But when **Introd.** p. 23 ff.; **Mullach, Poeseos Philosoph. quae supersunt**, p. 109; **Clinton, Fast. Hell. II. Ed. 3.** we come to details difficulties arise. Of the three principal characters in the dialogue the only one regarding whose life we have definite information is the youngest. The birth-year of Socrates lies within the limits 471-468 B.C., with apparently a preference for 469. At the date of the meeting he is described in the several references as *σφόδρα νέον, πάνυ νέος, ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν*, and the whole setting of the dialogue accords with these emphatic phrases. Ueberweg, indeed, considers this to mean that he was young only when compared with the mature or advanced age commonly assigned to him in other dialogues, and cites—though admitting the authority to be second-rate—the statement of Synesius, **Syn. Encomium Calvitii, c. 17.** Σωκράτης . . . πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς, ὀπτηνίκα Παρμενίδης καὶ Ζήνων ἥκον 'Αθήναξ, ὡς Ηλάτων φησί, τὰ Παναθήναια θεασόμενοι. Clinton, Mullach, and Zeller, on the other hand,

agree in rejecting this age as much too advanced: and certainly with justice. Not only does it add to the difficulties of the situation, so far as Parmenides is concerned, but it is intrinsically improbable. Even among ourselves a man could hardly, unless to serve some purpose, be called extremely young as a student of philosophy at five and twenty; and still less among the Greeks. The whole atmosphere of Plato's writings conveys the impression that many of the interlocutors are mere lads, while on glancing at Clinton's tables we find it set down that Pindar was an author at sixteen, that Demosthenes spoke at eighteen, that Epicurus took to philosophy at twelve, and that Arcesilaus, 'if the numbers are accurate,' had won a reputation at seventeen. Democritus, too, is said to have studied Diog. Laert. theology and astrology *ἐτὶ παῖς ὥν*. Clinton and Mullach, while extreme on the other side, are much nearer the truth in calling Socrates fifteen. He could not well have been so young—first, because the age is extremely boyish; and, second, because Aristoteles is described as still younger, which on that supposition is hardly credible. If we call Socrates eighteen—the age of the ephebi—and Aristoteles seventeen, we strike a very reasonable mean. This will assign the meeting to the year 451 B.C., from which, as point of departure, we have to reckon the ages of the other speakers. Zeno is said to be *έγγυς ἐτῶν τετταράκοντα* at the time, so that he would be born about 490 B.C. Our chief external evidence upon the question is the statement of Diogenes Laërtius that he 'flourished about ix. 29. the nine and seventieth Olympiad,' or 464-61 B.C. It seems a fair and moderate calculation to suppose him thirty at that time, which would place his birth somewhere about 492 B.C., a result not out of harmony with Plato's language. With Parmenides the case is less satisfactory. Plato describes him as *περὶ ἑτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἔξικοντα*, which would assign his birth to some date about 516 B.C. Here, likewise, our best independent witness is Diogenes, who says that he 'flourished about the nine and sixtieth Olympiad,' or 504-1 ix. 23. B.C. If this be correct it renders the assumption of his birth in 516 B.C., or even (as Clinton gives it) 519, absolutely out of the question. He could not 'flourish' in his teens, and the most favourable view which could be taken—519 for his birth and 501 for his 'floruit'—makes him but eighteen at the time. Even this will accord with our other dates only on the assumption that Socrates was fifteen and Aristoteles fourteen when they met him. If, as seems to be imperative, we make Socrates at least seventeen at the time of meeting, and Parmenides thirty when he 'flourished,' the result can be achieved only by a change in the text of either Plato or Diogenes. To alter texts with the view of harmonizing dates is, while a tempting, an extremely dangerous course. In this case the Clarke Ms. offers no justification for a change, and, so far as can be judged from Huebner's edition, the MSS. of Diogenes furnish no variants, although editors differ freely from the text. Moreover, Athenaeus, who seems to be at least as old an author as Diogenes, rejects the idea of the meeting, and his attitude would rather tell in favour of the text of the latter as it stands. If a change is to be made, perhaps the simplest would be the following. The words *πέντε καὶ ἔξικοντα* in the Clarke Ms. are at the end of a rather crowded line. If the circumstances happened to be analogous in the case of some older Ms. from which the Clarke has descended, we might imagine some contraction being

resorted to, so that ἔξηκοντα might by possibility have resulted from the running together of ἐνεγκοντα—two Ν's when placed sideways very much resembling the majuscule ξ, thus ξ ζ. This would give us for the age of Parmenides ninety-five instead of sixty-five: his birth would fall in 545 B.C., and his age at his 'floruit' would be, let us say, forty-two. Nor would there be any impossibility in all this. A glance at the ages of the Greek philosophers will show that they were a long-lived generation. The description, too, of Parmenides as εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην, σφόδρα πολιόν, and his professed shrinking from the labour of discussion, agree better with the greater than with the lesser age. The change, however, is quite gratuitous; and it makes Parmenides about forty-five years older than Zeno, which introduces fresh complications. So much for dates. Athenaeus is justified in declaring, Παρμενίδης μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς λόγους τὸν τοῦ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτην, μόλις ἡ ηλικία συγχωρεῖ! He does not stop there, however, but regards the topics discussed as equally improbable—οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιούτους εἴπειν ἡ ἀκοῦσαι λόγους. He rejects the meeting as unlikely; and, in addition, he cannot believe that either Socrates or Parmenides said what is ascribed to him in the dialogue. Socrates is represented as handling familiarly and with ease, although no doubt with a suggestion of youthful hesitancy, conceptions to which, unless our whole modern view of the subject be a delusion, he could advance no claim at any time; to which, on the contrary, Plato himself found his way only after his master's decease. This point we need not labour. In regard to Parmenides something more must be said. That Plato knew what the tenets of Parmenides were does not admit of doubt; he refers to them repeatedly, and even quotes from them. And the relation of the statements here made by Parmenides to those tenets is unquestionably more than merely nominal. Great weight attaches throughout to the doctrine of the One. And we may also catch echoes of Parmenides in points of detail. Take the well-known, although somewhat uncertain, lines—

χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι,
ημὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκὲς ἥτορ,
ηδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθής.
ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθῆσει ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
χρὴ δοκίμως γνῶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.

Mullach, Fragm. (So Mullach, although χρὴ δοκιμωθῆναι would be a possible reading, and liker the original δοκίμως εἶναι.) Here we seem to find an analogy, and perhaps a hint, for Plato's antithesis between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα; while the last line—taken in connection with what Socrates says of the relation between Zeno's method and that of Parmenides—may contain a suggestion of the maxim, so emphatically laid down, about the duty of testing all sides of every hypothesis. Again, the words εὐπειθέος and πίστις, when coupled with the phrases πειθοῦς ἔστι κέλευθος, παντεπιθέα ἔμεν ἀταρπόν, which immediately follow, and others at intervals, may not have been without some influence upon two passages in the dialogue where, in addition to the general purport, we have the words ἀπίθανος and δυσανάπειστον εἶναι. So also in two lines of the poem, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸν νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι and τωντὸν δ'. ἔστιν νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκέν ἔστι νόημα, it is not impossible that we may have the original of

Parm. 133 B, 135 A-B.
Fragm. 40, 94.

Plato's suggestion to name the ideas *νοήματα*. Besides such analogies as these we ^{Parm. 132 B.} have various resemblances which are verbal merely, the sense of the corresponding passages being widely divergent—Parmenides speaking of what he accepts, Plato of what he criticises or rejects. It is such passages which, while externally bearing a resemblance, gradually convince us that the tenets of the historical Parmenides have in many cases little or no connection with what Plato feels at liberty to put in his mouth. Many citations might be made: let us take the following. Repeatedly Parmenides affirms that Being alone exists, and that Not-being is without existence, unthinkable, unnamable; and declares emphatically with regard to Being that

ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνάλεθρόν ἔστιν,
οὐλον, μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ήδ' ἀτέλεστον
οὐ ποτ' ἔην οὐδὲ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὅμοι πᾶν,
ἐν ξυνεχέσ.

Fragm. 59-62

This description is reiterated in varying language, but with unvarying strength of conviction. We gain additional clearness from such phrases as *εἴ γε γένοιτ' οὐκ ἔστι—οὐδὲ διαιρέτον ἔστιν—πᾶν δὲ πλέον ἔστιν ἔόντος—ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει τε καὶ ἀμφὶς ἔέργει—έστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδενές—πάντοθεν εὐκύλου σφαιρῆς ἐναλίγκιον ὅγκῳ μεσσόθεν ἵστοπαλὲς πάντη*. To harmonize these numerous characteristics is no part of our duty: Parmenides is satisfied of their necessary co-relation, and explicitly lays down the dogma that whatever deviates from them, and cannot be included in their scope, is a subject of mere opinion and a branch of the non-existent, *ἄλλα σὺ τῆσδε ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διέγησις εἰργε νόημα*. Under the head of *δόξα* falls, so far as can be gathered from the fragments, a general survey of physical nature, analogous to that which is met with in most systems of Greek philosophy, including those of Plato and Aristotle. Now a glance through the synopsis of this dialogue, which has been placed in the margin of the text, will suffice to show that Plato ascribes to the One every characteristic which Parmenides thus rejects, in addition, or in alternation, to those which the latter accepts. Again, while we might at first be tempted to suppose that *τὰ ἄλλα* of which Plato speaks correspond roughly to the Not-being, or to the domain of *δόξα* whereof Parmenides bids us beware; a moment's reflection will recall to our minds the fact that Plato does not assign these *ἄλλα* or *πολλὰ* to a sphere of *δόξα* distinct from the region in which the One is found, but that—so far as their truth or falsity, their knowability or unknowability, are concerned—the One and these Others stand upon a perfectly equal footing. In short, we find that Plato while putting his argument into the mouth of Parmenides, from whose thesis it begins, advances in the course of it *πολλὰ καὶ ἐναντία αἰτῷ*, against which the venerable speaker would at once have raised an urgent protest. To what conclusion, then, are we led upon the matter of historic veracity? It is just a possibility that Socrates may as a boy have chanced to meet Parmenides, when (or if) the latter was at Athens, as Scott tells us he met Burns at Edinburgh—‘*Virgilium vidi tantum.*’ But it is extremely improbable, all but inconceivable, that the two had any conversation upon philosophy. Plato, however, having, like all contemporary thinkers, a deep veneration for Parmenides, seeks, when

discussing his doctrines, to make that respect manifest, while at the same time giving dramatic force to his work, by dwelling upon this possible meeting, so as to suggest that his own master might advance a claim to be the other's disciple. The thesis of Parmenides is Plato's starting-point, and there is a show of adherence to it throughout; but the adherence is verbal chiefly. Accordingly we need not bind ourselves to historic fact as a test by which to try Plato's assertions, but may deal with the Parmenides freely upon the assumption that it is Plato who speaks throughout, and that the various interlocutors are but his *dramatis personae*.

Zeno.

What now of Zeno in the same connection? If we are hampered in alluding to Parmenides by the fragmentary state of his writings, our position as regards Zeno is still more unfortunate. Brief quotations which scarcely profess to be exact, and sometimes mere accounts, avowedly in the language of the narrator, are all that have reached us from this famous fountain-head of dialectic. It is generally assumed that Plato refers to Zeno in the query, *τὸν οὐν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνῃ ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούοντι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα*; If that be so, and if the description be designed as historic—though it may well be but another involved allusion to this dialogue—then its resemblance to what Plato puts into the mouths of Zeno and Parmenides in the work before us is very striking. But there is no independent historical corroboration of that. Our authorities tell us that Zeno had two groups of contentions, directed, one against the existence of multiplicity, the other against that of motion. Plato's language in the Phaedrus might cover both, though principally the former. Between the accredited statements of Zeno and the argument in our dialogue the following items of correspondence may be noted. It is a well-known assumption of his that space and extended objects, if such exist, are infinitely divisible. With this we may

Parm. 142 B, etc.

compare the opening of what Grote calls the Second Demonstration in the Parmenides.

Again, Simplicius, in his commentary upon Aristotle, represents Zeno as maintaining that if the Many exist they are both limited and limitless, which corresponds with what we find in Plato, but with a difference. Zeno seeks to make this good with respect to the Many, Parmenides is represented as demonstrating its applicability to the One. Finally, the familiar Achilles paradox, and that of the Arrow flying and at rest, are based, as Simplicius points out, on the assumption that time consists of an endless series of points *συμβαίνει δὲ*

As above fol.

παρὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν μὴ διδομένου γὰρ τούτου οὐκ ἔσται ὁ συλλογισμός. This at once recalls two striking passages of the Parmenides. At the same time these arguments of Plato, when viewed in detail, are not quite similar to those of Zeno; while we have also to remember that they are boldly attributed to Parmenides himself, and that they are applied to the One as straightforward reasoning, not to the Many as paradoxical confutation.

Melissus.

Plato makes no allusion to Melissus in the Parmenides; but he twice refers to him elsewhere, and in such a way as to indicate a knowledge of his writings—in particular of his view that motion was impossible for lack of empty space. Much of the argument in this dialogue has quite as close a likeness to the tenets of Melissus as to those of Zeno.

Theaet. 180 E,
183 E.

Thus the reasoning of Melissus that what 'is' cannot 'become,' and therefore has no beginning; cannot 'perish,' and therefore has no end; and as having neither beginning nor end cannot be limited, therefore the One is 'limitless'; recalls at once what we find at the opening of the First Demonstration: while the fallacy of arguing thus from time to space is analogous to the ambiguous use of *ταῦτὸν* for the same thing and the same place in the Second. Again, the contention against motion in any form, whether as destruction, or growth, or change, or suffering, on the ground that whatever is so affected cannot be One, finds a parallel in both the First Demonstration and the Third. There is even an echo of the language, although with a difference; for example εἰ γάρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἀν Mullach, § 4 and ἐν εἴη τὸ γάρ ἡντιναοῦν κίνησιν κινεόμενον ἐκ τίνος καὶ ἐσ ἔτερον τι μεταβάλλει: and εἰ γάρ § 11. ἔτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι may be compared with the phrases used throughout the Third Demonstration. Parm. 156 B.C. Yet we feel that in the case of Melissus, as in the cases already touched upon, the divergences are quite as noteworthy as the coincidences. And our general conclusion upon the evidence must be that—so far as can be ascertained from the fragments preserved—Plato treats the works of the three Eleatic philosophers rather as suggestive texts and points of departure, than as systems accepted in their entireness and containing a satisfactory answer to the questions of metaphysics. The Parmenides is after all a Platonic speculation, although resting upon an Eleatic basis. In Plato's view the One 'is and is not' all that the Eleatics ascribed to it and to the Many conjointly.

Of the two great exponents of Platonism for the English-speaking world of our generation the one, while striving to maintain a historic attitude, subjects Plato's works to a scrutiny having for basis a sensational conception of knowledge, and for weapons the laws of formal logic; the other does not shrink from hinting his distrust of metaphysics as anything more than a mental gymnastic, and regards Plato by preference as the untrammelled 'poet or maker of ideas.' The two are agreed, however, in putting aside any suggestion of system in Plato's mind, so far as that is unfolded in his writings; and in regarding each of his works as an independent inquiry undertaken to meet an independent, perhaps even a transitory difficulty. This view, while countenanced, as we have seen, by the peculiar form of authorship which Plato has thought fit to adopt, hardly seems in perfect harmony with the two important facts, that he both strove to get his views embodied in practical legislation, and devoted his best energies to professorial instruction in philosophy. It is doubtless true that he is not systematic after the conscious and pre-determined fashion of Kant or Spenser; yet he is manifestly anxious to consider all aspects of the philosophic problem, as these are successively brought under his notice. He earnestly seeks to attain philosophic certainty on all points, and if he fails, it is less from a want of systematic grasp of the subject, than because, with the means at his disposal, he finds success beyond his reach. He is a consciously unsuccessful seeker after reasoned truth, not a mere—if it be permissible to say 'mere'—metaphysical Ariel singing 'Where the bee sucks there suck I.' The Parmenides alone is sufficient to show that he sought to rectify his own mistakes and make definite progress towards truth. In it we

find, beyond dispute, an intentional review of past difficulties, and a conscious step in advance, so far as the doctrine of ideas is concerned.

Before entering upon a detailed discussion of the work, it is necessary to explain that no attempt is here made to put before the reader a complete description or co-ordination of the views of previous writers upon the question. The task of reading over all that has been written in explanation of the Parmenides becomes—where time for consideration is limited—confusing rather than helpful to the mind. As little, on the other hand, is any pretension advanced to the merit of originality; to that special information, or clearness of penetration, which might justify the setting of previous expositions aside. The object aimed at has been to acquire, so far as time might permit, a sufficiency of information from authoritative sources, and after assimilating that, to take the course which seemed marked out by personal study of the work.

Part First:
Analysis.
Zeno's problem.
126-129 E.

The dialogue opens with a reference to the speculative relation in which Zeno stands to Parmenides. The former is declared to be the negative, as the latter is the positive, supporter of the thesis that Being is One. Parmenides, as we have seen, in his poem, after setting forth this dogma in detail, feels constrained, like many expounders of the problem of existence, to admit that ordinary experience yields no support to his chosen view. Accordingly in the second part of his poem he takes up the facts of nature as we find them, and offers his explanation of them, just as the physical philosophers had done before him. But the whole of this wide field which rejects incorporation with his doctrine is classified as Not-being, and relegated to the sphere of opinion, while its votaries *φορεύνται κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα.* It is to the further refutation of the judgments of opinion that Zeno, and Melissus with him, has directed attention. He seeks to prove the doctrine of the One-Being by elaborating the contradictions latent in its counterpart, the Many-Not-Being. To his arguments Socrates is here represented as partly assenting and partly taking exception. The attitude assumed amounts in effect to a 'solvitur ambulando.' Practically Socrates says, I find no difficulty in accepting the statement that sensible objects have what you call the contradictory attributes of many and one; it represents a fact in experience of which we are daily conscious. They *are* many and one, and where is your difficulty? If it exists, is it of essential importance? One might, indeed, at first suppose that Socrates was admitting the unanswerable character of Zeno's reasoning as regards the world of sense; but really that is not so. Virtually he offers a vindication of the sensible, material world against the contention of the Eleatics, as is clear from the statement a little further on, that 'those things which we see must be accepted as existing.' Although the two chief auditors are said to have felt a little annoyed at this line of argument, they are not represented as controverting it. Yet it conflicts with their views, and can hardly be reconciled with Plato's own opinions elsewhere. It follows, however, the objective tendency common among early Greek thinkers, who are prone to reason, like the Scottish school, about an 'external world,' whatever that world may, upon examination, be found to comprise. The same feeling is behind the statement that the ideas are 'set up in nature.' Plato's verdict upon Zeno's

130 D.

130 A.

contentions would seem to be, not that they prove their point, if by proving it is meant abolishing the sensible sphere; but rather that, however ingenious, they have not been applied by their author to the sphere where the results would have greatest value, and involve real argumentative subtlety. Now that sphere can be none other than the sphere of One-Being, to which in Zeno's intention his arguments were to form a sort of phylacteries.

The next stage in the discussion—which arises in connection with the first, and partly overlaps it—is that in which Socrates brings forward the question of ideas. He invites Zeno to say whether he recognizes their existence, and whether he holds that it is from participation of some kind in them that external objects derive their characteristics. To the query it is Parmenides who replies, and he does it Scottish fashion, by putting another. He passes over the question whether he and Zeno hold such a doctrine, and asks whether Socrates himself does so. Receiving an affirmative answer, he goes on to interrogate Socrates upon the scope of his theory. It is probable that Plato designedly suffers the query of Socrates to pass unanswered. He could not truthfully ascribe his ideal theory to the Eleatic thinkers, while to have openly admitted that they did not hold it, would have given rather a shock to the series of assumptions upon which the setting of the dialogue is based. And he might feel that, if not the theory as he held it, at least a germ which could develop into that, was to be found in the views of Parmenides. For the ideal theory is put forward as a simplifying, unifying principle, and the ideas are ‘apprehended by the intellect’; in both which respects its affinity to the Eleatic doctrine is obvious and close. The questions put to Socrates by Parmenides in regard to the ideas are four:—

(1.) Are ideas admitted for likeness, one, many, ‘and all of the qualities of which Zeno was speaking’? It may be remarked that Zeno has specified only likeness and unlikeness, but has admitted that he is resisting the existence of Many *ταρπά πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα*. Socrates answers, ‘Yes.’ (2.) And for all such qualities as the just, the beautiful, the good?—‘Yes.’ (3.) And for man, fire, water, and the like?—‘There I have often felt a difficulty.’ (4.) And for all such unworthy things as hair, mud, filth?—‘By no means. Indeed, the case of such sometimes makes me tremble even for the others. At present I devote my attention to those just admitted.’

While the scope of the ideal world will be found to be insensibly enlarged as we proceed, it seems that we are to accept this as the original immature conception of it: and in regard to this conception several remarks suggest themselves. First, the object with which it has been referred to at all is, that the dialectic of Zeno may be brought to bear upon it. According to Socrates—that is, Plato—neither advantage nor honour is to be derived from a dialectic treatment of the sensible sphere; what he would wish to see demonstrated is, as we have said above, the existence of a conflicting series of qualities ‘winding in all directions’ through the ideal region. Next, it cannot but be felt that if the purpose of the ideas is to explain, and almost to create, our ordinary world, the outline here furnished is wholly inadequate. And this inadequacy is due not more to inherent difficulties than to sentiment. Ideas are rejected because of their

unworthiness; and where there is no unworthiness, ideas are readily accepted even when they would seem to be least required. It is conceded at once that there are ideas for intellectual or mathematical, and for moral or aesthetical, conceptions; which conceptions are already themselves abstract and products of the mind. And it is gravely doubted whether there be ideas for even the most important classes of objects associated with physical impressions; while the suggestion of ideas for objects that seem 'common and unclean' is rejected with something like a shudder. To put it otherwise: Plato accepts with greatest pleasure ideas for such conceptions as Socrates had been in the habit of attempting to define, and rejects with emphasis ideas for such objects or impressions as fall within the sphere assigned by Parmenides to opinion. The relation between the One and the ideas thus tends to become closer. It must be said, however, in the third place, that if the domain of ideas, as thus far mapped out, has, in the language of modern diplomacy, an 'intelligible frontier,' it can hardly boast a 'scientific' one. The mere putting of the question whether there are ideas in cases (3) and (4) shows—what the form of rejection confirms—that Plato had come to feel some further step to be a necessity.

Enlargement
of the ideal
sphere.

130 C.E.

And we have evidence that such a step is in contemplation. Parmenides plainly tells Socrates that it is his youth and speculative timidity which disincline him to accept the existence of ideas for the humblest physical phenomena, and that years will bring conviction with them. And gradually as the disputation unfolds itself, we find incidental references to ideas for 'bigness, smallness, equality'; for 'slave and slavery,' 'master and mastery'; for 'science' and 'truth.' This all increases the scope of the theory, alike on the abstract or conceptual, and on the concrete or physical side; while finally the expression *εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου*, with others like it, seems to point, although not with absolute certainty, in the direction of admitting ideas for every clearly distinguishable division into which our experience may be found to part itself. That would, of course, include ideas for man, fire, water, and even for their humbler congeners. At the same time this conclusion is one that is glanced at rather than definitively stated, a fact which, as we have urged above, makes for the view that the work ranks early among Plato's metaphysical writings. For Plato is not here drawing back from a wider conception of the ideal sphere, which he had formerly recognized, to a narrower which he now regards as more correct; but is advancing from the narrower to a wider under a sense of intellectual pressure which he cannot resist but which his fastidious feeling still renders distasteful. While, however, the horizon is undoubtedly expanding we cannot but feel that the features of the landscape are far from clearly defined, or given with a due sense of relative importance. Are we to assume, for example, that there is but a single idea of 'beauty' to which all types of beauty bear a relation—beauty of form, of colour; of man, of animal, of plant; of implement and product? If so, what are we to think of separate ideas for bigness, smallness and equality, where we might imagine a single idea of 'size' more appropriate? The parsimony in the one case hardly accords with the plethora in the other.

Let the scope, however, and the contents of Plato's ideal world be consistent or ^{The ideas form} inconsistent, wide or narrow, one thing about it at least is beyond dispute, that it is a ^a world apart. world quite apart from ours. We arrive indeed at a conception of it by means and a process familiar enough. It is clearly laid down that the ideas are 'grasped by reflection'—λογισμῷ λαμβανόμενα. These are the means, and the process is in accordance with them. We proceed by comparison and abstraction. The course of this process is not absolutely clear, and comments are made upon its character in the notes. But so long as it resembles 'abstraction and generalization,' the remark which one is most naturally tempted to make upon it is, that while the process is familiar the result is unique. The process seems quite analogous to that which Aristotle refers to Socrates ^{Met. xii. 4.} as its first expositor—'for there are two things which one might ascribe justly to Socrates; inductive trains of reasoning and universal definition.' Acquired by such means, ideas ought to be what we mean when we use the term—that is, νοήματα or notions. To Plato they are something wholly different. Here again Aristotle describes the facts for us: 'Socrates, however, did not make the universals nor yet the definitions separate or transcendental; but *they* (the makers of ideas) did this, and such sorts of entities they named ideas.' Like Jack, we climb up the familiar bean-stalk into wonderland: only that his bean-stalk is itself a wonder, while ours is not. This break is mentioned repeatedly in the dialogue, and the reader can judge whether Aristotle in what we have quoted from him seems to have this dialogue in his mind. Thus εὰν δέ τις... πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη.—αὐτὸς σὺ οὖτω διηρησαί Parm. 129 D. ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα;—εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς. And their characteristic peculiarities are noted in three forms of expression which agree with this act of χωρισμός: we have αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητην, δὲ ἔστιν ἔν, and as above εἴδη ὅντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά. Socrates, then, has got (1) an ill defined and ill regulated world of ideas, which is (2) reached by an intellectual effort of abstraction, but (3) found when reached to be 'like a star that dwells apart.' Parmenides proceeds to interrogate Socrates upon the subject and to raise objections. To his mind a great difficulty is this. Postulating the two spheres, ideal and sensible, fully developed —what must we hold to be the nature of the participation or μέθεξις of the ideas by τάδε τὰ ἄλλα or our world of sense? First he asks, do objects of sense share in the whole or in a part of the idea? If in the whole, then is the idea manywheres at once: if in a part, the effect upon them may be fraught with ludicrous contradictions—a twofold difficulty which Socrates frankly admits. The assumption underlying this dilemma is that the participating object represents, so to speak, a sensible material body of death ready made, into which the idea is supposed to enter. That is, of course, dualism in a pronounced form. The world of sensible objects is somehow already there, waiting for the advent of the intelligible element. And it is noteworthy that Parmenides gives point to the paradox by choosing, to illustrate his argument, the ideas of physical bigness, smallness, and equality. The anomaly resulting from μέθεξις by parts might have escaped notice had justice or

129 B.
130 A.
130 C.129 B.
133 A.

beauty been selected. But absurdity is elicited at once when ‘a portion of smallness’ is ‘added’ to ‘one of us.’ Smallness should be the irreducible minimum of extent; but matter being infinitely divisible you get parts of smallness, and never reach your goal. Again, for the moment, participation is regarded as physical addition, which ought to increase the size of an object; while yet by hypothesis the object should be reduced, if things ‘become small by partaking of smallness.’ Having thus an easy victory over the doctrine of participation, Parmenides turns to look at the character of the ideas. These are assumed to be a series of ultimate units, each of which has the power of influencing the nature of an indefinite multitude of sensible objects: and each of which is reached, as we have seen, by the process of abstraction and generalization. We are accustomed to draw diagrams of the operation here referred to, which represent a gradual convergence from the many of sense to the one of abstraction, after the fashion of a genealogical tree or the gorgeous tassels of a cardinal’s hat. That this progress leads from many to one there is no doubt. But it seems—as is further pointed out in the notes—not to be the progress or the process which Parmenides has in mind. He would appear to imply that the very first step in the generalization includes a comparison of all available physical data, so that you would hope to reach what will prove to be your idea at a single stride. This, however, says Parmenides, you fail to do. What you have now got is a fresh field for comparison—the indefinite mass of sensible things on the one hand, on the other the abstract which you have just made. Compare these two and a third is the result. This process repeats itself indefinitely—‘all men,’ ‘man,’ and a ‘third man’ or *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*—so that the one idea which is supposed to terminate the inquiry is never reached. Whether this contention be just or not, it seems to be a formal rather than a real difficulty. Your first act of abstraction has by hypothesis exhausted the data at command; from *a* you have extracted A. What Parmenides contends is that by comparing *a* with A a new result is obtained. Is that so? You import no new element by your second comparison. It may be that the process admits of indefinite repetition, but what does it yield? It would not prevent you from justly using your first A as a sufficient type for every participating *a*, if participation be itself otherwise feasible. The objection of Aristotle to the doctrine of ideas, that in each case it merely adds one more object to the sensible objects, *καὶ παραπλήσιον ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων, μὲν ὄντων οἴοιτο μὴ δύνασθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη,* would be doubly applicable to this theory.

Met. xii. 4.

Are the ideas
notions?

Parm. 132 B.

Socrates attempts to get rid of this difficulty—this, at least, seems to be what he is meeting, and not the previous question of division through participation—by urging that each idea may be simply a mental conception or notion, and so may be one. A very odd contention indeed; however faithfully it may reflect the ‘universal’ or ‘general definition’ of the historic Socrates. These endless comparisons and successive results are possible just on the assumption, and on no other, that each abstraction remains mental and is not converted by *χωρισμὸς* into an objective

entity or 'thing in itself.' If, as Plato insists, our series of comparisons serves but to point the mind's attention to an idea which is 'set up in nature' and exists *χωρίς*, manifestly indefinite comparison is by that very fact stopped off. That objective thing is wholly independent of any future comparisons into which our ingenuity may seek to inveigle it, and stands there unaffected by our subjective activity. One it is, and one it remains: our comparisons have served only to draw the veil from before it. The fact that we thus discuss it may be a sound reason for doubting that it 'stands there in nature'; but grant such existence to it and our further speculations in its regard will hardly make it uneasy. It and its peers 'still are sitting, still are sitting' like the senate during the Gallic invasion, or like 'dukes, whom we do not criticise, but only contemplate.' It is singular to note, however, that Parmenides is not represented as doubting that if the ideas were but ^{Parm. 132 B-C.} notions his difficulty would be removed. He seeks rather to demolish that suggestion. All conceptions, he says, are conceptions of an object, and that object will in each case be the idea. If it be mental, and all things participate in it, then all things as sharing in thought should have the power of thinking—the contrary would be absurd. A modern idealist finds no difficulty in conceiving all things as built up of connected and coordinated conceptions. But it demands a Greek to urge as necessary sequel that thoughts should be able to think. Would it not be an analogous contention that words should be able to speak? How plausible soever the hypothesis, it is in direct conflict with fact: the Ego alone it is that thinks and speaks. It may be noted in passing, however, that Plato seems to have in the end come gradually round to the view that thought somehow constitutes the universe. This appears to some extent in the Timaeus. And the suggestion about thoughts thinking may have helped to persuade him that the universe must in that event be a creature or *ξώον*.

It is admitted by Socrates that these objections baffle him; and he is thus led ^{The ideas are in truth patterns.} to propound what would seem to be his final and abiding view of the nature and function of ideas. 'They are set up as patterns in nature' after the similitude of which sensible objects are framed, 'and the participation of objects in them is none other than that of being likened to them.' It is interesting to note that—as remarked above—this important suggestion seems to be put forward here for the ^{p. xxxii.} first time, as a novel expedient to meet a pressing difficulty. That fixes the position of the work as earlier than others in which the theory is mentioned. On this new development of the doctrine Parmenides continues his attack. The arguments put into his mouth thus far have had two tendencies. They have exposed the objections to the assumption that objects 'partake of' ideas, and likewise the difficulties besetting the attempt to construct a simplified ideal world aloof from the sensible one. He now urges what takes for a moment the appearance of a new contention, but what is in truth merely an elaboration of the former of these. Between the ideal and the sensible there is, as we know, a great gulf fixed. We are now told in regard to this gulf that God himself cannot bridge it: that he is debarred from ^{132 D.} ^{133 A.}

Parm. 135 B-C.

contact with the sensible sphere, even to the extent of knowing it. And it is now clearly acknowledged that this is due to the original severance of the two spheres. Nor can the objection be rebutted. The verdict of reason is absolute—let no god join what man has put asunder. The ideal sphere pays the penalty of all privilege, even the privilege of unsullied purity, that it is out of contact with the stream which flows in the river of life: that circumstance too is emphasized just as the sphere is expanding to completeness. It is a perfect and immaculate Constitution, but like the French one it will not ‘march.’ ‘He *shall* march,’ cried my uncle Toby, marching the foot which had a shoe on, though without advancing an inch—he *shall* march to his regiment.—An’ please your honour, said the Corporal, he will never march but to his grave.’ It certainly will, as Parmenides declares, be the work of a man *πανὸς μὲν εὐφυοῦς* to bridge over this difficulty, if he goes about it on the foundation here laid down. Yet Plato while clearly alive to the difficulty is far from making it a reason for renouncing his hypothesis. On the contrary he maintains that with the rejection of an intellectual idealistic standpoint the possibility of philosophy and all its rational activity disappears. *Tί οὖν ποιήσει φιλοσοφίας πέρι;* he exclaims: and in a sense—though scarcely in his—he is perfectly right.

Critical comments.

Met. i. 9.

Having now reached the end of Plato’s course of self-criticism, which forms the important introductory section of the dialogue, we pause for a little to make one or two remarks upon it, in addition to any that may have been dropped in passing.

i. Reference has been already made to certain objections on the part of Aristotle. Taken as a body his adverse comments are very comprehensive and pointed. The substance of them may be given thus. (*α*) We do not really reach the ideas by the methods which Plato suggests. And that statement, as we have just seen, is perfectly true, whether our reasons for accepting it are those of Aristotle or not. No advancing chain of abstraction will conduct us logically to another and absolutely separate world, to what moderns would call the sphere of the unconditioned. (*β*) The character of the ideas is objectionable in various ways. If we are to have, as Plato implies, ideas corresponding to every branch of knowledge we must have ideas of negations (*ἀποφάσεις*) such as ‘unlikeness,’ and of things that have perished; while a prominent feature of the theory is that which comprehends ideas of relations, such as ‘motion,’ ‘smallness,’ ‘truth.’ But if the use of the ideas is that they are to be participated in by objects of sense, they ought to comprise substances (*οὐσίαι*) alone. That we possess ideas in the modern sense, that is conceptions, of unlikeness, motion and all similar things, is quite certain. But to affirm that there is a ‘thing in itself set up in nature’ called motion or smallness, is a hard saying. (*γ*) The use of the ideas is to constitute, and to aid us in knowing, the world of sense; and they do not fulfil that function. The talk about their being patterns, to be partaken of by sensible objects—that and the like of it *κενολογεῖν ἔστι καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικάς*. And we have seen that Plato himself partially suspects this to be so.—Thus Aristotle attacks at once their existence, their character and their function.

2. The world of ideas is to be reached, we are told, by abstraction. By abstraction, then, from what? From the world of ordinary experience; which is said on the one hand to partake in (*μεταλαμβάνειν, μετέχειν*) the ideas, and on the other to be apprehended by sensible perception (*αἰσθησις*), and so to lie outside the sphere of science. Suppose Socrates entering upon his course of procedure by abstracting successive ideas from some sensible object such as a man. He abstracts, we shall say, 'one,' 'limit,' 'shape,' 'bigness,' 'likeness,' 'beauty,' 'justice,' 'goodness,' 'mastery,' and so indefinitely onwards. And when the process exhausts itself what is it that remains, to be apprehended by sense but ignored by thought? Either there must be a primal unmodified matter whose function it is to 'partake of' ideas, and which remains when they are gone; or our sensible world runs serious risk of being 'abstracted' from us and becoming intellectual, or even ideal, before we are aware. Plato does not explicitly pronounce for either alternative, yet he seems to favour the former. His conception, in fact, of what the sensible world actually is resembles in its vagueness and want of consistency the view entertained on the subject by non-metaphysical reflection. He affirms that without the ideas we must sacrifice *τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν*, while again of these ideas he declares emphatically *οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ήμāν*. No proof is led that the want of ideas will do away with dialectic and philosophy: this result is assumed without discussion, and it certainly leaves us in a position of some difficulty. In favour of the opposite conclusion we have the following curious deductions from Plato's own line of reasoning—(1) *διάνοια* and *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι* both exist apart from the ideas, and are our means of discovering them: (2) in making that discovery these faculties are employed upon the world of sense, which thus succeeds in furnishing a field of exercise for the speculative intellect: (3) this world of sense contains a sort of science suited to its wants, and to which the only limit is that it cannot know a world which is expressly placed absolutely out of connection with it. In these circumstances do we need the realm of ideas? If they cannot be brought to bear upon the world of sense, and if the latter is sufficient unto itself even in the matter of science, why retain them? Has not Plato over-reached himself in this part of his argument? At the very moment when he seeks to magnify his world of ideas as unapproachably pure, rigidly scientific, without one taint of sense to sully or confuse it—when he seeks to enthrone it as the dominating influence in speculation—has he not been unconsciously enriching the world of sense to an alarming degree with qualities to which it can lay no claim, and which are assigned to it solely because they seem to him unworthy of the other sphere? The contents of the ideal world we have already collected above. What are those of the phenomenal world? They consist of Parm. 129. 'you and me, and the rest of what we call the many,' 'stones and pieces of wood and such things.' To these we add by inference—since there are ideas corresponding to them—'likeness, one, many; justice, beauty, goodness; master, mastery, slave, slavery; science, truth.' Finally, whether or no there may be ideas for 'man, fire, water; hair, mud, filth,' it is certain that they, as we accept their meaning, belong to the sensible

sphere, for Socrates says of them *ταῦτα μέν γε, ἀπέρ ὄρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι*. Such is the world of ‘what we call the many,’ the world which is ‘with us,’ which ‘partakes, or whatever you call it, of the ideas,’ which ‘we handle’ (*μεταχειρίζομεθα*) and ‘see.’ And this world we know by the senses : of some parts of it this is expressly affirmed ; while for others there are ideas corresponding, whose distinctive feature it is that they are known *λογισμῷ* and *διανοίᾳ*. Such a conception of a world of sense is manifestly untenable ; and indeed it speedily breaks down. For when Plato goes on to insist, by the mouth of Parmenides, upon the absolute separateness of the ideal sphere he announces that the latter is known by ‘the idea of science,’ while the ordinary world is known (not by sense, but) by ‘our science,’ *τῇ ήμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ*. And it would hardly avail to urge that this latter science is mere ‘opinion,’ as Parmenides calls it in his poem, or to translate *τῇ ήμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ* into *λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ*, to quote a phrase from the Timaeus ; because it is by its means that we have discovered the ideas. The fundamental difficulty lies in the relation, or rather want of relation, which is originally assumed as existing between the two spheres. Although Plato would deny that ideas exist corresponding to individual sensible objects, such ideas after all are the goal to which things seem to be tending. He has ideas for the qualities of objects, and ideas for motion and rest ; and if he goes on, as Parmenides urges, to admit ideas for man, hair, mud, why should he not translate *εἶδος ἐνὸς ἔκάστου* in its most literal sense and acknowledge the existence of ideas for ‘you, and me, and the rest of those present’? An *εἶδος Σωκράτους* would at least not be *ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαλότατον*; and when we have got that length we should have in the ideal world, what we can hardly help feeling as if we were intended to have, a detailed duplicate of the sensible world complete to the minutest ramification. And do we not seem to attain to this consummation in the latter part of the Phaedo? There he launches into a rhapsody upon the future dwelling-place of the soul, which is made to appear as an idealized sensible sphere, where our world is repeated in detail with transcendental attractions. Is this the *τόπος νοητός*? If so, then each blade of grass has an *εἶδος* or heavenly counterpart, as in the land of Beulah. Those there have *αισθήσεις τῶν θεῶν* and behold the sun, moon and stars *οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα*. On this assumption our sensible One, which for argument’s sake might be supposed to contain but a single quality, could be represented by *q*, and Socrates with his indefinite qualities by *qⁿ* ; while over against this would stand the idea of each, represented by *q* and *qⁿ*. And so our worlds would run side by side

$$\begin{array}{cccccccccc} q & q^2 & q^3 & q^4 & q^5 & q^6 & \dots & q^{n-3} & q^{n-2} & q^{n-1} & q^n \\ q & q^2 & q^3 & q^4 & q^5 & q^6 & \dots & q^{n-3} & q^{n-2} & q^{n-1} & q^n. \end{array}$$

If we are to have two worlds with the theory that the one is the model or pattern of the other—then no fitting conclusion but this seems to be possible. What advantage, now, has the world in italicics over that in roman type that such pains should be taken in the elaboration of it? ‘What’s *q* to *q*, or *q* to *q*, that *q* should weep for *q*?’ It is not simple as opposed to the other’s complexity, it is not pure as con-

Parm. 130 A.

134 E.

Tim. 52 B.

Phaedo 109 sq.

trasted with the other's unworthiness, it is not stable as distinguished from the other's mutability—there is actually an *εἰδος κινήσεως*. What then is it? Shall we say it is intellectual as contradistinguished from the other's dependence on sense? Well, after consideration, it is not that either. No: between the two there is indeed a vital distinction. The world in italics is 'The-idea-of-scientific': the other is 'The-our-scientific.' This is what comes of having 'made that distinction—on the one side, certain ideas; on the other, things partaking of these': and here for the present we Parm. 130 B. must leave the question.

3. The ideas as patterns are said *ἔσταναι ἐν τῇ φύσει*. What does this mean? One would at first be disposed to fancy that 'nature' could be nothing but the world as we see it: but obviously that sense cannot be the right one. As little can nature mean the human mind; for although it is by the exercise of the intellect that we reach a conception of the ideas, they are in themselves quite separated from us. He speaks repeatedly in the Republic and elsewhere of a *νοητὸς τόπος* as contrasted with the *όρατός*. Should we identify that with the mind of the Creator? Even this is not without its difficulties; for the ideas are patterns *πρὸς & βλέπων* the Creator creates, a description which gives them a certain externality and independence even where he is concerned. The *νοητὸς τόπος*, again, and the mind of the Creator are subjects which carry a certain suggestiveness in connection with the question which Plato raises as to whether the ideas are *νοήματα*. What should occupy a *νοητὸς τόπος* if not *νοήματα*? Granting, too, that *νοήματα* must have objects, still we ask—may not such objects, and in the given circumstances must they not, be themselves *νοήματα* or *νοητά*? Nay, even the *αἰσθητὰ* seem not to be perfectly excluded from this intellectual influence. Granting that we perceive them by sense; do we not, even according to Plato, likewise form abstract conceptions of them, when discovering the ideas? And are they not the objects of our thought at that time, and so in his view capable of thinking? Further, of the ideas it is affirmed that they are *λογισμῷ λαμβανόμενα* and the mode of reaching them is *τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα (τὰ ὄρώμενα) ἴδεῖν*. There is also an *ἐπιστήμη* whereby God knows them. Finally we are told that if the ideal theory be abandoned man *οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει*, and so the possibility of discussion will be absolutely destroyed. Plato is, of course, committed to the position that the ideas are not mere notions in the human mind, but objective entities. We may grant him that; we may even raise no difficulty about their being 'set up in nature.' Still to admit of being discussed at all they must imperatively be either 'mental' or 'physical'; and if physical they are perceived by sense, while, if mental, he grants them the power of thinking. The subject is a supremely difficult one. Probably Plato is all along struggling to say what we also are struggling to say when we speak of things 'unconditioned,' 'in ordine ad universum,' 'seen as they appear to the creative intelligence.' In the Phaedo such expressions occur as *αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, ὃ τυγχάνει ἔκαστον ὅν, εἰλικρινὲς ἔκαστον τῶν ὅντων*, and, as we have seen above, *οἷα τυγχάνει ὅντα*.

4. It has been pointed out that the reason assigned by Socrates for raising the question of ideas here at all is that he may see the same contradictory qualities proved to exist in them which Zeno shows to exist in sensible objects. No proof to such effect is forthcoming. All that is said in reference to conflict between ideas has reference to ideas which encounter each other in objects of sense. Doubtless it is shown that there are difficulties in the way of our conceiving an ideal world at all; but these difficulties do not quite involve the fundamental contrariety which Plato through Socrates sees fit to suggest. The argument which most nearly supplies a result of this nature is the one in which it is pointed out that if we reach the ideas by a series of comparisons and abstractions each idea must be many and not one. But this argument is not prosecuted in such a spirit as to indicate that Plato sees in it the presentment of an internecine struggle between 'absolute one and absolute many.' We come more nearly within sight of such proof as we are looking for in the Sophistes, Philebus, and Phaedo, than here. Even in the Phaedo, however, what is pointed out is principally that there are ideas which will not inhabit the same body together, while others do not show a similar mutual repugnance. One explanation of the failure to satisfy expectation may be that the ideas are found to be beyond the sphere of 'our science.' Another seems to lie in the aversion which Plato up till now exhibits against the acceptance of ideas for 'man, fire, water; hair, mud, filth, and such things.' The ease with which contradictory characteristics are shown to exist in sensible objects arises from the complexity of those objects. The difficulty in the case of the ideas is caused by the comparative simplicity of those ideas which are accepted as existing. If Plato accepted ideas for 'man, fire, mud,' he would approximately reach the concreteness of the sensible sphere. The idea of man could readily be shown to be both one and many: and so with others, in proportion to their inherent complexity.

5. Such ideas as these would be ideas of *οὐσίαι*, which according to Aristotle are the only ideas that should be admitted at all. And when their admission would be an advantage, why does Plato raise any difficulty? It is not altogether because of their physical character. Some of those which he admits most readily—'bigness and smallness' for example—are in origin physical. Probably the abstractness of the latter veils to his mind the fact that they are physical, while the concreteness of the former gives that fact full prominence. And we know from Aristotle why it was that Plato felt a distaste for ideas of a concrete physical type. 'Having from his youth become acquainted with Cratylus and the views of Heraclitus, that all objects of sense are in perpetual flux, and that in their regard, science does not exist, he ended by adopting this theory as correct. And accepting as his guide Socrates, who busied himself about ethical questions to the exclusion of nature at large—and in these sought the universal and led the way in turning attention to definitions—on some such ground as this Plato took up the view that all this applied to a separate class of facts, and not to any of the sensible objects, as one could not attain a common definition of

any of them from their ceaseless mutation.' This gives the explanation of the dislike for physical ideas which appears in this dialogue; and it makes still clearer that such was Plato's earlier view, which he finally overcame. One can also see how much more simple it is to accept 'smallness in itself' as an abstract entity than 'man in itself'— g^6 than g^{n-6} , so to speak.

6. The expedient of calling the ideas patterns, an expedient of the utmost significance in Plato's eyes, traces, as we say, its origin to this dialogue. It occurs to Socrates as a sudden inspiration—ἀλλ', ὁ Παρμενίδης, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὡς εἶχειν; and it appears to exercise in the end a potent influence in expanding the contents of the ideal sphere. It is true that in the Republic we are pointedly told that only one couch has been created as a model for all; but in the Timaeus we can observe a change. There is, indeed, still a single pattern, but this is a pattern for the whole world, of which pattern the world is an image. Now a pattern for the world, one cannot but feel, is likely to be a much more complete and comprehensive thing than could be elaborated consistently with the assumption of solitary patterns for vast masses of phenomenal objects. It is quite unnecessary to enlarge upon the difficulties involved in this doctrine of the pattern so far as its application is concerned. But the necessity for postulating a pattern world at all seems inconsistent with philosophic parsimony. The tendency to imitation must indeed be firmly rooted in us if we cannot look at the world without regarding it as a copy, and calling into being another world whose only function it is to act as model for it. Yet like the 'scheme' or 'method' of salvation so dear to the heart of scientific theologians, such a view as this contains much that is attractive and satisfying to the uneasy lay mind. It seems so far analogous to a constitution with two chambers, and possibly on that ground may commend itself as conservative. But how does it add to our security? The world of sense is a fact which we have always with us, and somehow or other we make a shift to know it. That is our *ὅτι*; but apparently we cannot—so long at least as we hold that world to be sensible—rest satisfied without a *διότι*. And so we postulate, deduce, or hypostatize a second world, as a species of pattern-shop or *παραδειγματικὸν*, whose function it is to fortify us in our convictions about the first world, by giving it the appearance of being in turn deduced and not a mere fortuitous creation. Such a pattern world is in imminent danger of becoming a museum. So far as Plato's view in this dialogue and in the Republic is concerned—that there is one pattern for many copies—it is certainly, as Aristotle puts it, a mere talking of empty poetical metaphors. All copies of a pattern ought to be exact duplicates of each other. Now the very characteristic of the copies in the case before us is that they diverge widely from each other; and the pattern, if it is to be a pattern for all, must in that very act cease to be a pattern for any. We are reminded, in this view of the subject, of the 'schematism' of Kant. 'There can never, says Kant, be an adequate picture for the notion of a triangle in general. For it would never attain to that generality which enables the notion to hold good of any triangle, right angled, oblique Kant, p. 28-2 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Translated by J. H. Stirling, Text-book Kant, p. 2

angled, etc., but would be limited always to a part of this sphere.' One cannot avoid the suspicion that it is precisely this impossible 'general picture' which Plato's pattern in its present stage aims at being; and that he has been gradually forced onward to this position as a consequence of having made *χωρισμός* of the 'general notion' or 'general definition' of abstract qualities like 'the good' which he received from Socrates. Perhaps a lurking sense of this difficulty may have had its influence in making him averse to admit ideas of 'man, fire, water.'

Resumption of Analysis.

To resume, then, we see that Plato has made the mistake which later thinkers have repeated without his excuse, and which less disciplined intellects are ever prone to make. He on the one hand refers far more of our world of experience to sense or *aἰσθησίς* than actually belongs to it; while he on the other hand feels constrained to place intellect or *διάνοια* in a hostile camp of observation. The result is to him, as to all men so placed, a feeling that contradictions multiply: and his aim is, as is also the aim of such men, to reconcile those contradictions without changing his original position. Mr. Archer Hind appears to contend that he did finally change his standpoint for that of a consistent idealist. Whether or not he may have done this elsewhere, it seems certain that he does not do it here. The dualistic assumption was to him the natural, traditional, unquestioned one. The reconciliation was the great problem presented for discovery: and it was sought for as was the philosopher's stone in a subsequent age—hope never died though fruition came not.

A more searching method of investigation essential.

Parm. 135 D-136.

In looking about for his solution, he proceeds to advance the contention that dialectic, or discipline in following up trains of reasoning about metaphysical problems, is an essential *προπαρασκευή* towards success. He presses this point with much earnestness and illustrative detail, and his pronouncement upon it seems in effect to be an admission that the Socratic type of inquiry was inadequate for the present need. It is not without a certain significance that Parmenides, in now putting the subject before Socrates, chooses as examples with which to test the method the ideas of 'the beautiful, the just, the good.' Hitherto these have yielded place to others: but we know that they were topics upon which Socrates had been wont to dwell—a fact which is also hinted at in the reference to previous discussions with Aristotle; and in the words ὁρίσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τε τί, καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ ἀγαθὸν one almost recalls Aristotle's description of what 'may justly be ascribed to Socrates.' 'But to nature at large' Socrates had not turned his attention. Plato is now discovering not only that 'universal definitions' 'on the ethical virtues' must have a metaphysical basis, but that such a basis cannot be constructed at haphazard, or by taking up any question that chance may suggest, as Socrates had been accustomed to do. This is a point upon which Parmenides—so Plato was beginning to find—might act legitimately as a mentor to Socrates. 'What is the just?' may be a most instructive inquiry; but, if the answer is to be satisfactory, 'What is being?' must precede and support it. There seems no necessity to contend that Plato is discarding the reasoning used in the inquiries of Socrates on moral questions as fallacious in its own sphere, or as ill con-

135 C

ducted within its presuppositions. Rather he is feeling that those inquiries had been detached, fortuitous, wanting in system, without a secure foundation; feeling also, it would appear, that his own previous gropings in the metaphysical region had been open to the same objection; and that these defects can be removed only by making a fresh and better advised beginning. That he now proceeds to attempt. The base idea he gets from Parmenides; the method of testing his inferences from Zeno. But to the details of their historic position he is not confined. Not history but expediency leads to the compliment from Parmenides that Socrates has done well in forcing the discussion away from the physical into the metaphysical sphere. To Parmenides 'Being is One' was a faith quite as much as it was an inference, nor had Zeno's support of the doctrine been quite as detailed and many-sided as we are here led to believe. Zeno's dialectic instead of following a four-fold direction had been confined to the single contention 'if the many are, what follows to them?' It appears to be Plato's own advance upon both these thinkers, that on the one hand he applies dialectic to the One itself, and, on the other, recognizes the necessity of dealing in argument with all sides of a question.

We are now more in a position to understand the relation of the second great division of the dialogue to the first. While it is made conversationally to appear an accident, it is in reality part of the design that the argument should from this point onward be devoted to the Parmenidean doctrine or 'hypothesis' of the One. And the connection of that subject with the one hitherto under discussion has been treated as though it were more of a difficulty than it is. If we are to assume, with Grote, that the remainder of the dialogue is simply what it affects to be—an example, namely, of the mental discipline which Parmenides deems indispensable to the philosopher—then its relation to the earlier portion is determined at once beyond the need of argument. But in pressing his view with grave persistency, Grote seems rather to manifest a want of tact. Not only does he miss the literary finesse of the composition; he even raises in a gratuitous manner the question 'si un Grec peut avoir de l'esprit.' What Plato seeks is to reach his real end by apparently accidental steps, to guide the listener to a predetermined issue while seeming to let him wander at his will. The fact that much has been written upon the question is due to a belief, prevalent among students of all ages, that something more and higher is intended than a mere dialectical exercise. In very early times—among Neoplatonists, for example—the remainder of the dialogue was viewed as something allegorical, symbolical, enigmatical, in which hidden meanings lurked. Something analogous, although less credulous and whimsical, has occurred in our own time in the region of comparative mythology. The Iliad is a solar myth in which Achilles represents the sun: Antigone is the 'afterglow' of the dying day, who insists on 'burying her brother' in the west; and so in other cases. Apart from any value which may attach to such elucidations, it may be conceded that they are at once most fascinating in themselves and most plausible in their verisimilitude and adaptation to the outlines of the various stories. But they have the

Relation of the
Second Part to
the First.

serious drawback of seeming to support us in making anything out of anything. In like manner, if we are free to regard Plato's discussion as allegorical, sober criticism must quit the field. If such a conception as the ONE is spoken of 'in a mystery,' it will be found equal to any demand that is made upon it. Last century, no further gone, Thomson in his edition of the dialogue—while duly setting aside Neoplatonic extravagances—feels entitled to regard the One as synonymous with the Deity; and assigns his reasons. The One, he says, is here represented as

universitatis unica causa	sine figura
simplex ac perfectum	immobile
sine principio et fine	aeternum
	non genetabile nec corruptibile.

And is not the Deity all these? We must on the one hand begin by discarding all mythic and hidden meanings. Plato introduces myths repeatedly into his works, and when doing so he makes no secret of it. On the other hand we decline to have it exacted of us that we shall show between the two portions of the disputation a connection more precise and intimate than Plato has thought necessary in other writings. What is the proper subject of the Republic, the definition of justice or the construction of a state? How are love and rhetoric connected in the Phaedrus? Why are the Theaetetus Sophistes and Politicus so closely associated by their author? There is nothing in the sequence of parts in the Parmenides which need cause more embarrassment than any of these problems.

Certainly the second part is an exercise in dialectical inquiry, and as such its point seems to be twofold: (1) to show that the very simplest of all conceptions has many aspects from which it may be viewed; (2) to embody a type of inquiry more subtle and abstract than any with which Plato had been familiarized in the practice of Socrates. But everyone must feel that if it be this it is likewise something more. Plato had begun, as we have said, to realize that the Ethical inquiries and definitions of his master stood in the midst of nebulous surroundings. He had tried to render everything clear by the expedient of ideas 'set up in nature': but his first efforts in that direction would not bear criticism. Could any regulative or unifying principal be found which might bind all firmly and harmoniously together, and remove complications? That question seems to represent his present frame of mind. We know from the Phaedo that he had turned to Anaxagoras in search of such a principle, not with perfect satisfaction. Here we find him approaching the problem through the dogma of Parmenides. The former had said ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἔστιν δὲ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος: the latter declares τωύτον δὲ ἔστι νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκέν ἔστι νόημα, and οὐ ποτὲ ἔην οὐδὲ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν δύον πᾶν ἐν ξυνεχέσ. Neither is consistent; neither can elaborate in detail his own convictions: but each gives suggestions for constructive idealism. Plato making confession here of his own shortcomings practically approaches Parmenides with the request, Can you help me? And to whom could he more naturally go than to him who professed to have reduced

the whole problem of Being to Unity? This seems an obvious reason for discussing the nature of the One. Again, however, one of the foremost desires expressed by Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue is to see Zeno's dialectic turned upon the intelligible sphere. And here it is so turned: turned upon Parmenides' own intelligible sphere, which if not ideal in the Platonic sense is at least widely severed from the sphere of opinion, and may be said to be on the way towards idealism. Moreover Socrates was anxious to see the *ἀπορία* which Zeno had revealed as existing in the sensible sphere running riot *ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἰδεσι*: and here something of the kind actually is exhibited. The One may not be a Platonic idea, but it is at least a very abstract conception, and under treatment it presents *ἀπορίαι* in abundance. Any reader of what remains of the work must feel the full significance of *παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην*, while the result upon the One and the Many is such as can be described only in the complicated sentence with which the dialogue closes. This seems not an unreasonable account of the connection between the two parts. He who demands a 'truer inwardness' in the matter, and seeks for it, may possibly find it; but, if so, will he not find more than Plato is elsewhere in the habit of providing? If indeed we feel compelled to continue the search we might make the connection complete by assuming that the remainder of the work is a practical exemplification of the method according to which the ideal is to be brought into connection with the sensible sphere. The want of such connection has been strongly emphasized, and Parmenides has declared that to supply it is all but impossible. If we are to assume that in the sequel this difficulty is supposed to be surmounted, we must hold that the connection implied between the spheres—which is the question involved in the doctrine of *μέθεξις* or *παρουσία*—is one of dialectical necessity, resulting inevitably from the mere action of the laws of thought: must hold that the one factor when clearly realized by the mind postulates the other for its own completeness. 'One' and 'Many' demand each the other as poles or sides of a single complex conception, reminding us of the Unity Plurality Totality which we find in Kant. This surely would complete the connection of parts in a degree satisfactory to the most exacting, and would at the same moment solve Plato's problem for him in a novel and cogent manner. But while a tempting, it is a questionable theory. In the first place it supplies, as substitute for Platonic *μέθεξις*, a conception which is so modern as to be suspicious upon that ground alone. Even Aristotle's doctrine of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* must be regarded as a falling away from such a standpoint as that. Assuredly it leaves far behind anything else in Plato. In the second place it at once renders nugatory all the intellectual distress which has been lavished upon the difficulty which *μέθεξις* was found to involve; while at the same time not a hint is given at the close that a problem so remarkable has been deftly and completely dealt with upon a basis which changes the whole aspect of the question. Had Plato really made out such a connection between ideas and sense it seems likely that he would have announced it more explicitly. Finally

Is the One an
idea?

Parm. 129 D-E.

it renders inevitable a conclusion which finds favour with some, that the One represents an idea while the many are the sensible world. Is it the case that the One of this dialogue is to be regarded as an idea? The point is not absolutely clear, but on the whole the answer must be No. Various reasons make for that conclusion. First: the discussion upon the One is undertaken, as we see, just after the decision has been reached that the sphere of the ideas has no connection with ours, and that the science found with us is of a much less exact type than the other. To begin immediately after such a pronouncement a discussion which sets it at naught seems a questionable step. Again: the One is expressly said to be the hypothesis of Parmenides, and although he placed Being much nearer to the ideal region than any of his predecessors had placed their principles, and separated it from the sphere of opinion in a way which must have proved very suggestive for Plato; yet the actual distinction which Plato drew has never been ascribed to him. Moreover we find in Plato's discussion of the One bonds which connect it with space and time, a fact which at once parts it off from the sphere of ideas. Nor do we hear of an *αὐτὸν ἐν*, *δὲ εἰστιν ἐν* at this point, where, if the intention was to fulfil the expectation expressed above by Socrates, some reference to such terms seems almost essential. As little do we hear of the difficulties of knowing the One, or of the 'idea of science.' On the contrary we are told that One partakes of various ideas—*εἰ τῷ ἐν σμικρότητι ἔγγιγνεται*—like other *οὐσίαι*, in which respect it occupies a position identical with *τὰ ἀλλα*. The passage where this statement is made seems to leave no ambiguity, although others are less specific. Finally it is expressly said that both One and Others 'grow older and younger,' 'become and perish' and exhibit other characteristics of sensible existence. From all this the natural conclusion appears to be that the One, Many and Others are notions corresponding to physical originals, and that Plato is dealing with them *λογισμῷ* and *διανοίᾳ* but only up to the limits of 'our science.' What he seems to be aiming at is to turn the Parmenidean principle on all sides with the view of ascertaining whether he can incorporate it into his ideal system with advantage. The odd feature of the business upon the other hand is that after disparaging 'our' science as he does he should proceed to a detailed use of that science the course of which tends to enhance our estimation of its efficacy. But we must remember that Plato's theory of ideas is so exacting in its nature and conditions that to maintain a consistent attitude towards it is quite beyond his power. The exigencies of such a position compel him to fall away from his theoretic distinction between two degrees of science, and to go on reasoning with such sublunary intellect as mortals possess, upon topics with which it can deal, and to give this as the best substitute he can supply for a dissertation upon what moderns would call the Unconditioned.

In surveying the second and most important division of the work it will not be possible to enter into every detail. Certain general lines of remark alone can be pursued, lesser issues being dealt with in the notes.

1. As we have already noticed, the first step of Parmenides, on the threshold of the subject, is to insist that any topic chosen for debate must be discussed in a definite methodical manner. This he never did as a matter of historic fact; nor is there evidence that Zeno elaborated any such scheme of inquiry. We must suppose that Plato has himself methodized the investigation while appropriating from Zeno its keen dialectical character. His scheme at its fullest may be formulated thus—

1. If A is what follows in regard (α) to it, and (β) to not-A?
2. If A is not „ „ (α) to it, and (β) to not-A?
3. If not-A is „ „ (α) to it, and (β) to A?
4. If not-A is not „ „ (α) to it, and (β) to A?

A moment's reflection will show us that this, while doubtless a symmetrical, is really a redundant form of discussion. Its results may be fully attained without our carrying it further than the first two stages. Nor does Plato, in point of fact, carry it further here. It is true he maps out an elaborate table of eight heads or, as Grote calls them, Demonstrations, which might be supposed to correspond to (1, 2, 3, 4) α and (1, 2, 3, 4) β : with an odd one thrown in after the first two. These have been arranged in our marginal summary in two groups which may be called A and B, having under A Demonstrations I. II. IV. V., and under B, I. II. III. IV.; while the odd one appears as Demonstration A III. But, as will be seen, Demonstrations A I. and II., IV. and V., B I. and II., III. and IV. really exhibit respectively contradictory discussions upon a changed hypothesis. Thus—setting on one side A III.—we have the argument reduced in reality to 1 α followed by 1 β , and 2 α followed by 2 β . Even in this reduced shape its closing divisions are hurried through in a rather perfunctory manner with the remark *kai πάντα ποι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀ διελθεῖν εὐπετὲς ηδη ημῖν*, or again *οὐδὲ*^{165 b.} *ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διηλθομέν*. The discussion is indeed protracted beyond these limits; not however from the necessity of the case, but because Plato enters upon what, while nominally a revised statement of each argument, is really a reversal of it arising from a modification in the sense of its terms. Demonstration A II., while professedly a restatement of A I., is in fact a transformation of it covertly brought about; and the same is true of A V., B II. and B IV. when compared respectively with A IV., B I. and B III.

2. The course of the discussion, when these points are cleared up, comes to present on the one hand a deductive, negative, destructive,—on the other an inductive, positive, constructive aspect. Thus

- a. A I., 'if the One is,' ends by annihilating the One:
- A V., 'if the One is,' ends by cancelling the Others:
- B II., 'if the One is not,' likewise destroys the One: while
- B IV., 'if the One is not,' again does away with the Others.

On reference to the marginal summaries it will be seen that these results are reached in the two former cases through a resolute keeping of the One to its oneness, and in the two latter by an equally tenacious holding of Non-existence to its nothingness.

The inquiry and results are partly negative, partly positive.

So rigidly is the One to remain one that it is not allowable to call it even 'the same' as itself; while 'the One is not' is defined to mean utter absence of being in the thing spoken of. And practically the reason assigned for this stern repression of all expansiveness in sense is that, unless we guard ourselves with ceaseless care, the One will reveal such diverse characteristics as to become Many while we are occupied in examining it. Put in terms of Logic, the conclusion thus reached may be called a denial of the possibility of predication, or the concession in the case before us of such predication alone as amounts to the assertion of an identity—'the One is one.' But we must be careful not to make this denial unconditional. Plato makes no declaration against the possibility of predication per se: he merely says that, if we are to be jealous in guarding the absolute unity and simplicity of our conception, the result will be that we can say nothing whatever about it. It is natural that on its way toward this consummation the One should become *ἄτειρος*, or should gradually lose all definite characterization. In terms of Metaphysic, again, our conclusion may be stated thus—that with bare uncompromising oneness Being or positive existence is unthinkable and incompatible. Existence waxes and wanes pari passu with complexity: do away with complexity, relationship, multiplicity, and Being is no more. The point thus reached would, were Plato in reality confining himself to the position of the historic Parmenides, form the conclusion of the work. It shows what comes of rigid adherence to a hastily assumed simplicity and unity. As Dr. Jackson says, 'when the Eleatic principle is strictly interpreted it is as complete a denial of philosophy as Heracliteanism or Cynicism.'

Journ. Philol. xi.
No. 22 p. 31x.

β. In A II., 'if the One is,' the result proves that the One 'is and is not' in an indefinite number of ways:

In A IV. a similar result arises in the case of the Others:

In B I., 'if the One is not,' the same conclusion still holds of the One: while

In B III., it arises from this latter hypothesis that the Others 'seem' many contradictory things.

This is the positive or constructive limb of the argument. In it the One forms a centre for multiplex and even conflicting existence. And the principle which underlies the process is the counterpart of that which has led to the negative conclusions. We have simply to concede to the One so much of positive characterization as will save it from extinction, and to the Not-being such a sense as will allow us to speak about it. This slight concession proves to be the letting in of water. Make over but so much to the One as will let you discuss it, and this apparently rudimentary conception will develop a complexity which confounds you, and carries with it attributes as contradictory as Yes and No. For even its Not-being, if a not-being with which you can deal, proves a source of fresh predications—*omnis negatio est determinatio*. Thus, Logically, we reach the conclusion that where predication is possible it is not a mere statement of identity; and, Metaphysically, we perceive that the simplest of entities can have being only as part of a complex whole.

Let us dwell for a moment longer upon this double result: its importance in Recapitulation. Plato's reasoning cannot well be exaggerated. In the former portion of the argument (*a*) we have an attempt (A I.) to think back, under Parmenidean conditions, to a One which shall prove a 'minimum cogitabile,' or an existence in a state as simple as we can conceive. While this One is assumed to 'be,' its being is suffered to retire into the background, as Plato busies himself in reducing its character to the most naked simplicity with which being may be found compatible. When he has reached this stage, however, he comes to find that being no longer is compatible with it. This minimum cogitabile has become a minimum *incogitabile*, and by the same gate whereby it passes out of thought, it vanishes from existence. When and where qualities cease then and there being leaves us. This result is attained by consistently rejecting from the conception of the One every means by which it might break away from the most rigidly unmodified oneness. He withholds it from any share in parts, whole, inner, outer, change, on the ground that it must be truly one: he will not suffer it to be denoted by the most harmless looking synonym—to call it 'same' involves a 'different.' The One must be, in Bacon's language, strictly a vestal virgin: let it but 'change its name,' so to say, and at once pulcra faciet te prole parentem; or, to vary the figure, it may say 'I secretly laugh at my own cenotaph. . . . I arise and unbuild it again.' Preserve it, on the other hand, immaculate in its vestal condition, and you speedily find that it cannot be, cannot be one, cannot be named, cannot be known. It is gone: and with its own has dragged all other existence (A v.). If this be so when the One 'is,' shall we fare better when it 'is not'? This case is put in B II.: the reasoning is short and has the same result. As he has shut out existence by pressing home the absence of qualities, he now excludes qualities by emphasizing non-existence. If the One is not, nothing is: existence is impossible for anything apart from association with unity. The converse view of the problem is brought out in the latter half of the argument (*B*), by simply urging that the One must not be pressed out of existence, since in terms of our hypothesis it 'is.' The element of existence being transferred to the foreground a revolution follows (A II.). The One is now no longer the minimum *incogitabile* but the minimum *cogitabile*—and as a consequence it has parts, is a whole, exists in time, and in a word, goes off at once conquering and to conquer in the absorption of characteristics, until we discover that it is the Many or the Others. Would all this be upset, now, should we say again 'if the One is not'? By no means necessarily. Grant but a meaning to that assumption (B I.) and all follows. Give to the non-existent One but definiteness sufficient to admit of discussion and it will give itself variety: let it but have individuality and it will not long want for multiplicity. The whole tendency of the reasoning is very prettily summarized by Plato himself in the Sophistes, καὶ γάρ, ὡς 'γαθέ, τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ πάντως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσουν τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφουν. Τί δὴ; Τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἔστιν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἔκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν

Met. iv. 29. For $\tau\hat{\omega}\nu \epsilon\delta\hat{\omega}\nu$ in this passage read $\tau\hat{\omega}\nu \sigma\tau\hat{\omega}\nu$, and for $\delta \lambda\hat{o}\gamma\sigma$ put $\tau\hat{\omega} \epsilon\hat{\nu}\nu$: then from being logical the statement becomes metaphysical without losing any of its value. It is not at all improbable that Plato in the Sophistes has Antisthenes the Cynic in his eye, as the $\tilde{\alpha}\mu\sigma\sigma\delta\sigma \tau\hat{\omega}s \kappa\hat{a} \dot{\alpha}\phi\lambda\tilde{\o}\sigma\phi\phi\sigma$. Nay, the language of Aristotle in regard to him almost suggests that he may be referred to in our own dialogue, $\delta\hat{\iota}\delta' \dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\sigma\theta\epsilon\eta\eta\sigma$ $\dot{\psi}\sigma\sigma\tau\hat{\omega}\sigma \mu\eta\delta\sigma \dot{\alpha}\xi\hat{\iota}\hat{\omega}\nu \lambda\hat{e}\gamma\sigma\sigma\theta\sigma \pi\lambda\hat{\iota}\nu \tau\hat{\omega} \sigma\kappa\hat{e}\nu \lambda\hat{o}\gamma\sigma \dot{\epsilon}\nu \dot{\epsilon}\nu'$ $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\sigma\sigma$ $\dot{\epsilon}\xi \hat{\omega}\nu \sigma\sigma\nu\sigma\theta\sigma\sigma\sigma \mu\eta\epsilon\hat{\nu}\nu$ $\dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\tilde{\iota}\lambda\tilde{\e}\gamma\sigma\sigma$, $\sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\hat{\omega}\nu \delta\hat{\iota} \mu\eta\delta\sigma \dot{\psi}\nu\delta\sigma\sigma\theta\sigma\sigma$. Certainly the phrase $\dot{\epsilon}\nu \dot{\epsilon}\nu'$ $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\sigma\sigma$ is remarkably apposite when compared with $\dot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\lambda \tilde{\delta}\mu\sigma\sigma\sigma \dot{\alpha}\nu \lambda\hat{e}\gamma\sigma\sigma \dot{\epsilon}\nu \tau\hat{\omega} \epsilon\hat{\nu}\nu \kappa\hat{a} \dot{\epsilon}\nu \dot{\epsilon}\nu$, at the opening of Demonstration A II.

Parm. 142 B. Relation of the argument to logical rules.

p. ix.

155 E. A. III

Such is the general bearing of the discussion, a bearing which modern metaphysical theory confirms. It by no means follows, however, that each step in the reasoning is a safe one: that the details fully accord with the sketch. Of the two divisions the negative one is that which seems the more cogently put. And naturally so. It is simpler, more human, to take to pieces than to construct, to see flaws in creation than to create, to be deductive than to be inductive, to converge upon a point than to expand over a wide horizon. Such flaws in details of the argument as can be detected will be found mentioned in the notes, but there is a grave drawback to its general character which calls for notice here. This consists, as we have already hinted, in a doubtful attitude towards the logical law of Contradiction. Not only do the statements in the positive limb of the inquiry conflict with those which the negative one seeks to establish—an issue due largely to the ambiguous use of the terms One and Not-being to which we have just referred—but the repeated assertion, which marks the positive limb, that the One ‘both is and is not’ affected in a given way, seems to clash with what is the earliest accepted and most comprehensive dictum of all formal logic. It is not that Plato was ignorant of this principle—whether technically enunciated or not it must form the basis of all just argument—on the contrary he expressly states it both elsewhere and in this dialogue. Of the series of arguments the two first—A I., II.—are the most elaborately developed, the latter in particular, and at their close Plato seems to realize the difficulty with which he is confronted. In the opinion of Grote it is with the view of clearing this up that he inserts unsymmetrically Demonstration A III. In this he points out that when the One ‘becomes’ as one, it ‘perishes’ as many, or whatever the special feature may be; and he leaves the impression that the contradiction involved in ‘both becomes and perishes’ can be disposed of by this interposition of time. We are here brought into contact with a very important distinction, that between knowledge as a completed result, in which a simultaneous ‘becomes and perishes’ should be impossible; and knowledge as a progressive acquisition, in which the contradiction is not so easily eliminated. If we are to assume that the One, or any other entity, exists in an unchanging form like one of Plato’s ideas, then it comes under the law of identity or contradiction. It is what it is, as a sum total of characteristics, which individually are what they are: time has nothing to do with the matter, and ‘is or is not’ must

take the place of 'is and is not.' If our knowledge of it is perfect we know it as it is, without ambiguity. But if, on the contrary, we do not actually so know the One, or any other entity; if our knowledge is a growth or activity, which advances from small beginnings towards a fulness never realized, then the One is a centre of shifting characteristics, and each time we deal with it we deal probably with a different group of these. In the main we are likely as we discuss it to be advancing from a view which includes few characteristics to one which includes more. But not necessarily. When we reason deductively we start from what for our purpose is a given sum total of knowledge, as if it were complete, and draw from that conclusions which already lie implicitly in it—we are dealing with our knowledge as if it were acquired and stored up, and are simply satisfying ourselves as to the details which it includes. Here time does not enter, and the formal rules are the sole legitimate guides. When, on the other hand, we reason inductively or synthetically, we advance from a basis confessedly imperfect and strive to enlarge our mental possessions. Here we cannot always speak in terms of 'is' or 'is not': our knowledge does not exist, but is in process of formation: time enters as an element, and the laws of formal logic must be charily applied. And if he would receive it, this is the direction in which Plato would have to look for a reconciliation of the conflict he recognises between *αἰσθησις* and *ἐπιστήμη*. In the former he is at what miners call the 'working face,' and is quarrying out new knowledge from the ungauged sum which lies before him. In the latter he is dealing with the 'bing' of coal already raised to the pit-head, which he weighs and measures as a definite quantum by definite tests and standards. It is patent at a glance that the result in the latter case might from its greater definiteness be called knowledge or science, while that in the former, from its constant incompleteness and confusion, might seem to a methodical mind unsatisfactory in comparison. As time goes on the working face advances, while for each generation the bing represents a different total. The point, for us, is that when knowledge is in process of becoming, its condition at any moment is sufficiently uncertain to render a strict application of the laws of deductive logic uncertain and unfair: and that it is not necessarily to the prejudice of a line of argument, in such circumstances, that it seems technically a little at fault. In arguing thus, however, we are not to be held as admitting that each seeming violation by Plato of the law of contradiction is in reality such. Another glance may be taken at the subject from a somewhat different standpoint. While the laws of formal logic are invaluable as tests of an intellectual conclusion, they may yet be far from conveying a just picture of the activity which leads the mind to the acceptance of that conclusion. They represent the dissecting implements of the anatomist, or the solvent appliances of the chemist, much more than they exemplify the natural process by which is produced the complex organism with which anatomist or chemist has to deal. And if an attempt be made to exhibit that process in operation, the attempt does not at once stand condemned by reason of imperfect conformity to them. That it may be inherently defective as a repre-

sentation is possible enough, but not because it happens to jar with deductive formulae.

The significance
of argument
A III. upon
'process.'

Parm. 127 D.

3. Grote, we have said, regards the argument A III. as an attempt on Plato's part to explain apparent violations of logical law. That is not an unfair account to give of its rather unexpected occurrence in this place; yet it is one that may be overpressed. Plato no doubt feels that his previous arguments seem contradictory, and seeks to elucidate them. But the course he takes partly tends to show that the charge of inconsistency would be in some degree out of place. What he wants us to understand is that he has been dealing with the One as in 'process,' a condition in which contradictory or seemingly contradictory affirmations about it are inevitable. And he is less concerned—though no doubt sincerely concerned—to prove himself a fair reasoner, than he is to account for this phenomenon of process or becoming with which he has to do. It is another manifestation of the influence of Zeno's dialectic upon him. 'The first hypothesis of Zeno's first argument' had been directed against multiplicity. Plato, however, has accepted multiplicity; and what he sees is that his acceptance carries with it the necessity for some theory of change in all its various manifestations. This brings him face to face with another group of Zeno's arguments, that denying the possibility of motion. Zeno endeavours to show that because of the infinite divisibility of space you cannot admit that in any given time a swift runner can overtake a slow runner, as the apparently small space which divides them can itself be so divided as to become infinite. And from this he deduces the impossibility of motion. It may be urged in an ex parte manner that if Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise in a limited time, having unlimited space to cover, you can evade the difficulty by dividing the limited time as you do the limited space, and so showing that he has unlimited time in which to do it. As Being and One are equally divided—

οὐτε γὰρ τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὐτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ' ἐξισοῦσθον δύο ὄντες αἱὲ παρὰ πάντα—so space and time may be equally divided, the one becoming infinite if the other is. But this is not Plato's difficulty. He accepts here the doctrine that

p. xxxviii. time is made up *ἐκ τῶν νῦν*, and has to ask himself how the gaps between these p. xlvi., xlix., iii. isolated moments are to be bridged. Thus we again see the consequence of beginning

τοῦ μοι εἰπέ, ἀτὸς σὺ οὖτω διῆρησαι ως λέγεις;—they refuse to reunite. But Plato here offers us his theory in explanation. After the first instant or *νῦν*, during which the moving arrow is at rest, there comes *τὸ ἐξαίφνης* or the momentary suppression of time, in which timeless flash of 'unaccustomed liberty' the arrow (or the One) bridges over the barrier between the first instant and the second, thus making a start; and by similar means it retains its acquired motion through *νῦν* after *νῦν*. And what is true of physical motion is true, says Plato, of other types of change. We thus explain Becoming. This reasoning will at once suggest a comparison with Aristotle's solution of the same apparently unanswerable *λόγος*. And there cannot be a doubt that the latter is the more philosophically matured. There is something almost absurd—unless it is intentionally humorous—in the suggestion that the One

goes, as it were, behind the scenes for a moment to change its dress ; and no one knew better than Plato that, however instantaneous he might make it, the period, unless he was able to alter its character by sleight of hand, would still be but a minimum of *time*. Yet when we reflect a little we may see that the two philosophers are substantially at one. Aristotle's reply to Zeno practically is that the latter puts the dividedness of time against its connectedness, so much so as to push the latter wholly out of view, and make us think of time as divided merely, while it is no less truly connected. Now Plato in speaking of time accepts Zeno's view of its dividedness; but he says the separation of moments is overcome by $\tau\circ\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\gamma}\acute{a}\acute{\phi}\nu\eta\circ$, a something that is not divided nor even divisible. This is but an awkward way of recalling for us the other aspect—the continuous side—of time. We are made to figure time as divided and continuous not simultaneously but alternately. We think of it as discrete—continuous—discrete—continuous, and so ad infinitum ; only that he gives to the second limb of the antithesis the name of a timeless 'instantaneous.'

4. It was said above that the divergence in the results between the positive and negative limbs of the argument was due largely to ambiguity in the terms. Foremost among these ambiguous terms is the One itself. Its different meanings in this dialogue are chiefly two. It is used in a more or less logical sense as a unit of measurement, or terminus a quo in speculation : and it is used in a metaphysical sense as an entity whose existence and composition are to be comprehended gradually by research, or as a terminus ad quem. In the former of these senses it is of course quite immaterial to consider the positive character of the One: it may be concrete, it may be abstract in itself. For us it is used abstractly when used as a unit of measurement. It is more important to observe that while such is its function you cannot do with it what, as is to be feared, Plato sometimes assumes the right to do. You cannot divide it and then treat its parts as on an equal footing with itself—as new Ones. The parts of a unit are fractions, and are not to be treated as new units on a level with the whole from which they are taken. It is when viewed as a unit that the One seems to be most simple and elementary in constitution—most really one, with but the single characteristic of unity. If it be used merely as a counter we feel almost entitled to consider that we have reached a One which no argument can prove to be many. It certainly should not *be* many, but it cannot avoid implying or presupposing many. We must remember that even as so conceived it cannot be spoken of save as in relation to other similar ones in endless succession. It forms one of a multitude like itself, and it may be *any* one of that multitude. Plato may be right or wrong in his method of reaching number by 'two twice and three thrice' and 'every combination of even and odd'; but it is true that One carries number with it. To say 'one' involves the mental act of numeration; and numeration is the act of reckoning plurality. In this sense one and many, one and 'limitless multitude' are but the two factors of a single mental process. Each involves the other, and the question Whether One does not come first, is inept. When thought has reached the stage of reckoning

Ambiguous use
of terms.
The One.
p. lvii., 1. ix.

Parm. 1.43 E]

136 A.

its impressions, its consciousness that they are many and that each is one constitutes a single simultaneous decision. When it goes on to deal with any given set of impressions and seeks to find how many they are, one, in that sense, or 1, comes before two. But number and the unit of number take form together. Thus we are far removed from perfect simplicity in dealing even with the one of number. Plato admits this in practice, as well as maintains it in theory, by assuming that there are Many or Others standing over against the One from the very threshold of the inquiry.

Phys. i. 6.

Nor do we mend matters on passing to the metaphysical One, the one of existence, or what we hope may prove the simplest form of Being. In that case we have still to reckon with the problem of numeration, just discussed; and we have added to it the problem of existence, which was there in abeyance. What is Being? At least it is not identical with unity: unity does not carry objective being with it. Plato is quite right in saying that the statement 'the One is' already involves something more than One. As Aristotle points out—whether with this dialogue in his mind or not, readers must decide—even when in search of an *ἀρχὴ* or first principle we cannot accept a single one: the case requires several. To judge by Plato's language, the One to him in this aspect consists of a mental picture of a physically existing One—of a One in space and in time. Now the very simplest conception which can be formed of such an entity must treat it as a homogeneous extended thing. But in that case the circumstance that it is viewed as one is not essential; it is accidental. We are in search of the smallest unit of being and have happened to stop at this point. Unlike the unit used as measure this One may be broken up, and each portion may be called One. And such divisibility is co-extensive with thinkability. You may go on dividing so long as what you divide can form an object of thought; while again it is only as an object of thought that you can deal with the matter at all. Thus multiplicity dogs this One out of the confines of existence; we cannot reach it, do what we may. But further, it is certain (unless it be pure space) to have as a physical existence various characteristics in addition to mere extension: and these characteristics will abide with it, like those of water, in the smallest part you reach. Thus in itself, and apart from its further divisibility, this smallest part is not One in the sense of having but a solitary quality or feature. Simplify as we may we cannot arrive at what we seek: to adapt the language of Edgar in King Lear, 'the One is not, so long as we can say—This is the One.' Strip it of quality after quality, as we have already stripped it of part after part: still it remains a complex so long as we can form such a conception of it as will admit of discussion. Strive to reduce it step by step to absolutely featureless Being and it vanishes at the back door of thought as Nothing, as the unthinkable. Plato is right as regards the scope of his argument, although he may take doubtful steps from time to time.

Act IV., Sc. i.

The Many.

The Many also is a term which is not very consistently used. Frequently it is transformed to the Others, a step which, in a work dealing with the most elementary distinctions of thought, it is not permissible to take. By so treating this conception

you acquire greater freedom in developing from it fresh characteristics. The One as opposed to the Many is not identical with the One as opposed to the Others. Plato himself rightly says that only the other can be other than the others: that is, in being opposed to the Others the One sinks its oneness in order to become other than they. But there is a further confusion of thought in this connection. We have noted how Plato accepts almost unconsciously at starting the view that over against the One a body of Many or Others takes its place. The whole mapping out ^{Parm. 135 B-137.} of that model scheme of argument, which ought to form the discipline of the philosopher, is based on the assumption that the One is not all, but has Others with which it is to be contrasted. Now we have also seen that the One itself under treatment develops into Many. What difference is there between the Many into which the One thus changes and the Many originally existing in contradistinction to it? That is not a thing easy to decide. We have a many of ones, any one of which may be fixed upon as the One; this again when we examine it separates into a new Many in our hands. Have we not here, after all, the same Many or Others viewed at two separate logical moments of their existence? The development of these from a careful consideration of all that is involved in the conception of the One gives us what Kant would call the 'deduction' of the Many or Others. The contention that no argument about the One will be complete which fails to ask 'what follows to the Others,' simply exhibits us as assuming without deduction a fact which we are able if necessary to deduce. Yet Plato seems to speak as if this identity between the two sets of Many were not present to his mind. If that is really his mental position perhaps the inconsistency may be due to a cause which produces difficulty in most abstract thinking. One would suppose that discussions about abstractions would be in a sense easy, from the fact that we ourselves choose the qualities which our abstractions shall comprise, and dispense with whatever might prove superfluous. The difficulty is that, abstract as we may, we never can get the existence of these surplus qualities, and of a whole surplus world, swept clean out of our thoughts. This background of superfluous qualities and existences colours our abstraction in spite of our will. The analogies and materials of our ordinary experience, which our abstraction is supposed for the time being to have flung aside, dog our argument like the consciousness of evil deeds, and force themselves surreptitiously into trains of reasoning which purport to disregard them. We cannot keep our thinking consistently at the level of our abstractions. Could we do so we might find arguing about them to be tolerably simple and satisfactory. This line of reflection may partly explain the introduction by Plato of the conception of Others or Many even at the moment when his hypothesis seems to be that the One exists alone, the sophism being partly veiled under the plea that every side of a question must be considered.

Yet another ambiguous term is Not-being. It need not detain us. Sometimes ^{Not-being.} it is used comprehensively as an absolute denial of existence to the subject under review, at other times it is used in a restricted sense as meaning a something which

is not the same with that subject. In the former case it closes the discussion, in the latter it forms in itself a fruitful theme of discussion. On this topic Plato's views are much more clearly elaborated in the Sophistes. One's first impulse undoubtedly is to think that while Being may be exhibited in many shapes and degrees, Not-being is unvarying, is always *ταῦτὸν ἔαυτῷ* and has but one signification. But we come to learn that in this as in the popular contrasts between the sexes great error may be committed. It is fallacious in discussing the characteristics of humanity to devote a chapter a piece to the soldier, the explorer, the lawyer, the statesman, the trader, the man of letters, the poet, the man of science, and then to round off the work with a supplementary chapter on woman. 'You clash them all in one, that have as many differences as we,' says Tennyson's prince. And so with each tint of Being a separate shade of Not-being will be found to correspond. In the Sophistes we learn that while each order of Being necessarily *μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος* yet *ἡ θατέρου φύσις* is ever standing by which *ἔτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἔκαστον οὐκ ὄν ποιεῖ*. Nay, while *περὶ ἔκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἔστι τὸ ὄν*, it is not otherwise on the negative side—*ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν*. For we have on the one hand *τὸ ὄν*, but on the other *τὰ ἄλλα*, and the number of the latter whatever it be represents the exact number of times that *τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι*. Opposed to *τὸ ὄν* in its most abstract form stands *τὸ μὴ ὄν* in an equally absolute form, and the latter is the negation of existence. But for modified or definite Being you have similar Not-being. The *θατέρου φύσις*, he says, *φαίνεται κατακερματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη*—for every 'named variety' of science a suitable variety of negation is told off as partner.

What is the One
metaphysically?
An atom?

5. What, we may ask, are the characteristics which as the work progresses come to attach themselves to the conception of the One? When viewed metaphysically it is, as we have said, an extended unit. The characteristics which distinguish it beyond this are few and simple, as will appear from the marginal summary of the text. First it has existence, parts, whole, beginning (in space), middle, end, and shape. Then it has various qualities which Aristotle would describe as *πρός τι*: thus it is same—different, like—unlike, greater—equal—less, fewer—as many—more, older—same age—younger. Again it has position relative to itself and others; thus it touches and does not touch, is still and in motion, in space (*χώρα*); while it has also all the affections incident to existence in time. It would appear then that it is one—and *any* one—of a multitude of extremely elementary homogeneous extended things existing and moving in space and time. While such a One is in certain ways much more than the One of Parmenides, we cannot but feel that in a vital respect it is much less. It has altogether ceased to symbolize the Universe. No one on the other hand can fail to see the strong general resemblance between such a picture as this and the doctrine of the Atomists. True, Plato does not specifically say that space is empty, but his discussions of touch and motion tend in that direction; nor does he set a limit to divisibility, yet neither does he allow division to swallow up the One or the Many. It is impossible to imagine that Plato was ignorant of

the views of his contemporary Democritus—though, as we have seen, he never names him—and one is almost tempted to suppose that it was at least one among the objects of this dialogue to show how Zeno's dialectic if perfected and applied to the One would from the Eleatic doctrine develop the Atomistic. An analogy from modern speculation might be found in an attempt to affiliate the Monads of Leibnitz to the Substance of Spinoza.

But if the One is thus reduced in many respects very much to an atom, what, we may still ask, is to Plato the most fundamental requisite of existence for it, or for anything; and how to him does existence develop itself? We cannot single out any one characteristic from which all others are to be traced, but the vital features appear to reduce themselves to three at most: (α) it is in time, (β) it is in space, (γ) it has individuality. From these characteristics the others are variously deduced. Its individuality, however, is very elementary, and is more logical than physical: the One is 'different from the others' and 'one with itself.' In the course of his argument Plato adopts either of those three characteristics which suits him as the fundamental one, and from that establishes the existence or non-existence of others. From his reasoning it would appear to result that the beginning of existence to our minds for anything whatever is the acquisition by it of distinctness in some form or other. And our knowledge of it, or its existence for us, grows with the increasing number of relations in which this distinctness can be affirmed. Of the three characteristics given above we are in the habit of thinking that the order of natural priority is that in which they are named—that quantity has a more elementary character than quality. Plato does not appear to share that preconception. He would seem to imagine that a distinctness of quality or individuality might be to us the primary ground for assigning to a sensation a distinctness of quantity. From having a sensation of such and such a quality we are led to ascribe to it such and such a quantity or succession in space and time. This is not laid down as a principle by Plato, but the course of his argument rests upon a tacit recognition of it.

6. The point at which Plato looks most as if he were going to abolish his units by the process of endless division is in what we call argument B III., which deals with the condition of the Others on the assumption that the One does not exist. On that assumption this argument represents the more favourable possibility for the Others, and it reduces them to an unmanageable phantasmal chaos bordering upon annihilation. In the less favourable possibility which follows in B IV. they are actually done away with, the conclusion being that 'if the One is not nothing is.' This, however, seems rather to be a negative argument in favour of the Democritean contention that division must stop somewhere. Nor is the conclusion unsound, although both Plato and Democritus support it in a somewhat mechanical and materialistic fashion. Stated in terms of modern Metaphysics it would stand pretty much as we have put it already—that simultaneously with the removal of definiteness, numerability, clearness; of $\tau\circ\mu\acute{e}trou$, $\tau\circ\pi\acute{e}pas$, thought and existence vanish. At best there can remain that

Summary of results.

chaotic multiplicity which carries with it the possibility of existence, and which, if we please, we may call 'sense,' or in Platonic terms that 'which seems to be One, but is not; to have beginning, middle and end, but has not.'

It may be said, then, in general terms, that the work is undertaken in the interests of the ideal theory and consists in an attempt to appropriate to the uses of that theory the doctrine and dialectic of the Eleatic school, as a unifying, regulating, harmonizing and sustaining influence. But the process of appropriation brings into relief a fact startling indeed, yet not unperceived by Plato. This dialectic, when turned upon its own dogma, demonstrates that while unity is beyond doubt a principle essential to the very possibility of thought and being, it is at the same time parent to a complexity of which its sponsors did not dream: the problem of philosophy, even when we seek to solve it with the weapon of unity, unfolds as we deal with it deeps within deeps of unexpected multiplicity and complication. To adapt a familiar and weighty judgment *ει οὖν τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐν σοὶ πολλά ἔστι, τὰ πολλὰ πόσα*; We must accept the One, for we cannot dispense with it. But the atomistic element likewise claims a voice in the ultimate conclusion; and, if we are to repose upon the doctrine of Unity, that unity will not be the mere absence of plurality and diversity, but a something capable of reconciling in a new whole such elements as these, and such contradictions as are formulated in the closing sentences of this dialogue. The general scope of the discussion from the beginning, with its successive exponents, may not unfairly be presented thus. ZENO: Can a sensible Many be assumed to exist without involving hopeless contradictions in thought? No: yet what we see does exist. SOCRATES: Can even an ideal Many be postulated without leading to difficulties equally insurmountable? No: yet there it is. PARMENIDES: Setting aside Manies of both kinds, can so simple a hypothesis as the existence of One be maintained without bringing in its train every complication of which its presence is expected to relieve us? No: yet without the One nothing is.

Divergences from other commentators.

Dr. Jackson,
Journ. Philol.,
vol. xi., No. 22.

Phileb. 16.

p. lvi.

It has been said above that no attempt is here made to reproduce in orderly sequence the views and reasoning of previous commentators. One or two points of divergence from them, however, may perhaps be referred to. A reader of Dr. Jackson's remarkably acute analysis and criticism of this dialogue will have his attention arrested by the following among other conclusions. The One is regarded as an idea, or as representing the ideal sphere, and there is assumed a graded progress—*ἐν, πολλά, ἀπειρά*—from it through 'kinds' or 'classes' to the 'limitless multitude' of sensible existence. This theory is undoubtedly attractive, especially when read in connection with the statement in the Philebus that we must not proceed at once from *πέρας* to *ἀπειρία*, from *ἐν* to *τὰ ἀπειρά*, but must interpose certain definite *πόσα* as connecting links. But reflection tends rather to discourage belief in this hypothesis. We have already given reasons for questioning the view that the One is an idea: certain of its characteristics seem to preclude that supposition. Again, Zeno at the beginning of the work places *ἐν* and *πολλά* in such contrast as to leave no doubt that in his mind

they comprise jointly all existence. At the close of the first part, Parmenides speaks of $\epsilon\nu$ and $\tau\alpha\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$ in a similar sense; while throughout the dialogue $\tau\alpha\ \delta\lambda\lambda\alpha$ and $\tau\alpha\ \pi\omega\lambda\lambda\alpha$ are used as convertible terms. Whatever may be symbolized by these expressions, it would be difficult to draw a distinction between either of them and the phrase $\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \pi\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota$ which occurs at intervals; nor does Dr. Jackson appear to cite any evidence that $\pi\omega\lambda\lambda\alpha$ and $\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha$ differ generically in their use. In other respects also Dr. Jackson is inclined to discover finer and more detailed distinctions throughout the work than in these pages it has been found possible to recognize. This may be natural, even perhaps imperative, from his point of view, according to which the dialogue is a late work; on the opposite supposition, such distinctions are not essential.

Throughout this introduction, the doctrine that the ideas are absolutely severed Zeller. from the sensible sphere has been emphasized, but not more so than the language of Plato, etc., the text would seem to require. Speaking of Plato's works at large, Zeller does not p. 316. regard such a doctrine with favour. He admits, indeed, that many expressions and arguments occur which point towards such a doctrine; but adds, 'We must nevertheless question its correctness.' He goes on to explain his contention by showing that the supposed sensible world is in reality Not-being, and that all Being centres in the ideal sphere. To elucidate his position would lead us far: but when all has been urged in its favour, it still lies open to the objection of not explaining the difficulty so much as explaining it away. Zeller is himself constrained to say 'whether the above-mentioned p. 318. difficulties as to the theory of Ideas do not, after all, reappear in an altered form, is another question.' From what does the necessity for philosophic inquiry, idealistic or other, arise but from a sense of difficulty? When Plato feels that difficulty, he begins like other thinkers by an attempt to solve it. But he is soon led to shake its dust from his feet and flee towards 'a city which hath foundations whose builder and maker is God,' and of which the characteristic is that it shuts the original and now somewhat despised difficulty outside its everlasting doors. Zeller urges that 'these objections p. 317. [in the Parmenides and elsewhere] to the doctrine of ideas would not have been suggested by Plato, had he not been convinced that his theory was unaffected by them,' a view with which Dr. Jackson sympathizes. But is it the case that every thinker, even every great thinker, is fully provided with a reply to all objectors? He is not driven from his position by objections: he feels, it may be, a conviction which objections fail to shake. But he may be sensible that he has not met the objections, nevertheless. Galileo was a very great man, yet when he was questioned about the fact that water would not rise in a pump beyond thirty feet, and reference was made to the doctrine that 'nature abhors a vacuum,' he could but say, half in jest, that nature seemed to abhor only a thirty foot vacuum. It was left for Torricelli to throw light upon the mystery. We must not, then, attempt to explain away what Plato actually says on the ground that it involves difficulties for which we think we have a solution after the lapse of two millenniums.

Life of Sterling,
viii., 'Coleridge'

p. xlvi.

Parm. 134 E.

'The difficulties reappear in an altered form.' What difficulties? Those which to the metaphysician spring eternal: those which centre in the relation of subject and object, which are so protean, and of which the solution looks so like juggler's work, that one almost takes refuge with laughter in Carlyle's sarcasms about "sum-m-mjects and om-m-mjects" 'uncertain whether oracles or jargon.' Perhaps the sharpest form of this contrast with which philosophy is acquainted is that between Plato's ideas and the many of sense. A less pronounced type of the difficulty is that which arises between the 'cognitive faculties' of more modern speculation—what Plato would call 'our science'—and an 'external world.' In the latest stages of metaphysical evolution, the great problem has been to reclaim the external world from its antagonistic externality, to include it in a revised sphere of consistent idealism. But granted that we are right in taking this course, admitting that thought is the parent of all things, even of its own object; still 'the difficulties reappear in an altered form.' Why this persistent pronounced unmanageable sense of objectivity and separateness? We demonstrate that sense is swallowed up in thought, and yet suspect that we have achieved but a Pyrrhic victory. What is sense? That is the mystery of mysteries. We may eat away all its substance with our 'forms of sensible perception,' and our 'categories,' but we cannot lay the spectre—'expellas furca tamen usque recurrit.' We have been saying and have seen Plato admitting that the world as we know it cannot be a world of sense. Is it meant then to affirm that sense has no existence? Or are we not rather bound to exclaim 'Αλλὰ μὴ λίαν θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος ἦ, εἴ τις τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν ἀποστερίσει τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι?' It is, of course, granted that 'beauty, goodness, slavery, bigness,' and even that 'man, fire, water, hair, mud, filth,' in their collective sense, are not perceived by the senses. Sense lies in the sphere of 'you and me, bits of wood and stone.' Now while 'beauty' may comprise many qualities, 'man' comprises many more; and 'you' still more, more indeed than anything except another you. Do we then approach to sense as we add qualities, and recede from it as we remove them? Not properly. 'Beauty' and 'man' are simply figments of the mind and have no connection with sense other than this, that they were deduced from the observation of individual 'sensible objects.' 'You' also can become a figment of the mind when one thinks of, and does not see, you. But it is true that sense attaches only to individual things, to things with a maximum of qualities in their several kinds, in short to existing—as opposed to conceived or imagined—things. Are such things then sensible objects? If not, no other such exist. Let us take a simple case as put by a thinker of anything but transcendental tendencies. According to Dugald Stewart, when you read a letter that which can be referred to sense is—not the comprehension of the contents, but—simply the perception of 'black marks upon white paper.' In reality this is much too liberal an allowance. Not by sense but by judgment do we recognize the substance to be paper and the marks to be black upon white. And our judgment would not cease to operate, however visionary the distinction might become, until all distinction had vanished; that is, until sense ceased from exercise for want of any object. The

very recognition that this state had supervened would itself be a judgment, though it might be delivered with hesitation. In a word so long as consciousness lasts, thought is at work, and the more alive consciousness with a view to detect and expose pure sense may become, the more completely does it fail of its purpose. As we might say, 'had ye but seen, then had ye been without thought; but now ye say "*We see,*" therefore your thought remaineth.' All that we can declare about sense is, that it is the vanishing point of knowledge—'who steals my sense steals trash, 'tis something, nothing:' while yet we feel that from that very vanishing point, the guarantee of all knowledge is given—'or hear'st thou rather pure etherial stream whose fountain who shall tell?' Thus we may say that the world of experience, which Plato has been seeking to dominate by his ideas, is all intellectual; if by this we mean that the sensible element in it is reduced to a minimum incogitabile at the start: or alternatively that it is all sensible if by this we mean that it never becomes transcendental. Either view is an advance upon the dualistic hypothesis of a composite world, half 'mind,' half 'matter.' Yet neither solves the problem of Whence all comes, and why this absolute freedom of sense from the control of the will? The sense function is within us like a well of water springing up unto everlasting life. So we must confess: nor is it part of our duty to pursue the inquiry further.

Of the Parmenides it may be said among other things that it forms as it were Conclusion. a vestibule to those vast and mystic halls which are trodden by the metaphysician. And already while passing through it we see the corridors appear which lead respectively to the courts of Being and Becoming. So impressive and intricate are the surroundings that we pause for breath, uncertain whether the building has two great co-ordinate wings, or whether it consists of an inner court approached through an outer. Certainly there are those who have sought a home in each mansion, and the thoughts called forth by the image of either are such as may separately dominate the mind. Few can form, fewer still can convey to others, an adequate conception of the sphere of Being. It is so completely withdrawn from experience. At best we must shadow it forth to ourselves as some Hall of the Chosen, some consistory, so to speak, of Egyptian Deities who have not stirred since time began. In such a picture an 'idea of motion' is a fatal flaw: the stillness there is absolute, and may not be disturbed. But has it not the atmosphere of a museum? In the midst of Being we are in death. It is said that certain subtle poisons kill by preserving the tissues, by stopping the action of growth and also of decay. Are we thereby the gainers? Our gain is loss: our being not-being. Can anyone have in truth seen this hall of Being; or do those who depict it dream that they were there? Not even Parmenides can vivify the description. The other to us seems less remote. It is as though the well of sense bubbled upward through a chink in the floor, bursting into the air and rippling over the pavement with multiplex undulation and ceaseless sound, reflected and reechoed from the roof and walls. To that we have seen something analogous; we are in sympathy with it, if imperfectly. But always the question returns upon us—Wo kommst du her? wo gehst

du hin? And Heraclitus our interpreter cannot tell. What is this Becoming? Is it after all Being, but *κατακεκερματισμένον*? Are we to solve the enigma of Being-Becoming on the analogy of the ‘continuous-discrete’ in space and time? Or is the antithesis Being and Not-being, with Becoming as bridge? Is *τὸ ἐξαιφνῆς*, ‘that odd thing the instantaneous,’ another name for Becoming? Or are both awkward adumbrations of the Ego—that one among many, that whole among parts, that *πόπος* amid *πενία*? Or does reasoning perhaps end here, and do we in the language of ‘divine madness’ rave about things unutterable? Finally, does speech fail, and must we wander backward in the expressive silence of *ἀνάμνησις* to God who is our home? Such are among the thoughts which suggest themselves to those who have come under the influence of Platonic speculation: thoughts tinged indeed by modern currents, and pressing forward through modern channels, but not the less truly tracing their source to the great fountainhead of all metaphysics.

THE TEXT.

I.

IN an edition, even of a single dialogue, which bears a relation so unusually close HISTORICAL.
to a special manuscript, some introductory remarks upon the manuscripts of Plato in AND CRITICAL.
general, with details in regard to certain of them in particular, are not only natural
but will almost be expected. It is hoped that what follows may be of service
to beginners in palaeography and in textual criticism. At the same time it is the
work not of an expert in these branches of study but of a tolerably instructed layman.
The writer knows only six Platonic manuscripts at first hand, and these he has studied
under all the difficulties and disadvantages which attend a comparative beginner, and
with but a limited time at his disposal.

1. The earliest edition of Plato's works appears to be that of Aldus Manutius, Editions.
published at Venice in 1513—the year of Flodden—a work which must have cost
infinite labour, and in regard to which its editor says that he would wish its errors
removed, even at the price of a gold piece each. Perhaps this edition was published
too soon: at all events the one which caught the attention of the world of letters was
not it but that edited by Serranus and Henricus Stephanus, and published at Paris in
1578, in three volumes folio, with a dedication to Queen Elizabeth. This has ranked
ever since as the editio princeps, and constitutes the standard of reference for all
succeeding scholars. The dialogues are arranged in what the editor calls *συγγραφαι*, of
which the fifth 'ad quam contulimus Physica et Theologica,' includes the Timaeus,
Timaeus Locrus, Critias, Parmenides, Συμπόσιον, Phaedrus, and Hippas Minor. The
Greek has a Latin version running in parallel columns with it, and the lines of the
page are subdivided into successive groups by the letters A, B, C, D, E placed in the
margin. It would seem to be the intention that these letters should be placed at
intervals of ten lines; but they often stand opposite the space between two lines, and
the contents of division E vary considerably, as the Latin and Greek, according as each
happens to be the less compact, expand in turn to the whole breadth of the page
at the foot. In our text A is omitted, and the other letters are placed opposite those
lines which include what seems to be the commencement of each division, so far as
that can be determined, in the original. Ste. III. 126 means Stephanus, vol. iii.,
page 126. These great editions of Aldus and Stephanus—or of Bauldie and Steenie
as, with fond familiarity, we may say—are not 'critical editions' in the modern sense
of that term. They appear each to be based largely upon one Ms., selected partly

on grounds of convenience—Schneider considers that in the *Laws* at least the original of Aldus was the Venetian Ms. called by Bekker Ξ , No. 184, which has no special authority—and where a difficulty arose any other accessible Ms. was consulted, or resort was had to conjecture, no great care being taken in giving references. Stephanus says that he puts in the margin conjectures that occurred as the book was passing through the press. This somewhat easy-going and self-reliant method of constructing a text appears to have continued till the close of last century, the edition of Heindorf being, according to modern German authorities, a brilliant example of it.

2. Immanuel Bekker represented, if he did not inaugurate, a new era in this respect, alike for Plato and for Greek texts in general. He subordinated conjectural emendation to a thorough-going comparison of manuscript data. Personally he collated with more or less completeness some 77 MSS., and classified their readings in the apparatus criticus of his edition, which was published early in the present century. Of all the important MSS. the only one apparently which Bekker never saw was the Clarke manuscript in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. It had been brought to England a few years before, and Bekker used the collation of it published by Gaisford, saying 'nolui actum agere.' His method seems to be in some sense that of a dispassionate eclectic. He inserts in his text the reading which he considers the best, wherever he may find it, and classifies the others at the foot of the page. No manuscript which he has collated is ignored on the ground that its readings are for any reason valueless. At the same time he clearly indicates that his study of the various codices had led him to place two or three of them on a much higher level than the remainder.

3. Editors since Bekker have largely acted upon the result of the comparison of manuscripts at which he had arrived. They select what they regard as a pre-eminent MS., constitute their text mainly from it, and use the remainder only in extremity or for purposes of subsidiary illustration. Hermann, for example, selects without hesitation the Clarke MS. as his authority for all those works which it contains. While Aldus and Stephanus appear to have been guided less by critical principle than by some form of convenience in selecting one codex as their basis, editors like Hermann have reversed the process, and decide entirely upon the apparent strength of the evidence in favour of the manuscript which they elect to follow.

4. Lachmann, who comes rather earlier than Hermann, is referred to by German scholars as the forerunner of yet another method in textual criticism. Good examples of how he deals with MS. data are to be found in his editions of the *Testament* and of *Lucretius*. There he endeavours to simplify the materials available by classifying the various codices, and affiliating them one to another. On this principle a derived manuscript is at once set aside in favour of its original. Such genealogical groupings of manuscripts may be made with some approach to certainty, and inferences even are possible from existing ones backward to their lost archetypes. According to Schanz and Jordan the critic who first adopted this method in dealing with the text of Plato

was E. Peipers in his *Quaestiones criticae de Platonis Legibus*. Since that work Götting. 186 scientific simplification of our authorities has been the prevailing tendency in constituting the text of Plato's works.

What, then, are the materials at our disposal? On the mere announcement that the known MSS. of Plato number at least 147, one would be disposed to infer that if a sound text cannot be extracted from such a collection individual conjecture will do little for us. But in reality the number mentioned gives a false view of the position. For no portion of Plato's writings are there nearly 147 independent authorities. Many of these codices consist of mere isolated and constantly varying fragments, bound up in miscellaneous collections. Others again are of very late date, and the probability that such are derived from early originals now lost is extremely remote. Even the seventy-seven collated by Bekker, supposing them to be all independent, do not all cover the same ground. The codices which contain a half or more of Plato's writings number about a score, while those which can be drawn upon to illustrate any given dialogue form an uncertain and shifting quantity. The text of the *Parmenides*, as given by Bekker, is based upon the evidence of seventeen MSS. The number noted by Schanz as available amounts to thirty-two. The number employed or discussed by scholars since Bekker varies between these two totals. From the entire number of 147 three have been pitched upon by the unanimous verdict of scholars as occupying a position of clear pre-eminence. These three, like almost all the large MSS., follow the order of the dialogues given at the beginning of this work as that of *Thrasylus*, and may be briefly described as follows:—


Designation.	Abode.	Contents in Tetralogies.
A (Bekker), or 1807.	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.	VIII., IX.
ꝝ „ or Clarke 39.	Bodleian Library, Oxford.	I.-VI.
t „ or Append., Class IV., I.	Biblioteca Marciana, Venice.	I.-VIII. (as far as Rep. iii.: the rest of the works by other hands).

It will be seen that ꝝ and A contain in the aggregate, with the exception of tetralogy VI, the whole of Plato's works, to which A adds the Definitions and seven Spurious Dialogues, while t gives nearly all, but partly by later hands. The grounds upon which scholars select these three from the mass are several:—(a) Their age: the two first are clearly the oldest in existence, while the third, if younger than these, seems older than almost any other. The transmission of written works, however careful, tends at each fresh step to introduce fresh departures from the original; and the earliest copies reduce that danger to a minimum. (β) The care with which they have been written, taken in conjunction with their age (for texts admittedly late may also be careful): this is a feature which impresses the most casual observer, and tends to inspire great confidence. (γ) The evidence adduced by modern scholars with a view to show that many, if not all, of the remaining MSS. can be traced back to these. The

The Manu-
scripts.
Martin Woh
in Fleckeisen
Jahrbüch. 1
pl. Band 1
1887.

Martin Schar
Studien zur
Geschichte de
Platon. Texte
p. 20. Würz
1874.

relative sizes of these very famous codices may be pretty accurately estimated from the following diagram, which represents them at $\frac{1}{8}$ of their actual measurements:—



Further back in the history of Plato's text we cannot go directly; but ingenious attempts are made to do so constructively. As A and Ι are among the earliest extant examples of minuscule MSS. it seems not improbable that any MS. from which they may have been copied would be written in majuscules or capitals. This would tend to increase its bulk, and as each of them is a large volume, it seems very likely that their archetype or archetypes would be in two volumes. Now in t we have at the close of the Menexenus, in the original hand, the words $\tauέλος \tauοῦ α' βιβλίου$: yet this MS. is in one volume. Schanz cites the same phrase at the same place

<sup>t f. 197 verso,
col. 2, line 4
from foot.</sup>

<sup>Stud. p. 24, and
Hermes x, 1876.</sup>

from Ms. Angelicus C I 4, which also consists of but one volume; from Laurent. 59. I.; and finally from the Vatican Δ-Θ, Nos. 225 and 226, where, although the MS. consists of two volumes, the words $\tauέλος \tauοῦ πρώτου βιβλίου$ occur on folio 196 r. of the second. The inference drawn by Schanz is that we have here an old tradition that the works of Plato had been at some time in two volumes, the first of which contained Tetralogies I.-VII., and the second the remainder. To such a second volume Paris A actually corresponds, while the Clarke MS. represents the first, save that it would appear to have been taken from a copy from which the short Trilogy VII., which closes with the Menexenus, had dropped away. Various scholars attempt to fix the probable length of the lines in the early copy or copies now lost, on the basis of what is called stichometry. MSS. were measured by the unit or line in which the earliest copies were written, that is by $\sigmaτίχοι$, corresponding to the average length of a hexameter, and Galen is quoted as giving the length of some medical definitions in this way. He says that two, one of thirty-nine, and another of eighty-four syllables, are $οὐ πλείονες τῶν ὀκτὼ ἑξαμέτρων$. This gives sixteen or seventeen syllables to the line, which is considerably less than the length of line used in the Clarke MS., but exactly corresponds to that of the passage omitted by this MS. on page 33 of this edition. But the subject is not without difficulties, and controversy upon it is keenly kept up. Schanz thinks he can form an estimate of the probable date of the archetype in the

<sup>Wachsmuth in
Rhein. Mus.
xxxiv, p. 38, 481,
1879. Galen de
placit. Hippocr.
et Plat. viii, 1.
169 D.</sup>

following manner. From the uniformity of existing MSS. in certain passages he naturally concludes that they faithfully represent in these the reading of the original. But he finds the passages in question quoted by writers like Eusebius and Theodoreetus with words omitted. Accordingly he considers that the archetype cannot have been so old as to have formed the text from which these men drew their quotations, and, therefore, it is more recent than 400 A.D. That may be correct, but it postulates two things, neither of which is quite certain—that there was but one text prior to our existing MSS., and that those Christian writers quoted it with verbal precision. The first of these assumptions is altogether disputed by A. Jordan on the understanding that the second is correct; but both may be erroneous. One scholar alleges that he can detect two features of the archetype of Η—that it did not belong to the most correct class, and that it was not easily legible.

Fleck, Jahrb.
Suppl. Bd. 7,
1873-5.
J. S. Kröschel
in Fleck, 123,
p. 553, 1881.

Another statement is made by Galen which is very interesting. He refers in his fragment upon the medical passages in the Timaeus to τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἀντιγράφων ἔκδοσις and says that in the Timaeus this edition reads δὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεως where other authorities give ἐξ for ὑφ'. Upon this has been reared a structure of very tempting hypothesis which may be thus summarized.

Our MSS. all read ὑφ' and thus show their connection with the edition of which Galen speaks. Scholars, including Cobet, are strongly of opinion that 'Αττικῶν is short for 'Αττικιανῶν, and Harpocration refers to readings of Demosthenes found ἐν τοῖς 'Αττικιανοῖς, while Dobree remarks on the resemblance between Η and codex Σ of Demosthenes, and holds that they are both from 'Αττικιανά. Now we find in Lucian Πρὸς τὸν ἀπαιδευτὸν two references to a very celebrated βιβλιόγραφος called Atticus, whom some hold to be the person here spoken of. Others, among whom are Birt and apparently Cobet, think that T. Pomponius Atticus is meant, and regard the editions here referred to in the light of publications carefully effected by his orders, not copies written by his hand: to which opinion Birt elsewhere adds, that these Attic editions were noted as written in the στύχοι to which reference has just been made, and of which traces are pointed out in the Clarke Ms. The same view has been recently maintained by H. Usener, who constructs in this connection a theory about the transmission of our Platonic texts which is eminently fascinating, but dependent a good deal upon assumptions in excess of his data. It may be well to give on the one hand what seem to be the data, and to add on the other the assumptions.

Dräse on
Philipp. ii.
Fleck, Suppl.
Bd. 7.

Birt, Antike
Buchwesen,
index, Atticus.

Nachrichten v.
der König.
Gesellsch. der
Wissensch.
Götting. No. 6,
1892.

DATA.

1. Apellicon's private library, which comprised those of Aristotle and Theophrastus, was taken to Rome by Sulla, and submitted to the editorial scrutiny of the celebrated scholar Tyrannion of Amisus.

2. Diogenes Laërtius does not really affirm that Thrasylos invented the arrangement of Plato's works in tetralogies, but only that he adopts it: in any case Diogenes adds words (*καὶ τίνες*) which show that others had a part in it, of whom Albinus names Dercyllides. Again, Varro, when referring to the Phaedo, says, 'Plato in quarto . . .

This library included care- Strabo xiii, p.
ful if not original copies of 6^o.
Plato's works.

Varro knew the arrangement of dialogues by tetralogies, and his learned friend Tyrannion was its originator. (We may add that Cobet holds Varro, L. L. vii, Thrasylos to be quite distinct 37.)

Alh. Isagoge.
Varro, L. L. vii.

appellat': and the Phaedo is the fourth in the Thrasylean arrangement. Finally, speaking of the possible origin of this grouping by fours, Usener says (referring to his *Philologie und Geschichtswissenschaft*, p. 22), 'nun kennen wir einen bedeutenden griechischen Grammatiker, der sein noch in vielen versprengten Resten erkennbares System der Philologie mit durchgeföhrter *Viertheilung* aufgebaut hat. Das war Tyrannion von Amisos.'

3. Atticus was a great scholarly publisher like Aldus, and had in his service a large staff of trained copyists and assistants, either paid or bought.

How much one desires to accept all this as historical fact! Yet even the initial assumption of an 'Attic' origin for all our MSS. rests on no broader foundation than a single νφ' for ἐξ.

To resume: the following are the characteristic titles and endings of the works in the three chief manuscripts.

A	Α	t
Πλάτωνος	[Πλάτωνος]	[Πλάτωνος]
Πολιτεῖαι ἡ περὶ δικαίου	Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἴδεων. λογικός	Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἴδεων
A'		
Πολιτείας ἡ περὶ δικαίου A'.	Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἴδεων.	Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἴδεων.

In Α t Πλάτωνος occurs in the case of the first dialogue and is then dropped: but in t it reappears at the Republic as in A, and while the first and third books of that work read πολιτείας, the second gives πολιτεῖαι. We may thus infer (1) that in the original the word Πλάτωνος appeared at the beginning, and at the Republic and Laws which have more than one book: (2) that the adjectives in -κός, which occur in Α unsymmetrically, are not original, but may trace their origin to such a phrase as occurs in t after the title of the Euthyphro, ὁ λόγος ἐριστικός. The kernel of the title lies in the form Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἴδεων both at the beginning and at the end of each work; and this exactly corresponds with the description given by Diogenes of the titles employed by Thrasylus. He says, διπλαῖς δὲ χρῆται ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς ἐκάστου τῶν βιβλίων· τῆς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, τῆς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος. ταύτης δὲ τῆς τετραλογίας, ἣτις ἔστι πρώτη, ἡγεῖται Εὐθύφρων ἡ περὶ ὄστιον· ὁ διάλογος δὲ ἔστι πειραστικός· δεύτερος Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, ἡθικός: and so on. Here it is quite clear that Εὐθύφρων ἡ περὶ ὄστιον is the title from 'name' and 'subject' given by Thrasylus, while the words ὁ διάλογος δὲ ἔστι πειραστικός are explanatory words added by Diogenes in giving his account, which dwindle to ἡθικός, λογικός, etc., as the description proceeds. We thus see that the phrase ὁ λόγος ἐριστικός at the beginning of t, and the adjectives in -κός throughout Α, have been added to the original titles of Thrasylus by some

from the contemporary and friend of Tiberius; so that in the case that he really invented the arrangement, it might still be as old as Varro.)

The ἀντίγραφα Ἀττικιανὰ are his editions: Tyrannion was his editor. Our MSS. of Plato descend through this channel from the library of Aristotle.

one who had probably read Diogenes. This circumstance strengthens the conviction that all existing texts may be traced back to the Thrasylean recension, but it does not decide the question as to whether there was numerically but one archetype. When one gets so far backwards to an original source, the chances of appreciable divergences between separate copies of it become very small, so that our existing MSS. might be due to different originals of the same edition so to speak, without our being able to detect it from their text. Nay, the evidence rather, if anything, leans that way, since A is written in pages of two narrow columns, and t in larger pages of two broader columns, while \mathfrak{A} is written in smaller pages without columnar divisions.

What now are the materials available for the construction of our text? The MSS. used by Bekker in editing the Parmenides are the following, which received their designations from him.

\mathfrak{A} , Oxford: ГВСDEFHIQR, Paris: Δ, Rome: ΛΞΠΙΣΥ, Venice. To these must be added t, Venice, which Bekker does not collate for this diaioque; and others which he did not know, as those collated by Stallbaum g, a, b, c, i, Florence, Zittav., a, with Tub., Tübingen, and Ces., Cesena, which have come into notice more recently. Here then, without reckoning one or two others, we have a list of twenty-seven, and the question to be determined is the relation in which they stand to each other. As it happens only the first is dated, and while the subscriptio containing the date tells us as usual something about the writer, his employer, and his pay, it tells us, also as usual, nothing about the place of writing, and nothing of the Ms. copied, two points which for textual criticism would be more important. We are thus left to deal with circumstantial evidence, which, besides its somewhat inconclusive character, has all its value dependent upon the assumption, natural enough no doubt, but not inevitable, that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a Ms. is likely to trace its origin as a whole to a single source, and that thus proofs for parts hold good for the whole. No one can give even a glance at the collation printed in Bekker's edition without being struck by the remarkable recurrence of the group $\mathfrak{A}\Delta\text{IIDR}$ in support of the same readings. Not only do they occur together 85 times alone, but they appear in many other cases along with varying groups of other authorities. It is evident that they are a closely related family. But in that family there appears to be an inner circle. This will be clearer from a glance at the following figures:—

$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\text{IIDR}$ + various others occur together many times.

$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\text{IIDR}$	"	"	85
$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\text{IID}$	"	"	37
$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\text{II}$	"	"	36

Manifestly the connection between the first three of these is extremely intimate. Not only the number but likewise the character of their coincidences testify strongly on the point. Now, as is noted by Schanz, there is at the same time quite a different and equally strong bond of union between them. All three give the Theaetetus with

Studien, 46 ff.

a gap of considerable extent, from 208 D πάντα μὲν οὖν to 209 A τὸν σὸν λόγον, or nearly half a page of Stephanus. All the rest which contain the Theaetetus, however they may otherwise differ, would appear to agree in not having this gap, and accordingly Schanz here finds proof of the existence of two families tracing their origin to different sources:

- a. that of which \mathfrak{A} is the chief member and which has the gap;
- $\beta.$ „ t „ not the gap.

Tub. does not give the Theaetetus; but Schanz refers it to family α on other grounds. And he says in general, that while family α agree closely, family β differ widely. In this edition it has not been possible to deal comprehensively with all the existing MSS. The writer's personal study has been confined to $\mathfrak{A}\Delta\text{ITub.t}$. Upon family β he takes the testimony of Schanz, which is that all other members can be traced back to t as original. Evidence of a very convincing character is given in support of this conclusion, and whether it is actually established or not, there can be no doubt at all that t is by many degrees the most important member of the group. In the case of a dialogue which has a text so little injured as that of the Parmenides investigation need go no further. We pass then to the consideration of family α . Here also—subject to the exclusion of certain dialogues in certain MSS.—the decision of Schanz is similar. All can be traced back in the last resort to \mathfrak{A} . Let us take them in the order $\Delta\text{ITub.DRQg}$. It will be sufficient to give selected specimens of his evidence.

Schanz on the
Manuscripts.

Δ . (Our dialogue occurs in vol. Δ of the MSS. $\Delta\Theta$.) This codex, which he places in the 12th century, is, except in tetralogy i. and the Gorgias, a transcript—though not necessarily direct—from \mathfrak{A} .

Δ 360 verso
361 rect. and
vers.
 \mathfrak{A} 184 r. and v.
Steph. 34 E, 36 B.

(1) In the Philebus it has a series of short gaps, filled in by a younger hand, which correspond to similar gaps existing in \mathfrak{A} and caused by injuries to the lines at the outer edge of the leaf. The writer of Δ , or of its original, would seem to have found those injuries and to have left spaces which he thought sufficient for them, and these a later reader of Δ has filled up from another source. \mathfrak{A} itself has been similarly but very coarsely completed since the date of Δ or of its original.

Δ 433 v. 434 r. :
326, 237.
253 E, 254 E.

(2) In the Phaedrus two similar blanks occur which have never been filled up. They represent an injury in \mathfrak{A} caused by the dropping of some dark acid upon the text. The condition of Δ shows that at the time the injury had affected only the back of the one leaf and the front of the other, since Δ gives the words which were on the other sides of these respectively. In our time the acid has eaten its way through both leaves.

(3) Δ also omits from time to time words which form complete lines of \mathfrak{A} . Examples of this are the following—though the first seems a very long line:

404 B Cratylus, Δήμητράν τε καὶ Ἡραν καὶ Ἀπόλλω καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ Ἡφαιστον καὶ Ἄρη.

123 C Theages, -σθα, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ὄνομα, ἦ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα; καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἔγωγε.

198 D Laches, γέγονεν, ἀλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων, ὅπῃ γίγνεται, ἀλλη δὲ

All these statements it was intended to verify in Δ , but through unavoidable circumstances the task was omitted. Schanz concludes by giving reasons for holding that the derivation of $\Delta\Theta$ from \mathfrak{A} is mediate rather than immediate.

II.TUB. Schanz held at one time that these MSS., while closely related to \mathfrak{A} , were not directly transcripts from it, but connected with it in some other manner. According to Wohlrab, however, Schanz has changed his opinion and finally holds that both could be directly traced back to \mathfrak{A} , but without stating his reasons.

DR. These Schanz holds to be closely connected with II. D in particular agrees in many ways with II, and where it differs, the difference betrays the connection. A test case occurs in the Parmenides, οὐκοῦν ἐπέπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνός ἔστιν, οὐτε τὸ ἐν ἔστι τὰλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἄλλα^{157 B.} τοῦ ἔνός [ἔστιν οὐτε τὸ ἐν ἔστιν. ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνός] ἦν. The words in brackets are a repetition of part of what precedes. The writer's eye, after he wrote the second ἔνός, seems, on looking up, to have caught the first, and so he repeated the words ἔστιν. οὐτε τὸ ἐν ἔστιν: then glancing up again he seems to have caught ἄλλα in place of τὰλλα, and so he wrote ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνός: finally he seems to have caught the second ἔνός, and so he went on ἦν. This mistake reappears in D, and it seems to originate with II rather than to come from some common source, for II is largely characterized by such blunders which are sometimes corrected and sometimes not. If II be indeed the source, then the younger D by reproducing so peculiar an error reveals its own origin. Now R does not extend beyond the Parmenides, and Schanz gives from this dialogue several cases in which II DR combine to present readings peculiar to themselves, and again other cases in which the two last agree in differing from II. His inference is that D coming from II develops new features of its own, and that R being drawn from D exhibits some of the latter's peculiarities.

Q is a Ms. cited by Bekker in the Parmenides as far as to 129 A: of it Schanz merely remarks in a note, Q.. gehört zur Sippe D.

g is a Florentine Ms. collated by Stallbaum, which Schanz places in the same group with Platocodex, p. those of which we have been speaking; but as it contains only a fragment of the Parmenides,^{54.} and is not intrinsically very important, no more need be said of it.

Such then is an enumeration of those codices, which, according to the greatest recent authority upon the question, rank apart as the most reliable guides for the formation of our text. Does a minute study of them in so far as the Parmenides is concerned yield any further evidence tending to support, or alternatively to weaken the verdict given by Schanz? They may be dealt with in the same order.

As confirming the division into classes, we may take the following evidence:—

Fresh comparison.
son.
^{143 E.}

a. τρία δἰς εἶναι καὶ τρία δῖς; so all \mathfrak{A} Δ II TUB. DR.

b. „ „ „ δῖς τρία; so t and all its followers. This case is important, because the MSS. appear all to be wrong, the true reading τρία δἰς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς; being preserved or suggested very faintly in the margin of \mathfrak{A} , where it has been either overlooked or inserted late. Again we have a. τίνι δή; b. τῷ δή; and a. δέξιν νοοῦντι, b. δέξιν νοοῦντι—which are also^{139 B., 165 C.} noteworthy. Let us now take the members of the a family in order.

Δ. Vat. No. 225. In regard to this codex, various facts are to be noted.

1. For the word Παρμενίδης \mathfrak{A} Δ, and they alone, read throughout Παρμενείδης.
2. In \mathfrak{A} the phrases τί δέ; τί δή; τί δαλ; all occur as questions or as parts of questions. The last is much the most frequent, occurring twenty times, and being in each case, with a single doubtful exception, a substitute upon an erasure for one of the other phrases. In everything but the erasure Δ faithfully reproduces this peculiarity of \mathfrak{A} .

3. The word ἀεὶ occurs forty-three times. In the first twenty of these it is written αἰεί. In the rest, beginning 147 D, the first i is erased and the α joined to ε by a longer line than

usual, save in the solitary case 147 E where *æl* looks original. Apart from signs of erasure,
158 c. this striking difference of usage is exactly copied in Δ, only that in one place the word has dropped out.

4. We find a series of patches or mistakes occurring in words at the outer ends of the first lines in the following pages of this edition.

p. 16	<i>-σίας</i>	Δ δέες	p. 21	<i>μορίωι</i>	Δ μορίων.
,, 17	<i>δυοῖν</i>	,, δύο	,, 25	<i>με-</i>	,, patched.
	<i>περ ἄν</i> (l. 2)	,, <i>περ δ</i>	,, 28	<i>που</i>	,, <i>του.</i>

On each of these pages there is, as on many others, a stain at the corner of the Ms. which precisely covers the letters misread.

5. The readings of $\mathfrak{A}\Delta$ may be compared in a number of places where they are such as to arrest attention. More examples might be quoted, but the most striking only are given, and for convenience the readings of II and Tub. are added.

Text.	Ἄ	Δ	Π	Tub.
127 C ἀναγυγνωσκομένων -κόμένων ^ο	-γινωσκόμένων ^ο	γιγνωσκομένων	-γιν-	
128 A ὁ περ σύ, δῆν περ σύ, ἐν φὺς ἐν ἔφης	„ „	„ „	„ „	„ „ ἐνέφης
129 D ἐρεῖ ἐρῆ	ἐρῆ	ἐρῆ	ἐρῆ	ἐρῆ [η for ει frequent]. in all.
διαιρήται	-ρεῖται	-ρεῖται	„ „	-ρῆται.
130 B αὐτὴ δίμοιότης τὸν—παρμ.	αὕτη ὁμ. τόν τε παρμ.	αὕτη ἡ ὁμ. „ „	αὐτὴ δίμ. (τε erased)	αὐτὴ ἡ δίμ. τόν τε παρμ.
C αὖ τῶν τῇδε δῆν	αὔτῶν. ἡ δῆν	„ „	(ἡ) erased)	αὔτῶν. ἡ δῆν
D ταύτῃ ἵστῳ,	ταύτῃ ἵστῳ	„ (‘ patched)	τ. ἵστῳ	„ (a θ on τ.).
E αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις	αὐτὸν ἀ.	αὐτὸν ἀ.	αὐτῶν ἀ. (ω patched)	-τὸν ἀ. changed -τῶν
131 B οἶον εἴη ἡμέρα ἡ C ἡ σῦν ἐθέλ.	οἰονεὶ ἡμέρα εἴη εἰ ὁ. ἐ.	„ „ so all	{ οἶον ἡ ἡ. εἴη ἡ μ. κ. αὐλ.- as Η save οι- μία { (ἡ) on eras.)	
I32 A αὖ που μ.	αὐτοῦ μ.	„ „	αὐ [eras. = 2 letters with ω on it] μ.	as Η.
B προσήκη	-κει	„ „	„ „	„ „
C ἐπὸν νοεῖ	εἰπὸν νοεῖν	„ „	„ „	„ „
I33 A ἐκεῦνό τῷ	-νῷ τῷ (ψ on eras.)	-νῷ	„ „	„ „
D παρμενέδην	-νείδη	„ „	-νίδη	-νίδη ^v patched, ε erased.
E δούλου ὃ ἔστι	δούλου ἔστι	δ. ἔστι	adds δ later	δ. ἔστι (δ later).
I35 D οὗτος, εἰπεν, I36 B καὶ αὐθις αὖ	οὕτως εἰ-	„ „	„ „	„ „
C ὑπετίθεσο ἐάν τε	-θεσθε· ἄντε	,(contracted) „ (no ·)	„ „	a gap here. „ „
διόψεσθαι	-σθε	„ „	, (αι altered)	-σθε (αι later).
ὑποθέμενος τι ἵνα	-ος τίνα	-ος τίνα	-ος τίνα (later τίνα)	-ος τίνα

Text.	Α	Δ	Π	Tub.
D δεώμεθα	δεόμεθα	"	"	"
I37 A διανεῦσαι	-νύσαι	"	" (a " patched)	"
B πραγματιώδη	"	"	"	-τειώδη
E ἀπέχῃ;	ἄν ἔχῃ (orig.)	ἄν ἔχῃ	"	"
ἐπίπροσθεν γ;	-σθεν εἴη;	"	"	"
I38 B ἔαντὸ εἴη	-τῷ εἴη	-τῷ εἴη	" (η patched)	"
τι εἴναι μὴ	τι εἴη μὴ	"	" (εἴη changed (η changed to ν, and to εἴναι) above later).	
D ἀμείβων	ἀμείβων	"	"	"
E ἐγγιγνόμενον ...	ἐνγ-... ἐν γ-	"	"	"
νεται				
I39 B πῆ δή;	πίνι δή :			" (τέλη divided).
E οὔτε αὐτῷ	οὐτάνι αὐτῷ (or αὐ.)οὔτ' ἄν αὐτῷ	"	"	"
I40 B τὸ ταῦτὸν πεπονθὸς τ. ταυτὸ π.	τ. -το\ (ends line) π.	as Α		"
E καὶ ἀνισότητος	κ. ἴσοτ-	"	"	"
I41 B διαφέρον ... φόρον	"	"	"	"
C ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν	ἀ. γὰρ ἀν	"	"	"
I42 B φανῆ;	φανείη;	"	"	"
οὐ γὰρ ἄν	ἄν omitted	"	"	"
D []	words dotted	undotted	words omitted	words omitted.
I43 C τινε ὁ... ἀμφοτέρω: τινέω ... -τερα:	τινεώ ... -τερα:	"		τινέω (" added later) -τερα
D σύνδο	οὐν δύο	"	"	"
I47 B μορίων... μορία·	-ίου ... -ίου	"	"	" (οὔτε twice, αὐτὰ).
I48 A τῷ ἀνομοίῳ	τῷ ὅμ.	"	"	"
I49 E τι [ἄλλο]	τι ἄλλο	, (τι)	"	as Δ.
I50 D ἐν ἔχετον	ἐν ἔχέτω	"	"	"
I52 D τῷ νῦν	τῷ, νῦν	"	"	"
οὗτερ	οὐ πέρι	οὐ πέρ ^x (x erasures)	εἰ περιεγ-	
I54 C νεώτερον δ' αἱ	ν. δ' οὐ:	"	" (γίγνεται above, later)	, (γίγνεται in marg., later).
I55 A γὰρ αὐτὸ εἰς	γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς	"	"	"
I57 C μετέχει αὐ πγ:	-έχεται πγ	"	"	" (πῆ).
I58 A αὐτὸ_ἐν	αὐτὸ_ἐν (' erased)	"	αὐτὸ_ἐν	as Π.
I60 D οὐδὲν γὰρ ἤττον... γὰρ omitted	as Α, but in text.	all omitted		as Π.
εἴναι				
I61 E μετέη	μετίη	"	" (no')	as Α.
I62 A τῇ τοῦ εἴναι ἀνήστει so: corr. in marg.	no corr.	orig. = τοῦ ^x η εἰ. d. (xeras)	as Α.	
C μεθίσταιτο	μηθίσταιτο	, (-τὸ)	μεθίσταιτὸ (patched)	μηθίσταιτο.
I63 C ἄρα εἴναι δύναιτο εἴναι omitted	"	εἴναι in marg.	as Α.	
D οὔτ' ἄν λαμβάνοι οὔτ' ἀναλ-	"	οὔτε ἀναλ-	as Α.	
I64 E δόξει, εἰπερ	δόξειεν, εἴ.	"	"	"
I65 B τούτου μέσα σμ.	τὰ τοῦ -σου and	"	"	"
δὲ διὰ	δὲ omitted			

Text.	\mathfrak{A}	Δ	II	Tub.
C ὁξὺ γνόντι	ὁξύνοντι	ὁξύνοντι	as Δ	as Δ .
δεῖ φαίνεσθαι	δῆ φ.	„	δεῖ φ.	as \mathfrak{A} .

Adding this to the evidence which Schanz has produced, readers will be disposed to admit that his case is established—that Δ is derived from \mathfrak{A} . At the same time facts exist which slightly weaken the first vivid sense of conclusiveness. Take the following :—

1. The scribe in Δ in very many cases, though not in all, omits the v at the end of such forms chiefly as $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota v$, $\epsilon\sigma\kappa\epsilon v$ when the succeeding word begins with a consonant; although the practice in \mathfrak{A} is different.

2. A few cases occur in which the verbal endings ϵi and $o i$ and similar ones are transposed in the two MSS.

3. A few such divergences as $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\chi\epsilon i s$ for $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\chi\epsilon i$ (middle), $\tau i s$ for τi .

4. Also mere blunders such as $\chi\rho\nu\sigma\nu$ for $\chi\rho\nu\sigma\nu$, $\iota\sigma\theta i$ for $\iota\sigma\theta i$, $\eta\delta\epsilon a$ for $\iota\delta\epsilon a$, $\sigma\omega\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\nu$ for $\tau\eta\nu$, $\tau a i$ for τe ; and varieties of spelling such as, occasionally, $\gamma\iota\omega\sigma k-$ for $\gamma\iota\gamma\omega\sigma k-$.

5. The following small words are left out :—

136 B ἦ [εῖ] μὴ.	οὐ τι οὖν ἄλλο [πάθος] πάσ-	145 C περιέχοιτο [τὸ] ἐν.
	χοντος.	D Ἀδύνατον [γάρ]: ends a line.
E ἐγὼ μὲν [οὖν] ὁ Παρμ.		148 B δέ [γε] πάθος. δέ γε on a cleaned space II.
137 C τὸ [ἐν] ἐκ μερῶν.		149 E ἔστον [τέ] τινε. So II.
D οὐτ' [ἀν] ἀρχὴν. So II.		152 E ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ [νῦν] ὅταν περ ἦ (a νῦν immediately above).
138 E τὸ [δὲ] ἔξω part of a phrase written on an		158 C ὅσον ἀν αὐτῆς [ἀεὶ] δρῶμεν.
erasure.		164 E εἴτερ ἐν [μὴ] ἔσται.
142 C ἄλλο [ἢ] ὅτι.		

6. Two larger gaps occur :—

150 D After writing the first $\dot{\nu}\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\chi\epsilon i v$ [καὶ $\dot{\nu}\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\chi\epsilon i s$ θαι ... the writer goes on at the second ... $\dot{\nu}\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\chi\epsilon i v$] μήτε $\dot{\nu}\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\chi\epsilon i s$ θαι: thus omitting nearly four lines.

158 B δτε μεταλαμβάνει [αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνει].

7. Two transpositions occur :—

No. 4, p. lxxxii. 142 E τὸ ὄν $\iota\sigma\chi\epsilon i$ αἰεὶ for τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ $\iota\sigma\chi\epsilon i$. This ends the third line of 162 recto in \mathfrak{A} (page 17 of this edition): and as shown above the ends of the two lines preceding it are also patched.

166 B Δ reads ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota v$ οὐδὲ δοξάζεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλὰ τάλλα οὐτε $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota v$.

Of these we may say that (1) has no significance: a scribe with a bias on the question of using v ephelkystikon might give effect to his views on principle. The remainder are such slips as occur in every Ms., even the most careful. Some of them easily explain themselves, and might be paralleled from \mathfrak{A} itself, and they give no suggestion tending against the idea of a derivation from \mathfrak{A} . With regard to the large gap in 150 D, the second $\dot{\nu}\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\chi\epsilon i v$ does not come so nearly below the first in \mathfrak{A} as to give a ready explanation of the error; but the writer of Δ has, after writing the first of them, to turn his own page, which gives room for a mistake. So too at 166 B after writing $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota v$ he has to turn his page, besides which he is hurrying to be done. At the utmost, the errors marked (5), (6), (7) may support the theory of Schanz, that the derivation of Δ from \mathfrak{A} is at second hand.

II. Ven. No. 185. This Ms. is described in the catalogue as saeculi circiter XII.: it is most carelessly written.

The following facts deserve notice in regard to it:—

1. The title, while omitting $\eta\theta\kappa\sigma$, has ornaments and an ornamental initial letter which bear a strong resemblance to those of \mathfrak{A} .

2. The dialogue opens with three lines which are verbatim et literatim identical with the three first in \mathfrak{A} —for the writing of π above the τ in $\tau\omega v$ and the omission of ι adscript in $\tau\hat{\eta}\delta\epsilon$ form no difference. The fourth line is longer by η , the fifth by $\phi\omega$; and then the lines gradually diverge. Yet in spite of gaps in the text they always tend to come back to the original identity; from which they again separate themselves. Thus, taking the paging of this edition, the following lines are identical in the two Mss.:—

PAGE.	LINE.	PAGE.	LINE.
6	12	21	24, 25 last and first of a page.
8	13, 14	22	29
9	22	25	12
10	5, 6	31	32, 33, 34
11	18	32	1, 2, 3
12	30 new page in II.	34	29 new page.
13	20	37	28, 31
17	10, 25		

The opening three and the consecutive six on pages 31-32 are very noteworthy.

3. The spelling $\pi\alpha\rho\mu\nu\epsilon\iota\delta\eta\varsigma$ occurs, though in a way that might escape notice, in the title, and twice in 130 A, while the ϵ of the diphthong is erased in 127 A. Elsewhere the spelling is $\pi\alpha\rho\mu\nu\iota\delta\eta\varsigma$.

4. The word $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ varies its spelling, but not with that adherence to the changes of \mathfrak{A} which is observed in Δ . We have $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ 34 times, $\alpha\dot{\epsilon}\iota$ with erasure twice, and $\alpha\ddot{\epsilon}\iota$ seven times.

5. The original hand in \mathfrak{A} writes almost invariably $\phi\hat{\alpha}nai$ (for $\phi\alpha nai$), while a later hand corrects it. This accentuation is in II so uniform that after a certain point it ceased to be noted in collation. Much the same holds with $\hat{\iota}\sigma ov$ for $\iota\sigma ov$.

6. A glance at the comparison of readings given above will show that in the great majority of cases II agrees with $\mathfrak{A}\Delta$; and more might be given.

7. Cases occur in which II differs from Δ but agrees with \mathfrak{A} :

138 D	$\epsilon\nu\tau\nu\alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\dot{\nu}$	$\alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\dot{\nu}$ with erasure after α \mathfrak{A} . $\alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\dot{\nu}$ II.
139 B	$\alpha\dot{\nu}\theta'\epsilon\sigma\eta\kappa\nu$	$\alpha\dot{\nu}\theta'$ \mathfrak{A} II.
143 D	$\sigma\mu\chi\gamma\dot{\iota}\alpha$	$\sigma\mu\chi\gamma\dot{\iota}\alpha$ \mathfrak{A} II, erasures at the gaps and after α .
152 B	$\hat{\iota}\pi\epsilon\rho\beta\hat{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha$	$\hat{\iota}\pi\epsilon\rho\beta\hat{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha$ \mathfrak{A} eras. II $\hat{\iota}\pi\epsilon\rho\beta\hat{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha$ —a line through σ from β to $\hat{\iota}$.
155 E	$\pi\epsilon\rho\dot{\iota}\tau\dot{\iota}\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda$	$\pi\epsilon\rho\dot{\iota}\tau\dot{\iota}\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda$ on erasure \mathfrak{A} . $\pi\epsilon\rho\dot{\iota}\tau\dot{\iota}\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda$ II.
165 B	$\epsilon\nu\phi\alpha\nu\sigma\theta\alpha:$	$\epsilon\mu\phi\alpha\nu\sigma\theta\alpha:$ \mathfrak{A} patched.

Here again we have very considerable support for the view that II descends from \mathfrak{A} . It is, however, not quite so strong as in the case of Δ , and the counter evidence is stronger.

1. In every case $\tau i \delta\alpha\iota$ is wanting, being replaced by $\tau i \delta\epsilon$.
2. Exclusive of considerable repetitions and omissions, there are about a hundred small divergences in the text including (a) some small blank spaces or blots, (b) a good many variations in

the use of final *v* (not always ephelkystikon), (γ) some transpositions, (δ) several variations in terminations as *εὐθέως* for *-έος*, (ϵ) some patchings, (ζ) some omissions of single words, (η) a number of obvious blunders, (θ) a good many deviations that do not admit of any classification. While many of these differences are of little moment and a good many suggest their own cause, not a few are not easily explicable, nor can it always be determined whether they are due to the original writer or another. At the same time few can be called suggestive or symptomatic. Here is one, however,

137 B καὶ ἄμα ἐμοὶ

καὶ ἄνω ἐμοὶ, changed in different ink to καὶ ἄλλως ἐ. II.

A palaeographer will at once see that the meaningless *ἄνω* could much more readily be derived from *ἄμα* (carelessly written or read) in old minuscules than in majuscules, nay, that in minuscules the two words are remarkably similar *ἄμα*, *ἄνω*. This makes it at least probable that the original of II was in minuscules, and thus at least improbable that it was older than \mathfrak{A} .

3. A disproportionately large number of important omissions occur, which will be discussed immediately. If any of these were in the original of II, it could not have been \mathfrak{A} ; and must at least have been a somewhat careless copy of \mathfrak{A} , if not from a distinct source.

4. The word *κατέχον*, 148 E, and the phrase *οὐδὲν ἥπτον γινώσκεται τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι*, 160 D, which appear in the margin of \mathfrak{A} are entirely wanting in II, a circumstance which could hardly be accidental.

Of these arguments against deriving II from \mathfrak{A} , the first and fourth do not count. The word *δαῖ* is always on an erasure in \mathfrak{A} , and the words just quoted are in the margin in an old, but not the original, hand. We have only to suppose that II or its original was copied before these changes were made in \mathfrak{A} . Arguments (2), (3) are more serious; but they may be greatly weakened by the allegation of downright carelessness in II. Its writing is of very unequal size, and to one who has seen really fine caligraphy, repulsively ill formed. Apart from that, marks of inattention are frequent.

129 D The words *ἀμφότερα ἔὰν ... ταῦτὰ ἀποφαίνειν* are written twice, and the two editions differ. The first has *καὶ* before *πολλὰ* and *-νει*, altered *-νη*, for the infinitive: the second omits *καὶ* and reads *ἐν ταῦτα* and *-νειν*. The second is coarsely scored out. This oscillation between *-νει* and *-νειν* helps to explain several cases where \mathfrak{A} has the infinitive and II the other termination—as in *τί χρὴ συμβαίνει*. Perhaps the writer intended to insert his *v* by the familiar — above, and forgot.

130 D *εἰς τιν' ἄβυθον*—is in II *εἰς τινὰ ἄμνθον*. But the *μ* is carelessly written, and may quite possibly be intended for the old minuscule form of *β* which resembles our *u*.

135 A *μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ* appears as *μάλλιστα εἴη, πολὴ*.144 E *διανενεμημένον* has one of the syllables *νε* omitted.

147 D The words *προσαγορέεις ... οὐκ ἔκεινο* which form a line in II are written twice, and then, together with half the following line to *πολλάκις*, are coarsely ruled out. This blunder rather makes p. 21. for a derivation in some form from \mathfrak{A} . It will be seen from our text that after writing *οὐκ ἔκεινο* the scribe's eye might very readily be caught by the *ἔκεινο* above it, which would lead to the repetition.

149 E The following form lines in II :—

τὰ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἔνος [οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἄλλο ἐλάττων ἢ αὐτὰ
ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἔνος] μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἅρα οὐκ ἀν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν
καὶ τὰλλα ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἔνος οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ὅλο ἐλάττω ἀν

Here the words in [] have obviously been inserted out of place, and the mistake was discovered. They are obliterated by a coarse line and dots. This is another case which rather supports a direct derivation from \mathfrak{A} . Let the reader look at our text. After writing to $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\delta$ the scribe glanced up and p. 23. his eye caught $\tau\omega\dot{\nu}$ $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\delta$ in the following line. He then wrote on in that line till he reached $\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega$ when, looking up, his eye caught $\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega$ two lines above. He then altered $\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega$ to $\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega$ —writing v through the ω —and went on with the words $\dot{\eta} \alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\alpha \dot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha \tau\omega \dot{\epsilon}\nu\delta$, where he completed the circle and found out his mistake. It is the double parallel of position in our text

$\dot{\epsilon}\nu\delta$	$\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega$
$\tau\omega\dot{\nu}$ $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\delta$	$\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\tau\tau\omega$

which speaks for \mathfrak{A} as the original.

152 C $\lambda\eta\phi\theta\acute{\epsilon}\eta$ in II is near an injury in the parchment and is written $\lambda\eta\phi\acute{\epsilon}\eta$.

152 E II has

$\text{ο}\ddot{\nu}\text{τ}\epsilon \nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\delta\text{o}\nu \dot{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\epsilon\text{i}\nu$

$\text{o}\ddot{\nu} \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho : \tau\delta \dot{\epsilon}\nu \dot{\alpha}\rho\alpha \tau\delta \dot{\iota}\sigma\omega\text{o}\nu \alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\delta \dot{\epsilon}\alpha\text{u}\tau\delta \kappa\alpha \gamma\text{u}\gamma\text{u}\text{m}\epsilon\nu\kappa \kappa\alpha$
 $\delta\nu \text{o}\ddot{\nu}\text{t}\epsilon \nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\delta\text{o}\nu \text{o}\ddot{\nu} \pi\text{r}\epsilon\sigma\beta\text{u}\tau\epsilon\rho\delta\text{o}\nu$

This is repeated with $\tau\delta \dot{\iota}\sigma\omega$, and the repetition is coarsely cancelled. Here again our text shows p. 26. how the mistake may have arisen—after writing the second $\text{o}\ddot{\nu}\text{t}\epsilon \pi\text{r}\epsilon\sigma\beta\text{u}\tau\epsilon\rho\delta\text{o}\nu$ the scribe may have reverted to the first, which is directly above in \mathfrak{A} .

157 B Here comes the case cited by Schanz in which D agrees.

p. lxxxii.

164 B For $\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\text{o}\nu$ divided between two lines II gives $\ddot{\alpha}\text{-}\lambda\lambda\text{o}\nu$.

165 A For $\phi\acute{\alpha}\text{n}\tau\alpha\sigma\mu\alpha$ II reads $\phi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\mu\alpha$ which suggests mere inattention.

165 B For $\pi\dot{\alpha}\nu \tau\delta \delta\nu$ II gives $\pi\dot{\alpha}\nu \pi\dot{\alpha}\nu \tau\delta \delta\nu$.

Before dealing with the cases of omission it will be convenient to speak of the next Ms. on our list.

TUB.—This codex, which is also called Crusianus from having been got by Martin Crusius, a professor at Tübingen, in 1560, contains what it calls $\tau\alpha \dot{\epsilon}\pi\tau\alpha \tau\omega\dot{\nu} \Pi\lambda\alpha\tau\omega\nu\omega$, viz., the Euthyphro, Crito, Phaedo, Parmenides, Alcibiades I. and II., and the Timaeus. The writing which is very neat and carefully formed is regarded by Schanz and Fischer as belonging to the 11-12th centuries, which would make it older than II. Its numerous omissions are supplied, when they are supplied, by a much later hand. A comparison of the readings given above will show that this Ms. stands very closely related to \mathfrak{A} II. It is to be added that the name $\Pi\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu\delta\eta\delta$ is always written with an erasure before the ϵ , so that the text had originally given the diphthong, which shows a clear connection with \mathfrak{A} . But, on the other hand, evidence may be adduced which tends to show that the connection with II is still more intimate. Thus we have the following:—

Text.	\mathfrak{A}	Tub.	II
128 D $\dot{\nu}\pi\dot{\alpha}\nu \nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\delta\text{o}\nu$	$\dot{\nu}\pi\dot{\alpha}\nu \nu\acute{\epsilon}\delta \delta$	$\dots \nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\delta\text{o}\nu \dots$	$\dots \nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\delta\text{o}\nu$
129 D $\tau\alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\alpha \dot{\alpha}\text{p}\alpha\phi\acute{\alpha}\text{v}\alpha\text{e}\nu\text{e}\nu$	$\dots -\nu\epsilon\text{e}\nu$	$\dots -\nu\eta$	$\dots -\nu\epsilon$ changed to $-v\eta$.
130 A $\tau\omega\dot{\nu} \sigma\omega\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\text{t}\alpha\text{t}\alpha$	so	$\dots -\tau\eta\tau$	$\dots -\tau\eta\tau$ with v cancelled.
130 D $\tau\alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\alpha \dot{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha$	so	$\dots \dot{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha (\theta \text{ later on } \sigma\tau)$	$\dot{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha$ (above is $\epsilon\gamma\omega \eta\kappa\omega?$).
130 D $\tau\iota\tau\epsilon' \ddot{\alpha}\beta\text{u}\theta\delta\text{o}\nu$	$\tau\iota\alpha\beta\text{u}\theta\delta\text{o}\nu$	$\tau\iota\alpha \ddot{\alpha}\beta\text{u}\theta\delta\text{o}\nu$	as Tub. (but β may be μ).
133 D $\delta\delta\text{o}\nu\delta\text{o}\nu \delta\delta\text{o}\nu\delta\text{o}\nu$	δ omitted	δ added later	as Tub.
135 E $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\text{e}\acute{\alpha}\text{s} \dot{\epsilon}\nu \tau\omega\dot{\nu}$	so	$\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\text{e}\acute{\alpha}\text{s} \tau\omega\dot{\nu}$	letters $\sigma\epsilon\nu$ patched.
136 C $\delta\delta\text{o}\nu\delta\text{o}\nu \delta\delta\text{o}\nu\delta\text{o}\nu$	so	$\delta\delta\text{o}\nu\delta\text{o}\nu$ (scrape after ϵ , and below \wedge)	$\delta\delta\text{o}\nu\delta\text{o}\nu$
136 C $\delta\delta\text{o}\nu\delta\text{o}\nu \delta\delta\text{o}\nu\delta\text{o}\nu$	so	$\delta\delta\text{o}\nu\delta\text{o}\nu$ $\alpha\iota$ put above $\theta\epsilon$ later	$\theta\epsilon$ changed in orig. to $\theta\alpha\iota$ or the reverse.

Text.	¶	Tub.	II
136 D ὑποθέμενός τι ἵνα	... τίνα	-μενος τίνα	as Tub.
136 E συνδέομαι	συν on eras.	changed from συνδέομαι	as Tub.
	v		
137 C ἀποκρινουμένου	[-νομένου Δ]	-νομένου	"
138 B τῷ γάρ τι εἶναι	... εἴη	... εἴη, changed to εἶναι	"
141 D τε αὐτοῦ ἄμα	so	τε ἄμα αὐτοῦ	" (but ἀντοῦ)
142 D [καὶ ... λέγεται]	"	omit	"
148 E κατέχον ἐκείνης ὁ	"	... ἐν ὁ	"
152 B ὑπερβοήσεται	-β..η(eras.)	ὑπερβοήσεται	" (o patched).
154 C νεώτερον δ' οὐ:	so	γίγνεται added later in marg.	γίγνεται later above.
155 E καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα	τ on eras.	καὶ περιττὰ ἄλλα	"
			ο
158 C τὸ ὀλίγοστον	τ. -τὸν	τὸ ὀλιγοστὸν	-γιστὸν.
159 A ὅμοια ἀν εἴη	so	ὅμοια ἀν εἴη	"
160 D οὐδὲν ... μὴ εἶναι marg.	,,	omit	"
161 B δῆλον: εἴη	,,	δηλονότι εἴη	-νοτείη (τα patched and dots below στ).
162 D τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν	τῷ on eras.	τῷ γε μ.	"
165 B ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη: ἐν „, ἐμφαίνεσθαι: ἀνάγκη: ...			"

These striking coincidences are sufficient to establish an unusually close connection between the two MSS. Again, both differ in various ways from ¶ in the use of αἰεῖ, ἀεῖ: and both read τί δέ uniformly for the τί δαί of ¶. Yet if we seek to infer the derivation of either from the other we are met by very serious difficulties. These arise more especially in connection with omissions. We have found reason to regard II as a very carelessly written codex. Tub., while much more prettily written, gives proof of similar inattention. In ¶ there are but three serious cases of error arising from this source:—a repetition, 142 D, the omission of κατέχον, 148 E, and of a considerable phrase, 160 D. What the condition of II is with regard to repetitions has been already seen. In Tub. we find, 147 B, οὐτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἔνος μορίου, 150 B, ναι: οὐτε γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει, 156 B, τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, and 161 E, η οὐχ οὐτω; twice written, not to speak of smaller signs of carelessness. It is, however, the question of omissions that is the vital one, and here the MSS. IIITub.DR are all brought under consideration. The blanks which exist in one or more of these will, for the sake of clearness, be referred to both according to the paging of Stephanus and according to that of this edition. DR are quoted from Bekker.

- p. 2. 127 E [τοῦτο δὲ]
ὅμοια ἀνόμοια] omitted in Tub. added later at foot.
3. 128 CD [πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχει
πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ] „ added later in margin.
4. 129 B [τοῦ ἔνος, καὶ]
θους αὖ μετέχειν.] „ added later in margin.
- * 6. 131 C [ἡ οὐ τὸ]
η οὖν ὄλον] „ not added.
8. 133 E [ἀλλ' ἄν-
ταῦτ' ἐστίν] „ added later in margin.

8. I34 A [οὐ τῆς παρ'
-στήματι] omitted in Tub. II : added later in marg. of Tub.
9. I34 D [οὐτ' αν ἵ
δεσπόσειν] „ II : added later, brown, in marg.
10. I36 A [μᾶλλον εἰ βούλει] „ „ „ „
- * * 10. I36 B [καὶ αὐθις αὐ
καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα] „ Tub. not added.
11. I37 D [ἄμφοτέρως ἀν . . .
ἄληθη] „ DR.
- * 12. I38 A [οὕτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὕτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη:] „ Tub. not added.
12. I38 A [ἐν ἄλλῳ
μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον] „ D.
- * 13. I39 B [οὐκ ἔοικεν:
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] „ Tub. added coarse in margin.
13. I39 B [καὶ οὐκ ἀν εἴη] „ „ added in margin.
14. I40 B [ἔστιν . . .
ἀνόμοιον] „ „ added in lower margin.
15. I41 A ? [ἢ [τὴν αὐτὴν . . .
οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ]] „ „ „ „
- * 15. I41 B [τοῦ δὲ
γεγονέναι] „ „ not added : words patched to give sense.
16. I44 A [καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις] „ „ seems to be noted.
20. I47 A [ἄλλα πῃ . . .
μη ἐν ἦν] „ „ added later in margin.
20. I47 A [τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄρα . .
τὰ μη ἐν] „ II added in orig. (?) in marg.
21. I47 D [οὐκ ἐκάνο;
-λάκις] „ D cf. II.
22. I48 D [τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ
ἄπτεσθαι] „ II added, dark in margin.
- * 23. I50 A [ἔνείη
-λον αὐτοῦ] „ Tub. not added.

* 256. 152 C	[ἐπειδ' ἀντίχηγ γεγνόμενον:]	omitted in Tub.	added late, rude.
- 26. 153 A	[οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν: ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα]	IID	not added in II.
- 27. 153 D	[πεφυκὺς εἴη γίγνεσθαι: τῶν ἄλλων]	„ D.	
* 27. 153 E	[ἄστρ' εἰ μὴ εὖ]	„ Tub.	not added.
* 27. 154 A [οὐτε νεώτερον]		„ „	not added.
* 27. 154 C	[οὐ γάρ οὖν: γίγνεται:]	„ „	not added.
29. 156 B	[ὅτι ἀν δὲ ἀπόλλυται:]	„ „	added later in margin.
30. 156 D	[οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς . . . μεταβάλλει]	„ „	added late.
* 30. 157 B	[πῶς δ' οὐ; εὐ εἰ ἔστιν]	„ „	not added.
31. 158 B	(a gap of three words, but?) μήτε [^{ἐν} μή τε] ἐνὸς	„ „	added in margin.
* 32. 159 A	[αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐναντιώτατά τε]	IID	not added in margin II.
* 33. 160 C	The words in margin of Η	„ PTub.DR.	
34. 161 D [ἔστι γάρ: . . . συμπρότης]		II	added, brown in margin.
35. 162 A	[εὐθὺς ἔσται μὴ εἶναι]	„ R.	
35. 162 A	how much? [εἰ μέλλει . . . δν [^{μὴ} οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ δν,] εἰ καὶ]	„ Tub.	added later, outer margin.
35. 162 B	[φαίνεται . . . μὴ ἔστι:]	„ „	added later.
36. 163 B	δὲ οὐ [^{γίγνεται} ἐν μὴ δν]	II	added brown in margin.
* 37. 164 A	[ἢ τὸ τοῦτο]	„ Tub.	not added.

From this synopsis it seems clear (1) that II cannot be derived from Tub. since it contains at intervals ten passages at least of which there is in Tub. no trace; (2) that Tub. is not likely to have come from II since it gives three passages which are not found in II. It is conceded that Η is much older than either; and accordingly two conclusions are open to us as alternatives, (α) either Tub. and II both come from Η, or an early copy or copies of it now lost; (β) or all three descend from one original now lost. In the former case indirect descent seems the more likely, because while all three closely resemble in many ways, the divergences between II and

Tub., when compared with \mathfrak{A} , do not seem easily explicable on the theory of direct descent. Assuming indirect descent, again, we may justly infer thus much—that the copy or copies from which Π Tub. come must have been taken from \mathfrak{A} at a date

- before 1. $\tau\acute{i} \delta\acute{e}$; was changed to $\tau\acute{i} \deltaai$;
- " 2. $aie\acute{e}$ " " $\delta\acute{e}$ from page 147 onward.
- " 3. $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{e}\chi\sigma\nu$ was inserted in the margin at 148 E.
- " 4. $\pi\epsilon\rho\tau\acute{t}\alpha$ was changed to $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{l} \tau\acute{u}$ in 155 E.
- " 5. $\omega\ddot{\nu}\delta\acute{e}\nu \dots \lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\mu\acute{n} \epsilon\acute{v}\nu$ was inserted in the margin at 160 D.

An attempt might be made to reason to the exact connection from the character of the omissions above, but the result is not clear. We should have almost positive evidence of descent from \mathfrak{A} if any of the blanks consisted of an exact line of \mathfrak{A} , not merely the equivalent of a line but a line in point of fact. We have no gap of that character. Our nearest approach to such a gap is the one common to Π Tub. at 134 A, which is the exact equivalent of a line yet not actually one. Such a gap may be suggestive but is no proof. One has only to glance at the various gaps given to see that the mistakes which the eye of a copyist may make, while very generally connected with one another by the bond of a repeated word, come under no rule as regards the relative positions in which the two cases of the repeated word stand to each other. As respects supposition β , there does not appear to be anything which makes against it. But we may say that even if it be the fact that \mathfrak{A} Π Tub. come from a common original, the superiority of \mathfrak{A} is so undoubted and the errors in the text of this dialogue are so few and unimportant that reasons for considering the supposed independent evidence of the two latter MSS. are almost non-existent.

What then is to be our verdict upon the authority of the various MSS. of the first family $\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi$ Tub.DR...? Something like this:— \mathfrak{A} is far and away the best, and so satisfactory as to give little occasion for extraneous support: Δ is derived from it, and may be set aside: Π and Tub. are extremely like it, and almost seem to be derived from it, while even if not they are far less valuable: DR—whose case the student may work out for himself—are closely associated with Π but of less value: the remainder besides being of secondary value are mere fragments. Practically, therefore, we rest upon \mathfrak{A} ; but, in as much as a collation of Tub. has not yet been published we give its readings in full. Outside of this circle we appeal to t which in some ways is more careful even than \mathfrak{A} ; and as a last resource in one or two cases we resort to conjecture. Perhaps our adherence to \mathfrak{A} would have been less decided and the results as a whole more in keeping with the character of a 'critical edition,' but that our text is in form so closely connected with that codex. The testimony of C. G. Cobet in favour of A and \mathfrak{A} as the sole satisfactory authorities for those works Mnemosyne, ix.
1860, p. 337, etc. which they contain is frequent and exceedingly emphatic, even exaggerated, in character. The grounds upon which he bases his decision seem to be two: that these MSS. not only give the soundest text as judged by the test of intelligibility, but likewise preserve more faithfully than others the true Attic forms of many words which scribes had a tendency to modify. Thus, speaking of A—though other passages show that \mathfrak{A} also is to some extent included—he says

Mnem. Nova
Series III. 195.

Namque non tantum locis plurimis manifesto veras lectiones *solas* servavit, sed etiam antiquae dialecti Atticae rationem et usum in iis quae constanter in caeteris scioli et inepti correctores contaminare solent intactam et inviolatam solus omnium ad nos propagavit. Quod quale sit paucis exemplis demonstrare operae pretium est.

Parisinus.	caeteri.
Critias 108 E βασιλῆς	-λεῖς.
109 A ἀνειλλομένη	ἀνειλομένη, -ελομένη.
109 B νομῆς	-μεῖς.
109 D σέσωται	-σται.
110 A διασέσωται	"
111 C σᾶ	σῶa.
112 A πύκνα, πυκνὸς	πνύκα, etc. . .
121 B ἐμπιμπλάμενοι	ἐμπιπλάμενοι, etc.

Plusquam perfectum apud Platonem more majorum exibat in -η, tertia persona ante vocalem et in sententiae exitu in -ειν In Platonis Codicibus duobus optimis Clarkiano et Parisino A formae in -η saepe comparent, sed in Parisino futilis corrector *fere semper* -η eraso de suo -ειν substituit

Again he says when criticizing the edition of Schanz:—

B = Bodleianum.

Itaque speraveram fore ut in prima Tetralogia, quae prodiit, unum solum testem produceret egregium illum Clarkianum B et ex caeteris paucula quaedam sumere satis haberet sicubi boni aliquid aut lacunae supplendae aut ab acuto lectore feliciter emendatum contineret.

Fleck. Jahrb.
Bd. 113, 1876.

A. Jordan likewise uses this argument about old Attic forms as evidence of the superiority of A $\ddot{\text{A}}$, while he points out that Schanz on the authority of $\ddot{\text{A}}$ reproduces the forms θυγῆσκω, μιμηγῆσκω, σφέων, πρόφην, ἄσμενος, and others. Again, there is the much vexed question of the use of ν ephelkystikon. What we find in regard to this form in $\ddot{\text{A}}$ is a two-fold peculiarity; the ν is used in many cases where no hiatus would be caused by its absence, and is omitted where a hiatus is the result. This indicates a distinct absence of method when compared with many authorities, and is on that ground regarded as evidence of the age and purity of its source, the tendency of Alexandrian and other early commentators being to establish and adhere to an intelligible rule.

Fleck. Suppl.
Bd. 7, 1873-5,
and as above.

On the other hand, the contention of Cobet that any independent readings found in less valuable MSS. are due to conjecture alone is emphatically put aside by both Wohlrab and Jordan on the ground both of inherent improbability and of the incontestable fact that blanks in the best MSS. have to be supplied from the inferior ones, which must have got the material from a source distinct from that of the others. Again, as we have seen already, it is pointed out that we find Plato cited by authors like Stobaeus and Eusebius who lived long before our earliest MSS. were written, and if the texts of these authors can be relied on, he is sometimes quoted in a form different from the text transmitted by A $\ddot{\text{A}}$. Also cases are given in which the 'old Attic forms' have been preserved in the family β when family α, at least as represented by ΠΙΤub. etc., give an inferior form: thus in certain places τ reads ἀλιῆς and

ἐμπίμπλησι where \mathfrak{A} gives $\dot{\alpha}\lambda\iota\epsilon\varsigma$ -*πίπλησι*. On this and other grounds it is maintained by some that while most MSS. of the β family are inferior to those of the other, this does not at all hold in regard to \mathfrak{t} the best MSS. of that family, and still less does it hold when the respective sources of the two families are considered. Indeed Jordan ^{Hermes, xiii.}
^{1878.} quite turns the tables in the following manner. He takes up the text of the Republic for which we possess as authorities both A and \mathfrak{t} : and after a comparison of these two he comes to the conclusion that \mathfrak{t} is actually a copy of A . He contends that both in text and scholia the two agree as completely as is humanly possible, while little mistakes occur which tend to show that the writer of \mathfrak{t} had A before him, but misread it. He goes on to infer that in tetralogies I.-VII. \mathfrak{t} is a copy of the lost first volume of A , from which it seems to follow that even for these works it is on the whole to be preferred to \mathfrak{A} , if Cobet's verdict upon the authority of A is accepted. Jordan does not seem quite to accept it, but is content to place A in the same class as contradistinguished from \mathfrak{A} . There is, of course, no proof that A had a first volume.

The latest episode, and one of the most interesting and unexpected, in the history of the Platonic text is that arising from the discovery in Egypt of the Flinders Petrie papyri, which seem to date from the third century before the Christian era. These papyri contain among other things fragments of the Phaedo in a very dilapidated condition, extending over pp. 67 D-69 A, 80 D-84 A of Stephanus. A glance at these documents at once reveals that they differ from the text of our best MSS. both by transpositions, by omissions, and by various readings, while the gaps which occur compel us to infer that the contents destroyed must have been of different extent from the corresponding passages in \mathfrak{A} . Nor are these divergences superficial; they are numerous and striking. Such a discovery tends to make students of Plato most uneasy. Is our text, preserved in three of the most valuable Greek MSS. in existence, so little entitled after all to our confidence and support? One ray of comfort appears in the fact that the differences though numerous do not affect the argument; the substance of Plato's reasoning remains as we have been accustomed to understand it. A further study of the papyrus tends rather to re-assure us. Although in some respects the sense seems slightly to gain by little omissions, the general character of the text is not such as we should be disposed to take in exchange for our own. One is tempted to consider that although an early it is yet a careless transcript, and one feels entitled to wait for much more extensive materials before deciding against the testimony of our highest authorities. Where the value of the latest discovery seems unquestionable is in matters of spelling and pronunciation. Thus we have $\dot{\alpha}\omega\eta$ - $\delta\epsilon\varsigma$ for $\dot{\alpha}\epsilon\omega\eta$ - $\delta\epsilon\varsigma$, $\alpha\bar{\nu}\theta\acute{e}v$ $\mu\eta\theta\acute{e}v$ and their cases. For indications of sound again we find $\dot{\epsilon}\mu$ φιλοσοφία, θεῶγ γένος, τούτωμ μέν, δσομ μή, τοσοῦτογ κακόν, ἀμ μάλιστα. These last show how in the writer's time and by persons among whom he moved sounds were assimilated in pronunciation. And they may, though not certainly, represent the actual speech of Plato. On this subject we may refer to Blass and Meisterhans, whose detailed and sometimes even statistical treatment of Greek spelling and pronunciation

Usener, König
Gesellsch. der
Wissenschaft.
Götting. Nach-
richten,
Nos. 2, 6, 1892.

Blass,
Aussprache des
Griechischen,
1888
Meisterh. Gram.
der Attisch. In-
schriften, 1898.

as exemplified in the inscriptions of the time is most instructive. But assimilation would go further with stone-cutters and scribes than with high-born authors.

II.

DESCRIPTIVE. WE propose now, for the information of any who may take an interest in such matters, to give a more or less detailed description of the three great manuscripts to which reference has repeatedly been made, taking them in the assumed chronological order.

I. PARIS A,
No. 1807.

PARIS A. This volume is strongly and handsomely bound in red leather tooled with gold. On the back it is marked, upon a small round paper label, ^{GR.} 1807; but we find written in the middle of the upper margin of the first leaf of the text an earlier number xciv, while in the outer margin, opposite, 94.2087 appear upon an erasure. Before the text come four plain leaves of vellum. A Latin table of contents on paper is pasted on the face of the first, while near the top of the second face of the fourth is written in a very careless and late hand a *πίναξ* in Greek. The following are the contents, no attempt being made to reproduce the style of writing. The heading is invariably written in the upper margin of the column in which the dialogue begins, and the text begins with the first line of the column. Pale and rather coarse lines in red ink are made in the margin to receive the title, sometimes 3, one for each line of the title, sometimes 2, the title going above, between and below them.

Contents.	Heading.		Ending.
	+ Πλάτωνος +		
Κλειτοφῶν	ἡ προτρεπτικός	fol. 1 recto, col. i. 3 red lines	Κλειτοφῶν ἡ προτρεπτικός 2 vers., c. ii. l. includes small flourish
A	ΚΘ		flourish.
	+ Πλάτωνος +		
Πολιτεῖαι	ἡ περὶ δικαίου scr.	3 r., i. ,,	Πολιτεῖαι ἡ περὶ δικαίου A 14 r., i. 44.
A	Λ		
	as above exactly, including scratch	14 r., ii. ,,	as above exactly
B	ΛΑ		B 24 v., ii. 12.
	"	no scratch	
G	ΛΒ	25 r., i. ,,	" " G 37 v., i. 17.
"	" ΑΓ	37 v., iii. hangs from 3 red lines	" " Δ 48 v., i. 24.
"	ΛΔ	48 v., ii. 2 red lines	E 61 v., i. 17.

Heading.				Ending.		
S	as above exactly, no scratch	ΛΕ	61 v., ii. } 2 red lines as above	as above exactly	S	72 v., ii. 39. }
Z	"	ΛΣ	" } 73 r., i. hangs from 3 red lines	"	"	Z } 83 v., i. 22.
H	"	ΛΖ	" } 83 v., ii. red under first and through last	"	"	H } 94 r., i. 37.
Θ	"	ΛΗ	" } 94 r., ii. hangs from 3 red lines	"	a scratch	Θ } 102 v., ii. 15.
I	"	ΛΘ	" } 103 r., i. as in last	"	"	I } 114 r., i. 9.
Tίματος	+Πλάτωνος+	M	114 r., ii. a red line } η περὶ φύσεως above and below second line of title	Tίματος is darker than others	144 v., ii. 44. }	
Kριτίας	as above	ΜΑ	145 r., i. } η ἀτλαντικός as above	title not repeated The margin of 151 is cut off close to the text, which is slightly injured on both pages.	151 r., ii. 31.	
Μίνως	as above	ΜΒ	151 v., i. } η περὶ νόμου as above	Μίνως somewhat dark	154 v., ii. 30. }	
Nόμοι	as above	ΜΓ	155 r., i. } η νομοθεσία hangs from 3 pale red lines	Nόμων as above	165 r., i. 40. }	
B	as above	ΜΔ	165 r., ii. } as above	as above	B } 173 v., ii. 42.	
Γ	"	ΜΕ	but darker } 174 r., i. as above	"	"	Γ } 184 v., i. 14.
Δ	as above	ΜΣ	184 v., ii. } 2 red lines	"	dark	Δ } 193 r., i. 11.
E	"	ΜΖ	193 r., ii. } as above	"	"	E } 202 r., i. 20.
S	"	ΜΗ	darker } 202 r., ii. "	"	"	S } 216 r., i. 22.

	Heading. as above, darker MΘ	216 r., ii. } as above	Ending. as above	Z } 231 v., ii. 24.
Z				
H	" " last word dark N dark	232 r., i. } "	" "	H } 241 v., i. 44.
Θ	" NA "	dark } 241 v., ii. " "	" "	Θ } 255 v., ii. 8.
I	" NB "	256 r., i. " "	" dark	I } 267 r., i. 43.
IA	" NP "	dark } 267 r., i. " "	" "	IA } 278 v., ii. 7.
IB	" NΔ "	279 r., i. " "	hangs from a red line: no flourish	IB } 291 r., i. 24.
'Επινομίς	+Πλάτωνος + NE	291 r., ii. } "	'Επινομίς η φιλόσοφος	η φιλόσοφος } 299 v., i. 18.
	as above	299 v., ii.		
	'Επιστολαί IB NS	"		
A	Πλάτων Διονυσίῳ εὐ πράττειν.	299 v., ii. 1 ends line 25.		
B	" "	300 r., i. 28	" 15.	
Γ	" χαῖρειν.	302 r., i. 18	" 12.	
Δ	" Δίωνι συρακουσ σίῳ εὐ πράττειν.	304 r., i. 14	" 19.	Letter A although on the first line of the column has a red line coarsely drawn through the title: Δ has a red line below the first and through the second line of the title: SZ are, like the titles of dialogues, in the upper margin, with red lines.
E	" Περδίκκαι εὐ πράττειν.	304 v., i. 22		
S	" Ερμεία κ. Έρα στωι κ. Κορίσκωι εἰ πράττειν.	305 r., i. 2 in upper margin, } 2 red lines, ends 44.		
Z	" τοῖς Δίωνος οἰκεί οις τὲ κ. ἔταροις εὐ πράττειν.	305 v., i. 2 in upper margin, } 2 red lines, ends 317 r. ii. 5.		

Z has what seems to be an ending with the word *εἰρημένα*: on p. 317 r. as noted. But the scribe or his original seems to have had some difficulty at the point, 311 v. 34 (339 v, Hermann, vol. 6), where Plato refers to a letter of Dionysius, as to whether the letter did not there end. A gap of four lines was left which was filled up by putting $\div \div \div$ in line 34, giving twelve \div in each of lines 35, 36, 37, and beginning 38 with *Διονύσιος Πλάτων τὰ νόμιμα* as if it were the title of a new letter. After *εἰρημένα*, on 317, we have four vacant lines and then $\delta \delta \delta \delta$ *διανοηθέντες*, etc., which Hermann treats as the beginning of the letter H, and to which he prefixes a title which is the duplicate of that given to Z above. It is not so treated in the Ms.: nor are the numerical capitals that stand opposite the remaining letters written in the original, but by a later hand.

ἀ δ' ἀν διανοηθέντες κ.τ.λ.			
[H] Πλάτων, 'Αρχύται τα ραντίνωι εὐ πράττειν.	{ 317 r. ii. 10 ends 319 v. i. 13. hang from red lines,	Hermann gives five additional letters which are not found in	
[Θ] " 'Αριστοδώρωι εὐ πράττειν.	{ 319 v. i. 16 ends 319 v. ii. 13. }	this manuscript.	
[I] " Λαοδάμαντι εὐ πράττειν.	{ 319 v. ii. 16 " 319 v. ii. 32.		
[IA] " 'Αρχύται ταραν τίνωι εὐ πράττειν.	{ 320 r. ii. 12 " 320 r. ii. 35.		
[IB] " Διονυσίωι τυράννωι συρακουσσῶν, εὐ πράττειν.	{ 320 r. ii. 38.	Πλάτωνος ἐπιστολαί } 322 r. i. 14. flourish.	
+ "Οροι + NZ.	{ 322 r. ii. upper marg.	* "Οροι * flourish.	
			{ 324 v. ii. 20.

Each definition ends with : followed by a slight blank.

+Πλάτωνος νοθενόμενοι·	Above the usual position of the title as if added later by the scribe.		
+περὶ Δικαίου + NH	{ 325 r. i. upper marg. } hangs from a red line.	περὶ δικαίου	{ 326 r. ii. 40.
+περὶ 'Αρετῆς + ΝΘ	{ 326 v. i. as above.	π. 'Α.	{ 328 r. i. 32.
+Δημόδοκος ή περὶ τὸ συμβολεύεσθαι·	{ 328 r. ii. as Ξ above.	* Δ. ή π. τ. σ.	{ 331 r. i. 23.
+Σίσυφος ή περὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι·	{ 331 r. ii. from ΞΑ. 2 red lines.	Σ. ή π. τ. β.	{ 333 r. i. 42.
+Ἀλκυών ή περὶ μεταμορφώσεως·	{ 323 r. ii. as ΞΒ above.	'Α. ή π. μ.	{ 334 r. ii. be- low line 44.
+Ἐρυξίας ή περὶ πλούτου·	{ 334 v. i. as ΞΓ above.	E. ή π. π. (ή ἐρασίστρατος)	{ 341 r. ii. 27. in outer margin).
In the middle space opposite the title are to which the words in the margin at the end correspond.		{ ἐν ἄλλῳ ώ η ἐρασίστρατ.	
+Ἀξίοχος ή περὶ θανάτου·	{ 341 v. i. as ΞΔ above.	'Α. ή π. θ.	{ 344 v. i. 27.

So ends the Ms. on line 27 of the first column on the back of folio 344. There is no trace of a name or a date of any kind; but in the outer margin opposite there is a statement by a later hand in smaller style and yellow-brown ink as follows:—

ώρθωθη ή βιβλισ αῦτη·
ἵπὸ κα μητροπ ὑέραπ
τὸς ὑνησαμένδ.

=κωνσταντίνου μητροπολίτου ἱερα(σ)πόλεως
=τοῦ καὶ

Montf. Appendix, cf.
Gardth. p. 318.

Style and details.

Authorities differ as to whether the name of the city is one word or two, Cobet being of the former opinion. If he is right it must be the Hierapolis near Laodicea which, according to Le Quien, was erected into a metropolitan see in the 5th century. No Constantine, however, is named as in office there. But we find mention made of Constantinus sacerdos and calligraphist, in 1125 A.D., and of another, a presbyter and calligraphist, in 1326 A.D. The text is followed by three clean sheets of vellum, which, like those at the beginning, have probably been inserted when it was last bound.

The codex is in fine preservation; indeed, Cobet says, ‘non memini me videre integriorem librum neque emendatiorem.’ It has suffered a little at the beginning by damp creeping in from behind; it has lost the margin of fol. 151, which has slightly injured the end of the Critias and the beginning of the Minos, and in various places small holes have been drilled in the sheets by insects; but for all practical purposes it is as perfect and legible as when it was written,—now more than a thousand years ago. The size of the volume exclusive of the binding is 35·5 × 24·8 × 8·8 centimetres. The material is firm yellowish vellum. The page consists of two columns, each containing 44 written lines, which are bounded perpendicularly by double lines at each side; the length of each col. is 26·5 and its breadth according as both perpendicular lines at each side, or only the inner ones are included, is 8·1 or 6·8, while the free space between the cols. from outer to outer perpendicular line is 2·3 centimetres. The breadths of the free margins are—inner 1·6, upper 3·5, outer 4·8, under 5·7. All these figures, especially the last group, are slightly variable. The vellum is made up in quaternions, that is, sets of four pieces laid together, then folded across and stitched, so as to give 8 leaves and 16 pages; there are 43 quaternions, but the 43rd wants the 8th leaf. Originally each quaternion would be lettered, but the only trace of this which seems to remain is at the outer upper corner of fol. 177 r. where \bar{K} —the following Γ having been cut off in binding—represents the 23rd; more recently they have been numbered by small figures 2, 3, 4, placed at the inner upper corner. A late reader has carelessly numbered the front side of the leaves: after 243 he puts 245, but there is no gap; and in the third hundred the hundreds figure is often corrected. Each piece of parchment before being folded as part of its quaternion has received a complete set of rulings which are colourless, being, as usual, indented on one side by some blunt pointed instrument so firmly as to project on the other. This ruling seems to have been done on the outer or hair side of the vellum. The bounding lines are the following, on each unfolded piece:—

1. 8 double perpendicular lines to mark off the sides of the four cols.
2. Single perpendicular lines near the outer edge of the two outer margins, 3·8 removed from the outer boundary of the cols.
3. A horizontal line about 1·9 above the writing.
4. Double horizontal lines of which the lower is 2·6 below the writing.
All these are carried from edge to edge of the vellum.
5. 44 lines for writing, which begin at the left side of the first col. and go right across the four cols., ending somewhat unevenly at the outer edge of the fourth.

E. M. Thompson,
Palaeography,
p. 63, etc.

In laying the ruled pieces together for stitching, indented side touched indented, and projecting touched projecting, or, as Mr. Thompson puts it, hair side touched hair side and flesh side flesh side.

The writing hangs from the lines, save that the upper parts of the letters $\delta \epsilon \eta \theta \iota \kappa \phi$ project above them. The text is written in dark brown ink; the titles and some of the notes are reddish. One commentator writes in dark green.

The text is written throughout by the same scribe, who seems to have added the titles after the body of the work was finished. Sometimes his ink seems to have failed, and he has retouched

letters, as on 184 r., 189 v., 190 r., after refilling his pen. After learning more of \mathfrak{A} , Bekker changed his view that this Ms. was written in the tenth century, saying ‘patet Parisiensem primum (A), Index Codicum. qui omnes habet altioris vetustatis notas, perperam in catalogo Paris. ad decimum seculum referri. Conf. Bast ad Corinth., p. 81.’ Bast here speaks of ‘praestantissimus Codex 1807 (seculi noni).’ Gregor. Corinth. After looking over the plates of the Palaeographical Society and comparing all three MSS. concerned, ^{ed. Schaefer,} Lipsiae, 1811. we have come to the conclusion that the writing which most resembles that of this codex is that of the Clarke Ms. and of the Oxford Euclid, whose dates are fixed at 895 and 888 A.D. respectively. But the Paris one seems to be older than either of these. So far as the capital letters are concerned, a judgment is difficult to form. They are small, erect, and rather stiff, but present no special feature save that A, Δ and Λ do not terminate in a point at the top, but in a short horizontal stroke. In the body of the text, which is in minuscules in all three MSS., we have a better means of reaching a conclusion. At a general glance the first observation that occurs is that in whatever order A and \mathfrak{A} may stand, the Euclid comes between them: this amounts to the verdict that A comes first. The Euclid and \mathfrak{A} differ from A in having their letters of a uniform thickness: A, while using apparently a broader pen, aims at varying his strokes to some slight extent. In all three the writing is most carefully formed and erect, but \mathfrak{A} inclines more than either of the others to round off the angles of letters, while A makes them as abrupt as a continuous stroke will permit. In all, the lines of the letters generally finish in a dot or ‘blob,’ but in \mathfrak{A} this seems to be often managed by carrying the pen a little back upon its stroke, while in A the scribe ends his lines with a distinctly formed dot. A and Euc. agree in writing σ, φ, as σ φ; \mathfrak{A} gives σ φ. In A ε is written ε, in \mathfrak{A} it is Ε. The initial letters in A stand in the space between the perpendicular lines which bound the columns: like those of the Euc. they are quite plain, and differ from the text only by being considerably larger. There is an even more noticeable formality in the breathings and accentuation. While \mathfrak{A} and Euc. give these with some variety and inattention as seen in the facsimiles, A emphasizes its care by the forms ~ ~, ~ ~, ~; and Schanz says that while \mathfrak{A} often omit accents on prepositions before nouns, A never does. Ligature of letters is employed freely: here, for example, is the opening of the Republic, the ligatures being indicated by a closer position of the letters so treated.

Κατεβην χθες εὶ σπει ρ αι υ μετα
γλαυ κω ν ο σ το ν ἄρ ι στω ν ο σπρ ο
σενξ ο μεν ο σ τε τηι θεω ι και ἄ
ματην ἔο ρ την βο ν λο μεν ο σ θε
ασασθα.

Composite names in the titles are marked by a line below the junction Κλειτοφῶν: in the text also they are marked when they are divided by the end of a line Θρασύμαχος. Ordinary words are not invariably so divided or marked in the text. There is almost nothing ornamental about the Ms. but what occurs at the conclusions of the various works, a sample of which may be given. It is almost uniform throughout.

ἢν διεληλύθαμεν εὖ πράττω

μεν :

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ ἸΠΕΡΙΔΙΚΑΙΩΝ



Notes and hands
in the margin.

We pass now to the margins: i. (1) The speakers are usually named at the beginning of each dialogue, the names being placed as a rule between the columns under the heading ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ | ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ in two lines of small capitals, τοῦ διαλόγου being contracted. The names are in minuscules. Changes of speaker are marked in the text by :, and in the margin by —, between the double bounding lines of the column, while outside these lines the name is generally given, in full for the first appearance, and often, though not invariably, in contracted form afterwards, thus:—

Margin.	Col.	Margin.	Col.
θρασύμαχος *	: καὶ ὁ θρασύ,	πο	:
μαχος	.	κ	:
πολεμαρχο	.	σω	:

(2) The same hand, or one indistinguishable from it, also puts in the margin a number of scholia and brief notes, and synonyms for words in the text, the spaces for these being sometimes ruled in red. These are in small capitals with ordinary contractions. (3) The same hand has given at intervals various symbols and remarks in the margin. Such are those for Γρ. Πρ. and the following—

1.		= χρησίμη ?	82 v. ii.		= σημειωσαι δι' ὅλου τὸ χωρίον	318 r. ii.
	ΠΑΡΑΙΝΕΣΙΣ			Δ		
	Κ, ΤΠΟΘΗΚΗ			Γ		
2.		THN EPIVOLAHN	16 v. i.	Θ		
	" TÒ ΔΡΙΜΤ THS EPIVOL	18 r. ii.		Ο'		
	'ΑΣΤΕΙΩΝ	27 r. ii.		Α		
	'ΟΡ, ΦΕΥΔΟΤΣ	24 r. ii.		Ξ		
3.		= ὥραιον		Ω		
				Ρ		
				Ι'		
				Ο		
				Ν		

Two of these signs may be compared with their counterparts in the margin of our text, pp. 6, 15, 25; and the comparison will strengthen the evidence in favour of the greater age of this codex.

ii. Other hands also appear, but it would need considerable expertness to distinguish them accurately. There appear to be two which use dark brown ink, one small and delicate, the other somewhat larger: both of a date decidedly later than the first. We have seen that the owner of the book claims to have revised it, and there are distinct traces of corrections upon erasures in the text, which are in the same ink as his closing statement, notably a considerable sprinkling of a thin capital Η. Notes of his seem to occur on 10 r. i., 17 r. outer margin, 20 r., 25 v., 131 v. Then there is the green hand already mentioned, and one which makes a few ugly notes in pencil. Schanz points out that the Ms. after being completed has been compared with other texts, and entries appear such as—ἐν ἀλλῳ οὐτῷ εὗρον, οἶμαι δ' ὅτι καὶ κρέττον τοῦτο.

While the codex is written with admirable care, one can see on turning over its pages that there are several sorts of errors in it which recur pretty frequently. (a) Omissions inadvertently

made are supplied by running the omitted words out into the margins either by the original or by some of the later hands: cases occur at 24 r. i. 43, 177 r., 185 r. i. 29, ii. 41, 273 r. i. (β) Other errors are corrected by erasures with or without their being replaced: (so far as linguistic forms are concerned, Cobet holds that errors are perpetrated thus:) cases occur 17r. ii., p. xcii. above. 185 r., 207 r. (apparently by Constantine), 227 v. ii. 44, 231 r. i., and others. The erasure which has most interest for us is that in which the form $\tau\acute{i}$ $\delta\acute{a}i$ is repeatedly substituted in neat p. lxxxi. small letters for $\tau\acute{i}$ $\delta\ldots$ —the original being indistinguishable: cases occur 25 r. i. twice, 54 v., i. 12, 55 r. i. 21, 56 v. ii. 40, 57 r. i. 16, 184 v. ii. 20 and 35, with not a few others. We have likewise $\tau\acute{i}s$ $\delta\acute{a}i$, 153 r. ii. 3 and 13, and elsewhere. (γ) In several cases space has been left for words about which for some reason the scribe was uncertain. These are filled in by a species of asterisk (÷), at the rate of twelve to a line: one case is 54 v. i., where five occur, another 227 v. ii. 22, $\mu\acute{e}i\nu$ ÷ ÷ ÷ $\tau\acute{i}s$ $\sigma\acute{o}\nu$ $a\acute{u}\tau\eta$. $\kappa\acute{a}i$, another 240 r. i.; where lines 9, 10 have twelve each, a fourth is the one referred to above in epistle Z; in one case a line is drawn from p. xcvi. the word before the space to that after it. The most serious patch in the codex, combining both erasures, blank spaces, and words entered on such spaces, occurs in the last of the spurious dialogues, and extends over eleven lines, the last three of col. i. and first eight of col. ii. in 342 v. It seems clear that here the writer had an incomplete text before him. There are, of course, gaps in the text which only one who has collated it carefully can discover. Schanz has *Rhein. Mus.* done so, and finds at least the following of 15 letters— $\pi\acute{o}\iota\alpha$ δ' $\dot{\sigma}\tau\acute{o}\iota\omega$ ν $\beta\acute{i}\omega$ ν Rep. III, 400 A, and xxxiii. 1878. two large gaps from Laws VI., 745 A, θεοῖς—745 C, κλήρων δέ, and 783 B, παιδῶν—783 D, καλῶς, which represent 674 and 699 letters respectively. Taking several of the passages omitted and afterwards supplied, he finds that they contain respectively, 17, 17 or 16, 15, 17, 18, 18 letters. He then assumes that these represent lines of A's original, and that the large gaps represent columns which at the same rate would have about 40 lines. In A the lines are about 21-3 letters, and the page has 44 lines. Schanz thinks that the original was of the same size and arrangement, but written in majuscules and so containing less per line and col. He cites omissions of 46, 41, 39, 37, 35, 39, 48, 46, 44, 35 letters, which seem to him multiples of lines. It is noteworthy that the unmutilated lines in the Flinders Petrie papyri comprise 22-26 letters. It may be added that Graux, a high authority on palaeographic questions, considered that two Journ. des unsigned MSS. 'savoir ... le *Palatinus* des Paradoxographes (No. 398, à Heidelberg), et le Damascius Savants, Mai de Venise (*Marcianus* 246)' are by the same hand as Paris A. So far as the latter is concerned, de Venise (*Marcianus* 246) the facsimile given in the 'Mélanges Graux' seems to leave no room for doubt. We conclude Paris, 1884. our description by giving the contents of one page of the Ms., after Cobet with very slight corrections. It represents the opening of the Critias on the face of fol. 145. At the left side Mnem. Nov. Ser. III. 1875. the writing begins uniformly from the inner of the two perpendicular bounding lines of the column, but on the right it stops irregularly at any point between the inner and outer of these lines which may be found convenient. The same holds of all manuscripts as a rule: and the practice is exemplified in our text. But the printed reproductions, as is natural where the letters are of a strictly regulated size instead of being hand-made in each case, exaggerates the inequalities which occur. We do not undertake that the stops are invariably correct. Commas are rarely original; and while there are in use three points, upper, middle and lower (· · ·), the second is not represented here. When letters are not large it is not easily distinguished from the first. In modern times we appear to have inverted what was the original significance of the first and last. The middle one, $\mu\acute{e}\sigma\eta$ στιγμή, is considered to have been the least forcible, and the comma, for greater clearness no doubt, gradually superseded it.

+ ΗΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ +

ώστε ἀσημενος ὁ σώκρατες οἶνος ἐκ
μακράς ἀναπεπαινένος ὁ
δοῦν ὑνῦ οὕτως ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λόγου
διαπορείας¹ ἀγαπητῶν ἀπήλ
λαγμαὶ· τῶι δὲ πρὶν μὲν πάλαι
ποτ' ἔργῳ· νῦν δὲ λόγοισι ἄρ
τι θεῷ γεγονότι προσεύχο
μαι· τῶι ῥήθειντων ὅσα μὲν
ἔρρηθη μετρίωστ σωτηρίαν ἡ
μῦν αὐτὸν αὐτῶι διδόναι· πα
ρὰ μέλοσ δὲ εἴτι περὶ αὐτῶι
ἄκοντεσ εἴπομεν δίκην τὴν
πρέπουσαν ἐπιτιθέναι· δίκη
δε ὀρθῇ τὸν πλημμελοῦντα
ἔμμελῃ ποιεῖν· οὐν τὸ λοιπὸν
τούτο περὶ θεῶν γενέσεως ὁρ
θῶς λέγωμεν λόγους, φάρ
μακον ἥμαν αὐτὸν τελέωτατον
καὶ ἄριστον φαρμάκων, ἐπιστή
μην εὐχόμεθα διδόναι· προσευ
ξάμενοι δὲ, παραδίδομεν
κατὰ τὰσ ὄμολογίασ κριτίαι
— τὸν ἔξῆστον λόγον: ἀλλ' ὡς τίμαιε
δέχομαι μέν· ὧι δὲ καὶ σὺ κα
τ' ἀρχὰσ ἔχρήστω, συγγνώμην
αἰτούμενος ὡστε περὶ μεγάλων
μέλλων λέγειν, ταυτὸν καὶ νῦν
ἔγω τούτο παραιτοῦμαι· μείζο
νος δὲ αὐτοῦ τυχεῖν ἔτι μᾶλλον
ἀξιῶ, περὶ τῶι μελλόντων ῥῆ
θήσεσθαι· καίτοι σχεδὸν μὲν
οἶδα, παραίτησιν εὖ μάλα φιλύ
τιμον καὶ τοῦ δέοντοσ ἄγροι
κοτέραν, μέλλων παραιτεῖσθαι·
ῥήτεον δὲ ὄμωστ· ὡστε μὲν γάρ
οὐκ εὖ τὰ παρὰ σοῦ λεχθέντα,
εἴρηται, τίς ἀν ἐπιχειρήσειεν
ἔμφρων λέγειν· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ῥῆ
θησόμενα, πλείονος συγγνώ
μησ δεῖται χαλεπώτερα ὄντα,
τούτο πειρατέον πῆμι διδάξαι·
περὶ θεῶν γάρ ὡς τίμαιε λέγον
τά τι πρὸς ἀνθρώπουσ, δοκεῖν
ἴκανωσ λέγειν· ῥῆμαιον ἢ περὶ

Τηνητῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀπειρία καὶ σφόδρα ἄγνοια τῶν ἀκούντων περὶ ὧν ἀν οὗ τωσ ἔχωσιν, πολλὴν εἰπορίαν παρέχεσθον τῷ μέλλοντι λέγειν τί περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ δὲ δῆθ θεῶν, ὑπερεν ὡς ἔχομεν· ἐνα δὲ συφέστερον δὲ λέγω δῆλον λάσσω, τῇδε μοι συνεπίσπεσθε· μίμησιν μὲν γὰρ δῆλον καὶ ἀπεικασίαν τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν ἥρθέντα, χρεών που γενέσθαι· τὴν δὲ τῶν γραφέων εἰδωλο ποιῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα τε καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα σώματα γιγνομένην ἔδωμεν· διατάρηστ τε πέρι καὶ χαλεπότητος, πρὸς τὸ τοῦ δρῶσιν δοκεῖν ἀποχρώντωσι μεμνήσθαι² καὶ κατοψόμεθα. ὅτι γῆν μὲν καὶ ὅρη καὶ ποτα μοὺς καὶ ὕλην, οὐρανόν τε καὶ ἔνυμπαντα καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ ἴοντα· πρώτον μὲν ἀγαπῶμεν ἄν τις τί καὶ βραχὺ πρὸς δμοιότητα αὐτῶν ἀπομιμήσθαι δυνατὸς ἦν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἀτ' οὐδὲν εἰδότες ἀκριβέστερ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· οὗ τε ἔξετάζομεν οὕτε ἐλέγχο μεν τὰ γεγραμμένα· σκια γραφίαι δὲ ἀσαφεῖ καὶ ἀπατηλῶι χρώμεθα περὶ αὐτά· τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα ὅπτορ' ἄν τις ἐπιχειρῆι σώματα ἀπεικάζειν. ὁρέωστε αἰσθανόμενοι τὸ παραλειπόμενον διὰ τὴν ἀεὶ ἔνοιο κον κατανόησιν· χαλεποὶ κριταὶ γιγνόμεθα τῷ μὴ πάσασ πάντωσ τὰσ δμοιότητασ ἀποδιδόντε· ταῦτὸν δῆλον καὶ κατατοὺς λόγυστ ἰδεῖν δεῖ γιγνόμενον. ὅτι τὰ μὲν οὐράνια καὶ θεῖα ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ σμικρῶς εἰκότα λεγόμενα· τὰ δὲ θυη

¹ Changed to
dianoplas.

²Should be
μεμιμῆσθαι,
Cobet.

THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPT.—We pass now to what may be called our own manuscript, which is known as 'A' or 'Clarke 39.' Its history has a certain romantic interest. It was written, as we shall see, about a thousand years ago, to the order of a scholarly dignitary of the Eastern Church, and is believed still to bear traces of his ownership. These facts we learn from its own pages. Our first historic trace of it is many centuries later. In the Vatican library there is a codex numbered 1205, of the sixteenth century, which, it appears, contains among other things Migne, Bibl. Pat. a catalogue of books with the following title, Πληνάς τῶν ἐν τῷ σεβασμῷ μονῃ τῆς Νησου Πατμου rum Graeca, vol. ἀξιολογωτέρων εὑρισκομένων βιβλίων. Of this catalogue Mai says, 'confectus fuit hic Catalogus regnante Joanne Palaeologo, qui anno 1355 floruit; nec liber recentior occurrit.' It gives the names of 58 works (*vñ.*); and among the entries is the following, the only one which corresponds to any item in Clarke's list,

νέ. Λόγοι Σωκράτους, διν ἡ ἀρχή· Εὐθύφρων, ἡ περὶ δοτίου. Τί νεώτερον, ὁ Σώ-
κρατεῖς ἄχρι τοῦ Μένων, ἡ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν (sic).

There can be no possible doubt about the identity of the work, and we thus learn that the manuscript was in the library of the Monastery of St. John at Patmos in the middle of the fourteenth century, being then more than four hundred years old. In this library, sad to say, it would probably have been left to rot, had it not, like the Elgin marbles, been carried off by a countryman of our own. At the opening of the present century Dr. Edward Daniel Clarke, in Travels, etc. the course of his long visit to the countries lying round the Levant, met with the following incident E. D. Clarke, LL.D., Fourth in the island of Cos :—'A poor little shopkeeper in Cos had been mentioned, by the French Consul, as possessor of several curious old books. We therefore went to visit him, and were vñ, p. 263 ff., surprised to find him in the midst of his wares, with a red nightcap on his head, reading the freely condensed. *Odyssey of Homer* in *manuscript*. This was fairly written upon paper, with interlineary criticisms, and a commentary in the margin. He had other *manuscript* volumes, containing works upon rhetoric, poetry, history, and theology. Nothing could induce him to part with any of these books. The account he gave was that some of them were copies of originals in the library at Patmos, and that his father had brought them to Cos. They were intended, he said, for his son, who was to be educated in the Patmos monastery.' The travellers went on their way to Egypt and the Holy Land; but they did not forget the Patmos library, and in 1801 they were again in Cos and making arrangements to visit it.

'On Tuesday, October the sixth, as we were sitting with the Governor, a Greek officer of Discovery of the the name of Riley arrived. He conversed with great fluency in the Turkish language. Hearing Manuscript. that we intended to visit Patmos he requested a passage thither. On Wednesday our interpreter, mos. Antonio, returned in a small *caique*, manned by a single family of the Island of Casos. The vessel was old, and the large triangular sails were tattered and rotten. It was, in fact, nothing more than an open boat; a man of middle stature with his feet in the hold had at least the half of his body above the deck. [We are reminded, indeed, of Lord Dundonald shaving on board the *Speedy*, with his looking-glass on deck and his feet in the cabin.] We hired this vessel, and by the next evening we were desired to embark. At eight o'clock we were under weigh: a land breeze drove us smoothly along; and the *Casiots* began their evening hymn. This reminded us of a passage in Longus, who, in the very seas we were now traversing, describes a similar Lib. iii. *Paris*, 1778. custom: 'while they rowed, one of the crew sang to them:—

οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ, καθάπερ χορὸς, ὥμοφώνως
κατὰ καιρὸν τῆς ἐκείνου φωνῆς ἐβόων.'

¹It may have been so called from the steep ascent to the

The next morning, October the ninth, SAMOS appeared most beautifully in view, covered by a silvery mist, softening every object, but concealing none. At eleven o'clock A.M. we entered the Monastery, port of La Scala¹ in Patmos. In order to prevent our *caique* from being fired at, as a pirate which begins at the landing place.

vessel (which she probably had been), we had hoisted an *English* flag [thus drawing upon themselves the taunts of Frenchmen on their way home from the campaign in Egypt, “*Pavillon Anglais! Tremblez, Messieurs!*”]. The monastery of the *Apocalypse* is situate two miles and a half from the quay, upon the top of a mountain in the highest part of all the island, close to the town of *Patmos*. We set off, without further delay, for the Convent. The ascent is steep and rugged, but practicable for asses and mules. When we arrived at the monastery, we were quite struck by its size and substantial appearance.’ It may be explained that Patmos has a west coast running pretty fairly north and south, from the extremities of which two lobes run off irregularly to the eastward, being separated by a deep bay, which almost cuts the island in two, like an ill-shaped sand glass. The very innermost recess of this bay is the harbour of La Scala, from which the town and monastery lie due south. Whilst the travellers are enjoying their unequalled prospect we may seize the opportunity of throwing our extracts into such divisions as will contrast the view seen from without with the circumstances existing within.

WITHOUT.—‘It is a very powerful fortress, built upon a steep rock, with several towers and lofty thick walls; and if duly mounted with guns, might be made impregnable. According to *Tournefort*, it is said to have been founded by *Alexius Comnenus*, in consequence of the persuasion of St. *Christodulus*; but *Dapper* relates, that the saint himself founded the monastery, towards the end of the tenth century, when he retired to *Patmos*, to avoid the persecution of the *Turks*. Nothing can be more remarkable than the situation of the town, built upon the edge of a vast crater, sloping off, on either side like the roof of a tiled house. *Perry* has compared it to “*an asses back*”: upon the highest ridge of which stands the monastery. The inhabitants have no space for exercise, they can only descend and ascend to the harbour. On one of the towers of the monastery, a *look-out* is regularly kept for pirates. We returned to enjoy the prospect from this place. The sight was extremely magnificent. We commanded the whole island of *Amorgos*, which is nearly forty miles from the nearest point of *Patmos*: and were surrounded by many of the grandest objects in the *Archipelago*. As we descended from the great monastery of St. *John*, we turned off, upon our right, to visit a smaller edifice of the same nature, erected over a cave, or grot, where the *Apocalypse* is said to have been written. As to the cave itself, it may be supposed that any other *cave* would have answered the purpose fully as well: it is not spacious enough to have afforded a habitation even for a hermit. There seemed to be something like a school held in the *building* erected about this cave; but the only monk who showed the place to us, and who appeared to superintend the seminary, was not much better informed than his godly brethren in the parent monastery. The women of the island, here collected as it were upon a single point, are so generally handsome, that it is an uncommon sight to meet with any who are otherwise. There are several bells at the monastery, which the monks are frequently ringing. The enjoyment of the noise is considered a great indulgence; bells being prohibited by the *Turks*. Perhaps there is not a spot in the *Archipelago* with more of the semblance of a volcanic origin than *Patmos*, the ports of the island have the appearance of craters. In the evening we amused ourselves in fishing. The harbour appeared as literally swarming with the most beautiful fishes, of all colours; the water being as clear as crystal, the fish, tempted from their haunts among the marine plants were seen distinctly whenever they took the snare. We were much struck by the extraordinary intensity of the deep blue colour of the sea, which is as much a distinguishing characteristic of the *Archipelago* as the brightness of its sky.’

WITHIN.—‘We were received by the Superior and by the Bursar of the monastery in the refectory. We asked permission to see the LIBRARY, which was readily granted. We entered a small oblong chamber, having a vaulted stone roof; and found it to be nearly filled with


books, of all sizes, in a most neglected state; some lying upon the floor, a prey to the damp and to worms; others standing upon shelves, but without any kind of order. The books upon the shelves were all printed volumes; for these being more modern, were regarded as the more valuable, and had a better station assigned them than the rest, many of which were considered only as so much rubbish. Some of the printed books were tolerably well bound, and in good condition. The Superior said, these were his favourites; but when we took down one or two of them to examine their contents, we discovered that neither the Superior nor his colleague were able to read. They had a confused traditional recollection of the names of some of them, but knew no more of their contents than the Grand Signior. At the extremity of this chamber, which is opposite to the window, a considerable number of old volumes of parchment, some with covers and some without, were heaped upon the floor, in the utmost disorder; and there were evident proofs that these had been cast aside, and condemned to answer any purpose for which the parchment might be required. When we asked the Superior what they were? he replied, turning up his nose with an expression of indifference and contempt, *Χειρόγραφα!* It was, indeed, a moment in which a literary traveller might be supposed to doubt the evidence of his senses; for the whole of this contemned heap consisted entirely of *Greek* manuscripts, and some of them were of the highest antiquity. What was to be done? We referred the matter to Mr. *Riley*, as to a person habituated in dealing with knavish Greeks; and presently such a jabbering took place, accompanied with so many significant shrugs, winks, nods, and grimaces, that it was plain something like a negociation was going on. The author, meanwhile, continued to inspect the heap; and had soon selected the fairest specimen of Grecian caligraphy which has descended to modern times. It was a copy of the twenty-four first Dialogues of *Plato*, written throughout upon vellum, in the same exquisite character; concluding with a date, and the name of the calligraphist. It was a single volume in folio, bound in wood. The cover was full of worms and falling to pieces: a paper label appeared on the back, inscribed, in a modern hand, *Διάλογοι Σωκράτους*: but see ciii. the letters of *Plato's* name, separated by stars, appeared very distinctly as a head-piece to the first page of the manuscript. After removing these volumes all further enquiry was stopped by Mr. *Riley*. He concealed two of the smaller volumes in his *Turkish* habit, entrusting to the honour of the two *Caloyers* the task of conveying the others on board our vessel. The next day we were again admitted to the Library. Some of the inhabitants of the town thought proper to accompany us. The Superior took occasion to assure us, that both he and the Bursar were willing enough to part with the *χειρόγραφα*; but that if it were known to have brought them any gain, the people of *Patmos*, acting as spies for the *Capudan Pasha*, would make it the cause of a very heavy imposition upon the monastery. This day we dined with the monks.'

The scene now changes to the deck of the caïque. The Capudan Pasha referred to, is, no doubt, identical with the Capitan Pasha often mentioned in Finlay's History. He seems to have been a sort of high admiral with charge of the islands and coasts of the Aegean.

'The *Capudan Pasha's* letter enabled us to order bread from the island for our voyage; and this the monks promised to see provided. . . . The whole of Sunday, *October* the eleventh, was passed in great anxiety, being the day on which the Superior had engaged to send the remaining manuscripts. Mr. *Riley* had left and we began to fear, as evening approached, that his absence might become the pretext for a breach of contract. Towards sunset, being upon the deck of our caïque and looking towards the mountain, we discerned a person coming down the steep descent from the monastery towards the port: presently, as he drew near, we perceived that he had a large basket upon his head, and that

he was coming towards the quay, opposite to the spot where our vessel was at anchor. Upon his arrival, we saw him making signs for a boat; and we sent to him the little skiff belonging to our caique. As he came alongside, he said, aloud, that he had brought the *bread* ordered for us; but coming upon deck, he gave a significant wink, and told us the Superior desired that we would ‘empty the basket ourselves, and count the loaves, to see that all was right.’ We took the hint, and hurried with the precious charge into our berth; where, having turned the basket bottom upwards, we found, to our great joy, the manuscript of PLATO, the POEMS OF GREGORY, the works of PHILE, with the other Tracts, the two volumes containing the Greek Musical Notes, and the volume of Miscellanies containing the LEXICON OF ST. CYRILL: these we instantly concealed beneath a mattress in one of our cots; and making a grand display of the loaves, returned with the basket upon deck, giving a handsome present to the porter, and desiring he would inform the Superior, with our most grateful acknowledgments, that ‘*all was perfectly right.*’ Having set him again on shore, we gave orders to our captain to have everything ready for sailing the next morning, and to stand out of the port as soon after sunrise as possible; intending to leave *Patmos*. In this design we were, however, disappointed. When a few days later they insisted on putting to sea, they found, as their captain had predicted, that a furious storm was raging outside. ‘We [ch. ii.] passed like lightning within a cable’s length of some dreadful rocks, over which the sea was dashing as high as our mast head; until getting under the lee, to the south of *Naxos*, we ran the vessel aground, close to a small creek, upon some white sand. Like true shipwrecked mariners, wet to the skin, and without a dry thread on board, we opened all our stores upon the rocks to expose our clothes to the beams of the sun. Every article of our linen was completely soaked; but, to our great joy, the *Patmos Manuscripts* had escaped, and were safe. We had put them into a small but stout wooden box in the stern of the vessel; and had covered this with every article of canvas, etc., that could be collected.’ In a note, Dr. Clarke adds, ‘This manuscript [the Plato] after the author’s return to England, remained in the hands of his friend the late Professor Porson until his death.’ In 1809 it was bought by the Curators of the Bodleian Library.

Contents.



The following is Gaisford’s entry in the Catalogue of the Library:—

39 CODEX membranaceus ff. 418, anno 896 exaratus
PLATONIS Dialogi xxiv. hoc ordine

then follows the list, to which the scholia are added. The book which is bound somewhat handsomely in leather of a chocolate brown has the annexed title on its back.

The boards are lined with vellum. On the lining of the first are the following interesting entries:—

1. At the top—‘Clark 39. Totum hunc codicem ad edit. H. Stephani diligenter contuli. T. G. 31 Aug. 1813.’

Prof. Gaisford published this as *Lectiones Platonicae*.

2. A little lower, apparently by Porson, comes:—

‘Idem scriba, qui totum codicem exaravit, tetralogias et dialogos numeravit.’

3. Near the middle, also by him (?):—

‘Numeri, atramento scripti, e registro evanuere.’ Which seems to refer to the register of quaternions on the flyleaf opposite.

Then follow four leaves of clean vellum, the face of the first being occupied by an index of the dialogues in two columns, and below it the register just mentioned, chiefly in red but with some

black entries. These are most exquisitely written and have at the top this note, apparently by Gaisford:—

‘Tabula quae sequitur, a manu est eruditissimi viri
Ricardi Porson, A.M., Gr. L. Prof. Cant.’

After these leaves come two smaller ones terribly discoloured, and covered with some Aristotelian matter in a late hand, which is discussed by Schanz. We now reach the text, which we tabulate by title and conclusion, premising that the style may be gathered from our facsimiles and that the titles occur at all positions in the page; only the first is desiguedly in the upper margin, others being there by accident merely.

Title rr.	Π·Λ·Α·Τ·Ω·Ν·Ο·Σ				TETRAL. I.
top		A			
	Εὐθύφρων	η̄	π̄ Ὁσιον	παιαστικός	The title is very much faded, the first word having lost all its ink. The central A marks the tetralogy, the marginal A of the dialogue is gone. Below the flourish after the conclusion stands in the middle of the page a very finely formed Δ, with leaf ornament.
[A]					
End 7v. foot			Πλάτωνος Εὐθύφρων η̄ π̄ Ὁσι,	υ	
8 r. top	Ἀπολογία		Σωκράτους	ἡθικός	B faint, ηθικός reddish. Here also follows a beautiful Δ; for ornament see text, p. 29, top.
20 r. foot	B		Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους		
20 v. top			π̄ Πρακτοῦ	ἡθικός	The outer margin of 20 is gone; but there is room for Κρίτων in the title, of which, however, there seems no trace, either directly or by marks of damp ink (as there is of ηθικός and π̄) on next page. Δ follows again.
26 r. [Γ] Kρίτων			η̄ περὶ Πρακτοῦ		
26r.27 Δ	Φαιδων	η̄	π̄ Ψυχῆς	ἡθικός	ἡθικός is clearly later, and seems to have been touched before it was dry. Δ again.
58 r.			Φαιδων η̄ περὶ Ψυχῆς		
	B				II.
58r.13 E	Κρατύλος	η̄ π̄ Ὁνομάτων ὁρθότητο λογικός			Contractions for want of room. Conclusion on a scrape in lower margin: below the usual ornament, whose left side is very elaborate, there is another long scrape.
82v.34			Κρατύλη η̄ π̄ Ὁνομά ὁρ		
83 r. top	Θεαίτητος	η̄	π̄ Ἐπιστήμης		The title on a scrape in upper margin has lines ruled for it. A patch at the outer part of the vellum hides any adjective in -κός.
113 r. S			Θεαίτητος η̄ περὶ Ἐπιστήμης		

113r.21	Σοφιστῆς	$\hat{\eta}$	$\pi^{\epsilon} \tau\hat{o}^{\epsilon} \text{Οντος}$	$\lambda\omega\gamma\kappa^o$	The adjective is clearly redder than the rest.
136 v.			Σοφιστῆς $\hat{\eta}$ περὶ τοῦ "Οντος		
136v.30	Πολιτικὸς	$\hat{\eta}$	$\pi^{\epsilon} \text{Βασιλείας}$	$\lambda\omega\gamma\kappa^o$	Second half of title is dark; the adjective is as in the last case.
154 r.			Πολιτικὸς $\hat{\eta}$ $\pi^{\epsilon} \text{Βασιλείας}$		

Γ					III.
Θ	See the text and facsimile.				The adjective as above.
173r.13	Φίληβος	$\hat{\eta}$	$\pi^{\epsilon} \text{Ηδονῆς}$	$\dot{\eta}\theta\iota\kappa^o$	Adjective clearly different ink.
I					
198 v.			Φίληβος $\hat{\eta}$ $\pi^{\epsilon} \text{Ηδονῆς}$		
198v.30	Συμπόσιον	$\hat{\eta}$	$\pi^{\epsilon} \text{Ἐρωτο}s$	$\dot{\eta}\theta\iota\kappa^o$	The mark s refers to an alternative title in the outer margin $\pi^{\epsilon} \dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\delta$ which, like the $\dot{\eta}\theta\iota\kappa\delta$, is reddish. Four leaf ornaments follow the conclusion instead of the usual flourish below.
IA			Συμπόσιον $\hat{\eta}$ $\pi^{\epsilon} \text{Ἐρωτο}s$ flour.		
223v.34					
224 r. top	Φαιδρός	$\hat{\eta}$	$\pi^{\epsilon} \text{Καλοῦ}$	$\dot{\eta}\theta\iota\kappa^o$	Title in upper margin with a red line for it. Above it is ΙΔ. $\dot{\eta}\theta\iota\kappa\delta$ is faint red. The sign above καλοῦ has nothing to answer it, as the margin is cut away. No flourish below the ending.
IB					
248r.34			Φαιδρός $\hat{\eta}$ $\pi^{\epsilon} \text{Καλοῦ}$ flour.		

Δ						IV.
248 v. top	'Αλκιβιάδης α'.	$\hat{\eta}$	$\pi^{\epsilon} \Phi\acute{u}\sigma\epsilon\omega\sigma \dot{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{a}\pi^{\epsilon} \mu\alpha\iota\epsilon\nu\tau\kappa^o$		Title in upper margin with a coarse red line through it. Above Δ is a careless IE. The conclusion is darker than the text.	
IIΓ						
263 r.	'Αλκιβιάδ	$\hat{\eta}$	$\pi^{\epsilon} \Phi\acute{u}\sigma\epsilon\omega\tilde{\sigma} \dot{\alpha}\nu\tilde{\sigma}$			
263r.21 ΙΔ	„	β' .	$\hat{\eta}$	$\pi^{\epsilon} \Pi\rho\sigma\epsilon\nu\chi\hat{\eta}s$	The adjective differs and is redder; both title and conclusion are darker than the text.	
				"		
269 v.				β' 'Αλκιβιάδης $\hat{\eta}$ $\pi^{\epsilon} \Pi\rho\sigma\epsilon\nu\chi\hat{\eta}s$		

269 v. 24	"Ιππαρχος	η	Φιλοκερδής	ηθικ, ^ο	ηθικός differs and is redder.
IE					
273 r.			"Ιππαρχ ^ο	η Φιλοκερδ ^ς	
273 r. 22	'Ερασταὶ	η	π Φιλοσοφίας	ηθικ, ^ο	In the margin is ἀντέραστ ^ο , which with ηθικός differs in character from the rest. The conclusion is dark.
IS					
277 r.			'Ερασταὶ η περὶ Φιλοσοφίας		
	E				V.
277 r. 9	Θεάγης	η	π Σωφροσύνης	μαιευτικ,	In the margin is φιλοσοφί, which with the adjective is redder than the rest. The conclusion is darker.
IZ					
282 r.			Θεάγης η περὶ Σωφροσύνης		
282 r. 27	Χαρμίδης	η	π Σωφροσύνην	πειραστικ ^ο	The adjective differs, and is redder. The conclusion is darker.
IH					
294 v.			Χαρμίδης η π Σωφροσύνης		
295 r.	Λάχης	η	π 'Ανδρίας	μαιευτικ, ^ο	Title in upper margin with a red line: above it KA slightly dim, by a later hand. The adjective is faint red.
top	IΘ				
307 r.			Λάχης η περὶ 'Ανδρίας		
307 r. 9	Λύσις	η	π Φιλίας	μαιευτικ, ^ο	The adjective differs and is redder, the conclusion comes below the flourish, but is in the same ink as the text.
K					
317 r.			Λύσις η π Φιλίας		
	S				VI.
317 v.	Εὐθύδημος	η	'Εριστικός	ἀνατρεπτικ, ^ο	Title in upper margin: S of tetralogy in red. This letter, Εὐθύδημος, K and initial T, all leave a clear impression on the next page. The name, whose ink is gone, is carelessly rewritten later in brown. ἀνατρ. resembles the title. The conclusion is below the flourish.
top	KA				
336 r.			Εὐθύδημος η ἐριστικός		
336 r. 7	Πρωταγόρας	η	Σοφισταὶ	ἐνδεικτικ, ^ο	The adjective differs.
KB					
368 v.			Πρωταγόρ ^ο η Σοφισταὶ		

368v.ii	$\Gamma\sigma\rho\gamma\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha$	η	$\pi^{\epsilon}\acute{\rho}\eta\tau\sigma\iota\kappa\hat{\eta}s$	$\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\pi\tau\iota\kappa$	The adjective differs, and is redder. To get the conclusion into the line the usual preceding :— has been erased.
405 r.			$\Gamma\sigma\rho\gamma\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha \eta \pi^{\epsilon}\acute{\rho}\eta\tau\sigma\iota\kappa\hat{\eta}s$		
405r.ii	$M\acute{e}n\omega\nu$	η	$\pi^{\epsilon}\acute{\Lambda}\rho\epsilon\tau\hat{\eta}s$	$\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\kappa$	The adjective differs, and is redder.

418 v.

See facsimile

Here follows the Colophon or
Subscriptio, of which hereafter.

Then come three leaves covered with stains, and ‘manibus inelegantissimis polluta in quorum secundo index dialogorum inscriptus est’ (Schanz). These have been formerly bound in a reversed position, as some of the letters of the colophon are impressed upon them in that attitude. Finally three clean leaves have been inserted at the end by the binder.

Style and details. The vellum of \mathfrak{A} is distinctly less robust than that of A , and sometimes rather delicate. Setting aside the binding, the measurements of the codex are $32.2 \times 21.6 \times 7.6$ centimetres, or with the binding, $33.6 \times 23.3 \times 8.9$; in the course of binding some of the leaves have got slightly out of true line laterally or vertically. As will be seen, the writing is not in columns; the written space measures pretty exactly 20.3×14.6 . The widths of the margins are, with slight variations, inner 2, upper 4.5, outer 7, lower 7.6; the upper and still more the lower are curtailed in the facsimiles. The quaternions or, as Porson calls them, *plagulae*, are 52 and a half. In numbering the leaves Porson has missed two, and afterwards marked them 111*, 359*, so that the total comes to 420: in the table above, the paging is after Porson’s. The twentieth quaternion, beginning after fol. 151, has got displaced, and is bound up after the forty-fifth, so as to be numbered ff. 352-59: Porson at first thought it lost, but found out and noted the facts in his exquisite hand. Thus eight leaves in our table, representing, according to Porson, Steph. II. 289D $\chi\rho\dot{\eta}$ —307A $\pi\sigma\lambda\lambda\acute{\iota}\sigma$, must be taken from the *Protagoras* and added to the *Politicus*. The quaternions were lettered as in our edition, page 29, but very much nearer the outer edge: Porson’s list, which gives those that remain in red and those that are lost in black, no longer quite agrees with the facts, which are these:—

1. A has been renewed.
2. IA, IB, KF, $\Delta\Delta$, MS, MZ, M θ , N, NA, NT can be read with ease.
MB, M Γ , M Δ , ME, MH can be read but not easily.
B, H, IP, KA, KB, K Δ , KZ, LA, LB, L Γ , LE, M show slight or all but invisible traces.
3. Γ , S, Z, H, I Δ , IZ, KE, K θ , AS, AZ, A θ , NA, NB, NT, with others that are legible,
show a reversed trace of themselves on the previous page.
4. E, Θ , I, IH, K, KH, L Δ , MA are totally gone, and in the places where Δ , IE, IS, I θ , KS, A
were the vellum has become perforated or is otherwise injured. The letters which
are entire closely resemble those of the second part of the subscriptio. The margin
of 184 is torn away, yet KE show reversed on 183 v., which proves that the injury
was later than the lettering.

p. xcvi.

The method of ruling is quite analogous to that of the Paris Ms., but simpler from the absence of columns in the page. In each page there are two double perpendicular lines bounding the written space on left and right. These and the first and last of the lines used for writing extend to the edge of the vellum, while the other lines for writing are drawn exactly on

the principle of those in Paris A. The arrangement of the four pieces in each quaternion is this. The piece containing ff. 1 and 8 is laid with the projecting lines downwards, that containing ff. 2, 7 has them upwards, and the two remaining pieces repeat this arrangement. The writing hangs a little irregularly from the lines, and is of a dark brown in the text, and in most of the marginal additions: there are, however, as we have seen, traces of red in the titles, while some scholia etc. are in black and others in green.

Of the character of the writing the examples will be the best exponents. The following letters have two forms:—

$\alpha = \omega \delta$, the latter rare and generally at the ends of lines.

$\gamma = \gamma \Gamma$ the latter rare, sometimes marking paragraphs.

$\epsilon = \epsilon \varsigma$ the latter very rare, cursive; Plate III. foot; a third form σ is used in combination.

ζ two forms analogous to those of ξ below: see Plate III. 29, 28.

$\kappa = \kappa \kappa$ both are found; the latter not frequent.

$\lambda = \lambda \lambda$ both common, singly or double.

$\nu = \nu \omega$ the latter common after ν , as in $\omega\nu\nu\nu$, with which it combines: it occurs Plate III. 2 $\alpha\delta\omega\nu\tau\omega$, and elsewhere. This form of ν is almost indistinguishable from β and v in some cases.

$\xi = \xi \xi$ Plate III. 3, 5; former less frequent. Compare ζ .

$\tau = \tau \gamma$ the latter cursive, chiefly in combination. It is almost identical with γ .

In the cases of α , γ , ζ , κ , ξ , one of the forms is a survival of the older majuscule writing common up to the eighth century. Its forms gradually reasserted themselves in later minuscule MSS.

There is a considerable amount of ligature used in the writing: the connection being specially close between the letters $\epsilon\iota$, $\epsilon\sigma$, $\sigma\pi$, $\epsilon\sigma\tau$. But there is almost no contraction save the usual $\grave{\Sigma}$ for kai , and that generally at the end of a line with a view to economise room. Words divided between lines are not connected in any way, and all consonant groups which can be initial are carried to the next line: even κ in $\omega\kappa$ is so treated. Iota subscript is always postscript, and sometimes small and dark as if inserted afterwards. Both ι and ν are usually larger at the beginning of a word, and then have as a rule “ over them. The letters which project into the left margin indicate that a new paragraph has begun, either with them or in the previous line. They are not, as a rule, majuscules, but minuscules of considerably larger size than the text. While very like the text, they look in a good many cases as if patched on after an erasure; which seems to point to the idea that the constitution of a paragraph in the particular case was an afterthought. Instances are 8 r. 25, 8 v. 31, 9 r. 7, 16, 23, 74 v., 208 r. 29, 220 v. 18 (this is an ‘Arethas a’), 231 v. 16, 240 r. 29, 256 v. 14, 257 v. 17, 295 r. 27, 395 v. 8, 400 v. 27. The Ms. is quite appreciably more ornamented than A: this appears not merely in the flourishes which are seen in the facsimiles, but likewise in the initial letters of the dialogues. The first of these is illegible, but most of the others are clear and handsomely formed, although in the usual brown ink of the text. The following general observations on the writing may be useful, while there are minor variations in size, colour, and such matters:—

1. The text seems to be by one hand throughout.
2. The titles, endings, flourishes, and initial letters seem to be by one hand; very likely the original one, but after the text was finished. The concluding adjectives in -*kos*, however, are by a different hand.

3. While the capital letters have a strong general resemblance, those which mark the tetralogies and dialogues have no ornament and bear a closer likeness to the first part of the subscriptio: those which number the quaternions always have a leaf ornament below and bear a closer likeness to the second part of the subscriptio.
4. While the impression of a letter on the page opposite, from the ink being wet, is pretty frequent, this affects the body of the text only at outer corners, probably from damp getting in; in other cases it is confined to letters of quaternions, titles, and marginal notes.

The accents and breathings are not quite uniform in character, and never, save in the titles, so carefully done as those of A: the apostrophe, if it is of equal age with the text, is always comma-shaped. A hyphen — is used at times to mark the junction in compound words, e.g., 190 r. 34, δοξοσοφία, 271 v. 8, καινηφορία, 275 v. 33, 34, πολυπράγμονον and πολυμαθόντα. The punctuation is (:) for a change of speaker; (,), (·) and (·) elsewhere. If (; ; ,) are ever original they certainly are not always so, and in the first the comma seems laid on its back.

It is difficult to decide how many hands, and of what ages, appear in the margin. Some are clearly very old, others more or less recent: of the latter are the black hand which patches the text, as is done for instance on the closing page, and the green hand which comments; and both are φαντεπιφανλότατοι.

i. As a rule the antique scholia are entered in the margin, and certain corrections made in the text, either by the original hand or by one so like it as to make distinction very difficult. So far as corrections are concerned, there are two at least which seem almost certainly original. On 5 v. 31 the text gives τονθερξαντα, and in the margin stands Γρ. στέρξαντα. Again on 31 v. 32 we have in the text -θικαθιρώς, opposite which and the two following lines stands in the outer margin Γρ. ἀλλοθι δννα|τὸν εἶναι κα|θαρώς. It is impossible to distinguish these from the hand of the text. On a par with these old scholia and corrections seem to stand the usual symbols for σημείωσαι, ὠραῖον, etc., such as are given in the margin of our text. There they appear on too large a scale, however; and it is noteworthy that they are often, together with such phrases as διὰ σύνταξιν which accompany them, smaller and finer than many of the old notes, in which respect they correspond exactly with similar entries on the margin of the Lucian in the British Museum, of which hereafter. Some of these comments, like those in A, run perpendicularly. Samples are:—

	Δ ΣΤΝ S	64 v.		107 r.	'A 317 r.
	TAEIN			II 217 v.	In some cases, as on 10 v., such a note has been
		32 r. etc.		E	neatly impressed in a
				P	reversed position upon
	ΑΓΑΝ ΤΟ ΧΠΙΟΝ 225 r.			I	the page opposite, 11 r.;
	E'ΡΩΝΙΚ	225 v.		O	the original being left
ἐν ἀλλωι, ἐν ἑτέρωι, ἐν ἄλλοις				T	all but blank.
These last are in capitals,				'O	Some of the old scholia
and introduce various readings.				N	are disposed in ornamental shapes, and some
				P	are illustrated by dia-
				I	grams.
				K	
				A	
				A'	
				E	
				Π	
				I	
				Λ	
				O	
				Γ	
				I	
				K	
				H'	

To a very early hand belong also those letters alphabetically arranged in the margin of the Cratylus and Symposium, to which Schanz refers as measures of the contents—similar letters in the Theaetetus he regards as divisions of the argument. They occur at almost equal intervals, varying from 68 to 71 lines, but occasionally including from 72 to 75, which he says mark a uniform quantity in a previous Ms. Supposing the numbering to be at every hundredth line, then the number of letters of text included in each division yields when divided by 100 an average line of $35\frac{1}{2}$ in the Cratylus and $34\frac{1}{3}$ in the Symposium. Now all the known cases, says the late Ch. Graux on this subject, ‘donnent régulièrement pour la valeur du stique (or στίχος) de 34 à 38 lettres environ, ce qui revient à quinze ou seize syllabes,’ which forms the average length of the hexameter. And Birt considers that this was the normal length in works designed for the great literary market.

ii. Besides the late black and green hands (the latter of which, besides noting the speakers at the opening of the Cratylus, appears on the following pages at least 1 r., 8 r., 13 r., 24 v. 28, 53 r., 60 v., 65 v., 74 v., 83 v., then on 224 v., a long note on 225 v., and next 368 v.), there is a brutal brown hand which inserts in contracted form between the lines the names of the speakers in the Phaedo, Hipparchus, Theages; patches the words which happen to be injured at the outer ends of the top lines; supplies gaps (236-7), and makes notes. His symbols, C⁷~, etc., seem to begin at 256. It may be said that wherever the speakers are noted it is done by a late hand, which is very different from the practice in A.

iii. The last hand is that of Porson, who uses bright red ink, and adorns the page wherever he touches it. Besides numbering the leaves, he has noted at several points the corresponding pp. of Aldus. Thus, at the beginning, he enters ‘PAG 1 ed. ALD.’ on p. 8 r. he has ‘9 ed. ALD.’; sometimes, as in the Parmenides, he inserts the number of the page alone; finally he points out the misplaced quaternion.

There are also evidences of correction in the manuscript; and here a nice question arises. We have seen above that the dialogues of the first tetralogy are marked at the close with a very elegant Δ. It is clear that this letter is not a numeral, both because of its recurrence and because it has not the usual stroke above it. Does it represent the word διωρθώθη or διώρθωσα? Not improbably. It is a tempting thing to suppose that ΙΔ at the top of 224 r., which precedes the Phaedrus, means Ἰωάννης διώρθωσα; but this is far from likely. The Δ does not look old, and we must note that above the next dialogue in the same position stands IE, while above the Laches stands KA, all which facts point to a numerical signification in this case.

i. As in the Paris Ms., there are additions made in the margins to complete the text where omissions had occurred in transcription. We give noteworthy cases of this without pretending that they form a complete list. While the text is put on that side of the page which corresponds to its position in the original, the marginal additions are distinguished by smaller type.

4 r. 15

τοῦσιν

ἀμφισβήτη τοῦσιν ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικητα δεῖ διδύνει
δικητη διλλ' ἔκεινο
ἴσως ἀμφισβήτη

Caused by the double
ἀμφισβήτοσιν. The ad-
dition is in small minu-
scules inclining to the
right: not original.

^{1.} Euth.

5 v. 32 (following the correction στέρξαντα).

Caused by the

÷ ἐγώ οὐν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ
ποιητῇ εἰπω σοι ὅπῃ; πάνυ
γε: οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἵνα δέος ἔν-

ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς. ÷ πολλοὶ γάρ

double αἰδώς.

Style somewhat
like No. 1.

ἵνα γάρ δέος.

3. Apol.	16 r. 15	<i>πεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα, μήτε ἐδίδαξα εἰ δέ τις φησὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ</i>	Small, not very neat, dark red brown.
4. Crito.	22 r. 24	<i>ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τὰς δ' οὐ ; ἢ τί φησι;</i>	<i>οὐδὲ πάντων.</i> <i>ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν τῶν δ' οὐ ;</i>
			Seems to be the same hand as No. 1. (?)
5. "	24 v. 14		<i>ὅποι ἀν βούληται ἢ νῦν</i>
		<i>καὶ οὐδές ήμων, τῶν νῦν μων ἐμποδὼν ἔστι. οὐδὲ ἀπαγορεύει, ἔάν τε τις βούληται</i>	Caused by double βούληται. Opposite ll. 16-18: small, and like Nos. 1, 4.
			This hand appears twice on 32 r.; on 33 v. it gives a various reading; on 46 v. three short additions; on 48 r. a correction, and appears repeatedly in this dialogue—the Phaedo.
6. Phaedo.	51 r. and v. (34-1)	<i>νοσήσει, οὐκ ἔρω δι τὸ δὲν μέσος ἀλλ' φάντα πυρετός οὐδὲ φάντα δημιουργίας</i>	<i>οὐδὲ ἀν ἔρη δὲν σώματι τι ἐγγένηται ἢ περιττὸς ἔσται</i>
		This hand is very small and neat; it makes many small changes from page to page.	
7. Cratylus.	58 r. 21	<i>οὐδὲ ὄμολογεῖ [gap of 6 letters]</i>	<i>αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ δύναται τι δαι</i>
			Same as No. 6
8. "	61 r. 14	<i>ἔξαιφνης πεισθῆναι ἀλλὰ δοκῶ μοι δέν μᾶλλον πεισθῆσθαι σε εἴτε μοι δεῖξεις</i>	Between the dots is the note. Dots show scrapes. Seems the same hand, as 6, 7.
9. Theaetet.	91 r. 16	<i>ἡ δὲ γιγνόμενον, οὐδὲ τ' αὐτῷ λεκτέον, οὐδὲ ἄλλου λέγον</i>	Same, but less careful.
		On 105 v.—106 r. this hand gives three various readings of considerable length, prefaceing one by what seems to be ἐν ἀλλοις καὶ ταῦτα, and another by ἐν ἀλλῷ οὔτως.	
10. Parmen.		For this one see our text page 33. It stands below line 26 and on line 27 with a dumb line between on which its first portion rests. It closely resembles No. 3.	
11. Philebus.	178 v. 16	<i>μᾶλλον δ' εἰ βούλεις τριχῆς καθοτι φράζοις ἀν λαβωμέν.</i>	<i>διχῇ διαλάβωμεν ἄττα.</i>
		Caused by λάβωμεν. This is the hand of 6-9, but some- what rough. On 188 r. the same hand gives a various reading with γρ. At 229 r. there is a long v. r. preceded by ἐν ἀλλῷ: a very fine pen has been used, the writing being smaller and neater than the one on 105-6.	

256 r. 24 η οὐκ ἵσμεν ὡς οἱ μὲν ἡρακλέους οἱ δὲ ἀχαιμένους ἔκγονοι· τὸ (ras?) ἀχαιμένους εἰς περσέα τὸ δὲ ἡρακλέους τε γένους δ.

The ink is slightly 12. Alcib. i.
brighter than the text,
but this looks like the
first hand.

270 v. 31

Ink tawny and
writing slightly care-
less ; last $\mu\gamma\mu\nu$
in capitals. It
seems early.

·· εἰναι ὡφελεῖσθαι : τι
οὐν δὴ τοῦτο : θτὶ Σ τοδε
αὐτῷ προσωμολογή
σαμεν.

μεν ἡ βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντας

13. Hipparch.

371 r., 17

•· κ; ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ
βουλευτάς.

An addition : it is
certainly early.

14. Gorgias.

398 v. 5

$\alpha \mu \alpha$ are capitals.
Certainly early.

τήν τέχνην
ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστά-
μεθα.

younger

ἐπισταμέθα· τὴν οἴκο 15. ..

2. Another form of correction is erasure. We have seen that this occurs in the titles or endings of several dialogues. It also appears in the body of the text, nor is the alteration that frequently occurs upon it always the work of the first hand. Thus in the Parmenides and also elsewhere, besides repeated changes of *Tí δέ* into *Tí δαι*, *φάνται* is very frequently altered to *φάναι*. Of the κ in *οὐκ* we have already spoken.

3. Sometimes gaps occur without erasure: thus Schanz says ‘in Protagora licet videre lacunas complures manu recentissima suppletas: concludere igitur debes codicem e quo Clarkianus derivatus est hic non potuisse legi. Suppleta autem sunt p. 329 c haec: ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; [γὰρ δτι δ]; πεμ[ψειε]; καὶ [αῖ]—post δικαιοσύνην spatium vacuum; p. 329 d [ἔτερα τῶν]; [αλλῆλων καὶ τοῦ]; με[γέθει].’ In the same dialogue we have 341 r., 6 οὐτώσο [space of 3 letters] ἡγούματι.

cxi

4. A fruitful source of difficulty is, as under the circumstances was natural, external injury. The codex has received at some time a severe squeeze which has left a bend or 'crumple' in the parchment up the middle of the pages. The outer angles also have both suffered from a 'dog-ear' fold which almost always reaches and has injured the first or last letters in the first and last two lines of the page, which letters accordingly are often patched in a recent hand either brown or black. The injury just noted, especially at the upper corners, is considerably increased by the action of damp, which is traceable all through the Ms., and has often destroyed matter written in the upper margin. From the beginning to fol. 44, and from fol. 413 to the end in particular the leaves are so injured by damp and friction—probably the boards had been lost—that a great deal of recent restoration has been necessary, as may be seen from facsimile 1. of p. 418 v. All the ink is gone from the initial word ΠΑΤΩΝΟΣ and only the shapes of the letters remain. The parchment at its thinnest parts has holes which seem original, and which accordingly cause no injury to the text: but a good deal of damage to the thinner sheets has since been done, often accompanied by slight loss to the text. Thus near the foot of fol. 2 there is a hole with this result—

2 r. 32 Euthyphr. 5 B ἐκεινωι
 33 πρεσβυτερουσ
 34 διδασκοντα

2 v. Euthyphr. 6 A φήσει
 6 B εὖείδοτι
 ξυγγωρειν

The gaps (underlined) in l. 33 are supplied in the outer margins, those in 34 below, by the ugly brown hand. Again, we have the part destroyed by a dark acid, which has been referred ^{xxx.} to in connection with Vat. Δ: this affects both sides of two leaves.

236 r. 9 Phaedr.	252 E	<i>τοιουτοσ</i>	236 v. Phaedr.	253 E	<i>μετάκεντρων</i>
io		<i>τότεπι</i>			<i>ἐρωτικὸνδμμα</i>
ii		<i>μετέρχονται</i>			<i>γαργαλισμοῦτε</i>
237 r. 9	,, 254 E	<i>γνάθουσ</i>	237 v.	,, 255 E	<i>παραπλησίωσ</i>
io		<i>ἐρείσασ</i>			<i>-κεῖσθαικαὶ</i>
ii		<i>δπονηρόσ</i>			<i>συγκοιμήσει</i>

Of these the second and third passages together with discoloured words in lines 8 and 12 are supplied by a later hand in the outer margin: the first and last are not supplied, which seems to show that the acid had not at the time eaten through the two leaves. Sometimes the injury is made good by adding new parchment and writing upon that. This is so in the outer margin of fol. 20, but the injury is confined to the beginnings of lines 1-17 on the back, and is greatest towards the top. Again, f. 21 (Crito 45 b etc.) is so patched, the injury being at the beginnings of lines 1-6, 8, 9 on the back: f. 35 (Phaedo 73 E etc.) on the front has lost letters at the ends of ll. 1. 3-24, and on the back letters at the beginnings of 1-11: f. 38 (Phaedo 79 c, 80 c) has a hole filled up near the ends of 1-6 on the front, and near the beginnings of 1-7 on the back: f. 83, see title of Theaetetus: f. 178 r. (Phileb. 21 E) 'schedula allita abscondit literas extremas versuum septem ita tamen ut folio contra lucem verso possint legi,' (Schanz): fol. 189 r. (Phileb. 45 E) a patch at the outer side conceals four letters in lines 1, 2, two letters in lines 3, 4, 6, one letter in lines 5, 7, 8, 9. There are also places where the margin is cut or worn away without being replaced: ff. 157, 159 are cut away in the Parmenides but no ^{lxxx.} injury has ensued. The chief scene of such accidents is the Philebus: in f. 184 the text on both sides is injured for 13 lines: in f. 185 for two, 186 for one, 187 for three, 188 for two. Part of a scholium is lost by a cutting of the margin of f. 224 at the beginning of the Phaedrus. A good many yellow spots of wax, cedar oil or some such substance are scattered over the pages of the Ms.

Subscriptio, with
notes, chiefly on
Arethas, owner
of the Ms.

We now come to the Subscriptio. The writing is small majuscules, which are clearer in the original than in the facsimile. The words are as follows, and to these notes are added:—

21. ἐγράφη χειρὶ ὥ καλλιγράφου·
εὐτυχῶσ ὀρέθαι διακόνων πα
τρεῖ· νομισμάτων βυζαντί⁸
ων δέκα κγ τριῶν μηνὶ νοεμ

The letters αφη χει φου
πα
ντι
οεμ

25. βρίωι ἵνδικτιῶν ι.δ. ἔτει κόσορι⁸
,σνδ βασιλέασ λέοντοσ τοῦ φι
λοχν νιοῦ βασιλείου τοῦ ἀειμνήστου:—

β
λο are retouched: and
αφη χει, ντ, οε, β are impressed on the
fly-leaf, reversed.

cx.

θη

έδο

- πε⁰⁰ νν ιγ⁰⁰ * νπεργαμ νν

* Here are some small letters which can-
not be read. There is an abrasion
at the end.

Thaddeus M. Gosselin Whitepine Pecking 111

ΕΓΡΑΦΗ ΧΕΙ ΙΩΛΕΙ ΤΟΥ
ΕΥΤΥΧΩΣ ΑΡΕΘΗΣ ΔΙΗΓΕΩΝ
ΤΟΥ ΜΗΛΙΚΑ ΚΑΤΩ ΤΟΥ
ΩΝ ΔΕΙΔΑΛΟΥ ΣΩΝ Η...

R. P. WILSON, JR., M.D., F.A.C.P. (1968)

1933-1934 - BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARIES - 1934

21. *iō καλλ.* ‘John, calligraphus,’ the writer of the Ms. According to Montfaucon the Palaeogr. Gr. older term *γραμματεὺς* was out of date in the times of which palaeography chiefly treats, Lib. i. cap. v. ‘sed passim adhibetur καλλιγράφος, *Calligraphus*, ita dictus, διὰ τὸ εἰς κάλλος γράψειν, p. 34.
ob scribendi elegantiam: ut habet Theophylactus Simocatta, qui sub Mauricio et sequentibus Imperatoribus florebat, lib. 8. c. 13 ubi de nece Mauricii verba facit: ἐδέησε γὰρ ἀνδρά A.D. 582-602. τυντῶν εἰς κάλλος γραφόντων, δὸν ἐν συνθέσει φωνῆς καλλιγράφον ὄνομάζει τὰ πλήθη.
- Many calligraphi were called John: Montfaucon’s list, however, does not include this Cap. vi. one. The date of his nearest Joannes is 955 A.D. The next is in 973 A.D. Gardthausen mentions two besides our Joannes, both of whom are dated as ‘saec. IX.-X.’ If neither P. G. 325. be the same as ours—and we know nothing of their writing—they would be contemporaries. Of course the Clarke Plato was not discovered when Montfaucon wrote, and it does not appear that John has signed any other Ms. so as to be identified: but on the evidence of the writing the Laurentian Aristides 60, 3 is held to have been written by him. Allen, Notes on Abbreviations in Gk. MSS. 3.
22. *ἀρέθαι διακόνῳ πατρεῖ.* ‘For deacon Arethas of Patrae’ Let us go backward here. ‘Πατρεὺς ὁ ἀπὸ Πατρῶν. ἡ δοτικὴ Πατρεῖ.’ Patrae—in our period Patras—is a very old town on the N.W. of Achaea, a few miles west of the promontory of Rhium, which Strabo describes as *ἀπέχον Πατρῶν στάδια τεσσαράκοντα*, and is about half way between Corinth and Actium. One might almost suppose that the introduction of the silkworm under Justinian had a baleful effect upon Greece. It was preceded by an irruption of Sclavonians and Huns, and followed by terrible earthquakes, by one of which Patras Procopius, Goth. was overwhelmed. Yet the town recovered its strength so far as to repulse unaided War. iv. 25. a siege by the Sclavonians in the course of their further aggressions A.D. 807, at which time it was ‘the most flourishing harbour on the west coast of Greece.’ Ecclesiastically Finlay, Greece under Rom. 412, it was the supposed scene of St. Andrew’s Crucifixion, and had become a Christian Byzant. Emp., archbishopric, with a cathedral dedicated to St. Andrew, as early at least as 347 A.D. 122-24. Judging from the places in which inscriptions have been found it must at one time or Corp. Inscr. Lat. other have had, besides the cathedral, at least three monasteries and nine churches, one vol. III., part i. of which was dedicated to St. Basilius Magnus. St. Andrew having visibly interposed 95; and do. during the siege in 807 it pleased the Emperor Nicephorus—and we must remember Graec. vol. 1., p. 715. No. 1553. that Constantinople was the *θρόνος... τοῦ πρωτοκλήτου τῶν Ἀποστόλων Ἀνδρέου*—to cede Codinus, Parisiis, his own share of the spoils to the see, and to make various bishops suffragans of 1648, p. 364. Finlay ut supra. Patras. This was confirmed by the Leo VI. of our subscriptio, in whose ordering of the church Patras was clearly recognised as a metropolitan see. By Andronicus II. Palaeologus the rank of the see among the metropolitans was lowered—*λβ' οὐσία εἰς 1282-1328 A.D.* *λθ' ἑπεβιβάσθη*—on the other hand its archbishop is now one of the exarchs under the patriarch of Constantinople. In this list he is classed as *κθ'.* ὁ παλαιῶν (there was also a New Patras) Πατρῶν, πάσῃς Ἀχαΐας, and is one of the *ἱπέρτιμοι*. Here Arethas was deacon. ‘The church of the Nicene age was vexed with the peculiar presumption Stanley, East. of the order of Deacons.’ What their relations to the bishops often were we gather from Ch. 195. Montfaucon ‘In Actis vero Concilii Nicaeni secundi, quidam diaconus dicitur *Νοτάριος* Pal. Graec. 35. *τοῦ εὐαγγός Πατριαρχικοῦ σεκρέτου.*’ Later in life, as we shall see, Arethas had himself a deacon who copied MSS. for him; and from what we know of his own tastes he probably acted in this among other capacities when at Patras. In regard to Arethas personally, we know something of his rank, his library, and his literary work.

In the Bodleian Euclid we find in small majuscules ἔγραφη χειρὶ Στεφάνου κληρικοῦ Fol. 387 v. top.

^η μ. σεπτεμβρίωι ^δ iv. ^ο ξ ἔτει κ, | στρ̄ — This means, as we shall see, that it was written in

Mélanges Graux,
745-56.

888 A.D. E. Maass, who writes with the authority of an expert, but at the same time rather too much in the spirit of a special pleader, considers that these words were written by Arethas. However that may be, there is no doubt about those which follow them,

on line 5 of the same page, ἐκτησάμην Ἀρέθας πατρεὺς τὴν παρούσαν βίβλον νν Δ^{οο}. If not a native of Patras, then, Arethas was certainly a resident there in 888 A.D. and 'got' a beautiful copy of Euclid for a price which we shall not discuss. If he held any office he does not say so. As our subscriptio tells us, he had the Clarke Plato written for him in 895 A.D.: and now he is a deacon. When next we hear of him he has made a vast stride. The fine Ms. of Clement of Alexandria at Paris, commonly called Paris

Fol. 401 v.

451, bears in beautiful small majuscules the following note ἔγραφη χειρὶ Βαάνους νν: |

'Αρέθα αρεπισκ^χ, καισαρεὶ | καππαδοκ^π. ἔτει κόσμος | συκβ. The contracted words stand for νοταρίου ἀρχιεπισκόπου καισαρείας καππαδοκίας. Dindorf in his edition of Clement says 'Αρέθη ἀρχιεπισκόπως sic codex,' but he is wrong. Our note of the words was copied in facsimile from the Ms. Maass also has the genitive. Here we have, in 913-14 A.D., the fact that Arethas had a notary who copied Clement's works for him when he was archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. He now occupied one of the most exalted positions in the whole Eastern hierarchy. Unless he had been made one of the four Patriarchs or had been granted some great office at court he could not have stood higher. The archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia stands first on the list of metropolitans under the patriarch of Constantinople, he has 41 bishops under him, and is styled ὑπέρτιμος τῶν ὑπέρτιμων, καὶ ἔξαρχος πάσης ἀνατολῆς. With regard to notaries Montfaucon says 'Aliud scribarum genus erat τῶν νοταρίων καὶ ταχυγράφων ... ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς τάχος γράφειν ... vocantur item δέξιγράφοι eodem sensu, σημειογράφοι quasi dicas Notarum Scribae, unde vox Notarius. Erant autem Notarii arcanorum Scribae, τῶν ἀπορρήτων γραμμάτων Notariorum quidam numerus penes Imperatorem erat.' He goes on to cite this case as proof that archbishops and patriarchs had private notaries. The name Βαάνης is transliterated by Finlay in another connection as Vahan, and oddly we notice in recent papers a reference to one Wahan Effendi. At Moscow there is a Ms. of dogmatic works, the subscriptio to which as given by Maass is Στυλιανὸς διάκονος ἔγραψα Ἀρέθη ἀρχιεπισκόπῳ πατὶ Καισαρείας Καππαδοκίας ἔτει κόσμου | συνὶ ἵνδικτιῶν πέμπτης μηνὶ | ἀπριλίῳ συμπληρω | θέντος τοῦ τεῦχον. This is our last certain date in the life of Arethas, A.D. 932. He has now a deacon as calligraphus and his library seems to be taking a clerical turn. Perhaps we may quote, on the chance of its being to the point, the following passage from the subscriptio to Paris 781, a Ms. of John

Chrysostom, ἔγραφη χειρὶ στυλν (Στυλιανοῦ?) τοῦ ταλα· | εὐκλεεστάτῳ Καλοκυρῷ πρωτῷ (σπαθαρῳ?) τῷ παν (-λαβεστάτῳ?) | νομῷ βυζαντίῳ | μαρτινῷ | ιβ. ἔτει κοσμοῦ συμβ. The date is now A.D. 939, and in that year we seem to have a Stylian writing for a new master and calling himself ὁ τάλας—could it be that Arethas was dead? On the other hand, if Maass is right in reading Στυλιανὸς διάκονος for στυλια ... (τ)ξαύτξ, and ascribing the note in which it occurs in Luciani Cod. Vindobon. to Arethas, it is clear that Arethas survived a person of that name. But he is obviously in error. Du Cange under the word Τξαύτοις says 'Officiales Turcici, . . . Transiit a Turcis eadem appellatio, atque adeo dignitas, in Aulam Imperatorum Constantinopolitanorum. Nam—ut omittam Stylianum, cuius filiam Zoen in uxorem duxit Leo Philosophus, quem

Codinus, 406.

p. 35.

Gloss.
Graec.

Στυλιανὸν Τζιούτζιν vocat Leo Grammaticus (ut et Codex Regius 2023 Ζωοτζᾶν Scylitzes et Zonaras) cum incertum sit an cognomen fuerit Styliani an vero nomen dignitatis—scribit Acropolita cap. 60, etc. This clearly is the person to whom the note ascribed to Arethas refers, and, as he was father-in-law to the Emperor Leo of this subscriptio, Arethas might have alluded to him even before the date at which that was written. According to Gardthausen some 65 dated Greek MSS. have been saved to us up to the period of 1000 A.D. We have now seen that four of these owe their preservation to Arethas.

The Vatican codex contains three epigrams, marked in Anthol. p. 624.

Palatina as xv. 32, 33, 34, which are entitled ΑΡΕΘΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΚΟΝΟΥ. To this title a marginal note is appended 'γεγονότος δὲ καὶ ἀρχεπισκόπου Καισαρείας Καππαδοκίας.' If this is really an early note, based on knowledge, we not only have here three small poems by Arethas, but a strong confirmation of the supposition, on which we have thus far gone, that the person is the same in all the above MSS. It will be seen from the word deacon that these poems must have been written between the years 888 and 913-14 A.D. No. 34 is entitled *εἰς φεβρωνίαν μοναχήν*. The other two are epitaphs upon the author's sister Anna who is referred to as a widow of a pure character, and as dying τρεῖς πρὸς ἑείκοσ' ἐποιχομένην ἐνιαυτούς. There is a family burying-place, and χώρος εὐγενέων στενάχοντες ἀδελφῶν "Αννης (No. 32). Besides having anacreontic verses ascribed to him referring to the Emperor Leo among others, Arethas wrote or helped to write, when archbishop, at least one treatise. It is on the Apocalypse. In this treatise, Cramer, Caten. of which a small Ms. exists at Oxford, when commenting on the words καὶ εἰληφεν ὁ Graec. Patr. in "Ἄγγελος τὸν λιβανωτὸν the author observes τοίτῳ τῷ Ἀγγέλῳ, 'Ἀνδρέας ὁ τῆς κατ' ἐρέ [κατ' ἐρὲ nom est in B, note] Καισαρείας τῆς Καππαδοκίας ἀξίως τὴν ἐφορείαν λαχών, ἔκαστον ιεράρχην παρεικάζει.

Arethas is known to have written marginal notes on the volumes in his possession. In the Ms. of Clement, Paris 451, three such notes have the word 'Αρέθα prefixed to them. 'The name of Arethas, however, is prefixed . . . also to several in the Vatican Dind. Clem. codices of Aristides, according to A. Maius . . .' Accordingly, Maass regards—not p. xv. indeed these Vatican MSS., which are ascribed to the 11th and 12th centuries, but—the Laurentian 60, 3 of the 10th century (which contains the same note as appears in Vat. 1298) as having belonged to Arethas. Pursuing this line of investigation Maass identifies the writing of an undated Ms. of Lucian in the British Museum with that of Harleian, 5694. Baanes in Paris 451, and concludes that it also was written for Arethas. He then compares the MSS. either known or supposed to have belonged to him, and finds that while they differ in themselves, as the works of different scribes, they all contain examples of one particular hand which makes notes in their margins; this hand is very old and writes in small majuscules. Maass holds that it is the hand of the owner—Arethas. In this way he opens up quite a mine of Arethean scholia and says among other things Mélanges Græc., 'Morem sequebatur Arethas cum auctoribus suis colloquendi,' e.g. 'Ad Apologiam 27 D 758-9. Clarkiano adscripsit Arethas: καλῶς γε σὺ ποιῶν, Σώκρατες, ὅνοις καὶ ἵπποις τοὺς θεοὺς Ἀθηναίων παραβάλλεις.' This certainly savours of Christian authorship, and there are others like it: in particular Cobet points out that the remark, on Euthyphro, 14 E, πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθή καὶ ἔξης is really a quotation of the phrase 'every good and every perfect gift,' etc., James i. 17. Although the subject is a fascinating one and treated with the greatest ingenuity, it cannot be pursued here. We may say, however, that long before we knew anything of this question we made copies of words and letters in Paris 451, and recognized on comparing these with the Harleian Lucian that the

resemblance is very strong. The scholia too in the margin of that Ms. frequently terminate with the leaf ornament, which Maass identifies with the writing of Arethas. A detailed inspection of this Ms. of Lucian, moreover, brings out a very close resemblance indeed between much contained on its margins and similar notes on the margins of *U.* The forms of the usual symbols $\sigma\eta\mu$, $\dot{\omega}\rho$, etc., the leaf ornament and certain capital letters, as the A and M, could hardly be more alike. At the same time the argument from handwriting is periculose plenum opus aleae: and Maass proceeds to tie his scribes down to absolute uniformity in order to secure the necessary distinction in favour of this separate hand; while a new quill might make an appreciable difference in the writing of the same man. It may also be pointed out that the occurrence of the name 'Apétha before a few scholia is rather an argument against the same authorship in the case of those which, while resembling these, bear no signature. Finally, the leaf ornament is not confined to books owned by Arethas but appears elsewhere, e.g. in the codex Alexandrinus.

So Par. A : see
xcix. foot.

Oudinus, Script.
Eccles. tom. ii.
cols. 426, 540;
Cavus, Script.
Eccles. Historia
Literaria, i.
p. 407; Fabricius,
Bibl. Graec. viii.
p. 791 : and
Baronius, xv.
512, 564, 567, 602.

Thus far we have assumed the existence of but one Arethas: were there several? Some references on the point are given in the margin. Cave cites Coccius to the effect that Arethas, archbishop of Caesarea, flourished about 540 A.D.; but adds that he and his followers 'incertis prorsus nituntur conjecturis.' Cave, Oudin, Fabricius, and Baronius all agree as to the existence and date of our Arethas; and apparently the first three refer to his treatise on the Apocalypse and the debt which it owed to his predecessor Andreas. Cave and Fabricius with Baronius seem to hold that our Arethas may be the same with a presbyter Arethas of Caesarea who wrote homilies or orations 'de translatione Euthymii Patriarchae Constantinopolitani' (who died in 911 A.D.). In that case he must have been translated to Caesarea from Patras as deacon or presbyter. Oudin, while admitting that the dates allow of this authorship, denies that these homilies were written then—'habitae illae sunt centum annis postea, Eustathio primo Papa novae Romae praesente; sedit autem post Sergium nominis secundum ab anno 1019 ad annum 1025. Spectant ergo hae homiliae ad Aretham Caesariensis Ecclesiae Presbyterum integro seculo juniores altero Arethae ejusdem sedis Archiepiscopo.' Accordingly he has an article on this presbyter Arethas, under date 1020, where he returns to the charge. On sentimental grounds it would be pleasant to retain all three Arethae. We should then have the picture of an Arethas family for centuries connected with the greatest see in Asia Minor, one branch or one member of which family had migrated to Patras. In Patras there were several churches called by the name of Basil, one, as we have seen, dedicated to St. Basil, the Great. As St. Basil was both a native and, in later life, an archbishop of Caesarea we catch a glimpse of a possible reason why an Arethas in ecclesiastical employment might pass back and forward between the two cities.

23. νόμισμα. βυζαντ. δεκά καὶ τριῶν. 'For 13 byzants.' The νόμισμα or byzant was a gold coin weighing 'on an average 68 grains.' Finlay gives an example, having obverse a bust, bearded and crowned, bearing in the right hand a globe with patriarchal cross, the whole surrounded by the legend in mixed letters ΛΕΩΝ ΕΝ ΧΩ (Χριστῷ) BASILEUS ΠΟΜΩΝ (Πωμαίων); reverse, a female bust with both hands held up as if blessing, and the legend +ΜΑΡΙΑ+ ΜΡΘŪ (Μήτηρ Θεοῦ). As this is a coin of Leo VI., it is probable that it was the money actually used in paying for our Manuscript.
24. μηνὶ νοεμβρ. ἵδικτ. ι.δ. ἔτει κόσμου. σύδ. 'In the month of November of the 14th indication, in the year of the world 6404.' By Byzantine writers the year of the world when

Finlay, Byz.
Emp., pref.

given was given according to Byzantine reckoning, which assumed the creation to date from September 1, B.C. 5509. Now 6404, less 5509, gives as date for our Ms. the year 895 A.D. The word *indictio* is commonly held to mean the ‘announcement’ of taxation, but also means the year or cycle of fifteen years over which that taxation lasted. In the history of *indictional* dating, we may begin with the admitted fixed point 312 A.D.

‘The period is calculated from 1st September, 312.’ If now we count by periods of 15 from this date, we find that an *indictional* cycle—the thirty-ninth—closes on August 31st, 897 A.D. ($39 \times 15 = 585$; $585 + 312 = 897$). The ‘14th *indiction*’ of this period will extend from 1st September, 895, to 31st August, 896, which is exactly what we require. It is obvious, however, that when dealing with Byzantine datings the month is of importance. For any date from 1st September to 31st December we subtract 5509 Gardth. 387. from the given year of the world; for any between 1st January and 31st August we subtract 5508. Failing to note the importance of $\mu\nu\rho\nu\tau\alpha\beta\rho\iota\omega\iota$, some scholars date our Ms. A.D. 896. As the *indictional* cycle here under discussion has some palaeographic interest it is given entire:—

From Sept. to Aug.

$\iota\nu\delta\iota\kappa\tau.$ $\alpha' = 882-3$ A.D. } Ms. No. 8, Chalke, $\Sigma\nu\nu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta\kappa\alpha\nu\omega\nu$ written ‘a. 883.’ Gardth.

$\beta' = 883-4$ } p. 344.

$\gamma' = 884-5$

$\delta' = 885-6$

Leo VI. succeeds Basil I., March 1, -86. } ‘Laurent. 28, 26 Theon,’

$\epsilon' = 886-7$

$\varsigma' = 887-8$

$\zeta' = 888-9$

Bodleian Euclid written September, 888.

$\eta' = 889-90$

Ms. Paris 1470 (and 1476?) written April, 890.

$\theta' = 890-91$

$\iota' = 891-2$

$\iota\alpha' = 892-3$

$\iota\beta' = 893-4$

$\iota\gamma' = 894-5$

$\iota\delta' = 895-6$

Clarke Plato written November, 895.

$\iota\epsilon' = 896-7$

From what has been said it will appear that the dating of the Ms. written for Arethas by Baanes is not explicit to us: $\varepsilon\tau\alpha\kappa\sigma\mu\nu\sigma\tau\omega\beta$ might mean either 913 or 914 A.D.

$\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha\sigma$. . . $\dot{\alpha}\varepsilon\mu\nu\eta\sigma\tau\omega$:—‘of the reign of the most Christian Leo, son of Basil of happy memory.’ This is rather a modern rendering, but it pretty fairly gives the sense. For the persons named see $\iota\nu\delta\iota\kappa\tau.$ δ' . above and the description of Leo’s *byzant.* On the coin the words $\dot{\alpha}\chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omega$ correspond to $\phi\iota\lambda\chi\bar{\nu}$ ($\phi\iota\lambda\chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omega$) here: both being analogous to ‘most Christian king,’ ‘defender of the faith.’ In the National Library at Paris there is a gorgeous Ms. ‘omnium quotquot in Bibliotheca regia Graeci servantur ornatissimus’ of Gregorius Theologus, with comments by Gregorius Nyssenus, Paris DX (= 510). which seems to have belonged to Basil I. Facing a full page painting of Christ, it has three full page figures on gold ground, representing $\dot{\alpha}\nu\delta\kappa\iota\alpha$ $\dot{\alpha}\nu\gamma\omega\sigma\tau\alpha$ with $\Lambda\epsilon\omega\nu$ $\Delta\sigma\pi\omega\tau\eta\sigma$ and $\dot{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\xi\alpha\eta\delta\sigma\omega$ $\Delta\sigma\pi\omega\tau\eta\sigma$ on either side. On the second side of the third folio three more figures on gold appear, representing the crowning of Basil by Gabriel and Elias. A note says, ‘ex his figuris apparent hunc codicem scriptum esse ante annum Christi 886 quo anno obiit Basilius Imperator cognomento Macedo, maritus Eudociae, Pater Leonis σοφοῦ et Alexandri.’

29-30. With line 27 the subscriptio was probably intended to close. A flourish extends along line 28, and goes down through lines 29-30. But something had been omitted—the price. What follows we had thought, until we saw Maass' essay, to be a discovery of ours. Maass properly rejects the reading accepted from Gaisford by Schanz, which makes the words= ἐδόθη ὑπογραφῆς νομίσματα ιγ. ἀμήν. both as not being clear and because he saw that more letters were there. If the page, which has long been subjected to friction until all but the indentations of the letters is in some cases rubbed away, be held up to the light and examined with 'armed eyesight,' the actual letters can be pretty clearly seen, as given above. Being in doubt as to the two last marks, which are on an abrasion of the parchment, Maass adds 'H revera scriptum fuisse postea cum impetrasset, ut tinctura chemica huic codicis loco admoveretur, meis oculis vidi,' and renders the whole 'ἐδόθη ὑπὲρ γραφῆς νομίσματα ιγ., ὑπὲρ περγαμηνῶν νομίσματα—credo octo.' He believes that neither the main subscriptio nor this addition was written by Joannes, and holds that both are by Arethas. His grounds are 'At diversæ sunt non solum ab Joannis et atramento et calami ductu, verum inter ipsas certissima intercedunt discrimina. Sic igitur habeto,' he adds scornfully, 'scriba postea quam eadem scribendi supellectile uno tenore totum exaravit codicem, bis eam mutavit ut scilicet parvulas istas notulas adjungeret.' This is strong language. The page has been much rubbed and the letters patched; under the circumstances Gaisford's remark, 'ab eadem manu sed paullo negligentius et dierum aliquot intervallo scripta,' may cover the second subscriptio in relation at least to the first. We must note, however, that the form of subscriptio—*έγραψη χειρὶ Στεφάνου, Ἰωάννου, Βαάνου*—is common to three MSS. which belonged to the same individual, a fact which may incline us to hold that he was the writer in each case. If Arethas wrote the subscriptio, it would almost seem to follow that he likewise lettered the quaternions of the MS. We might add some facts about this literary archbishop's book account, as well as about other interesting matters, but space imperatively forbids.

III. CODEX
VENETUS.

CODEX † VENETUS. It remains to deal with the third of the great Platonic MSS., and after the details given in connection with the two older ones the description may be comparatively brief. It is described in the Catalogue as APPEND. CLASS. 4. COD. I. MEMBR. IN FOL. It is bound in wood covered with dark brown stamped leather which is a good deal injured on the back and at the corners. The contents fall into four portions—

1. The first which Schanz calls t_4 consists of four leaves on which are written the Timaeus Locrus 1 r.—3 v.: Πλοντάρχου ἐπιτομὴ τοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ Τιμαιῷ ψυχογονίᾳ 3 v.—4 r.: an index of the dialogues in the Thrasylean order, followed by the epistles and definitions, to which succeed Νοθενόμενοι οὐτοι πάντες, consisting of περὶ ἐικαίου, περὶ ἀρετῆς, Δημοδοκος, Σισυφος, Ἀλκυων, Ἐρυξίας, Ἀξιοχος, and twenty more, extending from ME to ΞΔ and concluding 'ΟΜΟΥΞΙΔ:

2. The second and chief part, called by Schanz t_1 of which the contents are these, written, as will be seen from the specimen, in two columns. The titles are in red, the first one being double, and are repeated in black at the ends. After the first the author's name does not, with one exception, recur until the Republic. We shall give details only where there is a divergence from the titles in the other MSS.; referring to the facsimile for the general style. The dialogues are lettered in red in the margin, while the letters are repeated by a later hand at the top of the pages.

খণ্ড ৪

ମୁଦ୍ରାବିହିତ

लिखितम्

Αἰγαῖος ἡ περιβασία εἰσὶν:

ΤΑΡΗΝΙΔΗΣ. ΗΠΕΡΙΓΛΕΩΝ:

πολιάθημεντούκατερόκαλωμένων
κομοσ. κατέρρεψεντούμεραδεμένης
τονεγγάνειαριλαίριατούμεροςτούχε
ολλαγμένος. χαίρεφτακέφυλοςτούδι
τούτοδεώνειμόδιαιτο. φράζειμενιτ
τηςτομέροςτούτοσύνειτοτούτοδεήροβρ
τυμών. λέγεισάμεφτακάτολυςτούτοπορτ

29-30. W
line
price
ours.
make
beca
jecte
away
can
whic
post
vidi,
ματα
writt
sunt
inter
eade
sciliq
mucl
eade
seco
form
whic
the
follo
abou
but

III. CODEX
VENETUS.

CODEX 4

after the data
brief. It is
bound in wo
back and at th

1. The f
Locrus i r.-3
of the dialogu
Νοθενόμενοι·
Ἐρυξίας, Ἀξιο

2. The s
as will be se
double, and ε
one exception
from the title
are lettered i
the pages.

		Begins	Ends
	+Πλάτωνος Εὐθύφρων. ἦ πε —<··· ρὶ ὁσίου ···>—	red } 5 r. i. upper } margin.	(no Πλάτωνος) — 8 r. ii.
A	Πλάτωνος Εὐθύφρων. ἦ π̄ ὁσίου δ λ̄, ἐριστικ':	black } 5 r. i. margin.	
B	Σωκράτους Ἀπολογία	8 r. ii. 16	— 14 r. i.
Γ	Κρίτων ἦ περὶ πρακτοῦ	14 r. ii. up. marg.	— 16 v. ii.
	in the margin by another hand is ἦ περὶ δόξης ἀληθοῦς καὶ δικαίου:		
Δ	Φαιδῶν ἦ περὶ ψυχῆς:	17 r. i.	— 31 v. ii.
E	Κρατύλος, etc.	31 v. ii. 34	— 42 v. ii.
S	Θεαίτητος, etc.	42 v. i. 23	— 56 v. ii.
	The ending is Πλάτων Θεαίτητ ἦ π̄ ἐπιστή:		
Z	Σοφιστῆς, etc.	56 v. ii. 23	— 67 r. ii.
	The ending is simply σοφιστῆς		
H	Πολιτικὸς, etc.	67 r. ii. 25	— 78 v. ii.
Θ	See facsimile	78 v. ii. 40	— 87 v. ii.
I	Φίληβος, etc.	87 r. i. 27	— 97 v. ii.
AI	Συμπόσιον, etc. [numerals so]	97 v. ii. 33	— 108 v. i.
BI	Φαῖδρος, etc.	108 v. i. 36	— 119 r. i.
GI	'Αλκιβιάδης ᾱ ἦ π. φ. ἀνού	119 r. i. 33	— 125 r. i.
ΔI	„ β̄ „ „	125 r. i. 50	— 127 v. i.
EI	"Ιππαρχος, etc.	127 v. ii. up. marg.	— 129 r. i.
SI	'Ερασταὶ, etc.	129 r. i. 17	— 130 r. ii.
ZI	Θεάγης ὃ περὶ σοφίας:	130 r. ii. 40	— 132 r. ii.
HI	Χαρμίδης, etc.	132 r. ii. 41	— 137 r. i.
IΘ	Δάχης ὃ περὶ ἀνδρείας (or -δρίας)	137 r. i. 26	— 141 v. i.
K	Δύστις, etc.	141 v. i. 20	— 145 v. i.
KA	Εὐθύδημος, etc.	145 v. i. 10	— 152 v. i.
KB	Πρωταγόρας, etc.	152 v. ii. up. marg.	— 163 v. i.
KΓ	Γοργίας, etc.	163 r. i. 43	— 178 v. ii.
[KΔ]	Μένων, etc. [numeral faded]	178 v. ii. 22	— 184 v. i.
KE	'Ιππίας μείζων ὃ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ	184 v. i. 25	— 189 v. i.
KS	„ ἐλάττων „ „ :	189 v. i. 25	— 192 r. i.
KZ	"Ιων ὃ περὶ Ἰλαΐδος	192 r. ii. up. marg.	— 194 v. i.
KH	Μενέξενος ὃ 'επιτάφιος	194 v. i. 29	— 197 v. ii. 44
	The last four represent Tetralogy VII. which is not found in Η. The Menexenus ends on line 44, then a line is missed, and on line 46 comes, in the same hand as that which gives the ending of the dialogue, τέλος τοῦ α' βιβλίου:		
KΘ	Κλειτοφῶν, etc.	198 r. i. up. marg.	— 198 v. ii.
Λ	Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας. ὃ περὶ δικαι ^δ	199 r. i. „	— 205 v. ii.
A	Πλάτων Πολιτεῖαι ὃ π̄ δικαίου	205 v. ii. 24	— 212 r. i.
B	Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας. ὃ περὶ	212 r. i. 45	— 212 v. ii.
Γ	δικαίου.		
	The closing words of this part of the Ms. are σωφροσύνης ἄρα οὐ δείχει Steph. 389 D.		
	The endings of the two first books are Πολιτείας ὃ περὶ δικαίου A and B.		

The next portion (t_2) includes the rest of the Republic, 213 r.—255 v.; and the last (t_3) gives the Timaeus, 256 r.—265 v.: so that the Ms. does not contain all that is specified in the $\pi\acute{v}a\xi$. These two portions are clearly distinguishable from the oldest by the character both of the parchment and of the writing: Schanz refers them to the 15th—16th century.

It is with the oldest portion alone that we have to do. The vellum is firm, well preserved, and of the same yellowish tint as that of the other two codices. The dimensions tested by fol. 67 are in centimetres 37.1×28.5 : the length of the writing space in the columns is 25.4 , while the breadth of the two columns is 9.3 , 9.4 : the space between the columns is 2.5 . The margins as usual come in the order inner, upper, outer, lower, and the breadth of the two last is considerable, more than 4 , but it varies with the cutting and binding in each leaf. The ruling is done much after the fashion described in A, only that the writing lines number 50. All the perpendicular lines, which include one near the outer edge of each outer margin, and the 1st and 50th writing lines, together with two more in the upper and one in the lower margin, are drawn from edge to edge of the vellum; the other writing lines as in A. The leaves have been numbered by a late hand in the outer upper corner after the parts were bound in their present order. Our portion extends over 5-212 inclusive, or 208 leaves. This would give 26 quaternions exactly; but that is not quite how they have been arranged. Originally the 1st and 24th had been quinions but have each lost a leaf—the first and second respectively; while the 26th quaternion has its two last leaves cut away. The 208 leaves thus consist of 2 nines, 23 eights and a six. These divisions are—except where injured—lettered in the original hand both on the face of the first leaf and the back of the last in the inner lower corner, and have a small cross in the upper margin. As in the Clarke Ms. the pieces of parchment are laid indented side to indented in pairs, and two pairs are stitched as a quaternion. The lines, as will be seen from the facsimile, almost cut the writing in the middle. While the headings and numerals are, as we have seen, in red, the colour of the initial letters varies between very dark brown, as in the Parmenides, and red as in the Philebus; and the body of the work is in dark brown. Paragraphs are not marked by projecting letters. In point of ornaments and initial letters the Ms. takes a middle place between A and \mathfrak{A} . The character of the writing will be seen from the facsimile.

Rhein. Mus.
xxxiii. 1878.

Schanz after a careful study of all three codices is not satisfied with the date assigned in the catalogue, 12th century, and says ‘wir haben ein höheres Alter anzunehmen.’ The text as incomplete has no date, so that this judgment must be based on the character of the writing. There is certainly a very considerable resemblance in general style between \mathfrak{A} and t , and one may note that in both there are the same double forms for the letters α , γ , κ , λ , ν . At the same time the letters in t are much less neatly finished; while not only have we the modern printed form for π , the c form for σ , and the capitals B, Δ, H, N at intervals in the text, but in addition to the ordinary abbreviation for kai , which is constant, many contractions are employed which never appear in \mathfrak{A} at all. Thus the facsimile alone gives examples of the following terminations

$-\epsilon\omega\varsigma = \epsilon\curvearrowleft\wedge$, $-\kappa\grave{\eta}\nu = -\kappa\curvearrowleft^1$, $\tau\omega\nu = \widehat{\tau\omega}$, $\tau\hat{\nu} = \widetilde{\tau\nu}$, $\tau\grave{\nu}\varsigma = \tau\grave{\nu}\grave{\varsigma}$: and of some of the following words:—

$\ddot{\alpha}\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$	$= \alpha\nu$	$\delta\grave{\epsilon}$	$= \grave{\delta}$	$\mu\grave{\epsilon}\nu = \mu\grave{\epsilon}\nu$
$\dot{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omega\varsigma$	$= \dot{\alpha}\nu\omega\varsigma$	$\epsilon\grave{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$	$= \grave{\epsilon}\grave{\iota}\alpha\iota$	$\grave{\sigma}\tau\iota = \grave{\sigma}\tau\iota$
$\ddot{\alpha}\rho\alpha$, $\grave{\alpha}\rho\alpha$	$= \dot{\alpha}\dot{\rho}\alpha$, $\grave{\alpha}\dot{\rho}\alpha$	$\grave{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota(\nu)$	$= \grave{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota$	$\grave{o}\nu = \grave{o}\grave{\nu}$

In the text of the Parmenides the name Socrates appears indifferently as $\mathbf{C}\omega\kappa\acute{r}\alpha\tau\varsigma$, $\mathbf{C}\omega\kappa\acute{r}\alpha$, $\mathbf{C}\omega^{\tau}$, $\mathbf{C}\omega^{\kappa}$, and many compound contractions such as of $\mu\grave{\epsilon}\nu$ $\text{o}\grave{\nu}\nu$, $\alpha\grave{\nu}\tau\grave{\nu}$ $\grave{\delta}\nu$, etc. occur. Sometimes either

for convenience or to supply an omission a word or phrase is put below the lowest line of the column, e.g. 32 v. i., 112 v. ii., 113 r. ii. Signs of erasure and of supplements in the margin occur from time to time as in all MSS. The stops are such as in A and Υ, and the breathings and accents which may be seen in the example resemble those of Υ much more than those of A, and are not put with absolute regularity. New speakers are marked by : in the text and — in the margin, save when a double change occurs in one line when — is not repeated. In the first seven dialogues and the two last the interlocutors are named by the scribe at the beginning, either in the outer margin or in the middle space, and usually after the same system as that pursued in A, i.e. the words *τὰ τοῦ διαλόγου πρόσωπα* contracted and in small uncials come in two lines, and below follow the names in succession. In the Symposium the names are entered opposite the place where each speech begins. Near the close of the Lesser Hippias, 191 v. i., abbreviated names come in succession down the outer margin. So also, as Schanz points out, contracted names appear from time to time throughout the Gorgias and Republic, while a younger hand puts them in the Sophist, 57 r. Finally, in the Menexenus, fol. 195 r. i., inner margin, stands ΕΠΙΤΑΦΙΟΣ· opposite the words Εργωι μὲν ἡμῖν. Besides other marginal symbols we have the usual σημείωσαι and ὠραῖον in more than one early form, all more or less resembling those in Υ. The expression **CH** ^aΠ appears more than once, e.g. 7 r., 44 v. ii., 54 v. ii.: what it refers to we had not time to note, but it may be = σημείωσαι παροιμία (?), to call attention to a proverb. Again, we have such expressions as **CH** ὅπος λήθης, noting a definition, 105 r. ii., and **CH** τί λέγει^r 155 v. i. The ὠρ. is usually neat and small, as 168 r. i., 204 r. i. The scholia and other notes are many, and seem, as Schanz decides, to be in most cases original. Such are the examples in the facsimile. There are other hands, one a very small neat one; and several much later, one which writes two or three notes in green. As in the Clarke Ms. some ^{cxxii.} small diagrams occasionally illustrate the notes, e.g. 121 r. ii. Cases occur of numeral letters in the margin, thus in the Phaedrus they run from A to Θ on 113 r. i. in the Gorgias, from A to Δ, 166 v. i., and in the second book of the Republic, 210 r. i. Whether they represent divisions of the argument or point towards stichometry we had it not in our power to decide, but they seem too close together to warrant the latter supposition. The scholia on the Parmenides will be referred to in the notes.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

NOTE.

THE text is printed line for line, as well as page for page, with the Manuscript. The accentuation is, where necessary, adapted to the orthodox standard, and the punctuation differs to some extent from that of the original: but any divergence of reading which involves a change in letters or words is underlined. It is to be noted that : marks the end of speeches, and ; the same where there is a question. Sometimes the scribe's view on these matters has not been adhered to, and the stops have been changed accordingly. In clear or brief questions—such as πῶς δῆ :—it has not been thought necessary to put ; if : stands in the original. It will be observed that capitals are not used for proper names.

γίγηραθαιτάνωντοι τάπεσλάρσι; δύσιςικαίδημασίαι, τούτοιμοιν παραγόντα
μέρησιν αμφισσιμάδιαστομ: τώστηνάρ δύ: τούτοδήτελόσ τραίνουποσά
υπαλληλίαισι, συμπλέκομενοι γίγηραθαιτάνωντοι παραγόντα
αμφισσιμάδιαστομ: τούτοδήτελόσ τούτομοι μοισικαίφιλία,
καιμόριζωσιγαγούσαντομπόριασιν ιαστολίκαιτεχνηπομπάρμεγαν
λοτρεντέναστομ: τραίνουποσάμικαίφιστομπότελόσ τούτομοι μοισικαίμόρι
τούτομποσάμποτακτωπάστομπότελόσ τούτοδητελόσ τούτομοι μοισικαίσχον
σασταρχήτιτούτο: τούτοιποτενικαίκαιτόσσομπότελόσ μοισικαίσχον
γίγηραθαιτάνωντοι τούτουμπότελόσ μοισικαίσχοντοι τούτοδητελόσ τούτο
στοντοι: καιμόριζωσιγαγούσαντομπόριασιν ιαστολίκαιτεχνηπομπάρμεγαν

 παρηνείδης * Ή * πτυχέων } εἰς λογισμόν

Γ
Σ
Γ
Σ

※ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΕΙΔΗΣ * Ἡ * ΠΙΔΕΩΝ ※ ΔΟΓΙΚΟ

Ἐπειδὴ ἀθήναξε οἴκοθεν ἐκ κλαξομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ' ἄγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν ἀδειμάντω τε καὶ γλαύκων· καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ ἀδείμαντος, χαῖρ', ἔφη, ὃ κέφαλε· καὶ εἴ του δέη τῶν τῆς, ὅν ήμεις δυνατοί, φράξε: ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, πάρειμί γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν: λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν: καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι· παῖς δέ που ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμηστα δεῦρο ἐκ κλαξομενῶν, πολὺς δὲ ἥδη χροόνος ἐξ ἐκείνου· τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, πυριλάμπης ὄνομα: πάνυ γε: αὐτῷ δέ γε; ἀντιφῶν· ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει; Οὔδε, εἶπον ἐγώ, πολύταί μοί είσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι· ἀκηκόαστι τε ὅτι οὐτος ὁ ἀντιφῶν πυθοδώρῳ τινὶ, ξήνωνος ἐταίρῳ, πολλὰ ἐντετύχηκε· καὶ τοὺς λόγους οὓς ποτε σωκράτης καὶ ξήνων καὶ παρμενείδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις ἀκούστας τοῦ πυθοδώρου, ἀπομνημονεύει: ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις: τούτων τοίνυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι: ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· μειράκιον γὰρ ὡν αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν· ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον, πρὸς ἵππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτόν ἄρτι γὰρ

†, 8 b 2

79 a 1

Cephalus.
I asked Adimantus, on meeting him and Glauco at Athos, if I and some philosophic townsmen from Clazomenae could hope to hear his half-brother Antiphon repeat a discussion which once occurred between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides and which he had committed to memory from the dictation of one Pythodorus, an associate of Zeno's.

ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται· οἰκεῖ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν μελίτῃ. ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐ-
βαδίζομεν· καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι χαλινόν τινα χαλκεῖ
ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἵ τε ἀδελφοὶ ἔ-
λεγον αὐτῷ ὃν ἔνεκα παρείμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέν τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέ-
ρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ με ἡσπάξετο. καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς
λόγους τὸ μὲν πρώτον ὥκνει, πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι· ἔπειτα μέν-
τοι διηγεῖτο: ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφί-
κοιντό ποτε εἰς παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα ξήνων τε καὶ παρμενείδης.

Τὸν μὲν οὖν παρμενείδην εὑρίσκειν μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολι-
όν, καλὸν δὲ κάγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα.
ξήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν τεσσαράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμάκη δὲ καὶ χα-
ρίεντα ἵδειν· καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ παρμενείδου γεγονέ-
ναι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ τῷ πυθοδώρῳ, ἐκτὸς τείχους
ἐν κεραμεικῷ· οἱ δὴ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι τόν τε σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς
μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ ξήνωνος γραμ-
μάτων· τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρώτον ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων κομισθῆναι. σωκράτη
δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον. ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν ξήνω-
να αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ παρμενείδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὅντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βρα-
χὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων ἡνίκα αὐτός τε ἐ-
πεισελθεῖν ἔφη ὁ πυθόδωρος ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν παρμενείδην μετ' αὐ-
τοῦ καὶ ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρῳ ἄττα ἔτι
ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον
ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ ξήνωνος. τὸν οὖν σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε
κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι,
καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, πῶς, φάναι, ὃ ξήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ
πολλά ἔστι τὰ ὅντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ δῆμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοι-
α· τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον, οὕτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια δῆμοια οὔτε τὰ
δῆμοια ἀνόμοια οἷόν τε εἶναι· οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; οὕτω, φάναι τὸν
ξήνωνα: οὐκ οὖν εἰ ἀδύνατον τά τε ἀνόμοια δῆμοια¹ εἶναι καὶ
τὰ δῆμοια ἀνόμοια ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ
εἴη πάσχοι ἀν τὰ ἀδύνατα; ἀρα τοῦτό ἔστιν δὲ βούλονται σου οἱ
λόγοι, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς
οὐ πολλά ἔστι; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἵτε σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἔκαστον
τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ ἡγεῖ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι δύσους

Yielding to persuasion Antiphon spoke as follows. Zeno and Parmenides came once to the great Panathenaea, Parmenides being about sixty-five and Zeno near forty, and stayed with Pythagoras. Socrates, then very young, and others had gone to hear Zeno's writings; and Pythagoras with Parmenides and Aristotle entered as Zeno was nearly done reading. S. Do I rightly take you, Zeno, to say that unless existing things are at once like and unlike—which is impossible—they cannot be 'many'; that it is your aim to show thus that they are not many; and that each of your arguments is so much proof to this effect?

περ λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά; οὕτω λέγεις, ή ἐγὼ οὐκ ὄρθως καταμανθάνω; οὔκ, ἀλλά, φάναι τὸν ξῆνων, καλῶς συ-
νῆκας δὲλον τὸ γράμμα δὲ βούλεται: μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν σωκρά-
Τη, ὃ παρμενείδη, δτι ξῆνων δὲ οὐ μόνον τῇ ἀλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ
βούλεται φίκειώσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι ταῦτὸν γὰρ γέγραφε τρό-
πον τινὰ δ_περ σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ήμας πειρᾶται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἔτερόν
τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν _φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων
τεκμήρια παρέχει καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· δὲ δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκ-
μήρια δὲ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν
ἐν φάναι τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἐκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐ-
τῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν, σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταῦτα, ὑπὲρ ήμας τοὺς ἀλ-
λους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρῆσθαι: ναί, φάναι τὸν ξῆνων, ὃ σώ-
κρατεῖ· σὺ δὲ οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ γέσθη-
σαι· καίτοι, ὥσπερ γε αἱ λάκαιναι^m σκύλακες, εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις
τὰ λεχθέντα. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, δτι οὐ παντάπασιν
οὕτω σεμνύεται τὸ γράμμα ωστε ἄπερ σὺν λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆ-
ναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὡς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον.
ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι· ἔστι δέ, τό γε ἀληθές, βούλειά
τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ παρμενείδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχει-
ροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμῳδεῖν, ὡς, εἰ ἐν ἔστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει
πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμ-
μα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας· καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλεί-
ω, τοῦτο βούλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἀν αὐτῶν ἡ
ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἔστιν, ή ή τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἰ τις ἵκανως ἐπεξίοι. διὰ
τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονεικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καὶ τις αὐτὸ-
ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ώστε οὐδὲ βούλευσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐ-
τὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μή. ταύτη γ' οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὃ σώκρατες, δτι οὐχ ὑ-
πὸ νέου φιλονεικίας οἵει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φι-
λοτιμίας· ἐπεί, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπείκασας: ἀλλ' ἀποδέχο-
μαι, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ·
οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰδός τι δόμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ
αὖ ἀλλο τι ἐναντίον δέστιν ἀνόμοιον; τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ
σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἂ δὲ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν, μεταλαμβάνειν; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁ-
μοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα δόμοια γίγνεσθαι, ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ το-

^mἀς ή συνή^τ
θεια λακω
νικ φη,

Z. You have well caught my purpose. S. I see, Parmenides, that while Zeno has in a sense written the same thing as you, he tries by a change to make us think it different. You say 'the whole is one'; he says 'the whole is not many'. The distinction, if there be one, seems too high for such as we. Z. The ambiguity is accidental. My arguments had the humble aim of supporting Parmenides against the scoffs of opponents, who urge that many absurdities arise if it be 'one'. I say—were their hypothesis of 'many' assumed, the results if followed out must be still more laughable. But the work was written in a fit of zeal when I was young, and some one published it without my sanction. S. I understand. But do not you accept the existence of some absolute *εἶδος* of likeness, and again of unlikeness; and the fact that we—the many—partaking of these, are like or unlike in proportion?

Nor would there be any wonder did we partake of both ; and so with all εἰδη. The strangeness would arise were the pure 'like' or absolute 'one' shown to be its opposite ; but not so in the case of mere participants. Of me, for example, it were easy to prove that having left-right, front-back, top-foot I am 'many' ; and again that as distinguished from the others present I am 'one.' Such a proof will hold for all natural objects : it proves that 'many' and 'one' exist. But were one first to part off the εἰδη which are apprehended mentally, and next to prove that these are equally subject among themselves to union and severance—then, Zeno, without depreciating your valuable work, I should indeed be filled with admiration.

After listening carefully, with what seemed a mixture of annoyance and pleasure, Parmenides said

σοῦτον ὅσον ἀν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὄμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν ; εἰ μὲν γάρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄμοιά τις ἀπεφαίνετο ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὄμοια, τέρας ἄν, οἶμαι, ἥντις εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ω̄ ξήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι· οὐδέ γε εἰ ἐν ἄπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους ἀν μετέχειν. ἀλλ’ εἰ ὁ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει, καὶ ἀν τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἐν, τοῦτο ἥδη θαυμάσομαι. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύτως. εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τάνατία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάξειν· εἰ δὲ ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν ; λέγων, ὅτ’ ἀν μὲν βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφαίνειν, ω̄ς ἔτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μού ἔστιν ἔτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ’ ἀριστερά, καὶ ἔτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν ἔτερα δὲ τὰ ὄπισθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως· πλήθους γάρ οἶμαι μετέχω· ὅτ’ ἀν δὲ ἐν, ἐρεῖ ω̄ς ἐπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἰς ἐγώ είμι ἄνθρωπος, μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ἐνός· ω̄στε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. ἐὰν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρῇ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῦτα ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν· οὐδέ τι θαυμαστὸν λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἀν πάντες ὄμολογοῖμεν. ἐὰν δέ τις ὁν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οἷον ὄμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνη, ἀγαίμην ἀν ἐγωγύ, ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ω̄ ξήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάνυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι· πολὺ μέντ’ ἀν φύδε μᾶλλον, ω̄ς λέγω, ἀγασθείην, εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ω̄σπερ ἐν τοῖς ὄρωμένοις διήλθετε, οὔτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδείξαι: λέγοντος δὴ, ἔφη ὁ πυθόδωρος, τοῦ σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν οἴεσθαι ἐφ’ ἕκαστον ἄχθεσθαι τόν τε παρμενείδην καὶ τὸν ξήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάντα τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδιάν ω̄ς ἀγαμένους τὸν σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ

B

C

D

E

130

πανσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν παρμενίδην ὁ σάκρατες, φάναι, ὡς
 ἄξιος εἰλλάγασθαι τῆς ὄρμῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐ-
 τὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα χω-
 ρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί σοι¹ δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ ὁμοιό-
 της χωρὶς ἥς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἐν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ
 καὶ πάντα δσα νῦν δὴ ξήνωνος ἥκουες; ἔμοι γε, φάναι τὸν σωκρά-
 τη: ἥ καὶ τὰ τοιάτα, εἰπεῖν τὸν — παρμενίδην, οἶνον δικαίου τι εἰδος
 αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτό, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων;
 ναί, φάναι: τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἰδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς
 ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἰδος ἀνθρώπου ἥ πυρὸς ἥ καὶ ὕδατος: ἐν
 ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολλάκις δή, ὁ παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα,
 πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἑκείνων ἥ ἄλλως: ἥ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε,
 ὁ σάκρατες, ἀ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειν ἀν εἶναι, οἶνον θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ
 ρύπος ἥ ἄλλο ὅ τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ
 φάναι καὶ τούτων ἑκάστου εἰδος εἶναι χωρὶς, δν ἄλλο αὖ τῶν τῇδε ὧν ἥ-
 μεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή; οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν σωκρά-
 τη, ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μέν γε, ἀπερ ὄρθωμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἰδος δέ τι αὐτῶν
 οἱ θῆται εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἥ ἀτοπον. ἥδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε
 μή τι ἥ περὶ πάντων ταῦτον· ἔπειτα δτ' ἀν ταύτη ἵστω, φεύγων οὔχο-
 μαι δείσας μή ποτε εἰς τιν' ἄβυθον φλυαρίαν ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ.
 ἔκειστε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἀ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εἴδη ἔχειν, περὶ
 ἔκεινα πραγματευόμενος διατριβώ: νέος γὰρ εἰ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν παρ-
 μενίδην, ὁ σάκρατες, καὶ οὕπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς
 ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, δτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν
 δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. τό-
 δε οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φήσ, εἶναι εἴδη ἄττα ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα
 μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἵσχειν, οἶνον ὁμοιότητος
 μὲν μεταλαβόντα δμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, καλλοντας τε καὶ δικαι-
 οσύνης δίκαια τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι; πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη:
 Οὐκ οὖν ἥτοι δλον τοῦ εἴδους ἥ μέρους ἔκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον
 μεταλαμβάνει, ἥ ἄλλη τις ἀν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο; καὶ
 πῶς ἄν; εἰπεν: πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι δλον τὸ εἴδος ἐν ἔκαστῳ εἰ-
 ναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὅν, ἥ πῶς: τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη, ὁ
 παρμενίδη, ἐν εἶναι: ἐν ἄρα δν καὶ ταῦτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὖσιν

79 b 3

Do you
 then hold that
 'one,' 'many,'
 'likeness,' and so
 on exist as *εἶδη*
 apart from their
 equivalents
 among us? S. I
 do. P. And
 'justice,'
 'beauty,' 'worth'?
 S. Yes. P. And
 likewise such as
 'man,' 'fire,'
 'water'? S.
 There I have often
 felt a difficulty.
 P. And even in
 the apparently
 absurd cases of
 hair or mud?
 S. Those visible
 objects I accept
 as existing, but it
 seems monstrous
 that they should
 have *εἶδη*.
 Indeed I have
 sometimes feared
 it might be so
 with all.

The other
 classes form my
 present study.
 P. Years will
 strengthen in you
 the philosophic
 mind. You hold,
 then, that there
 are *εἶδη*, and
 that things

ἐπάραζε ήγωχλησε
 εἰς θυμὸν ἐκινησε
 τὰς φρενας διέ-
 σεισε

T

around us derive
 their names from
 participation in
 these—big things,
 for example, from
 'bigness'? S. By
 all means. P.
 That which par-
 takes must do so
 in either whole or
 part of the *εἶδος*.
 Which do you
 choose? S. Why
 not the whole?
 P. Then while
 itself one and the
 same the *εἶδος*
 is wholly

in many separate things, and so becomes separate from itself. *S.* How so? Day is everywhere, yet not thus divided. *P.* What! You cover men with a sail —does the whole or a portion rest on each? *S.* A portion. *P.* The *εἰδη*, then, are divided; and thus things are big or equal when possessing a mere fraction of 'bigness' or 'equality' which cannot be equal to the whole: and when anything has a fragment of 'smallness,' 'smallness' must be larger than this part, while that to which the part accrues is thereby smaller than before! *S.* This cannot be. *P.* But again: do you reach your several *εἰδη* by comparison—'bigness,' for example, being the appearance common to many big things? If so, taking the bigness thus reached you will always get another by a new comparison; so that your *εἰδη* in each case will prove innumerable. *S.* What if each *εἶδος* be a conception existing only in minds?

80 a 1

ὅλον ἄμα ἐν ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν χωρὶς ἀν εἴη: οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἶνον εἴη ἡμέρα, — ἢ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὗσα πολλαχοῦ ἄμα ἔστι καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἔστιν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἔκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν πᾶσιν ἄμα ταῦτὸν εἴη: ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὁ σώκρατες, ἐν ταῦτὸν ἄμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἶνον εἰ ἵστιψ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φάιης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον. ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγεῖ λέγειν; ἵσως, φάναι: ἢ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἔκάστῳ τὸ ἵστιον εἴη ἀν ἡ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ; μέρος: μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὁ σώκρατες, ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἰδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἀν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκ ἔτι ἐν ἔκάστῳ ὅλον ἄλλὰ μέρος ἔκάστον ἀν εἴη: φαίνεται οὕτω γε: ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὁ σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἐν εἰδός ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ¹ μερίζεσθαι· καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται; οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν: ὅρα γάρ, φάναι· εἰ αὐτὸν τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἔκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φαίνεται; πάνυ γ', ἔφη: τί δαί; τοῦ ἵστου μέρους ἔκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει φῶ, ἐλάττονι ὅντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἵστου, τὸ ἔχον ἵστον τῷ ἔσται; ἀδύνατον: ἄλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει· τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται ἄτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὅντος. καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸν τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται· φῶ δὲ ἀν προστεθῆ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἄλλ' οὐ μεῖζον ἢ πρίν: οὐκ ἀν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτο γε: τίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὁ σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; οὐ μὰ τὸν δία, φάναι, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι: τί δαὶ δή; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις: τὸ ποῖον: οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦθε ἐν ἔκαστον εἰδός οἰεσθαι εἶναι. δτ' ἀν πολλά ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι μία τις ἵσως δοκεῖ ἴδεια ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδοντι, δθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι: ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι: τί δὲ αὐτὸν τῷ μέγα καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὠσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐτὸν μέγα φανεῖται, φῶ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; ἔσικεν: ἄλλο ἄρα εἰδός μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτὸν μέγας ἔτερον, φῶ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκ ἔτι δὴ ἐν ἔκαστον σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἄλλὰ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος: ἄλλα, φάναι, ὁ παρμενεῖδη, τὸν σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἔκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσικη ἐγγί-

¶

c

D

E

132

B

γνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γάρ ἀν ἐν γε ἔκαστον εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἀν ἐπί πάσχοι ἀ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο: τί οὖν; φάναι· ἐν ἔκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, Ηόημα δὲ οὐδενός; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν: ἀλλά τινος; ναί: ὅντος ἢ οὐκ ὅντος; ὅντος: οὐχ ἐνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὐσαν ἴδεαν; ναί: εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἐσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, αἰεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται: τί δαὶ δή; εἰπεῖν τὸν παρμενείδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ ὡς τἄλλα φῆς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἔκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον. ἀλλ', ὁ Παρμενείδη, μάλιστα ἔμοι γε καταφαίνεται ὥδε ἔχειν τὸ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὄμοιώματα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὐτῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς: εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικεν τῷ εἴδει, οἶόν¹ τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ δόμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἐστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ δόμοιον μὴ δόμοιώ δόμοιον εἶναι; οὐκ ἐστι: τὸ δὲ δόμοιον τῷ δόμοιώ ἀρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἐνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους μετέχειν; ἀνάγκη: οὐδὲ δὲ ἀν τὰ ὄμοια μετέχοντα δόμοια ἢ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἐσται αὐτὸν τὸ εἶδος; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν: οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τε τι τῷ εἴδει δόμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἀν ἐκεῖνῷ τῷ δόμοιον ἢ, ἔτερον ἀδ· καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι δόμοιον γίγνηται: ἀληθέστατα λέγεις: οὐκ ἄρα δόμοιότητι τἄλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο δεῖ ξητεῖν φῶ μεταλαμβάνει: ἔοικεν: ὅρᾳς οὖν, φάναι, ὁ σώκρατες, δῆσῃ ἡ ἀπορία, εάν τις εἴδῃ ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διορίζηται; καὶ μάλα: εὖ τοίνυν ἵσθι, φάναι, ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδέπω ἄπτει αὐτῆς δῆσῃ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, ἢ ἐν εἶδος ἔκαστον τῶν ὄντων αἰεὶ τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις: πῶς δή; εἰπεῖν: πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἵα φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἀν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν τύχοι ἔμπειρος ὁν δὲ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυῖς, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάντα πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένον τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεισθαι· ἀλλ' ἀπίθανος εἴη δὲ ἀγνωστα ἀναγκάξων αὐτὰ εἶναι: πῆδη δή; ὁ παρμενεί-

80 a 2

It might then remain one. *P.* Yet a conception of something, and of an existent something; in short, of some one feature common to all. *S.* Yes. *P.* Then that feature is an *εἶδος*. And we have this dilemma—all things have conceptional power as sharing in conceptions, or may be conceptions and yet want this power! *S.* I think I have it! The *εἶδη* are patterns set up in nature, and things partake of them simply by resemblance to them. *P.* But thus the *εἶδος* must also resemble the resemblance—must itself be a resemblance—and what they both resemble will now be the *εἶδος*. As this calls up an infinity of *εἶδη* participation by resemblance is hardly possible. *S.* It seems not. *P.* So bard is it even to hold that such *εἶδη* exist! Yet are there difficulties greater far if we emphasize their separateness. *S.* How? *P.* Why, one might say that in such a case they cannot even be known. To answer this objection needs extreme skill. *S.* In what way?

P. Of course
Being which is
absolute has no
place in our
world. Even
those *εἰδη* whose
very essence is
co-relation are
related in their
own world, hav-
ing no convection
with so-called
resemblances of
themselves here.
And the case is
parallel with
these resem-
blances. Human
slave implies
human master;
mastery *per se*;
slavery *per se*;
and the converse.
No crossing of
worlds. S. I
understand.

P. Will not abso-
lute knowledge
then, and all its
sub-divisions,
deal with abso-
lute truth and
all its branches?

S. Of necessity.

P. The *εἰδη* or
γένη accordingly
are known by the
εἶδος of know-
ledge; this have
not we; hence
absolute 'beauty,'
'goodness' and
all such *ἰδέατ*
are unknown to
us. S. I fear so.

P. Worse still.
Absolute know-
ledge is more
accurate by far
than ours.

so b r

δη, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη: ὅτι, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλοι, ὅστις
αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, δύμολογῆσαι ἀν
πρῶτον μὲν μηδὲ μίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν: πῶς γὰρ ἀν αὐτὴν κα-
θ' αὐτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν σωκράτη: καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν. οὐκ οὖν
καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἴδεων πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς
τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν εἴτε δύμοιώματα εἴ-
τε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὃν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἔκαστα
ἐπιονομαζόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα, δύμωνυμα ὅντα ἐκείνοις,
αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὐτά ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἴδη· καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐ-
κείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὔτως; πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν σω-
κράτη: οἶνον, φάναι τὸν παρμενέδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλός
ἐστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου δήπου, ὃ ἐστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δοῦλός
ἐστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δοῦλου, ὃ ἐστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης· ἀλλ' ἀν-
θρωπος ὃν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα ταῦτ' ἐστίν. αὐτὴν δὲ δεσποτείᾳ
αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστὶν δὲ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως, αὐτὴ δουλεία
αὐτῆς δεσποτείας· ἀλλ', οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔ-
χει, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ἀλλ', δὲ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς
αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς αὐτά. ἢ οὐ μαν-
θάνεις δὲ λέγω; πάνυ γ', εἰπεῖν τὸν σωκράτη, μανθάνω: οὐκ οὖν καὶ
ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἐστι ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἐστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἀν
ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη; πάνυ γε: ἐκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ὃ ἐστιν,
ἐκάστου τῶν ὅντων, ὃ ἐστιν, εἴη ἀν ἐπιστήμη· ἢ οὐ; ναί: ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπι-
στήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἀν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὖ ἐκάστη ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπι-
στήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὅντων ἐκάστου ἀν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι; ἀνάγ-
κη: ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἴδη, ὡς δύμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε
παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδόν τε εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ οὖν: γιγνώσκεται δέ γέ που ὑπὲρ αὐ-
τοῦ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἢ ἐστιν ἔκαστα;
ναί: ὃ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν; οὐ γάρ: οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώ-
σκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν: οὐ-
κ ἔστιν: ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ πάντα ἢ δὴ ὡς ἴδεας αὐτὰς οἵσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν: κινδυ-
νεύει: ὅρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε: τὸ ποιὸν: φαίης ἀν ἢ
οὐ, εἰπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἰ-
ναι ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην; καὶ κάλλος καὶ τἀλλα πάντα οὔτω;

D

E

134

B

C

ναί: οὐκ οὖν, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἀν τινα μᾶλλον
ἢ θεὸν φάγης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην: ἀνάγκη: ἀρ' οὖν
οἶδός τε αὐτὸς τὸ παρόν ἡμῖν γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων;
Τί γὰρ οὖ: ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ παρμενείδης, ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ω σώκρατες, μή-
τε ἑκεῖνα τὰ εἰδή πρὸς τὰ παρόν ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢν ἔχει, μήτε
τὰ παρόν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἑκεῖνα· ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα: ὡμολόγη-
ται γάρ: οὐκ οὖν, εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία
καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὗτ' ἀν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἑκείνων ἡμῶν
ποτὲ ἀν δεσπόσειν, οὕτ' ἀν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν
παρόν ἡμῖν. ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε ἑκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρόν ἡμῖν ἄρ-
χῃ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐ-
κείνοι τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γι-
γνώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες: ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν,
ἔφη, θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσειε τοῦ εἰδέναι:
Ταῦτα μέντοι, ω σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ παρμενείδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τού-
τοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἰδή, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἴδεαι
τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὄριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἰδος· ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε
τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὖ τε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴ τε ὅ τι μάλιστα
εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα· καὶ
ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τὶ λέγειν καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς
ὡς διστανάπειστον εἶναι· καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνη-
τομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἕκαστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν,
ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρους τοῦ εὐρίσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνητομένου διδά-
ξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἵκανῶς διεκρινησάμενον: συγχωρῷ σοι, ἔφη,
ὦ παρμενείδη, ὁ σωκράτης· πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις: ἀλλὰ
μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ παρμενείδης, εἴ γέ τις δή, ω σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἔάσει
εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀπο-
βλέψας, μηδέ τι ὄριεῖται εἰδος ἐνὸς ἕκαστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει
τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει μὴ ἐῶν ἴδεαν τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστου τὴν αὐτὴν
αἱεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι δια-
φθερεῖ· τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθῆσθαι:
ἄληθῃ λέγεις, φάναι: τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ
Τρέψει ἀγνοούμενων τούτων; οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἐν γε τῷ
παρόντι: πρωτὶ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ω σώκρατες, ὁ-

80 b 2

Now who should have such knowledge if not God?
But having it can he know things as they are with us, any more than by absolute mastery he can rule things with us? S. This is too preposterous a conclusion!
P. Yet, if we insist upon absolute εἴδη, there are countless such difficulties—very hard to meet, and needing a most gifted opponent.
S. I admit it.
P. Nevertheless, as you of all men must have realized, he who in consequence denies the εἴδη will have nought to which his intellect can turn, and will thus annihilate the possibility of discussion. S. You speak truth.

P. Yes, So-
crates; you have
been precipitate.

While still young you must rack yourself with the type of training which Zeno has illustrated. Yet I admired your forcing the question away from the sensible to the intelligible sphere. S. I did so because it seems so simple to show contradictory qualities in the former.

P. Yes; but, if your training is to be thorough, you must follow up the consequences not of one hypothesis alone but of its opposite. Thus you must, in the case of Zeno's hypothesis, ask not only 'if the many are' but 'if the many are not' what follows to them and to the one, both severally and reciprocally.

And so with likeness and unlikeness, motion and rest, existence itself and non-existence: in short, with every possible hypothesis.

S. Pray, do you illustrate by some hypothesis of your own.

ρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τε τί καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν· ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρόην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεῖα, εὖ ἵσθι, ή ὄρμὴ ἦν ὁρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυστον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἥσως ἔτι νέος εἴ· εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ή ἀλήθεια: Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὁ παρμενεῖδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; οὐτος, εἶπεν, ὅντερ ἥκουσας ξήνωνος. πλὴν τοῦτο γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἡγάσθην, εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὄρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂ μάλιστά τις ἀν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδῃ ἀν ἡγήσατο εἶναι: δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπόν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι οὖν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν: καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη· χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἔκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι: πῶς λέγεις; φάναι: οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ Ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἦν ξήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλὰ ἔστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔν, καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά· καὶ αὐτὸς, εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ αὐθὶς αὐτὸν ὑποθῆ ἐί ἔστιν ὄμοιότης ή εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ, ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἀν αἰεὶ ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅ τι οὖν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅ τι ἀν προέλη, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς ἔνυμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τὰλλα αὐτὸς αὐτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἀν προσαρῇ αἰεὶ, ἐάν τε ὡς ὃν ὑποθῆ ὁ ὑπετίθεσο ἐάν τε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές: ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ παρμενεῖδη, πραγματίαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω· ἀλλά μοι τί οὐ διῆλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι,

D

E

136

B

C

D

ωστάκρατες, προστάττεις ωστηλικῷδε: ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν σωκράτη,
 ξήρων, τί οὐ διῆλθες ἡμῖν: καὶ τὸν ξήρωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι,
 αὐτοῦ, ωστάκρατες, δεῶμεθα παρμενεῖδου· μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον ἦδε λέγει.
 ή οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἡμεν οὐκ ἀν
 ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι, ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν
 ἀλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευ ταύτης
 τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ
 ἀληθεῖ νοῦν ἔχειν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ωστάκρατει συνδέομαι, ἵνα
 καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου: ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ ξήρω-
 Νος, ἔφη ὁ ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν πυθόδωρον, αὐτὸν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ παρμε-
 νεῖδου καὶ τὸν ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι, καὶ
 μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν: τὸν οὖν παρμενεῖδην, ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καὶ τοι
 δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, φέρεντος, ἀθλητῆς
 ὅντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑψ' ἄρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δὶ' ἐμπει-
 ρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕ-
 τω πρεσβύτης ὧν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάξεσθαι ἴέναι· καὶ γάρ μοι δοκῶ
 μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὅντα διανεῦσαι τοι-
 οῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος λόγων. δύμας δέ· δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι,
 ἐπειδὴ καὶ, ὁ ξήρων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξάμεθα, καὶ
 τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα; ἡ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγμα-
 τιώδη παιδίαν παιᾶνειν, ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑ-
 ποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴ τε ἐν ἔστιν εἴ τε
 μὴ ἐν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν: πάνυ μὲν οὖν φάναι τὸν ξήρωνα: τίς οὖν,
 εἰπεῖν, μοι ἀποκρινεῖται; ἡδὲ νεώτατος; ἥκιστα γὰρ ἀν πολυνπραγμο-
 νοῖ, καὶ ἀοίεται μάλιστα ἀν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἄμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἀν
 εἴη ἡ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις: ἔτοιμός σοι, ωστάκρατες, παρμενεῖδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν
 ἀριστοτέλη· ἐμὲ γάρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων. ἀλλὰ ἔρωτα ωστά-
 ἀποκρινούμενον: εἰλεν δὴ, φάναι· εἴ ἐν ἔστιν, ἀλλο τι οὐκ ἀν εἴη πολλὰ
 τὸ ἐν: πῶς γὰρ ἄν: οὕτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὕτε ὅλον αὐτὸς δεῖ εἶναι:
 Τί δή: τὸ μέρος που ὅλον μέρος ἐστίν: ναί: τί δαὶ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὖν ἀν' μέ-
 ρος μηδὲν ἀπῆ ὅλον ἀν εἴη; πάνυ γε: ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐκ
 μερῶν ἀν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὃν καὶ μέρη ἔχον: ἀνάγκη: ἀμφοτέρως ἀν ἄ-
 ρα οὕτως τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἴη ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐν: ἀληθῆ: δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ
 ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτὸς εἶναι: δεῖ: οὕτε' ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὕτε μέρη ἔξει, εἴ ἐν ἔσται τὸ

81 a 2

P. It is a pro-
 digious task, and
 I am old.
 S. Zeno, then?
 —But Zeno
 laughing said
 'No; we must
 ask Parmenides.
 He is old: but
 we are few and
 he need not
 mind.' As the
 others all joined
 in the request
 Parmenides con-
 ceded.—P. I
 may well recall
 the saying of
 Ibycus when
 venturing thus, at
 my years, to swim
 through such a
 mass of argu-
 ment.

Let me start,
 then, from my
 own hypothesis
 —the one exists
 and, again, does
 not exist: what
 must follow?—
 and Aristoteles,
 as the youngest,
 shall reply? So.

A. I. If the
 one is, then,
 i. The one can-
 not be 'many':
 ii. it cannot have
 a 'part,' nor be
 a 'whole'; as
 both these imply
 many. A. It
 cannot.

ἐν: οὐ γάρ: οὐκ οὖν, εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ' ἀν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχου· μέρη γὰρ ἀν ἥδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη: ὅρθως: καὶ μὴν τελευτὴ γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἐκάστου: πῶς δ' οὐ: ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἐν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει: ἄπειρον: καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα· οὔτε γὰρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχοι: πῶς; στρογγύλου γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἵστον ἀπέχῃ; ναί: καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε οὐδὲν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῦτον ἐσχάτοιν ἐπίπροσθεν —ῇ; οὔτως: οὐκ οὖν μέρη ἀν ἔχοι τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἀν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφερούς μετέχοι: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε Περιφερές ἐστιν, ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει: ὅρθως: καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε δὲν οὐδαμοῦ ἀν εἴη οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη: πῶς δῆ; ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν δὲν κύκλῳ που ἀν περιέχοιτο ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν φῷ ἀν ἐν εἴη, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἀν αὐτοῦ ἀπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἐνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῷ κύκλῳ ἀπτεσθαι: ἀδύνατον: ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δὲν κἀν ἑαυτὸν εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη· ἐν τῷ γάρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον γάρ: οὐκ οὖν ἔτερον μὲν ἀν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ δὲν γε ἄμφω ταῦτὸν ἄμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὔτω τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἔτι δὲν ἄλλὰ δύο: οὐ γάρ οὖν: οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἐν, μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲν δέν: οὐκ ἐστιν: ὅρα δὴ οὔτως ἔχον εἰ οἱδόν τε ἐστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι: τί δὴ γάρ οὐ: δτι κινούμενόν γε η φέροιτο ἢ ἄλλοιοῖτο ἄν· αὐται γάρ μόναι κινήσεις: ναί: ἄλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που δὲν ἔτι εἶναι: ἀδύνατον: οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἄλλοιώσιν γε κινεῖται: οὐ φάίνεται: ἀλλ' ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι; ἵστως: καὶ μήν, εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἢ τοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἔτέραν ἐξ ἔτέρας: ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσον βεβήκεναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· φῷ δὲ μήτε μέσον μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; οὐδὲ μία: ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμεῖβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὔτω κινεῖται: εἴπερ γε δή: οὐκ οὖν εἶναι μέν που ἐν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; ναί: ἅρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνα-

P.
iii. Nor can it
have 'beginning'
'end' or 'mid-
dle,' these being
parts. A.

Right. P.
iv. Therefore it
is 'limitless';
and also

v. 'shapeless';
since shape,
whether round or
straight, needs a
middle and ends.

A. Right. P.
vi. Now if it were
in another, then
were it enclosed
in a circle and
touched at many
points; and if in
itself, it would
both inclose and
be inclosed, thus
becoming two.

Accordingly it
cannot 'be any-
where.' A. It
cannot. P.

vii. Can it then
'be still' or 'be
in motion'? If
in motion it
would be either
changed—thus
ceasing to be
one—: or borne
along, in which
case—i) if it
moved in a circle
it would turn on
a centre—and 2)
as for going from
place to place,

E

138

B

C

D

τιώτερον; οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ: εἰ ἔν τῷ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω
ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, ¹ μήτ’ ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἰ-
περ δὴ ἐγγίγνεται; ἀνάγκη: εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἀν
μόνον πάσχοι οὐ μέρη εἴη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι αὐτοῦ ἥδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ
δὲ ἔξω εἴη ἄμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἶόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ
οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἄμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινὸς μήτε ἔξω: ἀληθῆ: οὐ δὲ
μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήτε ὅλον τυγχάνει ὅν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγί-
γνεσθαί που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον; φαίνεται:
Οὐτ’ ἄρα ποι ἵὸν καὶ ἔν τῷ γιγνόμενον χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὔτ’ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
περιφερόμενον, οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον: οὐκ ἔοικε: κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα
κίνησιν τὸ ἐν ἀκίνητον: ἀκίνητον: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι γέ φαμεν ἐν τινι
αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον; φαμὲν γάρ: οὐδὲ ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστιν: τί δή:
ὅτι ἥδη ἀν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη ἐν φῇ τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστιν: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: ἀλλ’ οὔτε
ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἀλλῷ οἴόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐδέπο-
τε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: οὐκ ἔοικεν: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὐθ’ ἔστηκεν: οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε: τὸ ἐν ἄ-
ρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔθ’ ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται: οὐκον δὴ φαίνεται γε: οὐ-
δὲ μὴν ταύτον γε οὔτε ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὖ ἔτερον οὔτε
αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου ἀν εἴη: πῆ δή; ἑτερον μέν που ἑαυτοῦ ὃν ἐνὸς
ἔτερον ἀν εἴη, καὶ οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἔν: ἀληθῆ: καὶ μὴν ταύτον γε ἑτέρῳ ὃν
ἐκεῖνο ἀν εἴη, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἀν εἴη· ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἔστιν,
ἔν, ἀλλ’ ἔτερον ἐνός: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ταύτον μὲν ἄρα ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἔτερον ἐ-
αυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται: οὐ γάρ: ἔτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται ἔως ἀν γῇ ἐν
οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλῷ δὲ
οὐδενὶ: ὁρθῶς: τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἔτερον ἢ οἵει; οὐ
δῆτα: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ οὕτω, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ αὐ-
τό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὃν ἔτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἔτερον: ὁρθῶς: οὐδὲ
μὴν ταύτον ἑαυτῷ ἔσται: πῶς δὲ οὐ: οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις,
αὐτῇ δή που καὶ ταύτον: τί δή: ὅτι οὐκ ἐπειδὸν ἀν ταύτον γένηται
τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται: ἀλλὰ τί μήν: τοῖς πολλοῖς ταύτον γενόμενον
Πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἔν: ἀληθῆ: ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ταύ-
τον μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὁπότε τι ταύτον ἐγίγνετο αἰεὶ ἀν ἐγίγνε-
το· καὶ ὀπότε ἐν, ταύτον: πάνυ γε: εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτον ἔσται,
οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· καὶ οὕτω ἐν ὃν οὐχ ἐν ἔσται: ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε ἀ-

81 b 1

only that which
has parts can
come to be in a
thing into which
it has not yet
quite got, and
wholly outside of
which it is no
longer. Thus it
has no type of
motion. But we
showed that it
was not in any-
thing, therefore
it is never in the
same thing.
Consequently it
cannot be still.
A. So at least it
would seem. P.
viii. Nor will it
be ‘different from
itself’—else
were it not one:
or ‘the same as
the different’—
else were it that
different thing;
or ‘different from
the different’—
since the different
alone can have
difference: or
‘the same as
itself’—for if
same were iden-
tical with one,
what of things
that are same
with the many?

So the one is neither 'different' from, nor 'the same,' as, either itself or the different. *A.* No indeed. *P.*
ix. Nor will it be 'like' either to itself or the different. For that is like which has been affected by the same, and as the same is distinct from the one, if the one were like it were more than one. Again, since that is unlike which has been affected by the different, the one—being in no way so affected—is in no respect 'unlike' either itself or the different. *A.* So it appears. *P.*
x. Now—if equal to anything it will be of the same measures with that thing, but it has no part in 'the same'; and if greater or less, then, however measured, it will have as many parts as measures, and so will not be one: while if it has but one measure it will—which is impossible—be equal to that. Being such as it is, then, it is neither 'equal' nor 'unequal' whether to itself or another. *A.* Clearly so. *P.*
xi. Recalling now

140

δύνατον: ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἡ ἑτέρου ἔτερον εἶναι ἡ ἑαυτῷ ταῦτόν: ἀδύνατον: οὔτω δὴ ἔτερόν γε ἡ ταῦτὸν τὸ ἐν οὔτ’ ἀν αὐτῷ οὔτ’ ἀν ἑτέρῳ εἴη: οὐ γάρ οὖν: οὐδὲ μὴν ὅμοιόν τιν ἔσται οὐδὲ ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἔτερῷ: τί δή: ὅτι τὸ ταῦτὸν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον: ναί: τοῦ δέ γε ἐνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταῦτόν: ἐφάνη γάρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν, πλείω ἀν εἶναι πεπονθοι ἡ ἐν τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον: ναί: ¹ οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταῦτὸν πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδὲ ὅμοιον ἄρα δυνατὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδὲ μὴν ἔτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν· καὶ γάρ οὔτω πλείω ἀν πεπονθοι εἶναι ἡ ἐν: πλείω γάρ: τό γε μὴν ἔτερον πεπονθὸς ἡ ἑαυτοῦ ἡ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἀν εἴη ἡ ἑαυτῷ ἡ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταῦτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον: ὀρθῶς: τὸ δέ γε ἐν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἔτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιόν ἔστιν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἔτερῷ: οὐ γάρ οὖν: οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὕθ’ ἔτερῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἀν εἴη τὸ ἐν: οὐ φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὃν οὔτε ἵστον οὔτε ἀντίστον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ: πῆ; ² ἵστον μὲν ὅν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ φῶ ἀν ἵστον ἥ; ναί: μεῖζον δέ που ἡ ἐλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἀν σύμμετρον ἥ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μεῖζόνων ἐλάττω: ναί: οἷς δ’ ἀν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν ομικροτέρων τῶν δὲ μεῖζόνων μέτρων ἔσται: πῶς γάρ οὐ: οὐκ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἡ ἄλλων ὁντινων οὖν τῶν αὐτῶν; ἀδύνατον: ³ ἵστον μὲν ἄρα οὔτ’ ἀν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη, μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν: οὔκουν φαίνεται γε: ἀλλὰ μὴν πλείων γε μέτρων ὃν ἡ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσων περ μέτρων τοσούτων καὶ μέρων ἀν εἴη· καὶ οὔτω αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσα περ καὶ τὰ μέτρα: ὀρθῶς: εἰ δέ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἴη, ⁴ ἵστον ἀν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη ⁵ ἵστον αὐτῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι: ἐφάνη γάρ: οὔτε ἄρα ἐνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε δλίγων οὔτε τὸ παράπον τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ποτέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔσται ⁶ ἵστον οὔτε ἄλλῳ: οὔτε αὐτὸν μεῖζον οὐδὲ ἐλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἔτερου:
Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν οὔτω: τί δαΐ; πρεσβύτερον ἡ νεώτερον ἡ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι; τί δὴ γάρ οὐ: ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ ἄλλῳ ⁷ ἴστοτητος χρόνου καὶ ὅμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὅν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἐν, οὔτε ὅμοιότη-

B

C

D

E

τος οὗτε ἵστητος : ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν : καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότη-
τός τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: πῶς
οὖν οἶν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἰναι, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡ-
λικίαν ἔχειν τῷ, τοιοῦτον ὅν: οὐδαμῶς: οὐκ ἄρα ἀν εἴη νεώτερον
οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἐν οὗτε αὐτῷ οὐ-
τε ἄλλῳ: οὐ φαίνεται: ἄρα οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύνατο
ἀν εἶναι τὸ ἐν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εάν τι ἦ ἐν χρόνῳ αἱεὶ^{82 a 1}
αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν τό γε πρεσβύ-
τερον αἱεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον; τί μήν: τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἐ-
αυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἄμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλ-
λει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται: πῶς λέγεις; ωδε. διαφέρον
ἔτερον ἑτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἥδη ὅντος διαφόρου ἀλλὰ τοῦ
μὲν ἥδη ὅντος ἥδη εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ
μέλλοντος μέλλειν τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὗτε γεγονέναι οὗτε μέλ-
λειν οὗτε εἶναι πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι:
ἀνάγκη γάρ οὖν: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεωτέ-
ρου ἔστιν, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου: ἔστι γάρ: τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ
γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἄμα ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι: ἐ-
οικεν: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον μήτε
ἐλάττω ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ
γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι: ἀνάγκη γάρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα: ἀνάγ-
κη ἄρα ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἔστιν καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιού-
του, ἔκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν, καὶ πρε-
σβύτερόν τε αὐτοῦ ἄμα καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι: κινδυνεύει: ἀλ-
λὰ μὴν τῷ γε ἐνὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν: οὐ γάρ
μετῆν: οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἐν τινι χρόνῳ:
οὔκουν δή, ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ: τί οὖν; τὸ δὲν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ
ἐγίγνετο, οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονό-
τος; καὶ μάλα: τί δαί; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσε-
ται, οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μέλλοντος; ναί: τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνε-
ται, οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος; πάνυ μὲν οὖν: εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν μηδαμῇ μη-
δενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὗτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὕτ' ἐγίγνετο οὕτ' ἦν
ποτέ, οὗτε νῦν γέγονεν οὗτε γίγνεται οὗτε ἔστιν, οὕτ' ἔπειτα γε-
νήσεται οὗτε γενηθήσεται οὗτε ἔσται: ἀληθέστατα: ἔστιν οὖν οὐ-



ἢ λόγος αἱρεῖ.

what we have said
about likeness
and unlikeness,
equality and
inequality—
can it, compared
either with itself
or aught else,
be ‘older’
‘younger’ or
‘the same age’;
since these imply
equality etc in
time? A. It
cannot. P.

xii. Hence it
will not be ‘in
time’ at all: for
so it must always
get older—and
if so then like-
wise younger
—than itself;
while yet it
must ever be
the same age as
itself. A. No;
according to the
argument. P.

xiii. But those
states of being—
was, has become,
will be, is, be-
comes, and so
on—all indicate
some participa-
tion in time.
That, therefore,
which in no way
partakes of time
has no share
in these.

σίας ὅπως ἀν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; οὐκ ἔστιν: οὐδα-

μῶς ἄρα τὸ ἐν οὐσίᾳ μετέχει: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ

ἐν: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδὲ ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἐν εἶναι: εἴη γάρ ἀν ἥδη

όν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον: ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ

δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν: κινδυνεύει: ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν τούτῳ

τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἀν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; καὶ πᾶς; οὐδὲ ἄρα ὄνομά

ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἰσθησις οὐδὲ

δόξα: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδὲ ὄνομάζεται ἄρα, οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξά-

ζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται: οὐκ ἔ-

οικέν: ἢ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἐν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; οὐκον ἔμοι

γε δοκεῖ: βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλ-

Θωμει, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιούσιν ἄλλοιον φαν_ῆ; πάντα μὲν οὖν βούλο-

μαι: οὐκον, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμὲν τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποιά πο-

τε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα: οὐχ οὔτω; ναί: ὅρα δὴ

ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸν εἶναι μὲν οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέ-

χειν; οὐχ οἶόν τε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς εἴη ἀν, οὐ ταῦτὸν

οὖσα τῷ ἐνί; οὐ γάρ ἀν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδὲ ἀν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν

ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν: ἀλλὰ ὅμοιον ἀν ἦν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐν.

νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν

ἔστιν οὐχ οὔτω; πάντα μὲν οὖν:¹ οὐκ οὖν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαίνον τὸ ἔστι

τοῦ ἐν; ἀνάγκη: ἄρα οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἐν, τούτ' ἀν εἴη

Τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ἀν τις συλλήβδην εἴπη ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν: πάντα γε:

πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν τί συμβίστεται; σκόπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγ-

κη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὃν τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν οἷον μέρη ἔ-

χειν: πῶς; φῦδε. εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος λέγεται [καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ

ὄντος λέγεται] καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸν ἢ τε οὐσία

καὶ τὸ ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου, οὐν ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος,

ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἐν ὃν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι

μόρια τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι; ἀνάγκη: πότερον οὖν ἐκάτερον τῶν

Μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσεροῦμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε

μόριον προσρητέον: τοῦ ὅλου: καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἔστι δὲ ἀν ἐν γῇ, καὶ μό-

ριον ἔχει; πάντα γε: τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἐνὸς

ὄντος, τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅν, ἄρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἐν τοῦ εἶναι μόρι-

ον, ἢ τὸ ὅν τοῦ ἐνὸς μορίου: οὐκ ἀν εἴη: πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων

Thus the one will not 'be.'
A. It appears not. P.
xv. Neither, then, can it 'be one.' A. I fear not. P.
xv. As there can be nothing either of or for the non-existent, so there can be 'no name for,' 'no science, perception, opinion of' the one. A. It seems not. P.
Now are all these things possible? A. I, at least, do not think so.

II. P. Shall we then take a second survey from the beginning? Our hypothesis was that the one *is*. Now this involves the separate existence of being, for 'the one *is*' and 'the one *one*' are not identical. A. Quite so. P.

i. But if 'is' be said of the one-existent and 'one' of the existent-one—the two elements being distinct—clearly one and is are 'parts,' and the existent-one a 'whole.'

A. Undoubtedly. P.

ii. But neither part ever lets the other go.

82 a 2

142

B

C

D

E

έκάτερον τό τε ἐν ἵσχει καὶ τὸ δν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῦ
αὐτὸν τὸ μόριον· καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτως αἰεί, δ τί περ ἀν
μόριον γένηται τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ αἰεὶ ἵσχει· τό τε γάρ ἐν τὸ δν αἰεὶ ἵ-
σχει καὶ τὸ δν τὸ ἔν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη δῦ αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἐν
εἶναι· παντάπασι μὲν οὖν· οὐκ οὖν ἄπειρον ἀν τὸ πλῆθος οὔτω
Τὸ δν οὖν εἴη: ἔοικεν: ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι: πῦ; οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέ-
χειν τὸ ἔν, διὸ ἔστιν; ναί: καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἐν δν πολλὰ ἐφάνη;
οὔτω: τί δαί; αὐτὸ τὸ ἔν, δ δή φαμεν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῇ δια-
νοίᾳ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἀνευ τούτου οὐ φαμὲν μετέχειν, ἀρά γε
ἐν μόνον φανήσεται ἡ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο; ἔν, οἷμαι ἔγωγε:
Εἰδῶμεν δή ἄλλο τι ἔτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι ἔτερον δὲ
αὐτό, εἰπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἔν, ἄλλ' ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μετέσχειν; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν
εὶ ἔτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἔν, οὔτε τῷ ἐν τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίας ἔτε-
ρον οὔτε τῷ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἔτερον: πῶς γάρ: τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν
εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἔν, εἴτε τὸ ἔν
καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ἀρά οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθά τι-
νε ῳ ὁρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω: πῶς; φδε. ἔστιν οὐσίαν
εἰπεῖν; ἔστιν: καὶ αὐθις εἰπεῖν ἔν; καὶ τοῦτο: ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ ἑκάτερον
αὐτοῦ εἰρηταὶ; ναί: τί δ'; δτ' ἀν εἰπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἔν, ἀρά οὐκ ἀμφο-
τέρω: πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἔτερον, ἡ ἔτερόν τε καὶ ἔν,
καὶ οὔτω πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἑκάστον ἄμφω λέγω: ναί: ὠ δ' ἀν ἄμφω ὁρ-
θῶς προσαγορεύσθον, ἀρά οἶόν τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτῷ εἶναι δύο δὲ
μή; οὐχ οἶόν τε: ῳ δ' ἀν δύο ἡτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐ-
τοῖν ἐν εἶναι; οὐδὲ μία: τούτων ἀρά, ἐπεί περ σύνδυο ἔκαστα συμ-
βαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἀν εἴη ἔκαστον: 'φαίνεται: εὶ δὲ ἐν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν
ἔστι, συντεθέντος ἐνὸς ὅποιον οὖν ἥπιν οὖν συζυγίᾳ οὐ τρία γί-
γνεται τὰ πάντα; ναί: τρία δὲ οὐ περιττά, καὶ δύο ἄρτια; πῶς δ' εῦ:
Τί δαί; δυοῦ ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δίς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς,
εἰπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δίς ἐν καὶ τῷ τρίᾳ τὸ τρίς ἔν; ἀνάγκη:
δυοῦ δὲ ὄντοιν καὶ δίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δίς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς
οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τρία τρίς εἶναι; πῶς δ' οῦ: τί δαί; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ
δίς ὄντων, καὶ δυοῦ ὄντοιν καὶ τρίς ὄντοιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δίς

✓

✓

Bab 1

After whatever subdivisions the two still keep fast hold of each other. Now that which always becomes two must he—not one, but—a ‘limitless number.’ *A.* So it seems. *P.*
 iii. Think now of the one apart from being—it and its being are then different. They differ, however, not as being and one, but as different. If so, the different has in turn a distinct existence other than both. Take any pair of these, being-different, being-one, one-different:—they must he spoken of as both, or two. But of two each is necessarily one. Now if to any of these pairs some one be added the result is three: and three are odd, while two are even: and two give twice, and three thrice: so there will be two twice and three thrice, and three twice and two thrice.

δυο τρις

εἶναι καὶ τρία^σ δίς; πολλή γε: ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ἀν εἴη καὶ πε-
ριττὰ περιττάκις, καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις;
ἔστιν οὕτω: εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἵτινα ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι
δν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; οὐδαμῶς γε: εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶ-
ναι: ἀνάγκη: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὅντος πολλὰ ἀν εἴη καὶ πλῆθος ἄ-

144

- ✓ πειρον τῶν ὅντων. ή οὐκ ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλιθει καὶ μετέχων οὐ-
σίας γίγνεται; καὶ πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει,
καὶ τὸ μόριον ἔκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἀν αὐτῆς; ναί: ἐπὶ πάντα^B
ἄρα πολλὰ ὅντα ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐνὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὅν-
των οὕτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὕτε τοῦ μεγίστου: ή τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐ-
ρέσθαι; πῶς γάρ ἀν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν ὅντων τον ἀποστατοῖ: οὐδαμῶς:
κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ως οἶόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ παν-
ταχῶς ὅντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα^C
τῆς οὐσίας: ἔχει οὕτω: πλεῖστα ἄρα ἔστι τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς: πλεῖστα
μέντοι: τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας οὐδὲν μέντοι μέ-
ρος; καὶ πῶς ἀν τοι τοῦτο γένοιτο: ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε, οἷμαι, ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη^D
αὐτὸ αἰεί, ἔωσπερ ἀν ἦ, ἐν γέ τι εἶναι μηδὲν δέ, ἀδύνατον: ἀνάγκη:
πρὸς ἀπαντι ἄρα ἔκάστῳ τῷ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστιν τὸ ἐν, οὐ-
κ ἀπολειπόμενον οὕτε σμικροτέρου οὕτε μείζονος μέρους οὕτε
ἄλλου οὐδενός: οὕτω: ἄρα οὖν ἐν δν πολλαχοῦ ἄμα ὅλον ἔστι'; τοῦτο
ἀθρει: ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ, καὶ ὥρῳ ὅτι ἀδύνατον: μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ
μὴ ὅλον^E ἄλλως γάρ πως οὐδαμῶς ἄμα ἀπασι τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας
μέρεσιν παρέσται ή μεμερισμένον: ναί: καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ^F
ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσάντα ὅσπατερ μέρη: ἀνάγκη: οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθῆ ἄρτι
ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες ως πλεῖστα μέρη ἡ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἴη. οὐδὲ
γάρ πλείω τοῦ ἐνὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ' ἵστα, ως ἔσικε, τῷ ἐντού οὔτε γάρ τὸ
δν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὅντος, ἀλλ' ἔξισουσθον δύο
ὅντε αἰεί παρὰ πάντα: παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται: τὸ ἐν ἄρα αὐτὸ^G
κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆ-
θος ἔστιν: φαίνεται: οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ δν ἐν πολλά ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ^H
τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅντος διανεμημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι: παν-
τάπασι μὲν οὖν: καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλον τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμέ-
νον^I ἀν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν· ή οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρι-
α; ἀνάγκη: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχου πέρας ἀν εἴη: πῶς δ' οὗ: τὸ

Having, therefore, by the existence of one every combination of even and odd, we have number; and so limitless multitude, whose every portion partakes of existence, which is thus endlessly subdivided into parts. A. That is so. P.
iv. But of necessity each of these parts is one. Thus the one clings to every single portion of being, and has as many parts as there are division — is, in short, not a whole but a limitless multitude.

Accordingly we show not merely the one-existent, but the one itself through the action of existence, to be 'many.' A. Entirely so. P.

v. But parts are parts of a whole, which circumscribes them:

82 b 2

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

ἐν ἄρα δὲ τέ εἰστι που καὶ πολλά, καὶ δλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερα-
σμένον καὶ ἀπειρον πλήθει: φαίνεται: δρ' οὐν οὐκ, ἐπεί περ πεπερα-
σμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; ἀνάγκη: τί δαί; δλον οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἀν ἔχοι, καὶ
μέσον, καὶ τελευτὴν; ἡ οἶόν τέ τι δλον εἶναι ἀνευ τριῶν τούτων; καν του ἐν
ὅ τι οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι δλον εἶναι; οὐκ ἐθελήσει: καὶ
ἀρχὴν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἀν τὸ ἐν; ἔχοι: ἀλλὰ μὴν
τό γε μέσον ἵστον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γάρ ἀν ἀλλως μέσον εἴη: οὐ
γάρ: καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον δν μετέχοι ἀν τὸ ἐν,
ἢ τοι εὐθέος, ἢ στρογγύλου, ἢ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν: μετέχοι γάρ
ἄν: δρ' οὖν οὔτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐσται καὶ ἐν ἀλλω; πῶς;
τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ δλῳ ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ δλον;
οὔτω: πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ δλον περιέχεται; ναί: καὶ μὴν τά
γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐν ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε τι πλέον οὔτε ἐλάττον ἡ
πάντα: οὐ γάρ: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὸ δλον τὸ ἐν ἐστιν; πῶς δ' οὐ: εἰ ἄρα πάν-
Τα τὰ μέρη ἐν δλῳ τυγχάνει ὅντα, ἐστι δὲ τά τε πάντα τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ δ-
λον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δλον τὰ πάντα· ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀν περι-
έχοιτο τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὔτως ἀν ἥδη τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη: φαίνεται:
ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε δλον αῦ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὐ-
τε ἐν τινί· εἰ γάρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνī· ἐν τινι γάρ ἐνὶ μὴ δν οὐ-
κ ἀν ἔτι που δύναιτο ἐν γε ἄπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάν-
των ἐστί, τὸ δὲ δλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἐνι, πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐν ἐσται:
οὐδαμῶς: οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν· εἰ γάρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ δλον εἴη
Τὸ πλέον ἀν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἴη, δὲ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον γάρ:
μὴ δν δὲ ἐν πλέοσιν μηδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ μηδὲ ἐν ἄπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ δλον,
οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν
μηδαμοῦ μὲν δν οὐδὲν ἀν εἴη· δλον δὲ δν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν,
ἀνάγκη ἐν ἀλλῳ εἶναι: πάνυ γε: γὰρ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν δλον, ἐν ἀλλῳ ἐστίν.
γὰρ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὅντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὔτω τὸ ἐν
ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ: ἀνάγκη: οὔτω δὴ πεφυ-
κός τὸ ἐν δρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι: πῆ; ἐστηκε μέν που,
εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν· ἐν γάρ ἐν δν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαίνον
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀν εἴη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ: ἐστι γάρ: τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ δν
ἐστός δή που ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι; πάνυ γε: τί δαί; τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἰεὶ
δν οὐ, τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀνάγκη μηδέποτ' ἐν ταύτῳ εἶναι; μηδέποτε δὲ δν

and what circum-
scribes is a limit.
One, then, is
(one-many,
whole-parts,
limitless and)
'limited.' A. It
seems so. P.
vi. Thus it must
have extremities,
and, as a whole,
possess 'begin-
ning' 'middle'
'end.' A. It
must. P.
vii. And so will
have a 'shape'
—straight,
spherical or
mixed. A. It
will. P.
viii. Thus 1), as
all the parts com-
pose the whole
and are contained
in it, the one
which is both
whole and parts,
is 'in itself' ·
2) as the whole
is not in the
parts—whether
all or some or
one—if it is to be
anywhere it must
(viewed as a
whole) be in the
different, or 'in
another.' A.
Inevitably. P.
ix. But 1) if
always in itself it
is always in the
same, or 'is
still': while 2)
if always in the
different it is
never in the
same,

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἔσταντι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; οὕτως : ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ ἐν,
 αὐτὸς τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰὲν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, αἰὲν κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἔσταντι : φαίνεται :
 καὶ μὴν ταῦτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐπερον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταῦτόν τε καὶ ἑτέρον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν : πῶς; πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ωδε ἔχει. ἢ ταῦτόν ἔστιν ἢ ἑτέρον.
 ἢ, εὰν μὴ ταῦτὸν ἢ μηδὲ ἑτέρον, μέρος ἀν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ως
 πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἀν εἴη : φαίνεται : ἀρ' οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ μέρος ἔστιν;
 Οὐδαμῶς : οὐδὲ ἄρα ως πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἀν εἴη, πρὸς ἐ-
 αυτὸς μέρος ὅν : οὐ γὰρ οἰόν τε : ἀλλ' ἄρα ἑτερόν ἔστιν ἐνὸς τὸ ἐν; οὐ δῆτα :
 οὐδὲ ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἑτέρον ἀν εἴη : οὐ μέντοι : εἰ οὖν μήτε ἑτέρον μήτε ὅ-
 λον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸς ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἥδη ταῦτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸς
 ἑαυτῷ ; ἀνάγκη : τί δαί; τὸ ἑτέρωθι ὃν αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅντος
 ἑαυτῷ, οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἑτέρον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἑτέρωθι ἔσται;
 ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ : οὕτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἐν, αὐτός τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν
 καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ : ἐφάνη γάρ : ἑτέρον ἄρα, ως ἔοικεν, εἴη ταῦτη ἀν ἑαυτοῦ
 τὸ ἐν: ἔοικεν : τί οὖν; εἰ τούτη ἑτερόν ἔστιν, οὐχ ἑτέρου ὅντος ἑτέρον ἔσται;
 ἀνάγκη : οὐκ οὖν ὅσα μὴ ἐν ἔστιν ἅπανθ' ἑτερα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν;
 Πῶς δὲ οὐ : ἑτέρον ἄρα ἀν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων : ἑτέρον : ὅρα δή: αὐτός τε ταῦ-
 τὸν καὶ τὸ ἑτέρον ἄρα οὐκ ἐναντία ἄλληλοις; πῶς δὲ οὐ : ἢ οὖν ἐθελή-
 σει ταῦτὸν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἑτέρον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ποτὲ εἶναι; οὐκ ἐθελή-
 σει : εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἑτέρον ἐν ταῦτῷ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὅντων ἐν φ
 ἔστιν τὸ ἑτέρον χρόνον οὐδένα. εἰ γάρ ὅντιν' οὖν εἴη ἐν τῷ, ἐκεῖνον ἀν τὸν
 χρόνον ἐν ταῦτῷ εἴη τὸ ἑτέρον οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτως : ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδέπο-
 Τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστιν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τινι τῶν ὅντων ἀν εἴη τὸ ἑτέρον: ἀληθῆ:
 οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐνείᾳ ἀν τὸ ἑτέρον : οὐ γὰρ οὖν : οὐ-
 κ ἄρα τῷ ἑτέρῳ γάρ ἀν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνός, ἑτερα:
 οὐ γάρ : οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἑτερόν ἀν εἴη ἄλληλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑτέ-
 ρου : πῶς γάρ: εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς ἑτερά ἔστι μήτε τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ
 ἥδη ἀν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἑτερα εἶναι ἄλληλων; ἐκφεύγοι : ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ
 τοῦ ἐνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἐν. οὐ γάρ ἀν μὴ ἐν ἦν, ἀλλά πῃ ἀν ἐν ἦν: ἀλη-
 θῆ: οὐδὲ ἀν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἐν. οὐδὲ γάρ ἀν οὕτω μὴ ἐν ἦν παντά-
 πασιν, ἀριθμόν γε ἔχοντα : οὐ γὰρ οὖν : τί δαί; τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄρα
 μόριά ἔστιν ; ἢ καν οὕτω μετεῖχε τοῦ ἐνὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν; μετεῖχεν: εἰ ἄρα πάν-
 τη τὸ μὲν ἐν ἔστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν, οὔτ' ἀν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν τὸ ἐν εἴη οὕτε ὅλον

and so is 'in motion.'

A. So. P.
 a. Everything is to everything either the same or different, or is part or whole to that which is so: now
 1) as the one is not part of itself, nor a whole to itself as part, nor different from the one, it is the same as itself:—but 2) the one was both in and not in itself, so it differs from itself:—but 3) that which differs differs from the different; the one, then, differs not from itself but from the others:—4) the different, again, cannot be in either the not-ones or the one, else it were the same with them: will not these, then, escape altogether from differing? Nay the not-ones, to be truly such, must be without all share in the one—they cannot even be number for that reason—nor can they be parts of the one, or the whole of it, nor the converse.

83 a 1

B

C

D

E

147

E

ώς μορίων οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς μόρια: οὔτε δλα ὡς μορίω
 τῷ ἐνὶ: οὐ γάρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε δλα μήτε ἔτερα
 ἀλλήλων ταῦτα ἔστεθαι ἀλλήλοις: ἔφαμεν γάρ: φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν
 πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αὐτοῖς; φῶμεν: τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, ἔτερόν τε τῶν ἀλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἐ-
 αυτῷ: κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου: ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ὅμοιόν τε καὶ
 ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς; ἵσως: ἐπειδὴ γ' οὖν ἔτερον τῶν
 ἀλλων ἔφάνη, καὶ τᾶλλα που ἔτερα ἀν ἐκείνου εἴη; τί μήν: οὐκ οὖν οὐ-
 ως ἔτερον τῶν ἀλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε
 ἥττον; τί γὰρ ἄν: εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον, ὁμοίως; ναί: οὐκ οὖν
 ἥττον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἀλλων καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὠσαύτως, ταῦτη
 ταῦτὸν ἀν πεπονθότα εἰεν τό τε ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς καὶ τᾶλλα τῷ ἐνὶ:
 πῶς λέγεις: φῶδε. ἔκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖς; ἔγω-
 γε: τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸν ὄνομα εἴποις ἀν πλεονάκις ἢ ἄπαξ; ἔγωγε:
 Πότερον οὖν, ἐὰν μὲν ἄπαξ εἴπης, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὐπέρ
 ἐστι τοῦνομα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ, ἐὰν τε ἄπαξ ἐάν τε πολ-
 λάκις ταῦτὸν ὄνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταῦτὸν καὶ λέγειν ἀεί;
 τί μήν: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπὶ τινι; πάνυ γε: ὅτ' ἀν ἄρα
 αὐτὸν φθέγγη ἐάν τε ἄπαξ ἐάν τε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τι
 ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐπέρ ἥν ὄνομα: ἀνάγκη: ὅτ' ἀν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι
 ἔτερον μὲν τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀλλων, δις τὸ ἔτερον εἰπόν-
 τες, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ ἄλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸν ἀεὶ λέγομεν,
 ἥσπερ ἥν τοῦνομα; πάνυ μὲν οὖν: ὢ ἄρα ἔτερον τῶν ἀλλων τὸ ἐν καὶ
 τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός· κατὰ τ' αὖ τὸ ἔτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ-
 ἀν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς· τὸ δέ που ταῦτὸν πεπονθὸς ὁμοι-
 ον· οὐχί; ναί: ὢ δὴ τὸ ἐν ἔτερον τῶν ἀλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι κατ' αὐτὸν τοῦ-
 Το ἄπαν ἄπασιν ὁμοιον ἀν εἴη· ἄπαν γάρ ἄπαντων ἔτερόν ἐστιν: ἔοικεν:
 ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὁμοιον τῷ ὀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον; ναί: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον
 τῷ αὐτῷ; καὶ τοῦτο: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο γ' ἔφάνη ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἐν τοῖς
 ἀλλοῖς ταῦτόν: ἔφάνη γάρ: τοῦναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταῦ-
 τὸ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς τῷ ἔτερον εἶναι τῶν ἀλλων: πάνυ γε: ὢ γε μὴν ἔτερον,
 ὁμοιον ἔφάνη; ναί: ὢ ἄρα ταῦτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τοῦναντίον πά-
 θος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει· ὁμοίου δέ που τὸ ἔτερον: ναί: ἀνομοιώσ-
 ει ἄρα ταῦτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἔτέρῳ: ἔοικεν: ὁμοιον ἄρα καὶ

83 a 2

But whatever
 was neither part
 nor whole nor
 different was the
 same; so the one
 and the not-ones
 are the same.

Thus the one is
 both 'different'
 from and 'the
 same' as itself
 and the others.

A. The argument
 would make it
 seem so. P.
 xi. Will it not

also be both
 'like' and 'un-
 like' to itself and
 the others? For
 i) the one and
 the others mutu-
 ally differing to
 the same degree
 are like by this
 equal difference
 —difference hav-
 ing the same
 meaning whether
 used of the others
 or of the one.

And 2) if dif-
 ference give
 likeness same-
 ness must yield
 unlikeness; now
 the one was the
 same as the
 others, therefore
 it is unlike them.

But 3) it was also different from itself, so it is 'like itself'; and 4) the same as itself, therefore finally it must be 'unlike itself.' A. Necessarily. P. xii. Since the one was in itself as whole it touches itself; but being also in the others it touches them likewise. Now to touch itself the one must lie next itself. But this makes it two: as surely as it is one, so surely can it not touch itself. And, as between two things which touch no third can come, two things will yield one touch, and three two touches—always one touch fewer than the things: one thing, no touch.

§3 b 1

*κατέχουν

άνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἢ μὲν ἔτερον, ὅμοιον, ἢ δὲ ταύτον, ἀνόμοιον: ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δί, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον: καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει: τίνα; ἢ ταύτὸν πέπονθε μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δὲ Πεπονθός μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι· ἢ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ δὲ δὲ ἀνόμοιον εἶναι: ἀληθῆ λέγεις: ταύτον τε ἄρα δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἔτερόν ἔστι, κατ' ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον ὅμοιόν τε ἀν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις: πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἔαυτῷ ὡσαύτῳ, ἐπεί περ ἔτερόν τε ἔαυτοῦ καὶ ταύτὸν ἔαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ' ἀμφότερα καὶ ἐκάτερον, ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται: ἀνάγκη: τί δαὶ δή; περὶ τοῦ ἀπτεσθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀπτεσθαι πέρι, πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει: σκοπῶ: αὐτὸ δέ γάρ που ἐν ἔαυτῷ ὅλῳ τὸ ἐν ἐφάνη ὅν: ὀρθῶς: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἐν; ναί: ἢ μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπτοιτο ἀν· ἢ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἔαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἀπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀπτοιτο ἀν ἐν ἔαυτῷ ὅν: φαίνεται: οὕτω μὲν δὲ ἀπτοιτο ἀν τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: ἀπτοιτο: τί δαὶ τῇδε; ἀρ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἀψεσθαι τίνος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κεῖσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὐ μέλλει ἀπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν ἢ ἀν μετ' ἐκείνῃ ἢ ἔδρα, ἢ ἀν κέηται ἀπτεσθαι; ἀνάγκη: καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἀψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἔαυτὸ κεῖσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἢ αὐτό ἔστιν: δεῖ γάρ: οὐκ οὖν, δύο μὲν δὲ τὸ ἐν ποιησιεν ἀν ταῦτα, καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἀμα γένοιτο· ἔως δὲ ἀν ἢ ἐν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει: οὐ γάρ οὖν: ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐν μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ: ἡ αὐτή: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀψεσθαι: τί δή: δτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἀψεσθαι χωρὶς δὲν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ εἶναι οὐ μέλλει ἀψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι: ἀληθῆ: δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ διλιγοστὸν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἀψις εἶναι: δεῖ: ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ δυοῖν ὅροιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἔξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται αἱ δὲ ἀψις δύο; ναί: καὶ οὕτω δὴ αἰὲνὸς προσγιγνομένου μία καὶ ἀψις προσγίγνεται καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἀψις τοῦ πλιήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾶ ἐλάττους εἶναι. φ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς ἀψις, τῷ ἵσφ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἀψις πλεονεκτεῖ. ἥδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀμα ἐν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἀψις ταὶς ἀψισιν: ὀρθῶς: δσα ἄρα ἔστιν τὰ ὅντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, αἰὲν μιᾶ αἱ

c

D

E

149

B

C

ἄψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν : ἀληθῆ : εἰ δέ γε ἐν μόνον ἐστίν, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἐστιν, ἄψις οὐκ ἀν εἴη : πῶς γάρ : οὐκ οὖν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἐν ἐστιν οὕτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν : οὐ γάρ : οὐκ ἄρα ἐν-
εστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἑνὸς μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν αὐτοῖς : πῶς
γάρ : οὗτ' ἄρα ἐν ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε δύο, οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὅ-
νομα οὐδέν : οὐ : τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ἐν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἀν εἴη : οὐ φα-
νεται : ἄψις ἄρα οὐκ ἐστιν, δυοῦν μὴ ὅντοι : οὐκ ἐστιν : οὗτ' ἄρα τὸ ἐν τῷ
ἄλλων ἀπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπει τὸ περ ἄψις οὐκ ἐστιν : οὐ γάρ οὖν:
οὕτω ὅῃ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν τῷ τε ἄλλων καὶ ἐαυτοῦ ἀπτεται τε καὶ
οὐχ ἀπτεται : ἔοικεν : ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἵστον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνίστον, αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις ; πῶς ; εἰ μεῖζον εἴη τὸ ἐν ἡ τᾶλλα ἡ ἐλάττον, ἡ αὐτὰ ἄλλα τοῦ
ἑνὸς μείζω ἡ ἐλάττω, ἄρα οὐκ ἀν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα ἄλ-
λα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι [ἄλλο,] ἐλάττω ἀν εἴη ἄλληλων αὐταῖς
γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν¹ πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἕκατερα
ἱστότητα ἔχοιεν ἵστα ἀν εἴη πρὸς ἄλληλα εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος
τὰ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἡ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἐν σμικρότητα δὲ τᾶλλα, ὁ-
ποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἴδει μέγεθος προσείη μεῖζον ἀν εἴη, ϕ δὲ σμι-
κρότης ἐλάττον : ἀνάγκη : οὐκ οὖν ἐστόν τέ τινε τούτω εἴδη τό τε μέ-
Γεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης· οὐ γάρ ἀν που μὴ ὅντε γε ἐναντίω τε ἄλληλοιν
εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐγγίγνοισθην : πῶς γάρ ἀν : εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ
ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται ἡ τοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἀν ἡ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη :
ἀνάγκη : τί δ' εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγνοιτο ; οὐχὶ ἡ ἐξ ἵστου ἀν τῷ ἐνὶ δι' ὅ-
λου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἡ περιέχουσα αὐτό ; δῆλον δή : ἄρ' οὖν οὐ-
κ ἐξ ἵστου μὲν οὖσα ἡ σμικρότης τῷ ἐνὶ ἵστη ἀν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχou-
στα δὲ μείζων : πῶς δ' οὐ : δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἵσην τῷ εἶναι
ἡμείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἴστότητος ἄλλὰ μὴ
τὰ ἐαυτῆς ; ἀδύνατον : ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ ἀν εἴη σμικρό-
της, ἀλλ', εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει ; ναί : οὔτε γε ἐν παντὶ αὐτῷ μέρει εἰ δὲ μή, ταῦ-
τα ποιήσει ἀπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ἵση ἐσται ἡ μείζων τοῦ μέρους ἐν ϕ ἀν
ἀεὶ ἐνῃ : ἀνάγκη : οὐδὲ ἐνὶ ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῷ ὅντων σμικρότης,
μήτ' ἐν μέρει μήτ' ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγνομένη οὐδέ τι ἐσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐ-
τῆς σμικρότητος : οὐκ ἔοικεν : οὐδὲ ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐ-
τῷ. μεῖζον γάρ ἀν τι εἴη ἄλλο, καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν
ϕ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὅντος, οὐ ἀνάγκη

83 b 2

Now the others have no connection with the one. The one stands solitary with no two. Touch therefore vanishes; and the one cannot touch the others. It thus both 'touches and does not touch itself and the other.' A. So it seems.

P.

xiii. Again : if the one he greater or less than the others, or they than it, this must arise solely from the possession by either of the ἔλος of bigness or smallness. Now 1) smallness cannot appear in the one : for if it extended through the whole it would be equal to it, while if it surrounded it it would be greater; and so likewise if it appeared in a part : but smallness is never equal or greater. Again, if bigness appeared in the one then were the one bigger than it, and that without any smallness to surpass : which is impossible.

Since, then, neither bigness nor smallness exists in it the one cannot be either bigger or smaller than the others, nor they than it: hence the one must be equal both to itself and the others. 2) As, however, the one is within, it must also be around, itself; so it must be bigger and smaller than itself. Again : outside of the one and the others nothing exists ; and that which exists must be somewhere ; and being somewhere it is a smaller within a greater. Clearly, therefore, the one and the others are reciprocally each in the other, and alternately bigger and smaller each than the other.

Accordingly the one is 'equal to, greater and less than' itself and the others. A. It seems so. P. xiv. But, if so,

84 a 1

ὑπερέχειν ἔαν περ ἥ μέγα τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἔνι : ἀληθῆ : ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μεῖζον ἥ αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἥ αὐτοῦ μεγέθους: οὐ γάρ: οὕτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζω τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ ἔλαττω, μήτε μεγέθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχοντα: οὕτε αὐτῷ τούτῳ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἔχετον τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλληλω. οὕτε αὖτὸ ἐν τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μεῖζον ἀν οὐδὲ ἔλαττον εἴη, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον: οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γε: ἅρ' οὖν εἰ μήτε μεῖζον μήτ' ἔλαττον τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἵσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἵσου δὲ ὃν ἵσον εἶναι: πῶς γάρ οὖ: καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτῷ γε τὸ ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτῷ οὗτως ἀν ἔχοι μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον. οὔτ' ἀν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτ' ἀν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἵσου ὃν ἵσον ἀν εἴη ἑαυτῷ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἵσον ἀν εἴη: φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀν εἴη ἔξωθεν καὶ περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον ἀν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον. καὶ οὕτω μεῖζον ἀν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐν: εἴη γάρ ἀν: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνὸς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: πῶς γάρ οὖ: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι που δεῖ τό γε ὃν ἀεί: ναί: οὐκ οὖν τό γε ἐν Τῷ δὲ ἐν μεῖζον ἔσται ἔλαττον ὃν, οὐ γάρ ἀν ἄλλως ἔτερον ἐν ἐτέρῳ εἴη: οὐ γάρ: ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτερόν ἔστιν χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὥδη ἐν ἄλληλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἥ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι; φαίνεται: ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστιν, μείζω ἀν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἔλαττον τῶν ἄλλων περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεῖζον ἀν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔλαττω; ἔσικεν: τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἵσον τε καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττόν ἔστιν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἵσον, ἵσων ἀν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἔλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων καὶ μερῶν: πῶς δ' οὖ: ἵσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὃν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἔλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἔλαττον ἀν καὶ πλέον εἴη αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ἵσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταῦτα: πῶς; ὅνπερ

D

E

151

B

C

μειζόν ἔστι, πλειόνων που καὶ μέτρων ἀν εἴη αὐτῶν· ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ με-
ρῶν· καὶ ὁν ἐλαττον, ὡσαύτως. καὶ οἱς ἵσον, κατὰ ταῦτα: οὗτως:
οὐκ οὖν ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἐλαττον ὃν καὶ ἵσον ἵσων ἀν εἴη μέτρων καὶ
πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν: πῶς
δ' οὐ: ἵσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν δν αὐτῷ ἵσον ἀν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ εἴη,
πλειόνων δὲ πλέον, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἐλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ:
φαίνεται: οὐκ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα ὡσαύτως ἔξει τὸ ἔν. δτι μὲν μει-
ζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν δτι
δὲ σμικρότερον, ἐλαττον δτι δὲ ἵσον μεγέθει, ἵσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος
εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις: ἀνάγκη: οὗτως δὴ αὐτὸν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἔν καὶ ἵσον
καὶ πλέον καὶ ἐλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων:
ἔσται: ἀρ' οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἔν, καὶ ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτε-
ρον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ οὔτε νεώ-
τερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον;
πῶς; εἶναι μὲν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει εἰπερ ἐν ἔστιν; ναί: τὸ δὲ εἶναι
ἄλλο τί ἔστι ή μέθεξι οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος; ὥσπερ τὸ
ἥν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὐσί-
ας ἔστι κουνωνία: ἔστι γάρ: μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἰπερ καὶ τοῦ
εἶναι: πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; ναί: ἀεὶ ἄρα
πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἰπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον: ἀ-
νάγκη: ἀρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα δτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτε-
ρον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται; μεμνήμεθα: οὐκ οὖν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύ-
τερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἔν, νεωτέρου ἀν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρε-
σβύτερον γίγνοιτο: ἀνάγκη: γίγνεται μὲν δὴ νεωτερόν τε καὶ πρε-
σβύτερον αὐτοῦ οὔτω; ναί: ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἀρ' οὐχ δτ' ἀν κατὰ τὸν
νῦν χρόνον ἦ γιγνόμενον, τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πο-
ρεύομενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν: οὐ γάρ:
ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ἐπειδ' ἀν τῷ νῦν
ἐντύχῃ, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται ἀλλ' ἔστι τότ' ἥδη πρεσβύτερον; προϊὸν γάρ οὐ-
κ ἀν ποτε ληφθείη ὑπο τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προϊὸν οὗτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμ-
φοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα· τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμε-
νον, τοῦ δὲ ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον· μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμε-
νον τοῦ τ' ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν: ἀληθῆ: εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν
Τὸ νῦν, πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδ' ἀν κατὰ τοῦτο ἦ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γι

84 a 2

the one will have
as many
measures as the
others and itself,
and more, and
fewer; and if
measures then
parts, and
numbers also.
So it will be
'equal in num-
ber' to itself and
the others, and
also 'more' and
'fewer.' A. It
will. P.
xv. That the one
'is' means that
it shares in ex-
istence with the
time that is at
any moment
present. Hence
it partaking of
time, and of
time as it passes,
it 'becomes,' as
we argued, at
once 'older' and
'younger' than
itself. But it
'is' both only
when, in process
of becoming, it
alights at now--
a point which in
passing from
past to future it
cannot skip.
Thus, when at
now, it pauses in
its becoming

and is both older and younger than itself. And this process it repeats through its whole existence. But it must always be and become the same length of time as itself. Hence the one is neither older nor younger than, but has 'the same age as' itself—whether being or becoming.

2). The others, again, as plural, are more than one—possess more number than the one. But the fewer comes earlier, and the fewest first. So the one, as earlier, is older than the others, and they are younger than it. Again, however, the one had parts, and so a beginning end and middle : and by its nature the beginning comes first, and the end last ;

D

γνεσθαι, καὶ ἔστιν τότε τοῦτο ὅτι ἀν τύχῃ γιγνόμενον : φαίνεται : καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὅτι ἀν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν : οὐκ οὖν οὐπερ—εγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν ; ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ; ναί: ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον; ἔστιν: καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἔστι τὸ ἐν ὅτι ἀν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν: ἀνάγκη: τό γε μὴν νῦν ἀεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἐνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἰναι· ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ νῦν ὅτι ἀν περ ἥ: πῶς γὰρ οὐ: ἀεὶ ἄρα ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἐν: ἔοικεν: πλείω δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἡ γίγνεται, ἡ τὸν ἵσον; τὸν ἵσον: ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε ἵσον χρόνον ἡ γιγνόμενον ἡ ὃν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει; πῶς δ' οὐ: τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἔστιν; οὐ γάρ: τὸ ἐν ἄρα, τὸν ἵσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὃν, οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται: οὐ μοι δοκεῖ: τί δαί, τῶν ἀλλων: οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν: τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἀλλα τοῦ ἐνός, εἴπερ ἔτερά ἔστιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔτερον, πλείω ἔστιν ἐνός. ἔτερον μὲν γὰρ ὃν ἐν ἀν ἦν ἔτερα δὲ ὅντα πλείω ἐνός ἔστι, καὶ πλῆθος ἀν ἔχοι: ἔχοι γὰρ ἀν: πλῆθος δὲ ὃν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἀν μετέχοι ἡ τοῦ ἐνός: πῶς δ' οὐ: τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἡ τὰ ἐλάττω: τὰ ἐλάττω: τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν τὸ ἐν. ἡ γάρ: ναί: πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντων ἔχει δὲ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ ἀλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἔστιν: ἔχει γάρ: πρῶτον δέ γε, οἷμαι, γεγονός πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἀλλα ὕστερον τὰ δὲ ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος· καὶ οὕτως ἀν ἐη τὰ ἀλλα νεώτερα τοῦ ἐνός, τὸ δὲ ἐν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἀλλων: εἴη γὰρ ἀν: τί δαὶ τόδε; ἀρ' ἀν εἴη τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἡ ἀδύνατον: ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἐν· εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον: ναί: οὐκ οὖν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἀλλων· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα μέχρι τέλους: τί μήν: καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ' εἶναι πάντα τᾶλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνός· αὐτὸ δὲ¹ ἐκεῖνο ἄμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἐν τε καὶ δλον: φήσομεν γάρ: τελευ-

E

153

B

C

τὴ δέ, οἷμαί γε, ὑστατον γίγνεται· τούτῳ δ' ἄμα τὸ ἐν πέφυκε γίγνε-
σθαι· ὡστ', εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἄμα τε-
λευτῇ ἀν γεγονὸς ὑστατον ἀν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι·
φαίνεται· νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς πρε-
σβύτερα· οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται· τί δαὶ δή; ἀρχὴν ἡ ἄλλο μέρος
ὅ τι οὖν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἡ ἄλλου ὅτου οὖν, ἐάν περ μέρος ἥ ἄλλὰ μὴ μέρη,
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὅν; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν τὸ ἐν ἄμα τε
τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἀν καὶ ἄμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐ-
δενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὃ τί περ ἀν προσγί-
γνηται ὅτῳ οὖν, ἔως ἀν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἐν γένη-
ται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἔσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς
ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει: ἀληθῆ: πάσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν
αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει τὸ ἐν. ὡστ', εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ
ἐν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὑστερον τῶν ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἀν εἴη, ἀλλ' ἄ-
μα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον
οὔτε νεώτερον ἀν εἴη, οὐδὲ τâλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν
πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τâλλα ἐκείνου ωσαύτως:
πάνυ μὲν οὖν: ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός. ἄλλὰ τί αὖ
περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων,
καὶ τâλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς· καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνε-
σθαι; ἄρα ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι
ἔχει, ἡ ἔτερως: οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν: ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε. εἰ καὶ ἔστιν
ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἔτερον ἔτερον, γίγνεσθαι γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι
ἡ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς γενομένον διῆνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐκ ἀν
ἔτι δύναιτο, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὃν ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι. ἀνί-
στοις γὰρ ἵστα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτῳ οὖν, ἴσῳ
ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὅσῳ περ αὖ τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ: πῶς
γὰρ οὐ: οὐκ ἄρα τό γε δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς ὅντος γίγνοιτ' ἀν ποτε πρε-
σβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἵσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀλ-
λ' ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον τόδε, νεώτερον δὲ αὖ: ἀληθῆ: καὶ τὸ
ἐν ἄρα δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὅντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον
γίγνεται: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα
γίγνεται: πῆ δή: ἢ τό τε ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ τâλ-
λα τοῦ ἐνὸς: τί οὖν: ὅτ' ἀν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον ἥ πλείω

and only when the end has come has the one come; consequently the one is younger than the others, and they are older than it. But the beginning, being one part, is one—thus the one becomes with the first, and with each successive part; and so maintains the same age with all the others. It must, then, be and have become of the same age with them and different, and the converse—but does it become so? If it was older—or younger—at first it cannot become more so; for if equals be put to unequals these always differ by as much as at first: and equal times are added here. But when the one is older

than the others it has existed longer than they, and if to these unequals we add equal times the wholes will differ by a less part than at first. The one, then, would always become less and less older than the others ; that is, would become younger in respect to them, while they grew older relatively to it. But though always having this tendency they never *are* so, since they continue to differ by the original interval, albeit that interval forms an ever-lessening part of their respective ages. Thus the one ‘is’ and ‘is not,’ ‘becomes’ and ‘does not become,’ ‘equal in age’ and ‘older’ and ‘younger’ in regard to the others—and they to it. *A.* Perfectly so. *P.* xvi. As partaking of time

84 b 2

D

που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα: ναὶ: πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἵστον χρόνον, ἀρα τῷ ἵσφι μορίῳ διοίστει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττονος, ἢ σμικροτέρῳ: σμικροτέρῳ: οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται ὅ τι περ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τὰλλα ἡλικίᾳ διαφέρον τὸ ἐν τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ἵστον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐλαττονὶ ἀεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίστει αὐτῶν¹ ἢ πρότερον. ἢ οὐ: ναὶ: οὐκ οὖν τὸ γε ἐλαττονὶ διαφέρον ἡλικίᾳ πρὸς τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτο ἀν δὴ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, πρὸς ἂν ἢ πρεσβύτερον πρότερον: νεώτερον: εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αῦτα ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον; πάνυ γε: τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονός Πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὅντις ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δὲ αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως. ἴοντε γὰρ αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλουν, γίγνεσθον τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου. γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἀν οἴω τε εἴτην εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο οὐκ ἀν ἔτι γίγνοιντο, ἀλλ’ εἶεν ἄν. οὐν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἐν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται δῆτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη δὲν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα δῆτι ὑστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἐντοσχει, ἐπειδὴ περ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα: φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω: οὐκ οὖν ἢ μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτερον ἔτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἵσφι ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων ἀεὶ διαφέρειν, οὕτε τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ’ ἀν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὕτε τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς· ἢ δὲ ἄλλως ἀεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὑστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτῃ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: κατὰ δὴ πάντα. Ταῦτα τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὕτε πρεσβύτερον οὕτε νεώτερον οὕτε’ ἔστιν οὕτε γίγνεται οὕτε αὐτοῦ οὕτε τῶν ἄλλων: παντελῶς μὲν οὖν: ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἀρότερον ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ

E

155

B

C

D

νῦν, εἰπερ χρόνου μετέχει; ἀνάγκη: ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἐν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται, καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται: τί μήν: καὶ εἴη ἂν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται: πάνυ γε: καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ δὴ ἐντὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξῃ καὶ αἰσθησις, εἰπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν: ὁρθῶς λέγεις: καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὄνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὅσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὅντα καὶ περὶ τὸ ἐν ἔστιν: παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὐτῶς: ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἐν, εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἀρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἐν τε ὃν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἐν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν οὐσίᾳς μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν¹ μὴ μετέχειν ἀντὶ ποτὲ οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη: ἀρ' οὖν ὅτε μετέχει οἷόν τ' ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει μετέχειν: οὐχ οἷόν τε: ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὐτῷ γάρ ἀν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι: ὁρθῶς: οὐκ οὖν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἷόν τ' ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτὸν τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μή ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀφίῃ: οὐδαμῶς: τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἄρα οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε: τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἀρ' οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; καὶ πάνυ γε: τὸ ἐν διῇ, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφίεν οὐσίαν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται: ἀνάγκη: ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ δὲ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ἀρ' οὐχ ὅτ' ἀν μὲν γίγνηται ἐν τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅτ' ἀν δὲ πολλὰ τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε: ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἀρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλή γε: καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅτ' ἀν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι; ναί: καὶ ὅτ' ἀν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἵσον, αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἴστοῦσθαι; οὐτως: ὅτ' ἀν δὲ κινούμεμόν τε ἴστηται καὶ ὅτ' ἀν ἔστος ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ δεῖ δῆ που αὐτό γε μηδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι; πῶς δή: ἔστος τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἔσταναι, ἀνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν: πῶς γάρ: χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἐν φέτι οἷόν τε ἀμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἔσταναι; οὐ γάρ οὖν: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἀνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν; οὐκ εἰκός: πότερ οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γάρ ἔστος οὖν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτ' ἐν χρόνῳ δέν: οὐ γάρ οὖν:

85 a 3

the one 'was'
'is' 'will be'
'was becoming'
'becomes' and
'will become.'
A. How should
it not? P.
xvii. And there
will be 'science,
opinion, and so
on, 'of it':
xviii. and 'a
name' and other
things 'for it.'
A. Entirely so.

III. P. But
thirdly:
i. The one, being
such, must, when
one, partake of
existence; and,
when not, not.
Nor can it do
both at once.
Thus there will
be a time at
which it takes
hold on existence,
and one at which
it lets go. The
one, therefore,
'becomes' and
'perishes.' A.
Of necessity. P.
ii. Being both
one and many,
when it becomes
as one it perishes
as many, and the
converse. In
which process it
must 'be separ-
ated and
united'; 'grow
like, and un-
like'; 'wax,
wane and grow
equal.'

A. Yes. P.
iii. But in pass-
ing to rest or
motion it suffers
change. When
changing it is
neither in motion
nor at rest, and
this it cannot be
in time.

When changing, then, it must be out of time, and in that odd thing the instantaneous, which lurks between motion and rest apart from time. And when it is out of time it 'neither is in motion nor at rest,' 'neither becomes nor perishes,' nor possesses any other such characteristic. So fares the one, if it is. A. How could it be otherwise?

IV. P. But now, if the one is, what of the others?

i. They are not the one.

A. Right. P.

ii. Yet as others they must have parts, else were they completely one: and parts are parts of a whole—a whole which must be one. For they cannot be parts of a many which includes themselves, else were each part part of itself and of each of the others.

85 a 2

ἀρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν φάσι τότε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δῆ: τὸ ἔξαιφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἔξαιφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἔξ ἑκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ γε τοῦ ἔσταναι ἔστωτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδὲ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινούμενης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἔξαιφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπος τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδὲ ἐν οὐσίᾳ, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσταναι καὶ τὸ ἔστος ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι: κινδυνεύει: καὶ τὸ ἐν δή, εἴπερ ἔστηκε τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἀν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα· μόνως γάρ ἀν οὔτως ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ. μεταβάλλον δέ, ἔξαιφνης μεταβάλλει· καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει ἐν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ ἀν εἴη· οὐδὲν κινοῖται ἀν τότε οὐδέ ἀν σταί: οὐ γάρ: ἀρ' οὖν οὔτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, δέ τ' ἀν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; ἔοικε γ' οὖν: κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἔξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἴὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἔξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἔξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὁμοιον ἴὸν οὔτε ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἵσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἴὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἵσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἀν: οὐκ ἔοικε: ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἀν πάσχοι τὸ ἐν, εἰ ἔστων: πῶς δέ οὐ: τί δαὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἀν πάσχειν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἀρ' οὐ σκεπτέον; σκεπτέον: λέγωμεν δή, ἐν εἰ ἔστι τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι: λέγωμεν: Οὐκ οὖν, ἐπεί περ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔνός ἔστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἔστι τᾶλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν: ὁρθῶς: οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεται γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τᾶλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει αὐτῷ πῃ: πῃ δὴ: δέ τι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἔστιν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἀν ἐν εἴη: ὁρθῶς: μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἔστιν δὲ ἀν δλον ἡ; φαμὲν γάρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια· ἔκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δλοι: πῶς τοῦτο: εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸς εἴη, έαυτοῦ τε δὴ που μόριον ἔσται, δέ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἑνὸς ἔκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων ἑνὸς γὰρ μὴ δὲν μόριον πλὴν τούτου τῶν

E

157

B

C

D

ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἐνὸς ἑκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὅν δὲ μόριον
ἑκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὅν, πάντων τούτων
τι εἶναι ὡν οὐδὲν ἐνὸς οὐδένι ἔστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι οὖν, ἀδύνατον εἰ-
ναι: φάίνεται γε δῆ: οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόρι-
ον ἀλλὰ μᾶς τιὸς ἴδεας καὶ ἐνὸς τιος ὅ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, ἐξ ἀπάντων
ἐν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἀν τὸ μόριον εἴη: παντάπασι μὲν
οὖν: εἰ ἄρα τὰλλα μόρια ἔχει καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνὸς μετέχοι: πάνυ γε:
ἐν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς: ἀνάγκη:
καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἑκάστου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
ἀνάγκη μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός. εἰ γὰρ ἔκαστον αὐτῶν μόριόν ἔστι τό γε ἔκα-
στον εἶναι ἐν δή που σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων καθ' αὐτὸ-
δὲ ὅν, εἴπερ ἔκαστον ἔσται: ὁρθῶς: μετέχοι δέ γ' ἀν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὅλον
ὅτι ἄλλο ὃν οὐ. οὐ γὰρ ἀν μετέχειν ἄλλο' ήν ἀν αὐτὸδὲν· νῦν δέ ἐν μὲν εἶναι
πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀδύνατον που: ἀδύνατον: μετέχειν δέ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄ-
νάγκη τῷ τε ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὅλον ἔσται οὐ μόρια τὰ μό-
ρια· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου ὅ ἀν οὐ μόριον ὅλου: οὕτως:
οὐκ οὖν ἔτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἐνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ: πῶς δ' οὐ:
τὰ δέ ἔτερα τοῦ ἐνὸς πολλά που ἀν εἴη· εἰ γὰρ μῆτε ἐν¹ μῆτε ἐνὸς
πλείω εἴη τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδὲν ἀν εἴη: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλεί-
ω ἐνός ἔστι τά τε τοῦ ἐνὸς μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς ὅλου μετέχοντα,
οὐκ ἀνάγκη ηδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκεῖνα τὰ μεταλαμβά-
νοντα τοῦ ἐνός; πῶς; φόδε εἰδῶμεν. ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἐν ὄντα, οὐδὲ
μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐνός, τότε ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνει; δη-
λαδή: οὐκ οὖν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔνι: πλήθη μέντοι: τί
οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διαινοΐᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἱοί τ' ἐ-
σμὲν ὅ τι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ
τοῦ ἐνὸς μὴ μετέχοι, πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἔν; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν,
οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοποῦντι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἔτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἰ-
δους, ὅσον ἀν αὐτῆς ἀεὶ ὀρῶμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει: παντά-
πασι μὲν οὖν: καὶ μὴν ἐπειδὴ ἀν γε ἐν ἔκαστον μόριον μόριον γέ-
νηται, πέρας ηδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον
πρὸς τὰ μόρια: κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν: τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἐνὸς συμ-
βαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν,
Ἱτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὅ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλ-

ες b 1

Being parts of one whole, then, they are in fact a perfect whole made up of parts. *A.* Of necessity. *P.* iii. So of each part; for 'each' implies oneness, and each is one separate part of the whole. Thus each part of the others partakes of the one, while yet distinct from it. *A.* So. *P.* iv. But being more than the one, and distinct from it, they are 'unlimited in number.' Since, if we cut off in our mind even the smallest portion of that which has no share in one, it will be a multitude. *A.* Quite so. *P.* v. Yet as all parts in turn become one they possess a limit towards each other and the whole, and conversely. So, as related to the one, the others become different in themselves

and produce a 'limit' even while their nature is unlimitedness. A. Quite so. P. vi. And as being all limited and all unlimited they are 'like'—while, as being both at once, they are 'un-like'—to themselves and each other. A. I fear so. P.

vii. And so we shall find sameness and difference, and all other contradictory qualities in the others. A. Right.

V. P. Yet again:

i. The one and the others are quite separate, as there is nothing to contain both. A. Yes. P.

ii. The true one has not parts; nor is it, as whole, connected with the others. Hence the others have 'no one' in them at all. A. No. P.

iii. Nor are they 'many'—for having no one, neither have they two, three. A. So.

ληλα· ή δὲ αὐτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀπειρία; φαίνεται: οὔτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἀπειρά τέ ἔστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει: πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς; πῆδή: εἰ μέν που ἀπειρά ἔστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν, πάντα ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα ἀν εἴη ταύτη; πάνυ γε: καὶ μὴν εἴ γε ἀπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτη πάντ' ἀν εἴη ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα; πῶς δ' οὖ: εἰ δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἀπειρα πεπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ὅντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πεπονθεν: ναί: τὰ δὲ ἐναντία γε ὡς οὖν τε ἀνομοιότατα; τί μήν: κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὅμοι' ἀν εἴη αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις κατὰ δὲ ἀμφότερα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα: κινδυνεύει: οὔτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτὰ τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοι' ἀν εἴη: οὔτω: καὶ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἔτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκ εἴτι χαλεπῶς εὐρήσομεν πεπονθότα τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα: ὁρθῶς λέγεις: οὐκ οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἥδη ἐώμεν ὡς φανερὰ ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐν εἰ ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὔτως ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ή οὔτω μόνον: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: λέγωμεν δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς πεπονθέναι; λέγωμεν γάρ: ἀρ' οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων χωρὶς δὲ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶναι; τί δή: δτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτερον, δὲ ἄλλο μέν ἔστι τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. πάντα γάρ εἴρηται δτ' ἀν ρήθη τό τε ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα: πάντα γάρ: οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἔστιν ἔτερον τούτων, ἐν φι τό τε ἐν ἀν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τᾶλλα: οὐ γάρ: οὐδέποτ' ἄρα ἐν ταὐτῷ ἔστιν τὸ ἐν¹ καὶ τᾶλλα: οὐκ ἔοικε: χωρὶς ἄρα; ναί: οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν: πῶς γάρ: οὔτε ἄρα δλον εἴη αν τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρὶς τέ ἔστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει: πῶς γάρ: οὐδὲ ἐν ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἀν τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἐν τᾶλλά ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδέν: οὐ γάρ οὖν: οὐδὲ ἄρα πολλά ἔστι τᾶλλα. ἐν γάρ ἀν ἦν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου εἰ πολλὰ ἦν. νῦν δὲ σύτε ἐν οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μόριά ἔστι τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει: ὁρθῶς: οὐδὲ ἄρα δύο οὔτε τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἔστι τὰ ἄλλα,



οὐτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς πανταχῷ στέρεται: οὔτω: οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἔστι τῷ ἐνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης. εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἴη, ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἶδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἀν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς: φαίνεται: Ἡν δέ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν ἡ μηδὲ ἐνὸς μετέχοι; ἀδύνατον: οὕτ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια ἔστιν οὕτ' ἀμφότερα τὰλλα. ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ὅντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἐνὸς ἀν τοῦ ἐτέρου εἴδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὅντα δυοῖν τοῦν ἐναντίουν ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐφάνη: ἀληθῆ: οὐδὲ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδὲ ἔτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἔστωτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἵσα, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, ὥν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη μετέχειν, τοῦ ἐνὸς γε πάντη πάντως στερομένοις: ἀληθέστατα: οὕτως δὴ ἐν εἰ ἔστιν πάντα τέ ἔστι τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐδέν ἔστι, καὶ πρὸς ἕαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα ὠσαύτως: παντελῶς μὲν οὖν: εἰειν. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἐν τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν ἀρ' οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ ταῦτα; σκεπτέον γάρ: τίς οὖν ἀν εἴη αὐτῇ ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; ἀρά τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν: διαφέρει μέντοι: διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τούναντίον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; πᾶν τούναντίον: τί δὲ εἴ τις λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν, ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἀρά ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἀν δηλοὶ ὅτι ἔτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὅν; πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ νῦν δηλοὶ ὅτι ἔτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὅν, ὅτ' ἀν εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἵσμεν δὲ λέγει: ἵσμεν: πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτ' ἀν εἴπῃ ἐν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεῖς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν γάρ ἤτοι γνώσκεται τι καὶ δῆτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὐ: ἀνάγκη: φέδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρ-
 χῆς, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τί χρὴ εἶναι; πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔσικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι ὅτ' ἀν τις εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν: ἀληθῆ: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι: πάνυ γε: καὶ ἔτεροιότης ἄρα ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἔτεροιότητα λέγει ὅτ' ἀν τὸ ἐν ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγη, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου: φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ

86 a.

P.
 iv. Nor are they
 'like or unlike'
 to the one,
 or in themselves.
 For had they
 likeness and
 unlikeness they
 would have in
 them two oppos-
 ing εἴδη; now
 they have no
 two. A. True. P.
 v. Nor are they
 'same or differ-
 ent,' 'in motion
 or at rest,' 'be-
 coming or perish-
 ing,' 'greater less
 or equal' or any
 such thing :—all
 these needing
 one, two, three,
 odd and even;
 which the others
 have not.

A. Most true. P.
 vi. Thus the one
 is at once every-
 thing and
 nothing, to both
 itself and the
 others. A. En-
 tirely so.

B. I. P. But now
 'if the one is not'
 what follows?
 To begin with,
 the phrase must
 indicate some-
 thing separate
 and knowable.
 Hence

i. there must be
 a 'science of it.'

A. True. P.

ii. The others
 also must be
 different from it,
 else were it not
 different from
 them; so it has a
 'differentness' of
 its own. A.
 It seems so.

161

τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων, καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδὲ ἂν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔτερα, οὐδὲ ἐκείνῳ ἂν τι ἦν οὐδὲ ἐκείνου, οὐδὲ ἂν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων : ὁρθῶς : εἴναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἐνὶ οὐχ οἶν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστιν μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἐν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι : καὶ πάνυ γε : καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἔστιν αὐτῷ Πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα, τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔτερα ὅντα, ἔτεροῖς καὶ εἴη ἂν : ναί : τὰ δὲ ἔτεροῖς οὐκ ἄλλοια; πῶς δὲ οὐ : τὰ δὲ ἄλλοια οὐκ ἀνόμοια; ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν : οὐκ οὖν, εἴπερ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίω τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἀν εἴη : δῆλον : εἴη δὴ ἀν καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀνομοιότης πρὸς ἦν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἔστιν : ἔοικεν : γὰρ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; πῶς; εἰ ἐνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ ἂν Που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οὗν τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδὲ ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἐνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐνός : πάνυ γε : οὐ δέ δέ γε : οὐ δῆτα : δεῖ ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι : δεῖ : καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀδίστοις ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἵστον, εἴη τε ἀν ἥδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἀν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἴστοτητα ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατα εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἐν : ἀδύνατα : ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἵστον ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἵστα εἶναι; ἀνάγκη : τὰ δὲ μὴ ἵστα οὐκ ἀνίστα; ναί : τὰ δὲ ἀνίστα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἀνίστα; πῶς δὲ οὐ : καὶ ἀνίστοτητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἐν πρὸς ἦν τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἀνίστα : μετέχει : ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνίστοτητός γ' ἔστι μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότητος : ἔστι γάρ : ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνί: κινδυνεύει : μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν : πάνυ γε : μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν ἀεὶ ἔστιν : ἔστιν : ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἴστοτητα; οὐκ ἀλλὰ τοῦτο : ὅτῳ ἄρα ἔστιν μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστιν καὶ ἴστοτης αὐτῷ μεταξὺ τούτοιν οὖσα : φαίνεται : τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἴστοτητος ἀν μετεῖν καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος : ἔοικεν : καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ; πῶς δή : ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὔτως ὡς λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ

- P.
iii. It must likewise partake of 'that' 'some'
'for this,' and so on, if we may speak of it at all :
iv. and so, while non-existent, it partakes of 'many.' A. Undoubtedly. P.
- v. It must have 'unlikeness' toward the others—the different are unlike—; and, therefore, 'likeness' to itself.
A. It must. P.
- vi. It is not equal to the others—else it would both exist and be (so far) like them—; so partakes of 'inequality, towards them.
A. It does. P.
- vii. It, therefore, has 'bigness' and 'smallness': but,
viii. having these, it must have 'equality,' which lies between them. A. It appears so. P.
- ix. Hence it must somehow partake (even) of 'being':

B

C

D

E

✓

οὐτως ἔχει οὐκ ἀν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἐν μὴ εἰ-
ναι εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὅντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ή οὐχ οὔτω; οὐ-
τῷ μὲν οὖν: ἐπειδὴ δέ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι
καὶ ὅντα λέγειν: ἀνάγκη: ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἕοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὅν. εἰ γάρ
μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὅν, ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι,¹ εὐθὺς ἔσται
ὅν: παντάπασι μὲν οὖν: δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἰ-
ναι μὴ ὅν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὅν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι,
ἴνα τελέως αὐτὸ εἶναι ή. οὔτως γάρ ἀν τό τε δὲ μάλιστ' ἀν εἶη καὶ τὸ μὴ
δὲ οὐκ ἀν εἶη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν δὲ οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὅν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ
τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὅν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι τὸ δὲ μὴ δὲ μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ
μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὅν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὅν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ δὲ αὐτὸ τελέως μὴ
ἔσται: ἀληθέστατα: οὐκ οὖν ἐπεί περ τῷ τε ὅντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ
ὅντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ ἐνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη με-
τεῖναι ἐς τὸ μὴ εἶναι: ἀνάγκη: καὶ οὐσίᾳ δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν:
φαίνεται: καὶ μὴ οὐσίᾳ ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι: πῶς δὲ οὐ: οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ
ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὔτως, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἔξεως;
οὐχ οἷόν τε: πᾶν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, δὲ ἀν οὔτω
τε καὶ μὴ οὔτως ἔχει: πῶς δὲ οὐ: μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις, ή τί φήσο-
μεν: κίνησις: οὐκ οὖν τὸ ἐν ὅν τε καὶ οὐκ δὲ ἐφάνη; ναί: οὔτως
ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὔτως ἔχον φαίνεται: ἕοικεν: καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα
τὸ οὐκ δὲ ἐγένεται, ἐπεί περ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ
μὴ εἶναι ἔχον: κινδυνεύει: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἔστι τῶν ὅντων,
ὦς οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἀν μεθίσταιτό ποθέν ποι: πῶς γάρ:
οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῖται: οὐ γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
ἀν στρέφοιτο, ταύτου γάρ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπτεται: δὲ γάρ ἔστι τὸ ταύτον, τὸ
δὲ μὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ τῶν ὅντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι: ἀδύνατον γάρ: οὐκ ἄρα
τὸ ἐν γε μὴ δὲ στρέφεσθαι ἀν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν φῷ μὴ ἔστιν: οὐ γάρ οὖν:
οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται που τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ δὲ οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὅν. οὐ γάρ
ἀν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴπερ ἡλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ
περὶ ἄλλου τινός: ὅρθως: εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταύτῳ στρέ-
Φεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἀρ' ἄν πῃ ἔτι κινοῖτο; πῶς γάρ: τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον
ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἔσταναι: ἀνάγκη: τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς
ἕοικεν, οὐκ δὲ ἔστηκέν τε καὶ κινεῖται: ἕοικεν: καὶ μὴν, εἴπερ γε κινεῖ-
ται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: ὅπῃ γάρ ἄν τι κινηθῇ κατὰ το-

for it has these qualities which, unless we believe ourselves, exist. So it is non-existent. You find that being, in order to exist, must partake of not-being; and the converse: and that the non-existent one, if properly such, must partake alike of being and not-being.

A. Necessarily.

P.

x. Now—x) this involves change from one state to the other; the non-existent one, therefore, has 'motion': but so, as non-existent and nowhere, it cannot change its place; no, nor revolve in the same place, for the same exists; nor yet change its nature, or we should cease to talk of the one; so it must 'be still.' A. Of necessity. P.

xi. The non-existent one, then, both moves or changes,

σοῦτον οὐκ ἔθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως: οὗτως: κινούμενον
δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται; ναί: καὶ μὴν μηδαμῆ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῆ ἀλλοιοῦτο: οὐ γάρ: εἰ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὃν ἐν ἀλλοιοῦται· εἰ δὲ μὴ κι-
νεῖται οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται: οὐ γάρ: τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὃν ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοι-
οῦται; φαίνεται: τὸ δὲ ἀλλοιούμενον ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἐτερον
ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἔξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοι-

and is still or
changes not: and,
as changing, it
'becomes' an-
other, and
'perishes' from
its former state;
while, as not
changing, it
'neither becomes
nor perishes.'
A. Inevitably.

εστιν

II. P. Let us
revise from the
beginning.
i. When we say
'is not' we mean
utter absence of
being in the thing
spoken of: there-
fore the non-
existent one
'cannot become
or perish.' *A.* It
appears not. *P.*
ii. It 'cannot
change' in any
way:
iii. it 'cannot
move,' nor yet
'be still':
iv. it 'has not
bigness, small-
ness, or equality':
v. nor 'likeness
or differentness'
either towards
itself or others.
A. Clearly not.

ούμενον μήτε γίγνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι; ἀνάγκη: καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα
μὴ ὃν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον
δὲ οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν μὴ ὃν γίγνεται τε καὶ
ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὕτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται: οὐ γάρ οὖν: αὐθις δὴ
ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν, ὀψόμενοι εἰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἀπερ καὶ
νῦν, ἢ ἐτερα: ἀλλὰ χρῆ: οὐκ οὖν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, φαμέν, τί χρὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ
συμβαίνειν; ναί: τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅτ' ἀν λέγωμεν, ἄρα μὴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει
ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ φὰν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι; οὐδὲν ἄλλο: πότε-
ρον οὖν, ὅτ' ἀν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι τι, πώς οὐκ εἶναι φαμεν αὐτὸ πώς δὲ
εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς
οὐδαμῆ ἔστιν, οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὃν; ἀπλούστατα μὲν οὖν:
Οὔτε ἄρα εἴη δύναιτο ἀν τὸ μὴ ὃν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν:
οὐ γάρ: τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μὴ τι ἄλλο ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσί-
ας μεταλαμβάνειν τὸ δὲ ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο: φὰν δέ γε μη-
δὲν τούτου μέτεστιν οὕτη ἀν λαμβάνοι οὕτη ἀπολλύνοι αὐτό: πῶς γάρ:
τῷ εἴνι ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῆ ἔστιν, οὔτε ἑκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον
οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς: εἰκός: οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται
τὸ μὴ ὃν ἐν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπει περ οὐδαμῆ μετέχει οὐσίας: οὐ φαί-
νεται: οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῆ. ἥδη γάρ ἀν γίγνοντό τε καὶ ἀπολ-
λύοντο τοῦτο πάσχον: ἀληθῆ: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ
κινεῖσθαι; ἀνάγκη: οὐδὲ μὴν ἔσταναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὃν· τὸ
γάρ ἐστὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινὶ δεῖ ἀεὶ εἶναι: τῷ αὐτῷ· πῶς γάρ οὐ: οὐ-
τῷ δὴ αὐτὸ μὴ ὃν μήτε ποτὲ ἐστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν: μὴ γάρ
οὖν: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὅντων· ἥδη γάρ ἀν τούτου μετέ-
χον ὃντος οὐσίας μετέχοι: δῆλον: οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε σμι-
κρότης οὔτε ἵστης αὐτῷ ἔστιν: οὐ γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοιότης γε
Οὔτε ἐτεροιότης, οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλα, εἴη ἀν αὐτῷ: οὐ
φαίνεται: τί δαί; τᾶλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἀν εἴη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι;

B

C

D

E

164

οὐκ ἔστιν : οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια, οὔτε ταῦτα οὔτε ἔτερά ἔστιν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα : οὐ γάρ : τί δαί ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου, ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ, ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ γῦν, ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ δόξᾳ ἢ αἰσθησις, ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα, ἢ ἄλλο ὅ τι οὐν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν ἔσται ; οὐκ ἔσται : οὕτω δὴ ἐν οὐκ ὃν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ : οὐκ οὐν δὴ ἔοικέ γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν : ἔτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τὰλλα τί χρὴ Πεπονθέναι : λέγωμεν γάρ : ἄλλὰ μήν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἔστιν οὐκ ἀν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο : οὕτω : εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος τά γε ἄλλα ἔτερά ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἔτερον ; ἔγωγε : ἔτερον δέ γέ που φαμεν τὸ ἔτερον εἶναι ἐτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλους ; ναί : καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὐ ἄλλα ἔσται : ἀνάγκη : τί δὴ οὐν ἀν εἴη ; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐνός οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα μὴ ὅντος γε : οὐ γάρ : ἄλληλων ἄρα ἔστιν. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις : ὀρθῶς : κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἔκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἔστιν· κατὰ ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἀν οἵα τε εἴη, μὴ ὅντος ἐνός. ἀλλ' ἔκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὅγκος αὐτῶν ἀπειρός ἔστι πλήθει· καν τὸ συμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβῃ τις ὥσπερ¹ ὄναρ ἐν ὑπνῳ φαίνεται ἔξαιρης ἀντὶ ἐνὸς δόξαντος εἶναι πολλά, καὶ ἀντὶ συμικροτάτου παραμέγεθες, πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ : ὀρθότατα : τοιούτων δὴ ὅγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἀν εἴη τὰλλα, εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὅντος ἄλλα ἔστιν : κομιδῇ μὲν οὐν : οὐκ οὐν πολλοὶ ὅγκοι ἔσονται, εἰς ἔκαστος φαινόμενος ὃν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται. καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει..., εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἔκαστον πολλῶν ὄντων : πάνυ γε : καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττά, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται : οὐ γὰρ οὐν : καὶ μὴν καὶ συμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν εἶναι. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἔκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς συμικρῶν ὄντων; πῶς δὲ οὐ : καὶ ἵστος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ συμικρὸς ἔκαστος ὅγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἀν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειν ἐλθεῖν· τοῦτο δὲ εἴη ἀν φάντασμα ἴστότητος : εἰκός : οὐκ οὐν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὅγκον πέρας ἔχων αὐτός τε πρὸς αὐτόν, οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων : πῃ δὴ : ὅτι ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ὅτ' ἀν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διαινοίᾳ, ὡς τι τούτων ὅν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλῃ ἀεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετὰ τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἐτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἐν τε τῷ μέσῳ

- P.
- vi. Nor are the others either 'like or unlike' it, or the 'same or different' from it.
 - vii. Nor has it 'of that' 'something' 'once' 'science' 'name' or,
 - viii. in a word, characteristics at all. A. It does not seem to have.

- P.
- III. P. Now 'if the one is not' what of the others?
 - i. They must be 'others'; which,
 - ii. as there is no one, must be 'other than each other.' But each iii. must be so 'by multitudes,' even the smallest breaking into countless number and acquiring boundless size.
 - iv. These will 'seem to be one, delusively;
 - v. and to 'have number, odd, even,' falsely.
 - vi. A 'seeming smallest' will 'appear big,' while a phantasmal 'equal will seem' to come between.
 - vii. Each bundle will 'seem to have a limit,' yet have no beginning or middle;

since these persistently reverse their nature on closer mental scrutiny.

viii. They will also, as regards both themselves and each other, 'seem like or different' according as they are seen far off or at hand.

ix. They will, in short, 'seem the same and different, touching and separate, moving in all ways and standing, becoming perishing and neither'; and all such things; if they exist while the one does not.

A. Most true.

IV. P. Once more and finally:

'if the one is not' while the others are

i. they will 'not be one,' nor 'many,' which involves one.

ii. Nor will they 'seem either,' having no connection with the non-existent.

iii. There will be 'no opinion or semblance of the non-existent' in them.

iv. They will neither 'seem nor be one or many.'

v. 'like or unlike'

87 a 1

ἄλλα μεσώτερα τούτου μέσαι, σμικρότερα δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνὸς αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνός: ἀληθέστατα: Θρύπτεσθαι δή, οἶμαι, κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ δὲ ἂν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ὅγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἐνὸς λαμβάνοιτ' ἄν: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν τό γε τοιοῦτον, πόρρωθεν μὲν ὁρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλύ, ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ δέξιν γνόντι, πλήθει ἄπειρον ἐν ἔκαστον φανῆναι· εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος: ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν: Οὕτω δὴ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἔκαστα τᾶλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός: δεῖ γάρ: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι: πῇ δή: οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φανόμενα ταῦτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεποιθέναι καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι: πάνυ γε: προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἔτερα, καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτοῖς: οὕτω: καὶ ὅμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὅγκους αὐτούς τε αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλιγῆσοις: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλιγῶν, καὶ ἀπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κίνουμένους πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἐστῶτας πάντῃ, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀ διελθεῖν εὐπετὲς ἥδη ἡμῖν εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν: ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν: ἔτι δὴ ἄπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπωμεν· ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τᾶλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι: εἴπωμεν γάρ οὖν: οὐκ οὖν ἐν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται¹ τᾶλλα: πῶς γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν πολλά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη ἀν καὶ ἐν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἔι, ἀπαντα οὐδέν ἔστιν· ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀν πολλὰ εἴη: ἀληθῆ: μὴ ἐνόντος δὲ ἐνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ἐν ἔστι τᾶλλα: οὐ γάρ: οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά: τί δή: ὅτι τᾶλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδὲ οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲ μίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει· οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ ἔστιν οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἔστι τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν: ἀληθῆ: οὐδὲ ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔστιν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὄντος τῶν ἄλλων: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἐνὸς πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον γάρ: ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τᾶλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδὲ ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνό-

c

D

E

166

B

μοια: οὐ γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν τα αὐτά γε οὐδ' ἔτερα, οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ
χωρὶς οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν δηλθομένων ὡς φαινόμε-
να αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τἄλλα, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν: ἀληθῆ:
οὐκ οὖν καὶ συλληβόδην εἰ εἴποιμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν οὐδέν ἔστιν, ὁρθῶς
ἄν εἴποιμεν: παντάπασι μὲν οὖν: εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι,
Ἄς ἔοικεν, ἐν εἰ τε ἔστιν εἰ τε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τὰλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ
πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντας ἔστι τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ
οὐ φαίνεται: ἀληθέστατα:—ΠΑΡΜΕΝΕΙΔΗΣ Ή ΠΕΡΙ ΙΔΕΩΝ ►►

- vi. 'same or different,'
- vii. 'touching or separate'; or anything else already mentioned.
- viii. In a word, if the one is not, nothing is. *A.* Entirely so.

P.
Thus we may say that, whether the one is or is not, it itself and the others, alike toward themselves and each other, all and in every way, both are and are not, and seem and do not seem. *A.* Most true.

NOTES.

I. TEXTUAL.

THE following is a detailed presentation of the readings in the Manuscripts **Α** **Tub.** **t.**, given line for line with the printed text. The readings of **Α** show the points, including punctuation and accentuation, in which these Mss. differ from the text. Those of **Tub.** give the particulars, not including punctuation but including every divergence of a letter, in which that Ms. is at variance with **Α**. The readings of **Tub.** are in different type from those of the other two. Erasures are shown by a *; while c. after a word means that it is contracted in the Ms. For the usual contractions see pp. cxii. cxxiv. above.

Α.	TUB.	t.	ST. 126 p. 1.
-κοθεν, ¹ -κόμεθα.	—	-μεθα. κατάγορὰν	
— [small on * τωτε		καὶ C. -κωνι. ¹ λαβομενος	
-μαντος· χαιρ' ἔφη θ ¹ τῆδε, ιδ dark, δέη τῶν τῆδε		-μαντος. χαιρ' ἔφη θ ¹ δέει ¹ τῆδε θιν	
-τοὶ. ¹ μεν δὴ εἰπον ἔγω, ¹ τοῦτο. -ζε ¹ μὲν		-τοὶ. ¹ δὴ ¹ ἔγω. ¹ τοῦτο δε-	
ἄν ἔφη τὴν ¹ εἰπον·	ὑμῶν. c. ¹ -σιν. ¹ τῶ	ἄν ἔφη ¹ εἰπον·	
-τρίψ. τί ἦν σνομα,	no + subss.	τρ̄ c. ὅμομητρίψ. τί ἦν σνομα·	
ἡν. ¹ -μενῶν·	[-τρὶ δοκῶ. τὸ πρότ- ¹ -μησα ἐκ κλαζ-	ἡν. ¹ -μενῶν·	
ἐκείνου κ το ν wide, ¹ τῷ acc. patched. ¹	τῷ ¹ πατρὶ c. ¹ -λαμπη	ἡδη χρόνος. ¹ πατρὶ δοκῶ. [-θάνει :	
δέ γε! ¹ -θάνει : [III. ¹ τε, γε ¹ αὐτω δέ γε! ¹ -θάνη :		πάνι γε ἔφη. αὐτῷ δέγε ἀντιφῶν ¹	
οἵδε εἰπον ἔγω, πολιταί πολ rough, Pl.	πολιταὶ μοι εἰσι	οἵδε εἰπον ἔγω πολιταί τέ μοι εἰσι	
-φῶν ¹ τινὶ, ¹ ἑταίρῳ.	no + subs.	ἀντιφῶν. ¹ τινὶ ¹ ἑταίρῳ.	
-γους, ¹ -κράτης. ¹ ἡγνων·	—	καὶ C. [out]. c	
-δώρου.	[a little, darker. -νίδης διαλεχ.	-νίδης διαλεχ. last + added?	
-θῆ ἔφη ¹ εἰπον. δεσμ- πον. δε' patched	—	-νίδης-θησαν. ¹ -δώρου (νίδης through-	
-λεπὸν ¹ ἄν. αὐτὸνς εῦ last two words	—	-θῆ ἔφη λέγεις: τούτων C. τοίνυν εἰπον.	
-νυμον.	[patched a little.	ἀκούσαι: ἀλλού χαλεπὸν ἔφη ¹ ὀν.	
βει ¹ ἀλλ' εἰ δει. ἵωμεν last e curs., see -κῇ		γε κατὰ ¹ -νυμον.	
-θένει ¹ -γὺς. ¹ -λίτηγ ¹ [Pl. μελίτη ¹ ταῦτ ¹		-τρίβει ¹ ἀλλ' εἰ δει. ἵωμεν παρ' αὐτὸν.	
οἴκοι.	τα.. οἴκοι.	μελίτη ¹ : -πόντες. δὲ C.	
-άσαι ¹ -λάγη.	—	οἴκοι. ¹ τινα	
παρεῖμεν·	-τῷ ¹ παρῆμεν ¹ σε τέ	-ασαι ¹ -λάγη.	
-μίας. ¹ -ξετο ¹	δι ¹ ελθεῖν δι later.	παρεῖμεν ¹ -σεν τέ	
λόγους. ¹ -νει.	—	μίας. καὶ ἡσπάξετο·	
-τοι. ¹ -φῶν, ¹ tall and narrow. ¹ -δωρον.	—	λόγους. ¹ ὕκνει ¹ εἶναι· ἐπ-	
		ἔφη ¹ -δωρον.	

A.	TUB.	t.
μεγάλα. ¹ -νείδης·	-θήγεα ¹ -νίδης·	-κοντό ¹ -γάλα. ¹ -νίδης·
Β δην.	-νιδην.	-δην. ¹ μάλα ήδη ¹ εἶναι. c.
πολιὸν. ¹ ὄψιν.	'έζηκοντα	πολιόν. ¹ κάγαθ ¹ ὄψιν·
δέ. ¹ εἶναι·	—	δέ. ¹ ἔτῶν c. τεττ ⁻¹ εἶναι. c.
—	Ιδεῖν ¹ -νίδου	Ιδεῖν ¹ αὐτὸν.
-ναι. ¹ -χούς.	ποθοδρώ	-ναι. ¹ ἔφη. ¹ -δώρῳ
C -μεικῷ· ει had been i, paler, tall, nar-	-μεικῷ·	-μικῷ ¹ -κράτη·
-λοὺς, [row. ¹ -κέσθαι ¹ κράτη,	-τας c.	πολλοὺς.
-μάτων. ¹ -θῆναι·	—	γὰρ c. ¹ ὑπέκεινων -σθῆναι·
τότε, ¹ νέον ¹ -τοῖς,	-γινώσκ-	τότε. ¹ νέον ¹ ἀναγινώσκεινοῦν c. αὐτοῖς.
αὐτὸν ¹ -δην, [neat, and fainter.	αὐτὸν ¹ c. ¹ νίδην	αὐτόν ¹ -νιδῆ ¹ ἔξι ὅντα.
λόγων, ¹ -κόμενῶν· first' and o small,	-γινωσκομένων·	-χὺ ¹ λοιπὸν των c. ¹ -μένων·
D -θεν.	-ν*θηγ ¹	-ωθεν.
-τοῦ ¹ -τέλη, ¹ -μενον.	ἄπτα	-τοῦ ¹ τὸν τῶν c. ¹ -μενον ¹ σμικρὸς ἄπτα
γε.	—	τῶν c. γραμμ ¹ γε.
ξήνωνος ¹ -σαντα,	—	ἀκηκ ⁻¹ -νωνος ¹ -σαντα.
-γνῶναι·	—	-γνῶναι·
-θείσης. πῶς φάναι διξήνων ¹ λέγεις, φάναι	—	-σθείσης πῶς φάναι διξήνω τοῦτο λέγεις.
ὅντα·	—	ὅντα. [εγ very like ει, so next case.
E δὴ. ἀδόνατον ¹ δμοια.	gap, see p. lxxxviii	-α. ¹ -νατον ¹ δμοια.
ἀνόμοια, ¹ λέγεις; οὐτω φ.	—	οὐτω φάναι τὸν c. — fainter.
εἶναι·	ξηνωνα:	δμοια εἶναι·
ἀνόμοια. ἀδόνατον ¹ εἶναι·	—	δμοια ἀνόμοια. ¹ εἶναι c.
εἴη. ¹ -νατα·	ἄρα	εἴη. ¹ -νατα ἄρα ¹ σονο*ι σ hasbeenpt?
-λότι. ¹ -μενα,	πάντας τὰ	λόγοι. οὐκ ἄλλο τι ¹ [=τῶν οἱ]
ἴστι·	αὐτοῦοστει changed to ο ¹ θσοι	ἴστιν·
λόγων ¹ γ=Γ ¹ ηγεῖ, ¹ -σθαι.	ήγη	τῶν λόγων ¹ both c., endaline ¹ -χεσθαι.
p. 3. 128 πολλά. ¹ -γεις. δι- faint.	-λά ¹ δι-	ούνω ¹ -γραφας. ¹ έστιν πολλά ¹ οὐτως λέγεις.
-θάνω: οὐκ ἄλλα ¹ -νωνα.	-νω ¹ φάναι changed to	-θάνω: οὐκ ἄλλα ¹ -νωνα [δ]
-μα, δ ¹ -θάνω	γράμμα [orig. on *	-νηκας ¹ -θάνω
-τη ¹ -νείδη ¹ δδε, faint [τὸν	-ν*τδη ¹ no i subscripts. φιλ-	-τη δι-νιδη ¹ δδε. [ταυτὸν
φκειώσθαι, ᾧ patched, darker ¹ ταυ-	οικειώσθαι, later ω. [later.	φκειώσθαι. ω had been οι? ¹ τῷ c. ¹
δνπερ σύ ¹ δε. ¹ -τᾶν, , faint.	δν ¹ περ σύ ¹ so but altered	τινὰ. δ*περ σύ ¹ μεταβαλὼν δε. ¹ -τᾶν.
λέγων ¹ -μασιν. ¹ ἔφης ¹ πᾶν·	ένεφης so but altered later.	λέγων ¹ -μασιν. ἐν φῆς ¹ πᾶν·
Β αδ ^{*1} -λὰ φησὶν εἶναι·	δδε δε (*=2) αὐτὸν changed	-έχει. καλῶσγε καὶ εῦ ¹ γε or τε? liker
-πολλα, ¹ -χεται·	later to δε αὖ οὐ [on *.	later to δε αὖ οὐ [on *. [former. αδ ¹ εἶναι·
φάναι, ¹ -λὰ καὶ ak close and faint ¹ φάναι changed δε καὶ c. αὐτὸς. ¹ -χεται ¹ μὲν	πάνυ πολλα. καὶ παμμε παμμ	πάνυ πολλα. καὶ παμμε παμμ δε καὶ c. αὐτὸς. ¹ -χεται ¹ μὲν
φάναι, ¹ -λὰ καὶ ak close and faint ¹ φάναι changed δε μὴ οὐ φάναι ¹ πολλα. ¹ τῶν c.	[λέγειν, same * as above.	φάναι ¹ πολλα. ¹ τῶν c.
ταυτὰ.	-τας· ταῦτα	-τῶν c. ¹ δοκεῖν ¹ ταῦτα.
λους, ¹ ναὶ φάναι ¹ -νωνα δι-	σωκρατ ¹ ends line.	-λους. ¹ ναὶ φάναι τὸν ξηνῶνα, δι σώ; lat-
-ματος. [faint, reddish, near edge	ξηθσαι σαι c.	-ματος. ¹ ησθη-[terhalfoffirst]darker.
C ώσπέργε ¹ -λακες ¹ The marg. note is δ. on * σκύ ¹ -θεῖς τὲ ¹ ιχ-	— no note in marg.	καίτοι ¹ γε ¹ λακες.
-θέντα. ¹ -θάνει.	γράμμα ¹ -θεν, stops faint.	-θέντα. ¹ -θάνει. ¹ οὐπαν-

Ἄ.	Τ.UB.	t.
ναι· ¹ -μενον· ¹ -τόμενον· ¹	[θές. ἀνόσος	-ναι· ¹ -μενον· ¹ -μενον· ¹
μὲν. has been a blot over word. ¹ δὲ ¹ θές.		εἰπες. ¹ δὲ ¹ ἀληθές.
-ματα. ¹ λόγῳ, , faint.	no + subs. ¹ -νείσου	λόγῳ c.
κωμῳδεῖν· ὡς εἴ ἔν ἐστι.	gap.	-μῳδεῖν· ὥστε ἔν ἐστι.
λόγῳ, , faint. ¹ αὐτῷ.	αὐτῷ ¹ γράψ-	τῷ λόγῳ. both c. ¹ αὐτῷ c.
-μα, faint. ¹ -γοντας. ¹ ταῦτα, , faint.	.δωσιν· καὶ πλει.	-γοντας ¹ -διδωσι καὶ [erased. ¹ αὐτῷ c.
·ω. τοῦτο . ¹ faint. ¹ δηλοῦν·	—	-ω. τοῦτο ^{*βου-} -λοῦν [*] βpatched. qu. v
-θεσις ¹ ἐστιν. οὐ ¹	ἡ τοῦ ἡ later. ¹ ικ.	-θεσις. ¹ εστιν. ¹ εἰναι, ¹ ικ- -ξίοι.
-κιαν ¹ νέδ ὅντος δ light and close on	ὑπὸ νεύοντος ¹ αὐτῷ ¹	-κιαν ¹ ἔγραφη.
[* ¹ -φῇ ¹ αὐτὸ [*] had been-τὰ or-τὸν?	—	
-φέν. ¹ -γένετο, faint.	—	
φῶς, ¹ μῆ ¹ -θάνει ¹ -κρατες.	ταύτῃ γοῦν	-ψεν γραφέν ¹ -νετο.
-φθαι. faint.	-κλας οἱ· orig. οἱ ·	φῶς. ¹ μῆ ¹ ταύτῃ οὖν ¹ -θάνει ωσω ὅτι
ἐπεὶ ὅπέρ γ' εἶπον. faint. [εἰπέ·	—	-φθαι. ἀλλάπο
-μαι μ small ¹ -κράτη ¹ faint. ¹ ἔχειν ¹ ἐπέ· later.	—	ἐπεὶ ¹ εἶπον. ¹ ἀλλάπο-
αὐτῷ ¹ , faint. ¹ -ότητος ¹	no + subs.	-μαι ¹ -κράτη ¹ ἔχειν ¹ [c.
αὖ, ἀλλό ¹ -τίον ¹ δ ἐστιν ἀνόμοιον; ;, -μοιον ¹ δυτοιν > καὶ	—	καθαυτὸ ¹ -τήτος ¹ καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ both ¹²⁹ (αὖ om.) ἀλλό τι ¹ ἀνόμοιον ¹ δυτοιν. ¹
[faint ¹ δὲ ¹ ἐμὲ, καὶ	—	[λοῦμεν. -βάνειν ¹
σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα ¹ -λοῦμεν	τᾶλλα	τὰ ἄλλα ἀ [*] δὴ (ἀ widely spaced on *)
-βάνοντα. ¹ -σθαι ¹ τε.	no + sub.	-βάνοντα. ¹ -νεσθαι ¹ κατατο-
-βάνη ¹ -τητος. ¹ -μοια.	-βάνη ¹	-βάνη ¹ -τητος. ἀνόμοια·
-τέρων. -τερα·	—	-τέρων. ¹ -τερα ¹
ἐστι, ¹ ἀμφοῖν, , faint.	ἔστι τῷ	-βάνει. ¹ ἐστι ¹ ἀμφοῖν.
αὐτοῖς. -στόν ¹ τις	ἀντοῖς, ¹ later. ¹ -ατίς	αὐτοῖς. ¹ -στον ¹ τις, ἀπέφαινεν
-μενα, , faint. ¹ ὅμοια. ¹ ἀν οἵμαι	—	-μενα. ¹ ὅμοια. ¹ ἀν οἵμαι ην ¹
-θότα. last half of a on *	—	-τέρων ¹ -θότα. faint.
ἔμοιγε ¹ ζήνων ¹	[ι faint.	γε ω σήνω ἄποτον δοκεῖ ¹ οὐδέγε
τις, faint; ἑνὸς ¹ ταυτὰ ¹ πολλὰ. τῷ ἀπο- ¹ patched ¹ τῷ ¹ gap.	πολλὰ	τις. ¹ ἑνὸς ¹ πολλὰ. [αὐτὰ
-χειν ¹ δ ἐστιν ἐν, ¹ -δείξει καὶ αὐτὰ ¹ αὐτὰ ¹ later?	—	-έχειν ¹ ἀλλεὶ ὁ ¹ ἐστιν ἐν, ¹ -δείξει. καὶ ἐν, ¹ -σομαι ¹ τῶν ἀλλων ἀπάντων. all.c.
ἐν ¹ -μαι ¹	[, faintish περὶ ¹ " later?	-αὐτῶς ¹ εἰδη. ἐν αὐτοῖς
-αὐτῶς ¹ αὐτοῖς ¹ ταν-	εἴδη εἴrough ¹ -νοι τάν· later?	-σχοντα. ¹ δέ με [στόν· λέγων
-χοντα.	εἴν ¹ ends line.	καὶ c. πολλὰ ὄντα. ("= transpose) ¹
πολλὰ. ¹ -στόν ¹ λέγων	εἴν ¹ με- ends line.	-φαίνειν ¹ δεξία μονέστιν. ¹ ἐπ' ἀριστερά·
-φαίνειν. ¹ μον ἐστιν ¹ -τερά·	ἐπαριστερά·	πρόσθεν. ¹ -σθεν ¹ κάτω,
πρόσθεν. ¹ -ισθεν ¹ ἄνω, , very faint.	—	πλήθους c. γάρ οἵμαι μετέχω ¹ ἐν. ἐρεῖ ¹ ¹
δτ' ἄν ¹ faint. ¹ ἐν ἐρῆ ¹ . faint.	ὅταν ¹ ἐρῆ	-των c. ¹ ἄνθρωπος c. [γῆμῶν c.
ὄντων, faint. ¹ -πος. ¹ ἑνὸς ¹	ἀνος ¹ ἑνὸς ¹	-φαίνοι -τερά ¹ -χειρῆ.
-τερα ¹ -χειρῆ, [· and ¹ on τὰ faint.	-χειρῆ πολλὰ·	-φαίνειν ¹ -αῦτα.
ταῦτα-νειν λίθους ¹ ξύλα ¹ τὰτοιαῦτα.	.φαίνηλιθους no stops till	λέγειν. ἀλλάπερ ¹ -γοῦμεν.
-νύναι. ¹ το ¹ πολλὰ ¹ ἐν ¹	·νύναι·	ἔλεγον ¹ μὲν c. ¹ καθαῦ-
λέγειν ¹	[, faint	εἰδη ¹ ἀνομοιότητα·
νῦν ¹ ἔλεγον, ¹ -ρεῖται ¹ καθ' αὐτὰ ¹ -ρῆται ¹ καθ' ἄντα	—	ἐν ¹ κίνησιν ¹ τοιαῦτα.
εἴδη ¹ -τητα, καὶ πλῆθος. stops faint.	—	
ἐν ¹ -νησιν ¹ -αῦτα ¹ ... faint and	-νησιν ¹ orig. [?]	
	[crowded.	

A.	TUB.	t.
φαίνη dots note an error? cp. -ρεῖται -κρινέσθαι ¹ φαίνη ^η [above. Written to dictation?]	-φαίνη.	
ἔγωγ' ἔφη-τως ω̄ ξήνων [subs.all faint. γέφην -σθαι ¹ μὲν τ' ἀν φδε -λον ^{'''} and ε πολλ ^υ ! ἀδε ^ν λέγω -θείην ¹ -ρίαν, (faint,) ἐν αὐτοῖς —— ——— [a crowded. ———	ἔγωγ ἔφη θαυμαστῶς ω̄ ξήνων ¹ δε, μὲν τ' ἀν φδε μᾶλλον λέγω ¹ αὐτὴν ταύτην -μένην.	[later.]
x30 φάλθετε ¹ δὴ ¹ -δωρος ¹ ταῦτα. οὔεσθαι, faint. ¹ -νωνα. δὲ, faint. ¹ -νοῦν. -κράτη ¹ αὐτοῦ. ¹ -είδην ¹ -κρατες ¹ φάναι ¹ dark. -ν*τδην ¹ φάναι B εἴπε ¹ ἀττα ¹ or doubtful: probably ¹ διῆρη ¹ & subs. [?] ἀττα	·μῶ —— ν*ιδην τουσδε ¹ -τω -κράτην ¹ οὐν c. αὐτοῦ. ¹ -είδην ¹ -κρατες ¹ φάναι ¹ dark. -ν*τδην ¹ φάναι ——	αὐτοῦ. ¹ -νίδην: ω̄ σωκ φάναι ω̄ς λόγους. ¹ εἰπέ ¹ οὔτως ¹ λέγεις ¹ ἄττα ¹ τούτων c. ¹ -χοντα ¹ αὐτὸ ^η ομοιότης ¹ -στητ ἔχομεν. ¹ πολλὰ. ; ἔμοιγε φά-, differs. [-νίδην. ¹ τί ¹ -τη ¹ : ἡ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε c. εἰπεῖν τὸν c. καθαντὸ ¹ -θοῦ, ¹ αῦ, ¹ -των; ,,, faint. καθάντὸ ¹ orig.? ¹ αὐτῶν [all -ων c.
ο ναι φάναι: τί δ ¹ τιδάνον	τιδάνον	ναι φάναι: τί δ ¹ αὐτρωπου c. εἶδος. [ἡμῶν c. ἀ second half of ^ added. πάντων. αὐτό τὸ ¹ αὐτρωπου c. ¹ υδατ; ἀπορίᾳ φάναι ¹ δὴ ¹ γέγονα ¹ [, differs. φάναι ¹ -νων. ¹ ἡ καὶ ¹ τῶιδε σώ, ἀ ¹ εἶναι ¹ πῆλος. ρύπος ¹ ἡ ἄλλοτε ¹ -λότατον. φάναι ¹ εἶδος. ¹ χωρὶς δνἄλλο αὐτῶν ¹ . [ἡ ω̄ν
D -ξύμεθα, , very faint ¹ μή ¹ φάν- -Τη ¹ γε ¹ -μεν. εἶναι. ¹ -πον ¹ μέντοι ¹ -ξε. Note near [marg.: -ον, -ας and -ε (4) all c. ταυτὸν ¹ ιστω.	θ ⁰ -ξομ end of line ¹ μή ¹ φάναι φάναι ω̄ usually patched, with 'dark. —— η ¹ ιστω (p. lxxxvii). [πολλὴν in mid. marg. ? ¹ -φθαρῶ φθαρίαν αν c. -μαι ¹ εἰς τινα ἁβύθον ¹ points to gloss δοῦν [ends line. -κόμενος. εῑ ιτι εῑ ον *. -ν*ιδην	-τη ¹ ταῦτα γε ἀπερ ὄφωμεν, ¹ αὐτῶν c. -τη ¹ ταῦτα γε ἀπερ ὄφωμεν, ¹ αὐτῶν c. η ¹ ιστω (p. lxxxvii). [πολλὴν in mid. marg. ? ¹ -φθαρῶ φθαρίαν αν c. -μαι ¹ εἰς τινα ἁβύθον ¹ points to gloss δοῦν [ends line. -κόμενος. εῑ ιτι φάναι -νίδην ω̄ σωκ. ¹ -σοφία. -ψεται ¹ -ξαν ¹ -τον ¹ ω̄ fainter. δὲ. fainter. ¹ -ξας. ¹ την ιαν ¹

A.

εἰπέ·¹ σοι¹ φῆς¹ ἄττα, fainter.
νοντα, fainter.¹ -χειν·

-βόντα, δμοια·¹ δὲ, μεγάλα·, saint.
-νης,¹ γε φάναι commas very faint.

-δους. ή μέρους,¹ -βάνον. . , faint.
-βάνει. ή¹ τίς¹ -ψις, faint¹ -οιτο: ή¹ -το:
ἀν¹ οὖν, , very faint. [καὶ c. εἰπε·¹ -στω

ἐν ὅν. ή¹ faintish.¹ -λύει φᾶ·¹ -ράτη λων ἐνδὸν ή πῶς: φάναι
-ν*/*δη¹ ταυτὸν¹ -λοῦς,¹ οὖσιν¹ very νέδη¹ εν εἶναι¹ πολλ²
[faint. ends

ἔσται. (or is . meant as a mark over δμα ἔσται·¹ αὐτοῦ¹ εἴη: φάναι ἔνεσται¹ αὐτοῦ¹ οὐκὰν εἶναι φάναι. p. 6.

εἴη below?)¹ αὐτοῦ¹ ἀν¹ φᾶ-
οίον εἱ¹ (‘darker, v patched at foot Same as A throughout, save
—had been¹) ήμέρα εἴη μία καὶ
ή αὐτὴ,¹ -χοῦ,¹ ἔστι. , , faint.

αὐτῆς¹ -τον¹ , , on αὐτὴ faint. αὐτῆς¹ later.

ταυτὸν¹ γε φᾶ·¹ ρατες¹ ἐν, ταυτὸν, τάντ¹ εἴη > ήδ- φᾶ-
[άμα, , , faint.

ποιεῖς. οἶονεὶ (as in 2) ὥστιώ i subs. οἶονεὶ ιστιώ¹ ἀνόν²
yellow, squeezed.¹ -σασ¹ -πον²

δλον¹ ή¹ -ειν: ὥστις φᾶ-

ή¹ ἀν¹ ή¹ ἄλλω:

ἄρα φᾶ·¹ -ρατες¹ ἔστιν¹ εἰδη¹
αὐτῶν¹ ἔτι faint.¹ δλον.

εὶ οὖν -σεις

-τεις¹ φᾶ·¹ ἔσται; , faint. φάναι¹ πο i subs.

-μῶς εἰπεῖν¹: γάρ φᾶ·¹ -ριεῖς¹ lower πεν.¹ φάναι
[point in : and last . faint.

-λων,¹ μέρει,¹ αὐτοῦ¹ , , faint. τέρω αὐτοῦ
ἔσται¹ ἄρα, latter half of ^ with, δρᾶ dark, patched?¹ ται; ἔσται¹ ἄρα οὐκάλογον φανεῖται¹ γ' ἐφη:
[faint: πάνυ γ¹ δάι.

-στον,¹ τι¹ ἔξει, φ¹ , , faint.

τῷ, ἔσται; , , faint.

τίς¹ τούτον δέ¹ -κρδν, , faint.

ἔσται;

-θῆ,¹ -θὲν¹ ἔσται¹, faint. [faint. θῆ

πρίν;¹ ἀν -το φάναι¹ -πον εἰπεῖν , πρίν;¹ ἀν,¹ φᾶ·¹ γε: τι οὖν¹ γένοιτο φάναι¹ τρόπον εἰπεῖν ω
τι ends line, να forgot?

-τεις¹ μέρη¹

-μενα: οὐ ('faint)¹ διά φάναι¹ faint. κατὰ τὰ διά¹ -μενα;¹ διά φά-

-οῦτον,¹ δάι δῆ,¹ , , faintish.

TUB.

εἰπε¹ φῆς¹ ἄττα
τοχαιν· —

φάναι
οὐκοῦν¹ ή μέρους

φάναι
οὐκοῦν¹ ή μέρους

[καὶ c. εἰπε¹ -στω

ἐν δη. ή¹ faintish.¹ -λύει φᾶ·¹ -ράτη λων ἐνδὸν ή πῶς: φάναι

-ν*/*δη¹ ταυτὸν¹ -λοῦς,¹ οὖσιν¹ very νέδη¹ εν εἶναι¹ πολλ²

[faint. ends

οίον εἱ¹ (‘darker, v patched at foot Same as A throughout, save
—had been¹) ήμέρα εἴη μία καὶ

ή αὐτὴ,¹ -χοῦ,¹ ἔστι. , , faint.

αὐτῆς¹ -τον¹ , , on αὐτὴ faint. αὐτῆς¹ later.

ταυτὸν¹ γε φᾶ·¹ ρατες¹ ἐν, ταυτὸν, τάντ¹ εἴη > ήδ- φᾶ-

[άμα, , , faint.

ποιεῖς. οἶονεὶ (as in 2) ὥστιώ i subs. οἶονεὶ ιστιώ¹ ἀνόν²

yellow, squeezed.¹ -σασ¹ -πον²

δλον¹ ή¹ -ειν: ὥστις φᾶ-

ή¹ ἀν¹ ή¹ ἄλλω:

ἄρα φᾶ·¹ -ρατες¹ ἔστιν¹ εἰδη¹

αὐτῶν¹ ἔτι faint.¹ δλον.

εὶ οὖν -σεις

-τεις¹ φᾶ·¹ ἔσται; , faint. φάναι¹ πο i subs.

-μῶς εἰπεῖν¹: γάρ φᾶ·¹ -ριεῖς¹ lower πεν.¹ φάναι

[point in : and last . faint.

-λων,¹ μέρει,¹ αὐτοῦ¹ , , faint. τέρω αὐτοῦ

ἔσται¹ ἄρα, latter half of ^ with, δρᾶ dark, patched?¹ ται; ἔσται¹ ἄρα οὐκάλογον φανεῖται¹ γ' ἐφη:
[faint: πάνυ γ¹ δάι.

-στον,¹ τι¹ ἔξει, φ¹ , , faint.

τῷ, ἔσται; , , faint.

τίς¹ τούτον δέ¹ -κρδν, , faint.

ἔσται;

-θῆ,¹ -θὲν¹ ἔσται¹, faint. [faint. θῆ

πρίν;¹ ἀν -το φάναι¹ -πον εἰπεῖν , πρίν;¹ ἀν,¹ φᾶ·¹ γε: τι οὖν¹ γένοιτο φάναι¹ τρόπον εἰπεῖν ω
τι ends line, να forgot?

-τεις¹ μέρη¹

-μενα: οὐ ('faint)¹ διά φάναι¹ faint. κατὰ τὰ διά¹ -μενα;¹ διά φά-

-οῦτον,¹ δάι δῆ,¹ , , faintish.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

A.

τόδε. ¹ -οῦδε, , had been .
 132 -ναι, ¹ ἄττα ¹ εἶναι ¹ τίς

-όντι
 -ναι; ¹ -γεις φᾶ- ¹ -γα, ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ -γάλα:
 ἕδης αὐτοῦ μέγα
 ἄλλο

B. ἔτερον.

ἔσται.

ἀλλὰ φάναι ¹ -νεῖδη ¹ -κράτη· faintish
 αὐτῷ προσήκει · faintish.

-λοθι· ¹ εἴη. ¹ ἀν ἔπι ¹ faintish. A stain
 [on ἔπι which is patched.

-χοι, , faintish ¹ οὖν φά- ¹ -μάτων
 νόημα ¹ -τον εἰπεῖν: ἀλλὰ τινός: ναι: ¹

οὗτος. ¹ ὅν ¹ has first half faint.

C οὐκ ὄντος: ¹ δι ¹ εἰπον νοεῖν,
 εῖτα · seems crowded in.

ἐπι [ἀνάγκη ¹ φῆς ἐπι]
 δαι (rough, no patch?) δὴ! -δην! τί δὲ δὴ! -ν*ίδην! ¹ ή τᾶλλα φῆς
 ή! εἶναι, , faint. ¹ νοεῖν.
 ή! εἶναι! τοῦτο φάναι! λόγον ἀλλ' ¹ ή! φά- ¹ λόγον:

D -δη! -νεται, , faint. ¹ τα
 ταῦτα. ¹ φύσει! ἀλλα, , faint.
 -κέναι. ¹ αὔτη, , faint
 εἰδῶν, ¹ τίς! τί ἔφη
 εἰδει· ¹ ἔκεινο· o faint on *! εἶδος,
 καθόσον! ¹ ἡ ἔστι τίς-η, ¹ faint.
 -ον, ¹ εἶναι!: τοδέ! ὁμοίῳ· ἄρ', , faint.
 -κη!, ¹ οὐ δ' ἀν, ¹ faint.

γ. . faint.
 μεν! εἶναι.
 μῆ! -ται εἶδος.
 133 ἔκεινῳ (ψ rough) τὸ ὅμοιον, ή! faint. ¹
 -μενον, , faint.

τᾶλλα

TUR.

·χεις· τὸ ποῖον :

θταν πολλὰ ἄττα ¹ δέξῃ ατο η, εἶναι! ¹ ἄττα μεγάλα δόξῃ σοι εἶναι
 in orig. ¹ τις

τοιοῦδε. ἐν ἑκαστ-
 ισ-! ιδ-! ιδόντι. ¹ ήγη [γάλα.

τοιοῦδε. ¹ ιδ-! ιδόντι. ¹ ήγη [γάλα.

A.	TUB.	t.
-βάνει ¹ -τεῖν, , faint. ¹ οὖν	ἀλλὰ τί ¹ -νει; ¹ δρᾶς	-βάνει. delicate ¹ ἔγειν. ¹ έοικεν:
φάναι ¹ -τεῖν, καθάντα 'faint. ἴσθαι φάναι ὅτι ¹ εἰπεῖν. , faint. αὐτῆς, ¹ -ρία ¹ ἡ ¹ ὄντων, , faint. δὴ εἰπ- ¹ ἀλλα φάναι ¹ δὲ. τόδε ¹ μη ¹ δὲ . . (ἡ) faint. φά- -σθαι ¹ -αῦτα, οὐα φαμέν ¹ εἰδη ¹ λέ- -ξασθαι, ¹ -δεται ¹ , faint. [γοντι. δτι ἀφῆς.	φά- ¹ καθ' ἀντά -ται ¹ -νῦν ἵσθι φά- διπτη ¹ ἡ θν -ριζ. φάναι ¹ δὲ. τόδε ¹ φαίη. [λέγοντι. -σθαι ¹ ταιαῦτα. οὐα φαμέν ¹ εἰδη ¹ ἀν ἔχοι ¹ -δεται ¹ πολλῶν μὲν τύχοι -φισβητῶν. c. ¹ ἀφῆς.	[δρᾶς οὖν φάναι ω σωκ. ¹ ἀπορία ¹ τις ως εἴδη. ἴσθιφάναι ὅτι ως ¹ εἰπεῖν. ἀπορία ει ἐν ¹ τῶν c. ὄντων. αἱεί τι -ξύμενος ¹ δὴ ¹ ἀλλα. φάναι ¹ δὲ. τόδε ¹ φαίη. [λέγοντι. -σθαι ¹ ταιαῦτα. οὐα φαμέν ¹ εἰδη ¹ ἀν ἔχοι ¹ -δεται ¹ πολλῶν μὲν τύχοι -φισβητῶν. c. ¹ ἀφῆς.
εἴη, ¹ δὴ	πῇ ¹ -ν*είδῃ (will note now only where no patch.)	-θανος ἀν εἴη ¹ αὐτὰ ἀναγκάζων ¹ δὴ -δη ¹ -κρατη: ὅτι ω σώ ¹ ἀλλοῦ.
δὴ ¹ ὅτι ¹ -τει ¹ σὲ. Stops all faint καθάντην ¹ εἶναι ¹ ἀν, , faint. [here. μὲν. εἴη φά- ¹ -γεις εἰπεῖν. εἰσὶν, ¹ -σιν αὐταῖ ¹ , faint.	καθάντην ¹ * later. μηδὲ ¹ αὐτῶ ¹ εἶναι ν later. ¹ φά- ¹ -τη ¹ οὖν [καθ' later. Ιδέων ¹ later. ¹ ἀνται, 'later. πρὸς αὐτὰς c.	καθάντην αὐτοῦ ἑκ- ¹ εἶναι. μὲν. μηδεμίαν ¹ καθ [οὐκοῦν έπι εἴη φάναι ¹ -κρατη: ¹ λέγεις εἰπεῖν. τῶν c. ιδ- ¹ εἰσὶν. αἱ εἰσιν ¹ αὐτὰς
ἡμῖν, , faint. δὴ ¹ -ται ¹ -τει ¹ , faint. -μεθα ¹ (a cursive maj.) ¹ ταῦτα. ἐστιν*, ¹ εἰδη ¹ ; ¹ -τῶν, , faint. -κείνων ¹ λέγεις, φάναι , faint. οδον φά- ¹ -νείδη ¹ τοῦ ¹ -λός. , faint ἐστιν ¹ δήπου ὁ ἐστι -της	όμοιό*τατα line ends at *	έχουσιν ¹ -ματα.
τησ ¹ next line. [paler.	Σημδή	δῆτις ¹ τιθεται ¹ -χοντες.
ἐστιν ¹ δούλου ἐστι δοῦλος ¹ ὁ δεσπό- ῶν. ¹ ἐστιν ¹ -τεία.	ταῦτα. ταν οι **	ταῦτα ¹ ἐκείνους. [οὐκ αὐτά ἐστιν ¹ εἰδη καὶ εἰ patched φά- Will not note again. δη ¹ ν later ¹ το ¹ ἐκείνου δεσ- ἀντοῦ first added; same
ἀντα ¹ ἐστι ¹ προσαντά ¹ ἡ	[τησ ¹ gap]	πρὸς αὐτῶν ¹ [line] ἔστιν ¹ δούλου. ὁ ἐστι ¹ ἀλλαν- (next gap. αὐτὴ δὲ changed to αὐτὴ looks like i, latter part very faint.
λέγω: ¹ γ' εἰπ- ¹ -άτη ¹ οὖν faint. -μη φάναι ¹ μὲν, ὁ ἐστι ¹ -μη ¹ ὁ ἐστιν ἀλιθεία ¹ (=θεια ¹) , faint. ἡ ἐστιν ¹ commas here faint. -των ὁ ἐστιν ¹ -μη ¹ . ἡ οὐ ¹ : faint. -μη ¹ εἴη ¹ , faint. μη ¹ -στον. -λαμῆν ¹ εἰδη ¹ -γεις ¹ -μεν, , faint. · οὐ ¹ , and next faintish.	έστινδ	ἔστιν ¹ δούλου. ὁ ἐστι ¹ ἀλλαν- (next gap. αὐτὴ δὲ changed to αὐτὴ looks like i, latter part very faint. λέγω: γ' εἰπ- ¹ -κράτη ¹ οὐκοῦν c. -μη φάναι ¹ ὁ ἐστιν -μη ¹ τη ¹ δη ¹ ἐστιν [-θεια.
· μη ¹ αὐτῶν first added. · οὐ ¹ :	· μη ¹ αὐτῶν first added. · οὐ ¹ :	λέγω: γ' εἰπ- ¹ -κράτη ¹ οὐκοῦν c. -μη φάναι ¹ ὁ ἐστιν -μη ¹ τη ¹ δη ¹ ἐστιν [-θεια.
εἶναι, ::	εἶναι, ::	· μη ¹ αὐτῶν -μῶν. ἡ ἐστιν -των ὁ ἐστιν ¹ -μη ¹ η οὐ ¹ : -στήμη ¹ εἴη ¹ -στήμη ¹ -νοι εἶναι c.: εἰδη ως -γεις ¹ ἔχομεν.
ἀλλά	οἴνοτέ εἶναι; 3 upper marks	ἡμῖν οἴονται εἶναι: οὐ γαρ οὖν c.: later. οὐναροῦν ¹ δενέ

A.	TUB.	t.
-μῆσ. ¹ ἀ ἔστιν δ, -μεν; , , very faint.	-μεν: οὐ γάρ: ¹ γινώ. οὐδὲν.	-μῆσ. ο. ¹ ἔχομεν: ¹ ήμῶν c. τῶν c. ¹ οὐδὲν. ¹ αὐτῆς ¹ μετέχομεν: οἰκ'
ἡμῖν, ¹ ὁ ἔστιν , faint.	εἰδῶν	ἡμῖν ἔστι c. καὶ ¹ ὁ ἔστιν ¹ αγαθὸν ἰδ- ¹ οὐσας,
c πάντα. [ἡ faint. Ιδεας ¹ μεν, : -τερον. ¹ ἄν. ἥ ' and first half of ^ on ἥ οὐ εἰπέρ ἔστιν αὐτότι " . and ' of εἰπέρ ἔστι τι γένος		φαίης ἄν που (then follows next line). εἰπέρ ἔστιν ¹ -στήμης.
[`` faint. ¹ -μῆσ. -ναι, ¹ -μην ¹ -λος ¹ τᾶλλα πάντα οὐ- τω; first (,) faint: second = other hand and ink.		-ναι. ¹ -μην. ¹ καὶ c. τὰ ἄλλα ¹ οὐτω: καὶ τὰ ᾧ rewritten in other ink on stain.
p. 9. οὖν εἰπέρ ¹ -ον at end amid brown stains. οὖν		οὐκούν εἴπέρ τι ἄλλη αὐτῆς ¹ -χει ¹ μᾶλλον, η αὐτη written over in other ink.
ἄρ' οὖν ν stained [(,) original. D θεὸς, ¹ -σκειν ¹ ἔχων; ν stained. The ὅτι ... to end: no stops. ἔχει.		ἔχειν. ¹ -τάτῃ ¹ ἄρ' -σκειν. ὅτι ¹ ήμιν ω σώ, ήμι ¹ ἔχειν ¹ ἔχει.
οὖν ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -τεία. -μη ¹ οῦτ ¹ ἄν ¹ -νων, , faint. E ἄν -σειν ¹ οὔταν ¹ -μη ¹ γνοίη. ἡμῖν ¹ -μοίως, , faint.		ἀλλάντα πρὸς αὐτὰ last οὖν ¹ ω [changed later δύταν ¹ ' later? ¹ ἔκει- οὔτ' αν
-χύ ¹ οὐδὲν, , faint. ¹ -μη ¹ had been -μη ¹ then i put and a new stop. λόγον, ¹ εἰσιν -ματα, , faint. ¹ λίαν ἔφη ¹ -γος. -τοι ¹ -τες. 135 -λὰ, , faint ¹ εἰδη, ¹ εἰσιν		πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. ἀλλαντά ¹ αὐτὰ breathing οὖν ¹ -τεία. [patched, had been'. -στήμη ¹ -νων, -σειεν. οὔτ ¹ ἄν ἐπιστήμη ¹ γνοίη. ἡμῖν ¹ τε* ἔκειν- * at end of a line. ¹ [χομεν. τῇ παρ
οὐτων, , faint. -βητεῖν, so in my notes: , very faint. ¹ -βητεῖν ώς οὐ τέ ἔστι ταῦτα. εἰ τε τε τε stand separate.		-χύ ¹ οὐδὲν. ¹ -στήμη. λόγον. ¹ εἰσιν. λίαν ἔφη ¹ λόγος. μέντοι ω σω, ἔφη ὁ παρμενιδης ¹ c. ἔχειν τὰ εἰδη. εἰ εἰσιν ¹ ἀνται αἱ ιδέαι ν patched, a very close, ν changed from ν, ^ had been'. = εἰσι ... ἄν? τῶν c. οὕτων. -οντα ¹ -βητεῖν ¹ ταῦτα.
-γοντα, , faint. ¹ τέ τι λέγειν. καὶ ώς, , very faint.	[-γομεν	είη. τέ τι λέγειν καὶ ¹ -γομεν.
B -θεῖν, ¹ -σία, ¹ -τήν ¹ , , faint. -τέρου, ¹ -σοντος, , faint. -ξαι. . faint. ¹ σοι ἔφη		δυσανάπειστον ¹ -φυοῦς. καθ' αὐτήγ. " have been added -τότερον -νῶς c. ends line.
-τοι ¹ -νείδης ¹ δὴ ¹ -τες αὐ ¹ ἔαση [faint.		μαθεῖν. ¹ ἔκαστ ¹ καθαύτην. -τέρου ¹ -σομένου ν ον * had been ν ξαι πάντα ταῦτα ίκ- ¹ σοι ἔφη -νίδη ¹ -κράτης. [αῦ μη ἔσω μέντοι ¹ -μενιδης. c. εὶ δὴ γέ τις ω σω,

A.	TUB.	t.
εῖδη ¹	—	τῶν c. ὄντων c. εἶναι.
-ψας μὴ δέτι ¹ -στον.	μηδέτι	-βλέψας μὴδ' ὅτι ὁρ. ¹ -στον.
ἔξει ¹ ἔῶν faint.	ἴῶν ιθ-	ἰδέαν τῶν c. ὄντων c.
εἶναι.	—	εἶναι.
-ρεῖ ¹	—	-ρεῖ ¹ δοκεῖς.
-γεις φᾶ ¹ πέρι.	—	λέγεις ¹ τί ¹ πέρι.
-ψει, ἀ τούτων ¹ -ρᾶν, , , faintish.	τρέψῃ	τούτων ¹ γε τῷ c.
γὰρ εἰπεῖν ¹ -ναι ¹ -τες	—	παρόντι πρωΐ γὰρ εἰπεῖν ¹ -σθῆναι ω
σω. In in. marg. γρ. πρώτη, sugg.	—	σω.
-λὸν τέ τι, ¹ -καιον, ¹ -θὸν, , , faint.	—	by πρωτην below?
-ριζ stained. [outer corner. [even in vbs. or advbs.)	—	-χειρεῖς. καλοντέτι ¹ -θὸν.
τῶν τ stained, stain creeps in from πρώτη (no i. Cease to note	—	p. 10.
-θάδε, faint. ¹ τῷδε ¹ μεν ¹ θεία ¹ -θι θεία ¹ orig. ¹ το.	—	D
-γονς. ¹ σαντδν, ¹ -λον, , faint.	—	-θάδε c. ¹ τῷδε ¹ θεία εὐ ἵσθι ἥ ὁρμή.
εἶναι, faintish.	—	ἀριστοτέλει... ὁρμή = 1 line in Ms.
αἴδ- i subs. dark ¹ μὴ. σε	άδολ- (i held as subs.) ¹ σὲ	with ση. in middle space.
-πος φάναι ¹ -σίας: οὔτως εἰπεν	—	γύμνασον μᾶλλον,
—	τῶν c. πολλῶν c.	τρόπος φάναι ω -νίδη ¹ -νασίας : οὔτος
-σθην -τοις, ¹ εἰασεν ¹ -νοις, , faintish. εἴασε τοῖς	—	-νωνος ¹ πρὸς
-πεῖν ¹ -να, ¹ -βοι. , faintish.	—	-σθην. ¹ -μένοις.
μοι ¹ γε. faintish. [faint.	—	-σκοπεῖν ¹ λάβοι.
ναι ¹ -μοια, ¹ -μοια ¹ , and 'on οὖν ὅτι οὖν	πρὸς τοῦτο π-	είδη ¹ μοι ἔφη ταῦτη γε.
γ' ἔφη ¹ -εῖν.	εἰστιν	ἀνόμοια.
—	μή ἔστι	γ' ἔφη. ¹ ποιεῖν.
-σεως ¹ ἔστι, faint. ¹ -θαι.	—	-μενον.
-γεις φᾶ- οἰον ἔφη, faint.	—	-θέσεως c. ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -θεσθαι.
-λά ἔστι.	—	λέγεις φάναι: οἷον ἔφη.
-νειν ¹ το ἔν.	αὐτά ¹ patched ¹ τὸ	-θέσεως c. ¹ ἴπέθετο ¹ εἰ πολλά ἔστι.
πρὸς γε αὐ ¹ αῦ ¹ -λὰ ¹ πάλιν	αὐτὸ ¹ added. μή ἔστι πολλὰ	-βαίνει ¹ πολλοῖς ¹ αὐτὰ ¹ ἔν.
-πεῖν, ¹ -λοῖς.	αὐτά ¹ patched.	-νὶ ¹ πρόστε ¹ αῦ εἰ μή ἔστι πολλὰ.
-λα ¹ αὐτοῖς αῦ ¹ -της ¹ ἔστιν. . .	πρὸς ἀλληλα gap	πολλοῖς.
-σεται ¹ [faintish. gap [had been πρὸς	gap πρὶ π patched, i on ;	ἀλληλα ¹ αῦθις ¹ -ότης ¹ ἥ εἰ μή ἔστιν. B
-θεῖσιν. ¹ -λα.	gap πρὶ π patched, i on ;	ἐφ ¹ -σεται.
-μοίον, faintish. ¹ -σεως. ¹ περι ¹ -σεως ¹ περι ¹ twice	—	-τεθεῖσι ¹ ἀλλοῖς ¹ αὐτὰ ¹ -ληλα ¹ .
-ρᾶς ¹ -ναι, faintish.	γενέσεως ω rough	-σεως ¹
καὶ ¹ λόγῳ, had been. ¹ -θῆ.	ἀει ¹ καὶ οὐκ	-νεσεως c. ¹ -ρᾶς ¹ .
-κόντος ¹ -τος.	ὅτι οὖν	καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ¹ οὗτον οὖν αἰεὶ ¹ καὶ ώς
-νούτα, very faint. ¹ αἵτδ. ¹ -έλη ¹	αὐτὸ ¹ .	ὄντος ¹ καὶ ὅτι
τᾶλλα faintish.	ξυμπαντα ¹ -τως καὶ τᾶλ-	αὐτὸ ¹ ἄλλων ¹ προέληγ ¹ .
τε. ὅτι οὖν ¹ αἰεὶ ¹	αὐτά ¹ ὅτι οὖν ¹ αἰεὶ so.	πλείω ¹ ὡσαῦτως ¹ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αῦ πρὸς
-θεσθε ¹ ἀντε ως μὴ δι ¹ , faint. ¹ -μενος ¹	ὑποτιθεσθε ¹	αἰεὶ προαιρῆ.
-ψευθε ¹ -χανον ἔφη λέγεις ω	διδικεσθε ¹ αι added.	-θεσθαι ¹ ἀμήχανόν γ' ἔφη λέγεις ω

॥.

TUB.

t.

-τίαν. *i* changed by first hand (?) to a ματέιαν
[faint ει¹ μοι, , faint¹ θες.

D ιποθέμενος· τύρα ¹ -μάθω ¹ -γον φάναι μενος· τίνα		
p. 11. -τεις -τεις. ¹ σὺ ¹ -άτη on a stain.	——	
-ινων. ¹ φάναι·	——	
αὐτοῦ ¹ -τεις. δεόμι ¹ γάρ. ¹ -γει·	——	
ἡ ¹ -τεις ¹ ἡμεν. οὐκάν	ἡσυχορᾶ ¹ ἡμεν orig. on *.	
-σθαι ¹ γάρ., faint. ¹ -γειν.	——	
-λοὶ, , faint.	οὗσι	
E διαπάντων ¹ -ης.	τὲ	
-θεῖ, ¹ ἔχειν ¹ οὖν ¹ -δη ¹ συνδέομαι -θῇ altered later ¹ σύνδ. al-	——	
[συν small on *, same ink.]	tered later from συδ. ¹ ζ-	

-νος ¹ φά ¹ -ροι·	ἀντίφ-	
-νείδον ¹ λη. ¹ -λοις, , faint.	——	
ποιεῖν ¹ -δην, -κη φάναι -σθαι ¹ , faint.	ποιεῖν:	
137 μοι, ¹ -θέναι ¹ faintish. ¹ -νος	Ιβ- Ήπ-	
οὗται, ¹ -σθαι, -λοι., ? ¹ -ξων.	νιφάρματι ¹ added later ¹ τῷ	
-τω, ¹ ὄν. ¹ ιέναι·	μοντι, τὸ	
-μένος ¹ -σθαι. ¹ οὗται, διανήσαι, faint.	ιέναι.	
-γων ¹ δε·	δμως δὲ δει γάρ -σθαι·	
E καὶ ὁ ξήρων λέγει αὐτοῖς ἐσμεν·	καὶ ἐπ- ὅ ζ- λ- αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν ¹ ἀρ-	

-σόμεθα· η ¹ -σθε ¹ faint. ¹ αγμα on a πρωτον	[ἄρξο-	
-ζειν. ¹ -μαι, faintish. [roughish stain. -τειώδη ¹ ἀπεμαν. (' added)	τειώδη ¹ παίξειν, απ' ἐμ-	
-σεως ¹ -μενος ¹ ἐν ἐστιν, , faintish.	σεως. ¹ -μενος. ¹ ἐν ἐστιν	
ἐντί ¹ οὖν φά ¹ οὖν	ἐντι ¹ οὖν φά ¹ τίς οὖν C.	
-πεῖν ¹ -ιείται ¹ η ¹ -τατος ¹	εἰπεῖν μοὶ -νείται. ¹ -τατος ¹	
-νοῦ ¹ -εται	—	[ends line.]
C εἴη. ¹ σοι ¹ φάναι τοῦτο, , faint.	η ἐκ· η late on *. ¹ τοῦτο τὸ-	[ἔποιμ-]
-γεις. ¹ -γων ¹ -τα.	[, faintish.	παίξειν, απ' ἐμ-
δὴ φά ¹ η ¹ ἐν ἐστιν; ἀλλότι οὐκάν εἴη,	—	σεως. ¹ -μενος. ¹ ἐν ἐστιν
νομένου ¹ η ¹ ἐνέστιν altered	—	ἐντι ¹ οὖν φά ¹ τίς οὖν C.
ἀν ¹ αὐτοῦ.	[orig. hand on *	εἰπεῖν μοὶ -νείται. ¹ -τατος ¹
ἐστιν; , faint. ¹ δαὶ τὸ δλον· δαὶ τὸ τὸ δῆ ¹ η ¹ ἐστι ¹ : τὶ δὲ τὸ	—	-νοῦ ¹ οὔται, μάλιστ' ἄν ¹ -πανλ' ἄν
ἀπῆ ¹ ; ; ἀρατο ἐν, commas faint.	—	ἔποιμό σοις ὃ παρμενιδη C. φάναι τοῦτο
D εἴη ¹ οὖν.	—	λέγων ¹ ἀλλέρωτα.
-τως, το ¹ εἴη. ¹ γε, μὴ πολλὰ., , faint. τὸ	—	[τὸν]
εσται.	—	εἰ οὐ δὴ φάναι. εἰ οὐ δητι C. οὐκάν
p. 12. η ¹ οὖν ¹ ἔχει μέρος. ¹ -χὴν ¹ All the η ¹ οὖν ¹ ἔχει ¹ οὐτ' ἄν	—	ἀρά C.
and the η subs. in this line faintish.	—	μέρος C. που, μέρος δλον ἐστίν; δλον.
η ¹ on stain	—	ἀπῆ ¹ εἴη ¹ : [the c. ends a line.]
τὴν ¹ τ on a stain.	—	εἴη ¹ δη.
γε, ¹ ἀρχῆ.	—	ἔσται ¹ η ¹ οὐ γάρ: οὐκοῦν ¹ ἔχει μέρος. ¹ ἀρχῆ ¹ .

-νιδη C. -τείαν.

τι¹ -μάθω C.: ἔργον φάγαι
ῳ σω¹ -ττεις.¹ σὺ¹ -κράτη
ξήνων.¹ -σαντα. φάναι·
αὐτὸν ὃ σὼ, δεώμεθα -νιδού.¹ λέγει·
-τάττεις;¹ οὖν C. ἡμεν. οὐκάν
-σθαι¹ -αντα.¹ λέγειν.
τε¹ -οοῦσι¹ πολλοί.¹ ταύτης
πλάνης. ἀδύνατον C.

ἀληθεῖ. νοῦν σχείν¹ οὖν ὃ παρμενιδη
[C. -δεομα. Ἡ-

ἀκούστω

-νος.¹ -φῶν. φάναι¹ -δωρον.¹ δεισθαι C.
-νίδον¹ τοὺς C. ἀλλούς.¹ λέγοι
-νίδην. -γκη φάναι -σθαι·
ἰβυκ- ἵπ- -θέναι¹ -νος ἀθλ-. ἰβυκ- ...
... τὴν ὅν = a line with τ- opposite.

-τέρφω¹ -σθαι. καὶ διέμπει-
μέλλον.¹ -κάζων.
ὅν¹ ιέναι·
-μένος.¹ διαινεῖσαι.
λόγων. C. δὲ¹ -ζεσθαι
καὶ ὁ ξήρων λέγει. αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν¹ ἀρ-
ξ*όμεθα. 1st half of an ω removed.
-σομεθα¹ -λεσθε.
τειώδη¹ παίξειν, απ' ἐμ-
-σεως.¹ -μενος.¹ ἐν ἐστιν
ἐντι¹ οὖν φά¹ τίς οὖν C.
εἰπεῖν μοὶ -νείται.¹ -τατος¹
-νοῦ¹ οὔται, μάλιστ' ἄν¹ -πανλ' ἄν
ἔποιμό σοις ὃ παρμενιδη C. φάναι τοῦτο
λέγων¹ ἀλλέρωτα.
δη¹ οὐ δητι C. οὐκάν
μέρος C. που, μέρος δλον ἐστίν; δλον.
ἀπῆ¹ εἴη¹: [the c. ends a line.]
εἴη¹ δη.
ἔσται¹ η¹ οὐ γάρ: οὐκοῦν¹ ἔχει μέρος.¹ ἀρχῆ¹.

ἔχοι¹ ηδη η on *
ἀρχῆ.

A.	TUB.	t.
το ἔν. ¹ ἔχη : ^c subs. faintish	ἔχη :	ἔν. ¹ ἔχει :
-λον. , faintish.	εὐθέος	ἄρα ¹ -γύλου. [οὖ*άν] ὅρος στρογγ. E
πῶς : ¹ τοῦτο.	που	πῶς : ¹ γέπου ἔστι τοῦτο. γύλου.
-ταχη̄ i fainter. ¹ ἀπέχη̄; altered from ισον ἀν ἔχη :	ισον ἀπέχη̄ : ¹ γε.	ισον ἀπέχη̄ : ¹ γε.
μέσον, ¹ εἴη; ¹ οὖν. , , and 'on οὖν οὖν (will not note again).	[fainter.]	(Note in outer μέσο̄ . marg. 1st hand.)
εἴη ¹ εἴη. ¹ -ματος [*]	ἔν.	ἔστιν.
εὐθὺ.	—	ἔν. καὶ πόλλ' ἀν εἴη. εἴτ' ¹ -ματος.
ἔστιν.	δρθῶς.	ἔν.
δη. ¹ -λω.	gap.	δη. ¹ εἴη. ¹ εἴη [*] :
δή : ¹ ον. ¹ περιέχοιτο, , faint. ¹ -νου. -έχοιτο	—	δή : ¹ ον. ¹ κύκλω ¹ φ (ον had been ἀν)
εἴη̄ . fainter.	—	ἀν εἴη ¹ ἀν
-ροῦς, , faint. ¹ -χοντος.	—	-χοντος.
μὴν, , fainter. ¹ ἐν * after ¹ ον. κὰν ἐν ἐ ¹ κὰν	—	ον. κὰν
ἔαντψ εἴη περιέχον, η αὐτὸ ¹ , "fainter. η	—	ἔαντδ ¹ -χον. ¹ αὐτὸ ¹ εἴη̄ ἐν
τῷ γάρ τι εἴη̄ μὴ περιέχον, τὶ ¹ i subs. εἴη ^a μὴ περιέχοντι, η changed [and , . fainter to ν and αι put later.	—	τῷ γάρ τι είναι c. 1 -χοντι. ¹ οὖν c.
εἴη ¹ -έχον.	—	έχον. ¹ -μενον :
ἄμφω, ταυτὸν , faint.	ταυτὸν	γε.
ἐν οὐκάν ¹ ἐν ¹ οὐγαροῦν ¹ : ¹ ἐν, ' faint. ἀν ¹ οὐ γάρ οὖν : ¹ ἔστι αὐτῷ. ¹ δή.	—	ἔν. οὐκ ἀν ¹ ἐν. ¹ οὐ ¹ ἔστιν πουτδ ἐν.
κινούμενόν * γε, had been ούτε, τ ἔστά ¹ -μενόν τε, η	—	ἔαντψ c. 1 ἀλλω ¹ ἐνόν : ¹ ἔχο .
-ροιτο. [changed to Γ, faint. ἀν ¹	—	οἰόντε ἔστιν ἔστάναι ¹ ὅτι c. κινούμε-
ἔαντο ¹ .	—	-ροιτο. ¹ ἀν ¹ γλ (= γάρ). [νόντε c.
κατ' ¹ ἄρα τῷ i squeezed in. ¹ , of ; φέρεται ¹ φ neat dark on *	—	ἔαντο ¹ . c. 1 ἔτι που είναι : ¹ ἄρα c.
μὴν ¹ ἐν ¹ [faint. φτοι	—	καταλλοίων ¹ ἀλλάρα
κύκλω. ¹ -λάττοι, . , faint. ¹ οὖν ¹	—	ἴστω ¹ μὴν ¹ ἐν.
-μενον. ¹ -γκη̄	—	κύκλω ¹ οὐκοῦν c.
το ¹ φ, , faint. ¹ μεσον [*]	ἄλλα ¹ άδε	-μενον. ¹ -κέναι c. ἀνάγκη.
-σήκει. ¹ -χανή ¹ τοῦτο,	—	-μενα. ¹ έαντού ¹
-θῆναι ¹ : ¹ ἀμείβων	—	-σήκει ¹ ποτὲ ἐπὶ
-νεται. ¹ εἴπερ ¹ οὖν ' faint.	εἴπεργε δή :	-χθῆναι ¹ : ¹ ἀμείβον.
αὐτὸ ¹ ο on * ¹ ἐφάνη ¹ : ¹ ἄρ ¹ οὖν.	αὐτῶ ¹ ἐφ ἀν ¹ : φ neat dark	ον *. γίγνεται ¹ οὐκοῦν
-τερον ¹ : ¹ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται ¹ i subs. δη ¹ : o on * ¹ μῆτε	—	αὐτῷ. c. 1 ἐφάνη ¹ : ¹ ἄρ ¹ -νεσθαι.
squeezed and faint ¹ τέ πω ω on a stain.	—	-τάτερον ¹ : ¹ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται ¹ μηδέπω
επι, ἐνγιγ- ¹ μήτετι ¹ -πασιν [*]	—	p. 13.
ἐν γίγνεται ¹ ; faint. ¹ τὶ ¹ τοῦτο.	ἐν γίγ- ¹ later? ¹ τι ¹	έγγιγνόμεν ¹ μήτετι ¹ -πασιν.
πάσχοι, ¹ το ¹ -νψ ¹ το	τὸ ¹ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡδη ¹ τὸ ¹	περ ἥδη ἐγγίγνεται ¹ τι ¹ -σεται. τοῦτο E
μέρη.	εἴη ¹ που ἔστι τρ-	πάσχοι. ¹ εἴη ¹ αὐτοῦ ¹ ἥδη ¹ -νψ ¹
-ναι τινος	ἄμα ¹	δὲ ¹ εἴξω ¹ μέρη ¹ οἰοντέ ¹ ἔσται.
εἰσι ¹ δη ¹ -τώτερον ¹ , faint.	-χάνει a large, ε on *1	ἄμα ¹ είναι τινος
		εἰσιν ¹ δη ¹

A.	Τυπ.	t.
πον ¹ μέρη, ; , faint.		
139 ποὶ ἴδν ιων same hand, neat on * ¹ ποιῶν.		
τῷ -μενον, -ττει ¹ τῷ both i subs. added, yellow, squeezed. , , faint.		
-όμενον.		
το ¹ ἀλλα ¹ γεφαμὲν	ἀλλὰ	-μενον. ¹ ἔοικεν: ἄρα c.
; , faint ¹ ἔστιν:		ἔν. ¹ γε φαμὲν
εἴη. ¹ ἔστιν:	τὸ ¹ αὐτὸ ¹ ἔστι: πάνυ	αὐτὸ ¹ . ἄρα c. ποτὲ. ¹ ἔστιν:
αὐτῷ ¹ αὐτῷ ¹ ἐν εἴναι: i subs. inserted,		εἴη ¹ ἔστι: [οὖν: c.
αὐτῷ ¹ αὐτῷ ¹ εἰναι: i subs. added. ! οὐ ¹ ἔστι ¹ gap.		ἐν αὐτῷ ¹ ἄλλῳ. ¹ αὐτῷ ¹ c. ! ἐν εἴναι:
αὐτῷ ¹ i subs. added. ! ὥγει.	-κεν.	ἔστιν τὸ ἔν. ¹ αὐτῷ ¹ c.
[in pale ink.] οὐκ οὖν		ἔντῳ c. αὐτῷ ¹ c. οὐν οὔτε ¹ ἄγει. οὔτε
-ρα ¹ οὔτε ¹ ἔστηκεν. first τ has 0 on it ούτε ¹ ἔστηκεν. later θ ¹ pale on -ρα ώς ἔοικεν. οὔτε ¹ ἔστη-		
δεμηῆταντόνγε, , faint. ¹ ἔτέρῳ ¹ ἔαυτῷ μῆ =ν.		γε. οὔτε ¹ ἔσται ¹ ἔτερον.
[<i>(i added?) ἔσται¹ ἔτερον</i>]		[first τ. [έστηκεν: οὐν crowded in.
αὐτοῦ. ¹ τίνι δῆ ¹ δη.	αὐτῷ orig. = ¹ τίνι δῆ: τι αὐτοῦ ¹ πῆ δῆ ¹ οὐν. had been αὐτοῖ	[ends line.
εἴη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ καὶ ¹ fainter. ¹ ταυτόνγε gap. ¹ καὶ μῆν		εἴη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ εἴη ¹ ὅπέρ ἔστιν
ἔτέρῳ δη. i subs. squeezed.		ἔν. ¹ ἀλλέτερον ¹ οὐ γαρ
εἴη ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ ὅπέρ ἔστιν	οὐκὰν	-αυτοῦ. ¹ ἔσται. ἔως ¹ ἔν;
ἔν. ¹ οὐγάρ οὖν: ταυτὸν ¹ ἔτέρῳ, η̄ ἔτε- -σήκει, εἴναι. ¹ ἔτέρῳ ¹ ἄλλῳ δὲ. last i	οὐγάρ:	-σήκει. ¹ εἴναι. ¹ ἔτέρῳ ¹ ἔτέρου ¹ ἄλλῳ
[ρον. 'on η̄ is dark at the turn. οὐ γάρ : ¹ ἔσται.		
-σήκει, εἴναι. ¹ ἔτέρῳ ¹ ἄλλῳ δὲ. last i [subs. fainter and squeezed.		
εἴναι. ¹ ἔσται ἔτερον ¹ η̄ (had been) οἵει: ἔσται ¹ η̄		εἴναι.
ἄλλαμῆν, ¹ οὐτῷ. ¹ οὐδεάν, and ειδή μῆ αὐ- last part of + faint, i subs. fainter and squeezed. [οὐδὲ		μῆ τούτῳ ¹ c. ! μῆ αὐτῷ.
D -δαμῆ i fainter and squeezed. ¹ ἔτερον. ¹ δη ¹ οὐδὲ ταυτὸν ¹ οὐχ ¹ , περ ¹ , faint. ¹ φύσις. δο ¹ : ¹ ήπερ ¹ ταυτοῦ ¹ οὐκέπει δᾶν ταυτὸν γένηται δᾶν		ἔτερον. ταυτὸν αὐτῇ ¹ καὶ τοῦ ταυτοῦ ¹ οὐτὶ c.
[, and last' faint.		
τῷ ¹ ἀλλα ¹ ταυτὸν γενόμενον.	ώ τι ἐγγίγνεται: ἀλλὰ clear, τῷτι. ¹ ταυτὸν -μενον.	
-σθαι ¹ ταυ-		
-φέρει ¹ ὅπτότετι ταυτὸν ἐγγίγνετο. αἰὲι [has been αἰὲι, changed on a *	δύχεν twice second ' added. τῷ in one, patched later.	ταυτὸν αὐτῇ ¹ τοῦ ταυτοῦ ¹ οὐτὶ c.
E ἔν ταυτόν : ¹ το ¹ ταυτὸν ἔσται. faint. τὸ		
—	δύχεν twice second ' added.	ἔν. ¹ ταυτὸν ἔσται.
ἔν., faint. ¹ εἴναι. ¹ ταυτόν :		ἔσται ¹ c. ! δη ¹ γε.
ταυτὸν ¹ οὐτῶν αὐτῷ. last ' blurred.	οὐτῶν αὐτῶ	ἔν. ¹ ἔτερον c. εἴναι c.
ἔσται ¹ -μοιον οὐτῶν	-οὐτῶν ¹ οὐτῶν ¹ ' added?	ταυτὸν τὸ ἔν. ¹ αὐτῷ.
αὐτῷ ¹ ταυτόν ¹ -θος, ὄμοιον; latter αὐτῶ		οὐ ¹ -μοιον οὐτ'
[part of + and , , faint.		ἔαυτῷ ¹ ταυτόν ¹ -θος.
140 ένδει ¹ φύσιν, ¹ ταυτόν ¹ -λαμῆν, , , faint.		φύσιν.

A.	TUB.	t.
-θει· ¹ το ἔν· ¹ -θοι, η ἔν· , faint.	τὸ ¹ ἦ τν. last` on *	-ποιθει· ¹ ἔν· ¹ η ἔν· The last ἔν· and its [stop resemble ἔν·
ἔστιν ¹ ταυτὸν εἶναι, faint.	ἔστιν ¹ πεπδνθδς	-νατο̄: ¹ αρα ταυτὸν.
ἔν· ¹ darker, orig. ² -λω.	—	ἔν· ¹ ἀρα c.
-ναι. ¹ -λω. ¹ οὐδει· ¹ -ρόνγεπέ	οὐδὲ μῆν	εἶναι. ¹ ἔαντῷ : c. οὐκ ἔοικεν : c. ¹ γε.
το ἔν· ¹ darker. ¹ οῦτω, ¹ εἶναι.	ἔν· (1) πλεῖον (1) ¹ πλεῖω (2)	οὐτῶ(s) c.
-θδς, η , faint. ¹ -λον. ¹ εἴη.	η	γάρ· τὸ ¹ ἄλλον.
-τῷ. η ἄλλῳ ¹ ταυτό	—	ἄλλῳ. ¹ ταυτό
ἔν ὡς ¹ -θδς ¹ ¹ ἔστιν.	ἔοικεν ¹ ἀνόμοιον gap.	ἔν. ὡς ἔοικεν. ¹ -θδς. ¹ ἔστιν.
οὐτεάντῳ ¹ close and pale ¹ οὐγάρ	—	αὐτῷ c. ¹ ἐτέρῳ : c. ¹ οὐ ¹ ἀνόμοιον.
[οὖν ¹ ¹ -μοιον twice.	—	
-τέρῳ. ¹ ἔαντω	ἴσον οὐθ ¹	ἐτέρῳ c. ¹ ἔαντῷ
ὄν, ¹ ίσον ¹ is fainter. ¹ -ται ¹ -τῷ. πγ̄: ίσον twice ¹ ἀντό. after this	—	ὄν. ¹ ίσ- ¹ ἀντονέονται ¹ ἔαντῷ c. ¹
οὐκόνν. A stain covers φαι and ούκονν ' accident. ' under	—	ἄλλῳ c. ¹ πγ̄: ίσ- πγ̄: begins a line—Δὴ in margin.
[lower half of ἄρα above. ¹ [the ¹ γε.	—	
-τόνων ¹ -τρων.	τοσοῦτον.	ὄν. ¹ τῶν c. αὐτῶν c. ¹ ίσο̄ η̄ :
ἔσται. ¹ σαῦτα, faintish.	οὐκέτι	ὄν. ¹ η̄. τῶν c. ¹ -τόνων,
εἴη. ίσον	ίσον	ἔξει ¹ -μετρον. τῶν c. μὲν ε in μὲν curs.
δὲ ¹ ¹ ίσον (' fainter) μὲν. ἄρα, ¹ -τῷ. τινων οὐθ ¹ line orig. ² ίσον	—	-τρων. τῶν c. δὲ ¹ οὐκοῦν
οὐκόνν. A stain covers φαι and ούκονν ' accident. ' under	—	αὐτῶν. ¹ τῶν c.
[lower half of ἄρα above. ¹ [the ¹ γε.	—	αὐτῶν : c. ἀδύνατ ¹ : ίσ- ¹ ἄρα.
-τόνων ¹ -τρων.	τοσοῦτον.	αὐτῶν c. ¹ ούκονν
ἔσται. ¹ σαῦτα, faintish.	οὐκέτι	
εἴη. ίσον	ίσον	ὄν. ¹ -τόνων. ¹ μέτρων.
δὲ ¹ ¹ ίσον αὐτῷ ¹ fainter.	ίσον αὐτῷ ¹ patched?	εἴη ¹ ¹ εἴσται.
ἔχον. ¹ -λων, ¹ -γων, faint.	τὸ παρὰ- ¹ Orig. ?	μέτρα ¹ εἴη. ίσ- ¹ τῷ c. μετρῷ writing
ἔχον ¹ ποτε ¹ -κεν ίσον. ¹ fainter.	ποτὲ ¹ ίσον	in μέτρα and μετρῷ partly cursive.
μεῖζον. ¹ -τον. ¹ [την , faint.	—	ἔφάνη ¹ ίσον τῷ αὐτῷ
δαί: small and on * ¹ -τερον, ¹ -τερον, ¹ τί δὲ πρ- ¹ τῇ	μετέχον. ¹ -λων. ¹ -γων.	μετέχον. ¹ ποτε οὐσοίκεν ¹ ίσον.
ἔν, ¹ τῷ, ¹ squeezed and pale ¹ τί δὴ γάρ	—	ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ c. ¹ -ττον.
[δηγαρ ¹ ποῦ, , , faint.	—	οὖν. ¹ δὲ ¹ -ώτερον.
ἔχον, ¹ -τῷ, ¹ -λω, ¹ -τος. χρόνου. , , , αὐτῷ ¹ ισότ-	τῷ ¹ εἶναι : τί δη	τῷ ¹ εἶναι : τί δη
] ¹ faint. ¹ roughish.	—	
ξει. ¹ ἔν· faintish.	—	ἔχον. η ἔαντῷ c. η ἄλλῳ. ίσο-
οῦν ¹ ¹ μῆν, fainter. A stain on οτη, ισότ- ¹ οὖν:	—	θέξει ¹ -γομεν. ¹ ἔν·
πῶς and η at end of lines 1, 2, 3.	do.	ισότ- ¹ -έλεγομεν
ισότητος ¹ -έχει. ¹ μεν	εἶναι ¹ ¹ last (=οὐδὲ) on *. gap	p. 15.
ἔσται, faint. ¹ εἶναι.	—	ἀνισότητος c. ¹ -χει.
ἔχειν, τῷ ¹ -τερον ¹ , faint.	—	οὖν c. ¹ ἔσται ιτνο ¹ εἶναι. c.
-τερον ¹ τῇ ¹ το ἔν ¹ αὐτῷ traces of ¹ .	τὸ ¹ αὐτῷ had been ¹	τῷ ¹ -δαρμός: c. ¹ ἀρ' αν ¹ -τερόν γε
ἄρ'	τοπαράπαν ¹ orig. ?	ἔν. ¹ αὐτῷ c.
		ἄλλῳ c. ¹ ἀρ' δύνατάν

A.

TUB.

t.

το ἔν, , fainter. ¹ εἴη. ḡ ¹ χρόνῳ·	τὸ ἦ	ἔν. ¹ εἴη; ḡ ¹ , later. ¹ -κη. ¹ χρόνῳ.
-σθαι: ¹ οὖν,	αὐτοῦ ¹ orig.?	οὐκοῦν
B -Τερον'	—	-τερον. ¹ -τερον:
-μένον. ¹ -νεται. [ou * φδε· i darker.	—	-μένον. ¹ -τερ ¹ -νεται.
ἔχειν, ¹ Πῶς λέγεις: II same ink but πᾶς λέγεις: ὁδε!	—	ἔχειν ¹ πρευβ ¹ φδε· -φορον lower half
-ρου, , fainter. ¹ -σθαι.	—	ἔτερ ¹ -σθαι. [of β patched.
ὄντος. ¹ εἶναι ¹ -νότος. -νέναι.	-νέναι gap [for sense? ὄντος. ¹ εἶναι ¹ -νότος. -νέναι.	—
-λοντος. ¹ -μένον, ¹ -νέναι.	resumes οὐτε μελ- altered οὐτε	-λοντος. ¹ -μένον. ¹ -νέναι c.
λειν ¹ -φορον ¹ -σθαι.	λει, οὐτε on ε is put a pale i	-λειν. ¹ πωτὸ διάφορον. ¹ -σθαι. c.
C γὰρ ἄν: ¹ -τερον. ¹ νεωτέ faint.	—	γάρ: ἀλλά ¹ -τερον.
ἐστίν.	ἐστὶ (1).	ἐστὶ·
-μενον ¹ ἀνάγκη,	—	-μενον.
ἀλλά ¹ χρόνον,	ἀλλά	ἐαντοῦ χρόνον γίγνεσθαι μητ ¹
ἴσον ¹ fainter. ¹ εἶναι.	ἴσον	ἔλαττω ¹ c. ¹ ίσον ¹ ἐαντῷ ¹ εἶναι. clear that c. ~ does not always include i
-νέναι.	-σθαι.	οὖν. [subs.
D ἐστίν ὡς , fainter.	ἐστὶ (1). [had been ?]	ἐστιν ὡς ἔοικεν.
τον ¹ -τῶν, , fainter. ¹ ηλικ- -χειν	αὐτὴν τὲ αὐτὸ * αὐτῷ c. ἥλ-	-τον. ¹ ἔχειν.
ἄμα, , fainter.	ἅμα αὐτοῦ	αὐτοῦ
-λάμψη, . ink? ¹ ἔν, ¹ -μάτων. οὐδὲν	οὐδὲν	ἔν. τῶν c. ¹ παθημάτων * an N erased
-εστιν ¹ · on a scr. [ἡν, ¹ -γονε, αὐτῷμέτεστιν: orig. αὐτὸ	οὐδὲν δῆ. ὡς ¹ λόγος. ¹ οὖν ¹ · on * οὐκοῦν ¹ paler ¹ -γος ἐρει: no	-εστιν.
οὐκόνν δῆ. ὡς ¹ λόγος. ¹ οὖν ¹ · on * οὐκοῦν ¹ paler ¹ -γος ἐρει: no	δῆ ὡσγε ¹ οὖν ¹ γέγονε·	δῆ ὡσγε ¹ οὖν ¹ γέγονε·
-νετο ¹ -νειν, [ἐσται, ¹ -σται,	— [σημ. in marg.	-γνετο·
ε δαὶ αι on *, same hand and ink. ¹ -το; ¹ τιδὲ τὸ ἐσται τὸ broad	-το; ¹ τιδὲ τὸ ἐσται τὸ	δαὶ
-ται ¹ το twice ¹ δῆ ἐστί, all commas -λοντος; ¹ τὸ ¹ ἐστι ¹ τὸ [on *	-λοντος; ¹ τὸ ¹ ἐστι ¹ τὸ	-ται. ¹ ἐπειτα
-ται ¹ το [fainter. -το; ¹ τὸ	—	-ται·
χρόνον ¹ οὐτέποτε γέγονεν ¹ accents on οὐτε ποτὲ ¹ οὐτῆν	οὐτέποτε γέγονεν. ¹ -γνετο ¹ οὐτήν	—
Γούτε fainter. ¹ -νετο.	—	—
ποτε ¹ -νειν ¹ -νεται ¹ οὐτέεστιν ¹	ποτὲ ¹ οὐτέπειτα	ποτὲ ¹ -γονεν ¹ -γνεται ¹ ἐστὶν ¹
-νήστεται ¹ -θήστεται	—	-στεται ¹ -θήστεται·
p. 16. -σχοι, ἀλλως ¹ τί; ;, faint, στασ at the τ;	—	ἀλλως c.
beginning and μ on l. 2 on a stain.	[again] ¹ ἐστι τὸ on *	[wax (?) which has come off.
ἐστι 'faint and rough.	-χα; (will not note this stop	ἔν. ¹ -έχει: -ει on a small spot of
ἐστὶν, ¹ ἥδη, , faint.	ἔν; on * ¹ ἐστιν	ἔν ¹ ἥδη ¹ ἐστὶν ¹ εἰη
δν. ¹ το ¹ ἐστιν οὐτέεστιν, εἰ ¹ , faint.	δν ¹ ἀλλά ¹ ὡς ¹ οὐτε τὸ ¹ οὐτε ἐστιν	δν. ¹ ἀλλά ¹ ὡς ¹ οὐτε τὸ ¹ ἐστιν ¹ εἰη
142 δ δέμη ¹ ἐστιν ¹ '''' fainter.	δαι ¹ κινδ ¹ .. later. ¹ δδε μη ¹ ἐστι	δαι ¹ κινδ ¹ .. later. ¹ δδε μη ¹ ἐστι.
ὄντι, ¹ ἀν τι αὐτῷ, ¹ πᾶς: , fainter.	—	τῷ c. μη ¹ ὄντι, ¹ αὐτῷ: c. ¹ πᾶς: ¹ οὖνα
αὐτῷ ¹ -γος. ¹ -τίμη ¹ -σις	τὶς	αὐτῷ ¹ λόγος ¹ -μη ¹ -θησις ¹ οὐδὲ c.
ἄρα ¹ -γεται ¹	—	ἄρα ¹ λεγεται ¹
-ζεται ¹ -σκεται ¹	—	-ζεται ¹ -κεται ¹ δντων c.
ἔχειν : οὐκοῦν	ηδύνατο οὖν ¹ οὐκοῦν so orig.,	οὐκοῦν
—	—	but altered. αρχῆς ¹ :: opposite οὖν in inner space.
B φανείη ¹ ; , and the other fainter.	—	-θωμεν ¹ φανῆ ¹
οὐκοῦν ¹ ἐστιν.	—	οὐκοῦν ¹ ἐστιν. ¹ αὐτοῦ.
οὗτα ¹ ; , very faint.	τὲ	οὗτα ¹ ταῦτα.

Α.	ΤΙΒ.	τ.	
μὲν, οὖν, , very faint. ¹ ἔνδς. ¹ ἀν ¹ ταυτὸν ἔνι ¹ οὐγάρ ἐκείνη ¹ -στα· οὐδᾶν ¹ ἔν, , λέγειν ¹ εἶναι. καὶ ενει· [faint. καὶ εἰ, εἰ ends page, ν added δὲ. ¹ -θεσις εἰ ἔν ειτι ¹ -νειν ¹ ἔν ἔστιν ¹ ἄλλότι ¹ ἔστι ἄρα οὖν, ἄλλο. ¹ το ἔν, , faintish. ἔπειδάντι συλ- ¹ εἴπη ¹ i subs. seems squeezed in afterwards. ¹ ἔν ἔστιν: -μεν ¹ ἔστιν. ¹ -στατι· -νειν ¹ πῶς: ¹ ἔστι ¹ -γεται· καὶ το ¹ from be- gin. to πῶς: scratch above line. No injury. Dots over text = dele: [] added by me.	ἄρα οἱοντε οὐχ' οἱοντε: 2nd 'added. ¹ οὖν οὐκοῦν ¹ ἀν. οὐδᾶν 2nd 'added. καὶ εἰ, εἰ ends page, ν added later: orig. εἰ? ἔστιν εἰ εἰ έτη last' had been? ² -θεσις εἰ ἔν τι ¹ -νειν. ἄλλει ἔν οὐκοῦν ¹ έστι καὶ: ἀνάγκη: last: crowded έστι; [in later. ¹ τὸ -μενον. ¹ τις ¹ ἔν ἔστιν: λέγομεν ¹ ἔστι· τὸ ἀδε: εἰ τὸ ἔστι : later? ¹ τὸ ¹ [] added by me. οὗτος -γεται, faint ¹ το ¹ ἔνδς· no repetition here. το ἔν ¹ -νον ¹ -μεθα ¹ οὗτος. -κη, , faintish. ¹ ὅλον ¹ αὐτὸ· μόρια, ¹ οὖν, , and the other faint. εἶναι; , added. τούτων ¹ -ροῦμεν ¹ η ¹ ὅλου μόριον, η ¹ -ρον ¹ (2nd) [seems a faint * at ' on ὅλου ἔστι ¹ εν ¹ + latter part fainter—hesita- προσρήτεον: ¹ ἔστιν ¹ ἔνη altered tion between text and ἔνη. οὖν ¹ τούτων, οὖν ¹ -ον: η το ¹ οὐκὰν εἰη πάλιν	ἔστιν ¹ ἄρα ἔνη ¹ -νον οὐν -μεθα τοῦ ἔνδς οὗτος. ἄρα ¹ αὐτὸ· μόρια ¹ το ¹ , οὖν. ἐκάτερο τῶν c. τούτων c. ¹ -ροῦμεν ¹ μόριον ἄρα c. ἔστιν οὐ ἐὰν ἔν γ ἔχει ¹ τι οὖν τῶν c. μορίων c. οὗτος το ¹ , οὖν ἄρα ¹ -πεσθον. ¹ μόρι- ε ον ¹ μορίου; οὐκὰνει ¹ τῶν c. μόριον had been μορίον? A \ through εἰη likely by accident. -τερον. τό, τεῖν ισ- ¹ διν-χιστον. never ε: will not be noted further. αἰεὶ ὅτι περ [* had been ε? -νηται, τούτῳ c. τῷ c. μορίων ¹ τό, ¹ ἔν. -σχει ¹ -μενον. μηδεπ- μὲν οὖν: (both c.) οὐκοῦν ἀπ- ἔοικέγε: ¹ πή ¹ : ἔν. διό ἔστιν; ¹ οὖν ¹ ἐφάνη: τὶ δὴ ¹ ἔν. ο δὴ ¹ καθ' αὐτὸ ¹ -έχειν -στατι ¹ η ¹ το ¹ τούτῳ: ἔν ειδώμεν δὴ, ἄλλοτι ¹ εἶναι, , , fainter. αὐτὸ ¹ ἔν, , and the others fainter. οὐσία, ¹ ἔν ¹ ἔν, τῆς ¹ , , fainter. -ρον ¹ ἄλλο.	βωμεν c. τούτοι. ¹ -χειν. ἀράγε -στατι ¹ τούτῳ: ἔν δὴ ¹ εἶναι ¹ [οὐκοῦν ¹ B αὐτὸ ¹ οὐσίας τὸ ἔν. ἄλλα ¹ -σχει ¹ οὐσία ¹ ἔν ¹ τῷ ἔν ¹ -ρον ¹ εἶναι ¹ ἄλλον ¹ τῷ c. ἐτέρῳ c.
οὖν, , fainter. The οὖν at end and the [ἀν of next line on a stain. αἰεὶ ὅτι περ [and on * -τατ· -τω φῶ-ρίψ ¹ αἰεὶ (2nd) αἰ smaller μηδέποτε τρῆδε i seems squeezed in. ¹ πῆ: ἔν, διό ἔστιν; ¹ το ¹ ; , , fainter. δαῖ ¹ αι on * same hand. ' and com- mas fainter. ¹ ἔν ¹ δὴ φαμὲν ¹ αὐτὸ, καθ' αὐτὸ ¹ -έχειν -στατι ¹ η ¹ το ¹ τούτῳ: ἔν ειδώμεν δὴ, ἄλλοτι ¹ εἶναι, , , fainter. αὐτὸ ¹ ἔν, , and the others fainter. οὐσία, ¹ ἔν ¹ ἔν, τῆς ¹ , , fainter. -ρον ¹ ἄλλο.	τούτῳ '' added? ¹ ἀράγε η ¹ [later. ειδώμην δὴ. ἄλλοτι ε shales, slightly above in outer marg. οὐσία τὸ ἔν, τῷ ε. ends l. [is :: ἄλλο ¹ ε later.	βωμεν c. τούτοι. ¹ -χειν. ἀράγε -στατι ¹ τούτῳ: ἔν δὴ ¹ εἶναι ¹ [οὐκοῦν ¹ B αὐτὸ ¹ οὐσίας τὸ ἔν. ἄλλα ¹ -σχει ¹ οὐσία ¹ ἔν ¹ τῷ ἔν ¹ -ρον ¹ εἶναι ¹ ἄλλον ¹ τῷ c. ἐτέρῳ c.	

A.	TUB.	T.
ἀλλω. ¹ ταυτόν ἐστιν. ¹ ἐνι.	—	ἀλλω. ¹ μὲν οὖν: (both c.) ¹ ταυτόν
οὖν ¹ αὐτῶν, , faint.	—	οὐσίᾳ. ¹ οὖν
στίαν, ¹ το ἔτερον ¹ στίαν, ¹ το ἐν. ¹ το τὸ 3 times	το ἔτερον. [ἐν, , , faint. τὸ	ἔτερον. ¹ ἐν.
νέῳ ¹ -τερα: πῶς: φῦδε.	νέῳ. ¹ later. ¹ ἀδέ εἰστιν	*ῶ* ¹ σθήσ ¹ -τέρω; πῶς: ὥδε.
ἐστίν: ¹ ἄρ' commas fainter.	ἐστιν: ¹ ἄρ' οὖν (last ' later)	ἔτερον: ¹ ἄρα
τί δ' ὅτ' ἄν ¹ ἐν.	ὅταν ¹ τε ¹ ἄρα [οὐχέ- χ ον *]	-τέρω; ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ ἔτερον ¹ ἐν.
οὖν, ¹ ἐν. commas fainter.	οὖν	ἔφ' ἔκαστ' ¹ λέγω; ¹ ὁ δ' ἀν
D δᾶν [mas fainter.]	δᾶςδν last ' added, and so	ἄρα C. ¹ σὺν δύο
-ησθον ¹ οἶόντε, ¹ αὐτῶ εἴναι, com-	ἄρα ¹ αὐτῶ [line 25.]	εἴναι. ¹ ἔκαστον: written under low-
οἶόντε φ δᾶν ¹ ήτον. ἔστι τις μηχανή, δύνχδιόν τε:	[οὐχ, -τερον	[est line of 82 a 2.
εἴναι: ¹ ἄρα ¹ περ οὖν δύο	δυδεμία:	ἔστι τις ¹ δύνχέκ-
εἴναι.	—	—
ἐστι, ¹ ἡτινι latter half of +, the ', δποιον: ¹ ήτινι οὖν συζυγία. ¹ ἐστιν ¹ ὁποιονοῦν ἡτινιοῦν -γίᾳ. ¹ **	[faint. had been ', as for separate words.	ριττὰ.
and the commas fainter. ¹ συ*ξυ-	[faint.	εἰπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ ¹ ἐν. ¹ τῷ ¹ ἐν;
γί*ᾳ, first * = i let., i subs. orig?	[; seems changed from :	The first three words have scratchings.
δὲ, ¹ -ριττὰ; ¹ δύο, all commas faint.	—	δαὶ ¹ -τοιν. ¹ δὶς ¹ τρὶς.
[-των τρὶς; commas fainter.	—	εἰπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ ¹ ἐν. ¹ τῷ ¹ ἐν;
ἐν. ¹ τῷ ¹ παλε and squeezed in. ¹ δὶς ἐν.	[ἐν:	δαὶ ¹ ὕντων.
The words from τε which follows to ἀνάγκη a ⁶ stand in the mid space with <u>l</u> at the end corresponding to a similar mark rather above and before δὶς ὕντοιν, which can hardly be the right reference as the τε runs straight out into the margin after τῷ. Written, I should say, by the scholiast. See Schanz.		δὶς. ¹ εἴναι ¹ τρὶς.
δὶς. ¹ καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρὶς.	τριῶν καὶ τρὶς	δαὶ ¹ ὕντων.
αὐ ¹ , ¹ δαὶ: ¹ αἱ first hand on *, ' fainter. ¹ τὶς δὲ	τὶς δὲ	ὅντων! ὕντοιν! twice! τρία τε δὶς!
[ὅντων, commas fainter.	—	ὅντων = ὕντοιν? my notes dub.
ὅντων! ὕντοιν! -γκη τε, , fainter. ¹ -κητρία addition later.	—	εἴναι. καὶ δὶς τρία; ¹ -τιακις ¹ εἴη.
p 18. ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ¹ εἴη. A stain over εἴη.	καὶ τρία δὶς: ¹ ἄρα ἀρτιάκ-	-τάκις ¹ -τάκις. ¹ -τὰ ἀρτιάκις:
τάκις ¹ twice.	[. , fainter.	ἔστι ¹ οὖν C. ¹ ἔχει. ¹ -σθαι.
οὖν ¹ ἔχει. ¹ -πεσθαι, , fainter.	-ριττα (1st) -τάκις. (gap.)	ἔστιν ἐν.
δὲ ¹ ἀγάγκη ¹ ἐν.	δὲ	ὅντος. πόλλ' ἀν εἴη. καὶ πλῆθος C.
-ναι: ¹ μὴν, ¹ ὕντος. ¹ εἴη.	—	— πειρον τῷ C. ὕντων C. ¹ ἀπειρον
ἡ ¹ -θει,	ἡ	-σίας ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ χει.
σία -ται: ¹ οὖν, ¹ ἔχει, commas	—	— μοδ. ¹ αὐτῆς:
fainter, latter had been a period.	—	-μηται. ¹ οὐδενὸς
B -θμοῦ	—	-τῶν.
ἄρα, ¹ ὕντα, ¹ -μηται. commas fainter.	οὐδενὸς	-ρέσθαι. ¹ γε. ¹ τοι, ἀποτατει: ^{οι} , ink?
-τοιν ¹ -τάτοιν ¹ ἦ	ἢ! μλογον	
-σθαι. ¹ δὴ, ¹ ὕντων, τοῦ -τατει: com-	-τατεῖν:	

A.	TUR.	t.
-όντε ¹ -γιστα, commas fainter.		
όντα ¹ -λιστα'	καὶ μερισταὶ	όντα ¹ πάντων c. -λιστα'
έστι ' fainter. [fainter. ¹ οὐσίας, έστι αὐτῆς·		οὐτω(s): c. [¹ on last έστι = acc.? c
οὖν έστι τι αὐτῶν, '' and commas έστι τι (a leaf out here; no γε οἷμαι έστιν. [γέτι ¹ δὲ		οὖν ¹ έστιντι αὐτῶν c. ὁ έστι ¹ οὐσίας.
αἰεὶ first i on • and darker. ¹ ἢ ἐν αἰεὶ ἔνγει		[gap.) -ρος ¹ ἀλλεπίπερ γε οἷμαι
ἔν. πρόσεστι		αἰεὶ ὥσπερ ¹ ἢ ¹ μῆδεν δὲ.
-μενον, , faintish. ¹ μέρους		μέρει. πρόσεστι τὸ ἐν
ἀρα οὖν, ἐν δν, ἄρα, έστι; ' and έστι τοῦτο		μέρους.
-θρῶ καὶ δρῶ. [all stops faintish.		ἄρα ¹ ον. ¹ έστιν.
γάρ πως	γάρ πᾶς ¹ ἡ μα δπ. μα wide	ἀλλάθρω καὶ δρῶ ¹ ἄρα
-σται. ¹ -στὸν, , fainter.	·ρεσι	ὅλον ¹ πον (so my notes).
-σαῦτα, , fainter.		[on a * μέρισι παρέσται. c. ¹ -στὸν.
		-σαῦτα.
		-γομεν λέγοντες.
-μηται ¹ ὥστα ὡς εοικε accent on ισα ἀλλ'ισα " retouched.		-μηται ἀλλίστα ὡς εοικεν τῷ ἐνι.
-πεται. ¹ οὗτος ¹ -σθον.	οὔτε τὸ (v erased) ¹ ·ισοῦσ-	-πεται ¹ οὗτος ¹ ἀλλεξισοῦσθον.
παραπάντα : dot accidental?	παρὰ	
-σίας.		οὐσίας.
έστεν: ¹ ἐν, ¹ έστιν.		τὸ ἐν ¹ έστιν.
-μένον.		-μένον.
ότιγε ¹ μόρια. πε-	οὖν ¹	μὲν οὖν: both c. ¹ μόρια. πεπερασμε
ἐν ¹ [faintish.		ἐν ¹ [(= μένον?) ¹ 145
-α ¹ μῆν, ¹ -έχον, ¹ εῖη; commas		-έχον.
ον. ¹ έστι πον καὶ (dots ink?) πολλά ¹ ἐντέστι		ον. ¹ τε ¹ πολλά ¹ -λον. ¹ -ρια ¹
δλον. ¹ -ρια ¹ -ρα at end, and a,		
l. 2 on stain.		p. 19.
-σμένον. ¹ ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ	ἀρόνν ^ ^ altered.	
-σμένον ¹ δαί ¹ αι ¹ οιγ.ον ¹ ἔχοι ¹ καὶ c. τὶς δὲ		-μενον ¹ ἀπειρ ¹ ἀρ' οὖν c. οὐκ
μέσον ¹ ἦ ¹ εῖναι ¹ τούτων καὶ τοῦ	ἡγοντέ τι ¹ κάν	-σμέν. ¹ ἔχοι ¹ τὶς δὲ εἰ ὅλον. οὐ καὶ
έπι commas faint. [faint. ητι		τούτων κάν τοῦ [ἀρχὴν ἄν ἔχοι καὶ
δὴ ¹ -την, ¹ -σον, ¹ ἀλλα commas ισικε ¹ ἀλλά		δὴ ¹ ον an o. ¹ -στατη ¹ ¹ ἔπι
μέσον. ὥστον ' faint. ¹ εῖη: οὐ	Ισιον ¹ οὐ (2nd)	δὴ ¹ ὠσέοικεν ¹ μέσον. ¹ ον: ἔχει:
τινος ὡς εοικε ¹ ἐν ¹	εῖ.	μέσον. ¹ τῶν c. ἐσχάτων c. ἀπέχει.
-θέος ¹ η ¹ -λον ¹ [πῶς: commas faint.	ητοι	τινος ὠσέοικεν ¹ ον. ¹ ον: ἐν ¹
ἔχον. ¹ η ¹ twice, had been ἐν ¹ -σται, ¹ δρ' ¹ ον έαυτ ¹ έν μλλω:		-θέος ¹ -γύλον.
-στον, ἐν ¹ έστιν, commas faint.	ἐν ¹ έστι	ἀρ' ¹ ἔχον. ¹ ἀλλω: πῶς:
μέρη, ¹ καὶ μην commas faint.	μήν	ἐκαστον, ον τῷ c. ὅλφ c. έστιν. ¹ ολον:
αὐτοῦ ¹ έστι ¹ οὐτετὸ π ¹ -τον. η ¹	μέρη τοῦ αὐτοῦ ¹ τὸ πλέον ¹ η ¹	μέρη.
οὐ γάρ:	οὐ ¹ έστι ¹ δδν:	αὐτοῦ ¹ έστιν ¹ οὐτέτι πλέον ¹ -τον.
όντα ¹ ον, , faint.		οὐκοῦν ¹ ον έστι ¹ : c.
-λον ¹		όντα ¹
εν ¹ , , faint.		-λον ¹ πάντα.
-τοι, , faint. ¹ αὐ ¹ έστιν ¹ -σιν.		εν ¹ καὶ οὗτος ἀν ήδη τὸ ον ¹ έαυτῷ c.
εν ¹ τινι ¹ -σιν. ¹ ον.	εν ¹ τινι	αὐ ¹ μέρεσιν έστιν ¹ πᾶσιν.
-κὰν ¹ ένγε ¹ εῖναι	κὰν ¹ ένγε	εν ¹ τινι ¹ πᾶσιν. ¹ ον τινὶ ¹ ον.

A.	ΤΙΒ.	E.	
ἐστὶν ¹ μὴ ἐν· ἔντοι twice ¹ εἴη·	ἴστιν ¹ πᾶσι δν	-των C. ἔστιν ¹ ενί·	
μὴδὲ twice, but ¹ on μὴ faintish ¹ ὅλον ¹ πλεστιν	—	ἔν τινι τῶν C. μερῶν ¹ C. ἔν τινι εἴη.	
E commas faint. δν ¹ αὐτῷ ἔστιν.	—	τῷ C. εἴη. ὅ ἔστιν ¹ ἀδύνατό γάρ:	
ἡ* ¹ το ἐν, ὅλον. ἐν ¹ ἔστιν ¹ faint.	ἥμεν ¹ τὸ δὲ ¹ οὐ altered to ¹ ἔστιν ¹	πλείοσιν. μὴδ' ¹ μὴδ' ¹ ὅλον.	
ἡ* ¹ -νει ¹ ἔαυτῷ	ἡ ¹	εῖναι, C. εῖναι : C. οὐκοῦν	
αυτό ¹ εαυτῷ	αὐτὸ ¹ εαν-	δν ¹ δν. αὐτῷ ἔστιν.	
ἐν ¹ ἄρ ¹ -κη ¹ -σθαι, πῆ ¹ :	ἄρ ¹ ^ altered.	ἐν, δλον ¹ ἔστιν ¹	
146 ἔστιν ¹ ἐν γάρ ἐνι δν, εἴη ¹ αἰ ¹ εἰ δν, * slight., fainter.	ἐνι	μέρει ¹ -χάνει ¹ ἔαυτῷ ¹ δν.	
που ¹ δαι ¹ αι on *	[εῖναι: ἔστος δήπου, ἀν ¹ αἰει ¹ τιδε ¹	ἔαυτῷ C. [που.	
δν, οὐτὸ ¹ -τίον ¹ μὴδέπ- twice. ¹ ταυτῷ μηδέπ- twice.	τὸ ¹ αὐτῷ ¹ πatched?	ἐν. ἄρα ¹ -τάναι; πῆ ¹ : ἔστηκεν μέν αὐτῷ ¹ δν ¹ -βαῖνον.	
p. 20. μὴδὲ ἔστάναι ¹ -σθαι ¹ : το ἐν at μὴδὲ εσ- patched? twice. ¹	[beginning and ἀ of 2 on stain. τὸ ¹ [been,	εἴη ¹ ἐν ἔαυτῷ ¹ : C. αὐτῷ C. δν.	
έτέρωι αἰει ¹ i of αι on *	τὸ τὲ ¹ αἰει ¹ δει ¹ twice ¹ ἔστι. had	δν ¹ -στάναι: C.	
B καὶ μὴν ταυτόγει ¹ ``faint. ¹ -τοῦ·	—	ἔαυτῷ C. -τοῦ.	
-τω ¹ ταυτόντε ¹ εῖναι.	—	ώσταῦτω ¹ εῖναι.	
πῶς ¹ πρὸςάπαν, ταυτόν ἔστιν. [ώς πονθε ¹ : δπ. θε ¹	πῶς ¹ δδε ¹ ἔχει ¹ ἔστιν ¹ . ἔτερ ¹ .		
ἡ ¹ ταυτὸν γ, μὴδέτερον ¹ -του, ἔχει, μηδέτερον	ἡ ¹ ἔτερον. ἔχει. ἡ	ἀρ ¹ ἔστιν ¹ ; [αὐτοῦ?	
μέρος ¹ ἄρ ¹ οὐδν, το ¹ ἔστιν ¹ , , fainter.	τὸ ¹ αὐτοῦ ¹ πatched ¹ ἔστιν ¹ :	αὐτὸδάντοῦ ¹ εἴη. αὐτὸα had been	
μέρος ¹ , εἴη, fainter.	οὐδάρα αὐτοῦ ¹ πatched	ἄρα	
ἄρα	ἄρα	οὐκ ἄρα	
C εἴη ¹ -ρον, , fainter. [fainter.	—	-λον ¹ ἔστιν ¹ εῖναι C.	
-λον ¹ , -ρος ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -κη ¹ ταυτὸν, αὐτὸν πρὸς ἔαυτό [ἴαυτοῦ ¹ δντο ¹	ἔαυτῷ ¹ τί δὲ ¹ αὐτῷ C.		
δαι ¹ -τοῦ ¹ αὐτῷ δντο ¹ . αι and φ τιδε ¹ οὐτέρω ¹ pale, blotted.	ἔαυτῷ ¹ είναι.	ἔαυτῷ ¹ είναι.	
-τῷ ¹ εῖναι ¹	[on * :- in outer marg.	ἐν ¹ ἔαυτῷ C.	
ἐν ¹ εν ¹ ἄρα.	αὐτὸ ¹ τὲ ¹ εν ¹ δν ¹ πatched	ἄρα οὐτέρου ¹ -τοῦ,	
ἄρα οὐς ἔαικεν	[ἔστιν ¹ -τος, ἔαυτοῦ C. ends line.	ἐν ¹ οὐν ει τουτὶ [C. μὴ ἐν:	
D οὐν ¹ ει τού τὶ and commas fainter. ¹ ταυτὶ ¹ οὐχ'-τ- 2nd ¹ added.	ταυτὶ ¹ οὐχ'-τ-	οὐν δσα μέρη ἔστιν, πανθ ¹ τὸ ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ ἔστιν. ἀπανθ ¹ ενδ ¹ ἐν. τῶν	
ἔστιν ¹ οὐδ ¹ , το several accs. and οὐν δσα as well as commas, fainter.	—	breaths.,	
δη ¹ fainter. ¹ ταυ-	τῶν δν τῶν δλλων; ξερον: τῶν C. δη ¹ ταυ-	τῶν C. δη ¹ ταυ-	
ἄρα	ἄρα ¹ ή [dark added. δησι ¹ ξερο ¹ :	ἄρα ¹ -λοις: [c.	
ταυτὸν ¹ ποτε ¹	ποτε ¹	ξερο ¹ ή ξερον έν ταυτῷ C. ποτε είναι:	
ταυτῷ ¹ -ται ¹ οὐδένεστι	—	ταυτῷ C. μηδέποτ ¹ ἔσται. οὐδέν έστι ¹	
F ἔστιν ¹ εἴη, ἐντῷ , fainter.	ἔστι ¹ δντιν ¹	έστι ¹ -ρον ¹ εἴη. ἐν τῷ [οῦτων C.	
ταυτῷ ¹ -ρον ¹	—	χρόνον ¹ -τερον ¹ οὐχοῦτω; οῦτω:	
ἔστιν ¹ .	—	τῷ αὐτῷ ¹ ἔστιν ¹ τῶν C.	
ἐν ¹ εν ¹ οὐγάρ	οὐτάρα 2nd ¹ pale. ¹ εν δη ¹	ἐν ¹ ένι εἴη ¹ οὐ	
ἐτέρω ¹ i subs. faint. ¹ μὴ ἐν ¹ faint. ¹ γδν ¹ εν ¹ (2nd) ¹ μὴ ιούγαρ	τῷ C. ξερόφ C. έν. τῶν C. μὴ έν ¹ έν, <td>τῷ C. ξερόφ C. έν. τῶν C. μὴ έν¹ έν,<td>αλλήλων. [ξερόφ.</td></td>	τῷ C. ξερόφ C. έν. τῶν C. μὴ έν ¹ έν, <td>αλλήλων. [ξερόφ.</td>	αλλήλων. [ξερόφ.
ἀν [τὰμη a at end = maj. curs. -ρδν	αὐτοῖς	έαυτοῖς ξερα ¹ ἔστιν ¹ "patched. ¹ τῷ C.	
147 ἔστι ¹ , fainter. ¹ -ρω ¹	—	ἀν ηδη ¹ έκφύγοι ¹ είναι C. αλλήλων:	
-γοι ¹ -λων ¹ ἀλλα	έκφύγοι ¹ -φεύγ ¹ άλλα	έκφ- last κpatched—had begun φ?	

॥.	ΤΙΒ.	τ.
ἡν̄ ἀλλὰπῆ ' on ἐν before ἡν fainter τῷ gap. οὐδᾶν̄ τὰμη̄ οὐδεγάρ̄ ἡν̄ [twice.]		η̄. ἀλλά πῆ last faint.
-πασιν̄ οὐγάρ̄ δαῑ(*) ἐνδ̄ς ἄρα οὐ γάρ οὖν̄: τί δὲ ἐστιν̄. ἡ καν̄ ἔν̄: [,, fainter. ἡ καν̄		οῦ γάρ οὖν̄: τί δὲ̄ ἄρα ἐστιν̄ ἡκαν̄ ἐνδ̄ς. ἔν̄: παν- [όλον̄.
-τῇ, ἐστιν̄ ἐν̄ μη̄ ἐν̄ εἰη̄ δλον̄, μὴ (2nd) μορίον̄ twice. -φ and -a ending II. οὐτε αὐτὰ . . . νὸς μορίοῡ ἐν̄ μόριᾱ δλα. last u p. 21.		-τῇ ἐστιν̄ ἐν̄ τῶν c. μὴ ἐν̄ εἰη̄ δλα.
ι and 2 on a stain.	repeated. [marg. :: very like οὐ.	
-ριᾱ δλᾱ	between line 1 and 2 in outer τῷ c. δλα.	
-λων̄ ταῦτα	ταῦτα c. ends line. τὰ αὐτὰ	
τὸ̄ ἔχον̄, το̄ αὐτούς; ἄρα , fainter. τῷ ends line. ἔχον τὸ̄ αὐ-		τὰ μὴ̄ ἔχον̄. -τοῖς: ἄρα ώς
-τοῦ καὶ ταυτὸν̄	ἴοικ̄ ἐστὶ	ἴοικεν̄ τῶν c. ἀλλων̄ c. ἐστὶν̄.
-νεύεῑ ἄρ̄ οὐν̄ , fainter.		[τοῖς: δρ̄] [-τοῦ̄ τὲ c ἀλλοῖς: τῶν c.
-μοιον̄	[fainter. ἵστως: γοῦν̄	ἀλλῶν c. ἐφάνη. καὶ τᾶλλαπον̄. ἐτερ̄ εἰη̄: οἰκοῦν̄ 7=δὲ, after τᾶλλα ἵστως is above—thus γ̄ ἵστως:
-νη̄ καὶ τᾶλλα accents on τᾶλλα		τῶν c. ἀλλων̄ c. τᾶλλα -νοῡ
-λων̄ τᾶλλα fainter.		ἵπτον̄: τί γαρ: εἰ̄ -τον̄ δμοίως: [οὐκ οὖν c.
μᾶλλον̄, ἡττον̄ , fainter.	ἵπτον̄ δμ-	έτερον̄ τῶν c. -λων̄ ώσαντως.
ἡ̄ εἶναῑ τᾶλλα -νοῡ, -τως , fine.	ἡ̄ θε	ταυτὸν̄ τό̄, λοις.
ταυτὸν̄ εἰεῑ -λοις. τᾶλλα	θότα· εἰ ἐν̄ τᾶλλα	δδε
-μάτων,		
οὐν̄ ἡ ἄπαξ̄:	ἡ	οὐν̄ -κις. ἡ ἄπαξ̄:
οὐν̄ εἰπγ̄.	οὐπερ̄	οὐν̄ εἰπγ̄.
τούνομᾱ έαν̄ -λάκις̄ ἔκεινο̄ ἡ̄ ἄπαξ̄,	έστι τούνομᾱ 2nd 'patched.'	-νομᾱ -κις. οὐκ ἔκεινο̄ ἡ̄
ταυτὸ̄ -ξη̄ σταυτὸ̄ ἀ*εί̄:	άε̄ :	[έαν̄ -ξη̄ τὸ αὐτὸ̄ αἰε̄:
; , differs. ὅτ' ἀν̄	τιν̄ι δταν̄	οὐκοῦν̄ ἐτερον̄ τιν̄:
-γη̄ -παξ̄, -κις̄, -λφ̄, -λότι	φθέγη̄	-γη̄ -κις̄.
-ξεῑ, -γωμεν̄,	δταν̄	-ξεῑ, ἡ κείνο
τᾶλ̄ - patched! ἐνδ̄ς. το̄ -λων̄	τᾶλλᾱ τὸ ist.	ετερον̄ τᾶλλᾱ ἐνδ̄ς τῶν c. ἀλλων̄ c.
-τεῑ, -λγ̄, -γομεν̄	ἐπεκείνη	-τεῑ, ἀλλγ̄ αἰε̄ -μεν̄
τούνομᾱ; ἡ̄ ἐν̄ , , differ.	τούνομᾱ:	-νομᾱ, ἡ̄ ἐτερον̄ τῶν c. ἀλλῶ
τᾶλ̄ - ἐνδ̄ς, κατάταυτὸ̄ ἐτερον̄ -θέναι, τᾶλλᾱ (in marg. later hand		τᾶλλᾱ ἐνδ̄ς. καταταυτὸ̄ ἐτερον̄ πε- 138 πονθέναι. ἀλλο. In outer marg. faint and careless πεπονθεν̄ εἶναι
[οὐκάλλο. , differ. gives πέπονθεν̄ εἶναι]		
ταυτὸν̄		ταυτὸν̄ -θδος,
-ον̄ οὐχί̄: ἡ̄ 'patched?	οὐχί̄; 'later' ἡ δη̄	-ο̄. οὐχί̄: ἀλλων̄ c. εἶναι. c. κατάταυτὸ
ἀλλασ̄ τῷ δμοίψ̄ οὐν̄ 'dark.	ἀλλά μ̄ ends line.	γάρ. -τῶν c.
ἀλλαμῆν̄, -φάνη̄ ἐν̄.	ἀλλά τὸ ἐν̄	ἀλλῆν̄ δμοισ̄. τῶν c. ἀνομοίων c.
ταυτόν̄: τούν̄ ταυ-	ταυτὸν̄: τούν̄ ἐστὶ	-τίον̄: (not τῷ ούψ̄) οὐκοῦν̄ -ρον̄.
		τῷ αὐτῷ: -νη̄ τὸ ἐν̄ τοῖς. ταυτ̄ [by same hand in margin.
		ἐστὶν̄ τὸ αὐ-

A.

TUB.

t.

ἡ^{*} ἔτερον
ἡ ἄρα ταυτὸν.¹ τουν-
άνομοιώστ
εἴ ἄρα ταυτὸν.

πάνυγε: ἡγε ^ dark.
ἡ ^ added. τούν. ^ added.
ῶμοιοῦδέ —
—

-λοις. ^ ἔτερο¹ τῶν c.¹ -τερον.
-άνη¹ ταυτὸν.¹ ἔσται.
όμοίου
τὸ ταυτόν,¹ τῷ c. ἔτέρῳ: c.

p 22. C -λοις: η^{*} μενέτερον. ὄμοιον¹ η^{*} δὲ ανομοίεσται ov later¹ μὲnd ends -τερον. ὄμοιο¹ ταυτόν.
ταυτὸν. ἀν- at beginning on stain. [line.

δῆ ὠσέοικεν [θέναι¹ -κε
τίνα: ἡ ("darker) ταυτὸν πέποιθε,¹ ἡ
-θὸς.¹ -μοιον¹ μη¹ δὲ . ink?¹ η^{*} ἥδλλο
[" dark.
-θεν. -λοῖον¹ ὅν.¹ ταυτόντε. . ink?¹
ἐν "dark¹ ἔστι

ον
πάνυγε: ἡγε ^ dark.
ἡ ^ added. τούν. ^ added.
ῶμοιοῦδέ —
—

-λοις. ^ ἔτερο¹ τῶν c.¹ -τερον.
-άνη¹ ταυτὸν.¹ ἔσται.
όμοίου
τὸ ταυτόν,¹ τῷ c. ἔτέρῳ
[πεποι-

D καὶ¹ οὐκοῦν

-τῷ i darker and crowded in both ταυτὸν ἐαντῷ 2nd half of ω ὠσαῦτως.¹ ταυτὸν
[cases. -τως¹ -τοῦ¹ ταυτὸν dark on *

-φάνη¹ -τερα,¹ -τερον¹-τερον.¹ οὐκοῦνωσαῦτως.¹ ταυτὸν

-νη¹ καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον¹ Mark = a,
or only a stop cancelled? μοιον
φανήσεται: centred below last line
83 a 2.

τί διὰ δῆι ai darker on *¹ μη
πέρι¹ ἔχει¹ ἐαντῷ, , dark and fine.

ἐν; , dark and fine.

E η^{*} -λοις.¹ ἀν¹ η^{*}-λων. -γοιτο, -σθαι¹ ἀν.

το¹ αὐτοῦντε ' or ? patched.¹ ἀπτοι
δᾶι(*τῆδε¹ ἀρ¹ τίνος'

-νῳ, ¹ ἀπτεσθαι,ἔδρα¹ ἡ " differ.¹ το ἐν ἄρα-σθαι¹ εχομ-

-νης. ὢ i dark and crowded in:¹ κ- ἑκίν (end) ἐν η αὐτό¹ ἔστι:¹
[γάρ¹ ' seems orig.

149 -σει ἐν ἀν ταῦτα.¹ δᾶν¹ ἐν.οὐγάρ¹ ἐνι, ¹ εἰναι. , . fine and dark.ὅτι φαμὲν,¹ -σθαι¹ ὅν.εἰναι,¹ -σθαι¹εἰναι. (1st)¹ ἔανB ὕροιν,¹ ἔξ ἥ¹ ἔσται¹ἀ*ει¹ -μενον¹-νεται¹μιά¹ εἰναι¹ Γάρ¹ δύο,τί δὲ περὶ¹ αὐτοῦ¹ μη

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

δῆ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων¹ c.πέρι¹ ἔχειὅρφ¹ ὁρθός: c. οὐκοῦν¹ ἐν:-λοις. τῶν c.¹ ἐαντῷ c.

αὐτοῦ

τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ τὸ¹ ἀπ-τί¹ δε τηδε¹ δρα οὐ a / almostτηδε¹ ἀρ¹ τίνος,

hid in in. marg., no note.

-δραν¹ καὶ μετ' ἀκείνην ἡἔδρα, η διν κείταις ἀπτεται:¹ τὸ¹ ἔδρα¹ -τεται¹ ἄρααὐτοῦ had been¹-σθαι -ξῆς¹ μετὰ αὐτὸ¹ -ραν¹

κείσθαι

-σθαι¹ εχομ--νης. ὢ i dark and crowded in:¹ κ- ἑκίν (end) ἐν η αὐτό¹ ἔστι:¹[γάρ¹ ' seems orig.-σειεν δη¹ δᾶνοὐγάρ¹ ἐνι, ¹ εἰναι.ἀλλοῦδ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλ-ὅτι φαμὲν¹ ἀψασθαι¹ ὅν. [εἰναι : c.εἰναι¹ ἀπτεσθαι¹ αὐτῶν c. μέσῳ¹ὅλιγιστον εἰναι.¹ εἰναι : c.ὅροιν.¹ -νηται¹ ἔξης¹ ἔσται¹δύο : αἰει¹ -μένον¹.-γνεται¹ τῶν c. ὁριθμῶν. c.εἰναι¹ -τησε τῶν ἄψ-

A.	ΤΙΒ.	T.
-λων, ¹ -θμὸν, ¹ ἄψεις.	τιω	εων, ¹ ἄψεις.
-νεται.	—	πᾶς.
-θμὸν, ἀεὶ	ἴστι! αἰεὶ	ἴντετῷ C. ¹ -νεται. C
ἴστιν, last δὲ seems patched: parch- ment worn and stained.	ἴστι·	ὅσα a very like οὐ ¹ -μὸν αἰεὶ. ἴστιν.
ἴστιν. ¹ οὐκὰν! οὐνφαμὲν! ἐνδ., faint.	—	ἴστιν. ¹ εἴη! οὐκοῦν φαμὲν! ἐνδς.
ἴστιν. ¹ ἄλλα ἔστιν! ἐν ' rough : ἐν ἴστιν, ¹ γάρ : οὐ [patched?]	ἴστιν!	ἴστιν! ¹ αὐτοῦ! ¹ ἄλλα ἔστιν! ¹ ἐν
ἐνόντος had been ἐν δ?	ἴστιν! ἐν δυντος	ἴστιν! ἄλλοις. ἐνός μὴ ὅντ ^ο τάλλα.
-λα·! δύο·	οὐτ̄ δρα	-νομα, ¹ ἐν·! οὐκὰν
ἄρα, , faint. ¹ ἔστιν ἐν. ¹ δυάς.	οὐδὲν:	ἴστιν! τῶν C.
ἴστιν. ¹ οικέστιν:	ἴστι	-τεται, ¹ τάλλα! ἐνδς·! οὐ
-τεται. ¹ ἐνδς·! οὐγάρ	οὐ γάρ	ταῦτα. ¹ τῶν C. ¹ -τοῦ.
ταῦτα, ¹ ἐν·! -λων.	—	—
οὐχάπτεται: εῖκεν: ¹ ὥρον :::: eras. δρ' οὖν καὶ ισόν::: ίστι! αὐτῶ of 4 (?) letters like εστ +?) ¹ αὐτῷτε i squeezed in.	ίστιν! αὐτῶ [τε	ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ιστον ἔστι! -σον.
πῶς! τάλλα! -τον η αὐτὰ ἄλλα, <td style="text-align: center;">τάλλα! η αὐτά· ἄλλα·</td> <td>[λα ἄλλους; πῶς!: τὰ ἄλλα. ¹ -τοι! τάλ-</td>	τάλλα! η αὐτά· ἄλλα·	[λα ἄλλους; πῶς!: τὰ ἄλλα. ¹ -τοι! τάλ-
η -τω· ἄρα! τάλλα	δρ οὐκ! τάλλα· ἄλλα	-ττω· ἄρα οὐκὰν! τὸ ἐν,
-λα! ἐνδ., οὐτέτι μείζω. οὐτέτι ἄλλο, ¹ οὔτε τι ἄλλο δι.	—	ἐνδς· οὐτέτι! οὐτέτι ἐλάττω! -λων.
—	[-λων.]	-τερα.
ἴσα! -θος,	ισό-! ισα	ἔχοιεν. ¹ μὲν μέγεθο
-τητα· η! το ἐν, ¹ τάλλα, δ , faintish. η! το! τάλλα·	—	δε -τητα! ἐν, ¹ τάλλα.
-εῖη. ¹ εἴη.	—	-σείη. ¹ εἴη.
-κρότης. ¹ ἔστον τετινε	τέτινε	-κρότης. ἔλαττο: οὐκοῦν! τούτωει, δη.
—	δυτεγε	[τό, had been τούτω τῷ εἶδο?
εἴτην,	—	οὐτεγε.
ἀν! αὐτοῦ ἐν εἴη:	ητοι! η	εἴτην.
-γνοιτο, ¹ η! διό	gap.	—γνεται! ¹ ἀν.
η ἄρ' οὖν, , had been .	δή:	-γνοιτο·
μένουσα! ἐνι, ¹ αὐτῷ εἴη. ¹ subs. εἴσουσαν μένουσα! ιση	ισην τῷ εἴναι.	εἴη! ¹ ἄρ' οὐκ
τῷ, , fainter. [squeezed in.	ισό-	ίσουν! ἐνι. ¹ εἴη.
τινὸς! -τητος, , fainter.	[and pretty large.	τῷ εἴναι
ἐνι the, of ; differs.	ισν.	τινὸς! -τητος·
-της. ἀλλέι περ! οὐτέγε! δέμηταῦ-	εν έσται	τῆς: ¹ τῷ C. ἐν. οὐκὰν
ποιήσῃ ¹ subs. squeezed. ¹ το δλον! -σαι τῷ ιση	εν έσται	—της. ἀλλέιπερ ἐν μέρει: οὔτι! τῷ C.
ἀκεὶ! ἐν έσται! -της. [έσται, ¹ -ρους. αἰεὶ οὐδενὶ	δυτι	—μέρει! μὴ ταῦ-
-ρει. ¹ οὐδετὶ! -κρδν.	—	τα ποιήσει! δλον! η*μείζων! -ρους.
—	—	αἰεὶ! οὐδενὶ! τῶν C. οἵτων C. ¹ -της.
-τῷ! ἀντί! ἄλλο·! -θους	—	μήτε ἐν δλ-! -κρδν.
-είη! αὐτῷ isqueezed. ¹ οὐτος! ἀνάγκη	—	-τῆς τῆς σμ-
		ἄλλο! αὐτοῦ C. -θους.
		μέγεθος ἐκείη! οὐτος.

p. 24. κη -έχειν.¹ δὲ. -νατον¹ remains of κη
of ἀνάγκη on a stain and tear.

ἀλλα¹ -γεθος.¹ -ζον.
-τητος¹ οὐδὲ¹ -τον.
οὐγάρ¹ ένδος.¹ -τω.
D -θος¹ ἔχοντα¹ αὐτῷ τούτῳ¹ το¹ ἔχε¹
-σθαι.
-λω¹ αὐτῷ έν τούτοιν.¹ ἄν¹ εἴη
δύν¹ ἄρ¹ οὖν.
-ζον,¹ -λων,¹ νων, , fainter.
-έχειν.¹ -σθαι:
-χον,¹ -μενον.¹ -κη,¹ εἶναι¹ δν.
E ιτον
ἔχοι, , fine.
-χοιτο.¹ -τοῦ¹ ιτον
ἄρα.¹ ιτον
καὶ¹ αὐτό τε¹ δν, , fine.
μὲν.¹ εἴη¹ δὲ.

151 -κη.
ἀλλα¹ δε,¹ ἀεί¹ έν

τῷ, δν,¹ δν.
οὐ¹ ένδος.
τῷ, εἶναι.¹ εἶναι
B -λα,¹ έν.¹ το¹ εἶναι:
ένεστιν¹ ένδος.
αὐτό¹ το¹ -λων
έν¹ -λων¹ -γον,
εἴη¹ -λα¹ -τω; : ον^{*} το¹ ιτόντε, ἐλάττω. ξουκε: τὸ¹ ισ-
-ζον¹ έστιν¹ -τοῦ¹ καὶ
-ζον,¹ -τον,¹ ιτον¹ -τρων, , , fine.
C -νων,¹ -τόνων¹ αὐτῷ¹ -τρων.
δν,¹ -όνων, , fine.

p. 25.
-νων.¹ αὐτοῦ
-λων¹ ιτον¹ ταῦτα: πῶς:
έστι¹ ποι.¹ -τρων.¹ με on stain.
ιτον.¹ ταῦτα:
ιτον.¹ -τρων, , faint.
D πλειόνων, , faint.¹ αὐτῷ¹ -τρων.

αὐτῷ ιτον¹ αὐτῷ
δέπλεον¹ δὲ.¹ αὐτοῦ:

TUB.

ἀλλά.
οὐδὲ
[τω οὐγάρ¹ οὐδὲ δλ-
D -θος¹ ἔχοντα¹ αὐτῷ τούτῳ¹ το¹ ἔχε¹
-σθαι.
—

οὐδε δλ-
οὐν¹ ἄρ¹ patched.
μήτ' ελάτ- ist added?

ἔξιστον twice
Ιτον¹ καὶ μὴν
οὐθὲν 2nd added?
οὐτ' οὐ "added? έξιστον ιτον
— [and next line.]

περτ * added?

αὐτῷ* from orig. τοῦ, later.

αἰει¹ έν¹ 'patched from '

τῷ ισο: 'later¹ δν.
οὐ¹ έστι¹ ένός.
τῷ εἶναι;
τὸ¹ μῆδ.
ένεστι.
τὸ δὲ θλατ-

έλάττω. ξουκε: τὸ¹ ισ-
αὐτοῦ had been'
Ιτον. Ιτως δν
αὐτῷ
δος: ιτον

αὐτοῦ had been'
Ιτοναδ.
ποῦ.
Ιτ-
Ιτονιτων

Ιτ.
—

-έχειν. έάνπερ¹ μέγα.¹ -νατον.
t.

μεῖζ.
-τητος¹ -της.¹ -ττον.
-θούς: οὐ¹ τᾶλλα¹ οὐδὲ -τω.
-τα,¹ τούτω,¹ ἔχετον
[τδ -μιν.¹ -σθαι: c. αλλὰ [εἴη.
-λω¹ τούτοιν.¹ τῶν c. ἀλλων c. οὐδ'¹

οὐκοῦν¹ ἄρ¹
τῶν c. ἀλλων, c.
-σθαι¹ οὐκοῦν
-μεν.¹ -κη.¹ ίσου εἶναι¹ δν.
έαυτῷ οὐτω c.
ἔχοι¹ τῷ¹ έχον.
[τῷ:
οὐτ' οὐ "added? έξιστον ιτον
-χοιτο.¹ -τοῦ¹ ἀλλ'¹ δν. ιτον αἰει εἴη
έαυτῷ c.¹ -λοις.

-ται: c.¹ αὐτόγει¹ δν.¹ έξωθ¹
μὲν.¹ εἴη. -χόμενον c.¹ -τον

εἴη.¹ έαυτ.¹ οὐκοῦν
τόδε, -κη¹ -τός.¹ τῶν c. ἀλλων: c.
δεῖ.¹ αἰει¹ οὐκοῦν¹ έν έν τῷ had been
[έν τῷ, signs of change but no *.

τῷ¹ ἐλαττον οὐν.
ἐπειδὴ¹ τῶν c. ἀλλων c. έιδε.
έν τῷ (as above) εἶναι.¹ εἶναι.
ένι.¹ -λοις¹ εἶναι:
-στιν¹ τᾶλλα¹ ένός.
αὐτῷ¹ έν.¹ -λων -μεν.
τᾶλλα¹ έν.¹ αὐτ¹
εἴη.¹ -ττω: ξουκεν: c.
έστιν¹ τῶν c. ἀλλων: c.
ιτον.
αὐτῷ c.¹ -λοις.¹ -τρων.
πῶς δ' has been πωσο and put above
[ο, ends line.¹ ιτων ἄρα

εἴη.¹ τῶν c.
ἀλλων c.¹ ιτον.¹ πῶς:
έστιν.¹ -τρων καὶ
-τον. ὁσαύτωσ¹ ιτον.
οὐκοῦν¹ -ξ¹ ιτον.
ἐλαττόν αὐτῷ¹ from ατ to αι a stain
scraped, ν very faint.¹ -τρων¹ πῶςδ'
(as above c).
αὐτῷ¹ πλῆθο αὐτῷ εἴη
δὲ πλέον¹ ἐλαττόνων c. δὲ c.¹ αἰτιέ.

A.

	TUB.	
-τᾶλλα ¹ ἐν.	τάλλα traces of ¹ έξει	
-νεται·	—	
-τερον. -τον ¹ ἵσον -θει	ἵσον twice (cease to note, — [save change).	
αῦ ὡς ἔσικε τὸ ἐν. ¹ ἵσον	αὐτὸ τὲ ¹ τῶν ἀλλων έσ-	οὔτω δὴ αῦ ὡστοῖκεν τὸ ἐν. καὶ ἵσο
αὐτοῦ	αὐτὸ τὲ ¹ τῶν ἀλλων έσ-	τ̄ -μδν. ¹ καὶ, τῶν C.
ἀρ' ¹ dark, patched? ¹ ἐν, ¹ ἔστι ¹ ἀρ' ¹ έστιγε	[-γνεται, -ρόν γε ¹ αὐτὸ τὲ	ἀρ' ¹ ἐν.
ἄλλων,	[-γνεται, -ρόν γε ¹ αὐτὸ τὲ	αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν C. ἄλλων; C.
-τερον ¹ twice. ¹ -τοῦ, ¹ -λων,	ἔ*χον;	τῶν C. ἄλλων. C.
πῶς: ¹ ἐν ἔστιν; ¹ εἰναι,	ἐν ἔστι:	πῶς: ¹ -χει. ¹ ἔνέστι: 'patched.' ¹ εἰναι.
ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ¹ first part of added. ¹ άλλοτι ἔστιν, ¹	άλλοτι ἔστιν, ¹	ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ¹ -τος.
[σίας, ¹ -όντος,		
-θότος ¹ αὐτο ἔσται, ¹ -λοντος.	ἡν τοῦ παρ-	-θότος ¹ -ντος
—	ἴστι	-νία; ¹ μετέχειν ¹ -νου.
ἄκει in the two ; the , differs from : αἰεὶ	—	εἰναι; C. οὔκοῦν ¹ αἰεὶ
-τοῦ.	—	πρόέρχεται
οὖν, -μεθα·	ἀρ' ¹ νεώτερον	ἀρ' ¹ -μεθα ¹ -μένου.
—	—	-ρον· πρεσβύτερ ¹ οὔκοῦν
ἐν. ¹ -μένου,	—	-τερ ¹ ἐν. ¹ -τοῦ.
γίγνοιτο: ¹ meant? [lighter.	—	[ἀρ'
-ρον ἀν τοῦ, οὔτω; ¹ -τερον. ἀρ' ¹ , , διν τοῦ ¹ added. ¹ ἀρ' ¹ οὐχ' δταν	αὐτοῦ (2nd v patched) οὔτω: ¹ -τερον.	
ἔσται.	[dark. ¹ οὐ ¹ — [last 'added.	χρόνο ¹ -μενον ¹ ἔσται;
ἔπειτα, ὑπερβαστεται junction at * ὑπερβοή ¹ οὐ	—	ἔπειτα.
ἀρ' ¹ οὖν. οὐκεπισχει	οὐκ ἐπ ¹ -διν	ἀρ'
-τύχη ¹ -γνεται. ¹ τότηδη -τερον ¹ γάρ. ἄλλ ἔστη	—	-χη ¹ ἔστιν ¹ γάρ,
κάνποτε ¹ νῦν ¹ -ιδν, ¹ ἔχει.	ἀν	νῦν ¹ ἔχει.
-τεσθαι ¹ νῦν. καὶ	—	-σθαι ¹ νῦν. ἀφιεμέ-
-νον ¹ -μενον,	—	-νον. ¹ -τα. ¹ -τέρω
-νον ¹ -τα.	τοῦτεπ-	-νον. τοῦτε ¹ δέ C. γε
τὸ, νῦν ¹ οὐ ¹ ἀ*εὶ	·μενον: gap.	νῦν ¹ -μεν. ¹ κατατοῦτο οὐ ¹ αἰεὶ
-γνεσθαι ¹ τοῦτο ὅτι γ on a stain.	·νεται καὶ τὸ * ἐν	-σθαι ¹ τοῦτο.
ἀρα ¹ τὸ, νῦν.	ἄρα ¹ δταν ¹ τὸ νῦν ἔπεσχε	ἄρα δταν ¹ τῷ νῦν επεσχεν [ἐ-
-γνεσθαι ¹ ; ; finer. ¹ οὔκοῦν οὐπέριε-	οῦν εἰπεριεγ. (εγγ in Ms. ?)	-σθαι ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -τερον ¹ οὔκοῦν οὐπέρ
ἔστιν ¹ αὐτοῦ ¹ ; , finer.	γιγνετο ε υρον οι ¹ ἔστι δὲ	-τερον. ¹ ἔστιν ¹
; , finer.	-τερον; ναὶ C. ἔστιν:	-ἔστι τὸ ἐν ¹ -τερ ¹ -μενον.
ἔστι τὸ ἐν.	ἔαντο ¹ δταν	νῦν αἰεὶ ¹ τῷ C. ἐν.
νῦν, ἀ*εὶ ¹ -τὸς.	αἰεὶ and twice next line.	-ναὶ ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ νῦν. ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ ἔστι
ἀ*εὶ twice ¹ ἔστι ¹ i darker..	δταν ¹ ἔστι τὲ	-ται ¹ -τερον. ¹ ἔσικεν: C.
-γνεται, ¹ -τοῦ,	εν ¹ έσικε:	ἔστιν ¹ -ται ¹ -σον: τὸν
ἔστιν, ¹ -γνεται. ¹ first half of ^ τὸν ἵσον τὸν ἵσον.	—	
added? ¹ ἵσον: τὸν. Traces of ^		
on ἵσον twice.		
ἵσον χρόνον, ¹ οὐ ¹	έχειν ¹ [τε added later. τόγε ¹ -νόμενον C. η οὐ ¹ ἔχει:	
τοδετην ¹ ἔχον. ¹ -τερον ¹	δος: τὸ ¹ τὴν ¹ οὐπρεσ- ¹ οὐδηνεω- πῶσδ ¹ as in 151 C and D but not	
ἵσον	changed from -τὸ	[ending line. ¹ ἔχον.

TUB.

t.

οὔκοῦν ¹ τᾶλλα ὠσαῦτως	
αὐτῶν C. -ται. ¹ αὐτῶν ¹ C.	
-τερ ¹ -γέθει.	
οὔτω δὴ αῦ ὡστοῖκεν τὸ ἐν. καὶ ἵσο	
τ̄ -μδν. ¹ καὶ, τῶν C.	
ἀρ' ¹ ἐν.	
αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν C. ἄλλων; C.	
τῶν C. ἄλλων. C.	
πῶς: ¹ -χει. ¹ ἔνέστι: 'patched.' ¹ εἰναι.	
ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ¹ -τος.	
-θότος ¹ -ντος	
-νία; ¹ μετέχειν ¹ -νου.	
εἰναι; C. οὔκοῦν ¹ αἰεὶ	
πρόέρχεται	
ἀρ' ¹ -μεθα ¹ -μένου.	
-ρον· πρεσβύτερ ¹ οὔκοῦν	
-τερ ¹ ἐν. ¹ -τοῦ.	
[ἀρ'	
αὐτοῦ (2nd v patched) οὔτω: ¹ -τερον.	
χρόνο ¹ -μενον ¹ ἔσται;	
ἔπειτα.	
ἀρ'	
-χη ¹ ἔστιν ¹ γάρ,	
νῦν ¹ ἔχει.	
-σθαι ¹ νῦν. ἀφιεμέ-	
-νον. ¹ -τα. ¹ -τέρω	
-νον. τοῦτε ¹ δέ C. γε	
νῦν ¹ -μεν. ¹ κατατοῦτο οὐ ¹ αἰεὶ	
-σθαι ¹ τοῦτο.	
ἄρα δταν ¹ τῷ νῦν επεσχεν [ἐ-	
-σθαι ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -τερον ¹ οὔκοῦν οὐπέρ	
-τερον. ¹ ἔστιν ¹	
-ἔστι τὸ ἐν ¹ -τερ ¹ -μενον.	
νῦν αἰεὶ ¹ τῷ C. ἐν.	
-ναὶ ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ νῦν. ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ ἔστι	
-ται ¹ -τερον. ¹ ἔσικεν: C.	
ἔστιν ¹ -ται ¹ -σον: τὸν	
	D p. 26.
ἄρα δταν ¹ τῷ νῦν επεσχεν [ἐ-	
-σθαι ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -τερον ¹ οὔκοῦν οὐπέρ	
-τερον. ¹ ἔστιν ¹	
-τερον. ¹ ἔστιν ¹ :	
-ἔστι τὸ ἐν ¹ -τερ ¹ -μενον.	
νῦν αἰεὶ ¹ τῷ C. ἐν.	
-ναὶ ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ νῦν. ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ ἔστι	E
-ται ¹ -τερον. ¹ ἔσικεν: C.	
ἔστιν ¹ -ται ¹ -σον: τὸν	
έχειν ¹ [τε added later. τόγε ¹ -νόμενον C. η οὐ ¹ ἔχει:	
δος: τὸ ¹ τὴν ¹ οὐπρεσ- ¹ οὐδηνεω- πῶσδ ¹ as in 151 C and D but not	
changed from -τὸ	
άρα ¹ αὐτο [*] (ends line) έαυτῷ νεώτερ ¹ ἔστιν ¹ : ¹ άρα ¹ -νον. ¹ έαυτῷ C.	

A.	TUB.	t.
-μενον ε curs. ¹ ὁν. ¹ -ωτερον.	—	ὅν. ¹ -τερό
153 ἐστιν ¹ τί δαιτῶν αἰτ̄ on * darker. τί δὲ	—	ἐστιν ¹ τί δὲ τῶν c. ἄλλων : c.
τόδέγε ¹ -γειν ¹ ἔνδος ¹ ἐστιν, τό δέγε	—	λέγειν ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἔνδος ¹ ἐστιν.
ἐτερον ¹ ἐστιν ἔνός ; , differs. μεν ἔνδος ¹ μὲν	[γάρ ὁν ε curs. γ μαj.]	αλλὰ ¹ -ρον ¹ ἔνός ¹ ὁν. ¹ ἑτερα
οῦτα. ¹ γάρ ἄν.	—	οὗτα. ¹ ἐστι.
ον. ¹ ἔχοι. ¹ first half darker. ή	—	ον. ¹ -χοι.
οὖν ἀρ- ¹ -μεν ε curs. [γιστὸν δοῦ:	—	οὖν
-τερον. ¹ ^ first half darker. ¹ ὀλί- ή! ὀλιγοστὸν	—	-τερον.
βέστιν τὸ ἔν ¹ ἔν, , fainter. δέστι! ή	—	-τον. ¹ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔν η! πάντων c.
τᾶλλα ^ second half darker. ¹ -θμὸν. τᾶλλα	—	-γονεν. τῶν c. ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ -μὸν.
ἄλλα, ¹ ἄλλο ἐστιν: ¹ γε οἷμαι γεγονός.	—	ἄλλα! ἄλλο! ἔχει! γε οἷμαι -νός.
-νε, ¹ -λα, ¹ -νότα.	—	-νευ! ¹ ἄλλα! υστερα -νότα.
-τερα,	—	εἴν τὰ ἄλλα.
ἔνός ¹ ἐνπρε-	—	ἔνός ¹ ἔν. ¹ τῶν c.
τί δαιτό δε; αἰτ̄ on *: traces of ετό! τί δὲ! ἀρ'! αὐτοῦ! ή	—	τί δε. τόδε: ἀρ'! -νός
[ἀρ'! -γονός. ή both ^ patched.	—	δὲ μέρη:
C μὴν. ¹ ἔχον, ¹ -μέρη.	ἄλλὰ μὴν c. ends line.	τελευτή καὶ μεσον! ¹ οὐκοῦνc. πάντωνc.
-χῆν ¹ -τῆν ¹ οὖν, ¹ -τον,	—	-νεται! ¹ ἔνδος ¹ τῶν c.
-ται, ¹ ἔνδος, , tail added? ¹ -την	τῆν	ἀρχῆν. ¹ τᾶλλα πάντα. μέχρι τοῦ τ-: τᾶλλα! ἔνδος! δὲ c.
-χῆν ¹ τᾶλ- ¹ καὶ ¹ fainter.	τᾶλλα ^ patched. ¹ μὴν: καὶ.	φήσομεν c.
-μεν ε curs. ¹ τᾶλ-	—	δέ γε οἷμαι. ¹ ἄμα. ¹ -κεν
-νέναι.	έν	-σθαι. ωστ' επερ! γίνγνεσθαι. γινγ-
p. 27. δέ! γε νεat end on a stain.	·φυκε ε large on *	σθαι had been first meant.
D ωστ'! το! -σθαι.	—	-γονός. ¹ τῶν c.
—	—	τῶν c. ἄλλων. ¹ ἐστινιτὰ lastia letter?
-νός, ¹ -λων,	—	τί δὲ δή
ἐστιν ¹ -λα.	ἐστιν.	ἔνδος. ¹ οὖν c. ¹ μέρη.
διὰ δή ¹ αι darker on *	τί δὲ δή	εῖναι c. ¹ δν: ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ ἔν.
οὗτοι οὖν ¹ μέρη	έν	τῷ c. ¹ ἄν. ¹ -τέρῳ ¹ [s ends line.
; , differs.	δν:	τῶν c. ἄλλων c. -μένων. ὅτι! προσγί-
E ἄν, ¹ -τέρῳ	-τάν	οῦν! ¹ -λθὸν. ὅλον ἔν
-μένων ὅτιπερ [έγγενη-	—	-ται! οὔτε ἐσχάτου. οὔτε πρώτου.
ὅτιψον. i darker and squeezed. ¹ -λον	—	ἄλλοις.
-ται! -σου, ¹ -του, ¹ -τον.	οὐμέσου ν orig. ?	ἔν. ωστ' ει μὴ παραφίσου [line).
—	γεννήσαι:	ἔν. ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ εῖη. αλλ' ἄ (next
ἔν. ωστ' ει	το. ¹ ἔν. gap.	μα. ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων. c.
ἔν. ¹ -τερον ¹ -τερον, ¹ εῖη.	πρότερον.	τάλλα!
154 -μα.	—	τάλλα!
εῖη! τᾶλλα! δε	gap! εῖη, ¹ τᾶλλα and next	τάλλα!
-ρον καὶ τᾶλ-	—	τάλλα!
-νός.	—	τάλλα! ἔνδος:
-λων	—	—
τᾶλ- ^ dark. ¹ ἔνδος ¹ -ώτερον.	τάλλα	—

A.

TUB.

-σθαι· ἄρα ¹ εἶναι.	—	-σθαι ¹ εἶναι.
ἔχει. ή ¹ first half dark. ¹ -σόνδεγε, ή ¹ -γειν ¹ ἔγω	—	ἔχει ¹ αλλά ¹ γε ¹ ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστι
-ρου· -σθαιτε	—	έπερον· -ρου ¹ γε might be τε. ¹ ἔτι
-μενον,	κία: οὐκ	-γκεν ¹ -κίη ¹ οὐκάν
-το οὐδὲ ἀντὸ, ¹ ὅν, ¹ -σθαι· [squeezed. Ετι γίγνεται οὐδὲ αὐτὸ	—	-αιτο ¹ -τερ ¹ ὅν, ¹ -σθαι·
ἴστα-μενα ¹ -λφ ὅτρ οὖν ¹ darker and	—	-μενα ¹ οὖν ίσψ.
ἀκεὶ ὥστε ¹ darker and closer. ¹ -κη; ἀει so, and line 29.	—	αἰεὶ.
ὅν ον *, had been ἐν? ¹ ἐνὸς	ἐνὸς SO. ¹ -τάν	γὰρ c. ¹ τοῦ. ἐνὸς οὗτος.
-τερον ¹ -τερον. ¹ ἵψδ- all on *, same	—	οὔτε -τερον. ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ αλλ'
[hand.] ¹ ἀ*εὶ ¹ -κίαν	[(γίγνεται late in marg.)	c
τόδε ¹ νεώτερον δ' ὁν:	τό δε ¹ νεώτερον: δ'ού ¹ ' later.	γεγονε-τερον ¹ τὸ δὲ νεώτερον ¹ γίγνεται
ὄντων, ¹ ποτε.	—	τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων. all c. [δ' οὐδ':
οὐ ¹ δε ¹ a at end maj. curs.	γίγνεται: gap.	δὲ.
ἡ ¹ τᾶλ accents retouched.	ἡ ¹ τάλ-	τό, ¹ τῶν c. ¹ -τερον. καὶ τᾶλ-
ἡ ¹ first π on stain.	ταν	τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ η ¹
ἴσον ¹ darker. ¹ χρόνον ¹	·εῖονι	γέγονεν c. η ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ σκόπει.
-τονος. η ¹	ἄρα	ἐλαττονι ¹ χρόνον·άρα
ὅτιπερ ¹ τᾶλ- ¹ το ἐν·	η ¹	-τονος.
το ἔπειτα ¹ ισον ¹ λους.	τάλλα ¹ τὸ	ὅτιπερ ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἐν.
ἀκεὶ ¹ -τῶν, ¹ -τερον. η ¹	—	τὸ ¹ ἔπειτα ¹ αλλοις.
ἄν.	—	αἰεὶ ¹ αὐτῶν c. ¹ -τερον ¹ οὐκοῦν
ἡ ¹ first half darker. ¹ -τερον;	ἡ ¹ βύτερα -τερον:	ἐλαττον διαφέρο ¹ τι. ¹ -τερον ¹ ἀν.
νεώτερον: ¹ -νο, νεώτερον.	-τερον: ist.	—
πρότερον: ¹ -γονὸς.	—	εὶ δε ¹ -τερον.
-νεται, προστὸ	—	-σβύτερα ¹ -γονὸς.
δε ¹ . ¹ -τερον ¹ ἀ*εὶ	ην ¹ αἰεὶ	-νεται. ¹ -τερο ¹ τε.
-δωσιν. ¹ το πρ-	·διδωσι ¹ τὸ πρ-	-βύτερον ¹ αἰεὶ
-ρον ¹ -τερον. ¹ -τερον, ¹ -τως·	δαν	-ρο ¹ γὰρ. ¹ -σιν.
αὐτοῖν ¹ -λοιν. -σθον. ¹ -τερον, fainter. τοντε	—	-ρον ¹ -τερον. ¹ ὠσάντως ¹
-τερον ¹ -βύτερον.	—	αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον. τὸ ἐναντίον
-τέρον ¹ δε ¹ . ¹ -νοιντο.	οἰωτε	ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθο ¹ -τερον.
-γνοιντο ¹ ἄν ¹ δε ¹ ,	δην	-τερον ¹ -τερον,
-ται,	—	-τερον ¹ δε ¹ οὐκάν ¹ εἰτην ¹ -ντο. οὐκάν
-βύτερα.	—	-νοιντο. ¹ ἄν
-γονε ¹ τᾶλ- ¹ -το	λόγον ¹ καὶ τάλ. ¹ τὸ ¹ ισ-	τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ -ται.
-σχει.	—	δη ¹ δε ¹ ἄλλα ¹ -τερα.
η ¹ * i removed? so below.	η ¹	γεγονεν ¹ τᾶλλα. τούτῳ
-ται ¹ -τερον ¹ ἀ*εὶ	τσ ¹ αἰεὶ	-σχει.
-ρειν ¹ ἄν,	γίγνοται ¹ "later?" dark.	φαίνεται c. ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ ἔτερον
-ρον. ¹ τᾶλ- ¹ η ¹ * ἀ*εὶ μορύφ. ¹ -κη,	τάλλα ¹ η ¹ 'later' ¹ αἰεὶ	ἀριθμ ¹ αἰεὶ
-μενα, ¹ -τέρων.	—	-φέρειν ¹ τῶν c.
-κη, ¹ -σθαι·	—	-ρον ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἀ*εὶ (sic).
ἐνὸς.	—	τῶν c. ¹ -μενα. ¹ τῶν c. προτερων ¹ c.

t.

-σθαι ¹ εἶναι.	—	-σθαι ¹ εἶναι.
ἔχει ¹ αλλά ¹ γε ¹ ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστι	b	ἔχει ¹ αλλά ¹ γε ¹ ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστι
έπερον· -ρου ¹ γε might be τε. ¹ ἔτι	b	έπερον· -ρου ¹ γε might be τε. ¹ ἔτι
-γκεν ¹ -κίη ¹ οὐκάν	b	-γκεν ¹ -κίη ¹ οὐκάν
-αιτο ¹ -τερ ¹ ὅν, ¹ -σθαι·	b	-αιτο ¹ -τερ ¹ ὅν, ¹ -σθαι·
-μενα ¹ οὖν ίσψ.	b	-μενα ¹ οὖν ίσψ.
αἰεὶ.	b	αἰεὶ.
γὰρ c. ¹ τοῦ. ἐνὸς οὗτος.	c	γὰρ c. ¹ τοῦ. ἐνὸς οὗτος.
οὔτε -τερον. ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ αλλ'	c	οὔτε -τερον. ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ αλλ'
τόδε ¹ τῶν c. ¹ -τερον. καὶ τᾶλ-	D p. 28.	τόδε ¹ τῶν c. ¹ -τερον. καὶ τᾶλ-
τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ η ¹	D p. 28.	τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ η ¹
γέγονεν c. η ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ σκόπει.	D p. 28.	γέγονεν c. η ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ σκόπει.
ἐλαττονι ¹ χρόνον·άρα	D p. 28.	ἐλαττονι ¹ χρόνον·άρα
-τονος.	D p. 28.	-τονος.
ὅτιπερ ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἐν.	D p. 28.	ὅτιπερ ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἐν.
τὸ ¹ ἔπειτα ¹ αλλοις.	D p. 28.	τὸ ¹ ἔπειτα ¹ αλλοις.
αἰεὶ ¹ αὐτῶν c. ¹ -τερον ¹ οὐκοῦν	D p. 28.	αἰεὶ ¹ αὐτῶν c. ¹ -τερον ¹ οὐκοῦν
ἐλαττον διαφέρο ¹ τι. ¹ -τερον ¹ ἀν.	D p. 28.	ἐλαττον διαφέρο ¹ τι. ¹ -τερον ¹ ἀν.
—	155	—
εὶ δε ¹ -τερον.		εὶ δε ¹ -τερον.
-σβύτερα ¹ -γονὸς.		-σβύτερα ¹ -γονὸς.
-νεται. ¹ -τερο ¹ τε.		-νεται. ¹ -τερο ¹ τε.
-βύτερον ¹ αἰεὶ		-βύτερον ¹ αἰεὶ
-ρο ¹ γὰρ. ¹ -σιν.		-ρο ¹ γὰρ. ¹ -σιν.
-ρον ¹ -τερον. ¹ ὠσάντως ¹		-ρον ¹ -τερον. ¹ ὠσάντως ¹
αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον. τὸ ἐναντίον		αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον. τὸ ἐναντίον
ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθο ¹ -τερον.		ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθο ¹ -τερον.
-τερον ¹ -τερον,		-τερον ¹ -τερον,
-τερον ¹ δε ¹ οὐκάν ¹ εἰτην ¹ -ντο. οὐκάν		-τερον ¹ δε ¹ οὐκάν ¹ εἰτην ¹ -ντο. οὐκάν
-νοιντο. ¹ ἄν		-νοιντο. ¹ ἄν
τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ -ται.		τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ -ται.
δη ¹ δε ¹ ἄλλα ¹ -τερα.		δη ¹ δε ¹ ἄλλα ¹ -τερα.
γεγονεν ¹ τᾶλλα. τούτῳ		γεγονεν ¹ τᾶλλα. τούτῳ
-σχει.		-σχει.
φαίνεται c. ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ ἔτερον		φαίνεται c. ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ ἔτερον
ἀριθμ ¹ αἰεὶ		ἀριθμ ¹ αἰεὶ
-φέρειν ¹ τῶν c.		-φέρειν ¹ τῶν c.
-ρον ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἀ*εὶ (sic).		-ρον ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἀ*εὶ (sic).
τῶν c. ¹ -μενα. ¹ τῶν c. προτερων ¹ c.	c	τῶν c. ¹ -μενα. ¹ τῶν c. προτερων ¹ c.
-σθαι.	c	-σθαι.
ἐνὸς. ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων : c.	c	ἐνὸς. ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων : c.

A.

TUB.

t.

αὐτοῦ, ¹ -ώτερον,	αὐτοῦ had been'.	τῶν c. ἄλλων. c.
ἔστι ¹ -νεται ¹ -βύτερον, ¹ -ρον, ¹ ἔστιν.	ἴστι τὲ ¹ -στιν	ἔστίτε ¹ -ται ¹ -τερον, οὔτέστιν
-ται ¹ -τοῦ.	αὐτοῦ	-νεται, ¹ τῶν ἄλλων : -τελῶς all c.
D το ἐν,	τὸ ¹ -τερον καὶ νεό.	ἐν.
-σθαι ¹ -κη, ¹ -χειν, ¹ -τα,	δρ'	σθαι. ἀρ' ¹ ἐπειτα.
νῦν ¹ ; , finer. ¹ ἐν ¹ ἔστιν ¹ ἔσται.	ἴστι καὶ ίσται.	νῦν. ¹ ἔστιν ¹ ἔσται.
[καὶ καὶ on brown blots.		
-το ¹ -ται ¹ -νῷ.	μῆ: ends line.	εγίγ-
-νου ¹ ήν καὶ ἔστιν ¹ -τοῦ.	ἡν ¹ ίστι	[αν? ¹ αὐτοῦ,
-ξα ¹ -σις.		-νου. ¹ δὴ patched; had been αν or
δη ¹ -τῷ.	γει ¹ ίστιν	-τομεν; ὅρθως c. ¹ αὐτῷ.
E ίσται ¹ περιττὰ ἄλλα had been -ριττὰ	καὶ περιττά· ἄλλα	-ίσται c. ¹ τάλλα
οὗτα.	χνει χ ends line. ¹ ἔστιπαν.	έχει
-μεν ¹ ἐν ¹ -θαμεν ¹ .	τωσ'	ἐν εἰ ἔστιν c. οἷον -μεν ¹
-κη, αὐτὸ ¹ -λὰ ¹ -λὰ,	δρ' ¹ ἐν τὲ	ἀρ' ¹ αὐτὸ ¹ πολλὰ twice.
-νου ¹ ἐν ¹ ποτέ.	ποτὲ.	χρόνου ¹ ἐν ¹ ποτὲ ¹ Δ'οὐκ ἔστι c.
-στιν ¹ αὐτοτε ¹ ἀρ' (^ of ^ added.)	στιν ¹ αὐ σύστας ποτέ ¹ ἀρ' ¹ ποτε ¹ ἀρ' ¹ -χει. οἰόντε	
οὐν ¹ -έχει, last two , , differ.		
-σται ¹ -χει, ¹ -χειν:	σται rough (ff. 174, 175 -χειν. ¹ -χει.	
	have been stuck together,	
	latter is injured).	
-χει. καὶ	μόνος	-χει. ¹ εν ¹ -χει. ¹ ἀν μονως
156 -τοῦ, ¹ οὖν.	[darker. τε, καὶ	αὐτοῦ ¹ μετεχει ¹ οὐκοῦν
-νος ¹ -ναι ¹ αυτοῦ ή ' of last ή		εἶναι. ¹ αὐτοῦ.
ἴσται, τότε twice. ¹ ἔχειν.	οἰοντέσται	[μὴ ποτὲ
		ἴσται c. τότε ¹ αὐτὸ ¹ . τότε ¹ ἔχειν. ¹
		το
-νειν ¹ ἀρα, ^ looks patched ¹ -λεῖς ¹ το ἀρα ¹ τὸ δὲ		-νειν. ἀράγε οὐ -σθαι c. -λεῖς:
-σίας, ἀρ' οὐκαπόλ- ^ ' look patched ¹ ἀρ' ¹ τὸ δὲ		-σίας. ἀρ' ¹ -σθαι; , has been added. ¹
[το ἐν δὴ ὡς ἔοικε.		[δὴ ὠσεοικε
-Νοιτε, , faint ¹ ἀφιεν οὐσίαν.	ἀφιεν	-σίαν. γίγνεται καὶ ἀπόλλυται; c.
B -λὰ, δν ¹ -μενον ¹ twice. ¹ ἀρ' ¹ thick, ἀρ' ¹ διαν		δν. ¹ -μενον ¹ ἀρ'
ἐν ¹ -λυται ¹ -λὰ, [patched. ἐν πολλὰ εἰναι ἀπόλλυται: gap		ἐν ¹ -λυται ¹ πολλὰ.
καὶ ¹ πολλὰ ¹ ἀρ' ¹ of ^ darker. ¹ -κη καὶ ¹ ἀρ'		πολλὰ. ἀρ' ¹ ἀναγκη
καὶ μῆν,	τε . . . -σθαι; written twice,	
	dotted, later ¹ καὶ μῆν	
ἀν ¹ -ται ¹ τε ¹ ; , , fainter.	διαν	-νηται.
ἀν μεῖζον ¹ -τον ¹ ὥτον ¹ ' darker. ¹ ισ- ¹ ισ-		μεῖζο ¹ ὥτον.
C ὥτηται ¹ ἔστδο ¹ [τε, ¹ -νειν, οἴτως διαν (so twice) ¹ ισταται.		οἴτω ¹ -τηται ¹ ἐπι
-λη ¹ που ¹ ; seems uniform.	μεταβάλη ¹ μηδὲν	-σθαι. -λη ¹ εἶναι :
πρότερον. ¹ -σθαι.	ἴστδο ¹	-τερ. ǚ- -σθαι.
-μενον. ¹ ἔσταναι ¹ -λειν.	ἴσταναι ¹	-μενον. -τερ ¹ -ναι ¹ -λειν. ¹ ἔσται c.
-δεῖς ἔστιν,		οὐδείς ἔστιν.
-σθαι ¹ οὐγαρ ¹ οὐδε	ἴσταναι ¹ οὐ γάρ ¹ οὐδε	-ναι ¹ οὐ γάρ
-λει ¹ ποτ ¹ -λει ¹ [οὐ γάρ ¹ εἰκός ¹ πότ ¹		-λει ¹ -λειν ¹ -λει ¹
D έστδο ¹ οὐ ¹ οὐτε ¹ -λει ¹ has been ¹ έστδο ¹ οὐ γάρ ¹	ἴστδο ¹ οὐ ¹ -λει ¹ οὐ γάρ ¹	έστδο ¹ άν ¹ -λει ¹ οὐ γάρ ¹

A.

TUB.

t.

ἀρ' faint, yellow. ¹ ἔστι	ἴστι ¹ τοτὸν	ἀρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἀτοπό ¹ ποῖο δὴ:	p. 30.
-φυης. ¹ -φυης.	τοιονδέτι	-νης. ¹ -ης. τοιοῦτόντι ἔοικε -νειν.	
-τερον ¹ -ναι,	ον ¹ ο····: ἐκ injd., fol. 175 ¹	-τερον ¹ -έκτε ¹ -ναι.	
-λει ¹ twice. ¹ -σεως,	λει ¹ gap [ἴστι· twice.	-λει. ¹ -σεως. ¹ -λει.	
φύσις. ¹ -θηται,	αντή below the injury	φύσις. ¹ -θηται.	
-σεως,	οιδενι	-σεως. ¹ οιδενὶ ούσα·	E
-της, , saint. ¹ -ναι.	ἴστι· twice	-της, τό, ¹ -ναι.	
δὴ ¹ -ται	-πέρ ἴστηκε	δὴ ¹ ἔστηκε ¹ -ται.	
ποιοι·	-βάλοι ¹ μ····ιως inj.	ἐφ ¹ οὔτως. ¹ -οῖ·	
δέξ ¹ -λει. ἐν	-λλει, ἐν· οιδενὶ; late· erased.	δ ¹ οὐδενὶ	
τότε. ¹ ἄρ' οὖν,	-νοιτ' ὅν ¹ οιδ' ὅν ¹ 2nd 'added'	τότε. ¹ ἀφ'	
ἔχει ὅταν	ὅταν	[ἄρ' οὖν ἔχει.	
-βάλλη ¹ dark and small. ¹ -ναι,	-βάλη ¹ λ added orig.	-βάλλη ¹ has been -βαγ, altered ¹⁵⁷	
[σθαι ¹ -ξὺ τινῶν		[at once? ¹ εἶναι. ¹ σθαι. -ξύ τινων	
ται, ¹ στάσεων καὶ οὗτέ ἔστι τότε. ¹ οὗτε ἴστι		-σεων καὶ ¹ ἔστιν τότε. ¹ -τιν.	
-γνεται. ¹ -λυται: ¹ -γον, [ἴστιν	-λυται ¹ : added. ¹ γον	-λυται: ¹ λόγον.	
ένδος. ¹ ἴδν. ¹ ἐν ¹ ἔστιν. ¹ -λά·	ἴδν ¹ [crowded into line. ἴδν ¹ ἐφέν ¹ πολλὰ·		
-νεται. ¹ -νεται ¹ -οι, ¹ -ον	ὅμοις ἐπὶ ἀνόμοις.	dark on *	
-ον, had been. ¹ ἴδν ¹ -οι, ¹ -ον	ἴδν ¹ . altered to, ¹ ἀνόμη·	-ται καὶ ¹ -μοιον καὶ	
-μενον. οὔτε		εξ ¹ ἴδν. ¹ ἀνόμοιον·	
ἴστον twice. ¹ ἴδν, ¹ -κρδν. ¹ -γα·	ἴστο ¹ ἴδν ¹ . altered to, ¹ ίστον	μέγα.	[ίσον] B
φθίνον [part of T small on *	φθίνον ¹ ισούμενον ἀν εἴη ἀν:	ἴστον ¹ τάναντία ἴδν ¹ o has been ω? ¹	
-ματα, , fainter. ¹ ἐν. ¹ δαΐζοις αιανδ ἴστιν: gap		φθίνον οὔτε ¹ -κεν:	
-λοις, ¹ ἔστιν*ἀρ' ¹ of ¹ darker. com-	ἄρ' οὖ σκεπτέον: ^ patched	-ματα, ¹ ἐν. ¹ τί δὲ	
δὴ ¹ ἔστι τᾶλ- ¹ ἐνδ. [masall fainter.	δὴ ¹ ίστι τᾶλλα ¹ -θεναι: ε δὴ ¹ -τι. τᾶλ- ¹ -θεναι;	-χειν ¹ ἔστιν ¹ ἀρα C. ¹ -τέον: -τεον:	
	[patched on a, orig.	-χειν ¹ -τεον C. ¹ -τέον:	
οὖν ¹ ἔστιν. ¹ τᾶλλα: οὐ γάρ ἀν:	ένδος ἔστιν, ¹ τᾶλλα:	οὐκοῦν ¹ τᾶλλα.	
ἀλλάτον ἐνὸς ἦν; , differs.	[er. —	ἀλλα	C
τᾶλλα ¹ ἀλλάμετέχεται πγ: 'of ¹ dark-	τᾶλλα ¹ ' added. ¹ -χειν πγ:	τᾶλλα. ¹ μετέχει πγ: ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἐνὸς.	
-τα. ἀλλά ἔστιν ¹ ἔχοι.	—	-τα. ἀλλά ἔστιν ¹	
γε φαμέν ¹ ἔστιν ἐνὶ δ-	—	δέγε φαμεν τουτου ἔστιν. ¹ γ ¹ : ¹ γάρ : c.	
δλον, ¹ εἶναι.	—	δλον. ¹ πολλῶν c. ¹ εἶναι· οὐν ἔσται c.	
-ρίων. ¹ εἶναι.	—	τῶν c. μορίων. οὐπολλῶν c. ¹ εἶναι·	
εἴη ¹ εῆ ¹ .	—	πολλῶν c. ¹ εἴη. ¹ εῆ ¹ .	
-σται ¹ δὴ,	—	ἔσται ¹ τῶν c.	D
στον. ¹ -ριον, ¹ -τον.	—	-στον. ¹ -των. ¹ -τον, τῶν c.	
ἔσται ¹ -στον, ¹ -ριον ¹ μη ¹ ριον at end	[on a stain.	ἔσται ¹ -τον. ¹ μόρι ¹ .	
-στον ¹ ἔσται ¹ δν. πάντων ¹ fainter.	—	[πάντων c. τούτων c.	
τί εἶναι, δν ¹ ἐνδ. ἔστι ¹ -ριον, ¹ οὖν.	δη:	-στον. ¹ τῶν πολλῶν c. ᔾσται ¹ δν.	
λῶν·		τί εἶναι· δν οὐδενὸς ¹ ἔστιν ¹ δτιοῦν	
-ον. ¹ τινος -as. ¹ τινος. ¹ δλον. ¹ -των ¹ , ιδέας ¹ ἐνός τινὸς		δὴ ¹ τῶν c. πολλῶν c.	
-νδ. ¹ ἀν,		-ον. ¹ τινος ιδέας ¹ δλον. ¹ απάντων c. E.	
τᾶλ- ¹ seems patched. ¹ ἔχει, κὰν	τᾶλλα ¹ ' added ¹ κὰν do.	-νδ.	
		τᾶλλα ¹ ἔχει.	

A.

TUB.

t.

ταῦτα	-κοιδ·τατα:! [small.]	αὐτοῖς * very τâλλα, ταῦτά τε		
-μενα, ¹ -στῶτα, ¹ πάθη. τâλ- 'of' darker. ¹ ἐνὸς.	3 , , , all ταῦτα τâλλα 'added.' ¹ ἐνὸς.	ἀνόμοια ἀν ταῦτα 'dark patched.'		
οὖν εἰ -νερὰ -ποίμεν ¹ -λιν, ¹ ἔστιν. ἄρα. ἐνὸς. η̄ 'seems patched. -χῆς. ¹ ἔστιν τί, το ¹ -λων τâλ- 'dark.' ¹ ἔτερον. ἐνὸς. ¹ -λων	[` of ' darker. — οὐδχ'όντως 2nd ' added' ¹ η̄ ἔστι. γάρ: ἄρ ¹ τὸ τâλλα οὐδὲν	τâλλα, ταῦτα τε [dark. -λοις. -λων· c. 1 -τῶτα· ¹ -θη· τâλλα ¹ ἐνὸς: : wide. οὐδούνι εἰ -ρά. -ποίμεν ¹ -λιν ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα τâλλα ¹ -νὸς. -χῆς ¹ -τιν ¹ τâλλα ¹ -νὸς. -Ναι: c. 1 ἄρ ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων. c. and τâλλα τοῦ ἐνός; τί [so below. -νὸς. ¹ γάρ c. εἰρηγται. ὅτ'αν my notes c [have near this -οὖν (? ἐάν).		
ἐν, ¹ τâλ- 'of' dark. ¹ τοιτων, αὐτῷ i crowded. ¹ τâλ- as above ¹ οὐ ταυτῷ ἔστιν, ¹ τâλ- ¹ ἄρα; ' of ' [darker. ¹ ; seems uniform. φαμέν, ἄν, ¹ -λοις ¹ -τοῦ· -λων. ¹ ἔχη: -τâλ- ¹ ἐνὸς ¹ -τοῦ. τâλλα ἔστιν τâλλα· ὅλου. ¹ δὲ, ¹ ἐν· -λâ ¹ ὅλον ¹ τâλ- ¹ ἐνὸς. δύο ¹ τρία ¹ αὐτά ἔστι τὰ ἄλλα· ἐν ἔστιν ¹ αὐτοῖς. ¹ -ταχῆ i squeezed. [Final οὐ on a stain.	τâλλα: ¹ ἔστιν τâλλα: οὐ γάρ: ἄρα; ναί: οὐτάρα — ἴχη, ¹ οὐδενὶ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός. .δαμῆ ¹ τâλλα ἔστιν οὐδὲ [έκ- ον ¹ οὐδάρα ¹ τâλλα ¹ ἐν γάρ η̄ οὐ ¹ οὐδάρα ¹ ἔστι τâλλα· ——(no σημ. in marg.) αὐτῶν c. 1 -λον. ¹ ἐν. ἐστι ¹ τâλλα οὐδάρα 2nd ' ad. ¹ τâλλα· ἐν ἔστιν ξαντοῖς. ——	τό, ¹ τâλλα: ¹ γάρ: c. 1 ἄρα ἔστιν τό, ¹ εἴη τῷ c. αὐτῷ, c. καὶ τâλλα: ἔστι τὸ ¹ τâλλα: ¹ -κεν: ¹ ἄρα: c. — -μὲν, ¹ ἄρα c. -λοις ¹ -τοῦ ¹ -ρις ¹ [οὐδενὶ ἄρα c. τῶν c. ἄλλων c. 1 ἔχη: πῶς γάρ οὐ: τâλλα ¹ -νὸς ¹ -τοῦ ¹ κατὰ c. τâλλα ¹ τâλλα ¹ ἔστιν. οὐδάρα ¹ τâλλα ¹ ἐν γάρ η̄ οὐ ¹ οὐδάρα ¹ ἔστι τâλλα· ——(no σημ. in marg.) αὐτῶν c. 1 -λον. ¹ ἐν. — -λâ ¹ -λον. ¹ ἔστι τâλλα ¹ ἐν. τρία, ¹ -τιν τὰ ἄλλα· ἐν ἔστιν ¹ -τοῖς. —— [έκ- ἐν τὰ ἄλλα. οὐτε Εν ἔστιν ον [*] δὲ c. 1 -μοια, οὐ ¹ -στιν τῷ c. 1 τâλλα ¹ ——[or pchmt. rough? -της ¹ εἰ ἴχει εἴη, η̄ ¹ -ταδίο ἄν upper half of a on [*] Εν ⁰ : —— [tv· ends line.	— οὐδενὶ ends line. οὐτάρα ¹ οὐτάνθ- ¹ τâλλα· —— -νηληθή: οὐδέτερα· τοια. — δυοῖν dots very fine. ¹ -χειν, ¹ μὴδ ¹ μοια. ¹ ἔστιν ¹ τâλλα· -μοια ¹ -χοι· οὐτα. οὐδέτερα, ¹ -μενα, -μενα, ¹ -λύμενα ¹ -ξω ¹ -τω ¹ -θεναι, [τριών ¹ -τοῦ ¹ ἄλλα· dots meant? ¹ ἐνὸς. ¹ δυοῖν ¹ -μενει. ¹ ἐνὸς ¹ × = 'cancelled -ον [*] μεθέξει. ἔστιν ¹ τέ ¹ ἐν. ¹ ἔστι ¹ τâλλα εἰεν ¹ ἐν. ¹ ἄρ ¹ acc. patched?	οὐτάρα ¹ άνόμη- ¹ -τερα, τâλλα· γάρ ἀν οὐν -μοια. Εν ⁰ ¹ -χοι: -τα. ¹ -τίου. ¹ δὲ. ἀδύνατον [-τα: δᾶρα ¹ -τὰ ¹ οὐδέτερα ¹ -μενα ¹ οὐδὲ c. 1 -μενα ¹ -μενα ¹ οὐδή μείζω. οὐδέλαττω, ¹ -θεν τῶν c. 1 τοιούτων c. [τσα. -λα. -ξει ¹ μετεχειν. ἔστιν. ἐν. καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν ἔστι. c. 1 τâλλα μὲν c. οὖν: c. 1 εἰεν ¹ ἐν. ¹ ἄρ ¹

B

E p. 33.

B

A.

TUB.

ταῦτα : ¹ -θεσις.			t.
ἐστιν ἀρατί ¹ μη ἔστιν :	ἀρα το		μετατοῦτο; ¹ οὖν c. ¹ εἴη ¹ -θεσις.
εἰ μόνον ἡ ¹ ' of ¹ darker. ¹ τουναν ⁻¹ ἡ πᾶν τούν· ἔστιν ¹ μὴ twice.	[πεῖν ¹ μη twice ¹ ἔστι,		-τιν. ἀρατί
μη ἔστιν : ¹ τουν ⁻¹ -γοι, ¹ μη ἔστιν ¹ μη ἔστι: ¹ τούν ⁻¹ τιδεῖ ¹ μὴ			-νον. ¹ ἔστιν ¹ ἔστιν.
ἔστιν ¹ -ούτων, ἀρα dots small: ' of ἡτι on ¹ . ¹ ἀρα			ἔστιν: ¹ -γοι. ¹ -τιν.
-λοῦ, twice. ¹ , differs. [darker. λέγοιτο τὸ			-τιν. ἡ ἀλλότι τῶν c. -των. ἀρα ἐφ
λέγοι ¹ ὅν. ¹ ἀν ¹ ἐν ¹ ἔστι.	ὅταν ¹ μη ἔστι ¹ το-		λέγει ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ ὅν ¹ ἐν ¹ ἔστι.
λέγει.	λέγει: ¹ σ- : on ¹ .		ἀρα ¹ -γει. [γιγ- . . . εἶναι
δ-λων ¹ ἀν ¹ ἐν ¹ -σθεὶς. ¹ εἶναι ¹ Mar-	ὅταν ¹ no words in marg. or		ἐν ¹ ἀντῷ c. -σθεὶς. ¹ εἶναι ¹ c. οὐδὲν ἤττον
ginal addition has no γαρ, has	[in text, = εἶναι καὶ θη-		
-ται ¹ c., and εἶναι ¹ .			
ἡ	ἡ οδ: ¹ ἀδε		τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ ὁδε. ¹ αρ-
-χῆς ¹ μη ¹ ἔστιν. ¹ εἶναι.	ἔστι.		χῆς ¹ ἔστι. ¹ εἶναι. c. ὑπάρ- patched.
δε ¹ -μην ¹ ἡ μῆδε ὅτι ¹ ' of ¹ dark, and	ἄλλα ¹ μη ¹ δε		δει ¹ ωτέοικεν. ¹ -μην ¹ μῆδε ὅτι λεγεται
	[angle sharp. δτὰν τις ¹ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ:		-σθαι. ¹ ἔστι(v): c. ¹ οὐκοῦν c. ¹ τᾶλλα
εἶναι ¹ μῆδε ἐκεῖνο,			ἔτερ ¹ -ναι. ¹ μῆδε ¹ ἔτερ ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλῶν c.
			in lower margin
			of 85 b 2 stands
			3
ἔστιν ¹ επιστήμη.	ἔστιν		ἀντῷ c. ¹ -μη.
ε λέγει,	ὅταν		ἄλλων c. ¹ -τητα c. λεγει. ¹ λε-
-γγ ἀλλατῆν	ἄλλα ¹ -νου φανεται: καὶ		-γη. ¹ ἐκείνου: ου patched on a stain,
P. 34. τινὸς. ¹ -τον ¹ -τψ ¹ -των ¹ καὶ			and trace of accent? ¹ -νου
ἐν ¹ -γετο ¹ ἀν ¹ ' darker than ¹ ἔτερα. δᾶν ¹ ἐκεῖνω			τινὸς. ¹ -τψ ¹ τούτων c. ¹ πάντων τῶν
	[my notes.)		[των. all c.
ἡν ¹ -νου οὐδ' ἀντι ¹ -γετο. ¹ μετῆν (so οὐδάν			
-όντε.			δν ¹ ου ¹ -γετο ¹ οὐδᾶν ¹ -ρα ¹ ἐκεῖνω
τινὸς. ¹ -λῶν, ¹ -λύει ¹ -κη			orig. ἐκείνο? φ small, crowded.
ἔστιν ¹ το ¹ ἐν ¹ , , and the other are τὸ			ἡν ¹ -νου ¹ -γετο ¹ -ἡν.
τοῦ ¹ -γος. ¹ δέτδ accs. differ from			τῶν -λων -των : -θῶς: all c. ¹ τε
	[others.		ἔστιν ¹ -λυει ¹ -κη.
-νο ¹ εἶναι ¹ -νον, tail of, scraped. ¹ -κέται ¹ μη εἶναι καὶ			-νο ¹ -ἔστιν ¹ ἐν ¹ μητ ¹ ἔσται.
	[-λῶν. γε ¹ καὶ		-γος.
-λα ¹ τὰ ¹ ὄντα.			
δάλλοα.			
B ἔστι δῆλοι. ὅτι ¹ is sharp and dark. ἀνόμοια εστιν δῆλονότι			
-μοια, (1st)			
ἔστιν; ἔοικεν ¹ ἡ	ἴοικεν:		
ἔστιν αὐτῷ.	ἄρ' οὐκ		
πῶς ¹ ἐν ¹ .	ἴστι		
εἴη ¹ ἐνδεῖ.	-δᾶν		
ἐνδεῖ ¹ ἐνός; ¹ γε ¹ , , different.	ενδε ¹ (1st)		
C έαυτῷ; δε ¹ : ¹ καὶ μῆν accs. different. καὶ μῆν			

A.	TUB.	t.
οὐδαῦ ἵσον! -λοις! ἵσον! ηδη,	Ισόν ἔστι! ἵσον. τε	οὐδαῦ ἵσον γέστιν! -λοις! ἵσον! ηδη
-τα! ἵσον.	το-! δάμ-	-τα! ἔστι(ν) c. εν!: ἵσον.
ἀρα, τᾶλλ- ὥτα in ^ the darker.	ἄρα! τᾶλλα! τι.	ἄρα! τᾶλλα' [the , is later.
ἵστα! ἄνιστα!: ἄνιστα, οὐ	ἴστασθκάνιστα; δίδιστα! το-!	ἴστα! -στα, οὐτῷ c. ἀνίστιφ c. στα; In;
ἐν. πρὸς	-το-.	[το-: ἐν, τᾶλλα αὐτῷ c. ἔστιν c.
μέντοι! ἔστι	το-! γίστι... καὶ injured	γέστι.
—	μεγ... do! -ικρο-	[but = Η ἔστι! -κρότ.
ἀεί! -λοιν; , lighter.	αἰεί	-κρότ αἰεί ἀφεστ-
τε! ἀεί! τι	τε! αἰεί! οὐντι	-τοῖν. αἰεί! ἄλλο
-τητα: οὐκ! -θος.	το-! έστι	-τοῖν! -τητα: οὐκ. ἄλλα ('or'?)
-τητις ἔστιν! οὐντα; , small fine.	έστι! το- οὐντα.	-τητις. ἔστι! -τῷ c. [patched] ἔστι
οὗτι ώστοικεν! μετίγ, , small fine.	-κε. καὶ το-	ἐν! -τι ώστοικεν! μετείη:
-θους.	-κε:	καὶ μὴν οὐντίσαγε.
πῆ; δεῖ, οὐτως! -μεν'	—	πη! -τως! -μεν'
ἔχη! -μεις, εἰ at end on a stain.	ἔχει.	ἔχη. οὐκάν! -μεις.
-θῆ! -μεν' η ' of ^ dark. -τω:	λοντέι! η... -τω: written	-θῆ! -μεν'
δέφαμεν! -γειν! φάναι	—	[twice. δὲ φαμεν! -γειν.
ἄρα ώστοικε τὸ ἐν. οὐκόν.	—	[γαρ c. ἔστιν ἄρα ώστοικε τὸ ἐν. οὐκ ὁν! ει
ον, προστὸ! εἶναι.	τῇ τοῦ no note in marg.	ον. αλλά τι! ἀνήστε! εἶναι. c. (·S· αφήσει η! ἀνατει! σει opp. foot-line, inner marg., small majs.)
—	—	In lower marg. ^{S.} <u>τα</u>
ον δεῖ [μὴ θν ἔχει μὴ εἶναι οὖν; c. δεσμὶ! -ναι.	—	οὐκάν ειη! -τα. τὸ μεν οὐντίας. ον! δεῖ.
ον! εἶναι δύοιως, , fine. μη ον! -ναι	—	ον! ον! μεν.
μη δι, twice.	μη δι, ist. gap.	ον! δεῖ! ον!
ον! μη δι. ει	—	-θεστατα: οὐκ οὐν c. εἶναι. c.
—	—	-στι! εν! ἔστι! εἶναι c.
εν! εστι τοῦ εἶναι.	τὸ μη! μη έστι.	-ναι εις! εἶναι: c. τῷ c. εν! ἔστι:
μη! εν, ει μη εστιν; last , differs.	gap! πῶς δ!... -τε injured,	ἔστιν:
μη! ἄρα! οὐν,	—	πῶς! -τω.
πω! οὐτως	—	-τον! -νει.
-οῦτον,	—	-σις.
τε! δε, κίνησις. η ' of ^ darker.	τε! η	οὐκ οὐν c. -νη:
τὸ εν - patched.	ένδοντε	ἄρα c. twice! ᔁχον.
-μενον ἄρα	κοικε! ἄρα	—
ον ἐμπέφανται! εἶναι, ἐπι	έπι	ἐνπεφανται μ orig., sugg. εμπ?

A.

ἀλλα¹ -μοῦτέ ἔστι¹ -των

-τιν¹ ἔστιν¹ μηθίσται το ποθένποι : δόν μηθίσταιτο

D τῶιγε had been τό

-φοιτο· ταυτού γάρ¹ δόν¹ ἔστι¹ ταυτού⁵

μη ὁν εν τῷ⁵ repeated in marg.

ἔν¹ ὁν, "and , differ.¹ -νφ,¹ οὐ

ἔν, ἔαυτοῦ¹ ὁν¹ ὁν.

ἔνδος,¹ -τοῦ.

-οῦται,¹ ταυτῷ

E -φεται¹ -νει¹ -νητον·

-γεν¹ -ξον. εστάναι¹ το¹ ἄρα

δόν¹ μὴν εἰπέρ γε [line retouched. εστηκέτε¹ -κε¹ εἰπεργε

163 -ται¹ -θῆ. Several letters in this -ται¹ ἀν- μεγ-¹

p. 36. ἔχει, ὡς ἔχει.

-νον, οὐδαμῆ¹ ἀλ- in the ; ; differ.

οὐγάρ:

οὐγάρ¹ :¹ ἄρα ` of ^ darker.¹ τε.

-νον¹ ἄρα as above.¹ -ρον¹, , differs.

B —

δὲ¹ μὲν¹ -λιται¹

δὲ¹ -νεται¹ μη ὁν.

-λιται¹ -νεται¹ οὐγάρ

[†] ἰώμεν¹ 'patched.¹ -μενοι,¹ -εῖται,

οῦν¹ -τιν¹ φαμεν¹ αὐτοῦ

ἀν-μεν¹ ἄρα ` of ^ darker.¹ -νει¹

ἡ¹ ' of ^ darker.¹ -αν, τούτῳ¹ εἶναι¹: η

-ἀν¹ τι. πῶς twice.¹ -ναι φαμὲν αὐτὸ. 8τᾶν

-ναι¹ η¹ ' of ^ dark.¹ -μενον¹, νει, η

-τιν¹ οὐδεπῆ¹ ' of ^ dark.¹ -σιας¹ ὁν¹: οὐδεπή¹ οὐν¹: ' on *

ἄρα δύναιτο¹ δόν.

D -σθαι¹ -σθαι¹ η¹ η¹ ' of last ^ dark. η, η τό

-νειν¹ -σιαν¹ φ, [, differs.

-στιν¹ οὔτ' ἀναλαμβάνοι¹ αὐτό¹; last οὐτάναλαμβάνοι οὐτάπ-

ἔστιν¹ τέον¹ τέον¹

—

ἐν.¹ -νεται¹

E οὐδάμῆ¹ two dots very fine.

-κη, μη δέ

-σομεν,

τιν¹ ἀ·εὶ εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ:

ἀντὸ μη δόν, μη τέποτε έστάναι¹ -μεν:

μὴν.¹ έστι

ΤΙΒ.

μῆδα·

τόγε μετα¹ -τᾶν:

—

μὴ δόν ἐν τῷ τῶν πο⁵ over ἐν

μή ἔστιν: οὐ¹ οὐν

—

τινός:

—

ἄρ'

έστάναι:

δόν¹ μὴν εἰπέρ γε

—

οὐδὲ κιν-

οὐ

οὐ¹ ἄρα and line 5

—

—

μενον γίγνεται

οὐτέ a word on *, had been

οὐ γάρ οὖν:

[οὐδὲ¹ μη]

δψόμενοι

έστι φαμὲν.

—

δτᾶν¹ ἄρα

δτᾶν¹ τι.

πῶς twice.¹ -ναι φαμὲν αὐτὸ.

—

πῶς twice.¹ -ναι φαμὲν αὐτὸ.

—

οὐδεπῆ¹ οὐν¹: οὐδεπή¹ οὐν¹:

—

άρα δύναιτο¹ δόν.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

A.	TUB.	t.
-θος·		
-κρότης ¹ ἔστιν ¹ γε.	—	
-ότης ¹ αὐτὸς ¹ ἄλλα [dark. ¹ -τῷ εἰ αὐτῷ οὐ πο; slight stain.	—	
δαὶ τᾶλλα· ai darker on +, ' of τίδε τᾶλ- ¹ ξυθόπ-		
ὅμοια ¹ -μοια ¹ ταῦτα.	ταῦτα	
οὐ γάρ: τί δαιδὸν all after δ on * ¹ οὐ γάρ: τιδὲ τὸ gap.	[νου ¹ το ¹ νῷ, ¹ τί ¹ τοῦτο ¹]	
-τον ¹ -λου ¹ -λω ¹ ποτὲ ¹ -τα ¹ ἡ τούτου ¹ ἥ last, ' patched.	[νῦν ¹ -μη ¹]	
-ξα ¹ -σις ¹ -μα ¹ το Scratch oblique- δνομα ¹ δτιοῦν ¹ τὸ ly down from r. to l. on ἄλλο.		
μη ὅν, ¹ ὅν ¹ πῶς; ¹ οὐκοῦν	—	
δὴ ¹ γε, ¹ -μεν ¹ τᾶλλα. τί ' of dark. ξουκέγε ¹ λέγωμὲν ¹ μῇ ἔστι, τάλ-	μῆν ¹ μῆδὲ	
μῆν. ποῦ	ἄλλα ἔστιν.	
ἄλλα ἔστιν.		
-γος ¹ ἡ ' of dark. ¹ τῷ ¹ ἄλλο,	ἡ	
-ρον ¹ πον φαμὲν, ἔτερον	δέγεπον	
το ¹ δὴ, ¹ εἶναι. [εἴη ¹ ἐνδε ¹] -στατ ¹ τὸ		
ἔστιτι, ¹ ἄλλα second λ blotched, ' ξετιτι ¹ εἴη:		
ἄλλα ¹ ὄντός- ¹ ἔστιν.	ἄλλα μὴ ὄντοσγε. ¹ ἔστι	
-ται, εἰ μηδ- ¹ ἄρα,	κατὰ τα ον ¹ *	
-λων. ἄλλα ἔστιν ¹ γάρ. ¹ ἐνδε ¹	ἄλλα ἔστι ¹ ἀνοιατὲ	
-στος ¹ -κεν ¹ -τῶν ¹ -θει, κάντὸ	κάν	
τίς ¹ -νεται,	τίς	
-λά·	ἀντισμ-	
-μέγεθε ¹ . ' dark.	-θε ¹	
-κων. ¹ τᾶλ- ' of dark. ¹ ἄλλα ἔστιν: τᾶλλα ¹ ἄλλα ἔστιν:		
-μιδῆ ¹ ' dark, i subs. added later.	—	
νοσ ¹ ὅν δὲ οὐ ¹ -ται ¹ δὲ, ¹ δόξειεν.	δνδεον	
—	—	
-ριττὰ ¹ ὄντα ¹ -ται ¹	—	
οὐ γάρ " and next ", with some οὐγάρ οὖν: καὶ μην letters, retouched. ¹ γε φαμὲν δόξειεν		
-ναι·	—	
ἴσος ¹ -λοῖς ¹	δόν:	
εἶναι·	γάρ c. ends line.	
-μενος.	—	
οὖν,		
ἔχων, ¹ αὐτὸν, ¹ -χῆν.	αὐτὸς τὲ ¹ αὐτὸν ¹	
-ρας, ¹ ἀ*εὶ ¹ λά ¹ ,	ἀεί SO. ¹ θτάντις λα- ¹ SO. ISON*	
-νοίᾳ ¹ ὅν ¹ ἀ*εὶ	λεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ως τί ¹ αἰεὶ	
χῆ ¹ -ευτῆν. ¹ -ευτῆ	ἐν τε	
-τερα τὰτοῦ μέσου σμικρότερα, διάτο	τρα διάτο	
—	ἐνδε ¹ :	
δὴ οἷμαι ¹ -νον ¹ ἀνάγκη ¹ πάντο ὅν,	-νον: ἀνάγκη ¹ τὸ	
—	-τάν: one ' seems added.	
K		
-τος ¹ δῆλ ¹ :		
οὐ γάρ ¹ -της τε τε clear.		164
-της ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ αὐτῷ ¹ c.		
δὲ ¹ αὐτῷ ¹ c. ¹ -τῷ c.		
-μοια οὐτε ταῦτα ¹ εστιν		
-τῷ c. ¹ τὲ δὲ ¹ -νον ¹ -νῷ ¹ τί ¹ -το ¹		17.
-τον ¹ -λον ¹ -λῷ ¹ -τὲ ¹ -τα ¹ -νῦν ¹ -μη ¹ ¹ b		
-ξα ¹ ξ over a smaller ξ. ¹ -σις ¹ ἡ λόγ ¹ .		
[μα ¹ τῶν c. οῦτων. c.		
ἔσται ¹ δὲ ¹ πῶς ¹ οὐκονι		
-μεν ¹ -τι. τὰ ἄλλα χρή		
μέν ¹ μὴ δὲ		
ἔστιν c. οὐκάνπ ¹ τῶν c.		
-γος ¹ -λα ¹ -τιν ¹ -τῷ c.		[-ρον.
-ρον: ἔγωγε ¹ δέγε ποῦ ¹ φαμὲν. c. ¹ c		
ἄλλο δὴ ¹ ἄρα. c. ¹ ἄλλα εἶναι. c.		
ἔστιντι ¹ -ται; ¹ εἴη.		
ἄλλα ¹ -λων ἄρα c. ἔστιν.		
-ται ¹ -τα.		
-λων c. ¹ ἔστι c. ¹ οἰκάν ¹ εἴη ¹ -νός.		
-τος ὠστοικεν ¹ -τῶν. c. ¹ ἔστι c. ¹ -θει.		
δοκοῦν c. εἶναι c. ¹ τις ¹ -ται. [κὰν ο		
-τος ¹ -λά·		
-θει ¹ αυτοῦ ¹ -τατα: c.		
-κων. c. ¹ -λων c. ¹ τὰ ἄλλα ¹ εἴν ¹ -		
οὐκοῦν ¹ -ται	[ἔστι(v): c.	
-νος ¹ οὐ ¹ ἔσται: οῦτω: καὶ ¹ αὐτῶν c. ε		
-λῶν c. -τῶν; c. ¹ -τια	[δόξει·	
δὲ ¹ -τὰ ¹ -τα ¹ -ται.		
οὐ ¹ μην ¹ γε φαμὲν δόξειεν αὐτοῖς		
(πο ἐν) εἶναι c. ¹ -τὸν c. τῶν c.		
-λῶν c. -των:		
-κροῖς ¹ εἶναι ¹ c.		
-νος.		
-ξειεν ¹ δ' ¹ ἄν ¹ οὐκοῦν c.		
αὐτὸν.		
δὲτι c. αἰεὶ -τῶν c. ὅτ' αντιτι λά-		
-νοίᾳ ¹ -των c. οὐ ¹ -χῆς. ἄλλη αἰεὶ ¹ b		
-χῆ ¹ τὴν c. τελευτὴν. ¹ -τῆ ¹ τῷ c. μέσω.		
-τερα τοῦ μέσου. -τερα δὲ. c.		
-τῶν c. ¹ -σθαι.		
δὲ οἷμαι ¹ οὐ,		
-νοίᾳ ¹ ένδε ¹ αἰεὶ λαμβάνοιτο ἄν:		

॥

δρῶντις^{*} -βλν. ἐν φαίνε = ἐμφ-?
c σθαι^{*} ἀνάγκη[!] δὲ[!] δέξυνοντι.
-ναι,
ἔχοντα[!] τᾶλ- dark.
-λα δὴ φαί- ἔστιν, ἐνός; ! οὖν.
ἀνόμοια, -μένα.
μὲν. ! -μενα, ταυτὸν ε curs. , fine.
δ γε, ! ἔτερα.
-σματι.

—
-σθαι, a fine . in marg.
ἔαυτῶν
-σεις, ! εστῶτας πάντη.
-νους[!] -μένους[!] -τερα
ε τα, ! ἡμῖν, ! -λά ἔστιν;
ἄποξ, ! -χῆν.
μῆ[!] darker[!] ἔστιν τᾶλ-[!] ἐνός,
τᾶλ- dark.
γε[!] οὐδειν[!] ἐν εἴη[!] ἐν[!] μῆδεν
ἔστιν ἐν. ἄπαντα^{*} ! -ὰν
-λοις[!] -λὰ. ! οὐτ' ἐν[!] τᾶλλα: οὐ
166 ἐν, ! τᾶλλα darker.
των, ! οὐδέτι
τῷ, ! ἔστι

p. 30.

ἔστιν[!] -σμα.
οὐγάρ[!] ἄρα εἰ μή ἔστιν
ε εἶναι[!] ἐνός.
μή ἔστιν. τᾶλλα οὐτέ ἔστιν.
ἐν, ! ὅμοια.
γε. οὐδέτερα[!] -μενα.
-ρὶς[!] -λα. ! -μεν. [?! ἄλλα, ! ἔστιν: δσα
αὐτὰ τούτων, οὐτετέ ἔστιν, had been
c -μεν. ε curs. ! ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἔστιν.
-ποιμεν; ! τοῦτοτε. ! ὅτι [καὶ c.
ειτέ ἔστιν, ! ἔστιν[!] τᾶλλα, ! αὐτὰ, ξοικεν[!] ειτε ἔστιν[!] μή ἔστιν
αὐτὸτε[!] τᾶλλα faint[!] αὐτὰ
· ad.

-ληλα, ! ἔστιτε[!] ἔστιν
-τατα last a curs.

ΤUB.

οὖν: ! ἐμφατ-
-σθαι: ἀνάγκη[!] δέξυνοντι

—
τᾶλ-
μη ἔστιν a saint[!] ον η? ! οὖν
—
—
-θόντι δεγκ[!] ad.?
φαντάσματι some marks

above ist a[!] αὐτοῖς altered and doubtful.

αὐτοὺς τέ[!] καὶ τοῖς ἄ-

νάγκη φατ-[!] οὖν

ἄπτο- had been[!]

ἔστωτ had been[!]

μηδέτ-

some stains on 188 scraped,

— [but text clear.]

μη ἔστι. τᾶλ-

οὐκοῦν[!] τᾶλλα:

οὐδέ[!] 2nd[!] ad.?

οὐτ' ἐνεστι τᾶλλα:

τᾶλλα

οὐδεν[!] οὐδέτι

οὐδὲ γάρ

οὐγάροῦν: ἐν ἄρα[!] ἔστι

πολλά: ist

ἐστι τᾶλλα. ! ἔστιν

-δάρα

οὐδέτερα[!]

αὐτὰ τούτων, c. οὐτετέ ἔστιν[!] τᾶλλα

οὐδέν[!] -μενα.

γε. οὐδέτερα. οὐδέ -μενα.

χωρὶς[!] -μεν.

αὐτὰ -των. c. οὐτετέ ἔστιν[!] τᾶλλα

οὐκοῦν[!] -μεν[!] ἔστιν. οὐδέν ἔστιν.

τε. ! ὅτι

-κεν ἐν εἴτ[!] ἔστιν[!] ἔστιν[!] τᾶλ-[!] αὐτὰ

· ad.

ἔστιτε[!] ἔστιν

ἀληθέστατα:—No title.

t.

οὖν: c. οὐκοῦν c. ! -ρωθεν ὁρῶντι καὶ
[ἀμβλὺ ἐμφαίνε- (next line).

-σθαι: ἀνάγκη[!] ὁξὲν νοοῦντι.

-ναι.[!] ἐν [ἀπειρά is loosely written ὀι

-τα[!] -λα[!] ἔκαστα: c. τὰ ἄλ- first a of

δεῖ -θαι, ! ἔστιν. ! ἐν: ! οὐκοῦν

ἀνόμοια, ! εἶναι:

μὲν, ! -μενα,

δέγε, ! -ρα[!]

-ματι, ! ἔαυτοῖς:

above ist a[!] αὐτοῖς altered and doubtful.

οὐμίοις c. ! -κους, ! ἔαυτοῖς

οὐκοῦν c.

-λων, c. ! -νους[!] -τῶν, c.

-σεις[!] -τας πανταχῆ.

-νους[!] -μένους, c. ! μηδέτερα.

-τα[!] -θεῖν, εὐπετὲς ἡμῖν ἥδη, ! -λά

-θόντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν. [ἔστι(v): c.

-τιν. ἄλλα[!] εν[!] εἶναι: c.

οὐκοῦν[!] ἔσται c. τᾶλλα:

οὐσῆ[!] εἴη[!] ἐν.

ἔστιν ἐν, ! οὐδᾶν

-λοις, ! τᾶλλα:

-λά[!] τᾶλλα

-των c. οὐδεν[!] -μῶς. οὐδέμιαν[!] ἔχει.

τῶν c. οὐτων c. ! τῶν c. ! -τῷ -τιν

-τίν[!] -μα[!]

δν, ! τῶν c. -λων: c. ! -τιν

-ναι[!] ἐνδος.

-τιν. τᾶλ- οὐτέ ἔστιν

οὐτέ πολλά: ! οὐδέ[!] ὅμοια.

γε. οὐδέτερα. οὐδέ -μενα.

χωρὶς[!] -μεν.

αὐτὰ -των. c. οὐτετέ ἔστιν[!] τᾶλλα

οὐκοῦν[!] -μεν[!] ἔστιν. οὐδέν ἔστιν.

τε. ! ὅτι

-κεν ἐν εἴτ[!] ἔστιν[!] ἔστιν[!] τᾶλ-[!] αὐτὰ

· ad.

ἔστιντε[!] -τιν.

~ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ. Η ΠΕΡΙ ΙΔΕΩ[!]

Slight flourish.

II. EXPLANATORY.

BESIDES the various medieval or modern commentaries and translations available for the elucidation of the Parmenides, the writings of succeeding Greek thinkers, more particularly Aristotle, furnish many apt notes and illustrations. But there are likewise works of a very early date devoted specially to the explanation of the dialogue. Of these two have been cited in this edition. One is the commentary by Proclus, which is printed, somewhat inaccurately, along with Stallbaum's text, and is here referred to according to the paging of Cousin. The other, entitled *Δαμασκίου διαδόχου ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην*, has been more recently edited, with the greatest care, by C. E. Ruelle (Paris, 1889). This latter is less a commentary than a discursive consideration of speculative questions more or less connected with Plato's work, which it has not been possible for us to study with sufficient thoroughness. It is a strange compound of physics, metaphysics, and mythological theosophy; extremely subtle and provokingly confused. The nature of the *ἀπορίαι* will be gathered from the following examples:—What is an *ἀρχή*, and what is its relation to that of which it is *ἀρχή*? Is it knowable; is it one; is it *αὐτάρκης*? Is it *ἀρχὴ κυνήσεως*, and how are we to advance downwards from it to concrete things? What constitutes existence; has it phases; and are these represented by *ὑπαρξία, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή*? Do we ever really attain to the *ἀπόρρητος ἀρχῆς* and *ἀπλῶς ἐν*, or do we stop short at a lower, more concrete, phase of each? How know *τὸ πρὸ ἔαντοι*? At what point in development does *νοῦς*, and with it *γνῶσις*, appear—*ὅν, ζωή, νοῦς?*—or is *γνῶσις* even further removed from the *πρώτη ἀρχή*? Does knowledge not involve division, as opposed to simple oneness? What is *μέθεξις*, and what is comprehended in *τὸ μικτόν*? How things go in triads—*εῖναι, ζῆν, γιγνώσκειν—μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή—ἀκίνητον, αὐτοκίνητον, ἑτεροκίνητον—στοιχεῖα, μέρη, εἰδῆ?* How the last triad stand related? What is the relation of *ὅλον-μέρη, ἐν-πολλά, πολλὰ-στοιχεῖα* and the like? How the order of development is *ἐνάς, οὐσία, ζωή, νοῦς, ψυχή, σωματοειδὲς ἄπαν*, to which series, excluding the first, correspond *τὸ ἀδιάκριτον, διακρινόμενον, διακεκριμένον, αὐτοκίνητον?* Whether *ψυχή* is one, or as numerous as bodies? How *ἐν* produces not *ἐν* but *πολλά*; and how there are both *ἀμέθεκτοι ἐνάδες*, and *ἐνάδες* which are *μετεχόμεναι* by all the grades of existence just specified? How (apparently) a process ideal moves pari passu with a process phenomenal? How *νοῦς ἴδιον ἡ ἐπιστροφή?* Whether the *ἀρχὴ* must not be in fact complex if it causes the complex? What is the character of *χρόνος* and *ἀιών* (discrete *v.* continuous?), of *τὸ νῦν* and *τὸ δέ*, and how ὁ *χρόνος μερίζει τὴν γένεσιν?* And so on. Through all which runs on the one hand a disjointed reference to special passages of the dialogue, and on the other a strange artless appeal to mythology and the old poet-seers—would like to combine faith and reason.

The Title has been already discussed. The spelling *παρμενίδης* is used throughout the dialogue except in one case (131 B) where the *ι* is on a scratch. Cp. 127 C, *κεραμεικῷ* where the *ει* is patched, apparently by the first hand: also 137 B,

πραγματιώδη for the usual *-τειώδη*: and e.g. δέη St. 126: p. . side by side with *πνυθάνει* on this page. Cp. Plato himself, Crat. 418 B. The forms *ει ει* trace their origin to different sources in different words, and may have been differently treated by later writers

in consequence. But there is no doubt that these and other vowel sounds showed a strong tendency to approximate under certain circumstances, as time went on; and Blass (*Aussprache des Griechischen*, 1888), p. 58, says: Diese Schreiber des 2 Jahrhunderts [B.C.] wussten durchaus nicht mehr, wo sie *i* und wo sie *e* setzen sollten, sondern schrieben, *Eῖρις, τειμᾶς* [for **Ιρις, τιμᾶς*], und wiederum *παραμνάτω* und *ἱερᾶς*, etc. Again, Meisterhans (*Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*, 1888), p. 30, says: Dieses *e* nimmt dann in der römischen Zeit, wie verschiedene Versehen in der Orthographie zeigen (*Αἰγίς, Ἐρεχθίς, Οινός, χολιδῆς, λιτουργία*), die Aussprache *i* an. Gleichwohl ist die gewöhnliche Schreibweise, wenigstens bei den Eigennamen auch in der Kaiserzeit, die mit *e* (*χολλείδης*). That the quantity need not trouble us is clear from Meisterhans, 54: Dass in der Kaiserzeit die Quantität der Vokale sich mehr und mehr vermischt, geht hervor aus Messungen wie, *Kῶς μέν μοι πατρίς ἔστιν, ἐγὼ δὲ ὅνομα Νεικομήδης*. For us the point of interest is—does this spelling indicate that at any stage of its transmission our Platonic text had been written to dictation?

ἐκ κλαζομενῶν. κλαζομεναῖ! πόλις Ἰωνίας says a Schol., t, and Rhunken's collec. Anaxagoras was born here. Stallbaum says fuerunt igitur haud dubie Anaxagorei, and seems to find in that a point specially appropriate. Possibly. Yet perhaps the town is mentioned merely to give an air of reality to the work. Cp. Ion 530 A, *Τὸν Ἰωνίαν χαίρειν. πόθεν τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἐπιδεδήμηκας; η̄ οἴκοθεν ἐξ Ἐφέσου;*

ἀδειμάντῳ etc. The question of the identity of the interlocutors cannot be clearly determined. Plato's brothers and the Cephalus of the Republic naturally suggest themselves; and perhaps we may claim it so far as an evidence of the authenticity of the work, that the difficulties connected with such an identification must have been present to a forger's mind and yet cause no concern. To go no further—the Cephalus of the Republic is described by Socrates as resident in Piraeus, as an intimate acquaintance of his, and as considerably his senior; while our Cephalus is now on his second visit (*τὸν πρότερον*) from Clazomenae, and his own language would convey the idea that

he is younger than Socrates. It is objected, too, by Stallbaum, Hermann, and others that Antipho, Plato's youngest brother, could hardly be old enough to have learned the conversation from Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno; and Hermann assumes a set of three brothers of Plato's mother, called by these names, as the true interlocutors both here and in the Republic. Antipho, the brother of Plato, could hardly have been born much before 420 B.C., neither could he have learnt this dialogue much sooner than 404 B.C.: so that Pythodorus must have been an old man when the two met. On the other hand we cannot well place the arrival of Cephalus in Athens earlier than 399 B.C., since, had Socrates been alive, the inquiries might have been addressed to him, in which view an older Antipho seems to be rendered unlikely. See Zeller's *Plato*, and his references: also Stallbaum's *Parmenides*. For Pythodorus, Proclus IV. 13, refers to Alcib. I. 119 A, *εἰπὲ ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ [Σωκρ.] ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν διὰ τὴν Ζύγονος Πινθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχον καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδον, ὃν ἐκάτερος Ζήρωνι ἐκατὸν μνᾶς τελέσας σοφός τε καὶ ἐλλόγυμος γέγονεν.*

μου λαβόμενος τ. χ. Does *μου* depend upon the participle 'taking me by the hand,' or the noun 'taking my hand'? For the former we have Laws I. 637 C, *ταχὺ γάρ σου λάβοιτ' ἄν τις τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμνόμενος*, although the sense of the verb is different. Parallel passages are Charm. 153 B, *Χαιρεψῶν δέ ... ἔθει πρός με, καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρός, ὁ Σώκρατες, η̄ δ' ὁς;* Rep. I. 327 B, *καὶ μου ὅπισθεν δὲ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἴματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη,* where *ὅπισθεν* seems to be the adverb, as *ἄνωθεν* in v. 449 B, *λαβόμενος τοῦ ἴματίου ἄνωθεν αὐτοῦ*, although here the pronoun depends upon the noun. But Cratyl. 429 E, gives *οὖν εἴ τις ἀπαντήσας σοι ἐπὶ ξενίας λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἴποι·* which makes for the view that *λαβ.* *τῆς χειρὸς* is a phrase. We have no means of translating neatly the force of the aorist in these cases; 'after taking' 'having taken' are too formal. We do not usually associate this form of greeting with Greek life; *ἀσπάζεσθαι*, as in 127 A, is more common and more suggestive of southern feeling.

εὶς τὸν ... δυνατόν. It seems to be accepted that *τον* and *δν* are neuter. Yet *τι τὸν τῆδε* is a peculiar

expression, which Ast, Müller, and the Engelmann and Didot translators all give loosely, avoiding the plural in spite of $\tauōν$ and $\hat{\omega}r$, while it appears that Ficinus gave no equivalent for $\tauōν τῆδε$. All are clear and united as regards the text—though II suggests $\tauōν$ —so that any change would be very rash. It may be just possible that $\tauōν τῆδε$ means ‘belonging to those here.’ But is there any objection to our taking $\tauōν$ as masculine, and translating ‘if you are seeking for any one of those belonging to this place with whom we have any interest?’ It will be observed that $\delta\eta\sigma\delta\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma$ $\hat{\nu}\mu\hat{\omega}\nu$ follows.

Φράζε. The use of the present imperative as contrasted with the aorist is said to suggest ‘the notion of permanence, as in general precepts, advice, rules, etc.’ (Jelf), but it can hardly do so here. If we are to see any special purpose we must suppose that the explanation by Cephalus will be an act occupying some time: cp. Theaet. 143 c, ‘Αλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε, where λέγε may be taken as present; Phaed. 61 b, Ταῦτα οὖν, δὲ Κ., Εὐηγῷ φράζε. But Polit., 263 c, gives φράσον δή μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, where time enters more clearly than here.

ἀλλὰ ... ὑμῶν: We may render thus ‘Why in point of fact I am *here* ($\gamma\varepsilon$) for this very purpose.’ Τοῦτο may be used here, rather than $\tauόδε$, as referring backwards to $\tauōν δέγε$ etc. no less than forwards to $\delta\eta\sigma\delta\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma$; cp. ἀρα τοῦτο, 127 E. Stallb. cites Euthyd. 274 A, ‘Ἐπ’ αὐτό γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, δὲ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐπιδεῖξοντε ...’, and cp. Gorg. 447 b, ‘Ἐπ’ αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν. $\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\omega\nu$ $\hat{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$ is inserted parenthetically as compared with καὶ $\hat{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$ $\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\omega\nu$ below, which forms an integral part of the narrative. This parenthetic use occurs again in B and C and in the form $\delta\pi\epsilon\rho\gamma' \epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\omega\nu$, 128 E. Arthur Frederking (Jahrbücher für Philologie—Fleckisen, cxxv., 1882, p. 534 sqq.) treats of this use, whether in the mid. or at the end of a sent., as an evidence of date. While not over confident he urges that this usage is unknown in Protag., Charm., Phaedo, and occurs only once each in Lysis and Euthydemus, while greater liberty is taken in other works such as Sympos. and Repub. In the Phaedo, he points out, the case is striking, as it is a narrative at second hand. Here are the statistics for

the Parmenides as far as 137 c, where the construction stops:

$\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\omega\nu$ mid. 4 end o

$\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\epsilon\nu$ „ 2 „ i

$\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\epsilon\nu$ „ 8 „ 4 $\delta\pi\epsilon\rho\gamma' \epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\omega\nu$ is included; ὡς $\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\omega\nu$ $\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\epsilon\nu$ not. The number is considerable: yet we must weigh the exigencies of the narrative at fourth hand. Plato also requires in the same space a liberal parenthetical use of $\hat{\epsilon}\phi\eta$ and $\phi\alpha\nu\alpha$. $\hat{\epsilon}\phi\eta$ mid. 16 end i

$\phi\alpha\nu\alpha$ „ 29 „ 12 All five words occur non-parenthetically likewise. Sometimes $\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\epsilon\nu$ comes between two cases of $\phi\alpha\nu\alpha$ (130 B, 131 c). Little can be inferred except that Plato’s ear required variety; and possibly a later work might have fewer instances simply because no need arose for the usage. For $\delta\eta\sigma\delta\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma$ $\hat{\nu}\mu\hat{\omega}\nu$ cp. 136 D, $\alpha\hat{\iota}\tau\hat{\omega}\nu$ $\delta\epsilon\alpha\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha$ Παρμενεῖδον. We may complete the construction by $\tau\iota$ with or without an infin., unless Plato intends to suggest $\delta\eta\sigma\delta\iota\nu$, which is not essential where it stands. Cp. for somewhat analogous passages, Hipp. Min. 373 A and Crat. 391 C.

λέγοις ἄν, Both Heindorf and Stallb. cite instances of this polite imperative. Thus λέγοις ἄν alone occur Phaedr. 227 c, Polit. 267 D, 268 E, 291 B. λέγοις ἄν, $\hat{\epsilon}\phi\eta$, ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλα $\hat{\eta}\delta\iota\nu$ ἀκούοντι, Rep. x. 614 A. So ἀκούοις ἄν, Rep. x. 608 D, Polit. 269 C. Also λέγοις ἄν $\tau\hat{\eta}\nu$ διαίρεσιν $\delta\pi\eta$, Polit. 283 D. They seem unfinished conditional sentences.

καὶ ἔγώ ... διακοῦσαι: Construc. easy and conversational: πᾶς δέ που... αὐτῷ δέ γε; being a parenthesis needed only from a picturesque point of view. The speaker, seeking to strengthen his claim to attention, lets the sentence get so broken up that the important ἀκηκόασι becomes formally a mere adjunct. Strictly we should have καὶ ἔγώ $\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\omega\nu$, οὐδὲ ἀκηκόασιν ὅτι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ιμᾶν Ἀντιφῶν τὸν λόγον, οὐδὲ ... διελέχθησαν, ἀπομνημόνευει. τούτων δέομεθα διακοῦσαι. Cp. Apol. 21 A, where the parts bracketed, although conversationally very natural, really confuse the construction, Χαιρεψώντα γὰρ ὦστε που[. οὐδὲς ἔμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλινθεὶ ἐταῖρός τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταῦτην καὶ μεθ’ ιμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ὦστε δὴ] οἷος ἦν [Χαιρεψών,] ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ’ ὅτι ὄρμήσειε. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαρτείσασθαι] [καὶ,

ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὁ ἄνδρες· ἥρετο γὰρ δῆ;]
εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος.

E τί ἦν ὄνομα; It would seem that *ὄνομα* is used predicatively here, ‘what was name to your brother, what had he as name?’ Cp. Crat., opening *Κρατύλος φησὶν* ὅδε ... οὐ τοῦτο εἴναι ὄνομα ὃ ἂν τινες ξυνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι ... ἐρωτῶ οὖν αὐτὸν ἔγώ, αὐτῷ πότερον *Κρατύλος τῇ ἀληθεά ὄνομά ἔστιν* η οὐ. Unless we are to take it as = τί ὄνομα ἔπην τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἡμῶν; Had Plato said *τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ* ἡμῶν τί ἦν *τοῦνομα*; the sense would have been much the same, but *τοῦνομα* the subject.

παῖς δὲ *πον* ἦν Is ἦν 1st or 3rd person? Probably, though not certainly, the latter: *ἥ* being the more likely form in Plato for the 1st. Cp. Prot. 310 E, ἔγὼ γὰρ ἄμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός εἰμι, ἄμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἔώρακα *Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδὲ ἀκήκοα οὐδέντεν ἔτι γὰρ παῖς* *ἥ*, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. The constant use of *πον* with no reference to place bears some analogy to that of ‘there’: ‘A time there was, ere England’s griefs began,’ etc. We might trace the original sense perhaps by saying ‘he was somewhere in his boyhood.’

τὸ πρότερον Cp. ἐξ ἑκείνου and 127 A, *τῆς πρότερας ἐπιδημίας*. C. had been only once at Athens, years ago. Stallb. raises the question whether *τὸ πρώτον* may not be the reading. Apart from the fact that it appears only in ΞΣ, MSS. of no authority, this reading would injure the sense; for what matters the length of time since the first visit, if C. had had later opportunities?

ἐπεδήμη. could stand alone; the add. of *δεῦρο* may be compared with *τῶν τῇδε* above for insistence on the place; while *ἐκ κλ.* may just possibly be an early gloss upon the other two words.

πολὺς ... ἑκείνον. Here, as with *ὄνομα*, the article is omitted, the sense being *πολὺς* δὲ *ἥδη χρόνος παρελήλυθε*. Are we to understand *τοῦ χρόνου* after *ἑκείνον*; or to assume a neuter construction, either absolute ‘from then,’ or having reference to *τὸ πρ. ἐπεδ.* as a sort of neuter equivalent for *τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας*?

δοκῶ, used thus parenthetically is rare, the phrase being usually *ὡς (ἐμοὶ) δοκῶ* (οΓ δοκεῖ); Ast gives a case from Laws 111. 687 E, *τότε, δοκεῖς, παῖς πατρὶ συνεύξεται*. This is no evidence that the Parm. is late; Stallb. cites a like use in Theages 121 D,

δοκῶ γάρ μοι, τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τινὲς ... διαταράττουσιν αὐτόν.

πάνυ γε: αὐτῷ δέ γε; ἀντιφῶν ἀλλὰ So Ι: giving *πάνυ γε*: to Adimantus; αὐτῷ δέ γε, which we make interrogative, to Ceph.; and the rest to Adim. This gives excellent sense; but t disagrees, inserting (as the printed texts do) ἔφη after *πάνυ γε*, and giving the whole to Adim. It may be said that the upper point of the second: in Ι is weaker than the lower. γε ... γε = ‘quite so,’ ‘And his?’

Oτδε. The o placed in the margin indicates a new paragr., as δ below marks one at *τούτων*.

πολίται μοὶ ... ἀκηκόαστι τε. So Ι reads: t gives *πολίται τέ μοὶ*, and this or *τε μοὶ, τ'έμοὶ (=mei)* *τι μοὶ* (strangely) appears in most texts. It may be right, yet the *τε* may have crept in to balance the following one. If the text is as here given the latter *τε* is an illustration—the only other in Parm. occurring 131 A—of a use which Frederking (as p. 77) cites as a mark of lateness. He counts 200 cases of it in Timaeus—e.g. at the opening, ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν σὸν τῶνδέ τε ἔργον etc.—and argues, but with hesitation, that its rarity in Parm. suggests an early date for the work. Cp. on 127 A.

πολλὰ ἐντεύχηκε ‘has had many a meeting.’ Ast c cites Phaedo 61 C, *πολλὰ γὰρ ἥδη ἐντεύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί*: and Crat. 396 D, *ἔωθεν γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆν καὶ παρεῖχον τὰ δτα*. Naturally we find also *πολλάκις*, e.g. Sophist. 251 C, and Menex. 249 D.

διελέχθησαν, The tenses of this verb used by Plato in this sense seem to be *διαλέγομαι*, *διαλέξομαι*, *διελεγόμην*, *διελέχθην*, *διελεγμαι*: the form *διελεξάμην* never occurs. In Alcib. I. 129 C we have the definition *τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταῦτα πον καλεῖς*: but this is modified in Gorg. 448 D-E, and again Rep. v. 454 A, from which we see that it is not rhetoric, nor yet wrangling. Later we find, 135 C, *τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν*, and in Theaet. 161 E, *τὸ δὲ δῆ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς σιγᾶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφίστακομεν* οἷμαι δὲ καὶ *ξύμπασα* ή *τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία*. In short, it is methodical conversational argument on philosophic questions. For the language here compare Theaet. 142 C, *δοκεῖ γάρ μοι (οΣωκρ.) ... συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φίσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι Ἀθήνας τούς τε λόγους, οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ, διηγήσατο*.

πολλάκις ... ἀπομνη. Comp. the course taken by Euclides in reconstructing the discussion between Socr. and Theaet., Theaet. 143 A. He took notes of what Socrates told him, expanded these carefully from memory, consulted Socrates whenever he had an opportunity and corrected his narrative. *ἀπομνη*. = 'has them by heart' 'is able to repeat'—Euclides was not able διηγήσασθαι οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος—as Critias says, Tim. 26 B, ὡς δῆ τοι, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὰ παιδῶν μαθήματα θαυμαστὸν ἔχει τι μνημείον ... καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτου προθύμως με διδάσκοντος, ἄτ' ἐμὸν πολλάκις ἐπανερωτῶντος, ὥστε οἷον ἐγκαίματα ἀνεκπλύτου γραφῆς ἔμμονά μοι γέγονε. Cp. Phaedr. 228 B, D. The word also means 'to repeat from memory' as Critias had already said (*id.* 20 C), ὡς ἀπεμνημόνεν αὐτὸν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ γέρων: cp. Phaedr. 227 E, οἰει με ἀ Λισίας ... συνέθηκε ... ταῦτα ἴδιώτην ὅντα ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἀξένως ἔκεινον;

τούτων ... διακ. *τούτων* must mean *τῶν λόγων*: the accusative would have been equally natural, as in Tim. 26 B and Rep. I. 336 B, βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον. Perhaps the construction is varied designedly, *ἀκούσας* being so far associated with the accus. so recently. *τοίνυν*, as in Gorg. 454 B, *ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω* = 'well' 'well then': it refers back to *λέγοις* *ἄν*, this forms *τὴν δέσηται*. It reads *ἀκούσας*, but Proclus *διακοῦσαι*.

μεράκ. ... διατρ. *μειρ.* etc. explains οὐ χαλεπόν: and ἐπεὶ etc. explains *μειρ.* *διεμελέτηρεν* seems to occur only in Critias and Laws, which may perhaps speak for a late date. *πρὸς ἵππικῆ*—Proclus IV. p. 13. 'Αθηναῖος δὲ οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν, τῶν ἐπ' εὐγενείᾳ φρονούντων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἵππικῆν σπουδάζων, ὡς τοῖς γενναλοῖς ἦν Ἀθηναῖων πάτριον. To explain the absence of *τῇ* Stallb. says 'non opus articulo ante artium nomina, ubi significatur quempiam eas attingere tantum, non omnem earum vim et ambitum complecti.' Is this likely? Like other such adjectives *ἵππικῆ* would require the article so long as *τέχνη, παιδιά*, or some such word was supposed to follow, but when used as a naturalized noun it might take it or want it like other nouns; *μοντική, γυμναστική, ἰατρική* are frequently so used, and Plutarch, Mus. c. 2, speaks of *ἄνδρας μοντικῆς ἐπιστήμονας*, which does not mean attingere tantum. For the language here cp. Lach. 180 D, ἀτε κατ' οἰκίαν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβοντες ὑπὸ τῆς

ἡλικίας. Rep. VII. 540 B, τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας.

εἰ δέ, Stallb. seems quite right in rejecting Heind.'s proposal to read εἰ δοκεῖ, both because this has no authority, and because δεῖ is read by Procl. IV. 73 and 78, and finally because δεῖ lenem quandam habet recusationis significationem, quandoquidem Adim. ad eum, qui omne tempus equitandi studio transigat, non statim vult una cum hospitibus accedere.

ἐνθένδε ... μελίτῃ. Surely Plato's ear must have been at fault in the collocation of the first four words. Μελίτη δῆμος Κεκροπίδος says Schol. t given by Rhunkens. Suidas s.v. quotes Harpocr. δῆμός ἐστι τῆς Κεκροπίδος, ὀνομασθεὶς ἀπὸ Μελίτης τῆς κατὰ μὲν Ἡσίοδον θυγατρὸς Μύρμηκος, κατὰ δὲ Μουσαῖον Δίου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος. It seems to have lain to the N. of the Areopagus, and to the E. of Ceramicus. From the Agora they would walk north, E. of Areopagus, W. of the Propylaea.

ταῦτα εἰπόντες έβ. Proclus in his overstrained manner says, IV. 78, τὸ σύντομον τοῦ λόγου καὶ σαφὲς καὶ καθαρὸν ἔξεστι καὶ διὰ τούτων ὄραν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκαλλώπισε τὸν λόγον εἰπών, 'ταῦτα εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες,' ὡς εἴωθεν, ἡδύνων τὴν συγγραφήν, ἢ τι ἄλλο προσθείς, ἀλλ' ἀμέσως 'ταῦτα εἰπόντες' αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἤσαν οἵ τε εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες. 'Having said this we began walking'; unless (spite of aor.) it means 'we were walking as we said these words.'

χαλινόν τινα ἔκ. 'some bit or other,' 'a bit or some such matter.' Ceph. is not a horsey man. *ἔκδιδ.* is tech., as Heind. and Ast note, 'locare faciendum,' the correl. being, though not in Plato, *ἔκλαβεῖν*.

ἔκενον might refer either to the *χαλκεῦς*, or to the important *χαλινός*, or in a general way to 'that weighty matter.'

τε. A case of *τε* used as introductory with no καὶ (Intrcd. xxi.) which Frederking has overlooked.

παρεῖμεν. So Η: t gives *παρεῖημεν*, which seems to mean that *παρείημεν* was first written, then η was dotted for ejection, and the circumflex put as for *εἶμεν*: optative in either case. The apodosis begins at *ἀνεγύρ.*

δεομ. ... διηγ. The full constr. would be *δεομένων αὐτοῦ ἡμῶν διελθεῖν αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον*. ὕκνει = 'began to make excuse,' 'showed a disposition to decline.' With *πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι* we must

supply τὸ διελθεῖν as subject. Stallb. notes the tenses from ἐβαδ. to διηγ. The impfs. are descriptive, and suggest continuance, as of acts going on under the eye : the aorists merely record necessary facts without dwelling upon them as filling time : ἐκδιδ. = 'in the act of ...' : ἀπηλλάγη for πλυρ. : we also say 'was done' as well as 'had done.' The language of this introduction may be compared with that of *Protag.* 310 ε, 311 A, some of which has been already quoted. We may add ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν ... ἀλλ' ἵωμεν ... καταληψόμεθα αὐτὸν...ἔνδον. Cr. also *Rep.* I. 328 B, ὅμεν οὖν οἰκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Λυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐ. ... εὐθὺς οὖν με ὤδων δέ Κέφαλος ἡσπάξετο τε.

Ἐφη δὲ etc. From here to the beginning of Part II. 137 c, the construc. is involved, and not always consistent; the reason being, as Proclus says, IV. 13, that ἔστιν αὕτη δηλαδὴ τρίτης τῆς συνουσίας ἐκθευτική τούτη τούνν παρών τις Κέφαλος ... ἀφηγηματικῶς καὶ οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥρισμένα πρόσωπα λοιπὸν τοὺς λόγους διατιθέεις, κατά γε τὴν ἐκθευτικήν παραδίδωσι τὴν συνουσίαν (1) Πρώτη τοίνυν ἔστιν συνουσία ἡ αὐτὰ περιέχουσα τὰ κύρια πρόσωπα καὶ τὴν πρώτην σκηνὴν τῶν λόγων· (2) δευτέρᾳ δὲ ἡ παρὰ Πυθόδωρον διαμνημονεύοντος τῆς πρώτης συνουσίας καὶ οὖν ιστορούντος τὰ κατ' ἑκείνην πάντα· (3) τρίτη δὲ ἡ παρὰ Ἀντιφῶντος, οὓς δέ Πυθόδωρος διηγήσατο λόγους ἀπαγγέλλοντος τῷ τε Κεφάλῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν, ὃς εὑρηται, φιλοσόφοις· (4) τετάρτη δὲ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ Κεφάλου τῶν ὑπὸ Ἀντιφῶντος αὐτῷ λόγων παραδεδομένων ἀφήγησις, εἰς ἀδριστον τελευτήσασα θέατρον. We have a change from ὅτι ἀφίκουντο τὸ τὸν μὲν οὖν ... εἶναι instead of καὶ ὅτι ... εἴη. Plato gives us dialogues at first hand, such as *Crito*, *Cratylus*, *Philebus*, *Phaedrus*; at second, as *Phaedo*, *Theaetetus*, *Republic*; at third, as *Symposium*; and here at fourth hand. The reason seems rather literary than philosophical. Here the repeated transmissions suggest that remoteness which Plato desires to set up for the original conversation. The *Theaet.*, 143 c, alludes to the difficulty of sustaining a second-hand narrative—copied by Cicero—which seems to imply that Plato had already tried that method, although it may be simply another literary artifice to secure variety. Some light would be thrown on the matter, no

doubt, if we possessed any of the dialogues composed by Plato's contemporaries.

παναθηναῖα. Ἡ τῶν Παναθηναίων ἑορτὴ καὶ δὲ ἀγὼν ἔτεσθη μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ Ἐριχθονίου τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τῆς Ἀθήνης, ὃντερον δὲ ὑπὸ Θησέως συναγαγόντος τὸν δῆμον εἰς ἄστυ. ἄγεται δὲ δὲ ὁ ἀγὼν διὰ πέντε ἔτων· καὶ ἀγωνίζεται παῖς Ἰσθμία οὐ πρεσβύτερος, καὶ ἀγένειος [καὶ] ἀνήρ· τῷ δὲ νικῶντι διδόσασιν ἔλαιον ἐν ἀμφορεῦσιν, καὶ στεφανοῦσιν αὐτὸν ἔλαιά πλεκτή. Schol. t, with contracs., top, 79 a 2, and Rhunk. What connection has the last sentence? διττὰ παν. ἦγετο Ἀθήνησι, τὰ μὲν καθ' ἔκαστον ἐνιαυτόν, τὰ δὲ διὰ πενταετηρίδος, ἀ καὶ μεγάλα ἐκάλουν. ἦγαγε δὲ τὴν ἑορτὴν πρῶτος Ἐριχθόνιος δὲ Ἡφαίστου τὰ δὲ παναθ. πρότερον Ἀθήναια ἐκαλοῦντο (Harp.) Suid.s.v.

ζήνων τε ... γεγον. See the histories of philos. etc. We may quote Diog. Laert. ix., Parm. 21-23, Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης δήκοντες Ξενοφάνους Εἰς τοῦτον καὶ Πλάτων τὸν διάλογον γέγραφε, Παρμενίδην ἐπιγράφας ἡ περὶ ὑδῶν. ἦκμαζε δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ ἐξηκοστὴν Ὁλυμπιάδα (B.C. 504-1). 25-29, Ζήνων Ἐλεάτης. τοῦτον Ἀπολλόδωρός φησιν εἶναι ἐν Χρονικοῖς φύσει μὲν Τελευταγόρον, θέσει δὲ Παρμενίδου περὶ τούτου καὶ Μελίσσου Τίμων φησὶ ταῦτα·

'Αμφοτερογλώσσου τε μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδὸν Ζήνωνος πάντων ἐπιλίπτορος ἢδε Μελίσσου

Ο δέ Ζήνων διακήκοε Παρμενίδου καὶ γέγονεν αὐτοῦ παιδικά· καὶ εὐμήκης ἦν, καθά φησι Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Παρμενίδῃ, ὃ δέ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Φαιδρῷ καὶ Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην αὐτὸν καλεῖ. (261 D.) φησὶ δέ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ εὑρετὴν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι διαλεκτικῆς, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλέα ρήτορικῆς (seems a lost dial. cp. D. L. viii. 57 under Empedocles, and Bekk. Arist. v. 1484). γέγονε δὲ ἀνὴρ γενναιότατος καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ ἐν πολιτείᾳ ... οὗτος τὴν πρότερον μὲν Υέλην, ὃντερον δὲ Ἐλέαν ... πόλιν εὐτελῆ καὶ μόνον ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τρέφειν ἐπισταμένην ἥγαπτησε μᾶλλον τῆς Ἀθηναίων μεγαλαυχίας, οὐκ ἐπιδημήσας τὸ παράπαν (which need not be taken too literally) πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀλλ' αὐτόθι καταβιούς. ... ἦκμαζε δέ οὗτος κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ ἐβδομηκοστὴν Ὁλυμπιάδα (B.C. 464-1).

ἐν μάλα δὴ is not a usual combination. We find εν μάλα frequently, both in regard to age (*Euthyphro* 4 A, with πρεσβύτης: Tim. 22 B, with παλαιόν) and otherwise. Again, *Sophist.* 217 c, we have μάλα δὴ used of Parmenides—ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε οὗτος

πρεσβύτον. In Charm. 154 B Socr. says *νῦν δ' οὐμαί πον εὖ μάλα ἀν τῷδη μειράκιον εἴη*: and Ast in his Lex. and text reads *εὖ μάλα τῷδη* here with *t*, which may be correct. But *δῆ* need not go too closely with *εὖ μάλα*, it may = 'you are to observe.'

περὶ έτη The only analogy which Ast quotes is Rep. x. 602 c, Πρὸς Διός, *ἥν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μυμένθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτον μέν τι ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*; Stallb. renders 'circiter (*περὶ*) quinque et sexaginta annos et quod excurrit (*μάλιστα*) natus' citing authorities. But L. and S. quote Thucyd. I. 118, *ταῦτα δὲ ... ἐγένετο ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα, μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ὀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου*, where the time is 480-431 B.C. or 49 years at most. So vii. 68, the constitution of the 400 at Athens is said to have occurred *ἐτεὶ ἑκατοστῷ μάλιστα ἐπειδὴ οἱ τύρannoι κατελύθησαν*, that is 510-411 B.C., or 99 years. Although (Introd. xxxv.) the text here is certain, one cannot but think that there is something wrong. *εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι σφόδρα πολιόν*, together with the phrases from Sophist. above and Theaet. 183 E, *πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη*, suggest an age decidedly beyond sixty-five. *ἔξηκοντα* may be a very early corruption of *ἐνερήκοντα*. Or may it have crept in from some early reference to the *ἐνάτην καὶ ἔξηκοστην Ὀλυμπιάδα* of Diog. Laert.?

αὐτὸν ... γεγονέναι is subject to *λέγεσθαι*. *καὶ ἐπὶ θηλειῶν καὶ ἐπὶ ἄρρενων ἐρωμένων* *ἥ λέξις εὔρηται, κατὰ μεταφορὰν*¹ *δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν σπουδαξιμένων πάνυ·* *ἥ καὶ ἐν Φαιδρῷ λέγεται·*¹ *ἐσπούδακας, ὡς Φαιδρέ, ὅτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμην, ἐρεσχῆλῶν σε.*¹ *ἥ δὲ λέξις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀστελγῶν ἐρωμένων.* Sch. t, with contrs. foot of 79 a, Rh. It is clear that Diog. Laert. took the statement literally. So does Athenaeus, Deipn. xi. 505 end, *τὸ δὲ πάντων σχετλιώτερον, καὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν, οὐδεμιᾶς κατεπειγούσης χρέιας, ὅτι παιδικὰ γεγόνοι τοῦ Παρμενίδον Ζήνων ὁ πολίτης αὐτοῦ.*

καταλύειν ... νέον. *ἔφη* breaks the constr. Its next use in D, *ἔφη ὁ πνυθόδωρος* is still more irregular, following *λέγειν τὸν π.* above. Note the absence of the article with the nouns *τείχους* and *κεραμεικῷ* contrasted with the use of it with the names of the various persons. *ἐν κεραμεικῷ* corresponds with *ἐν μελίτῃ* above, and *ἐκτὸς τείχους* may be compared with our 'out of town,' 'out of doors.' We have

τόπος ἀθήνησιν ἔνθα καὶ οἱ πόροι προειστήκεσαν. *εἰσὶ δὲ δίο κεραμικοὶ·* *ὅ μὲν ἔξω τείχους, ὅ δὲ ἐντός:* Sch. t, foot of 79 a, Rh. The use of *οἱ* with infin., like that of *ἥνικα* below, is not unusual in orat. obl., cp. 130 A, and Timae. 21 E, *οἱ δὴ Σόλων ἔφη πορευθεὶς σφόδρα τε γενέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔντιμος, καὶ ...*, and has parallels even in Latin. Thus Tac. Ann. vi. 2 has the relative 'sed quos omitti posse, quos deligi? ... quam deinde speciem fore?'

ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς. Here *τινὰς* must be taken closely with *ἄλλους*, much like *χαλινόν τινα*, otherwise it seems to clash with *πολλούς*: we may render 'a number of less important persons.' Still the phrase is odd, and inconsist. with 136 D-137 A which closes with *ἐπειδὴ ... αὐτοί ἐσμεν.* One could fancy the text standing *ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ* and some early reader writing in the marg. *οὐ πολλούς* with a ref. to the above passage, then *οὐ πολλούς* getting incorporated, and finally losing the *οὐ* after *αὐτοῦ*. Socrates says, 129 D, that they were seven.

τότε γὰρ Here we have the first introduction of *διαλεκτικὴ* into Athens, about 450 B.C. according to Plato. For Socrates' age, see Introd. xxxiv.

ἀναγιγ. ... τοῦ ζῆν. *τὸ τοῦ ζήνωνς ἥ ἐπιχ.* *εἰ πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, τὸ αὐτὸ δόμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον.* *ἄλλα μὴν ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ δόμοιον εἶναι!* *καὶ ἀνόμοιον οὐκ ἄρα πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα.* Sch. t, with contractions, top, 79 a 2. *αὐτὸν*, 'himself.' Is *τῶν λόγων* practically the same as *τῶν γραμμάτων* before and after it? The point would be clearer if the altern. reading in *Ἄ-κόμενον* (agreeing with *βραχὺ*) were adopted (Stallb. translates 'sermonum, vel potius disputationum quum recitarentur,' which itself is ambig.); but *τὴν πρώτην ἵπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι* in D seems to decide for the identity. *Verti potest litterae;* says Ast, 'very little was still left of the arguments as they were being read.'

ἥνικα ... ᔕφη The constr. becomes irreg. again, shaking off the gov. of *λέγειν*, 127 A. It should have been *ἥνικα αὐτόν τε ἐπεισελθεῖν τὸν πνυθόδωρον ... οὐ μὴν αὐτὸν γε.* As it stands it gives a good illustr. of the nom. before the infin., when the subject of the principal verb is referred to, in contrast with the accus. (*τὸν παρμενέδην*) of any other person. *μετ' αὐτοῦ* throws Pythod. once more into the background; the *ἔφη ὁ π.* almost, as Heind. says, demands *μεθ' αὐτοῦ.* *τὸν γενόμ.* seems to be used as

a hist. ref. to something in the past, but has little weight in fixing the date, since (Introd. xx.) the dial. must be supposed to be written after the death of Soc. If special force lies in the prefix of ἐπικοῦσαι it may be contrasted with διακοῦσαι, 126 c. οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε (sc. οὗτως τὸ πρῶτον ἐπικοῦσαι). The constr. of the thing heard with δικούειν varies throughout between acc. and gen.

^D τὸν οὖν σωκ. ... δ βούλ. It does not appear that any fragments of Zeno's writings are left. We know them only by reference and description, ancient historians and commentators giving in many cases descriptive summaries which may or may not include the actual expressions of their author. According to Grote (Plato, Parm.) Zeno is here confuting the assumption that 'the self existent and absolute *ens* is plural.' This seems a rather unfortunate account of the matter. Opponents of Parmenides did not, as a rule, set up a 'self existent and absolute' plurality, but rather that every-day plurality of sense which his absolute unity of being was vainly put forward to account for: 129 A, καὶ ἔμε καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλα ἡ δὴ πολλὰ κυλοῦμεν. In dealing with the question Zeno composed several λόγοι, and each of these, it would seem, had more than one ὑπόθεσις. This may perhaps refer to such an argument as that in which he shows that the many must be both (1) infinitely small, and (2) infinitely great; where 'the first hypothesis' would be the working out of No. 1. According to this view each λόγος would be likely to have two ὑπόθεσις, each setting out one side of the contradiction. But in the case before us, ὅμοια τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, not ὅμοια εἶναι alone, seems to be the πρώτη ὑπόθεσις. This would necessitate a different view of λόγος, according to which the πρῶτος λόγος would be perhaps the whole argument against multiplicity, of which the contention from likeness and unlikeness would form the first ὑπόθεσις; while the next λόγος might be the whole argument against motion, of which the 'Achilles' would rank as one ὑπόθεσις. ἀναγνωσθείσης sc. αὐτῆς. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; must be read along with οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; οὕτω: below. It seems compounded from πῶς λέγεις;—ἢ τοῦτο; and πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;—ἢ οὕτως; or = ως τί διανοούμενος τοῦτο λέγεις;

ἢ πολλά ἔστι τὰ δ. Zeno assumes this as the ^E popular view (τὰ λεγόμενα, ε below) in opposition to the view of Parmenides (Introd. xxxvii.). Immediately below the construc. is οὐτε γάρ οἴδοντε (ἔστι) τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια ... εἶναι.

οὐκοῦν is usually two words in ^A and most codices vetustissimi. With our punctuation the word may be made to explain its origin εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον ... οὐκ ἀδύνατον δὴ ... ; But we might also take οὐκοῦν as the beginning of an inference resumed at ἄρα, the words εἰ ἀδύνατον ... τὰ ἀδύνατα coming in as what is inferred, οὐκ οὖν—εἰ ἀδύνατον ... πάσχοι ἀν τὰ ἀδύνατα—ἄρα τοῦτο ... λόγοι; the purport of this inferential query being yet further explained by οὐκ ἀλλο ... ἔστι; In the sentence εἰ γάρ ... εἴη πάσχοι ἄν, the condition is as clearly held to be denied as if the form had been εἰ γάρ ... οὐ πάσχειν ἄν.

παρὰ ... λεγόμ. Heind. treats this on the analogy of παρ' ἐλπίδα, παρὰ δόξιν, παρὰ φύσιν, 'beyond, contrary to, in opposition to, all received views'; but it seems better to say with Stallb. 'to fight the matter out along the whole line of popular opinions,' or 'from front to rear of their array' as in 144 E, where of οὖν and ἐν it is said ἔξιστον δύο ὄντε αἱεὶ παρὰ πάντα: so too Rep. VII. 514 A, ἐν καταγένει οἰκήσει ... τὴν εὔσοδον ἔχοντα μακρὰν παρ' ἄπαν τὸ σπίλαιον. A pron. is omitted in οὐγεὶ τοσαῦτα [σε] τεκμ. παρέχ.

ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά; It may be doubted whether ^{128 p. 3} this means ως 'πολλὰ' οὐκ ἔστι, or whether the sense intended is, as above, ως οὐ πολλά ἔστι [τὰ ὄντα]. For the κ of οὐκ see Introd. cxi.

καταμανθ. may be compared with κατελάβομεν, 127 A, and καταψαίνεται, 132 D; where, if the prep. has a definite purpose, it seems to recall our 'come down upon,' 'drop upon,' whether what is so 'dropped upon' be a person or the sense of a statement.

οὐκ—negatur τὸ 'οὐκ ὄρθως καταμανθάνειν' says Heind., and compares Gorg. 453 D, πότερον ὁ διδάσκει πείθει η οὐ; Οὐ δῆτα, δ Σ., ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει. Stallb. adds other cases. We may simplify the sense to ourselves by putting κακῶς or εὐηθῶς for οὐκ ὄρθως.

ὅλον τὸ γράμμα Partly under each verb: the phrase is not simply συνήκας δ βούλεται ὅλον τὸ γράμμα, but includes συνήκας δλον τὸ γράμμα—δ βούλεται. We have the former construc. alone in

Crat. 414 D, συνεῖναι δὲ τί ποτε βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα, where note the modified relative. *γράμμα* is questionable in the singular for a writing. We have first τῶν τοῦ Z. *γραμμάτων*, the plural being used so in e.g. Xen. Memor. iv. 2 : to it corresponds τῶν λόγων, where the arguments are regarded without reference to their written form. Then comes τοῦ πρώτου λόγου, ἔκαστον τῶν λόγων—to which corresponds τὸ γράμμα. Finally ὅσους περ λόγους γέγραφας, when viewed as a whole, are called up by τῷ συγγράμματι with which we are familiar in Thucyd. G. Kaibel (Hermes xxv. 103, 1890) holds that Zeno introduces the word as a local idiom, which Socrates quietly corrects once by τῷ συγγράμματι. But it is not Zeno who first uses the word (127 c), so that, if the argument is to hold, we must assume that *γράμμα* was the accepted title of Zeno's work, and used as such. Kaibel adds that a mutilated gloss of Phrynicus gives ... καὶ (leg. αἱ) ἐπιστολαὶ δὲ γράμματα καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα, ὡς Δημοσθένης.

τῷ ἀλλῃ φ. The whole might be arranged thus οὐ μόνον τῇ ἀλλῃ φιλίᾳ σου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι βούλεται φίλιωσθαι [σοι]. Heind. would read *σου* for *σου*: Stallb. rightly objects : 'non modo in universum amicitia erga te cupit se insinuare (better insinuasse, gratum tibi fecisse)' is Ast's rendering : 'desires to have secured to him a place in your affection, not merely by his general friendship towards you.' In both Υ and t the first syllable of φ. seems to have been originally οἴκ.

ταῦτα ... σύ, τρόπον τινὰ is of course parenthetic. Υ reads ὅν περ, and in t there is a scratch between ο and π in ὅπερ: no doubt an early scribe was led astray by τρόπον τινά. For the expression cp. Theaet. 152 A, λόγον οὐ φαῦλον ... ἀλλ' ὅν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἀλλον εἰρήκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

μεταβάλλων 'Twisting it about under our very eyes' so to speak: but t has *μεταβαλών*. We have a different constr. of this word, Phaedr. 241 A, *μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἀρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ ... νοῦν ... ἀντ' ἔρωτος*: cp. mutare sententiam with mutat quadrata rotundis.

Ἐν φῆς ἔφης Procl. and Υ; was he or his orig. thinking of the poems as already finished, without noticing *παρέχει?* t has ἐν φῆς. Ast prints ἐν φῆς.

τούτων Germans translate 'dafür': strictly it should be *τούτου*, 'of this assertion.'

δὲ ... δὲ δὲ without *μὲν* is common enough; but a double δὲ is unusual. οὐ π. φ. εἶναι, it would seem that the οὐ is to be tacked to πολλὰ like the *μὴ* which follows.

τεκμ. δὲ αὐτὸς t reads δὲ καί, the καὶ being a contrac. whose form (Introd. cxi.)—if we suppose the archetype of Υ written in minuscule—would help to explain how Υ may have omitted καί, i.e., by mistaking it for a superfluous δ' = τεκμήρια δὲ δ' αὐτός. The whole would be simplified could we read *τεκμήρια καὶ αὐτὸς ... παρεχόμενος*.

παμμεγθη—this form occurs once oftener, according to Ast, than the form *παμμέγις*, two of the three cases being in this dialogue (164 D). We also find *παμπληθής* though much more rarely than *πάμπολος*; and *παμμήκης* without any *πάμμακρος*. The following sentence is loosely constructed. It is not absolutely certain whether *μὴ* is to go with πολλὰ or with φάναι understood, nor whether *ἐκάτερον* is masc. and subject, or neut. and object to λέγειν. Again, while σχεδόν τι may in a vague way qualify λέγοντας ταῦτα it would be better if written λέγοντας σχεδόν τι ταῦτα. And while the whole down to ταῦτα is begun as subject to φαίνεται with perhaps an εἶναι added, he suddenly introduces a sort of résumé of the subject in the words ίμῦν τὰ εἰρημένα (= τὰ ίμῦν εἰρημένα), which again prompts him to replace εἶναι by εἰρήσθαι. Stallb. compares Rep. 1. 331 B and Theaet. 144 A, the latter being very good, τὸ γάρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα, ὡς ἀλλω χαλεπόν, πρῶν αὐτὸν διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεὸν παρ' ὄντινοῦν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὖτ' ἀν φόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνομένους. For the language cp. Crat. 429 D, Κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος η̄ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐρήνην ήλικιαν, ὁ ἑταῖρε; and Arist. Met. II. 4, 1000 A, 15, Καίτοι περὶ ... τούτων ὑπὲρ ήμᾶς εἰρήκασιν.

ναί, φάναι ... ἀπ. What is it that *ναί* confirms? Stallb. says 'recte quidem nos fere idem dicere arbitraris etc.' and refers to E. But the σὺ δ' οὖν would be clearer if we take *ναί* as affirming ὑπὲρ ήμᾶς (nous autres) etc., 'Quite true: our position does seem to transcend the comprehension of you outsiders. You at least, for one, have not in all points perceived the true purport of the writing.' As to the dogs Suidas quotes Soph. (Aj. 8), κυνὸς C

Λακαίνης ὡς τις εὑρίσκονται βάσις. Aristotle says Περὶ τὰ Ζῷα, p. 607 a 3, καὶ ἔξι ἀλώπεκος καὶ κυνὸς οἱ Λακωνικοὶ. I. 608 a 27, καὶ αἱ Λάκαιναι κύνες αἱ θήλειαι εὐφύεστεραι τῶν ἀγρένων εἰσίν. Περὶ Ζώων γενέσεως, E 781 b 9, διὸ δύσων οἱ μυκτῆρες μακροί, οἷον τῶν Λακωνικῶν κυνιδάνων, ὅσφραντικά. The σκύλαξ suits the age of Socrates. So Rep. II. 375 A, οἵεις οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναῖον σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς; where see the comp. in detail: and VII. 539 B, οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γείνωται, ὡς παιδὶ αὐτῷς καταχρῶνται, ... χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἔλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίους ἀει. For the action of the dogs, cp. Politic. 263 A, ταῦτα δὲ εἰσαῦθις κατὰ σχολὴν καθάπερ ἰχνεύοντες μέτιμεν. The actual words occur Xen. Cyneg. IV. 9, ἄγειν δὲ ἀμεινον τὰς κύνας εἰς τὸ ὅρη πολλάκις ... τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅρη οὖλον τέ ἔστι καὶ ἰχνεύειν καὶ μεταθέειν καθαρῶς. In these the order of the two verbs is better than in Parmen. Stallb. quotes several examples in Plato of καίτοι followed by ἀλλά: Symp. 177 E, Euthyphro 3 c, Phaed. 68 E, 69 A. Here, however, the καίτοι rather answers σύ δ' οὖν etc., or comes in as a parenthesis, ἀλλά referring back independently.

πρᾶτον μὲν has no second objection answering to it, and E seems to admit that it is the only one; but so one begins a defence. τοῦτο, used like τόδε, of what follows.

ὅτι ... διαπραττ. may be freely rendered 'that the writing takes no airs whatever to itself as though it were written with the aims which you mention in its head, while at the same time (ἐπι-) keeping people in the dark, as if that were some great achievement.' The context (A-B, ταῦτὸν γὰρ ... εἰρῆσθαι) suggests that ὡς τι μέγα δ. mean chiefly, if not entirely, the success of the concealment; and these words can hardly be the object of ἐπικρυπτ., the thing which is to be concealed, though some translators seem so to take them. Cp. Gorg. 511 C-D, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν ... αὕτη ... οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐπιχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη. Here the γράμμα and the art of seamanship are personified, as below λόγος.

τῶν συμβεβ. τι is one of the accidental circumstances attaching to it, opposed to τό γε ἀληθές, the true aim: we come very close here to the technical Aristotelian sense of τὸ συμβεβ.

αὐτὸν is τὸν λόγον not τὸν Παρμενέδην. Cp.

Symp. 193 B, καὶ μή μοι ὑπολάβῃ Ἐρυξίμαχος κωμῳδῶν τὸν λόγον, ὡς Παυσανίαν καὶ Ἀγάθωνα λέγω, and D, μὴ κωμῳδῆσῃς αὐτόν: Theaet. 164 C-E, περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου—καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο δ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἄμα ... εἴπερ γε ὁ πατήρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη ... νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ... προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδέ οἱ ἐπίτροποι ... βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν ... ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτὸι κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἔνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν; also Phaed. 88 E, and for personification of δ λόγος, id., 87 A and 89.

κωμῳδεῖν, In Symp. 193 B the constr. is much as D here, where ὡς means 'to the effect that.' Ast would seem to supply λέγοντες ὡς; but it is simplest to suppose οὕτω κωμῳδεῖν ὡς, as below τοῦτο βούλομενον δηλοῦν ὡς.

πολλὰ καὶ γ. Heind. says, 'i.e., πολλὰ γελοῖα, ut semper fere Graeci dicunt πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, π. καὶ πονηρὰ, π. καὶ χαλεπὰ, π. καὶ ὀλβια.' Are π. καὶ γ. nom. to συμβαίνει as a personal verb, or acc.; and, if the latter, how are they related to πάσχειν? συμβ. seems to be so far imperson., and the constr. συμβαίνει τῷ λόγῳ πάσχειν πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ, the arrangement being a Platonic hyperbaton.

αὐτῷ. So Ι and t: neither it nor αὐτῷ seems satisfactory. We must read τῷ ἐνὶ into τῷ λόγῳ, and render ἐναντία αὐτῷ = ἐναντία τῷ ἐντοῦ φύσει, antagonistic, as πολλά, to its inherent nature.

τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα seems to be accepted as one phrase; yet τὸ γρ. might stand alone, and τοῦτο might be object of ἀντιλέγει, 'retorts this difficulty.' It would, however, strengthen the case of those critics who wish to read ταῦτά, immediately following, against the MSS.

τὸν τὰ πολλὰ λέγ. 'the asserters of The Many.' Above, ἐν and πολλὰ are predicates of τὸ πᾶν; here the πολλὰ are used in substantive independence; and perhaps the last εἰ ἐν ἔστι with the following εἰ πολλά ἔστιν, η τοῦ ἐν εἶναι are to be regarded in the same light, τὸ πᾶν having dropped away. For the language, cp. Arist. Met. I. 3. 984 b 1, τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ... τοῖς δὲ δὴ πλέιστοιοῦσι.

ὑπόθεσις An anchor to the agitated thinker, according to Phaedo 101 D, σὺ δὲ δεδώς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἐντοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἔχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο

ἄν. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἔψης ἄν: and if asked for a reason ὡσαύτως ἀν διδοῖς, ἀλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ητις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἔως ἐπὶ τι ἵκανον ἔλθοις. One expects an obj. to ἐπεξίοι, as Rep. iv. 437 A, πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐπεξίοντες. So one expects βούλευσασθαί (μοι) ἔξεγένετο below, as Euthyd. 275 E, ὅστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαί μοι ἔξεγένετο εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ.

ταύτη Stallb. and Ast render hactenus, but we get hactenus in κατὰ τοσοῦτον, 129 A, which differs from ταύτη. Is not ὁδῷ rather in Plato's mind with λανθάνει? Stallb. and others supply τὸ πρᾶγμα as nom. to λανθάνει, and σε τοῦτο λανθάνει ὅτι—above accords; yet Heind. better suggests τὸ γράμμα.

πρεσβυτ. Relative to νέου: Zeno wrote 'from an eagerness for controversy pardonable in a youth, not from a desire for notoriety undignified in a mature man.' ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, probably 'as I said above'—128 A, καλῶς ... δ βούλεται: yet it might be 'the actual purport of my argument' as opposed to its motive. Can Plato be writing historically when he puts this apology into Zeno's mouth? He certainly conveys that Zeno's contribution to philosophy has been overrated.

ἡγοῦμαι ... ἔχειν. Is the construction ἡγοῦμαι (τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχειν) ὡς λέγεις (αὐτὸν) ἔχειν: or ἡγοῦμαι 'I adjust my belief,' ὡς λέγεις (τὸ πρᾶγμα) ἔχειν 'in accordance with your account of the matter'? The question οὐ νομίζεις, etc. is not answered by Zeno, and Plato can hardly be serious in ascribing such doctrines to him. If we are to hold that Parmenides, and even Socrates as a lad, had got so far in speculation, what is left as Plato's own contribution to the subject? Cp. Introd. xxx.-xxxii., xxxiv.,¹²⁹ and ff. The full sense of εἴδος must grow upon us; but its strongest feature is that it is τι αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν or, 130 B, χωρὶς. Death is described in similar language, Phaedo 64 C, ἀρα μὴ ... εἶναι τοῦτο τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγένταν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι;

ἢ ἔστιν ἀνόρι. Stallb. 'H.e. δ ὄντως ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον, unde retracto accentu ἔστιν scripsimus.' in which editors follow him. We have δ ἔστιν ἐν below B, and the classical passage is Phaedo 75 D, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο δ ἔστι καὶ ἐν ταῖς

ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι—where he shows his whimsical insistence on the importance of question and answer. And throughout Socrates' speech, cp. Diog. Laert. Plato III. (9)-(13): also Phaedo 78 D, 92 D.

πολλὰ The world of sense with its multiplicity. **ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ τ.** 'In the way and to the degree in which.'

ἐναντίων Note the change from δυοῖν. δυοῖν brings p. 4 out the idea that there are two opposites to partake of; now his mind dwells on them as opposites and more than one. Immediately ἀμφοῖν recalls the dual idea, which is again merged in the plural.

αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, He does not, probably, mean that in any single object is like and unlike itself—though that might be taken as a sort of transcendental completion of the case—because the sharing in 'likeness' makes it like another thing which also shares likeness; and if that thing agrees with it further in sharing 'unlikeness,' the two will be at once like and unlike. If αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς is to be pressed, then it would seem to mean 'among themselves as a world of sensible objects' as against αὐτὸν τὰ ὄμοια, etc. which follow.

τι θαυμαστόν; Thus far he readily accepts a world of sense so sharing in εἴδη. In αὐτὰ τὰ ὄμοια he is speaking of εἴδη; does he assume numerous εἴδη of ὄμοιάτης? Probably not. But μετάληψις among the εἴδη, which he would like to see thought out, must lead to complications. There will be as many ὄμοια among the εἴδη as there are derived ὄμοια with us. And due to the same cause?

εἰ... ἀπεφαίνετο ... τέρας ἀν ἦν rejects the supposition as hopeless; εἰ ἀποφαίνει ... οὐδὲν ... ἀτοπὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι, speaks as of a thing actually going on; εἰ ἀποδεῖξε ... θαυμάσομαι takes a hopeful view; εἰ ἀποφαίνοι ... ἀξιον [ἀν εἴη] θαυμάζειν is quite impartial; εἰ ἀποδεῖξε ... τί θαυμαστόν; is back in the region of fact, cp. εἴπερ καὶ νῦν πάντα ταῦτα πράτομεν, 155 D.

μετέχοντα In treating of participation he uses two verbs μεταλαμβάνειν and μετέχειν, each of which gives a noun μετάληψις, μέθεξις. No theory on the kind of relationship is implied in either word; at present he does not seem to think any necessary. Phaedo, 100 C-E, directly states that any theory is renounced and gives παρουσία, κοινωνία as alterna-

tives. ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τῷ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά... καὶ μεγέθει ὥρᾳ τῷ μεγάλα μεγάλα. In other respects the views of Socrates on *μέθεξις* seem much clearer in the Phaedo. Here he draws no distinctions as to compatible and incompatible combinations, but speaks of *μέθεξις* as though anything might share in anything; in Phaedo 102 D ff. he shows not only that there are (104 B) *ἐναντία* which are ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα ἄλλήλους *ἐναντία* ἔχει ἀὲτ τάναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ὕδεαν ἡ ἀν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὕσῃ *ἐναντία* γ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἦτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἡ *ὑπεκχωροῦντα*. ἡ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολεῖσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο διοιν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; So too 103 A and Sophist. 253 B-254.

ἢ ξτιν ἐν Note the emphasis in this and in *τὰ πολλὰ δή*. These latter are of course quite other in sense from ἀ δή πολλὰ καλοῦμεν above, which mean ‘the many of sense,’ whose real existence Zeno rejects. Socrates assumes that these draw with them as real counterpart an abstract ideal many which he here calls *τὰ πολλὰ δή* and *πλῆθος*.

καὶ θηθαυμάσ. ‘When you are as far as this, I shall be at the wondering point,’ ‘by this time I shall have begun to wonder.’ Of the future of *θαυμάζω* Ast cites no other case in Plato but Euthyphro 15 B, *θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων*.

γένη τε καὶ εἴδη In the fully elaborated Aristotelian terminology these differ as the more general and the more specific, as genera and species. Even A., however, does not always adhere to this use, nor does Plato speak in such a sense here. The two words are merely a comprehensive phrase for the world of ideas. If there be a distinction, perhaps γένη brings out the generality of the ideas, and εἴδη their outward aspect so to speak.

πάθη πάσχοντα, Cp. Apol. 22 C, *τοιοῦτον τὸ μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες*: and for Socrates’ language about his own plurality, Phaedo 102 B; also Soph. 251 A, *Λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δή που πόλλ' ἄπτα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς ... καὶ τάλλα δή κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτως ἐν ἔκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν*, and Phileb. 14 C, *ἀρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῦ Πρώταρχον ἔνα γεγονότα φύει,*

πολλοῖς εἶναι πάλιν τὸν ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἄλλήλους, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μηρία;

ἔφε is in Ι wrongly ἐρῆ. The form may have arisen partly from a mistake in dictation, and partly from an association with ὅτ' ἀν. It enters as a conversational relief, but breaks the construction. The passage should grammatically run εἰ δὲ ἐμὲ ... πολλά —λέγων, ὅταν μὲν ... ὡς ... ὡσαντως, ὅταν δὲ ἐν, ὡς ... ἄνθρωπος—τί θαυμαστόν; καὶ γὰρ πλήθους οἷμαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς μετέχω, ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα.

ἔπτα We can name only five—Parmenides, Zeno, Pythagoras, Socrates, Aristotle.

ἐὰν οὖν ... ἀποφαί. = ἐὰν οὖν τις ἐπιχειρῇ ἀποφαίνειν ταῦτα ὄντα τοιοῦτα πολλὰ καὶ τοιοῦτον ἐν, ‘that many and one of this type, in this sense of the terms, are the same.’ We have here another series of conditional sentences whose shades of thought the reader can work out. Of the form ἐὰν ... ἀποφαίνῃ ἀγαίμην ἀν Jelf (854, 2b) gives a case, Phaedo 93 B, ἀν (ἐὰν) μὲν μᾶλλον ἀρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, ... μᾶλλόν τε ἀν ἀρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων εἰ δὲ ἤτοι τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἥττον τε καὶ ἐλάττων; where note also the change to ει.

λίθους καὶ Cp. Phaedo 74 A-B, *φαμέν πού τι εἶναι* ἵστον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πάντα ἔτερόν τι αὐτὸν τὸ ἵστον. The verb ἀποδεικνύναι means ‘gives us examples of’; in the next clause it is understood in the sense of ‘prove that the one is many,’ etc.

ῶν νῦν δὴ So Ι and t—δ τc. II. — Stallb. says Vett. editt. ὕν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον quod Heindorfius interpretans per τὰ εἴδη τούτων ἀ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, i.e. τοῦ ὁμοίου, τοῦ ἀνομοίου, κ.τ.λ., duriorem amplexus est explicandi rationem quam quae cuiquam placere possit. Recte aliquot codices δ, quod etiam Bekkerus restituit. Heind. adds—Ita recte habet hoc δ, quod jam nolim mutari in ως, quum manifesto opponatur praececd. λίθους καὶ ξύλους καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, and he refers to 130 C-D, where εἴδη for θρὶξ etc., are rejected. The reading δ may be suitable, but we have shown that ‘τc. II.’ is no authority; it is likely a conj. of a reader of II. H. seems right in saying that ὕν does not refer to λίθους, etc., and the tense of ἔλεγον confirms him, ‘which I was speaking about just now,’ i.e. before I referred to stones and wood. Cp. Gorg. 485 D,

δ γάρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ πάντι εὐφυῆς ἦ, which refers to 484 C-D, ἐὰν γάρ καὶ πάντι εὐφυῆς ἦ, etc., and 135 A, where δὲ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν refers to 133 B below.

διαιρήται Η has διαιρεῖται, which cannot go with έάν. Was this a dictation error—see on 126 A? It seems not to have been detected till the writer came to ἀποφαίνη, the η of which is inclosed in three dots. He would see that -η disagreed with -εῖται, then seeing that -εῖται was wrong he corrected it -ῆται. In διαιρήται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη we have the most characteristic step in Plato's theory. What the unphilosophic mind daily has to do with is the πολλὰ of sense. Philosophic thought may be said to have begun for Plato with the general definitions which Socrates extracted from these πολλά. What Arist. says on this point has been seen (Introd. xxix.; cp. xxxii., xlili., l.); Xen. (Mem. IV. 6, 13) says something similar, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπάνηγγεν ἀν πάντα τὸν λόγον. The special Platonic contribution was the χωρισμός.

E ἀγαίμην Why the speedy change to ἀγασθείην? ταῦτα δὲ sc. ἃ συ λέγεις ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι.

πεπραγμ. The perf. inf. of this verb is again used Apol. 22 B, ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ πουόματα ἡ μοι ἔδοκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς—both are passive, although the verb is what would be called in Lat. a trans. deponent: cp. 130 E.

φδε Such is the spelling of Η (not so in t), and if the word be formed from δε on the analogy of τῇδε, ταύτῃ, οὖ, ἦ, it seems reasonable. Stallb. punctuates so as to make ὡς λέγω parenthetic, ‘as I say.’ But it might equally be φδε ὡς λέγω = ‘in the way I mention.’ The expression is careless for πολὺ μέντ’ ἀν τόδε μᾶλλον ὡς (οτ δ) λέγω ἀγασθείην, cp. 135 D. Perhaps he would have preferred τούτῳ μᾶλλον and felt that he had used ταῦτα already.

ει τις ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν t inserts ταῦτην, 130 and so most editors. πλεκομένην would suggest that the εἴδη are in space, but cp. νοητὸς τόπος, Rep. vi. 508 C, VII. 517 B, and λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις below.

οὐτῶς καὶ... λαμβ. break the constr., but add a further detail to our knowledge of the ideas. For the language cp. Rep. vi. 496 D, ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβὼν ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων, also Phaedo 79 A, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχόντων οὐκ

ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἀν ἀλλῷ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν δεὶ δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὅρατά; This λογισμός (which—see Ast—is constantly coupled with ἀριθμός, γεωμετρία, ἀστρονομία; and with νοῦς, νόησις) is as it were the mental telescope by means of which διαιρούμεθα χωρὶς each successive εἴδος in the νοητὸς τόπος or intellectual firmament.

ἐποδεῖξαι. From B to E we had two words used to signify ‘prove, show, demonstrate’—ἀποφαίνειν (he begins with the middle) 8 times, and ἀποδεικνύειν 3 times. Here the prefix is changed, as though Socr. were now looking at the proof for the ideal world as something added on—as an œuvre de surcroît for his special satisfaction—to the proof for the physical world. Note that while Zeno advances his proofs in regard to the latter as a reductio ad absurdum, Socrates takes them up seriously and wants similar entanglements carried into the sphere in which the one of Parmenides is supposed to be supreme (Introd. xl.). For it seems clear that he does desire it; the θαυμαστόν, θαυμάζειν, τέρας change to ἀγαίμην θαυμαστῶς, and merely indicate his consciousness that the topic involves great difficulties. One cannot help contrasting this whole passage with Phaedo 102-4, Sophist. 248-52, Phileb. 14-16. In the two latter dialogues the service to philosophy here spoken of in such terms as ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρέως μὲν πάνυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι, is ridiculed as an occupation for children—Soph. 251 B, οὕτε γε, οἶμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέστι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν εἰδῆς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ που χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἔωντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον, etc.; Phileb. 14 D, εἰρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, ... παιδαριώδη καὶ ρίζδια καὶ σφύρα τοῖς λόγους ἐμπόδια, etc. (Introd. lx.). And in all three the carrying of the matter into the world of ideas is treated very differently (Introd. xxxi., and on 129 B above). Thus Socrates old repudiates Socrates young. In Sophist. he makes distinctions, 251 D, 252-53 A—finding that to deny all forms of mingling, and to affirm all, lead equally to absurdities, and that the true course is to admit certain combinations and to reject others.

ἴφ' ἐκάστου Cp. 160 c and Theaet. 204 c, οὐκον ἔφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως τὰ πάντα ἔξ εἰρίκαμεν; But these are not quite parallel, and our phrase refers to a cause, while there is a feeling of locality in them. The dat. is more general, as Rep. v. 457 B, δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυμναῖς γυναιξὶ ... οὐδὲν οὐδεν ... ἔφ' ϕ γελῷ οὐδὲ ὅ τι πράττει. ἄχθεσθαι, at the invasion of the sphere of the one by a crowd of *εἴδη*. Stallb. and Heind. would prefer the future, 'on the brink of being annoyed'; but is that better?

τὰς δὲ = αὐτὸς δέ, a known usage: here *αὐτὸς* precedes and *αὐτῷ* follows. How steadily Plato uses the article with the proper names.

μεδιάν etc. Cp. Phaedo 62 E, ἀκούστας οὖν ὁ Σ. ἥσθηναι τε μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἀεί τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κ. λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ. 86 D, διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σ., ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδάστας. On ἀγαμένους cp. Phaed. 88 E, πολλάκις θαυμάστας Σωκράτη οὐ πάποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος ... ὡς ἡδέως ... τὸν λόγον ἀπέδεξατο.

ὅπερ οὖν sc. αὐτοὺς ἄγασθαι τὸν Σ. as Heind. points out, 'which in point of fact (*οὖν*) Parm. declared they did.' Here again we have relat. with inf., 127 C.

p. 5. εἰπεῖν φάναι This Frederking regards as the normal usage of these verbs in such cases; εἰπεῖν part of the narrative, φάναι parenthetical.

B ἄξιος ἄγασθαι θαυμάζεσθαι c., Schol. t outer marg. 79 b 1, and Rh. Yet the verb seems active 'worthy to wonder at'; cp. Lys. 207 A, οὐ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἄξιος ἀκούσται, etc. Donaldson in a like case cites Waverley, 'a Prince to live and die under.' Still we have Alcib. I. 105 B, ὅτι ἄξιος εἰ τιμάσθαι, etc. We may take the inf. as in the gen., both from the ordinary govt. of ἄξιος, and from e.g. Phileb. 14 A, ἀρά ἄξιος ἀν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν;

τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, cp. 135 D. Probably 'your zeal for discussion' (*τὸν λόγον = τὸ διαλέγεσθαι*): but it might also mean 'your eager attack upon Zeno's λόγοι.'

αὐτὸς σὺ 'Is this distinction your own?' says Grote; but does it not mean 'You ask if Zeno has done this: have you yourself done it?' What follows upon the ideas comes clearly under the criticism of Aristotle, Met. A. 9, 990 b 15 (Introd. xlvi.) who defines τὰ πρός τι thus: Cat. 7, 6 a 36, Πρός τι ὃς τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὃς αὐτὸν ἄπειρος ἐστὶν

ἔτερων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁ πωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἔτερον, οἷον τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθεν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔτερον λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ λέγεται μεῖζον· καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον Again, ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι, οἷον ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον Again, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥπτον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρὸς τι· ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόμοιον μᾶλλον καὶ ἥπτον λέγεται. Once more, πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δούλος δεστότον δούλος ... καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος, etc. In a word τὰ πρὸς τι are what we call 'qualities' as opposed to those complexes which are called 'things' or 'objects.' And it may be observed that Socrates feels most confidence in the *εἴδη* which are πρὸς τι, and least in those which are objects or οὐσίαι.

ἄττα Sophist., 255 E, speaks of 5 as a minimum. In Η the breathing is patched (Notes I.). t reads ἄττα. Authorities say ἄττα=τινά, ἄττα=ἄτινα. But the latter form alone is found in Attic inscriptions. (Gramm. der Att. Inschr., p. 123, Meisterhans.) 'Recte Stephanus καὶ τί σοι δ. scribendum vidit pro vulgato καὶ τί σοι δ.' Stallb. I.e. the *τι*=aliquid, not quid? The constr. is καί σοι δοκεῖ αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης εἶναι τι χωρὶς τῆς ὁμοιότητος ἦν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν, καὶ αὐτὸν δὴ ἐν καὶ ... ἡκούετε, χωρὶς ὧν ... ;

αὐτὴν ὁμοιότης This seems to have been the orig. from which the variants come. Stallb. thinks the want of the article led to all the changes. Notes I.

ὅσα νῦν δὴ ζήνων Zeno has urged only that the sensible many must be 'like and unlike, which is impossible.' Even if we suppose Parm. to allude to all the λόγοι οր γράμματα he can only mean—'Do you assume *εἴδη* for those qualities which Zeno was proving to be inseparable from a sensible many, with a view to disproving the existence of this latter?' From Phaedr. 261 D, τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴστμεν τέχνη, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούοντι τὰ αὐτὰ (1) ὄμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, (2) καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, (3) μένοντά τε αὐτὰ καὶ φερόμενα; we see that the only remaining *εἴδη* to be covered by πάντα ὅσα would be στάσις καὶ κίνησις—if the list in Phaedr. is exhaustive. For the general vagueness and absence of order and gradation in the ideal sphere as here embodied cp. Introd. xxx., xlvi. Damasc., § 95, p. 237, speaks of a διπλὸς μερισμὸς—οἱ μὲν κατὰ βάθος τῆς καθ' ὑφεσιν ἀπορρεούσης ὅλης σειρᾶς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πλάτος τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχομένων εἰδῶν, but we have here rather a refer-

ence to the concretion of a single idea, so to speak, from pure αὐτοάνθρωπος to our ἀνθρώπος in a σειρά, than to a succession of ideas.

τοιάντα, it has τοιάδε, more usual in ref. to what follows; but cp. Jelf 655, 6.

δικαίου Adjs. as nouns without art. beside τὸν σωκ., τὸν παρμ. It is hard to give a rationale. See Phaedo 76 D-77 A.

πάντων αὐτὸν This list is separate from Zeno's πάντων ὅσα. Is it a series of εἴδη bearing on conduct?

C καὶ τῶν οἰοι ... πάντων 'i.e. καὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων τοιούτων οἰοι ἡμεῖς (ego, tu, ceterique qui adsunt) ἐσμὲν, s. πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων ἀνθρώπων.' Heind. 'Sed grammaticae rationi convenientius ita potius interpretaberis: καὶ χωρὶς τῶν πάντων, οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν, h.e. ... speciem sejunctam a nobis et ab omnibus iis, quae talia sunt, quales nos sumus. Ex quo clarum est, cur deinde adiiciatur αὐτό τι ... ὕδατος; Etenim Parm. vult non tantum homines, sed omnia, quae sub sensus subjecta sunt intelligi.' Stallb. This is better, except as to χωρὶς τῶν πάντων. The sense seems to be χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰοι-ἡμεῖς-ἐσμὲν (i.e. τῶν ὄρατῶν) πάντων, and Stallb. so translates. Failing this it would be better to read καὶ τῶνδε οἷοι. The constr. would be improved by omitting ἀνθρώπου εἶδος, or transposing τί δὲ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος—αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἡ πυρὸς ἡ καὶ ὕδατος, χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων'. See Phileb. 15 A, ὅταν δέ τις ἔνα ἀνθρώπου ἐπιχειρή τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἔνα, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται. We have got ideas of physical qualities and of moral qualities; we now take the important step of assuming ideas for sensible things or complexes of qualities. Such Arist. calls (Met. II. 2, 997 b 10) the same with the sensible objects but eternal. παραπλήσιον ποιοῦντες τοὺς θεοὺς μὲν εἶναι φάσκοντιν, ἀνθρωποειδῆς δέ· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐποίουν ἡ ἀνθρώπους ἀιδίους, οὐθὲ οὗτοι τὰ εἴδη ἄλλ' ἡ αἰσθητὰ ἀΐδια. He adds (xi. 3, 1070 a 18) that such ideas according to Plato ἔστιν ὀπόστα φίστει, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη ἄλλα τούτων, οἷον πῦρ, σάρξ, κεφαλή. Cp. Damasc. § 102, p. 263, τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη φαινόμενα τῶν πολλῶν ἀληθινῶν εἶδον ἔστι τεκμήρια, etc. That ideas for 'things' are an advance upon ideas for single qualities is the view implied in Arist. Phys. II. 2, 193 b 36, τὰ γὰρ

φυσικὰ χωρίζουσιν, ὃντα ὄντα χωριστὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.

ἢ πυρὸς etc. Ficinus 'et ignis etiam et aquae,' qua si legisset ἡ καὶ πυρὸς ἡ ὕδατος, non male. Heind. Such is the sense clearly.

αὐτῶν for τούτων, so in E.

ἀν... δόξειν ἀν εἶναι, sc. εἴ τις φαίη καὶ τούτων ἔκαστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς: more simply (οὐ καὶ γελοῖον δόξειν ἀν εἶναι).

οἷον θρὶξ What is the rationale of the nom.? Is it = ἡ καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιωνδε οἷον (ἔστι) θρίξ, helped by the intervening δέ? Is ρύπος only here in Plato?

αὐτῶν τῇδε ὀν Both Ηt (Notes I.) have αὐτῶν ἡ ὀν, which can hardly be right. Editors with Π drop ἡ; even so αὐτῶν is rather unsuitable. 'Sed αὐτῶν hoc vide an rectius mutetur in αὐτό τῶν. Ut Theaet. 204 D, ταῦταν ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστι' etc., Heind. But Stallb. defends αὐτῶν positum pro τούτων quanquam paullo alia vi et significazione. We have had this above, and it occurs in E below. But this rather makes against a third case so near. Yet αὐτό τῶν ὀν seems harsh, and ἡ is unexplained. Our τῇδε justifies both the ἡ and the αὐτό τῶν, and makes excellent sense; see Phaedr. 249D, "Ἐστι δὴ οὖν δεύτερο ὁ πᾶς ὕκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μαρίας, ἣν διατὰ τὸ τῇδε τις ὄραν κάλλος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμησκόμενος, πτερώτατε καὶ etc.; and 250 B, οὐκ ἔνεστι φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὄμοιώμασιν. Proclus, too, repeatedly uses τὰ τῇδε as an expression for τὰ ὄρατά, e.g. v. 5. on 130 B, πῶς μετέχεται (τὰ εἴδη) ὑπὸ τῶν τῇδε, καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς μεθέξεως; So, too, Damasc., § 91, p. 226, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὁ τρήδε ἀνθρώπος ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ ἐκεὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, and elsewhere. A palaeographer will know that a contracted τῇδε in majuscules might be very like Η. The class of things here discussed is merely another type of ἀπερ ὄρωμεν; if an εἶδος πυρὸς be granted so may an εἶδος πηλοῦ. The only difference is the greater unworthiness (Introd. xli. ff.).

οὐδαμῶς appears to deny the question ἡ ... ἀπορεῖς; 1

ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι 'sc. οἴομαι, φημι,' Heind. This of course occurs even to a Zeno; indeed were it otherwise there would be no problem.

οἰηθῆναι εἶναι Although a passive sense would be quite good, the active is meant. See Ast. One might supply (ἀπορῶ) μὴ λίαν, or δέδοικα, which is to hand. Grote refers here to the note

of Alexander on Arist. Met. 1. 991 a 23, Bekker iv. 575 a 30, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῷων τινῶν γενέσεις τεταγμέναι μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς ἰδέαν, οἷον σκυλίκων ἐμπιόων τερηθόνων. Proclus expands on the question of what ideas are to be admitted; but his views, incorporating all that appears in Timaeus, and indeed in generations of commentary, are far in advance of Plato's present stage. He explains the hesitation of Socrates about an idea of man by urging that man as known to us is at the lower end of a series of which the idea is the upper (cp. on B), οὐ γὰρ τὸ πρώτως μετασχὸν ἀνθρώπου ὁρῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐσχάτως, and thus εἰκότως παμπόλλην ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν διαφορότητα καθορῶμεν (v. 41). Again he rejects hair as being a mere part of that which comes from a rational pattern; and πηλὸς as a σύρμιξις δύο στοιχείων ἀόριστος, οὐ κατὰ λόγον γενομένη; and finally ῥύπος because all κάθαρσις is removal of ῥύπος, and while there is an idea of the former there is none of the latter as being a κακία to be cleared away: of κακίᾳ there are no ideas (v. 61) he affirms.

ἢδη μέντοι ... ἔθραξε Heind. would read μέν τι, after Phaedr. 242 C, ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔθραξε μέν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον. With which cp. Phaedo 86 E, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὖθις θράττον, and 103 C. But he has to admit that Theaet. 187 C differs, Θράττει μέπι τοῦ τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὡστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῆ ... γεγονέναι, etc., where there is no specific nom. to the verb. Stallb. objects that the change does not improve the sense, and also that the subj. is contained in the words μή ... ταῦτον, which on Heind.'s assumption would be in appos. with τι. In place of our Schol. t gives ἔταραξεν, ¹ ἡρώχλησεν, ¹ ἐνυξεν: so Rhunk. Suidas gives the same meanings, and adds δισωπεύσθαι καὶ ὑφορᾶσθαι. The glossary of Timaeus also gives ταράττει κινεῖ.

μή τι ἢ π. π. ταῦτον 'lest something the same might be the case in regard to all,' 'ob es nicht bei allen dasselbe wäre' (Engelm. Transl.); but what sense does it convey? Heind. says 'ne idem sit in omnibus, i.e. ne eadem sit omnium omnino rerum ratio, ut suum quaeque εἶδος habeat': meaning that after all θρὶξ πηλὸς etc., may have each their idea (he almost needlessly guards us from reading μή τι (*εἶδος*) ἢ π. π. ταῦτον). In this case the ἀβυθοφλυαρ. would arise from the hopeless complication of the theory when thus extended. Our marginal

summary gives another view, which also seems tenable: the difficulty involved in the conception of ideas for θρὶξ πηλὸς etc., is so great that he is sometimes driven to think that as there are no ideas for them so there is none for anything—the μή τι ταῦτον referring to εἶδος οἰηθῆναι ... ἄποτον. In this case the ἀβ. φλυ. would arise from the sea of sensible perceptions unregulated by any idea. Cp. Timae. 51 C, ἀρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πάντα, περὶ ὃν ἀεὶ λέγομεν οὕτως, ... ή ταῦτα ἀπερ καὶ βλέπομεν ὅτα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα μόνα ἔστι, ... ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ... ἄλλὰ μάτην ἐκάστοτε εἴναι τί φαμεν εἶδος ἐκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος; The language seems a compromise between μή ἢ π. π. ταῦτον and μή τι ἢ π. π. τοιοῦτον.

ταύτη ιστῶ, The reading of Ι is as given with the aspirate and long initial *v*, and (although t gives ταύτη στῶ) an effort should be made to maintain a form so clearly given. Proclus quotes τ. ἐγὼ ιστῶ. It may be noted that ταύτη is scarcely used = ἐκεῖ or τῇδε with a verb of rest like στῶ. Even in Philoct. 1331, ἔως ἂν αὐτὸς ἥλιος | ταύτη μὲν αἴρῃ, τῇδε δὲ αὖ δύνη πάλιν the verb is one of motion; and so generally when used of place it means 'in this direction,' 'by this road,' with a verb of motion. Could an object be understood with ιστῶ, such as τὰ πράγματα, τὸν λόγον? The sense would be either 'when I place matters in this fashion' or 'when I weigh the subject in this manner.' In Euthyphr. 7 C we come within sight of the latter use, καὶ ἐπί γε τὸ ιστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγώμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρον τε καὶ κουφοτέρον διακριθέμεν ἄν; and Prot. 356 B, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ιστάναι ἀνθρώπος where the context gives the meaning. For the former sense cp. Theaet. 171 D, η καὶ ταύτη ἄν μάλιστα ιστασθαι τὸν λόγον ...;

φεύγων οὐχομαι The participle with this verb is common, especially ἀπιών and φερόμενος. For the sense see Phaedo 98 B, ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὃ ἐταῖρε, ψύχομην φερόμενος. Phileb. 13 D, καὶ δὲ λόγος ήμάν ἐκπεσὼν οὐχήστει.

ἀβυθοφλυαρ. There is no doubt of the reading (Notes 1.), though ἀμυθον is found, probably by confusion of the old minuscule *u*=*β* with a cursive *μ*. The sense is clear, although the adjective seems unique. 'Denique Synesius qui ad hunc locum

respxit ... et Origenes ... legerunt ipsi quoque ἄβυθον non ἄμυθον. Nam Celsus quidem dixit εἰς πέλαγος φλυαρίας ἐμπεσώντες sed verba Synesii haec sunt, καὶ κίνδυνος εἰς ἄβυσσόν τινα φλυαρίας ἐμπεσύντας διαφθαρῆναι δὲ καὶ Σωκράτης ἐφοβήθη παθεῖν, καὶ τὸ πάθος ωκεῖ ἀπεκρύψατο φίλους ἄνδρας, Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα. Atque his ex locis Vytenbachius, in Notis ad Plutarch, de S. N. V., p. 72, putabat satis apparere, apud Platonem reponi debere εἰς τινα ἄβυσσον φλυαρίας. At neuter, neque Orig. neque Synes. retinuisse videtur ipsa verba Platonis, immo utrumque imitari tantum voluisse arbitror omnino formam loquendi, ita ut non dubitarint adjectivi loco substantiva ponere.' Fisch. L. and S. suggest that we should read εἰς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας, which has some support from the text of Η and the reading φλυαρία suggested by the words of Synes. But the text of Proclus v. 64 reads λοιπὸν καὶ αὐτῇ ἔστιν ἡ ἄβυθος φλυαρία, εἰς ἵν etc.

Ἐκεῖσε δ' οὖν ... εἰς ἀ=εἰς ἐκεῖνα δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος ἀ ... or ἐκεῖσε ... οὖν ἔστι τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα εἰδη ἔχει What is the exact sense of δ' οὖν? Perhaps 'however that may be (about my fear of destruction, etc.) at all events I get back to the safer ground just referred to.' The ἀ are probably the two groups referred to in *v. above*—Zeno's group and the next. ἐλέγομεν, cp. note, 129 D.

E περὶ ἐκεῖνα There is good Platonic authority for taking this either with *πραγ.* or with *διατρ.*

νέος γάρ So Theaet. 162 D, Νέος γάρ εἶ, ὁ φίλε παιῶν ταῖς οὖν δημηγορίαις ὅξεως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει, What does γάρ meet?—the δέστας etc., the ἔθραξ etc., or the μὴ λίαν γάρ ἀτοπον? Perhaps the general sense of contempt for the suggestion of ideas which are common and unclean; this would appear from ἀτιμάσεις which follows.

οὕπω στον ἀντεῖλ. So Phaedo 88 D, θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ On the whole passage see Procl. v. 65-7, Ταῦτα ὁ Π. ἐπιπλήττων ἀποροῦντι τῷ Σ. δόξειν ἀντιτίθεσθαι πάντων, καὶ ὅσα σμικρὰ καὶ ὅσα ἐνυλότατα καὶ ὅσα παρὰ φύσιν ... ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ μὴ πρὸς τούτο πεποῆσθαι τὴν ἐπίπληξιν, ἀλλὰ ... τὸ ἀναίτιον οὐδαμῶς προσιέμενος (meaning all has a cause, but that cause is not necessarily an idea? Questionable.), πᾶν γάρ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου

τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι φησὶ καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος ... οὐδὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὕτως ἀτιμον καὶ φαῦλον, ὃ μὴ μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κάκεῖθεν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν ... ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαι τὰ σμικρὰ καὶ εὐτελῆ τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἐξάπτειν ἐξαισχύνονται ... οἱ δὲ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι πάντα ὄστα πέρι τὴν γένεσιν οὐδὲν ἀτιμον οὐδὲν ἀπόβλητον ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ Διὸς ὄραστιν ... ὅτι δὲ ὁ Σ. ἀναιρῶν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ἐνυλοτάτων τὴν εἰδητικὴν αἰτίαν ἀνήρει καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἐλαβεν ὁ Π. ... ἡ θρὶξ μὴ ἔχέτω μὲν παράδειγμα νοερόν, ἔχέτω δὲ φυσικὸν λόγον αἰτίον. ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὴ ταῦτην εἶναι τρίχα μόνον ἢν ὄραμεν, ἀλλὰ κάκεύην τὴν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως; δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ τρίχας πιοῦστα ἐν τοῖς ἥσοις καὶ οὐ μάτην οὐδὲ ταῦτας ὑποστήσασα καὶ ἡ ἐκλειψις ἡ τούτων παρὰ φύσιν, διατιθέσα τὰ δεόμενα τῆς ἀπὸ αὐτῶν βοηθείας. ... καὶ εἰ ἀπορήσεις δὲ τῶν προσεχῶν αἰτίων, ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀνάδραμε τὴν μίαν τοῦ ὄντος αἰτίαν ἀφ' ἧς πάντα τὰ ὄντα προελήλυθε, καὶ ἐκείνην φάθι καὶ τούτοις παρέχειν τὴν γένεσιν, ὡς μηδὲ τούτων ἀναίτιον εἶναι τὴν ὑπόστασιν. καὶ ἵστως ἐπρεπε τῷ Π. τῷ τὸ ἐν δὲ τὸ πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν ὄραντι τὸ "κατ' αἰτίαν" προτιθέναι τοῦ "κατ' εἰδῶς" καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιπλήγτει τῷ Σ., μετὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀναιροῦντι καὶ τὴν ἀλληλην πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, δέον μὴ κατ' εἰδος μὲν αὐτὸν νοερὸν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὴν γένεσιν, κατ' αἰτίαν δὲ πρεσβυτέρον τῶν εἰδῶν (better, not worse, than ideas?) ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἡμεῖς τὰ τεχνητὰ ποιῶμεν, ποιεῖ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ νοῦς

αὐτῶν See Notes 1 and above c. The observation οὐδὲν ἀ-ἀτιμάσεις, etc., must be for the Platonic Socrates, not the Socrates of history, who had little regard for the conventional dignity of philosophy, and who did not touch these inquiries —οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, γῆπερ τῶν ἀλλων οἱ πλεύστοι, διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλοί-μενος ὑπὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφυ ... αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπειών δὲι διελέγετο, σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές ... Xen. Mem. I. i. 11-16. We are to hold not that Plato draws no distinctions between diverse objects, but that he sets any such distinctions aside in the interests of philosophy. Thus in Polit. 266 D, Νῦν, ἐκεῖνό ἔστι καταφαίνεις μᾶλλον ... ὅτι τῇ τοι φίδῃ μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὔτε σεμνοτέρον μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν ἢ μή, τόν τε σμικρότερον οὐδὲν ἱπτιμακε πρὸ τοῦ μείζονος, etc.; cp. Soph. 227 A. On the other hand when looking at them from the standpoint of

character he speaks—Theaet. 174 C-D—of ‘practical’ matters with scorn,—οὐ προσποιήτως ἀλλὰ τῷ σὸντι γελῶν, etc.

¹³¹ οὐ ... ισχεῖν Οὐ εἶναι εἴδη ἄττα, see for variants Notes 1. For constr. cp. 127 C. Stallb. well cites Phaed. 102 B, ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἔκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, and Symp. 210 E-211 B, κατόφεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν ... αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν μεθ' αὐτὸν μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ σὸν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἔκεινον μετέχοντα. For the language see Soph. 257 C, ηθάρεον μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη ... μία μὲν ἐστί που καὶ ἔκεινη, τὸ δ' ἐπί τῷ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἔκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ ἑαυτῆς ίδιαν. Herodt. VII. 121, Θέρμη δὲ ... ἀπ' οὗ καὶ ὁ κόλπος οὗτος τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει. Dam., § 86, 205, says ἀλλὰ ὅμως τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστι τὰ παρ' οἷμν ὀνόματά τε καὶ νοήματα—noteworthy. μεταλαμβ. the present is descriptive—you see the process going on, and with the process comes the name: μεταλαμβόντα is a narrative reference to the description given, the participation has now taken place, whence the likeness. It is clear that the εἴδη are much fewer than τὰ ἄλλα. “Because there is only one idea for each class of things (Rep. vi. 493 E, αὐτὸν τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλά, η̄ αὐτό τι ἔκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἔκαστα, ἐσθ' ὅπεις πλῆθος ἀνέξεται η̄ ἥγήστεται εἶναι;) ideas are also termed ἑνάδες οἱ μονάδες (ὅταν δέ τις ἔνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἔνα ... περὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων η̄ πολλὴ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται ... πρώτον μὲν εἰ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὖσας, etc.), Phileb. 15 A.” Zeller.

μεγέθους This, with σμικρότης, ισότης, and others is fairly hit by Arist. Phys. IV. 1, 209 A 17, ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα σώματα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν οὐδὲν γίνεται μέγεθος—if the idea in such cases is an entity.

χωρὶς τούτων ‘h. e. praeter haec,’ Stallb. Symp. 211 B gives a vague suggestion of the μετάληψις—τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἔκεινον μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιούτον, οἷον γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων μηδὲν ἔκεινο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. It may be true even of a conception that you must possess either the whole or a part of it if you possess it at all; yet

one feels instinctively that Plato is here somewhat governed by physical analogies, and tends to think of the idea as extended. On ὅλου τοῦ εἰ, we may use a phrase of Dam. § 87, 207—individuals differ, he suggests, only by place; the idea is the same, ὡς εἰ τις ἀφέλοι τὴν ὕλην ἐν τῷ ὅλον εἴδος ἐφάνθη. At § 90, 225, he distinguishes ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρωθεν τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅφον, ταύτη μεθεξις· ὃ δὲ συμπληροῖ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν, ταύτη ὑπαρξις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Also § 126, ii. 2, without actually dealing with participation of ideas, he discusses the meaning of the word and the possible varieties of the fact—ἕνωσις, σύγκρισις, πάραθεσις, and finds difficulties on all sides; but adds 'Αλλὰ μὴν δεινὸς ὁ λόγος, εἰ διεσπασμένα πάντα ποιήσει ἀπ' ἄλληλων ... καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν διαφθερεῖ ὁ λόγος. Οὐ γὰρ ἔξεσται αὐτῷ λέγειν κεχωρίσθαι ἄλληλων τὰ πράγματα· μεθέξει γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλα χωρισμοῦ. In fact we are back at the negation of predication (Introd. lx.), for, he says elsewhere, § 70, 152, τὸ ἡνωμένον εἰ γιγνώσκοιτο, οὐκ ἔσται μόνον ἡνωμένον ἀλλὰ καὶ γιγνωστόν,—which makes it two at least.

πότερον ... εὐ εἶναι: πότερον preceded by ὅλου η̄ μέρους and followed by ὅλον leads one to expect η̄ μέρος αὐτοῦ; in place of η̄ πῶς; But the context might suggest that πότερον is superfluous; and that he means to begin δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, and is for the present taking up only the former alternative of ὅλον, and dwelling not on that alternative but on the question of the idea remaining one in the process (ἐν δὲ = ita ut unum sit. Heind.) This view is enforced by εὐ εἶναι, which, again, Schleiermacher changes to ἑνεῖναι against Ηt. Stallb. agrees; Heind. dissents, giving as the meaning τί γὰρ κωλύει ὅλον τὸ εἴδος ἐν ἔκάστῳ τῶν πολλῶν ἐνδὺ ἐν εἶναι; of which Stallb. says (why?) contorta est Heindorfii interpretatio.

ἐν πολλοῖς χ. t has καὶ c. before χωρίς, which adds B force.

ἐν ξεσται So Η; t also, but on eras. "Ἐνεσται might p. 6 be better; but Plato may be purposely harping on the εὐ εἶναι—if there is nothing to prevent it being one, at least it ‘will be one’ in such a way as to be separate from itself.

εἰ γε, φάναι etc. As to the text, setting aside stops, Ηt agree on the following—οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα εἴη μία καὶ η̄ αὐτῇ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἄμα ἔστι, while t begins with

οὐκάν εἶναι φάναι followed by a stop. Some change seems needed, and *εἰ γε* seems preferable to *εἶναι*. The phrase *οἷον εἰ* lacks Platonic authority, and has been changed by some to *οἷον ἡ*. Again the *εἴη* following has been omitted so as to give *οἷον ἡ ημέρα, μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία*: this *ἡ* seems superfluous, while the omiss. of *εἴη* is questionable. Yet some omission is called for; and we may note the repeated use of *εἰ, ἡ*, and the collocation *εἴημι* in quick succession. Any text involves a somewhat broken construction which is picked up at *εἰ οὕτω*. In Proclus' comments the phrase *εἰ γε οἷον ημέρα εἴη* without article occurs v. 12. The text given demands little change, and yields a satisfactory sense, the break in constr. being as follows—οὐκ ἀν εἴ γε, φάναι, οἷον εἴη ημέρα (*ἡ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία πολλαχοῦ ἄμα ἐστί, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἔστιν*)—εἰ οὕτω, ‘not if it were some such thing as day, which, etc.... if in such a fashion as this, I say, each of the ideas preserved its identity in all things.’ Procl. says δι’ ὑπερβατοῦ τὸ ὄλον συναπτέον· φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σ. μὴ ἀν συμβῆναι τοῦτο δὲν ἀτοπον, ὃ φησιν ὁ Π., “εἰ γε οἷον ημέρα εἴη, οὕτω καὶ ἔκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν πᾶσιν ἄμα ταῦτὸν εἴη” (where the interpretation differs a little from ours). δεύτερον δὲ τὸ “εἰ οὕτω” διὰ τὴν ἐπανάληψιν οἰητέον ἔχειν τὸ “εἰ τοῦτο” προκείμενον, ἐν γὰρ ταῖς διὰ πλειόνος ἀποδούσεσιν αἱ ἐπαναλήψεις χρήσιμοι· τρίτον δὲ τὸ “μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία πολλαχοῦ ἄμα ἐστί” μεταξὺ ρήθεν κατὰ ἀπόστασιν ἀκουστέον. In illustrating he reminds us, though without referring to the Rep., of the analogies ήλιος—ἀγαθόν, φῶς (*ημέρα*)—τὰ εἰδη, σκότος —ὔλη (*τάδε τὰ ἀλλα*). And he adds (v. 101) καὶ θτὶ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγου τὸ παράδειγμα εἰληφε, δῆλον· (on what authority?) ἐκείνος γὰρ δηλῶσαι βουλόμενος, ὅπως τὰ πολλὰ μετέχει τινὸς ἐνὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔρημα ἐνὸς κανὸν διειστήκει πορρωτάτῳ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, εἶπεν ἐν τῷ ἔαντοῦ λόγῳ μίαν οὐσίαν τὴν λευκότητα παρεῖναι καὶ ήμιν καὶ τοῖς ἀντίστοιν οὕτως ὡς τὴν εὑφρόνην καὶ τὴν ημέραν ... ἀλλ’, οἶμαι, Z. ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνύλου εἰδούς τὸ παράδειγμα θείς, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἐν καὶ οὐχ ἐν μεριστῶς μετεχόμενον ... τῷ... παραδείγματι τοῦ τοιούτου εἰδούς ὄρθως ἔχρητο καὶ ἀνελέγκτως ὁ δὲ Σ. ἐπ’ αὐτὸν τοῦ εἰδούς τοῦ ἀμερίστου ὄντος καὶ ἐνὸς ἄμα παρόντος τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐκ ὄρθως. Arist., Phys. III. 6, 206 a 30, says of the ἀπειρον—οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς τόδε τι, οἷον ἀνθρωπον ἡ οἰκίαν,

ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡ ημέρα λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀγών, οἷς τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς οὖσία τις γέγονεν, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἐν γενέσει ἡ φθορῆ, εἰ καὶ πεπειραμένον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ γε ἔτερον καὶ ἔτερον.

ἥδες ἀντὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν οὐν. σημαίνει δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὸ εὐήθως καὶ τὸ γελοίως. Schol. Rhunk. ‘Male Schol. Ironice hic quoque adhibetur hoc verbum’ Heind. = lepide, ‘that is a pleasant conceit of yours, to prove your case by, as it were, putting men under a sail and saying,’ etc.

οἷον εἰ etc. The *οἷον εἰ* here are separate, not as they would have been above *οἰονεί* (or as Plato puts it, *οἰονπερὶ στοιχεῖα*, Theaet. 201 E). The phrase *ιστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρ.* seems an odd reversal, and recalls *αὐτοὺς ὕβρει περιέθηκε*, Diog. Laert. VI. 3 3, and still better Choeph. 576, *νεκρὸν θήσω ποδάκει περιβαλῶν χαλκεύματι*.

τὸ τοιοῦτο. One almost wishes *τι τοι.*, but cp. e. c

ἥγεται λέγεν as 127 E without the pron. as subj. to the inf.; see Rep. I. 338 A, σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναι καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, and a little lower ἥγονύμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην. Although Parmenides makes merry over such an idea, does not his own ἐν συνεχές bear some colourable resemblance to it?

ἢ οὖν ἡ h.l. idem est quod πότερον. Heind.; but it means rather more, ‘would the whole *really* be present then, or only a part?’ Immediately below it recurs, but this time suggesting the improbability of the other alternative. οὐκ ἔτι So Η for οὐκέτι.

ἐν ἔκάστῳ Note the change of reference in the next *ἔκάστον*—οὐκ ἔτι ἐν *ἔκάστῳ* (*τῶν πολλῶν*) *ὄλον* (*τι εἰδούς εἴη*), ἀλλὰ μέρος *ἔκάστον* (*τοῦ εἰδούς ἐν ἔκάστῳ*) ἀν εἴη. οὕτω γε ‘according to this reasoning?’

ἢ οὖν—Η εἰ οὖν, τὴν οὖν: another error by dict.?

φάναι Is this word parenthetic? If so, one of two things follows; (1) either the phrase *τὸ ἐν μερίζεσθαι* as a whole is an object to *ἔθελησεις*, while that verb generally governs, at least in Attic, a mere infinitive (*ἔθέλω πειθεσθαι, ποιεῖν*, etc.); (2) or *μερίζεσθαι* must be used in an active sense; which is rare, although if taken with *ημῖν* it might yield a good sense—‘Do you wish then to be in very truth a party to our splitting up the one idea among us?’ But we have parallels to the use of *φάναι* governing an inf. and itself governed by a verb like *ἔθέλειν*—Rep. VI. 510 A, *ἢ καὶ ἔθέλοις ἀν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, διηρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε κοὶ μή;*

Theaet. 171 E, ἔθελησαι ἀν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον... οἰκανὸν εἶναι ἴσσθαι αὐτό. Polit. 276 B, ἐπιμέλεια δὲ ... οὐδεμίᾳ ἀν ἔθελήσειν ἑτέρα μᾶλλον ... φάγαι καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς εἶναι τέχνη. The only objection to this construction is the other use of φάναι so repeatedly; and there is a further argument in its favour that it gives a definite sense to ἡμῖν (to divide among us all the one εἶδος ἀνθρώπου) which in the other case would seem a mere adjunct to τὸ ἐν εἴδος = ‘our one εἶδος.’ Yet for such a use see E below, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι etc.

καὶ ... ἐπειν: We may make καὶ ... ἔσται; a fresh interrog. sent.; but it is as likely to be part of the previous one with the constr. varied—see Riddell’s Platonic idioms, § 277 b (Apology, Clar. Press)—while οὐδαμῶς gives a denial to both φάναι etc. and ἔσται. We bring out the force of γὰρ thus—καὶ καλῶς γε, ὅρα γάρ.

D καὶ ἔκ. ... ἔσται ‘and each of the many objects which rank as “big” will be such in virtue of a portion of bigness which is smaller than “bigness” proper.’ φάνεται—i better, φανεῖται: but the point is small. δαῦ; See Introd. lxxxi. and Notes 1.

τοῦ ἵστον μέρους etc. So At, though t has os above -ous. The reading is rather difficult, and it is just possible that an orig. os has been changed through the ambiguities arising from ἔκαστον and σμικρόν. If retained the phrase must mean ‘the “equal-” section of our ideal kingdom.’ The order of words is ἔκαστον (των πολλῶν) ἀπολαβὸν σμικρόν τι τοῦ ἵστον μέρους, τὸ ἔχον (τοῦτο τὸ σμικρὸν) ἔξει (τι) φ., ἐλάττονοι ὅντι αὐτὸν τοῦ ἵστον, ἵστον τῷ ἔσται; As Heind. notes τὸ ἔχον might be omitted.

τούτοις ... ὄντος. i.e. τούτον δὲ αὐτὸν (τοῦ μέρους αὐτὸς) τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται ἄτε (τούτου) μέρους ἔαντον [sc. τοῦ σμικροῦ] ὄντος.

καὶ οὕτω ‘smallness’ will become bigger thus—a change which should be impossible to it—in one of two ways: (1) either by being, as we have seen, greater than its part, (2) or by having something taken from it, for like a negative quantity it grows by deductions—as he goes on, the addition of a bit of smallness (i.e. of a negative quantity) lessens the size of that which receives it. This is partly jocular. Plato knows that if ‘smallness’ proper be indeed greater than its part, then the part cannot reduce the size of that to which it accrues; while if the

latter is the case it follows that ‘smallness’ itself would reduce the object still more, and is therefore smaller than its part. τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν is the μέρος just referred to. Cp. Ar., Phys. I. 4, 187 b 35, εἰ δπαν μὲν σῶμα ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἐλαττον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ σαρκὸς ὥρισται τὸ ποσὸν καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἐλαχίστης σαρκὸς οὐθὲν ἐκκριθήσεται σῶμα· ἔσται γὰρ ἐλαττον τῆς ἐλαχίστης. Proc. v. 115, ἀποπον ὅρα διαιρετὸν ἡγεύσθαι τὸ σμικρόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ μέρος, διότι μὲν ἐλασσον ἔστι τοῦ ὅλου, μεῖζον ἐκεῖνο πάντως ἀποφαίνει, διότι δὲ τῷ λοιπῷ προστίθεται, μεῖζον αὐτὸν τὴν προσθήκην λαβὸν ἀπεργάζεται ... δ καὶ ἔδοξε τισὶν οὐτῷ δινδιάθετον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόθοις αὐτοῖς [αὐτὰ, Bekk.] καταλέξαι τινὰς καὶ περιγράψαι τῶν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ῥημάτων.

τίνα οὖν ... διορ. Proc. (116) dwells on the conditions of the problem here with great point, but without answering this question. ἀδιάστατα (without dimensions) ὅρα πάντα τὰ εὑδῇ ἔστι· κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τόπου παντὸς ἵπεριδρυται· πᾶσι γὰρ πανταχοῦ τοῖς μετέχουσιν ἀκωλύτως πάρεστι. τὰ δὲ ἐν τόπῳ κρατούμενα τῆς ἀκωλύτου ταύτης παρουσίας ἄμοιρα πέφυκε. ... ὥσταντος γε καὶ χρόνου παντὸς ἵπεριπλωται· πάρεστι γὰρ ἀχρόνως ἀπασι καὶ ἀθρόως· ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ γενέσεις προπαρασκευαὶ τινὲς εἰσι τῆς ἐκείνων μεθέξεις ... μὴ τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῶν μετεχόντων ἐπὶ τὰ μετεχόμενα μεταφερέτω τις ἢ τὸν χρόνον ἢ τὴν τοπικὴν περίληψιν ἢ τὸν σωματικὸν μερισμόν, μηδ' ὅλως συνθέσεις ἢ διαιρέσεις σωματοειδεῖς ἐν ἐκείνοις ἐπινοείτω. πόρρω γὰρ ταῦτα διέστηκε τῶν εἰδῶν τῆς ἀπλότητος τῆς ἀύλου, τῆς καθαρότητος τῆς ἐν αἰώνι συνεχομένης ἀμεροῦς ἵποστάσεως. We have learnt above so far that the ideas are certain moulding formative entities existing apart, and grasped by reason. Their function is to introduce method, form, meaning into the many of sense (but how πολλὰ without ἐν etc.?), and we see that this is done by their entering into these, or giving the latter a share in them, and that either κατὰ ὅλον or κατὰ μέρος, if at all. The whole argument suggests physical conditions and analogies, none the less so because of the special ideas selected for treatment; and Proc. enters a caveat that such physical conditions as space, time, dimensions are out of place. He adds an elucidation of the difficulty, which amounts to this, that the many may be ranged in

grades, the more exalted of which come close in character to the ideas, and may partake of them with practical completeness; the others tail off towards matter, and partake of less and less, or of mere εἶδωλα, of the ideas. Parmenides, he says, ἀνακινεῖ τὸν Σ. καὶ προκαλεῖται τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ νοῦν εἰς τὴν τῆς κυριωτάτης μεθέξεως εἴρεσιν . . . By those who understand the whole and part μὴ σωματικῶς, ἀλλὰ προσφόρως ταῖς ἀλλοῖς καὶ νοερᾶς οὐσίαις, ὅφθισται τὰ τῆς καὶ ὄλων μετέχοντα τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ μερῶν . . . καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα τῶν μετεχόντων πλείους ἵποδέχεται τοῦ παραδείγματος (we have not got this length yet in the text) δυνάμεις, τὰ δὲ κοιλότερα ἐλάσσους. He even supposes men in other parts of the universe μᾶλλον ἔγγυς ὄντας τῆς ἀνθρώπου ἰδέας, and so partaking of it κατὰ πλείους δυνάμεις, and adds οὕτως ή μία ἰδιότης ἀνωθεν καθήκει μεχρὶ τῶν ἔσχάτων . . . σειρὰ γάρ τινες ἀπὸ τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καθήκουσι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δέ πάλιν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, καθ' ἕκαστον στοιχείον ἔξαλλαττόμεναι καὶ μέχρι γῆς ὑφιξάνονται. τούτων δὲ τῶν σειρῶν τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα μειζόνως μετέχει τῶν παραδειγμάτων, τὰ δὲ χαμαιξηλότερα ἐλαστόνως, τῆς ἰδιότητος ἐπὶ πάντα τῆς μίας ἐκτεινομένης, η̄ καὶ ποιὲ μίαν τὴν ὅλην σειράν. And so Dam. § 206 II. 89, η̄ σειρὰ προποδισμός ἔστιν οὐσίας ἀπὸ ἐνὸς εἰς πλῆθος ἐκμηρυνομένης. Pl. has nothing of this.

ἢν ἕκαστον The latter is part of subj., the former of pred. ἐκ. εἶναι ἔν.

¹³² Ιδέα ‘h. l. non est idem quod εἶδος sed potius conspectus sive species quaedam menti objecta.’ Heind. But we get here the origin of the technical term, as we do that of the idea it represents. ἐπὶ πάντα with ἰδεῖν does not seem to be a common phrase with Pl.; L. and S. quote Iliad xxiii. 143, ἰδὼν ἐπὶ οἴνοπα πόντον.

τι δ’ . . . φαίνεσθαι; He seems at first to have meant αὐτὸν . . . μεγάλα to be subj. to some such verb as παρέξει, to which ἔν τι would be the obj.: as he wrote he made the latter the subj. and replaced παρέξει by φαίνεται as though he had begun τι δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ . . . μεγάλων. But again, φαίνεσθαι with its relative would more naturally be φ . . . φαίνεται or φανεῖται. Either there is suggested dependence on the sense of the clause ἔν . . . φαίνεται, or a lapse into orat. obl. Either way the fact that φαίνεται precedes and ἀναφανήσεται

follows may help to explain the change. While we reason back to the ideas they, of course, prove to be the causes or rational elements of the things through which we reach them. In this case of μέγεθος the remark of Arist., Met. xi. 10, 1075 b 29, applies—εἴτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; τῇ ψυχῇ is here identical with τῇ διανοίᾳ.

αῦτον is the smallest change which yields a meaning from the text of Η αὐτοῦ: t has αῦτον μέγα.

ἀναφανή Will start up beyond the end of the row.

ἔτερον, Has no meaning here distinct from ἄλλο. B This idea is not ‘different’ in kind from the others, and it can be called a ‘second’ only if we arbitrarily call ἄλλο the first of the series.

Ἄπειρα should in strictness be sing. to agree with ἐν ἕκαστον, but is attracted into the plur. by its mean. and by τῶν εἰδῶν. Having dealt a blow at the idea of μέθεξις or μετάληψις Parmenides now takes up the nature of the ideas themselves as apprehended by reason. Cp. Phaedo 74 B-C, ἀρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἵστοι καὶ ἔνδιλα ἐνίστε ταῦτα ὅντα τῷ μὲν ἵστα φαίνεται τῷ δὲ οὐ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν . . . ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἵστων, ἐτέρων ὅντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ὕστον, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας; ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Sympr. 211 B, τοῦτο γὰρ δή ἔστι τὸ ὅρθως ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴέναι η̄ ὥν' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶν δικαίων ἐκείνουν ἐνεκα τοῦ δικαίου δεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἐνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυνέν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ δικαίων σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δικαίων ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δικαίων ἐπιτηδεύματων ἐπὶ τὰ δικαίων μαθήματα, ἔως ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸ μάθημα τελευτῆσῃ ὅ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλου η̄ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνουν τοῦ δικαίου μάθημα, καὶ γνῷ αὐτὸν τελευτῶν δέστι δικαίου. Phaedr. 249 B, δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ἔννιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἵνα αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἔν λογισμῷ ἔννιαρούμενον τοῦτο δέ ἔστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἀ ποτ' εἰδέν ήμων η̄ ψυχῇ συμπορεύεσθαι θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦντα ἡ νῦν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ ἀνακύψασι εἰς τὸ δὲ ὅντας.

In all these generalizations is regarded as a certain and fruitful method, not a hopeless one: also the objection that we merely read into sensible objects what we wish to find there is parried in a fashion by the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις and the walking of the soul with God. It will be felt that they are in advance of our passage. In particular the rising gradations

of the *Sympos.* from *καλὰ σώματα* through *ἐπιτηδεύματα* and *μαθήματα*, while resembling roughly the *ἄνθρωπος*, *πῦρ—καλόν, ἀγαθὸν—έν, πολλὰ* of our 130 B, in crescendo abstractness, show a much firmer grasp of the subject. In the *Parmenides* the process is treated almost hopelessly—as a chasing of the rainbow. Nor must we mistake the contention. Our ideas of generalization are not what Plato has in his mind here (*Introd. xliv.*) though they do seem to be something like what he assumes in the dialogues just quoted. His meaning would be better suggested thus—

ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδοντι then come successive generalizations.

$\tau_{\alpha} \tau_{\eta} \delta_{e}$ + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + etc. + n
 τὰλλα τὰ μεγάλα τὸ μέγα ἄλλο μ. ἄλλο ἄλλο ἄλλο ἄλλο

Here the new *μέγα* does not arise in each case from a fresh generalization based on a new set of *τὰλλα τὰ μεγάλα*. The latter are supposed to be exhausted in the first view—*ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδοντι*—and the only new element at each step is the *τὸ μέγα* just previously reached. In this way not only does the process never end, but it is unfruitful in another sense. Each fresh judgment is what Kant calls analytic, not synthetic. All the evidence was led when the first was formed; in going on to a second and a third you add to that evidence merely a synopsis of itself. We may compare here—although it is used rather of the countless types of *εἶδον* than of the countless replicas of one—the language of Arist. already quoted, *Met. i. 9, 990 b 1, ζητοῦντες τῶν τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἔτερα τούτοις οὐτὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οὐσιοτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοῖ.*

ἀλλὰ ... μὴ ‘What if Should we perhaps say ...?’ So in Dam. often *μήποτε*, as § 42, 84, *μήποτε οὖν ἀσφαλέστερον λέγειν ...* “*Ιδωμεν, ἄθρε,* or so is omitted.

ἢ τούτων ... προσήκῃ See Notes 1.: the order of the text is the more euphonious, and, so to say, distinguished. Is -κει of both MSS. due to dictation?

D. 7. οὐ γε τὸν τε. But Heind. says ‘prius propositionis membrum οὗτον γάρ ... εἴη explicatur per posterius hoc καὶ οὐκ ... ἐλέγετο, sc. τὸ ἄπειρα εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος, ut parum hic apta videatur vocula τε.’ He adds (not knowing Η) scripserim ἐν τι ἔκ. With

regard to the whole passage—which has so struck some reader (Arethas?) that he has marked it with a *σημείωσαι* ‘N.B.’—note that the process of reaching *εἶδον* by the method *ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδοντι*, and the treating of them as *νόηματα* is much in accord with the *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* and the *δρίζεσθαι καθόλον*, ascribed by Arist. to Socrates (*Introd. xxix., xlvi.*). Plato does not accept the theory; but it is the first point at which the conception of an extended idea is definitely excluded. Grote refers to Simplicius on Arist. *Categ. 8 b, 25, τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνύρουν τὰς ποιότητας τελέως, τὸ ποιὸν συγχωροῦντες εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἀντισθένης, ὃς ποτε Πλάτων διαμψιβῆτῶν ‘ὅτι Πλάτων’ ἔφη ‘ἴππον μὲν ὄρῳ, ἵππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὄρῳ’ etc. Here *ἵππότης* would be a *νόημα*, or with Porphyrius Simplicius etc., a *ψιλὴ ἐπίνοια* or *ἔννοια*. Referring to *ἐν ψυχαῖς* Grote says ‘Here we have what Porphyry calls the deepest question of philosophy explicitly raised; and so far as we know for the first time.’ Porph.’s words (*Isag. to Categ. begin.*) are *αὐτίκα περὶ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν τὸ μὲν εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται, εἴτε καὶ ὑφέστηκότα σώματά ἔστιν ή ἀσώματα, καὶ πότερον χωριστὰ ή ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ τῶντα ὑφέστωτα, παραιτήσομαι λέγειν, βαθυτάτης οὖσις τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας καὶ ἄλλης μείζονος δεομένης ἐξετάσεως.* Grote refers to Simpl. on *Categ. 8, 8 b οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐρετρίας ἀνύρουν τὰς ποιότητας ὡς οἰδάμως ἔχοντας τι κοινὸν οὐσιῶδες, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ συνθέτοις ὑπαρχούσας, and after referring also to Dicaearchus and Theop. he adds οὔτε γάρ σώματα οὔτε ἀσωμάτους ἔθεντο εἶναι τὰς ποιότητας, ψιλὰς δὲ μόνας ἔννοιας αὐτάς ὑπελάμβανον διακένως λεγομένας κατ’ οὐδεμιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, οἷον ἀνθρωπότητα ή *ἵππότητα*.**

οὐδενός; etc. See *Theaet. 163 E, Τί δέ;* *μηνήρν οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;* *Ναΐ.* *Πότερον οὐδενὸς η τινός;* *Τινὸς δή πον.* That the *νόημα* must be *τινός* is clear: it is not clear that it must be *ὄντος*: so Arist. *Met. i. 9, 990 b 25*, καὶ γάρ τὸ νόημα ἐν οὐ μόνον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἔστι, καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι οὐ μόνον τῆς οὐσίας εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέρων. And what Proc. urges against the advance by generalization from *κοινότητες* (v. 131) is true here λήσομεν ἀπὸ πάντων εἰς ἐκείνας δρούσας ἀνατρέχοντες, οὐ μόνον διν εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διν οὐκ εἰσίν, οἶνον τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, τῶν παρὰ τέχνην, τῶν παρὰ λόγον, τῶν ἀνουσίων,

αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνυποστάτων, τραγελάφων λέγω καὶ ἵπποκενταύρων· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτων κοινότητες· καὶ οὕτω τῶν οὐκ ὄντων θήσομεν ἰδέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τούτους τῶν ἀπείρων, οἷον τῶν ἀλόγων γραμμῶν, τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς λόγων ... διν εἰσὶ κοινότητες. That Plato had no doubts as to the separate existence of these objects of νοήματα is clear. Cp. Rep. v. 476 c, ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε νομίζων μήτε, ἢν τις ἡγῆται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἐπεσθαι, ὅναρ ἡ ὑπάρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; etc.

C δ ... ιδέαν; The words should be taken thus [ἐνός τινος ὄντος] ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὸν—μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν —ἔκεινο τὸ νόημα νοεῖ; For the text see Notes 1. It seems here nearer the orig—νοεῖ may have become νοεῖν by a confus. with either the μ of μίαν or the πάντα νοεῖν below (which in t is nearly underneath, and may have been so in the archet.); and this corrup. would tend to produce εἰπον to govern the infin. Again οὖσαν is probably rightly explained by Heind.—‘legitimo modo positum est pro ὄν (agreeing with ὁ) propter praecedens μίαν’: failing that it must have the same sense as ὄντος above, and be taken closely with ιδέαν,—οὖσαν—ιδέαν = existent ιδέα. Of transls. we may give Ast ‘Nonne unius cujusdam rei quam in omnibus exstantem cogitatio illa cogitat, ut quae una quaedam sit species?’ Heind. ‘Quod tanquam omnibus rebus inditum cogitatio illa cogitat?’ ‘of some one existent thing, which resting upon all objects—being in fact some single visible characteristic of them—that thought dwells upon.’ For the language see Theaet. 203 c, φέρε δῆ, τὴν συλλαβῆν πότερον λέγωμεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλειό γη δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἡ μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν γεγονίαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;

Ιδέαν ... εἴδος ξεται Stallb. ‘Itaque ex ταῖς ιδέαις liquet τὰ εἴδη existere.’ It seems to be the fact that when these two words are not used as synonyms the former has more of the sensible in it. Heind. adds ‘ita rursus εἴδη existunt, a νοήμασι diversa.’

νοούμ. ἐν εἴναι, ‘this object perceived by thought to be one.’

ἀνάγκη γη so read for ἀνάγκη γη, to save altering with editors to ἀνάγκη εἰ... δοκεῖν. The sense seems good, and the language may be compared with Phaedr. 264 B, σὺ δ' ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικήν, γη ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος οὗτως ἐφεξῆς παρ' ἀλληλα ἔθηκεν; Phaedo 76 E, ἀρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἵση ἀνάγκη

ταῦτα τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι; ... ὑπερφυῶς ... δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

ἐκ νοημάτων ... εἶναι; See Tim. 30 B, οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν, τόγδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶντον ἔμψυχον ἔννον τε ... διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν. Dam., § 26, 46, says of the one, ἔτι εἰ, ὅτι πάντα, διὰ τοῦτο γνωστόν, ἔσται καὶ γνωστικόν· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τῶν πάντων, and certainly if one is All it must ‘know even as also it is known.’ Our passage recalls the historic Parm. (Introd. xxxvi.) who holds that thought is identical with being, or certainly that being includes thought as part of itself. Of a much later date we have Plotin. Enn. v. 4, 2, νοῦς δὴ καὶ διν ταῦτον οὐ γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ νοῦς ὥσπερ ἡ αἰσθητική τῶν αἰσθητῶν προσόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πράγματα etc. But in our passage Plato assumes that a thought has itself the power of thinking (Introd. xlv.). For the language cp. Tim. 30 B, λογισάμενος οὖν (ὁ θεὸς) εὑρισκεῖ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόγτον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον δόλου καλλιον ἐσεσθαί ποτε ἔργον, νοῦν δ' αὐτὸν χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῷ: also in another connection, Arist. Phys. III. 3, 202 a 30, ὥστ' ἡ πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν κινήσται, ἡ ἔχον κίνησιν οὐ κινήσται.

καταφαίν. Cp. with note on καταμανθ. 128 A; ^D and contr. with ἀναφάνη. 132 A and E. The observer detects as it were by looking from above, while the new object will emerge from below. See Phileb. 16 C, θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί: and 16 D, πρὶν διν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδη, and Crat. 401 B followed by 402 A. Proc., v. 160, notes the sudden boldness of Soc., καὶ διὰ τοῦ καταφαίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ φαίνεσθαι μόνον εἰπεῖν ἐνδειξάμενος, ὅτι διαφερόντως περὶ ταῦτης τεθύρηκε τῆς ὑποθέσεως. But is this accurate? Rep. x. 596 A has—after a reference to those who ἀμβλύτερον ὁρῶντες πρότεροι εἴδον—ἀλλὰ σοῦ παρόντος οὐδὲ ἢν προθυμηθῆναι οἵος τε εἴην εἰπεῖν εἰ τι μοι καταφαίνεται· ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ὄρα.

παραδείγματα ... φύσει, Two difficulties arise here, that of holding on to the intelligible character of the ideas when called models, and that of distinguishing between Plato's concep. of φύσις here and our own. We would naturally think of physical patterns to be found in the sensible world, in spite of the warning of Proc., εἴωθε γοῦν διΠλάτων καὶ

ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ φέρειν τοῦτο τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα. Stallb. well cites Rep. x. 597 B, οὐκοῦν τριττάι τινες κλίναι αὗται γύγνονται· μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα, ἥν φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἔγφυαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι, and so on till 598 A, and Phaedo 103 B. Arist. Met. I. 3, 984 b 15, again, comes nearer our conception when he says of Anaxag. Νοῦν δὴ τις εἰπὼν ἐνέναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἕψισ, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει, etc. We may also cite Theaet. 176 E, παραδειγμάτων, ὃ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὅντι ἐστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου (N.B.) ἀθλιωτάτου. Suid. says of παράδειγμα—εἰκὼν, ἢ χαρακτήρ ἔννοιαν ἔχων αἰσθητὸν πράγματος. ... παράδειγμα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὅταν ἀντιπαραθῇ τις ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ, οἷον λογικῷ λογικόν. He quotes Alex. Aphrod. on Top. 254, παράδειγμα δὲ γίνεται τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ γνωριμώτερον τοῦ ὅμοίου καὶ ἥττον γνωρίμου. To apply in our case, the word γνωρίμον must not be rendered ‘familiar’ but as = γνωστόν. For the reading ἐν τῇ φύσει as opp. to τῇ φύσει we have early testimony in favour of the MSS., as is noted by Fischer: the passage ἀλλ' ὃ Παρμ. ... εἰκασθῆναι being quoted by Stobaeus, Eclogg. Phys. p. 31, who is put roughly at the beginning of the 6th century A.D. On ἐστάναι Proc. says, v. 161, εἴ οὖν τὰ εἴδη καὶ δ. Σ. ἐστάναι λέγει, τὰ δὲ ἐστώτα (as he mentions above) κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἐν Σοφιστῇ γέγραπται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναι τὰ θειότατα τῶν πάντων ἐν Πολιτικῷ διώρυσται, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ εἴδη θειότατα ἄν εἴη καὶ οὐκέτι νοήματα αὐτὰ ψυχῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξηρημένα πάντων τῶν τοιούτων.

τὰ δὲ ... δόμοιῶν. This closely corresponds with Rep. x. 595 etc., where there is but one *ἰδέα* of each class μία μὲν κλίνης μία δὲ τραπέζης, and δὸς δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκείνους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὡς μὲν τὰς κλίνας, δὸς δὲ τὰς τραπέζας: but he adds, 597 A, οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, δὸς δῆ φαμεν εἶναι δὲ ἔστι κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά, which being so οὐκ δὸν τὸ δον ποιοῦ ἀλλά τι τοιούτον οἷον τὸ ὄν, ὃν δὲ οὐ. Against this hypothesis Arist. urges Met. I. 9, 991 a 20 (Introd. xlvi.), τί γάρ ἔστι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον; ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ὅμοιον ὅτιοῦν καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε καὶ ὅντος Σ. καὶ μὴ ὅντος γένοιτο ἄν οἶστε περ Σ. That is, apparently, A. admits that sensible objects—κλίναι τινές—might be modelled after δὲ ἔστι κλίνη, but sees nothing to necessitate this as the only expl. But does A. make as much as he

assumes by his argument? He does remove the necessity for ideas, which is much; but his own contention is not a *disproof* that two separate and apparently unconnected like objects were by some divine δημιουργὸς moulded consciously upon a divine pattern known to him. Alexand., in commenting on A. (574-5, Berlin), admits the connection which exists in nature—διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ,—but says to deduce παραδείγματα therefrom τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἔχει τὸ δὲ ψευδές τι. γίγνεται μὲν γάρ πάντα τὰ φύει κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ καὶ ἀριθμούς τινας ὠρισμένους καὶ οὕτε ἀπὸ τύχης οὕτε αὐτομάτου, οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς παράδειγμα. οὐ γάρ ἐννοοῦσα [so far as we know] ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ ἢ ποιεῖ (ἄλογος γάρ αὐτῇ δύναμίς ἐστιν), ἀλλ' ἐστὶν αὐτία τοῦ εἶναι ἐν τεταγμένῃ κινήσει ... ἔως ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος αἱ κινήσεις προέλθωσιν, οὐδὲν δέ τοι τέλος δύναμίς ἐστι λογική, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἄλογος. He rejects the idea of calling the action of nature θείαν τινὰ τέχνην.

καὶ ἡ ... αὐτοῖς: Are τὰ μὲν εἴδη and τὰ δὲ ἄλλα above also noms. before their infns. like μέθεξις? or is this the begin. of a new direct constr. which relapses into the form of the previous sent.? The sense is clear, ‘and this participation of the ideas accrues to the other existences in no other form than that of resembl. to them,’ ‘this particip. by the others in the ideas proves to be a simple resembl.’ ‘Et communitas ipsa qua cetereae res cum formis teneantur alia nulla esse nisi similitudo cum ipsis,’ Ast. The form which would be grammatical with least change would be καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὐτῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν εἰδῶν γίγνεται οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἡ ὅτι γίγασθη αὐτοῖς. Note the difference between ἐοικέναι, a mere fact, and εἰκασθῆναι, a fact with its producing cause. What is modelled on the παράδ. is called here a δόμοιῶμα and it is said εἰκασθῆναι; but the word εἰκὼν found in e.g. Tim. 29 B, ὥδε οὖν περὶ τε εἰκόνος καὶ περὶ τοῦ παράδ. αὐτῆς διοριστέον, does not occur. Yet this latter is the term which was accepted finally as the technical one: thus Dam. § 83, p. 190, οἷον εἰκὼν καθ' ἥν τὸ παράδ. εἴσεται, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδ. τὴν εἰκόνα· καίτοι πολλῇ τῆς εἰκόνος ἡ πρὸς τὸ παράδ. τὸ οἰκεῖον διάκρισις: and § 93, p. 231, παράδ. γὰρ καὶ δ. Σ. τῆς οἰκείας εἰκόνος. Is this not another evidence

that we are here at the beginning of Pl.'s theory on the subject? ἔφη Parmen., not Pythod., this time.

οἱόν τε... εἶναι Proc. maintains the possibility of such a one-sided connection even in the case of participation proper—οἵκ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἔκείνους ἀλλὰ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῖς v. 129: and Dam. § 37, p. 77, draws distinctions καὶ γάρ τοῦ ἡλίου μύσαντες ἀφιστάμεθα μὴ ἀφισταμένου... καὶ τῆς ὥλης αὐτὸν διακέριται τὸ εἴδος οὐκ ἔχοντης τὴν διάκρισιν, εἴδος γάρ τι καὶ ἡ διάκρισις... καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν τῷ παραδόμοια οὐκ ὅντες δόμοιψ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνι: again εἰ δὲ ὅτι ἡ εἰκὼν δόμοιονται τῷ π., καὶ ταύτη δόμοια κατὰ ἔλλειψιν, καὶ τὸ π. δόμοιον τὴν εἰκόνα πρὸς ἑαυτόν, καὶ ταύτη δόμοιον [καθ' ὑπεροχήν];

αὐτῷ [τῷ εἴδει] ἀφωμοιάθη [τὸ εἰκασθέν]; ἡ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ δόμοιον [sc. τὸ εἰκασθέν] μὴ δόμοιψ [sc. τῷ εἴδει] δόμοιον εἶναι; μηχανὴ with the simple inf. seems to be just as common in Pl. as it is with ὄστε or ὅπως. Note the want of the art. in μηδόμοιψ. Is it because these words are part of the predicate?

τὸ δὲ... μετέχειν; The connection is ἀρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη τὸ δόμοιον μετέχειν ἐνὸς εἴδοντος τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῷ δόμοιψ, where however the last words are still condensed for μετέχειν ἐνὸς εἴδοντος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔκείνῳ οὐ τὸ δόμοιον μετέχει. The first τὸ δόμ. is τὸ εἰκασθέν, the second which we have extracted from τῷ δόμ. is the original εἴδος on which τὸ εἰκ. was modelled, while the two cases are combined in the τὰ δόμοια which immediately follows. Jackson (Jour. Philol. xxii. 291) would bracket εἴδοντος ‘as a premature anticipation of Parmenides’ next question.’ Certainly the word might be dropped, if we are always to assume that an author said what centuries of criticism discover that he should have said.

εἰ δὲ μή, An odd neg.; it denies the previous one οὐκ ἄρα οἶδόντε. We must take the εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐχ οἶδόντε=εἰ δὲ οἶδόντε and transl. with Stallb. ‘sin aliter,’ or with Ast ‘alioquin.’

παρὰ τὸ... ἀναφ. etc. The same reasoning and in the same language as above A. The idea seems to be similar to what we observe when a company of soldiers forms ‘from column into line’; as each new file comes up and takes his place and dressing, the officer at the pivot can say of him ἀναφαίνεται παρὰ τὸν πρότερον, and if he is not sufficiently visible the officer will bid him ‘dress up.’ The

difference is that in this case the movement starts from zero and has a definite end, while with Plato it starts from τὰ πολλὰ ὄρατα and is endless. There is, as we have hinted, another difference—the successive files are each a ‘living man of mortal mould’ contributing new strength to the formation, though no one claims to be better than the last: Pl.’s endless εἴδη are mere ‘men of buckram,’ each one being but a reflection of those before, with no substance of his own. In this view they resemble still better perhaps the reflections of a figure in two opposing mirrors; the figure is τὰ πολλά, the reflections are the successive εἴδη—they are endless, yet none of them contributes an atom of new information to justify its existence. This ἀπορία seems to be very much upon the analogy of Zeno’s ἀπορίαι on motion: Zeno would prevent a man going from A to B not by adding to the distance but by dividing the given space into an endless succession of smaller and smaller parts. Or, as we have said, it resembles an analytic judgment which brings more clearly before us all the possibilities latent in the distance from A to B, or from πολλὰ to εἴδος, but does not synthetically increase our acquaintance with the unexplored region beyond. As to the mutual likeness, it is plain that an εἰκὼν (such as the copy of a picture) has been made like the original, without the other having been made like it—the likeness here is all on one side. But Pl.’s view is that the original must, not so transparently yet really, be itself a copy of some idea which was its model; and that both are like that, and so on.

καὶ ἀν It is striking to find ἀν and ἀν interchanged within twenty words. Probably the καὶ has something to do with the difference; yet Ast gives Polit. 292 E, ἐπιστήμην, ἀν τ' ἄρχη καὶ ἔαν μὴ, which reverses the case. Are we certain that such uses are not sometimes due to the scribes?

ἔκεινό τῷ So t, which seems clearly the better: ¹³³ see Notes 1. The question throughout is whether the εἴδος is like the εἰκασθέν, and here ἔκεινο is the new εἴδος which is assumed to be δόμοιον τῷ; that being so, both are like some other thing which becomes εἴδος ἔτερον αὐτῷ.

καὶ οὐδέποτε... αἰδεῖ etc. The language is a little odd, καὶ κανὸν εἴδος οὐδέποτε παίνεται αἰδεῖ γιγνόμενον,—it might have been οὐδὲ παίνεται ποτε κανὸν

εἶδος αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον, omitting *καὶ*,—‘and never at all will a fresh *εἶδος* desist from always turning up.’

μετέχοντι As the sole *μέθεξις* here is that of *ὅμοιον γίγνεσθαι*, it would be more correct though grammatically confusing to say *τῷ ἑαυτῷ εἰκασθέντι*. Here comes a pause in Par.’s *ἀπορίαι* to Soc.’s assumption of the ideas. Soc. gives up the argument, and does so because he cannot conceive how the ideas can influence the many, while yet remaining ultimate absolute entities *νοητά, χωριστά, ἔντῶτα ἐν τῇ φύσει*. The *μέθεξις* cannot be physical else the ideas get broken up; nor can it be by resemblance else we have a progressus in infinitum—*ἄνθρωπος + εἶδος ἀνθρώπου* yielding a *καινὸν εἶδος* or *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* and so on indefinitely. Introd. xii.

ὅρες οὖν, etc. It is not clear whether *οὗτα αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ* form an attribute to *εἶδη* or, with *ὡς* understood, a part of the predicate with *διορίζηται*. Engelm. ‘wenn Jemand die Begriffe als an und für sich seiend gesondert hinstellt.’ t reads *ἔάν τις ὡς εἶδη* and so most texts; but it does not seem a gain, and may have arisen from a confusion of the eye with *ὡς ἔπος* below.

B οὐδέποτε ἀπτα etc. Of course the verb is 2nd sing. mid. Stallb. says ‘h.e. *αὐτῆς τῆς ἀπορίας, δῆση ἔστιν*,’ while Heind. quotes as analogous Apol. 20 E, *τῆς γάρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τις ἔστι σοφία καὶ οὕτα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεύν.* Cp. as odd Crat. 413 C, *ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἔγώ ... πολὺν ἐν πλείονι ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ οὐ πρὶν ἐπιχειρήσας ...*, and Ar. Met. vi. 14, 1039 b, *ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα τε συμβαίνει καὶ τούτων ἀτοπώτερα.* *γ* is given from a strong desire to follow *Α* wherever it yields a meaning. But the constr. is unusual, and t reads *εἰ ἐν* which also corresponds with *ἔάν τις* above.

Ἐν εἴδος ἔκαστον ... θήσεις: The most natural understanding of this would be that of Heind. who arranges thus *εἰ ἔκαστον εἴδος τῶν οὗτων ἐν τι αἰεί*, ‘if you are always going to set up each several *εἶδος* of those which exist, as an exclusive isolated entity.’ This is quite clear, but it is a mere repetition of *εἴδη οὗτα αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ διορίζηται*, strengthened by *ἐν ἔκαστον αἰεί*. Can the words mean then that that former phrase admitted intercommunion of *εἶδη* which by this amended form is disallowed? If so, they are at variance with the whole purport of the following argument, which admits co-relations in the ideal sphere, and is directed to destroy only the

relation which Soc. assumed that sphere to have with the world of sense. If again we are to assume that the insistence upon the *ἀπορία* which arises out of the *ἐν ἔκαστον αἰεὶ τι ἀφορίζεμενος* is meant to suggest that some *εἶδη* may be in connection with our world while others admittedly are not—then, while this would be in harmony with the constant contention of Proc. that there are ascending or descending grades in the ideality of the *εἶδη*, and that the solution of the problem is that there are *σευραὶ*—Jacob’s ladders, as it were—between the ideal and sensible spheres, it would place us under the necessity of assuming that Plato really was inclined to believe that *οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον*, that you do ascend from sense to *εἶδος* by a graduated series of existences; a supposition which is not only at variance with the whole tone of his reasoning above, but is in absolute antagonism to what he advances for the next page. It would however have some affinity with his later views, Phileb. 16 D, *τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρον ιδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἀν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατέβῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρον τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνός· τότε δὲ ἥδη τὸ ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἀπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἔργον.* As to language, *τῶν οὗτων* seems to mean the ideal not the sensible sphere, while *ἀφορίζόμενος* would be simpler if changed to *ἀφωρισμένον*. *πολλὰ etc.* is as if he had said *ὅσα ἔστι τὰ ἀπορα* or *ἀπορήματα*.

εἴ τις φαίη ... εἴναι: The persons here are not easily kept distinct. It is clear that *τις φαίη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι, ψεύδεται*, and *ὁ ἀναγκάζων* are the same; and equally so that *ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξει* is another. Which is *ἔμπειρος ὁν ... μὴ ἀφυήσις?* Heind. says ‘is qui contendit ne cognosci quidem haec posse’: Stallb. says ‘potius is qui istius rei sententiam in dubium vocat et impugnat.’ So again on *ἐνδεικνυμένον* Heind. says ‘sc. ὅτι ψεύδεται ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, manifesto enim hoc ἐνδεικνυμένον spectat ad praecedens *ἐνδείξασθαι*:’ while Stallb. contends ‘τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένον Heind. refert ad adversarium, intelligendum est de illo ipso qui cognitionem ea ratione sublatam esse contendere singitur.’ Stallb. sees the necessity for acuteness on the part of him chiefly who undertakes to prove the error of saying that the *εἶδη* cannot be known, and neglects in urging this necessity the clear connection of *ἐνδεικνυμένον* with *ἐνδείξασθαι*, which Heind. points out.

There can be little doubt that Heind. is right. Both men require to be acute, and if the man who denies the possibility of knowing the *εἶδη* is to be convinced of his error it will only be by arguments which come *πόρρωθεν* and which it will tax his intellect to follow. Arist. himself could not see the force of the argument in favour of knowing *εἶδη* which were *χωριστά*: and Pl. clearly points out, 135 A-B, that the cleverness of *τοῦ δυνητομένου μαθεῖν* on this point is second only to that of *τοῦ ἄλλον δυνητομένου διδάξαι*. The parallelism of the passages is complete *ἀμφισβητεῖν—δὲ ἀμφισβητῶν, εὐφυοῦς—μὴ ἀφυῆς, ἐνδεικνυμένου—δυνητομένου διδάξαι, μαθεῖν—ἐπεσθαι, δυνανάπειστον—ἀπίθανος*. As regards language *πραγματευομένου* is gen. absol. and *ἐπεσθαι* is used without a case. *ἀπίθανος*, though generally meaning ‘unpersuasive’ rather than ‘unpersuaded,’ clearly corresponds to *δυνανάπειστον*, 135 A, and Ast renders it ‘*is cui non persuaseris*,’ while Müller gives ‘unwiderlegbar’: the Rhunk. Scholiast too has *ἄντὶ τοῦ δύσκολος καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως πειθόμενος*, and Stallb. agrees. For expressions cp. Phaedr. 229 D, *ἔγὼ δέ... ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάντα εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός*. Phaedo 70 B, *ἄλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἵστις οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως*.

c *ἀναγκάζων* Cp. Soph. 241 D, *βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ δὸν ὡς ἔστι* etc.; 246 B, *νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἰδὴ βιάζομεν τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι*.

p. 8. *οἴμαι ἂν* ‘I should suppose’: *ἄν* recurs in place after *ὅμολογ.*

ἐκάστον The usual reading is *αὐτοῦ ἐκάστον*, and so t. It seems to make the passage tautological, and may have crept in from a zeal for exaggerated abstractness ‘a separate existence, apart, of each separate *εἶδος*.’ The text makes *οὐσίαν = ἰδέαν*, and *ἐκάστον = ‘each several class of beings in the sensible world.’* Cp. 135 B, also Phaedo 78 D, *αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἡς λόγοι δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι*, and 92 D, *ἀσπερ αὐτῆς (τῆς ψυχῆς) ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὅ ἔστιν*.

τιθέται is habitually used in this sense, as some English writers use ‘posit’; but *εἶναι* rarely appears with it. The phrase is not similar to e.g. Phaedo 93 C, *τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι*, where the last three words are the judgment *ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἀρμονία* put as object of *θεμένων*: nor to Crat. 385 A,

ὅ ἀν θῇ καλεῖν τις ἐκαστον, which but varies the ὁ τι ἀν τις τῷ θῆται ὄνομα of 384 D. Our passage means ‘assumes or posits as existing,’ and comes nearer to Rep. v. 458 A, *θέντες ὡς ὑπάρχον εἶναι ὁ βούλονται*, where ὑπ. *εἶναι* again seem connected with such other phrases as *ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι*.

ἐν ἦμιν: So again *ε* for the more usual *παρ' ἦμιν*. *πῶς γάρ* Pl.’s interlocutors cease raising difficulties when he wishes them to cease; see 137 B.

πρὸς ἀλλήλας etc. Introd. xlvi. and on 130 B above. *αἱ* is fem. in both MSS., where we would rather expect *ἄ* or *ὁ ἔστιν*: but the sense is clear, as in Phaedr. 243 E, *ἔωστερ ἀν ἥς ὃς εἰ*. Stallb. seems to think that the alternative to *αἱ* must be not *ἄ* or *ὁ* but *οἷς*, and that clearly this would be wrong. The full phrase would be *εἰσὶν αἱ ἴδεις εἰσὶν*, as in Rep. v. 533 D, *χρωμένη αἱς διγλόθομεν τέχναις*, and 130 B, *ἥς ἥμεις ὅμοιότητος ἔχομεν*.

αὐταὶ ‘scripserim αὐταὶ pro αὐταὶ’ Heind. There is no need; still there is a scratch over *αὐ* in *Α.* *πρὸς αὐτὰς* combines the sense of *καθ'* *αὐτὰς* and *πρὸς ἀλλήλας*. We may cp. Dam. § 93, p. 231, *ἅρα οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματά ἔστι, τὰ δὲ εἰκόνες, καὶ ταῦτα εἴδη ἔστι καὶ ἐκατέρωθι ἔστι; πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἀν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ ἐκὼν ὅμοιώματά ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ὅμ. ἀποτέλεσμα ὅμοιότητος* ὅμοιούται δὲ καὶ ἐκεὶ ἔτερον ἐτέρῳ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὠσταύτως’ π. γάρ καὶ ὁ Σ. τῆς οἰκείας εἰκ.

τὰ παρ' ἦμιν ... *ἐκαστα* ‘Quorum dum nos partem *D* habemus, singulis appellamur nominibus—v.c. magni parvi similes etc. Trahendum hoc *εἶναι* ad *ἐπονομάζομεθα*’ Heind. ‘Sive simulacula sive quo quis alio modo ea statuat quorum dum participes sumus, singulis appellamur nominibus’ Stallb. Our idiom would omit the first *εἴτε*. See for the idea and lang. Phaedo 100 C-D, more than once referred to: Stallb. also cites Crito 50 A, *εὶ μέλλοντιν ἦμιν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴτε ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο*, and others. One would suppose that the *ὅμοιώματα* were the individual things of sense which, as we have learnt to think, partake of and are called after *εἶδη*. But they are *ὅμοιώματα* ὃν *ἥμεις μετέχοντες*, which throws us back on the explanations of Proc. already quoted, 131 E etc., to the effect that there are grades of abstractness in the *εἶδη*, some *εἶδη* being *φυσικὰ* or *αἰσθητά*, which must be understood here. Plato must be held as saying—all our discussions on *εἶδη* thus far turn out

to be discussions upon spurious semi-sensuous models; for the more clearly we grasp the separateness which we ascribe to the *εἶδη*, the more clearly we see that they have nothing to do with our world.

ἔκεινοις, ‘Ceterum ἔκεινοις dixit quia jam τὰ εἴδη in mente habebat’ Stallb. These are the real *εἴδη*.

πρὸς αὐτὰ include the sense πρὸς ἀλληλα, for we are dealing with ὅμοιώματα which πρὸς ἀλληλά ἔστιν ἡ ἔστιν.

ἔστιν ‘Temere aliquis inserendum conjectabat ἡ ἔστιν (after ἔστιν), quum ἔστιν hoc loco idem sit quod τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει’ Heind.

καὶ ἔαντῶν ... οὗτως; The transl. deal loosely with this; closest comes Engel. ‘und von sich selbst, nicht von jenen, erhält gleichfalls den Namen, was benannt wird.’ All seem to suggest that the genitives are equivalent to ἐπ’, ἔξ, ἀφ’, ἔαντῶν ... ἔκεινων = ‘and all things again in our world which are so named (large, small, like etc.) are named after themselves (i.e. each other), and not after those abstract *εἴδη*.’ Is there any justification for this construction? It seems better to extend the passage thus—καὶ ἔαντῶν αὖ [i.e. ἀλλήλων] ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔκεινων ὅμοιώματά ἔστιν ὅσα παρ’ ἡμῖν ὄνομάζεται οὗτως [i.e. τοῖς τοιούτοις ὄνομασι sc. μεγάλα, ἥπα, συμκρά, δεσπότις etc.]: unless we prefer καὶ ἔαντῶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔκεινων μετέχοντα ἐπονομάζεται ὅσα αὖ ὄνομάζεται οὗτως: It will be observed that Engel. severs οὗτως from ὄνομάζεται, and puts it as gleichfalls in another connection.

παρμενεδην *v* wanting in *A*: in Σωκράτη *v* is often added by scribes.

δεσπότης ἡ δούλος The example chosen by Arist. Categ. 7, 6 b 28 on πρὸς τι. ὁ δούλος δεσπότου δούλος λέγεται καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης: he adds διπλάσιον—ἡμίσεος, μεῖζον—ἐλάττονος: but τῇ πτώσει ἐνίστει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη Sometimes οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν ... οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ οὐ γάρ οἰκεῖως τὸ πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος: ... but ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ οἰκεῖως, καὶ ἀντιστρέψει, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτόν. We even coin to get the antith.: if we say τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πλοιοῦ ... οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις: but with τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πηδαλιωτοῦ we are right τὸ γάρ πηδαλιωτὸν πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν. We must be careful

then not to make the ἀπόδοσις πρὸς τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων as δούλος—ἀνθρώπου. See on 130 B.

αὐτοῦ δεσπότου ... δὲ ἔστι We may note here these E usages of αὐτὸς and ὁ. The originals we find in 134 B, αὐτὸς τὸ καλὸν ὁ ἔστι [καλὸν], where concord is accurately observed, and we have throughout concords of αὐτὸς and ὁ taken separately. The rel. seems to have been fixed in the neuter first, for Pl. often uses ὁ ἔστι absolutely, e.g. Phaedo 75 D, περὶ ἀπάντων οὓς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο ὁ ἔστι: and we have here ὁ ἔστι δεσπότης—δούλος. This phrase must be distinguished, as Stallb. says, from e.g. πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν ἀλλ’ εἰσιν above and αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δοντείας ἔστιν ὁ ἔστι below, which mean ‘are what they are,’ ‘is what it is.’ Again we have had, 130 B etc., such expressions as δικαίον τι εἶδος αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτὸς and αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου which, with the constant neuter forms such as αὐτὸς τὸ καλὸν and τὸ ἔν, serve as bridges to phrases like Prot. 360 E, σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος ... τί ποτ’ ἔστιν αὐτὸς ἡ ἀρετή, where Herm. puts a comma after αὐτό, and Crat. 411 D, εἴ δὲ βούλει αὐτὸς ἡ νόητος τοῦ νέον ἔστιν ἔστι. In Arist. the phrases have advanced beyond themselves: for αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνθρωπός we get αὐτο-ἀνθρωπός and beyond ὁ ἔστι—τὸ τί ἔνι εἶναι.

δούλον δὲ ἔστι δούλος No ὁ in *A*, but t gives ὁ ἔστι, and clearly this is wanted. On these two phrases Heind. says ‘Epexegesin referunt praecedentium αὐτὸν δεσπότου et αὐτὸν δούλου, in quibus commode abessent haec δεσπότου et δούλου.’ ἀνθρωπός ὁν=εἰς ὃν τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν, τῶν τριῶν.

τὴν δύναμαν ἔχει (sc. ἡν ἔχει), like ἔστιν ὁ εστι above.

πρὸς αὐτὰ again involves καθ’ αὐτὰ πρὸς ἀλληλα: ¹³⁴ καθ’ αὐτὰ = in our (or the other) world πρὸς δούλον and the converse. τῆς δὲ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἀν ἔκεινης εἴη ἐπιστήμη [=εἴη ἡ or ὁ ἔστι]. In order the words would be εἴη ἀν ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς ἔκεινης ἀληθείας δὲ ἔστιν (ἀλήθεια). Cp. Arist. Met. XI. 7, 1072 B, νόητις ἡ καθ’ αὐτὴν τοῦ καθ’ αὐτὸς ἀρίστοιν, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ ἔστιν: Stallb. is prob. right in saying that ἡ so closely after ὁ in regard to ἐπιστήμη is to point the distinction between ἐπιστήμη ἡ and τῶν ὄντων ὁ. He adds ‘τὰ ὄντα sunt τὰ ὄντως ὄντα ut sexcenties.’

έκαστη ἡ ... συμβαίνοι εἶναι; Steph. notes that ἔκαστη ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι ἀν εἶναι ἐπιστήμη might equally

be συμβαίνοι ἀν ἐκάστην τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὅντων ἐπιστήμην. A desire for antithesis has entrapped Pl. into using ὅντων of sensible things. He had ἐκάστου τῶν ὅντων ὃ ἔστιν above, and so he uses τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὅντων ἐκάστου here, where his usual guarded phrase τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, or τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, would have done. ἀλλὰ μὴν ... εἶναι; = ἀλλὰ μήν, ὡς ὁμ., οὐτε ἔχομέν γε αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οὐτε οἷόν τε (ἔστιν αὐτά) παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι;

γένη εἰδη, ἰδέαι and γένη are, or may be used as, equiv. when that is desirable. Here γένη is used probably because τοῦ εἴδους has preceded—the power of knowing being for the moment an εἶδος the objects of knowledge are for the time γένη. In a sentence we return to τῶν εἴδων οὐδέν: and after passing ἰδέας αὐτὰς come to αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστ.

ἢ γε etc. Grote cites here Arist. Met. VIII. 8, p. 1050 b 34, εἴ ἄρα τινές εἰσι φύσεις τοιαῦται, η̄ οὖσιαὶ οἵας λέγοντιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ἰδέας, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιστῆμον ἀν τι εἴη η̄ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ κινούμενον η̄ κίνησις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνέργεια μᾶλλον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ δυνάμεις τούτων. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν πρότερον η̄ ἐνέργεια καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ πάσις ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς, φανερόν.

ἅ δὴ ... ὑπολαμβ. Heind. says 'i.e. ᾧ δὴ ὡς ὅντα ἰδέας αὐτὰς ὑπόλ.' perhaps rightly: but perhaps we should take ἰδέας-αὐτὰς-οὕτας closely 'abstract existent ἰδέας.' There may be point in ὑπολαμβ. after the argument that the εἶδη cannot be known. We only assume their existence after all.

δευτέρου—τὸ δεινότερον οὐχ ὡς ἴσχυρότερον ἄπορον, ὡς εἰώθασι δεινοὺς λέγειν τοὺς κρατοῦντας τῇ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, ἀλλ' ὡς μείζονος δείματος καὶ εὐλαβείας τοῖς νοῦν ἔχοντιν ἄξειν. Schol. Rh. from Proc. v. 220, who adds τὴν γὰρ ἔνωσιν τῶν ὅντων διασπῆ καὶ διοικῆσει χωρὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου τὸ θεῖον etc.

τὸ ποῖον: The punctuation is left as in Η. This is clearly a question; and so in other cases.

ἀκριβέστερον as we talk of 'the exact sciences.' The sense is very clear in Phileb. 23 A, οὐκ ἀμεινον αὐτὴν [ἡδονὴν] ἔφη ηδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἔξελέγχοντα λυτεῖν; So Nubes 130, πῶς οὖν ... λόγων ἀκριβῶν σκινδαλάμους μαθήσομαι; cp. 153, ὁ Ζεῦ βασιλεὺς τῆς λεπτότητος τῶν φρενῶν. Ar. Met. XII. 3, 1078 a, διτρὶς δὴ ἀν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπλονστέρων, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει τάκριβές. From our context αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη = ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστ., ναί = φαίνη ἀν:

εἰπερ τι ἀλλο ... ἐπιστήμην; Sense as clear and p. 9. constr. as faulty as Milton's 'loveliest pair That ever since in love's embraces met, Adam the goodliest man of men since born His sons, the fairest of her daughters Eve' (P. L. IV. 321). Pl. seems to mean 'If any other thing [than science?] possesses science, you would say that no one was more entitled to possess it than God': what he does mean would be clearer thus—οὐκοῦν θεόν, εἰπερ γέ τι, φαίης ἀν ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην; The very tenses are jumbled.

παρὰ τῷ θεῷ In the νοητὸς τόπος as contrasted D with the ὅρατὸς or ὅρώμενος τόπος, Rep. VI.-VII. 499-532 etc., Introd. xlvi. Whatever may be meant by this, it is clear that God is closely associated with it. Thus Rep. x. 597 B, οὐκοῦν τριταί τινες κλῖναι αὐται γίγνονται· μία μὲν η̄ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα ἡν φαίμεν ἀν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι. Proc. v. 238, δὲ μὲν ὅλος συλλογισμὸς τοιοῦτός ἐστι τῶν προκειμένων οἱ θεοὶ τὴν αὐτοεπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αὐτοδεσποτείαν ἔχονται· τὰ τὴν αὐτοεπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αὐτοδεσποτείαν ἔχονται· τὰ τὴν αὐτοεπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αὐτοδεσποτείαν ἔχονται· οἱ ἄρα θεοὶ οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχονται τὴν αὐτοεπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αὐτοδεσποτείαν ἔχονται· οὐ γιγνώσκουσιν ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ δεσπόζουσιν ἡμῶν. (οὐ, or οὐκ ἄρα γ;) This holds only if we transl. the major (here second) premiss 'whatever has absolute science and power has a science and power which have no connection with us.' Dam. § 70, p. 154, doubts if even God can know the real One: τόγε πρὸ τοῦ ἡνωμένου ἐν ἔτι μειόνως ἀγνωστον. It comes before νοῦς.

οὐτὶς δὲ ... ἀν δεσπόζειν οὐτ' ἀν The hypothetic form even redundant, and that after εἰ ... ἔστιν. The cond. is assumed as true—God has perfect knowledge: the consequence is felt to be questionable—he surely cannot be ignorant of our world. While Plato raises the question apropos of knowledge he soon makes it co-extensive with the whole scope of the two worlds. Indeed his language is elastic throughout—even θεὸς becoming θεοί.

ἄλλ' ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε etc. Observe the precision of E the inference. If the one assumption holds the other holds. Is that a fact? 'Our science' may be powerless to know the divine, though in conjuring up and discussing all this it seems to do pretty well; but does it follow that the perfect divine science

must fail in knowing us? The greater includes the less, though not the less the greater.

Θεοὶ ὄντες: Might be either because, or although, they are gods: we may say ‘gods though they be.’ έχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ‘θεοὶ ὄντες’ προστεθὲν πολλήν τινα τὴν ἐνδεξίν τῆς ἀπορίας· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ θεῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ βούλεται πάντα πληροῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ... ἐπήνεγκε μετὰ πολλῆς βαρύτητος ‘θεοὶ ὄντες.’ Proc. v. 237-9. ἀποστ. τοῦ εἰδέναι: not ‘to say that God is without knowledge’ but ‘to rob God of some knowledge—make his knowledge less than universal—minish aught of it.’ καίτοι (Proc. v. 240) πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἔδει στέρησιν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ’ ὑπεροχὴν γνώσεως· εἴρηται γὰρ ηγνώσις ἐκείνη πολὺν τῶν ἀλλων ἀκριβεστέρα πασῶν· ἐπειτα εἰ καὶ στέρησιν ἔδει λέγειν, τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων πραγματείας (-τειῶν?) γνώσεως ἔδει τίθεσθαι τὴν στέρησιν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀπλῶς γνώσεως οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο συνήγαγεν ὁ λόγος. This recalls the Phileb. as to the relative dignity of νοῦς and ἡδονή. Here the knowledge of αἱ ἡμετέραι πραγματείαι is put in the position of ἡδονή, and seems in the judgment of Proc. to merit the same rejection. ‘The inference here drawn by Parmen. supplies the first mention of a doctrine revived by (if not transmitted to) Averroes and various scholastic doctors of the middle ages, so as to be formally condemned by theological councils. M. Renan tells us “En 1269 ... Quod Deus non cognoscit singulaaria” etc. (Ren. Averr. p. 213). The acuteness with which these objections are enforced is remarkable. I know nothing superior to it in all the Platonic writings.’ Grote Pl. II. 275. Of course γὰρ must be supplied mentally with μὴ λίαν θαυμαστός. Heind. wishes to write it, and well cites 132 B and 136 D with others.

135 εἰ εἰσὶν ... τῶν ὄντων etc. Once again we have the distinction noted in 133 A-B—if the εἰδῆ exist, and if each of them is to be held as separate from the others. Here τῶν ὄντων probably, though not certainly, = τὰ καθέκαστα. The order of the next words is ὄριεται τις ἔκαστον εἶδος (ώς) αὐτό τι.

ἀμφισβητεῖν ως etc. L. and S. give examples of this constr., and Stallb. cites Rep. V. 476 D, καὶ ἀμφισβητήν ως οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, and VI. 502 A-B, οὐ τε ... εἰ τε the copulative force is shown here by separating τε ‘both that they do not exist and if they did exist ever so much.’ Cp. L. and S. οὐτε 4. Stallb. raises difficulties, and proposes εἰ δέ. ‘Sub-

jungere in altero orationis membro volebat haec οὐτε τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει γνωστά. Sed mutata verborum structura’ etc.

λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε Several cases here of τε-καὶ run together. Stallb. rightly says we are not to expect τὸν λέγοντα because we have τὸν ἀκούοντα above. Τὸν ἀκούοντα is the subject of both ἀπορεῖν and δοκεῖν, while ταῦτα λέγοντα = σταν ταῦτα λέγη.

καὶ ἀνδρὸς etc. ‘Ficinus: et viri admodum ingeniosi esse, percipere posse etc. Bene si legereinū καὶ ἀνδρ. πάντα ... εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι. Nunc nihil adest unde genitivi hi pendeant, neque structuræ ratio constat, nisi post εὐφυοῦς excidisse putemus δεῖν. ut Charm. 169 A’ Heind. A better case is Stallb.’s, Menex. 235 D, ἀγαθοῦ δὲν ῥήτορος δέον τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὑδοκημήσοντος. The δέον may have been left out by his change of struct. He meant to put εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι after εὐφυοῦς, but having got so far wrote τοῦ δυνησ. after passing the proper point for δεῖν.

Ἱτι θαυμαστό. Another irreg. He mentally re-^B calls θαυμαστῶς ως δυσ. when the constr. is no longer parallel. He should have said Ἱτι δὲ εὐφυεστέρου. εὑρήσοντος, Proc. v. 240, says ὅτι γάνυμος καὶ εἰρητικός ἔστι περὶ τὴν διδασκαλίαν: we must add some such phrase as τὴν προσήκουσαν διδασκαλίαν. So Sophist. 253 C, πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δέι, καὶ σχεδόν γε ἵστως τῆς μεγίστης;

διεκρινητός. The MSS. agree: yet one would expect the genitive. It shows traces of having at first reversed this and written δυνησόμενον, which is obviously wrong. As it stands, this part. must agree with ἄλλον whilst one would expect it to agree with τοῦ εὑρήσοντος. It gives, however, a good sense: the hearer (ἄλλον) has so profited and has so clear a conception of the case that he believes, after ‘having sufficiently analysed or investigated.’

μὴ ἔάστα εἴδη ... εἶναι, Notes 1. It agree in reading ἔάση, which is due probably to dictation and is impossible, as εἰ precedes and ὄριεται follows. The phrase is counterp. of ἀγνωστα ἀναγκ. ... εἶναι 133 C.

ἀποβλέψας, Looking away from favourable points and confining his view to objections; cp. 130 E. μηδέ τι cp. the repeated use of τι in αὐτό τι ἔκαστον εἶδος A, and γένος τι ἔκαστον B above; yet It might suggest μηδὲ ἔτι, Notes 1.

τῶν ὄντων ἔκαστον seems to decide that τῶν ὄντων C

all through are the sensible world 'of each natural group of sensible, or at least of sublunary, existences.'

τὴν τοῦ διαλ. δύν. διαφθ. This means strictly metaphys. discuss. See above on 126 c; for the phrase Stallb. cites Phileb. 57 E, ἡμᾶς ... ἀναίνοιτ' ἀνὴ τοῦ διαλέγει. δύναμ. which is described as being περὶ τὸ διν καὶ τὸ οὐτως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταντὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως. also Rep. vi. 511 b, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἀπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλ. δυνάμει, which becomes in c ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ. The reason of its complete destruc. is clearly given in Arist. Met. i. 6, 987 a 32 (Introd. i. etc.) οὐτως ὑπέλαβεν (δὲ Πλατ.) ... ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν δρον (ὄν δὲ Σωκράτης ἔζητε) τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός, ἀεὶ γε μεταβαλλόντων. In Theaet. 161 E, ἔνυπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγ. πραγματεία becomes μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία—εἰ ἀληθῆς ἡ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου. At. Met. x. 6, 1063 b 10, μηθὲν γὰρ τιθέντες ἀναιροῦσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ὅλως λόγον. For the object of philosophical discussion you need an οὐσίαν or ἰδέαν τὴν αὐτὴν αἱὲ οὐσαν. Procl. v. 253-58 discusses the question as regards ἀπόδεξις, δρισμός, διαιρεσις, and ἀνάλυσις, and finds that all require τὸ ἀκίνητον τὸ μόνιμον τὸ τέλειον τὸ μοναδικὸν τὸ ἀνδον etc. for their action, δοξαστικῆς γάρ ἐστι διαιρετικῆς τὰ ὑστερογενῆ (=τὰ αἰσθητὰ) διαιρεῖν, διανοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἐπιστημονικῆς τὰς οὐσιώδεις τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ λόγων διαφορὰς θεωρεῖν etc.

καὶ μᾶλλον ἥσθησθαι: Stallb. quotes Ficinus 'tu praecipue sensisse mihi videris' but suggests that μᾶλλον may also mean justo magis, nimis. In the former case we must understand μᾶλλον ἔτερον—does he allude to the search for general definitions on the part of the historic Socrates as the reason? —in the latter case he may be supposed to have shown signs of being very much impressed by the force of Parmenides' argument.

τι οὖν ... πέρι; for dialectic and philosophy are one, Sophist. 253 E, ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις ... πλὴν τῷ καθαρῷ τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι. For the language see Rep. vii. 539 c, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τὸν ἀλλούς διαβέβληται. Cp. Met. i. min. 2, καὶ τὸ γιγνώσκειν οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ γὰρ οὐτως ἀπειρα πῶς ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν; XII. 10, 1086 b, there is a difficulty both with and without the ideas εἰ μὲν γάρ τις μὴ θήσει τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι κεχωρισμένας, ... ἀναι-

ρήσει τὴν οὐσίαν ... ἀν δέ τις θῇ τὰς οὐσ. χωριστάς, πῶς θήσει τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν;

ἀγνοούμενων τούτων; Does τούτων mean τῶν εἴδον (ἀγνώστων οὖτων)? or does the phrase mean 'these matters being undetermined'? Probably the latter; denial of the existence of the εἶδη has interposed since they were pronounced unknown, and a new paragraph begins here.

The following are the cardinal points in the discussion, thus far. 1. The terms εἴδη γένη ἰδέαι represent certain intellectual entities influencing essentially the world which we apprehend by the senses. 2. This latter is not subjective in the sense of being a mere series of impressions: it is objective, but as γιγνόμενον it cannot be known. 3. The εἴδη are totally separate from it and, if known, are known not by αἰσθησις but by λογισμὸς διάνοια νοῦς ἐπιστήμη. 4. After some efforts the best conception of the influence exerted by these εἴδη upon our world is found to be that they act as models after the pattern of which its several constituents are framed. 5. We advance to a knowledge of the εἴδη from our side by a process of inference and comparison; and it seems to be suggested that there may be stages in this advance—an early one being the sensible picture or what Proclus calls the αἰσθητὸν or φυσικὸν εἶδος, whilst a more adequate one is the νόημα or ψυχικὸν εἶδος. 6. But in the end we are baffled:—for (a) the process runs on ad infinitum—and naturally so, the εἴδη being given as χωρίς: (b) the εἴδη if reached would thereupon cease to be what they are—χωριστά, which it is their duty to remain, and would become tainted with a sensible flavour. However far we prosecute our 'victorious analysis,' or rather synthesis, the result when attained will remain at best an object of 'our science.' The world of εἴδη is the unconditioned, to know it would be to condition it. 7. This χωρισμὸς follows its own course of victorious analysis—will not 'burn so high and no higher.' After separating the εἴδη from our sphere it enters the νοητὸς τόπος itself and runs riot there, parting the ideal sphere into as many isolated units as will match the divisions of the sensible world. This involves an ideal knowledge which we don't possess, and whose possessor does not know us. 8. Thus to solve the riddles of world a, of which we know

little, we call up world β , of which we cannot know anything, and are left plantés là. While if we refuse to call up the latter, rational reflection is denied us.

We may note several facts in passing:—1. Although we have spoken of two worlds here, Plato does not so speak: he says merely τὰ πολλά, τὰ εἴδη. We must go to the Timaeus for the two worlds—for the κόσμος or ζῷον ὄρατὸν whose model is a ζῷον νοητόν (30-31 etc.). This may be an advance. At least it organizes the two spheres. Is Plato leading to this theory by his present ἀπορίαι? 2. We have not a whisper of ἀνάμνησις as a bridge between the spheres. For that and the immortality of the soul we must go to the Phaedo and Philebus. Is not it an advance also? 3. There is no suggestion that the world of sense has any worth—philosophic worth, at least—in itself. Yet it is a vast series of individual objects with an ἐπιστήμη of its own! When contrasting νόος and ἡδονὴ in the Philebus he presses the point that all trace of the former which may lurk in the latter must be eliminated, and has no difficulty then in degrading the latter completely. But here we have the world of sense consisting of such objects as ἔμε καὶ σὲ καὶ τάλλα as these are understood by us, and yet we need another world in order to make such a one an object of thought. Or does he mean that what knowledge we have here is due to that other world, whether we can explain it or no? 4. Science or knowledge can have only τὸ ὄντως ὅν for its object, and has no proper sphere in a world such as ours—τὰ παρ' ἥμῖν: not only must it have something unchangeable for its object, but it is something essentially ἀκριβὲς or exact in itself. Does not this look too exclusively at science as a result, forgetting science as a process? Knowledge starts from ignorance and does not reach perfection per saltum. However immutably existent its object may be, how does that object look in the process of becoming known? It can appear only as a γιγνόμενον—that is, under the character assigned to an object of sense in a sensible world. Then how can we be sure that it is not such? Alternatively, if science is always a fact or result and not a process, does not that make it a mere analytical thing, and deprive it of the power of advancing synthetically into the unknown? See Introd. xli.-li.

πρωι It is not always clear in the MSS. whether an *i* is subscript or not—all being postscript. Here it is clearly a separate syllable: while in *πρώην* immediately below it must be meant as subscript for the accent is upon the *ω*. This in each case accords with Curtius, s.v. But what of φόδολεσχίας, δ, where the *i* is inserted on a scratch? See L and S. On *πρωι* Heind. says vox haec rariore significatu h. l. sonat ‘nimis mature,’ and aptly quotes Sophocl. Trach. 631, δέδοικα γὰρ | μὴ τρῷ λέγοις ἀν τὸν πόθον τὸν ἐξ ἐμοῦ, πρὶν εἰδέναι τάκεθε εἰ ποθούμεθα, which also supports his preference for *τρῷ*. καλόν τε τί so from the MSS. reading καλόν τέ τι with most editors. But cp. Heind. ‘Vulgo καλόν τε τί καὶ. Sed καλόν τι h. l. est i. q. εἴδος seu γένος τι τοῦ καλοῦ. De pulchri justique et boni definitione in his non est sermo.’ That is, although ὄριζεσθαι is the verb used, Pl. does not here speak of defining τί τὸ καλόν; the phrase corresponds to ὅριείται τις αὐτό τι ἔκαστον εἴδος in 135 A. And yet there is room for doubt, as Parm. refers to what Soc. had been attempting in another discussion and the attempt to define is the great characteristic of the historic Soc. Proc. too assumes a ref. to definition, v. 261, καὶ πῶς, φαίη ἂν τις, ὅλως δυνατὸν ὄριζεσθαι τὰ εἰδῆ; τὰ γὰρ ἀπλᾶ καὶ ἀμέριστα ποικιλίαν λόγων οὐν ἐπιδέχεται καὶ σύνθετιν etc.

Ἐλκυστον δὲ etc. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τῆς λέξεως τὸ μὲν D. p. 10.
'εὗ ἵσθι' προσκείμενον βεβαιοῦν αὐτῷ τὸν ἔπαινον, ὃν
ἐπήγειρε, τὸ δὲ 'ἐλκυστον' δεῖξιν ἔχειν τῆς συμπαθείας
αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς πτοίας τῆς περὶ τὸ ὄν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τινῶν
δυσπαστικῶν καὶ δυσμεταθέτων, οὕτως εἶπε τὸ 'ἐλ-
κυστον,' ἐλξιν προσειπὼν τὴν ... περὶ τὰ διαλεκτικὰ
θεωρήματα μελέτην καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα μετάστασιν ἀπὸ τῆς
τῶν ὄντως ὄντων θεωρίας. Proc. v. 267. But does
the word mean 'to drag himself away from his
present studies to preliminary exercises'? It
means rather, as we say in Scotch, 'rax yourself'
'pull yourself about' as a gymnast in training must
do. K. J. Liebhold (Fleckisen's Jahrb. 123, 1881,
p. 561) objects to ἐλκυστον as always involving re-
sistance, which no doubt it does to some extent;
and proposes ἐκλυστον, citing Lach. 194 C, ἡμᾶς τε
τῆς ἀπορίας ἐκλυσται etc., and Tim. 22 D, ἐκ ταύτης
τῆς ἀπορίας σώζει λυόμενος. This is ingenious,
but it disturbs the metaphor.

τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστ. etc. We can hardly suppose

that ἀδόλεσχίας is the subst. meant here, as that would not seem, but actually be, useless ; probably some such word as μελέτης, πραγματείας, γυμνασίας was designed. ἀδόλεσχίας, 'useless prosing.' Grote.

οὗτος, so t, no doubt rightly ; Η gives οὐτως.

πλὴν τοῦτο γε etc. 'You have been injudicious save in this one point with which I was struck' : as if τοῦτο μέντοι γε. For the sentiment see Phaedo 89 A, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἔθαιμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, and above 129 E. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο, 'and that in regard to Z. himself, of whom I am speaking.'

E τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκ. 'dass man ... dem Irrthum nachspüre' (Müller), 'den Irrthum zu erforschen' (Engelm.), and Stallb. says πλάνη, i. q. ἀπόρια ἐν τούτοις παντοδαπώς πλεκομένη. This makes the words run οὐκ εἴας (ἡμᾶς) ἐπισκοπεῖν τὴν πλάνην ἐν τοῖς δ. Proc. again, v. 274, says δὲ τοίνυν τῆς πλάνης τῶν διαλεκτικῶν πρὸς τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν τῶν εἰδῶν ... τὴν ὅλην τὴν διαλεκτικήν, ἣν θριγκὸν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐκάλεσεν, ἐν λογικαῖς ἡμᾶς ἀνελίξει καὶ διεξόδους γυμνάζουσαν ... πλάνη γάρ τὸ μὴ μόνον τάληθή σκοπεῖν, ὅπως ἀποδεκτέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν μεθόδων ἐκπειτρέχειν ἐλέγχοντα ... καὶ ἔσκεν ἡ πλάνη τέτταρα δηλοῦν ἡ ... ἡ ... ἡ πλῆθος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα χωροῦν, ἡ ... τούτων δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων ἡ διαλεκτικὴ λέγεται γυμνασία πλάνη κατὰ τὸ τρίτον, διενόσυνα διὰ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ὑποθέσεων. So in 136 E we have ἀνεν ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης, 'libera disputatio' Ast calls it, while ἐπισκοπεῖν has the same sense as in 159 B. The words would thus run ὅτι οὐκ εἴας τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς δρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα. 'You would not suffer the argument to investigate merely in the' etc. In δ ... λόγῳ ... εἴδῃ ... εἶναι : Heind. says that λόγῳ = λογισμῷ, and argues for ἡδῃ (the read. of ε) in place of εἴδῃ, but Η and t agree on the text.

ταύτη γε οὐδὲν etc. ταύτη γε = εάντις περὶ ταῦτα ἐπισκοπή. Cp. 129 C-D etc., where he showed ἐμὲ λίθους ξύλα to be one in their collective capacity, many as having numerous qualities. Now, he rejects ideas for stones etc., and to that extent the world of ideas is less open to this treatment than the world of sense. But he holds that there is an αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου, and this is one and many in its degree. It has not as many qualities as ἔγω,

but it has very many, all that he directly assigns to ἐμὲ and more, and as having these it is many, while it is one in its character as εἶδος ἀνθρώπου. Plato as creator of ideas dwelt strongly on their character as simplifiers of phenomena, that was their raison d'être ; but they grow under his hand until their simplicity is not their most marked feature.

οἷον, The general sense is clear, but some words ¹³⁶ must be mentally supplied. The following may represent fairly Plato's thought—οἷον, ἐφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἦν ξήνων ὑπέθετο [μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι (unless εἰ βούλει be taken parenthetically), χρὴ σκοπεῖν ὑποτιθέμενον] εἰ πολλὰ etc. The inf. has been held over to πάλιν σκοπεῖν. The antitheses seem almost needlessly elaborate ; τί συμβήσεται καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τῷ ἐν πρὸς αὐτά, καὶ τούτοις ἀμφοῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα would suffice.

αθλίς etc. See Notes 1. ὑποθῆ, 2nd sing. of ^B ὑποθῶμαι, cp. βούλει above and μέλλει below C. On τί ἐφ' ἐκατέρας Stallb. cites 160 c and Sophist. 251 E, τί οὖν οὐ ... ἐφ' ἐκάστου τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω ; τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς = to the things postulated and to their antithesis in the given case.

καὶ περὶ στάσεως 'Posteriori περὶ elegantius abes-set,' Heind., and editors omit it,—yet its retention is quite reasonable. Hitherto we have had some details, here begins a summary statement. That statement is introduced by καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου δ αὐτὸς λόγος—the first step in the descent ; the second comes in the repeated περὶ ; then follows the bald enumeration.

δεῖ ... ὁσαντάς It is not easy to think out the details of this dictum. Take the case actually selected in this dialogue. If you 'posit' the 'one,' then its antithesis—the others which you don't posit—is certainly 'many' ; and what he seems to say is that you must institute an inquiry in which you compare this one with 'each one of the others, and with several, and with the whole mass of them,' and the converse. But the dialogue, although it is pretty detailed, does not fulfil the pledge. Yet the statement is sound. We do not truly know any thing, however small, until we have viewed it in relation to all other things whatsoever. And the extent to which we fall short of that standard of knowledge is what divides us from omniscience, and

makes ‘our little systems’ ‘but broken lights.’
Cp. Introd. lii.-lx.

c *ιπτείθεσο* is probably correct : t gives it, while Η is corrupt. Heind. wishes the aorist, but he might as well change *προαιρῆ* to *προέλη*. The aorist simply notes an item ; the present or imperfect gives to that pictorial reality. ‘Whether you assumed as existing what you actually were assuming in the given case or whether as not existing.’ *κυρίως διόψευθαι* is no doubt correct : t gives it, Η is corrupt, ‘to see through and through the truth with the eye of a master,’ so to speak, who has finished his apprenticeship. See Notes i.

ἀμήχανον ... πραγματίαν, etc. ‘A work of awful magnitude,’ Grote ; ‘an undertaking with which my resources cannot cope.’ We might perhaps have printed -*τείαν*, as Η is corrected and t so writes ; yet Η gives -*τιώδη* 137 B. *σφόδρα μανθ*. ‘I do not completely understand.’ So Phaedr. 263 D, *εἰπὲ καὶ τόδε ... εἰ ὠρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου*. Νὴ Δί! *ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα* : Phileb. 58 D, *καὶ νῦν δὴ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ίκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι. τί οὐ διῆλθες*, so Sophist. 251 E, quoted above on *τί ἐφ' ἐκατέρας*. The aorist seems to be part of the phrase. Thus Gorg. 468 C, *ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ω Πλάτε, η οὐ* ; *τι οὐκ ἀποκρίνει* ; has an entirely different sense ‘why do you make no reply?’ While Protag. 310 A, *τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω* *ἡμῖν τὴν ἔννοιαν* ; Symp. 173 B (similar) ; Phileb. 54 B, *τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαντῷ ω Σ.* ; and Phaedo 86 D, *εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο* ; are all a form of imperative—‘why have you not done it? pray do it at once.’

p. 11. D *προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῷδε*: Several parallels occur in Sophist., e.g. 226 C, *Ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις*. 234 E, *ὡς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῷδε ὅντι κρῖναι*—spoken by Theaet. a youth. Polit. 263 A, *οὐ φαῦλον προστάττεις, Σώκρατες*. Of the demonsts. *τηλικῷδε*—*τηλικούτῳ* (below), it often happens that the former stands like *δέ* for the 1st pers., the latter like *οὗτος* for the 2nd—‘a man of my, of your, years.’ Yet see Apol. 25 D, *Τί δῆτα, ω Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἴ τηλικούτου ὅντος τηλικότε δών, ὥστε etc.*

δεώμεθα So t, clearly better than Η. Notes i.

μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον ω We have a double parallel, Rep. II. 368 B-C, *δέδοικα γάρ, μὴ οὐδ' ὅστον ω παραγε-*

νόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορούμένη ἀπαγορεύειν etc., where we have the rationale of *μὴ ω* : and *εἶπον οὖν ... ὅτι τὸ ζῆτημα φ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον, ἀλλ' ὁξὺ βλέποντος*. Stallb. gives others, e.g. 374 E, *οὐκ ἄρα φ. πρᾶγμα γράμεθα*. Cp. Polit. 263 A above.

ει ... πλείους ήμεν οὐκ δν ων A model condit. sent. where the conclus. is *ἀλλ' οὐ πλείους ἐσμέν*. It seems to clash with 127 C, if we are to press that as alluding to the auditors of this discussion and not the visitors of Parmen. *ἀπρεπή ... τοιαῦτα ... λέγειν*, ‘such things are unbecoming to utter.’ *ἀπρεπὲς* would have been simpler.

ἐντυχόντα ... νοῦν ἔχειν. ‘Die Wahrheit zu treffen und Einsicht zu erlangen.’ Engelm. ‘ut quis verum adipiscatur et intelligentiae compos fiat.’ Ast, who reads with t *σχένιν* : and others take *νοῦν ἔχειν* or *σχένιν* in a similar sense. Proc. too, v. 311, uses such phrases as *ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς πλάνης ταύτης ἡ ἀληθεία καὶ δ νοῦς ... τοῦ χωριστοῦ νοῦ μετονοίαν. ... μόνη δὲ η κατὰ νοῦν ζωὴ τὸ ἀπλανὲς ἔχει*. The last words however, with *καὶ θόρυβον αὐτῆς* (sc. *τῇ ψυχῇ*) *παρέχειν ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεοι* point to the reasonableness of taking *νοῦν ἔχειν* as ‘to keep one’s head’ on discovering the truth, as opposed to *ἱλιγγιάν*. Thus Phaedo 79 C, the soul when contaminated by *αὐτθητισ* etc., *αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ιλιγγιῷ ὕσπερ μεθύνοσα*, all which is altered *ὅταν ... αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοτῆ* ; so Prot. 339 E, *καὶ ἔγω τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὕσπερε ἐπὸ δγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ιλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα—* he needed η διὰ πάντων δέξιος. This view is at least worth considering. On this passage Proc., v. 311, says, beyond Pl., *οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλλως ημᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀναδραμέν ἐπὶ τὰ πρώτα μὴ διὰ τῶν μέσων πορευθέντας ὃδῶν τῆς ζωῆς, ως γὰρ η κάθοδος ημῖν διὰ πολλῶν γέγονε τῶν μεταξύ ... οὕτω καὶ η ἀνοδος διὰ πολλῶν ἐσται μεσοτήτων*.

διὰ χρόνον: This cannot be historical. For the phrase, we also sometimes say ‘through time,’ not in the sense of ‘after a long interval’ but in that of ‘as time goes on.’

ἐνδεῖξ. δ λέγοι, Indirect for *τί οὐκ ἐνδείξω δ λέγεις*; Cp. Rep. I. 338 A, *μὴ οὖν ἀλλως ποίει. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ τε χαρίζον ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς καὶ Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἀλλούς*: and so elsewhere. Why is the first inf. aorist and the second present? *τὸ τον Ιβ. πεπονθέναι*. The perf. inf. slightly differs 137

from πάσχειν, 'to have met with an experience like that of.' τὸ τὸν μελοποιοῦ Ἰβύκου ῥητόν :¹ "Ἐρως αὐτέ με κνανέοισιν ὑπὸ βλεφάροις τακερά. ὅμιμασι δερκόμενος κηλήμασι παντοδαποῖς, εἰς ἀπειραδίκτυα κύπριδος βάλλεε·² ή μὰν τρομέω ἵν [νιν] ἐπερχόμενον³ ὥστε φερένυγος ἵππος ἀεθλοφόρος ποτὶ γῆραι ἀσκῶν, [ἀεκ-]⁴ σὺν συνοχέτι [ὅχεσφι?]⁵ θοοῖς εἰς ἄμιλλαν ἔβα. Sch. t 81 a 1. Proc. omits νν and reads ὡς τις, ἀσκῶν, θεοῖς. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici, reads "Epos, τακερ", ἐς twice, γῆραι, and divides into lines ending δερκόμενος, βαλλει, γῆραι, ἔβα. Ibycus belonged to Rhegium but lived at Samos, γέγονε δὲ ἐρωτομανέστατος περὶ μειράκια.—Suidas. Quis est enim iste amor amicitiae? cur neque deformem adolescentem quisquam amat, neque formosum senem?...maxime vero omnium flagrasse amore Reginum Ibycum, appetet ex scriptis etc. Cic. Tusc. IV. 33. μεμνημένος Does this refer to times when Z. formerly heard the discussion?

διανεῦσται...λόγων. Sch. t, in mg. 81 a 1—περαιωθῆναι, and Rh. Η has -νύσαι: even this is used of the sea by Hesiod, as L. and S. show; but the text makes the metaphor clearer. Ficinus 'quo pacto tam grandis natu tam profundum disserendi pelagus transnatare queam' has suggested to many that he had πέλαγος λόγων. He may be merely pointing the metaphor. If he had this, where did he get it? Stallb. well quotes Phaedr. 264 A, ὃς ... ἐξ ἵπτιας ἀνάπταλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον. Rep. IV. 441 C, ταῦτα μὲν ἄρα ... μόγις διανενέκαμεν, with others. Thus πέλαγος is not needed; nay, διανεῦσαι may itself be an early error suggested by such passages as an improvement. But if διανύσαι be correct it is the sole case of this word in Pl.

ὅμως δέ: ... δ etc. This seems the best solution—ὅμως δέ = 'but however,' with an aposiopesis, and ὃ as relative. 'However (let us proceed), for I needs must comply, and moreover, as Zeno says, we are by ourselves.' The only difficulty in the way is that Ζῆνων will have no article, which is unusual hitherto. On δέ γὰρ Heind. says 'ut bene monuit Heusd. (Spec. Crit. p. 10) post ὅμως δέ elliptice omissum est διανευστέον vel simile quid, ab eoque vim suam accipit hoc γὰρ,' and he very aptly quotes Charm. 175 B, νῦν δέ—πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὑρέν etc. We may add for an aposiop., resumed by breaking the constr. later, Theaet. 143 D,

νῦν δέ,—ἡττον γὰρ ἐκείνοις η τούσδε φιλῶ, and for lang. Alicib. I. 118 B, ὀνομάζειν μὲν ὀκνῶ, ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν, ρήτεον. Stallb. cites Pind. Pyth. I. 164, and better Aristoph. Lysistr. 144, ὅμως γε μάνδει τᾶς γὰρ εἰράνας μάλ' αὐτόν.

ἀρξώμεθα ... θησόμεθα; So Ηt. A 2nd hand in t 11 alters to ἀρξόμεθα, erasing the first half of ω. The cause of the change is clear; but the words do quite well: 'whence then are we to begin, and (if we do begin) what shall be our first assumption?' In this connec. we have a good illustr. of the danger of assuming that commentators had certain readings because of expressions which they use. Proc. says (quoting), v. 320, δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ 'πόθεν ἀρξομαι' καὶ τὸ 'τί πρῶτον ὑπόθωμαι' etc., while, 326, he says what we quote below. Probably neither represents his text.

πραγ. παῖδ. παῖζεν, 'Operosum ludere lusum' Stallb., 'to amuse ourselves with a laborious pastime' Grote. 'Nihil viderunt, qui ex hoc loco voluerunt demonstrare, universam, quae deinceps agitatur, disputationem nihil esse nisi dialecticum aliquod artificium, quo artes Eristicorum, imitatione scilicet delusae exagitarentur.' Stallb., and rightly; but the phrase detracts from the seriousness of the issue. We never quite allow metaphysics to overwhelm us, feeling that the laws of nature will continue to act until our system is ready. And yet, as Pl. says, Polit. 307 D, παιδιὰ τοίνον αὐτὴ γέ τις η διαφορὰ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· περὶ δὲ τὰ μέγιστα νόσος ξυρβίσινει πασῶν ἔχθιστη γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν. In Laws VII. 803 C he speaks of man as θεοῦ τι παίγνιον ... τούτῳ δή δεῖν τῷ τρόπῳ ξυνεπόμενον καὶ παίζοντα ὅ τι καλλίστας παιδιὰς πάντ' ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα οὕτω διαβιῶνται, τονταρτίον η νῦν διανοηθέντας. Perhaps the point is that referred to in Theaet. 168 E, where Soc. says to Theod. that they may have to dispute together, ἵνα μή τοι τοῦτο γε ἔχῃ (οἱ Πρωταγόρας) ἐγκαλεῖν, ὃς παίζοντες τρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθα αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. Parmenides' auditors are mostly young.

ἀπ' ἐμ. ἀρξωμαῖ etc. Proc. v. 326, δοκεῖ δέ ἐμοί γε τοῖς προειρημένοις συμφώνως ἀποδοῦναι τὰ προκείμενα, τῷ μὲν 'πόθεν ἀρξομαι' τὸ 'ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ', τῷ δὲ καὶ 'τί πρῶτον ὑποθήσομαι' τὸ καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως' καὶ οὐ ταῦτα ἐνδείκνυσθαι δι' ἀμφοῖν· οὐ μὲν γὰρ τὸν τρόπον ἀφορίζεται τῆς ἐνεργείας ... ὅπου δέ

τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτῷ πρᾶγμα περιποιήσεται τὴν διέξοδον τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου. Whatever we may think of this, his next remark is suggestive, if overstrained—θεοειδῆς καὶ ὁ τρόπος ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔκαστον γὰρ τῶν θείων ἀφ' ἔαντοῦ ἄρχεται ἐνεργεῖν. Parm. imitating the divine says this καὶ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον ἀλλὰ κάκεινο, τὸ πρᾶγμα παιδ. παιξ., θεῖον γὰρ δὴ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο, τὰς ἐμφάσεις καὶ πολυμερίστους ἐνεργείας παιδιὰς καλεῖν πάγγινον γὰρ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρωπον [text gives -πων, but see above, Laws VII. 803 C, which is clearly referred to] καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἔκαστον, δόποσα κατὰ τὰς ἔξω προϊόντας αὐτῶν ἐνεργείας ὑφέστηκε παιδιὰ μὲν διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς δξὺς λόγος πρὸς τὴν ἥρεμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡνωμένην τοῦ ὄντος νόησιν etc. There may be in fact a playful allusion to Homer's 'Ατρεΐδῃ ... σέο δὲ ἄρχομαι, Il. ix. 97, and Pindar's ὕμνησαν Διὸς ἄρχόμεναι, Nem. v. 45. The constr. βούλεσθε ... ἄρξωμαι has ample parallels, e.g. 142 B; also Phaeadr. 228 E, ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνῦμεν; repeated 263 E; and others.

περὶ τοῦ ... συμβαίνειν: Proc., v. 322, says one may ask πῶς ὁ Παρ. διπερὶ τὸ ἐν οὐ διατριβῶν ἔαντοῦ κέκληκεν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἐν; and says some suggest that like Gorgias Protagoras etc., Parm. becomes in Pl. φιλοσοφάτερος καὶ ἐποπτικάτερος ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ὑρώμενος. Pl. sees that τὸ ἐν ἐπέκεινα καὶ ὄντος καὶ οὐσίας πάσης ἐστὶ etc. Stallb., again, says that while Parm. does not seem to have called his δὲ ἐν —tamen quoniam τὸ δὲ volebat omnem omnino complecti οὐσίαν, praeter quam nihil esset, a Platone narratur docuisse omnia unum esse; and cites Theaet. 180 E ὅσα Μέλισσοι τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πάσι τούτοις διῆσχυρίζονται ὡς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἐστηκεν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν γε κινέσθαι, and Sophist. 242 D, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Proc. raises a difficulty too soon: Plato clearly holds this to have been historically the case, and ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὅμοι πᾶν, ἐν ἔννεχες are Parmenides' own words. But we should probably be nearer the truth if we understood εἴτε ἐν ἐστι (τὸ πᾶν) εἴ τε μὴ ἐν, as in 128 B, which would modify the argument a good deal.

μοι ἀποκρινέσται; etc. For the position of the pron. Stallb. cites e.g. Clitoph. 409 D, τελευτῶν ἀπεκρίνατό τις, δὲ Σ., μοι τῶν σῶν ἐτάρων: to which

add 407 A, ἐγὼ γάρ, δὲ Σ., σοὶ συγγιγνόμενος (but here *σοὶ* is emphatic), and above 135 D, εἰ δὲ μή, σε διαφείξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. ἢ δὲ νεώτατος; ... ἀπόκρισις:—see Sophist. 217 C-E, the passage which alludes to the meeting that is assumed in our dialogue, Introd. xix. It is too long to quote, but should be read: there is a strong resemblance. That Plato was serious in his insistence upon the importance of dialogue must be presumed, both from these passages and from such phrases as ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀπόκρινόμενος: yet the value of it could hardly be put lower than here; and Aristoteles certainly acts up to the description. Hitherto we have had dialogue: henceforward we have the ἡκιστα πολυπραγμονεύ and the ἀνάπαντα. And if dialogue is important, why should it be laboriously told at fourth hand?

ἔτοιμος ... φάναι, τοῦτο etc. The text, including c stops, is that of Herm.: and but for the stops (τ has none, Υ none but τοῦτο,) it is that of the MSS. with perfect clearness. As it stands it seems to mean ἔτοιμός σοι εἰμι—τοῦτο, φάναι τὸν 'A. 'I am at your service in that capacity'; or ἔτοιμός σοι ἐστι τοῦτο, 'this is at your command,' where we may assume τοῦτο to refer to the whole descrip. given by Parm. of what he wants, and the adj. to be attracted into concord with the nouns ἀνάπ. ἀπόκρ.—he starts in agreement with them and then finds the neuter better. Both, however, are forced interpretations. Another course is to read φάναι τοῦτο τὸν 'A.= 'I am at your service': Aristotle said this. But Stallb. is right in calling this a strange use of the parenthetic φάναι—to give it an object in a sort of apposition to the object-clause, as he seems to mean when he says λέγειν would be required. The next step is to read τοῦτον (sc. τὸν νεώτατον) with one or two MSS., 'said the one in question, Ar.' This gives a good meaning, although Heind. fails to see the force of τοῦτον. Two MSS., Λ H, read τούτῳ—the former with ^ ° above the line—which must mean φάναι τούτῳ (sc. τῷ Παρῷ), not a good solution. Another possible change would be ἔτοιμόν σοι ... τοῦτο, and the change would be easy enough if the ν were the small one like α, and were coupled to σ in σοι—νσ might then be mistaken for σσ. Here ends the bridge between part I. of the dialogue and part II. (135 C-137 C). For the nature of the relation between these parts see

Introd. xxxi.-ii., lii.-v. Does Plato now go on to talk metaphysics in a mystery, does he refute Parmenides' doctrine out of its author's own mouth, or does he merely give a lesson in dialectic? Such are some of the suggestions. Except that the second might better run, does he develop what is latent in the doctrine of Parmenides?—there is no inconsistency in supposing that he does all these at once, and advances his own conception of the ideal problem at the same time. Among the thoughts which succeed each other in his mind as he writes, one is that there is complexity within the ideal world analogous to that in our sensible one: a second is that the ideas having so far been held to be isolated, as *a sīna qua nōn* of their purity, hopeless contradictions thus arise which cut at the very roots of philosophy: a third is that some such trenchant dialectic as that exemplified by Zeno's writings is essential if these difficulties are to be overcome; and that a laborious discipline in it is the sole training adequate for him who would deal with the ideal theory, or (which to Plato is the same thing) with metaphysical problems at all. It is clear from the detail given that Plato has this last subject deeply at heart. As upshot, Parm. is, as it were, put to revise his own doctrine in the light of more recent developments. And the result seems to be that even the simple idea of 'one' has indefinite possibilities latent in it, and that, so far from its being possible to regard any idea as isolated, an almost Heraclitean complexity in the ideal sphere arising through dialectical necessities is now the real problem to be faced. Dialectic, says Aristotle (Met. i. 6; xii. 4), did not exist before this; and the more Plato looks into it as a factor in speculation the more impressed he is with its transforming powers—in physical matters it has infinitely divided the space between Achilles and the tortoise, so that we can hardly think of the one overtaking the other: in the intellectual sphere it converts even the simple unity of being as put forth by Parmenides into endless multiplicity. It is curious to observe, however, that the 'idea of science' quietly drops out of sight. Nothing has expelled it, for the separateness between the ideas and our world continues, though that between idea and idea does not; but somehow it has served its

turn, and we get on with our human science not so badly. It is said by some that what follows of the work is an imitation of Zeno's dialogue as well as of his dialectic. This may be so, though it would not be easy to prove it; but if so it is no isolated case of such imitation in Plato. The greater part of the Republic, for instance, is analogous.

εἰς έναν The first step is to make us realize that one is one, by freeing it as far as may be from everything extraneous. That is what this division of the argument does—it asks *τί χρή συμβαίνειν τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς αὐτό;* Grote says of Unum and Ens 'both words are essentially indeterminate ... are declared by Aristotle to be not univocal or generic words'; and of the same words and Idem Diversum Contrarium etc. (his equivalents for Pl.'s terms) 'Plato neither notices nor discriminates their multifarious and fluctuating significations ..., the purpose of the Platonic Parmenides is to propound difficulties; while that of Aristotle is, not merely to propound, but also to assist in clearing them up.' (Pl. Parm.) Of Gr.'s many references to Arist. and his Schol., it may be enough to cite Met. iv. 6 sqq., 1015 b 16, *ἐν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτό,* in the former case Coriscus, musician, Cor. the musician, Cor. the just musician, etc. are all 'one'—as it happens. True, these words are indeterminate, but only in the sense in which all words are so, unless we define them and stick to that. In speaking of Cor. many might refer only to his appearance; many (never having seen him) only to his fame; others, who knew him, to both etc. That Pl. does not notice or discriminate the senses of 'one' etc. is true only in a sense. He is not explicit, as we have learned to count explicitness; but he sees, and means us to see, much both of the different senses of the words and of the results of the inquiry. His intention clearly is to treat of one *καθ' αὐτὸ* and as an *οὐσία*, but he tries (Introd. lvii.-lxiv.) to simplify it so much that he overpasses the possibilites of the case—consciously. As Dam., § 48, 98, says *κατά τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθ. τὰ πάντα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀνελώ, καὶ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς ἀπασιν, αὐτὸν μόνον ἀφίησι τὸ ἐν γεγυμνωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλων ἀπάντων.* It is a *ἀπλῶς ἐν*, and (§ 108, 280) *δεῖ δὲ πρὸ τῆς τινὸς εἶναι τὴν ἀπλῶς ἐνάδα· δεὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀμέθεκτόν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μεθεκτὸν οὐδέποτε ἀπλῶς.* § 117, 304, *ἔστω*

γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀνάριθμον, καὶ εἰ χρὴ φάναι σαφέστερον, ἀτρίαστον καὶ ἀμονάδιστον. In such an undertaking τολμῶμεν (§ 119, 307) τά τε ἀνάριθμα ἀριθμεῖν καὶ τὰ ἱπέρ πᾶσαν τάξιν ὄντα (Dam. speaks also of ἀπλῶς πολλὰ) τάπτειν, καὶ τὸν ἵπερκοσμον τῷ ὄντι βυθὸν ὅμως διακοσμεῖν: for (309) ἀφανίζει τὴν τριάδα τὸ ἐν, καταπίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ [N.B.] ἄπας διορισμός. It is a ὑπαρξίας οτι ἀρχή—δεῖ δέ (§ 121, 312), εἰ μέλλοι σύνθεσίς τις εἶναι, προϋποκεύσθαι καὶ προϋπάρχειν ἀτεχνῶς τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀπλοῦν, ὡς ἀνεν γε τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο προέλθοι εἰς ὑπόστασιν· ὑπαρξίας ἄρα τῆς ουσίας ἀπάσης τὸ ἐν καὶ η πρώτη ὑπόθεσις. ἄλλο τι—as if η were dropped; so Theaet. 203 c, ἄλλο τι δ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;

οὐδὲν ... ἀπῇ ὅλον ἀν εἴη. We look for ἀπέλη· or for ὅλον ἔσται: neither this nor above εἰ ἐν ἔστιν etc. being normal; below D, οὔτε ἔξει εἰ ἔσται is.

^{... 12. D} εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, Υ has ἔχη which cannot be right without ἔάν, t gives ἔχει. Thomson recalls that Pl. quotes Parmen. in Soph. 244 E, πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον δύκω, μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντης etc., and must therefore know that what he gives is not the view of Parm.; and he refers to Simplicius' comm. on Arist. Phys. "pag. 12" (cannot verify), in which it is said that Pl. must be practically refuting Parm. in this part of the work: and quotes Dion. Halic. 'ita de Platone scribens αὐτὸς τε ὁ Πλάτων Παρμενίδην, καὶ Πρωταγόραν, καὶ Ζήνωνα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φυσιολόγων οὐκ ὀλίγους, ἡμαρτηκότας ἀποδεικνύναι βούλεται, quae confirmat Eusebius Praeparat. Evangel l. xiv. c. 4.'

οὔτε γὰρ ... μετέχοι: Herm. adds ἀν—'vel contra Oxon. cum VS retineri structurae concinnitas jubebat, eidemque mox, 138 A, debebatur ἐνείη ... circumscripto ἀν, cuius ut omnino vel optimi codices leges ignorarunt, ita nunc ne conjunctis quidem editorum omnium auctoritatibus concedi poterat.' ἀν is a delicate subject. If it be imperative here, we might urge that it may be understood from οὔτε ἀν ἀρχὴν above; or alternatively that μετέχοι might be μετέχει like ἔχει above. It is sometimes hard to decide when a statement is meant to have a conditional element; while again as ἀν is often redundantly repeated it may sometimes be repressed. στρογγύλου etc.: it can have no boundaries whether curved or straight: here the curved boundary is

circular or spherical, περιφερές. Cic., N. D. II. 18, eulogizing these as more perfect than all other forms, says his duabus formis contingit solis, ut omnes earum partes sint inter se simillimae.

εὐθὺν γε ... ὅ; i.e. if you put your eye at either end and look towards the other the middle will lie right in the way. Or as Heind. puts it—'cujus media pars extremae utriusque ita objacet, ut tegat quasi utramque et obumbret.' Euclid says γραμμῆς δὲ πέρατα, σημεῖα. εὐθέα γραμμή ἔστιν, ἡτις ἐξ ἦσου τοῦ ἐφ' ἐαντῆς σημείους κεῖται. In Η εἴη stands for the ὅ of t; wrongly: perhaps from confusion with the εἴη below.

οὐδὲν μέρη ἔχει: The δὲ has a force of its own here, ¹³⁸ not easy to render: it might be put ἐπέπερ καὶ μέρη οὐκ ἔχει. 'It must be without both straight and round, since it is also without parts,' would be our way of putting it. He dwells on the convertibility of these qualities. For the language cp. Arist. Phys. III. ii. 201 b 26, οὔτε γὰρ τόδε οὔτε τούόνδε οὐδεμία αὐτῶν [τῶν ἀρχῶν] ἔστιν, δτι οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν.

ἐν φ ἀν ἐν ἀη, etc. So Υ without doubt: and it is perfectly admiss. We oftener find a subjunct. when ἀν goes with the relat.: Heind. would prefer that, or to drop ἀν. But Jelf cites Thucyd. III. 59, φ τινί ποτ' ἀν καὶ ἀναξίω ἔνυμπέσοι. and Xen. Mem. II. i. 22, ἐσθῆτα δὲ ἐξ ἡς ἀν μάλιστα ὥρα διαλάμποι. and others. He does indeed lay down that in such cases the ἀν goes in sense with the vb. not with the rel.: but it is difficult to draw such a line precisely. See also Riddell, Digest of Idioms, § 68. t reads ἐν φ ἀν εἴη: possibly ἀν may have arisen from ἐν. ἐν εἴη is quite clear, and is one among many cases in which it is open to doubt whether ἐν or (as Heind. and Herm.) ἐν- should be used. Each case has been viewed apart and ἐν kept wherever it gives sense: cp. on 131 A, B. Pl. when discussing ἐν might sometimes strain his language to emphasize the word. αὐτὸν ἀπτοιτο πολλοῖς ... ἀπτεσθαι. περιέχοιτο has τὸ ἐν for subj.: has ἀπτοιτο the same subj.—αὐτὸν being = ἐκείνου—or does the subj. here change to ἐκείνο—αὐτὸν being = τοῦ ἐνός? The former is the more grammatical; but, as Heind. notes, ἀπτεσθαι has the surrounding ἐκείνο as subj. and τοῦ ἐνός as quasi-obj. Either way there is a hitch, although the sense is clear. It is hard to see

a distinc. between πολλαχοῦ and -χῆ. πολλοῖς = multis partibus, multifariam. Heind. As to the argument he seeks to move step by step, deducing each conclusion from the one preceding; otherwise he might have proved that the one cannot 'be anywhere' from the original assumption that it is not many, or from the second that it has no parts—he shows that these are in his mind by repeating ἐνός τε, and ἀμεροῦς.

τὸν κάνειντος etc. κάνειντος Υ, and it admits of transl. as the instr.: καὶ εἴη ἀν περιέχοντος οὐδὲ ἄλλο η αὐτό, the last words being obj. of περιέχον. But t gives the text, and it is on the whole better, ξαντὸς being nom.; unless we exactly reverse and read καὶ ἀν οὐδὲ ἄλλο η αὐτὸς εἴη περιέχον ξαντό. Some—e.g. Stallb. and Bekk.—seem to take ξαντὸς so, and read περιέχον, οὐδὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλο, without apparent Ms. auth. for οὐ. The redundant looking εἰπερ ... εἴη are after all significant. The words αὐτός γε ἐν εἰ. οὐδὲ merely put the altern. suggested above, while the repet. brings out its inherent impossibility in view of what is seen to flow from it. 'Put the case that it is within itself: then it itself will be in the position of surrounding what—if it really is within itself—can be nothing but itself after all.' So D, εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται ... εἰπερ δὴ ἐγγίγνεται. εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι is t and seems correct. 'I say surrounding itself—for it is impossible that anything can be within a thing which does not surround it.' The εἴη of Υ may be due to a confus. with the same word above and below. This is the b more likely as a confus. has arisen about περιέχοντι, written περιέχον τι, cp. lines above and below.

αὐτὸς τὸ περιέχον etc. So Υt. Heind. thinks αὐτὸς tautological: yet that which surrounds needs a little emphasis, for it is impalpable. It is the mere rim of what is surrounded—not even so much, it is an imaginary line, the whole ἐν (whatever it may be) being that which is surrounded. Heind. leans to Schleiermacher's αὐτοῦ 'that of the one (αὐτοῦ) which surrounds is one thing, that which is surrounded is another'; which, if a change be needed, is a good one. Stallb. retains αὐτός, making it the obj. of τὸ περιέχον, 'that which surrounds it is one thing'—a very good idea, but involving, he thinks, the mental add. ἔτερον δὲ τὸ (ὑπ' αὐτοῦ) περιεχόμενον; while at the same time the colloc. αὐτὸς τὸ περιέχον,

if that is its meaning, tends to mislead. But he gives instances. For the arg. cp. Arist. Phys. iv. ii. 209 b 32, δοκεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ ὅν που αὐτό τε εἶναι τι καὶ ἔτερόν τι ἔκτὸς αὐτοῦ.

οὐδὲ γάρ δύο γε ἀμφω etc. Ficinus says 'nunquam enim idem ipsum totum utraque haec simul patet retur et ageret.' This Heind., rightly, approves; but adds that it seems to assume as text ἀμφω τούτων ταῦτὸν (τούτων sc. τὸ περιέχειν et τὸ περιέχεσθαι); and Stallb. agrees. Is that necessary? It seems merely a hyperb. of ἀμφω—οὐδὲ γάρ δύο γε ταῦτὸν πείσεται ἀμα καὶ ποιήσει ἀμφω. Stallb. would take δύον ἀμφω ταῦτὸν as 'the single identical whole consisting of these two aspects,' and leave the verbs with no obj. One feels throughout the diff. of keeping the language faultless when describing what is so very liable to confusion. Cp. Arist. Phys. iii. i. 201 a 20, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἔστιν, οὐχ ἀμα δὲ ... πολλὰ δὴ ποιήσει καὶ πείσεται ὑπὸ ἀλλήλων ἀπαν γάρ ἔσται ἀμα ποιητικὸν καὶ παθητικόν.

ἐστίν που που here is strictly local, referring to οὐδάμον A above; not as below ἀδύνατόν που.

ὅρα ... ξέχον ... οἰόντε έ. ή κ. οἰόντε must be personal to give a subj. to the verbs; ὅρα δὴ εἰ (τὸ ἐν) οὐτῶς ἔχον οἰόντε τε ἔστιν, 'has it in its power to' etc., see 141 A. τί δὴ γάρ οὐ: 'sic et infra (140 E); nam alias fere in hac formula omittitur illud δή.' Heind. κινούμενόν γε from Υt it would seem that their orig. had τε. Fischer says of γε 'posterior emendatio hand dubie vera est. At etiam in Stobaei Eclogis Physicis, p. 30, ubi verba δτι κ. ... ναί laudantur, legitur τε.' Heind. would reject τε.

ἀνταί γάρ μόνα κινήσεις. See Introd. vi. Thoms. C says that Galen calls these kinds of motion τὴν τοπικὴν κίνησιν and τὴν φυσικὴν. Here are some phrases from Arist. Phys. iii., ἀνευ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ χρόνου κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.—οὐδὲ ἔστι δὲ κ. παρὰ τὰ πράγματα.—ώστε καὶ τὸ κινοῦν φυσικῶς κινητόν πάν γάρ τὸ τοιοῦτον κινεῖ κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό.—φ γάρ η κ. ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ η ἀκινησία ὥρεμία.—η κ. ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, η κινητόν.—οὐδὲ η ποιήσις τῇ παθήσει τὸ αὐτὸν κυρίως, ἀλλ' φ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, η κ. Dam. § 101, 262, says τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀρξει μεταβολῆς τῆς τε ξαντοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἔτεροκινήτου. ἀνάγκη ἄρα πρὸ τοῦ ἐτ. τὸ αὐτό. ὑποτίθεσθαι· καὶ μὴν τὸ κινοῦν, η κινεῖ, πάντως ἀκ.: εἰ γάρ καὶ

τοῦτο κινοῖτο, ἐπ' ἀπειρον ἵξομεν—yet here too arise difficulties.

ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ ... ἔαυτοῦ ... εἶναι means, as Heind. and Stallb. suggest, ἄλλο s. ἄλλοιον ἔαυτοῦ, ἄλλοιον ἡ αὐτό ἔστιν, γιγνόμενον. This constr. recurs 162 D, 163 C, where also he urges the unity of ἄλλοισις and κίνησις. To say that the one, whilst passing through the process of change, cannot remain one, is to use the word ‘one’ in two senses—that of one numerically, and of one or the same in appearance. S. called himself ‘one as distinguished from those present’; he does not cease to be so by growing older or stouter or balder. He remains one numerically, but to the extent to which the change goes he ceases to be the same S. We can assent to Plato’s concl. rather than to his argument, and our assent is based on the understanding, obviously ruling his mind at this moment, that the one is to be one not in number alone.

ἔτέρας οὐκ ἔτέρας: This illustrates, and may have helped to suggest, the argument 139 C, that only the different can differ from the different. He could say μεταλλάττειν χώραν ἐκ χώρας, but if he uses one ἔτέρα he needs two. Phileb. 13 C, σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινας ἀγαθὰς ἥδονάς, τὰς δὲ τινας—ἔτέρας αὐτῶν—κακάς; is not an exception. τὰς μὲν τινας balances τὰς δὲ τινας, while ἔτέρας αὐτῶν comes in parenthetically—‘some good, some (distinct from them) bad.’ See ἄλλοις ἄλλοθι below. In Latin too we have alia-alia: but in English we can say ‘change to one place from another,’ and the German is ‘einen Ort mit einem anderen ver- tauschen.’

ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ‘It must be that in being carried round in a circle the one has gone off upon motion which leans upon a centre.’ In the equivalent which follows, *ἐπὶ τοῦ μεσ.* ἐν, the centre has become definite. *καὶ ... ἔαυτοῦ* ‘and possess as other parts of itself those portions which are being carried round the centre.’

D *χώραν ἀμεθίον* etc. -*βον* is the reading of t. and can hardly be wrong: Η has the masc. ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλοθι γίγνεται are one phrase.

εἴπερ γε δή: sc. κινεῖται. 150 B, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει.

δρ’ οὖν γίγνεσθαι sc. ἐν τινι. If it cannot be in anything, still less can it ‘come to be’ so.

P. 13. μήτε πω ... δὴ ἔγγ. It is not yet (*πω*) in, while

still (*ἔτι*) entering; nor is it any longer (*μήτ’ ἔτι*) wholly without, if it is actually (*δὴ*) passing in. Η = ἐνγιγνόμενον, ἐν γίγνεται: t rightly gives ἔγ- in both cases. Both give μήτετι, which Heind. rightly divides as in the text, saying *egregie hoc ἔτι re-spondebit praegresso πω*. Cp. Arist. Met. x. 6, 1063 a 17, ἔτι δὲ εἰ κίνησίς ἔστι καὶ κινούμενόν τι, κινεῖται δὲ πᾶν ἐκ τίνος καὶ εἰς τι, δεῖ ἄρα τὸ κινούμενον εἶναι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐξ οὗ κινήσεται καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰς τοδὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ.

τὸ ἄλλο πέντε though idiomatic—cp. 134 C—^E ἄλλο seems specially de trop here, where μόνον follows. The fut. is a little odd, ‘if anything at all is to have such an experience.’

ἄρα Heind. would expect a reply after this.

τὸ δὲ ... δλον ... ἔντδε ... οὐκω. Suppose the case of a thing ‘coming to be inside’—passing into—any other thing. Arrest it at any moment and part of it will ‘be’ inside, part outside. But here the thing has no parts, and cannot take that position. The only course open to it, if it is to pass inside something else, is that in the process it must ‘be’ *wholly* in and also *wholly* out. This he here says is impossible. ‘There is no possibility at all that a thing which lacks parts can as a whole be at the same moment neither in nor out of another thing.’ οὐδὲ ... εἰσὶ ... ἐγγιγνόμενον—and if that be so ‘is it not much more impossible that what has no parts, and is no whole should come to be anywhere, since it comes to be neither part by part nor whole by whole?’ The argument is a controversialist’s luxury, it slays the slain. The lang. is a little peculiar. Both Mss. have μήτε before an aspirate, so κατὰ δλον below. Both have εἰσὶ where ἔστι is normal. Heind. puts the latter: Stallb. supports the former, as put quo clarius vis multitudinis emergat. The construction would be simpler thus, δὲ μήτε μέρη ἔχει μήτε etc.

οὐτ’ ... ἄλλοιούμενον: In 138 C we have change and ¹³⁹ circular + linear-motion: here he puts linear-motion and circular-motion + change. Heind. says κινεῖται is to be understood, or even inserted, after ἄλλοιούμενον from χώραν ἄλλάττει.

γέ φαμεν Ficinus transl. ‘asseveravimus’ whence Heind. thinks he read γέ ἔφαμεν, the ref. being to 138 B, οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν που τὸ ἐν etc. But this would need ἔφαμεν γὰρ below; both Mss. = γέ φαμέν.

τὸν φῶν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστιν: ‘ἐν φῷ scil. τῷ αὐτῷ, ἔστιν’ Heind., or ‘ἐν φῷ tanquam τῷ αὐτῷ inest’ Stallb. H. cps. Gorg. 483 A, δὲ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανευοκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις: so 159 C below, ἐν φῷ τῷ τε ἐν ἀν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τὰλλα. This seems very probable: yet the sense might possibly be rather different—viz. that we should print ‘τῷ αὐτῷ’ as repeating literally the τῷ αὐτῷ just before, instead of changing it to τῷ αὐτῷ as gram. requires. Οὐδὲ ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστιν, διτὶ δῆλον ἐν ἑκάνει φῇ ἐν φῷ ‘τῷ αὐτῷ’ [= τοῦτο τὸ αὐτῷ] ἔστιν.

οἱ δὲ τε ἡν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι: So editors print: but both MSS. read ἐν εἶναι, and it is far from certain that this is not correct. Pl. thinks it ‘impossible for it (the one) to be ‘one’ in itself or in another.’ What is nothing save ‘one’ cannot be localized, 138 A etc.

B οὕτε ἡσυχίαν Proc. elaborates the arg. here in syllogs. VI. 163, τὸ ἐν οὐκέ ἔστιν ἐν τινι· τὸ μὴ δὲν ἐν τινι οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστι (he has said above πᾶν γάρ ἔστως ἐν τινι ἔστως· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἡσυχίας ἔστως ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ σωματικῶς ἐν ἄλλῳ)—these are the premisses to Pl.’s concl. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Proc. goes on ἔπειτα δεύτερος λόγος τοιούτος· τὸ ἐν οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστι· τὸ μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲν οὐχ ἔστηκε· τὸ ἄρα ἐν οὐχ ἔστηκεν. δὲ (Pl.) προσέθηκεν ‘οὐδὲ ἡσυχίαν ἄγει’—δοκεῖ γάρ ἔσταναι μὲν καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἰδρυμένον, ἡσυχίαν δὲ ἄγει τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένειν δυνάμενον. ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀπέφησε τοῦ ἐνός. Although Pl. has treated of motion with sufficient care for his purpose, and sees clearly its two great divisions; it seems very unlikely that he would have made no allus. to the more elaborate classification which Arist. gives—e.g. Phys. III.—had that been known to him. In this the Parm. agrees with the Theaet.

πῇ δῆ; So δή; Υ has τίνι δῆ which in uncials, if written closely, is very like πῇ. Introd. lxxxi.

ἔτερον ... ἐνὸς ἔτερον etc. The concep. of the ἐν is here much more abstract than it was above. Refs. to physical conditions, such as size and position, are now pointless: the ‘one’ has been driven from the physical sphere and is now a pure logical entity. The args. used will apply if we regard their terms as terms merely, or the one as a thing having no positive content. ‘This part of the argument is the extreme of dialectic subtlety’ says Grote. Of the four parts of the argument Proc. vi. 172, points out that he

begins ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων [read πορωτέρων] τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ήμὲν εὐληπτοτέρων—καὶ γάρ ὅτι ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις (Pl. says ἔτέρῳ) οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον καὶ ὅτι ἔτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔστι—the latter of the two, being clearest of all, comes first: καὶ γάρ ἔστιν ... τὸ ταῦτα ἔγγυτέρω τοῦ ἐνός, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον πορρώτερον τὸ δὲ ἔγγυτέρον χαλεπώτερον ἀφαιρεῖν.

ταῦτά γε ... ἔκεινο δὲ εἴη, Sound, as words are generally used: but we shall soon see it contradicted; and shall then learn why in elucidating his present position his args. do not run in the order given above (Proc.). The reasoning holds, moreover, only from the standpoint of the ‘one’; changing that standpoint we can see that ἔκεινο would in c turn cease to be itself and would be ἐν. Cp. Dam. § 42, 85, οὐτε δημοταὶ αὐτῷ εἴη γάρ ἀν ἔκεινο δημόνον.

ἄλλ’ ἔτερον ἐνός: This too is right in ordinary usage: but the words have scarcely been uttered when he shows that he should not have used them—οὐ γάρ ἐν προσήκει ἔτέρῳ τινὶς εἶναι. Θαρρεῖ δὲ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο, says Proc. 174-176, τῷ μηδὲν εἰσδέχεσθαι τὸ ἐν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ... οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἴδιοτητος ἀναπιμπλάσαι δυνατόν ... ἦν γάρ ἀν τι πρὸ τοῦ ἐνός: ή γάρ ἄνοδος ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος ... τὸ δὲ πρώτως ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐφετὸν πάσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἀμέθεκτον προϋπάρχει τῶν δλων, ἵνα μένγ ἐν ἀπλήθυντον ... οὕτω δὲ ἀποδείξεις καὶ τὴν ταῦτα τητητα αὐτὴν ἔστιν ὅπῃ ταῦτητα μὴ οὖσαν, εἰπερ εἴη πις τῇ ἔτερότητι ταῦτὸν η ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων παρ’ ἑαυτήν ... τὰ μὲν [N.B.] πρὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντα γένος η εἶδος οἷον ἀνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος ... ταῦτα ὄντα κατὰ τὸ γένος η εἶδος οὐκέτι ἀλλήλοις ἀπλῶς ἔστι ταῦτα: μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἀνάγκη πρὸ τοῦ ἐνός γένος η εἶδος ... τὸ γάρ μετέχον τοῦ γένους ἔχει τι παρὰ τὸ γένος ... καὶ καθόλου πᾶν τὸ μετέχον τινὸς ἔχει τι παρὰ τὸ μετεχόμενον εἰ γάρ μηδέν, αὐτὸ ἀν ἔκεινο εἴη παντελῶς καὶ οὐ μετέχον ἔκεινον μόνον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἐν μήτε ἐν γένει ἔστι μήτε ἐν εἶδει, ταῦτὸν δὲ η ἔτέρῳ τινί, αὐτὸ ἀν ἔκεινο εἴη φῶν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἄλλο ὄν.

οὐ γάρ ... ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἔτέρῳ, etc. How far may this arg. be due to the Greek idiom alluded to in discussing χώραν ἔτέραν ἐξ ἔτέρας, 138 C? Our idiom says ‘the one is larger than the other,’ but the classic idiom is ἔτερον ἔτέρου μεῖζον ἔστι alterum altero majus est. And this is the truer statement, a clearer perception of which may have fixed the

idiom. When we compare one with another the act places the former in a position of otherness to the latter, even if the result be that the two are pronounced similar. We may use a physical illustration which, though not quite fair, may help to explain the idea. Two similar pith balls are magnetized in the same way: place them together and polarization occurs, when each becomes 'other than the other,' while yet 'the same as the other.' It has *μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου*, which Stallb. and Heind. defend. The former says 'Nimirum quod unum est, hoc, ob id ipsum quod est unum, ab altero differre nequit. Quocirca post ἑτέρῳ deinde rursus infertur ἑτέρου quo magis urgeatur notio diversitatis quae in Unum infinitum cadere negatur.' The latter translates 'Neque enim ei quod unum est convenit diversum ab aliquo esse, sed huic soli id convenit quod ab altero diversum est,' adding 'quippe h. l. unum illud per se sine ulla alia qualitate intelligendum,' and giving a very acute reason for the *ἑτέρου*—'ἑτέρου illud post ἑτέρῳ si deleas vereor ne quis haec falso ita interpretetur: neque enim uni convenit diversum ab aliquo esse, sed tantum diversum aliud autem nihil.' That is, the one has no title to be 'other than something,' but only to be 'other' and nothing more. But the context renders such an error unlikely; and would not the Gk. have been *ἄλλα μόνον ἑτέρῳ* *ἄλλον* δὲ *οὐδενὸς* to bring out the meaning? Proc., 177, points out that this third arg. takes more discussion than the first two as being *μᾶλλον τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐγγύς* ... *διὰ τὴν ἔξηρημένην τοῦ ἑνὸς ὑπεροχήν*. Of *ταῦτὸν* and *ἑτέρον* he says *λέγεται γάρ ταῦτὸν* (1) *καὶ ἡ ταῦτοτης* (2) *καὶ τὸ μετέχον τῆς ταῦτοτητος, καὶ ἑτέρον ὅμοιως*. Thus far the 'one' is not 'other than' anything *διότι οὐ* (179) *μετέχει ἑτέροτητος*. *μόνῳ γάρ ἑτέρῳ εἶναι προσήκει τῷ ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ*, which phrase may perhaps support *ἑτέρου*. Dam., § 72, 159, says *τὸ διακεκριμένον διακεκριμένου διακέκριται, εἰ καὶ ἄλλος ἐκατέρον ὁ τῆς διακρίσεως τρόπος. καὶ γάρ τὸ καλὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἑτέρον, ἑτέρον καὶ τούτου ὄντος ἀλλ' ἡ ἑτέροτης οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ πλὴν τῷ γένει τῆς ἴδιοτητος*. We may cp. Theaet. 158 E, *ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτὸν τι ἔχειν ἡ ἐν δυνάμει ἡ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄτωδιν, ὅταν γίνεται κομιδὴ ἑτέρον*. With such cases of *πρὸς τι* we must guard, as Arist. says, Categ. 7, 6b 35 etc., against giving *τὸ ἀντιστρέφον* otherwise than *οἰκεῖως*. *ἑτέρον ἑτέρου* is given *οἰκεῖως*, but not (Polit.

283 D) *δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μεῖζον μηδενὸς ἑτέρου δὲν μεῖζον λέγειν ἡ τοῦ ἐλάττονος*; Pl. has to put *τὸ μέτριον* between, and even that hardly meets the case. He is right if he means that the sole antith. to *μεῖζον τυνὸς* is not *ἐλάττον τυνός*, but wrong if he thinks that anything can be inserted between the terms when saying *τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον ἔστι τοῦ ἐλάττονος*. Can he be thinking of *μέγα* and *συμκρόν*?

τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἐν εἴναι ... αὐτό τῷ ἐν εἴναι 'by the fact of being one': after *οὐδὲ αὐτό*· underst. *ἑτέρον ἔσται οὐδαμῶς*. We have seen that Proc., vi. 177, speaks of 'one' as not 'other' in two ways. He holds, 179, that here we have the proof that it is not itself 'otherness,' *εἰ γὰρ μὴ καθὸ ἐν ἑτέρον ἔστι, οὐκ ἔσται τῷ ἐνὶ ἑτέρον* εἰ δὲ μὴ *τῷ ἐνὶ ἑτέρον, οὐδὲ αὐτὸν ἑτέροτης ἔσται. πάνυ δαιμονίως* ἡ γὰρ *ἑτέροτης ἔαυτῃ καὶ δὶ’ ἔαυτὴν ἑτέρον, τὸ δὲ ἐν οὐχ ἔαυτῷ ἑτέρον ... καὶ τοῦτο ἔστιν ὅπερ αὐτὸς εἴπε συντόμως*' 'εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ *ἔαυτόν*, τούτεστιν εἰ μὴ *ἔαυτῷ ἐνὶ ὄντι ἑτέρον ἔστι, διότι ἐν καὶ ἑτέροτητος διέστηκεν, οὐδὲ αὐτόν ἔστιν ἑτέροτης*' *ἡν γὰρ ἐν ταῦτον φάναι τῷ ἐνὶ ἑτέρον εἴναι καὶ τῷ ἑτέροτητι ἑτέρον εἴτε τὸ ἐν ἑτέροτης, ὅπερ ἀνεῖλεν ὁ λόγος*.

αὐτὸν δὲ ... ἔσται ἑτέρον: etc. He has said that only the *D* other can be other than anything; he has next shown that the one is in no way other; he now infers that thus it cannot be other than anything. *ταῦτὸν ἔαυτῷ* this comes, says Proc., more closely home to the one than even the last arg.—*διὰ τὴν ἄρρητον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἑνὸς) καὶ ἄφραστον ὑπερένωσιν*.

οὐχ ἥπερ ... τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον. Proc., vi. 182-186, says that here (1) the one is proved not to be 'the same':—to be 'one' and to be 'same' would need to be rigidly convertible, but that which becomes the same as the many becomes so by becoming many, not by becoming one; so that 'same' and 'one' are not rigidly convertible: (2) *τούτῳ δὲ δειχθέντι συνῆψε* (Pl.) *καὶ διότι οὐχὶ ταῦτὸν οὔτω τὸ ἐν, ὃς ταῦτοτητος μεταλαβόν ... ἄλλης οὐσης, ... ἔσται γάρ τῷ μεταλαβεῖν ταῦτοτητος ἐν τε καὶ ἄλλο τι δὲ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ οὐκέτι φυλάξει τὴν ἴδιοτητα τοῦ ἑνός, πλῆθος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς γενόμενον*. Pl. may give the purport of these separate arguments in his text, but Proc. rightly adds that he does it briefly. Assuming that Pl. has proved one not to be convertible with same on the ground that, if it were, then *ὅποτε τι ταῦτὸν ἐγίγνετο αἰεὶ ἐν εγίγνετο*, Proc. asks what right he has to go further and say *καὶ ὅποτε ἐν, ταῦτόν*? The addition is justi-

fied if the two are convertible; but Proc. rather suggests an alternative which interposes, *ἐν γάρ τι γιγνόμενον ἔτερον γίγνεται τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τοι γε...* *ἔδει τὸ ἐν γιγνόμενον εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ταῦτόν.* He adds, by way of marking the priority and purity, so to speak, of the one as here viewed, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἐν διὰ τὴν ἀντίθεσιν [ἔτερον v. ἔτερον is present to the mind]* *ἔτερον γίγνεται (τὸ ἐν)*· καθὸ δὲ ἐν τὸ ἐν ἐστιν ἐν, οὐκ ὁν τῶν πρός τι· καθ' αὐτὸν γάρ, ... τὰ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸν προϋπάρχει πανταχοῦ τῶν πρός τι... τὸ δὲ ταῦτὸν τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων ἔστιν. This is how we must, if possible, conceive of the one in our present course of argument—οὐ γὰρ ἀποστατεῖ τοῦ πλήθους ἡ ταῦτης [we can say something is *ταῦτὸν τοῖς πολλοῖς*], τὸ δὲ ἐν [he also says ἐνότης δὲ] ἔξω τῶν πεπληθυσμένων ἔστιν· ἔκαστη γὰρ τάξις συνεισφέρει τι ἑαυτῇ πάντως δ μὴ ἦν πρὸ αὐτῆς. And so we are to think of the following hierarchy of existences, each step downwards (or, if we treat the first as lowest, upwards) bringing in its own special characteristic δ μὴ ἦν πρὸ αὐτῆς:

τὸ ἐν—	ἔχει ἀπλότητα κρείττονα ταῦτης	
τὸ δὲ—	ἔχει τὴν ταῦτητα καὶ ἔτερότητα ἢν οὐκ εἶχε τὸ ἐν	
δ νοῦς—	, τοῦ νοῦ δρεξιν	„ „ δν
ἢ ψυχὴ—	, μεταβατικὴν νόησιν	„ δ νοῦς
δ οὐρανὸς—	, κύκλῳ κίνησιν τὴν τοπικὴν	„ ἢ ψυχὴ
ἢ γένεσις—	, κατ' οὐσίαν μεταβολὴν	„ δ οὐρανὸς.

In this difficult section Pl. does convince us that same and one are not rigidly convertible, that οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ταῦτὸν γένεται τῷ τι ἐν γίγνεται. We may by popular usage say ‘what becomes the same as anything becomes one *with it*’ but not ‘becomes one’; and that being realized, when we say one is the same as itself, we add a fresh quality to one. So of *εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταῦτὸν ἔσται οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται* popular language says that a thing is the same as itself. But Proc. truly holds that ‘same’ is a *πρός τι*, and that our duty here is to think of ‘one’ as *καθ' αὐτὸν* if we can, as an entity rigidly unmodified by extraneous comparisons. If we do, then when we call it *ταῦτὸν ἑαυτῷ*—innocent as the act may seem—we have caused it to be no longer *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*—*καὶ οὔτω ἐν δν οὐχ ἐν ἔσται.* Proc. accounted for the order of the args. by their relative difficulty, the hardest coming last. But there seems to be another reason at work. The second contention, above B,

is *ταῦτόν γε ἐτέρω δν ἐκεῖνο ἀν εἴη.* This we now see is a popular use of language, which dialectic rejects; otherwise *ταῦτόν γε ἑαυτῷ δν ἐκεῖνο ἀν εἴη* would hold, and the one, when the same with itself, would be itself, and so necessarily one with itself. He could not, then, have put his second arg. after his fourth, which cuts away its basis. On the other hand if we accept the latter we may be supposed not to need the former. As to language Heind. justly says on γένεται ‘Rectius fuerit γίγνηται, ac deinde γιγνόμενον pro γενόμενον’: unless we are to fall back upon the distinc. between mere narrative or argumentative forms (aorist) and pictorial forms (present), ‘when it passes into sameness with anything, it is in that very process becoming one before our eyes.’ Heind. adds that δέφερε would be preferable to διαφέρει, while a διαφέρει οὐν would be an improvement before πάντι γε. Proc., VI. 185, asks, why say *τοῖς πολλοῖς ταῦτὸν* instead of *ἴστον*, and answers by saying that we don't here deal with a *τι ποσὸν* existing *ἐν τοῖς ἐνύλοις πράγμασιν*, but with an οὐσιώδες πλῆθος or ποσόν, and that *ἢ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν κοινωνίᾳ ταῦτότης ἔστιν, ἢ δὲ κατά τι ποσὸν ἴστορης.* He probably gets this partly from the language in 140 B.

οὕτω δὴ... ἐτέρω εἴη: ‘Malim οὕτω δὴ ἢ ἔτερον’ E p. 14.

Heind. A smaller change would do, οὕτω δὲ ἢ. From the dats. govd. by *ταῦτὸν* we supply gens. for *ἔτερον*. The statement is a condensation of the one with which the arg. began 139 B.

οὕτε... ἐτέρω are an enlargement of *τινι* above. We might have had *εἴτε εἴτε*, and also *οὐδενὶ* for *τινι*.

ὅτι τὸ ταῦτὸν ποι etc. ‘Because to be affected anyhow in the same way is resemblance,’ ‘because what is similarly affected in any way is like’; or as Jowett translates ‘Because likeness is sameness of affections.’ Plato exposes his arg. to needless danger by resting its further progress upon this assertion. The reasoning used about ‘same and different’ would amply cover ‘like and unlike’: but he seems to wish each step to lean, as far as may be, on its predecessor. If we are to define likeness this def. will do very well. Arist., Met. IV. 9, 1018 a 15-19, says *ὅμοια λέγεται τὰ τε πάντῃ ταῦτὸ πεπονθότα, καὶ τὰ πλείω ταῦτὸ πεπονθότα ἢ ἔτερα, καὶ διν ἡ ποιότης μία· καὶ καθ' ὅσα ἀλλοιούσθαι ἐνδέχεται τῶν ἐναντίων, τούτων τὸ πλείω ἔχον ἢ κυριώτερα*

όμοιον τούτῳ. ἀντικειμένως δὲ τοῖς ὁμοίοις τὰ ἀνόμοια. He says briefly, id. 15, 1021 a 10-12, κατὰ γάρ τὸ ἐν λέγεται πάντα. ταῦτα μὲν γάρ δὲ μία ἡ οὐσία, ὁμοιά δὲ δὲν ἡ ποιότης μία, ὥστα δὲ δὲν τὸ ποσὸν ἔν. In ix. 3, 1054 b 5-11, he speaks of things as like which κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ταῦτα γ... ὅτι ἐν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν, where εἶδος seems to mean appearance. We must note throughout the adherence to the perfect tense—never πάσχον πάσχει—the thing has been so affected, and thus is like. Cp. τὸ ταῦτὸν which occurs, with our ‘the t’other’ and the Scottish ‘the t’ae ane and the t’ither.’ τοῦ δὲ γε ἐνὸς etc. ‘jungas hunc in modum τὸ δὲ γε ταῦτὸν ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν χωρὶς (ὅν) τοῦ ἐνός.’ Stallb., who cites for abs. of ὅν 165 D, οὐκοῦν ... χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, and 166 οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρὶς.

140 εἰ τι πέπονθε etc.=εἰ τὸ ἐν πέπονθε τι χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, πεπόνθοι ἀν εἶναι πλείω ἢ ἐν. The strict balance of moods is broken. πλείω ἢ ἐν ‘This is the main point of Demons. 1. and is stated pp. 139 D, 140 A compared with 137 C.’ Grote.

οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν etc.=οὐδαμῶς δυνατόν ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἐν εἶναι ταῦτὸν-πεπονθὸς οὔτε ... οὔτε, οὐ φαίνεται is a little ambiguous: ‘non videtur’ Ast, ‘clearly not’ Jowett. οὐδὲ μήν if not ταῦτὸν ‘still less’ ἔτερον. One is tempted to relapse and hold that the one must be either ταῦτὸν π. or ἔτερον π. and that it cannot be at once οὐδαμῶς ταῦτὸν π. and οὐδαμῶς ἔτερον π. But the objection lies in the πεπονθός: to be one, as we are striving to regard that, it must be οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς πεπονθός, χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι: if indeed τὸ ἐν εἶναι is τι πεπονθέναι, and not αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτὸς εἶναι.

B οὕτε ἄρα ... δὲ εἴη τὸ ἐν: The dats. are luckily suited to both adjs. this time; not as 139 E. It reads ἑαυτῷ here. We are not far past the argt. ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἔτέρῳ ἀλλῷ δὲ οὐδενὶ, 139 C, and already we lapse and mingle ἀλλοῖς with ἔτερος, and even speak of ἔτερον πεπονθὸς ... ἀλλοῖς.

τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων With likeness and unlikeness physical features recur; and with equality and inequality they come to the front. We may recall what Proc. said (above) about τι ποσόν, and Arist.’s defin. (also above) ὥστα δὲ δὲν τὸ ποσὸν ἔν. He says, Categ. 6, 6 a 26, ἕδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἵστον τε καὶ ἄνιστον λέγεσθαι: when not used strictly so it is still used κατ’ ἀναλογίαν of τὸ ποσόν. Pl. regards all ποσά as estimated by units, and does not here

ask whether the measure is of length, capacity, or weight. οἷς ... σύμμετρον, those with which it is commensurable, or has a common unit. Cp. Arist. Met. I. 2, 983 a 15, we begin, he says, by wondering e.g. περὶ ... τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσυμμετρίαν θαυμαστὸν γάρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν εἰ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται, and end by reversing our wonder.

τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων τῶν δὲ etc. In the previous sentence the τῶν μέν, τῶν δὲ belonged to the foll. adj.: here they are separate, referring to the things (οἷς) with which the one is incommens., while the adjs. qualify μέτρων. It might have read σμικροτέρων μὲν καὶ μεζόνων μέτρων ἔσται ἡ ταῦτα ἔστι. He assumes, as dealing now with equality, that a standard is chosen in each case which will measure the objs. the same number of times; but this—as these objs. have not a common measure—will vary in absolute size. That which measures the ‘one’ a given number of times will in the cases of larger things be smaller, in the contrary case be larger, than that which measures those things an equal number of times. We may note the use of μὲν—δὲ throughout.

[ἴστον μὲν
μειζόν δὲ] [οἷς μὲν ἀντῶν δὲ] [τῶν μὲν
λοις δὲ]

τοῦ αὐτοῦ ... τῶν αὐτῶν This argt. depends on that regarding ‘same and different,’ while the orig. admits. that the one had no parts would cover the whole. τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ is the conditional part; the rest the consequent. οὐτ’ ἀν...οὔτε one would look for the repet. of ἀν or for e.g. οὐθὲν ἀν εἴη, οὔτε ἀλλῷ. οὐκον φαίνεται γε ‘well (οὐν) it does not seem (γε) so.’ τοσούτων καὶ μερῶν is true δ throughout. καὶ οὐτωαὖ the hiatus clear in both MSS.

τούτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ... ‘quoniam ita ei accedat aliud quiddam, videlicet mensurae ratio, quam tamen ipsa (unitas) ab omni ratione libera sit atque inimunis,’ Stallb. Proc. says here (VI. 210-12), ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἴποι ἀν τις ἀπορῶν, ἀλλὰ ἵστον μήτε ἔλαττόνων ἔσται μέτρων μήτε πλειόνων ἀλλ’ ἐνός, ἵνα μὴ πλῆθος ἐν τῷ ἵστον καταλίπωμεν, αὐτῷ οὖν ἔστω ἑαυτοῦ μέτρον· διὰ δὴ τούτων λύων τὴν ἀπορίαν ταῦτην ἐπήνεγκεν, ὅτι ἄρα εἰ τις τοιούτον ὑπόθοιτο τὸ ἐν, ἔσται ἵστον τινὶ πάντως—τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μέτρῳ· καὶ εἰ μὴ αὐτῶν (-το δὲν?) τὸ ἵστον καὶ τὸ ἐν, διότι τὸ μὲν καθ’ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ πρός τι, δῆλον ὃς ἵστον δὲν τὸ ἐν ἔσται καὶ οὐδὲν διὰ

τὸ ἵστον οὐχ ἔν ὅν. ... ἀνέκφατον ἔσται μετροῦν ἔαυτὸ καὶ ὑψ' ἕαυτοῦ μετρούμενον, καὶ ἔσται οὐχ ἔν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀλλὰ δυοειδές. ... εἰ οὖν μῆδὲ ὅλον ἔστι τὸ αὐτό, ἵνα μὴ πεπονθὸς γῆ τὸ ἔν, ὡς ἐν Σοφιστῇ δέδειχε, πολλῷ μᾶλλον μέρος οὐκ ἔστιν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀτελές γῆ πρὸς τῷ καὶ πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἔν. ἐκ δὲ τούτου φανερὸν (N.B.) ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸν ἔν τῶν εἰδῶν τι ἔν· πᾶν γὰρ εἴδος μέρος ἔστι τοῦ νοητοῦ παντός, ἀλλ' ἐξήρηται καὶ τοῦ ὅλου νοητοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδῶν μερῶν ὄντων. ... καὶ πῶς γὰρ ἀν εἴη μέτρον, ἐπέκεινα παντὸς πέρας δὲν καὶ δρουν καὶ ἐνότριτος; πᾶν δὲ μέτρον πέρας ἔστι τοῦ μετρούμενον καὶ ὅρος.

Ἴστον αὐτῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι : So **U**, retained as intelligible. But **t** gives **Ἴστον τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι :** which (if read as **Ἴστον τῷ**) is preferable. And the reading **Ἴστον αὐτῷ** may perhaps be an error from **Ἴστον ἀν** above. **τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι—γρ. αὐτῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι.** Sch. Rh.

οὐτὲ αὐτὸν μεῖζον etc. Proc. vi. 213, says διεῖλε δὲ τὸ ἀνιστὸν ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι, μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον εἰπών, ἀπερ ὠνόμασεν ἐν τῷ προτάσει κοινῶς διὰ τοῦ ἀνιστον παραλαμβάνων. His first statement was (b) οὐτὲ **Ἴστον οὐτὲ ἀνιστὸν**, but he followed it by μεῖζον δέ που ἡ ἔλαττον ὄν.

E **Δοκεῖ τῷ** The **τῷ**, as Stallb. says, depends on **τὴν αὐτήν**: the passage in full might run **τὸ ἔν δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι (ορ δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ ἔν) πρεσβύτερον ἡ νεώτερόν τον εἶναι, ἡ τὴν αὐτὴν ἥλικιαν τῷ ἔχειν;** as in 141 A; Stallb. cps. 151 B-end.

χρόνου καὶ δρμούτητος etc. It is not clear if **χρόνου** belongs to **δρμούτ.** or only to **ἰσότ.** Proc. however rightly says that likeness in time is as much to be weighed as equality (vi. 226) **πρεσβύτης γὰρ ἀνθρώπος ἵππῳ πρεσβύτῃ δῆλον δρμούτος ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰσῆλιξ· ἡ γὰρ οὖμαι χρόνου ἰσότης οὐ ποιεῖ τανότητα τῆς ἥλικίας...διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰσήλικον ὄνομάζεται, τὸ δὲ δημήλικον.** The **ὄν** does not include **χρόνου.**

p. 15. 141 πῶς οὖν ... τοιούτον δὲν : Proc., after saying that what has no equality or inequality in time may still have these of a non-temporal kind, adds (vi. 228) **προσέθηκε τὸ ‘τοιούτον ὄν·’ τὸ γὰρ δρμούτητος καὶ ἀνομούό-** **τητος ἐπέκεινα πῶς ἀν μετέχοι τῶν δρμούτητος καὶ ἀνομούότητος μετεχόντων** (such as time); **καὶ τὸ ἰσότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος ἐξηρημένον πῶς ἀν συντάττοιτο τοὺς μερικῶς τούτων μετειληφόσι;** **τὸ γὰρ κατὰ χρόνον ἄνιστον καὶ ἵστον οὐ πάσης μετέσχε τῆς τοῦ ἀνιστον τε καὶ ἵστον δυνάμεως.**

ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ... εἴη; οὐδὲ might be dropped.

νεωτ. πρεσβύτερον; Here two ideas **πρός τι** may be said οἰκείως ἀντιστρέφειν as he notes, c below. **τὸ πρεσβύτερον ... γιγνόμενον,** the article goes not, as above, with **πρεσβ.**, which is part of the pred., but with **γιγν.** A similar case in c.

καὶ νεώτερον ... γίγνεται: Apelt (Parm. des Plato, Weimar 1879) regards this argt. as unjust and due to the idiom, which occurs above, **αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι**, and which of course involves the element of time. A thing becomes older than itself *was*, not than itself *is*. But we are probably to think of the one as caught in the instant of changing its age (on the analogy of 138 D, where it is arrested at the moment of passing from one thing into another): at that instant it may be regarded as becoming both older and younger than itself. **εἰπερ μέλλει** etc. ‘if it is to have anything than which it grows older.’ Not only is this clause curtailed by the want of a proper object to **ἔχειν**; but it is odd in the use of the pres. indic. **γίγν.** This tense would be natural if the clause stood **εἰπερ ᔁχει**; but with **μέλλει** one expects **γενήσεται** or **ὅτου ἀν γίγνηται.**

διαφέρον **U** clear and admissible, although **t** has διάφορον as below. οὐδὲν δὲν γίγνεσθαι ‘premit notionem τοῦ γίγνεσθαι.’ Stallb. And so we see immediately. If οὐδὲν is nom. **ἔτερον** is tautol. Perhaps it is = **κατ'** οὐδέν, οὐδαμός.

ἀλλὰ ... **ἥδη εἶναι**, short for e.g. ἀλλὰ δεῖ μὲν αὐτὸν **ἥδη εἶναι διάφορον τοῦ ἥδη ὄντος διαφόρον**: and so below, μέλλειν needing also the word **ἔσεσθαι** as in c. After pointing out (vi. 235) that Pl. lays down here **κοινόν τινα κανύνα περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀπαξ ἀπάντων**, Proc. urges that this affects **παραδείγματα**, which must ‘become’ as their image becomes etc. If this is so, and if **παραδ.** are not to be affected by **τὸ γίγνεσθαι**, then οὐκ ἀποδεδόμεθα τοὺς πραγμάτων ἐπικήρων (mortal) **παραδείγματα ποιῶντας** ἔσται γὰρ τὸ **παραδ.** τῆς εἰκόνος οὐκ οὔσης,—unless the latter does not itself partake of becoming, but is of the same nature as its model.

ὄν: so **t**, **U** has **ἀν**: the two words, however written, c might easily be interchanged. **διαφορότης νεωτέρου—ον διαφ.** Fischer and Heind. cite Moeris Atticista Πλάτων ἐν Θεατῇ τῷ παρ' ἀλλῷ οὐχ εὑρον. Fischer adds ‘scilicet apud nullum veterem scriptorem Atticum Platonique aequalem. Phileb. 3 et 4 est διαφορότητα.’ At Theaet. 209A he quotes Thomas Magister

διαφορά, πάντες λέγουσι· διαφορότης δέ, Πλάτων μόνον ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ. These statements might appear to discredit the authenticity of the Parm.; but probably the case in Theaet. was better known than the others. Besides ours, Ast gives the foll.—Theaet. 209 A, D, E, 210 A; Phileb. 12 E, 14 A (the passages referred to by F.); Rep. ix. 587 E: a list which sets aside any argt. as to authenticity. The word does not seem to occur in Arist., who uses διαφόρα. Would any Aristotelian, familiar with the latter word, go back, even when writing in imitation of Plato, to this rare word, when διαφόρα is likewise habitually used by Plato? If not, then the Parm. is not likely to have been written by a later imitator.

νεώτερον ἄμα The adv. is important. He has been narrowing the question to the very instant of the change. But to such an argt. we may apply the lang. of Arist., Poet. 7, 1450 b 39, when discussing a brief plot—συγχέεται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἔγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθῆτον χρόνου γινομένη. Has Pl. in mind the reasoning of Zeno upon space? Proc. says, vi. 231, δόξειε δ' ἀν ἀπορώτατος εἶναι καὶ, τὸν εἴπω, σοφιστικός πως οὐτος ὁ λόγος. He points out (233) that there are two views of participation in time, τὸ μὲν οὖν εὐθεῖαν ὀδενὸν καὶ ἀρχόμενόν τε ἀπό τυπος καὶ εἰς ἄλλο καταλήγον (in which case the object sharing in time would not become both older and younger)—τὸ δὲ κατὰ κύκλον περιπορεύμενον καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸν τὴν κίνησιν ἔχον, δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ πέρας ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἀκατάληκτος, ἑάστου τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ πέρατος ὅντος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον ἀρχῆς καὶ [ἢ?] πέρατος. τὸ δὴ κυκλικῶν ἐνεργοῦν μετέχει τοῦ χρόνου περιοδικῶς, καὶ (ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸν καὶ πέρας τῆς κινήσεως ἔστι καὶ ἀρχῆ), καθόσον μὲν ἀφίσταται τῆς ἀρχῆς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται, καθόσον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας (which is the ἀρχῆ) ἀφικεῖται νεώτερον γίγνεται· γιγνόμενον γὰρ ἔγγυον τοῦ πέρατος ἔγγύτερον γίγνεται τῆς οὐκείας ἀρχῆς. This is ingenious: but had Pl. meant it he surely would have been more explicit. Besides, when life is advancing, περιπλομένων ἐνιαντῶν, do we grow younger as the end of the year brings round our birthday? Does the explanation explain? Proc. goes on to urge that whatever becomes ten years old becomes older than itself—as nine-years-old; ἐν φ δὲ γίγνεται τοῦτο, νεώτερον ἐντοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἐνναετές—by

instantaneous transition to ten years, which makes its still-at-that-instant-subsisting-age-of-nine younger than its at-that-instant-emerging-age-of-ten. This is just what has been urged above; but it has no necessary connection with circular motion.

ἀνάγκη ... τοῦτα: For this abbreviated express. Heind. quotes parallels, Gorg. 475 B, οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; and Rep. vii. 519 B, Laws x. 899 A.

ἐν χρόνῳ ... τοῦ τοιούτου, What does τοιούτου refer to? ‘Quae in tempore sunt atque hoc tali participant,’ Ficinus: ‘quaecunque in tempore sint hujusque partem habeant,’ Ast: ‘Was in der Zeit besteht und deren theilhaftig ist,’ Müller: ‘things which are in time and partake of time,’ Jowett. These agree more or less in referring τοιούτου to χρόνῳ directly. ‘Was in der Zeit ist und an so etwas Theil hat,’ Engelm.: this is less definite and may refer the word to the process of becoming older and younger just described. We might then supply mentally παθήματος, which occurs in the plural just below. But perhaps the former view ‘and partakes of such a thing as we have shown time to be’ is the more correct, considering what follows.

οὐδὲ ἄμα ... χρόνῳ: On this Proc., vi. 215 seqq., has much to say, e.g. καὶ μοι προσέχειν ἀξιῶ τὸν νοῦν ἐκείνους, οὐ ψυχὴν ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιούτου είρήκασι τὸ πρώτον, ὅπως αὐτῶν περιαἱρεῖ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Παρ. δεικνὺς ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἀδεκτον χρόνον, τὸ δὲ ἀδεκτον χρόνου ψυχὴν ἀδύνατο εἶναι· πᾶσα γὰρ μετέχει χρόνου, καὶ χρῆται περιόδοις ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρούμεναι. ... τοῦτο δὴ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀπιστον εἶναι πολλοῖς καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυσιολόγοις, οὐ πάντα περιέχεσθαι φοντο ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ εἴ τι ἀδιόν ἔστι τὸν ἀπειρον εἶναι χρόνον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀκαταμέτρητον ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν πάντων εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὕσπερ ἐν τόπῳ πάντα φοντο εἶναι, σώματα οἰόμενοι πάντα ὑπάρχειν ἀσώματον δὲ μηδέν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ πάντα εἶναι, κινούμενα ὄντα ἀκίνητον δὲ μηδέν. ... ὥστε διὰ τούτων εἶναι δεδειγμένον πάντων, διὰ οὗτος σῶμα τὸ ἐν οὕτε ψυχὴ οὕτε νοῦς, τὸ μὲν διότι μὴ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ διότι μὴ μετέχει χρόνου, τὸ δὲ διότι μὴ κινέται καὶ ἔστηκε. He goes on to raise the question what manner of time Pl. here refers to, and decides apparently that it is χρόνος ὁ πρώτιστος, οὐχ ὁ προελθὼν εἰς τὸ ἐμφανές, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀπόλυτος καὶ ἀσχετος καθ' ὃν αἱ περίοδοι πᾶσαι μετροῦνται τῶν ψυχῶν. But into this we cannot follow him, both because Pl. says nothing about

time which does not apply to the time which we know, and because, in the meantime at least, he declares the one to have no connection with it. For this concl. Proc., vi. 293, gives a reason δεῖ γάρ δειχθῆναι τὸ ἐν ἐπέκεινα καὶ τῆς θείας πάσης ψυχῆς πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν, ὡς δέδεικται πρὸ τῶν ὅντων ὅντων καὶ αἰτιον πάντων. But we must not forget that this severance from time speedily costs the one its existence. He further points out that a thing may, so to speak, be 'in time yet not of it,' may exist contemporaneously with time yet not be temporal (241): τὸ εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ is not the same as τὸ εἶναι τότε ὅτε χρόνος ἔστιν, any more than τὸ εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ τουτέστι τὸ εἶναι ὅτε τόπος ἔστιν, ή οὕτως πᾶν τὸ ἀσώματον ἐν τόπῳ φήσομεν εἶναι, διότι τόπου ὅντος ἔστιν. Nay τὸ 'ὅτε' χώραν ἐπὶ τούτου [τοῦ ἑνὸς] παντελῶς οὐκ ἔχει πρὸ αἰώνος ὑφεστῶτος ὃς ἔστι παράδ. τοῦ χρόνου. πῶς γάρ ἀν εἴποι τις τὸ ὅτε ἐπὶ τοῦ μήτε ἐν αἰώνι μήτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὅντος, ἀναινομένου δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἀμφα κοινωνίαν; ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ ἐν, διὰ μὴ ἐν κινήσει, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐν αἰώνι, διὰ μὴ ἐν στάσει μένει γὰρ διαίων, ὡς δι Τίμαιος φησιν. Any further discussion of these problems may be deferred.

ὡς ... αἱρεῖ: So At, and there are several instances of the phrase. Crit. 48 c, ἐπειδὴ δὲ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ. Phileb. 35 D, διψῆν ἄρα ημῶν τὸ σῶμα ... οὐδαμῆ δὲ λόγος αἱρεῖ. Rep. x. 604 c, ὅπῃ δὲ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἀν ἔχειν: see also 607 in etc. This need be said only because ἐρεῖ was an early reading, and seems to be transl. by Ficinus 'non sane, ut ratio dictat.' Cp. Phaedr. 274 A, ὡς δὲ λόγος φησιν. It will be seen that a reader of Η, (Arethas?) struck with the text, makes a note of it in the marg.

καὶ τὸ γέγονε etc. Cp. Rep. vi. 499 C-D, εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἥ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ ἥ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ... ἥ καὶ ἐπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἥ εἰρημένη πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὐτῇ ἥ μοντα πόλεως ἐγκρατής γένηται. Proc., vi. 242, cites Rep. vi. 617 B, where Σ. τὰς Μοίρας διαιρεῖσθαι τὸν χρόνον φησί, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἁδειν τὰ παρελθόντα, τὴν δὲ τὰ παρόντα, τὴν δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα: and says πρόεισι πρῶτον μὲν τριαδικῶς εἰς τὸ παρὸν καὶ παρελθόντα καὶ μέλλοντα, ἐπειτα ἐννεαχῶς ἔκαστον τῶν τριῶν τούτων εἰς τρία πάλιν ὑποδιαιρῶν. But in the case of τὸ παρὸν Pl. has only two subdivisions ἔστι and γίγνεται.

Q

He rectifies this by including in his summary νῦν γέγονε: but he thus repeats γέγονε twice and has to add ποτὲ to the first one. Proc. classifies thus:—

τὸ παρελθόν = μκρον, ἢν μέσον, γεγονέναι τελευταῖον, ἐγίγνετο
τὸ παρὸν = κυριώτατον, ἔστι,, γέγονε,, γίγνεται
τὸ μέλλον = ψηλότατον, ἔσται,, γενήσεται,, γενηθήσεται

but (243) has doubts as to the main divisions, μέχρι τίνος γάρ ἦν τὸ παρὸν ἢ τὸ παρελθόν, καὶ πόθεν ἄρξεται λοιπὸν τὸ μέλλον; ἀλλ' ὡς ἀμεινον λέγειν ὅτι πᾶσαι μὲν κατὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἐνεργοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἔχοντος τοῦ ὄλου χρόνου τριτλᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ διηγάμεις—τὴν μὲν τελεσιογρὸν πάσης κινήσεως, τὴν δὲ συνετικὴν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν βασιλευομένων καὶ φρουρητικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐκφαιτορικὴν τῶν θείων. Proc. speaks throughout as of δι χρόνος τῶν ψυχῶν, not of οὗτος δὲ ἐμφανῆς χρόνος, though this is constituted on the same analogy, or rather κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν αἰώνα ὁμοιώτητα which comes between. This is probably suggested by Tim. 37 D, εἰκὼν δὲ ἐπινοεῖ κινητόν τινα αἰώνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἄμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰώνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴονταν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τούτον δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν—and so on; but περὶ μὲν τούτων τάχ' ἀν οὐκ εἴη καιρὸς πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι. One would like an excuse for changing τὸ γέγονε into τὸ ἐγέγονε and ποτὲ γέγονεν into ποτ' ἐγέγονε. This would furnish τὸ παρελθόν with past tenses and remove the double use of γέγονε. But the text is certain, and Proc. goes on to comment upon it:—τὴν δὲ πρώτην τριάδα τέως ἐπισκεπτέον. αὐτῇ δήποτον κοινὸν ἔχει πᾶσα τὸ ποτέ... τῶν τριῶν τούτων τὸ μὲν σημαίνει τὴν ἀκρότητα τῆς τριάδος—τὸ δὲ τὴν τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἀφορίζον· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀθρόαν τελείωσιν—τὸ γέγονε· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῷ τελειούσθαι παράτασιν—τὸ ἐγίγνετο· μιμήματα ταῦτα τῶν νοητῶν—τὸ μὲν ἦν τοῦ ὅντος, τὸ δὲ γέγονε τοῦ αἰώνος, τὸ δὲ ἐγίγνετο τοῦ πρώτως αἰώνιον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πάσιν ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ διοῦ πᾶν καὶ ὄλοι ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, τὸ δὲ πληθύσθαι καὶ ἐκτείνεσθαι ὀπωσοῦν ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου. τούτοις δὲ τοῖς τρισὶ καὶ τὰ ἔξῆς ἔστιν ἀνάλογον τρία. Of the second γέγονεν he says ἐπερον γὰρ παρ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ γέγονε, τὸ μὲν ὡς παρελθόν, τὸ δὲ ὡς παρὸν... ἐπειδὴ οὖν διττὸν ἐσήμαινε τὸ γέγονεν, ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος δύο μόνα εἴπε—τὴν πρώτην τὸ ἔστι, καὶ [τὸ] γίγνεται, ἵνα μὴ παράξῃ τὸν λόγον· ὕστερον δὲ προσθήσει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ γέγονε. γενηθήσεται, 'inter γενήσεται et γενηθήσεται quid intersit non video. Vere, opinor, Schleierm. correxit γεγε-

νήσεται, quod in textum recepissem, si aliud usquam in promptu esset formae hujus exemplum.' Heind. Proc. views it as parallel with ἐγίγνετο and γίγνεται, regarding it as giving the continuance of a process —τὴν ἐν τῷ τελειωθεὶς παράτασιν. He adds σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν γενῆσεται τὴν ἄχρονον ἀθρόαν εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὑπαρξίν, οἷον ἀστραπῇ γενῆσεται· τὸ δὲ γενηθῆσεται τὴν παριτάσεως πρόσδον, γενηθῆσεται ἄνθρωπος· ἐπὶ δὲ ἀστραπῆς εἰπεῖν τὸ γενηθῆσεται ψεῦδος ἔστιν. This must apply here; but that the form in -θήσομαι is not always strictly so used appears from Theaet. 158 D, τί οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου ... τὸ ἀληθὲς ὄρυσθῆσεται; But perhaps the form ὄριεται is confined to the mid., as in 190 E, εἴ τις ὄριεται δύξιν εἶναι ψεῦδη τὸ ἐπεροδοξεῖν. Stallb., overlooking what Proc. says and the demands of the case, renders γενῆσεται 'es wird im Werden sein' and γενηθῆσεται 'es wird werden.' He cites cases of verbs possessing both forms—such as ἀδικεῖν, τρέφειν, παιδεύειν—in which (Gorg. 509 D, Crito 54 A etc.) the shorter form is used, and that (we must assume) in the sense of continuance. But there is no importance attaching to time in those instances: they are cases of statement merely.

τοῦ μέλλοντος; So At, and the sense is clear. Still Heind. says with reason 'Articulum τοῦ ante μέλλοντος male intrusit librarius. Τοῦ ἔπειτα μέλλοντος respondebit praegresso τοῦ ποτε γεγονότος et subsequenti τοῦ νῦν παρόντος. Thucyd. I. 123, τὰ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένα ... περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μέλλοντων' ... Stallb. agrees, but adds 'nisi forte praestat ratio G. Hermanni ad Eurip. Iphig. Taur. 1234, corrigentis τοῦ ἔπειτα πον μέλλοντος, ut ποὺ ad solum ἔπειτα referatur.'

Ἐστιν οὖν ... τούτων τι; 'But are there any forms of being other than these?' Jowett: 'Num potest quidquam essentiā aliter quam secundum istorum aliquod participare?' Fic.: and others clearly take τούτων of the phases of time just noted. This seems the natural sense; in which case Pl. imagines here no existence save one in time, and time such as we know it. Proc. has no basis for his repeated reference to a time other than ὁ προελθὼν εἰς τὸ ἐμφανές. Yet he regards τούτων as referring to the entire series of aspects in which the one has been thus far considered (vi. 249 etc.), πᾶν φησὶ τὸ

μετέχον οὐσίας κατά τι τούτων ἔστι μετέχον, ... οὗν ἡ ὄλον ἔστιν ἡ μέρη ἔχον ἡ ἀρχὴν ἡ μέσον ἔχον etc.

οὐδαμῶς ἄρα etc. It seems clear that this argt. is p. 16. meant to banish the one from existence, to annihilate it: but Proc. (vi. 250) regards it as raising the one 'above' existence. οὕτω δέ που καὶ ὁ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σ. τὸ πρῶτον ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ἐλεγεν εἶναι, ... ἐνταῦθα φησιν ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι μέν τι μὴ μετέχειν δὲ οὐσίας καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ διαλόγῳ καὶ ἐν Τεμαίῳ παραπλησίως. ... καὶ ταύτη διέστηκεν ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Παρμ. τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐν δὲ βλέπει, καὶ τοῦτο φησιν εἶναι πάντων αἰτιον, ὁ δὲ ... εἰς τὸ μόνως ἐν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἀναδραμών. The passage in the Rep. is vi. 509 B, καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπὸ ἔκεινου αὐτοῖς προσείναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβέᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος, the spirit of which is totally distinct from that of ours, where the assumption is that the one has been logically abolished. Proc. adds ἀποφήτας δὲ οὖν τὸ μετέχειν οὐσίας τὸ ἐν ... προσέθηκεν 'οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἐν,' οὐκέτι τοῦτο δι' ἀποδείξεως λαμβάνων οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀποδεῖξαι δυνατὸν τοῦτο αὐτόθεν διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ ἐν συγγένειαν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποφάσεσι τὰ συγγενέστερα. δυσαποδεικτότερα ... ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτὸν καὶ τὸ δὲ εἴξει τῆς δευτέρας ἀρχόμενος ὑποθέσεως. But the argt. in the text seems quite a case of ἀπόδειξις—Nothing that is apart from time has any being: the one is apart from time, therefore the one has not any being = Ferio of the first figure!

Ἔτη γὰρ ... μετέχον' The text and meaning both quite clear, 'denn dann wäre es doch seiend und des Seins theilhaftig,' Engelm. Heind. would prefer εἴ τι γὰρ ἀνήδη ἐν οὖν, καὶ οὐσίας μετέχοι,—neat but needless.

τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ Our idiom is the indef. art. in such cases; and so 'wenn man einem solchen Schluße vertrauen darf,' Engelm. It would agree with our ideas to explain the usage thus, εἰ δὲ πιστεύειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιῷδε ὄντι. The demonstr. is probably used δεικτικῶς, the λόγος being personified as one of the company: otherwise τοιῷδε would be more in place.

δὲ ... η ἀντοῦ; literally = but what does not exist—could there be to this non-existent thing

anything either 'for it' or 'of it'? We might simplify thus—μὴ ὄντος δέ τινος, εἴη ἀν τι η ἀντῷ η αὐτῷ; e.g. οὐδὲ ἄρα ὄνομά ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος [αὐτῷ]. So Alcib. I. 128 A-B, δακτύλιον ἔστιν ὅτου ἀν ἄλλου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίνεται η δακτύλου; What has no οὐσία can have no ποιότης or πρᾶς τι.

οὐδὲ τι 'neque ab aliquo ex iis quae sunt sentiuntur,' Fic., who must take the words thus, οὐδὲ τι τῶν ὄντων (subject of sent.) αἰσθάνεται αὐτῷ: and similarly Jowett, 'nor does anything that is perceive one': and Müller and Ast. But Engelm. 'noch (wird) etwas von dem Seienden an ihm wahrgenommen' clearly assumes αἰσθάνεται to be passive; and very naturally in view of the connection. Stallb. without remark renders 'nec quidquam eorum, quae revera sunt, in eo percipitur et animadvertisit.' Pl.'s point seems to be that nothing which is can perceive what is not.

ἢ δυνατὸν ... δοκεῖ: Here we have a conclusion; and it is unsatisfactory. Proc. (vi. 241) thus traces back the argt., ἀπέφησε πάντα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐν τάξει: (10) τὸ χρόνον μετέχειν ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε πρεσβύτερον εἶναι μήτε νεώτερον, (9) τοῦτο ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε δρμούτητος μήτε ἰστότητος μήτε ἀνομούτητος μήτε πετέχειν, (8) τὸ ἵστον καὶ ἀνιστον καὶ δρμούτον ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε ταῦτὸν εἶναι μήτε ἔτερον, (7) ταῦτα δὲ απὸ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλο τι η ἐν, (6) τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ κινέσθαι μηδαμῶς, (5) τὸ δὲ μὴ κινέσθαι μήτε ἔσταναι ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε ἐν ἀντῷ εἶναι μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ, (4) τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε περιέχειν ἑαυτὸ μήτε περιέχεσθαι, (3) τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρη μὴ ἔχειν, (2) τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι δλον, (1) τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι πλῆθος. At 251 he asks, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔστιν ἥρξατο τῶν ἀποφάσεων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, and answers ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐναντίως εἰχεν η τῆς οὐσίας ἀπόφασις: η μὲν γὰρ λέγει τὸ ἐν ὡς ἔστιν, η δὲ ἀπόφασις ὡς οὐκ ἔστι. πάντων οὖν γελοιότατον ἦν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγειν εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀν ἑαυτὸν ἔδοξεν ἀναιρεῖν οὐ λόγος. ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο τῷ ἔστι καταχρηστάμενος, καὶ ὡς μηδὲν διαφέρον λέγων εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, εὑρεν ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ μάλιστα ἀντικείσθαι πως δοκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐν· καὶ ἄλλως τῷ Παρμ. δοκοῦν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ὄν καὶ οὐ πολλά. ἀρξάμενος οὖν ἀπὸ τούτων ὡς γνωριμωτάτων, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ἀποφήσας, κατέδειν ὡς η τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐννοια καὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ἀναίνεται συνάρτησιν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔστιν. He gives, then, two reasons for the order; that to begin by

saying 'the one is not many' is to approach the subject from a distance and lay siege to it in due form, and that this falls in with the dictum of Parm. —as stated by Z.—that 'the whole is not many.' It certainly adds greatly to our conviction that the truth should seem to be reached gradually by cumulative evidence. Grote says 'As far as I can understand the bearing of this self-contradictory demonstration, it appears a *reductio ad absurdum* of the proposition—*Unum is not Multa*. Now *Unum which is not Multa* designates the *Aὐτὸν*—*Ev* or *Unum Ideale*; which Pl. himself affirmed and which Arist. impugned. If this be what is meant, the dialogue Parm. would present here, as in other places, a statement of difficulties understood by Pl. as attaching to his own doctrines etc.' Plat. Vol. II. Without at present discussing Pl.'s views upon the *αὐτὸν* we can only repeat that the argt. here says nothing upon the question of a 'one' which should be 'super-sensible' and *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*: it simply shows how by pressing the 'oneness' of the 'one' we press it out of existence. One might quote many phrases from Dam.:—§ 5, 7, τὸ γὰρ δὴ ἐν ... εἰ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ λόγος ἀρμόσει, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις ... ὄνομα ... δόξα ... ἐπιστ. ... οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐται ἀπλαῖ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς οὐ νοῦς ἀπλοῦς, ὥστε πάντη ἄγνωστον καὶ ἄρρητον τὸ ἐν. § 7, 15, καὶ τί πέρας ... πλὴν σιγῆς ἀμηχάνον καὶ δρμολογίας τοῦ μηδὲν γιγνώσκειν § 25 bis, 43, διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἀπογυμνῶν ἡμῶν ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν ἣν τελειτῶν οὐδὲ εἶναι φῆσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐν τοῦ εἶναι ἀμέτοχον ἀπ' αὐτῆς γὰρ τὸ εἶναι. § 27, 48, εἰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνο πάντα ἔστι καὶ πᾶν ... τὸ δὲ 'πάντα εἶναι' οὐκ ἔστι 'τόδε τι εἶναι,' τὸ δὲ 'γνωστὸν εἶναι' 'τόδε τι ἔστιν εἶναι'—δῆλον τὸ συμβαῖνον ὅτι τὸ πάντα οὐ οὐκ ἔστι γνωστόν. § 29, 55, ὡς γνωστῷ πόρρωθεν ἐντυγχάνομεν καὶ ... ὑπερβάντες ἡμῶν τὸ γνωστικὸν τοῦ ἐνὸς εἰς τὸ ἐν εἶναι περιστάμεθα, τούτουτον εἰς τὸ ἄγνωστον εἶναι ἀντὶ γνωστικοῦ. He like Proc. treats the one here as transcendental.

βούλει οὖν ... φανῆ; So t, which seems essential: β Φανεῖ. Cp. Phaedr. 263 E, βούλει πάλιν ἀναγνῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ; Tim. 17 B, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διὰ βραχέων πάλιν ἐπάνελθε αὐτὰ ἵνα βεβαιωθῇ μᾶλλον παρ' ημῖν. Arist. Met. I. end, ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν· τάχα γὰρ ἀν etc. We must suppose something like ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶμεν ἂν etc. (Riddell's Digest, § 64, γ):

'Considerantes si quid forte redeuntibus (Stallb. 'a principio repetentibus') nobis aliter se habere videatur.' Fic. t marks this by :: opp. οὐν.

οὐκοῦν ... ταῦτα. 1. 'Nonne, si ipsum unum est, confessi sumus, quae circa illud eveniunt, cuiusmodi esse oporteat?' Fic., which Heind. says would imply ἔφαμεν with a ref. to 137 b, ἡ βούλεσθε etc., but that a similar case recurs 163 c. We need not press Fic. too closely, who almost omits διομολ. ταῦτα. 2. Müller, 'Behaupten wir nicht (οὐκοῦν φαμέν) es liege uns ob vollständig darüber uns zu verständigen (διομολογ. ταῦτα) was etwa (ποιά ποτε) wenn das Eine ist (ἐν εἰ ἔστιν), in Bezug auf Dasselbe daraus folgt (τυγχάνει ὄντα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτὸν;)?' This is very literal, and gives the same interpretation as (3) Jowett, who is very brief, 'We say that we have to work out all the consequences that follow, if one exists.' 4. Engelm., 'Also "Eins, wenn es ist" sagen wir, und müssen das was dasselbe trifft, von welcher Art es auch immer sein mag, bestimmen.' This makes ἐν εἰ ἔστιν the object of φαμέν, 'this is our hypothesis "if the one is," and we are bound to follow out the consequences of it whatever they may be.' This yields excellent sense (though ταῦτα is treated as needless); but it inserts καὶ after φαμέν. 5. Ast, 'Nonne, unum si esset, diximus quae consequentur ratione ipsius, qualia ea cumque essent, oportere inter nos convenire haec?' This seems partly like (4). 6. Stallb. rearranges, and says 'quod dictum est per attractionem pro: οὐκοῦν [ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν] διομολογητέον, ποιά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτόν; Etenim ταῦτα ... ex abundanti adjectum est. Ex his vero intelligitur etiam alteram Heindorfii conjecturam, qua ὅποια pro ποῖα legendum statuit, minime necessarium esse. Ceterum cp. Rep. VII. 527 b, οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον; τὸ ποῖον; ὡς etc.' There is room for still another rendering, which would be brought out by arranging the words thus, οὐκοῦν φαμέν ἐν εἰ ἔστιν διομολογητά τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα [εἶναι]—ποιά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα; and by the following paraphrase—'let us review our hypothesis again in the light of our conclusions—and do we not maintain in it that if the one exists we must perforce agree that the conclusions flowing from it are those which we have just stated, whether

we like their character or not?' The weak point here lies in ποιά ποτε τυγχάνει for καὶπερ ὄντα τοιαῦτα: it would be met if we read for περὶ αὐτοῦ ποιά—περὶ αὐτό, ὅποια.

εἰ εἰ ἔστιν ... οὐσίας δὲ etc. 'In primo supposito unum supra ens efferebat et a rerum universitate eximebat Parm.; in hoc secundo vero unum vult cum essentia conjungi.' Thoms. He professes to have just discovered a grave blunder, and to be astonished at the consequences which flow from it. He said the one existed; and this time he won't forget it. Introd. lviii.

οὐ ταῦτὸν οὐσία τῷ ἐν; The point is vital to what follows. Yet had he made it ταῦτὸν τῷ ἐν he might have contended—as above—that this did not make it ἐν τῷ ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἀν ... μετεῖχεν so t but not Η: ἀν seems essential. The protasis might be either (1) εἰ γὰρ ταῦτὸν ἦν η οὐσία τῷ ἐν, or (2) εἰ γὰρ η οὐσία τοῦ ἐνός οὐκ ἦν—if it were one with the one, or if it did not belong to it, in either case—οὐκ ἀν ἔκεινη ἦν...οὐδὲ ἀν μετεῖχεν ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἀν ἦν. That the sentence is normal we see by νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη εἶστιν η ὑπόθεσις: where further note the αὕτη referring to what follows; but that repeats what precedes.

οὐκ οὖν ὡς ... τοῦ ἐν; is irregular. Fic. 'nonne ita dicitur tanquam aliud significet ipsum est, aliud ipsum unum?' But this would need οὐκ οὖν οὔτως ὑποτιθέμεθα ὡς ἀλλο τι σημαίνοντος τοῦ ἔστι ορ οὐκ οὖν (εἰ αὕτη ἔστιν η ὑπόθεσις) ἀλλο τι σημαίνει τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; or yet again οὐκ οὖν ἀλλο τι ον σημαίνοντα [η ὑπόθεσις] τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; as we have it a little below. That ον is all but as primitive as ἐν is granted by all the ancients, οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀλλων χωριστῶν ἔστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν πάντα γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται. Ar. Phys. I. 2, 185 a 31. Yet we ask πότερόν ποτε τὸ ον καὶ τὸ ἐν οὐσία τῶν οὖτων εἰσὶ, ... η δεῖ ζητεῖν τι ποτ' ἔστι τὸ ον καὶ τὸ ἐν ὡς ὑποκειμένης ἀλλης φύσεως. Met. II. 4, 1001 a 5. In making distinctions we are beginning 'process,' for (Dam. § 32, 62) η ἀρχή ἔστιν η πρόληψις τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, and we get a compound which (§ 66, 144) Pl. calls οὔτε ἐν οὔτε ον, ἀλλ' ἐν ον τὸ ολον δι' ἀπορίαν τοῦ προστήματος οἰκείου. We see (§ 67, 145) οίον προποδισμὸς εἰς τὸ ον τοῦ ἐνός: while next comes (§ 108, 280) μετὰ τὸ ἐν ον εὐθὺς τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀντιπαρατεταγμένα κατὰ δύο στίχους. The one is not a mere single quality of a thing—(§ 117,

300) τὸ γὰρ ἐν οὐκ ἴδιότης μία, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον οἷον πάντα. Our sent. implies that the preceding one ran νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ὑποτίθεται τὸ ὑποτιθέμενον. Probably the change arose partly through οὐχ οὕτω; coming between οὐχ αὐτῇ and οὐκ οὖν ὡς, and partly to avoid the colloc. τοῦ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; ἔστι and ἐν are, as it were, in inverted commas.

ἄρα ... τις ... ἔστιν: Υ τι, τις. One can easily see how s may have dropped out before συλ-. The order which would best give a value to each would be ἔπειδ' ἀν οὖν συλλήβδην εἰπη τις δτι ἐν ἔστιν, ἄρα ἀλλο ή τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἐν;—as Stallb. suggests. ἀν εἴη is softer for ἔσται. The text should read τις not -δην.

τοιοῦτον ... ἔχειν: i.e. τὴν ἵπόθεσιν σημαίνειν τὸ ἐν τοιοῦτον οὗ οἷον [= ὕστε] μέρη ἔχειν. Might we not also have μέρη ἔχον?

D εἰ τὸ ἔστι ... ὄντος ἐνός. After writing τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, John on glancing up let his eye rest on the first ὄντος, and wrote λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι etc. If he corrected the mistake by inserting points above the words to be omitted (there are no brackets) he must have gone on at least to ἔστι before noting his error, otherwise he need have cancelled only the 2nd λέγεται. The Ms. from which he copied could hardly have had lines of the same length as ours, for in that case the second ὄντος would not be likely to cause confusion. But if we assume what is primâ facie probable, that the archetype had two cols., then the words might have stood in some such form as

εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος λέγεται
καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι

or φῶε· εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος

λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος so that a mistake might easily happen. Stallb. rightly renders thus, 'si οὐσίᾳ tribuitur uni illi quatenus est, et vicissim unum τῷ ὄντι quatenus in se suscepit unum.'

ἔστι δὲ οὐ ... ἐνός ὄντος, Fic. 'est autem idem essentia et unum, eodem existente uno quod supposuimus' which differs from the text (1) by omitting οὐ, and (2) by treating τοῦ αὐτοῦ ... ὄντος as genitive absolute. The οὐ is needed, although t omits it; and the τοῦ αὐτοῦ depend upon ἔστι: so in B above, οὐκ οὖν καὶ ή οὐσίᾳ τοῦ ἐνός εἴη ἀν, οὐ ταῦτὸν οὐσίᾳ τῷ ἐνί; Stallb. 'sed ad ipsum illud pertinet [ἡ]

τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἐν] quod sumsimus, videlicet ad τὸ ἐν ὄν.

τὸ μὲν δλον ... αὐτό, Thoms. reads αὐτοῦ and conj. αὐτό, which agrees with Υ, which he had not seen. The sense is as if the words stood αὐτὸ—τὸ μὲν δλον—εἰναι ἐν ὄν 'dass das Ganze das seiende Eine sei.' Müller. But the emphatic word should be δλον, which the text, naturally interpreted, hardly gives. Jowett boldly puts it as we would wish it, 'must not the being or existence of unity be a whole?' For this we must view τὸ μὲν as adverbial, not followed by τὸ δέ: the words would then stand (τὸ μὲν—) αὐτὸ εἰναι δλον-ἐν-ὄν with the emphasis on δλον = 'is it not imperative *first* that the thing itself should be a *whole-existent-one*, and [second] that the "one" and "being" become parts of this?'

ἢ ... τὸ γε ... προσρητέον: γε italicises the noun, 'or is this *part* ['part,' observe] to be called part of the whole?' προσρ. is tautol., cp. Theaet. 204 E, Μέρος δ' ἔσθ' ὅτου ἀλλον ἔστιν ὅπερ ἔστιν ή τοῦ δλον; Τοῦ παντός γε... Δοκεῖ μοι οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ δλον.

μόριον ἔχει; 'Sed ne illud quidem μόριον... sanum est, quod mutandum in μόρια, nisi quis Platonom scripsisse conjiciat μορίω δύο.' Heind. But the singular is probably due to the vis inertiae, so to speak, of the three immediately preceding cases of the same word. It has a part, whatever more.

τῶν μορ. ... μόριον, The noun is not hitherto in the dual, while the verb is. μόριον, so Υ and t, but the latter is altered μορίον. Bekker reads ή τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος εἰναι μόριον [Stallb. μορίον], which gives a good sense: but then he says, 'ὄντος om. mei omnes,' and Heind. 'non sane τὸ ἐν est pars τοῦ ὄντος sed τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος, neque τὸ δν pars τοῦ ἐνός est, sed ejusdem τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός.' Perhaps the ὄντος before εἰναι may have been an early marginal substitute for εἰναι. It is more symmetrical to say τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος μ., than τοῦ εἰναι μ., when τοῦ ἐνός follows. There would be less diffic. if the following words were ή τὸ δν τοῦ ἐνός μόριον, but here both Mss. read μορίον. The sense is ἄρα ή τὸ ἐν ἀπολείπεται τοῦ εἰναι, ή τὸ δν τοῦ ἐνός; and Schleierm. would omit μόριον (as Bekk., or μορίον as Stallb.) in each case. Stallb. rejects B.'s μόριον, but adds 'nunc suffragari dubito sententiae Schleierm., Heind., et Bekkeri, qui istud μόριον et post εἰναι et post ἐνός tanquam insiticium delendum censuerunt. Nam quod Fic. illud inter-

pretatione sua omisit, vereor ne id non tam deliberato consilio quam propter inertiam quandam ita ab eo factum sit. Quod autem codices omnes eam vocem constanter utroque loco tueruntur [they are equally decided in omitting *ōnros*], id ejusmodi est ut summa suadeat prudentiam et cautionem. Sed dicam quod sentio; legendum est *μορίον*, genitivo casu, quod jam in ed. Basil. 2. evulgatum nuper codicum quorundam egregiorum auctoritate confirmatum est.' He interprets 'perinde ac si scriptum esset τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ὡς μορίον et τοῦ ἐνὸς ὡς μορίον.' This seems to mean that the sense is ἀρα η τὸ ἐν ἀπολείπεται εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ὡς μορίον etc., and to be designed as a reply to Heind.'s remark above. εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ὡς μορίον is intelligible, but it does not meet Heind.'s objection: and is there authority for using both ἀπολείπ. and εἶναι with τινος? The chief diff. in the text is *μόριον*—*μορίον*. Were both *μόριον* the form would have justification: were both *μορίον* all would be clear. Herm. defends the text —'Mihi librorum lectio idoneum sensum praebet: ex duabus unius-entis partibus neque unum, quia pars est [=μόριον, i.q.? μόριον δν], essendi notione caret [=ἀπολ. τοῦ εἶναι], neque ens, quia unum est, parte sui uno.' That is the meaning; but to reach that should we not need ἀρα ἀπολείπεσθον η τὸ ἐν τοῦ 'εἶναι' [μόριον] μόριον [δν], η τὸ δν τοῦ 'ἐνὸς' μορίον [μόριον δν]; why then the capricious omission? And the natural meaning of ἀπολ. η τὸ ἐν τοῦ εἶναι μόριον would be 'does either the one recede from being a part' or 'is either the one deprived of being a part,' which does not balance τὸ δν τοῦ ἐνὸς μορίον. On the whole, unless some serious error lurks in the text, the simplest correc. would be to read either *μορίον* or *μόριον* in both cases; and the former is simpler and has t in its favour. Perhaps 144 C, E
144. 17. decide that ἀπολείπεσθον is passive? τὸ ἐλάχιστον is adverbial, 'ex duabus saltem particulis.' Fic.

τούτω τῷ μορίῳ Notes 1. Does *μόριον* form part of the subj. with δ τί περ (quaecunque particula occurrit—Fic.) or is it pred. with γένηται?

143 δύ' ατελ γιγν. sc. αὐτό, i.e. τὸ μόριον. On the elis. cp. 143 D δύο ητον, δύο ἄρτια 149 A δύο εἶναι, δύο ἄρα B δύο ἐπλεο- etc. Leichtere Elisionen werden mit der grössten Inkonsistenz bald vorgenommen, bald nicht. Meisterhans 54, § 23, 1.

ἄπειρον δν τὸ πλήθος 'This is exactly what S....

(p. 129 B-D) had pronounced to be utterly inadmissible. [Had he? He desired to see Z. carry the discussion into that field.] The essential characteristic of the Platonic Idea is here denied. ... Pl. here reasons upon two contradictory assumptions: first that *Unum Ens* is a total composed of two parts separately assignable ...; next, that *Unum* is not assignable separately from *Ens*.... Proceeding upon the first, he declares *Unum Ens* to be divisible: proceeding upon the second, he declares that this division must be carried on ad infinitum, because you can never reach either the separate *Ens* or the separate *Unum*. But Pl. must make his election: either he takes the first, in which case the total *Unum Ens* is divisible, and its two factors, *Unum* and *Ens*, can be assigned separately; or he takes the second, in which case *Unum* and *Ens* cannot be assigned separately ... so that *Unum Ens* instead of being infinitely divisible, is not divisible at all.' Grote, Pl. II. Thoms. cps. this passage with the poem of Parm. (l. 81 Mullach) τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστίν, ἐν γὰρ ἐντὶ πελάζει: which seems to show that (Is it also Grote's view?) a physical turn is given to the division of ἐν and ὄν. Simpl., on Arist. Phys. I. 2, 185 b 5, illustrates the division of a συνεχὲς ἐν by that of a line: and if that is the division which is meant in our text, then you cannot take up the first half of the line and maintain that it contains the ὄν of the second. Now Pl.'s repeated use of the word *μόριον* does suggest physical analogies; but his detailed argt. for the relation of the *μόρια* to a δλον which is a ἐν-ὄν show that he means a logical not a physical division. 'One' and 'being' are the two distinguishable 'moménts' of a single complex but indissoluble conception. Yet this does not remove Grote's difficulty about the second half of Pl.'s argt. Pl. seems to hold that when he has established the separateness of being and one in his existent-one he introduces thereby into the latter a capacity for indefinite sub-div. which was not there before. Grote seems right in rejecting the argt. as thus put: and perhaps the argt. which immediately succeeds (143) shows that Pl. was not quite satisfied, and sought to secure divisib. otherwise. But again—granted that ἐν ὄν are distinct and essential elements in the concep. ἐν ὄν, are they co-ordinate as Being

and Nothing are in the Hegelian concep. of Becoming? Pl. must regard them so, since every sub-div. of one still retains being as factor. Proc.-Dam. vi. 258 becomes transcend. αὐτὰ τὰ μόρια τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὃν ἔχονται, καὶ αὖθις ἐκάπερον τῶν μορίων ... καὶ αὖθις ἔκεινα, καὶ δέ εἰ ἐπ' ἀπειρον πλὴν ὅσπερ ἐλέγομεν ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἐνός, ὅτι καὶ οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ ὑπερούσιον ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ δολον ὃν ἀμερές ἐστι ... ἐν γὰρ τῷ λεγομένῳ μορίῳ τὸ δολον ἄπαν πληρεστάτως, καὶ ἀνελιπώς.

διὸ ξετιν; ‘and therefore is’ Jowett. This seems correct; yet translators forsake the sense from a feeling that it should be the converse. Our assump. was εἰ ἐν ἔστι, not εἰ ἐν οὐσίᾳ μετέχει: on the contr. we reached the latter from having assumed the former—142 B ἐν εἰ ἔστιν ἀρά οἶνον τε αὐτὸν εἶναι μὲν οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; Fic. gives ‘Diximus unum essentia participare in quantum est?’ Müller, ‘Behaupten wir nicht, das Eine sei des Seins theilhaftig, weil es ist?’ and so Engelm. But can διὸ = because?

καὶ ... μόνον καὶ αὐτὸν The context suggests that μόνον goes with αὐτὸν καὶ αὐτό, not with τῷ δ.—**τούτου:** yet οὐσίας μετέχειν has scarcely left his pen. τὸ αὐτὸν τοῦτο; the sense would not suffer if the article were absent. The separation of τὸ ἐν from τὸ ὃν here is put with emphasis: yet we must take with us the caution of Stallb. ‘Fallitur igitur, Heind. mirifice, hoc jam Parmenidem docere velle existimans, etiam τὸ ἐν, quatenus absque τῷ εἶναι per se intelligatur, multa esse numeroque infinita. Licet enim τοῦ ἐνὸς natura per se spectetur tamen ea ab τῷ ὃντι minime prorsus sejuncta est aut divulsa, quod vel propter sumptionem ἐν εἰ ἔστι nullo modo ponit licuit.’ The position is complicated. The one has been assumed as existent; that at once confers upon it a more definite nature than was the case previously, and the definiteness clings to it even when we consider it apart from the element of existence which we have added to it. And definiteness is all that we require to work upon in order to transform one altogether. Stallb. urges that if there be any want of clearness it arises ‘aporum vocabulorum penuria’; which is likely, and makes for the authenticity of the work.

B εἰδῶμεν Notes i. Υεἰδῶμεν and eds. generally ιδωμεν. Confus. may have arisen from dict.; but

the form in the text is quite legit.—Veitch cps. Frogs 322, ήσυχίαν τοίνυν ἄγειν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἀν εἰδῶμεν σαφῶς. ἀλλο τι ἔτερον etc.: Ridd. Idioms § 22. Reference to ellipsis is out of date, yet the full thought here would need e.g. ἀλλο τι [συμβαίνει η ὅτι] ἔτερον etc. Heind. rightly rejects the punct. of Υ, “Ιδωμεν δὴ ἀλλο τι ἔτερον. εἴτερο μὴ οὐσία—the old read. was οὐσίας: Heind. sugg. οὐσία without knowing Υt. Stallb. ‘Nonne prorsus necesse est aliud quid esse ejus οὐσίαν aliud ipsum per se (αὐτό), siquidem τὸ ἐν non est οὐσία, sed tanquam unum, quod suam sibi propriam naturam habet, οὐσίαν participat?’

οὔτε τῷ ἐν ... καὶ ἄλλῳ etc. ἐν and οὐσία are in the nom., connected by subst. verb with τὸ ἐν and η οὐσία. ‘τῷ ἐν sc. εἶναι, quod etsi statim infertur post illa οὔτε τῷ οὐσίᾳ, tamen illud et hic accurata sermonis ratio requirebat. Commodius certe post οὐσία quam h. l. abasset.’ Heind. For the promiscuous use of ἔτερον and ἀλλο Stallb. cites ample auth., e.g. Il. ix. 472, οὔτε ποτ’ ἵσβη πῦρ, ἔτερον μὲν ... ἀλλο δὲ ἐνὶ προδόμῳ, and Soph. 245 E, συνάπτεται γὰρ ἔτερον ἐξ ἀλλον. Phileb. 57 B, ἀρά ἔστι τις ἔτερας ἀλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. In the argt. Pl. reverts to the line taken in Dem. I. and introduces plurality into the one more legitimately than in 142 E. Stallb. speaks of the ‘notio differentiae, quae tamen neque in uno neque in essentiae natura continetur, sed accedit extrinsecus. Est enim quasi negans quaedam utriusque illius copula’: cp. Soph. 257 B-C, ὁπόταν τὸ μὴ ὃν λέγωμεν, ὡς οὐκεν, οὐκ ἔναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ’ ἔτερον μόνον ... namely ὅτι τῶν ἀλλων τι μηνίει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ ... τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἄττ’ ἀν κέρται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὑστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὄνόματα. But why exclude the ὃν involved in εἰ ἐν ἔστι and then create another ὃν after that? Would he not have got his ἔτερον with the original ὃν as well? Proc. or Dam. vi. 259 says διὰ μικροῦ δὲ ἐφοδεύει τὰς ἀποδείξεις καὶ προηγουμένως κατασκευάζει· εἰ ἐν ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς ἔσται τούτῳ δὲ ἐπεται τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι, and goes on τὸ ἔτερον οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ ἔτερον οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἔτερῷ, δηλοντί τῇ ἔτερότητι, καθὼς ἐν Φαιδωνι ἐλεγεν, (100 E etc.) ... τούτων οὐν ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων, τῆς τε οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἐνός, παρεισάγεται τὸ ἔτερον, καὶ τρία γίγνονται. οὐ ταῦτον ... τὸ ἔτερον: here the dat. is used in connec. with the idea of

compar. ; not, as above, to express the instrum. or material. ἐὰν προελ. etc. our idiom would choose e.g. ἐὰν προελ. αὐτῶν δύο τινὲς ή βούλει, εἴτε ... εἴτε.

ω ... -τέρω Notes 1.: so τ (ω patched), and it seems to be required: Υ τινέω ... -τέρα. We have seen (142 E) a similar confus. of dat. sing. and accus. dual. The α is often almost indistinct from ω. For the express. cp. Crat. 392 A, γνῶναι ἄπγ ποτὲ ὄρθως ἔχει ἐκείνον τὸν ποταμὸν Ξάνθον καλεῖν, and δοψι φόρθότερον ἔστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκὶς κυμάνδιδος; Laws v. 744 D, [νοσήματος] δι διάστασιν ἡ στάσιν ὄρθότερον ἀν εἴη κεκλήσθαι. So Arist. De Coelo 1. 1, τὰ γὰρ δύο ἄμφω μὲν λέγομεν καὶ τοὺς δύο ἀμφοτέρους, πάντας δ' οὐ λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταῦτην τὴν προσηγορίαν φαμὲν πρῶτον—he has said above, quoting the Pythagoreans, that τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοὺς τριῶν ὕρισται. ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν; cp. nom. below ὅτ' ἀν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἔν, and again: the constr. seems free and capricious, e.g. Theaet. 147 A, ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός, Prot. 317 C etc.

οὐκ οὖν καὶ ... καὶ the second καὶ ('likewise') resumes the first. Stallb. quotes De Corona p. 317, ὥστε καὶ ὁν αὐτὸς ὡς ἀτυχημάτων ἐμέμνητο, καὶ ταῦθ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖ, et sic centenis locis. ἐψ̄ ἔκάστου ἔκ est 'quodcunque simul commemoratur,' ut non opus sit numero duali ἔκάστου quem desiderabat Heind. De formula ἐπί τινος λέγειν v. ad Remp. v. 475 A, εἰ βούλει ... ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἑρωτικῶν. Stallb.

ω seems necess.: Α φ, t ω. μηχανή οὐχ ... ἐν εἶναι; so Α, but it can hold only if the constr. is οὐχ-ἐν or οὐκ-εἶναι, which from the position is very unlikely. t μὴ οὐχ, and μὴ may easily have fallen out after μηχανή.

σύνδυο Η oñv, t σùv as first syll. This would perhaps be one of the cases relied on by Kröschel (Introd. lxxvii.) as proof that the source of Η was ill written. σùv as in t might be suggested by the later Hellenistic use of this word separately—see L. and S. ἑκαστα = each group, ἑκαστον = each factor, ‘now in as much as our selections each prove binary, surely of these factors each must be one.’

Ἐν ἑκαστ. etc. ἐκ. subj. *Ἐν* pred. as 131 E. συντεθέντος ... τὰ πάντα; = 'if to whichever couple we please be added whichever factor we please, does not the total become three?' or alternatively 'do not three arise in all?' Stallb. cites Prot. 317 C,

καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἔνυμπαντα [ἔτη] πολλά μοι ἐστιν. Proc.
or Dam., vi. 260, seems to take the second altern., as
he says ὑπενιοῦν δὴ συνγίᾳ προστεθέντος τοῦ ἐνὸς
τρία φαίνονται.

τῷ τε δύο ... τῷ τρίᾳ He chooses now to speak of E two and three as singular and in inverted commas; he might almost as well have put δύο ὄντος, τρίᾳ ὄντος above and below.

ἀνάγκη τε τρίᾳ etc. So Ι: the *τε* might quite well be misplaced, as we often misplace a word like 'both'—'both as regards time and space.' Pl. might wish to associate *τρίᾳ* δἰς as closely as δύο *τρισ*. It reads *τρίᾳ τε δὶς*. *δὶς τρίᾳ* is the text of Ητ., p. 18. but Ι has δύο *τρισ* very small and neat in marg. The correc. may have been very old without being seen, as the Ms. is both stained and creased there. Schleierm. anticipated the change; and all admit its necessity. Stallb. says 'veram lectionem habuisse videtur Dam., aut quisquis Procli commentarium inde ab secundae sumptionis exploratione continuavit, T. vi. 260, ἐναλλάξ συνδυάζει τὸ δὶς τοῖς τρισὶ καὶ τὸ τρίς τοῖς δυσιν.' The words are merely for symmetry, as *τρίᾳ δὶς* = δύο *τρισ*.

ἄρτια τε ... ἀνάγκη εἶναι; After noting that we have
4 ($\delta\acute{\eta}\nu\delta\acute{e}s$), 9 ($\tau\rho\acute{\iota}a\tau\rho\acute{\iota}s$), and 6 ($\tau\rho\acute{\iota}a\cdot\delta\acute{e}s = \delta\acute{\eta}\nu\tau\rho\acute{\iota}s$),
Proc.-Dam. goes on, vi. 260, καὶ δὴ γέγονονται ὁ μὲν
τέσσαρα [sc. ἄριθμος?] ἀρτιάκις ἄρτιος, ὁ δὲ ἐνέα
περιττάκις περιττός, ὁ δὲ ἔξι ἀρτιοπέριττος. ἔστι δὲ
καὶ ὁ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις, ὁ λεγόμενος περισσάρτιος,
ζῆτητέον δὲ πόθεν καὶ οὗτος συνάγεται· ἦ, ἐπεὶ ὁ δύς
συνίχθῃ ἐκ τῶν δύο καὶ ὁ ἔξι ἐκ τοῦ $\tau\rho\acute{\iota}s$ δύο, πάντως
ἐκ τοῦ δύο αὐθιτις καὶ τοῦ ἔξι ὁ δώδεκα, ὃς ἔστι περι-
σάρτιος. Is not six περισσάρτιος when = $\tau\rho\acute{\iota}a\cdot\delta\acute{e}s$?

εἰ ἄρα ξέτιν ἐν, ἀνάγκη etc. Yes: a definite,¹⁴⁴ thinkable, usable 'one' is such only as having number, or many ones, for background.

ὅντος ... τῶν ὅντων. The subst. verb is important throughout: he sets up multitude on the basis that ἔν is ὁν. καὶ here seems = μᾶλλον δέ. η̄ οὐκ ... γίγνεται; a hyperb. for η̄ οὐκ ἀριθ. γίγνεται—πλήθει ἄπειρος καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας; = 'or is it not so, that number boundless in amount and sharing in existence arises?' Thoms. says 'Numerus Platonicus et Pythagoreis denotabat essentiam, ὁ ἀριθμὸς inquit Damascius ἀποφαίνει οὐσίαν.' That may be so (though the language of Dam. does not necessarily express it, but may merely mean *quot numeri tot*,

essentiae), but Pl. makes no such assump. here. He is at pains to prove the connec. of existence with one; thereafter he infers the connec. of existence with number or many.

οὐκ οὖν εἰ πᾶς ... τὸ μόριον etc. ‘quod si totus ipse numerus est essentiae particeps unaquaeque etiam particula numeri essentia participabit’ Fic. The argt. seems curious. He began by establishing the connec. of ὁν with ἐν, next he built up the existence of number by 2, 3, 4, 9, 6, odd, even, etc., reaching πᾶς ἀριθμ., number as a whole, last of all. He now argues ἐν has ὁν, therefore πᾶς ἀριθμὸς has it, therefore τὸ μόριον ἔκαστον (2, 3, 4, 9, 6 etc. etc.) has it. This assumes that Fic. is right; and Jowett agrees with him. But if πᾶς = every, then in τὸ μόριον ἔκαστον we must deal with fractions; a view which finds some support in σμικρότατον, μέγιστον.

Ἐν πάντα ... ἔχει οὕτω. ‘Exscripsit haec ... (whole of 144 B) Stobaeus in Eclogg. Phys. p. 30.’ Stallb. ‘Sed legitur ibi οὐσία τῶν ὄντων τοῦ ἀποστατού—κατὰ κεκερμάτιστα—καὶ μεριστὰ πάντων, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς—ἔχει οὕτως. Et ἀποστατού quidem placet: caetera sunt manifesta librariorum vitia.’ Fischer. In ἀποστατοῦ. Notes I. The optat. is necess.; but clearly a very old error has to be dealt with. If in some very early copy ἀποστατοῦ stood as closely under ἀποστατεῖ, two lines above, as in Η, the mistake might be due to misreading. It might also have come through dict.—‘ei für ou kommt auch im Jungattischen sporadisch vor: οἴκει = οἴκοι bei Menandros, δνεῖν häufig, τοῖς λοιποῖς auf einer Inschrift des Jahres 100 v. Chr.’ Blass, p. 56-7. For the sense Thoms. says ‘Dionysius, vulgo Areopagita dictus, de Div. Nom. c. 5, Τὸ εἶναι οὐδέποτε ἀπολείτεται τῶν ὄντων, ὅτε γὰρ ἀπολείψει τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν.’ κατακε. ἄρα ὡς οἶόν τε σμικρ., in full = κ. ἄρα ἡ οὐσία εἰς μόρια ὡς οἷοντες σμικρ. etc. Stallb. cites Rep. III. 395 B, καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, δ' Ἀδ., φαίνεται μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερμάτισθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις. ‘Accusativi autem pendent a verbo κατακε. quae constans prope structurae est ratio in verbis divisionem significantibus: velut [D] λέγοντες ὡς πλεῖστα μέρη ἡ οὐσία νενεμ. εἴη.’ Heind. See Jelf § 583, 48 on δαιώ. L. and S. cite Symp. 191 D, ἔκαστος οὖν ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ξύμβολον, ἀτε τετρημένος ὥσπερ αἱ ψῆτται ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο. πανταχῶς ‘quomodo cuncte’ Fic.,

‘utique’ Heind. A part must either be small or large, so that this merely emphasizes the completeness of the division. μέρη ἀπέραντα with the whole cp. Sophist. 256-7 on τὸ μὴ ὄν etc.; thus 256 E, ἀπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν. 257 A, καὶ τὸ ὄν ἄρ’ ἡμῖν, ὅστις πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἐστιν ἔκεντα γάρ οὐκ ὄν ἐν μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰλλα οὐκ ἐστιν αὐτός. 257 C, ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερμάτισθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη—μία μέν ἐστι που καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἔκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσχει τινὰ ἐαυτῆς ἴδειν· διὸ πολλὰ τέχναι τ' εὐτὸν λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι. etc. μέντοι: ... μέντοι ‘plurimae certe ... c non tamen pars etc.’ Fic. τοι τοῦτο ‘πῶς ἀν τοιοῦτο dedi pro πῶς ἀν τοι τοῦτο, quia τοὶ in interrog. ferri non poterat; quanquam fateor etiam τὸ τοιοῦτο vel πῶς τι ἀν τοῦτο rescribi licuisse.’ Herm. He surely means πῶς ἀν τι? μηδὲν δέ, ἀδύνατον := ἀδύνατον δὲ αὐτὸδ εἶναι μηδέν.

τρὸς ἀπαντι ἄρα ἔκαστῳ etc. So Ηt: but ἄπ. ἔκ. is a strange phrase; though it may be compd. with such early expressions as everilk or everich, and even everichone, as in Kings Quair, stanza 64, And ester this, the birdis everichone. Heind. says ‘Fic.: non solum ergo universae essentiae, sed illius etiam singulis partibus unum adest. Quasi legerit πρὸς τῷ παντὶ ἄρα (i.e. τρὸς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπάσῃ) καὶ ἔκαστῳ τῷ τ. οὗτον. μέρει ... neque satis integrum ἀπαντι hoc cum ἔκαστῳ junctum videtur.’ i.e. τρὸς τῷ π. = ‘in addition to the whole.’ But cannot this be got from the text? Cp. Rep. vii. 514 A, εἰσοδον ἔχουσῃ μακρὰν παρὸ ἀπαν τὸ σπήλαιον; and Laws I. 637 D, ἐπὶ γὰρ οὖν εἴπωμεν πλείω περὶ ἀπάσης μέθης, which is explained below—λέγω δ' οὐκ οἶνον... μέθης δὲ αὐτῆς πέρι. Stallb. ‘itaque suspicari licet aut ἔκαστῳ ex glossemate natum esse—quod vocabulo ἀπαντι nunc unumquodque significanti additum esset; aut corrigi oportere ἔκαστοτε, quo facto haec eodem modo dicta erunt atque antecedentia illa ἀνάγκη αὐτὸδ αἰεὶ ἐν γέ τι εἶναι.’ This would do; but the change cannot be at once accounted for. In οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον... οὐδενός: the verb is middle, ‘partem nullam deserens.’ Fic.

ἄρα οὖν ... δλον ἐστι; Transl. divide differently. D The pith of the question lies in the last two words. Phps. the best grouping is ἄρα οὖν ἐν—δν πολλαχοῦ ἄρα—δλον ἐστι; but ἄρα might be taken with δλον

ἐστί; ‘Can one be in many places at the same time and still be a whole?’ Jowett. ‘Kann nun das vielerwärts befindliche Eine zugleich ein Ganzes sein?’ Müller. Some divide thus ἄρα οὐν ἐν ὃν (= ἐπείπερ ἐν ἐστί)—πολλαχοῦ ἄμα ὅλον ἐστί; = ‘Ist es nun, indem es Eines ist, an vielen Orten zugleich ganz?’ Engelm. ἀθρει: ἀλλ’ ἀθρῶ Stallb. cps. 148 D, σκόπει. σκοπῶ and Soph. 268 A, “Ορα σύ. Σκοπῶ καὶ μοι διττῶ etc. So βούλει οὐν ... πάνυ μὲν οὐν βούλομαι 142 B above, also Crito 49 B, φαμὲν ἡ οὐ; φαμέν. Phileb. 25 B, εὖχον δῆ καὶ σκόπει. σκοπῶ· καὶ μοι δοκεῖ etc. Rep. VII. 523 A, δείκνυ, ἔφη. δείκνυμι δῆ, εἰπον and many others.

Ἄμα **ἄπασι** ‘Malim ἄμα πᾶσι. Certe alias vix usquam reperias ἄμα ἄπαντες.’ Heind. ὄσαπερ μέρη: one would expect ὄσαπερ τὰ μέρη [ἐστί]. λέγοντες ὡς etc., see c above. On the construc., on which something has been said above, Fischer says, ‘aliud est ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται ἐπὶ πάντα· aliud ἡ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἴη πλείστα μέρη. Nam hoc quidem in genero, quum totum in partes dividi dicitur, verbis divisionem declarantibus additur fere simpliciter, activis quartus casus, primus passivis, ita ut πλείστα μέρη nominativi sint, non accusativi. Quod quum non animadvertisserint grammatici et veteres et recentiores, tentare hujusmodi locos scriptorum veterum temere ausi sunt. vid. ad Politic. § 24 [283 D διέλωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὴν (τὴν μετρητικὴν) δύο μέρη—where he quotes Herod. VII. 121, τρεῖς μοίρας ὁ Εὔρεξ δασάμενος πάντα τὸν πεζὸν στρατὸν] Sic apud Xenoph. Cyrop. VII. 5. 7 (? 13), recte legitur in libris editis antiquis omnibus τὸ στράτευμα κατένειμε δώδεκα μέρη· sed Hutchinsonus edere ausus est εἰς δ. μ. temere.’ He is right about the prep., but surely not about the nom. case? νενέμηκε τὴν οὐσίαν πλείστας μοίρας being the act., the pass. would be νενεμημένη εἴη or νενέμηται ἡ οὐσία πλείστας μοίρας, the sense being εἰς πλείστας μοίρας with either voice. In the examples chiefly cited of the pass. the case cannot be determined.

Ἐξισοῦσθον ... παρὰ πάντα: It is, as it were, ‘canto fermo’ and ‘counterpoint,’ ‘note against note’ all through the compos.—quot et quanta ὄντα, tot et tantae ἐνάδες. We may understand ἀλλήλου with ἔξισ., a verb which Pl. seems to use only twice elsewhere (Rep. VIII. 563 A, Laws XI. 927 E) and never in the act. Eds. give δύ’ ὄντε, not so Mt.

ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας strong, when he excluded the οὐσία contained in ἐν εἰ ἐστί. Even after that is in thought removed the influence of its original presence can revolutionize the nature of the one.

οὐ μόνον ... ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ‘Then not only is the unity-of-being many, but absolute unity, divided by existence, must also be many.’ Jowett. This refers to 143 A, where after showing that τὸ ὃν is πολλά, he proceeds to discuss τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ μόνον καθ’ αὐτό. This latter one it is which has now been made an innumerable multitude, and that too ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος (= ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας). Thoms. would read as in 143 A, τὸ ἐν ὃν—the text is very well as it is, and the language of Proc.-Dam. VI. 262, would seem to show that he had it, ἐν τῷ κερματοῦσθαι ἄρα τὴν οὐσίαν κερματίζεται καὶ τὸ ἐν. εἰπόντος δὲ ἐκείνου (Ἀριστ.) τὸ ‘φαίνεται, συμπεραίνει λέγων οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὃν ἐν πολλά ἔστιν etc. Stallb. would read τὸ ὃν alone, which seems to be a missing of the sense. ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος might have been ὑπὸ τοῦ ὃν or τοῦ εἶναι. πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι: for ἀνάγκη εἶναι πολλά, the adj. in this and the previous case is not govd. by διανεμει. or κεκερυ. after the anals. in B-D. With the assertion that τὸ ἐν alone becomes ἀπειρα τὸ πλήθος cp. Rep. VII. 524 E-525 A, where the study of ἀριθμός τε καὶ τὸ ἐν is called one of those which are ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως because ἀεὶ τι αὐτῷ ἄμα ὅρᾶται ἐναντίωμα, and we are compelled to ask τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν αὐτὸν τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἀν εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις ... ἄμα γὰρ ταῦτὸν ὡς ἐν τε ὄρῳ μεν καὶ ὡς ἀπειρα τὸ πλήθος. πεπερασ. ... κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν ‘terminatum, secundum totum, unum erit’ Fic., or (Heind.) ‘finitum fuerit ratione τοῦ ὅλου, i.e. quatenus totum est.’ Pl.’s statements here and above on whole and parts may be cpd. with those of Arist. (1) The most comprehensive def. of a whole by A. is Phys. III. 6, 207 a 9, οὕτω γὰρ ὅριζόμεθα τὸ ὅλον, οὐ μηθὲν ἀπεστιν, and just below he says τὸ ὅλον οὐ μηδέν ἐστιν ἔξω. With this cp. above 137 C, οὐ ἀν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῆρ ὅλον ἀν εἴη. (2) In Polit. III. 1, 1274 b 40, A. speaks of a city as being καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅλων μὲν συνεστώτων δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων; with which cp. our ὅλον τὰ μόρια μόρια etc. (3) Yet again, Poet. 7, 1450 b 26, ὅλον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτὴν, with which cp. 145 B, τί δαΐ; ὅλον οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἀν ἔχοι

καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; (4) But Arist. Met. iv. 26, 1024 a 1, draws a distinction ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ ἑσχατον, ὅσων μὲν μῆτ ποιεῖ ἡ θέσις διαφοράν (such as units), πᾶν λέγεται, ὅσων δὲ ποιεῖ (e.g. members of a body), ὅλον ὅσα δὲ ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ὅλα καὶ πάντα—ἐστι δὲ ταῦτα ὅσων ἡ μὲν φύσις ἡ αὐτὴ μένει τῷ μεταθέσει ἡ δὲ μορφὴ οὐ, οἷον κηρὸς καὶ ἴματον ... ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ ὅσα ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμός πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δὲ ἀριθμός καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἀν μὴ μεταφορά ... πᾶς οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ μονάδες. A clear and good distinction. Now our whole passage and all that has gone before shows that Pl. knows no such. He is speaking of parts ὃν οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ θέσις διαφοράν, yet he calls their sum ὅλον. But we are not left to inference. In Theaet. 204 A-205 B, after directly raising the question τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταῦτα καλεῖς ἡ ἔτερον ἐκάτερον; (which is a marked advance upon anything we find here—Introd. xxxi.), he declares δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον: and after asking ἡ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγει γεγονὸς ἐν τι εἶδος ἔτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν; (which would correspond to ποιεῖ διαφορά) he concludes for ὃν ἀν μέρη γένεται, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται. No doubt he deals with numbers to some extent, but he also discusses the στοιχεῖα of the συλλαβῆ; and one finds no distinc. between πᾶν and ὅλον, and this largely because he never raises A.'s point of divers kinds of μέρη.

p. 12. 145 τὸ ἐν ἄρα ὃν ... ἀπειρον πλήθει: 'Quum h. l. jam non τὸ ἐν ὃν, sed ipsum τὸ ἐν a Parm. intelligi superiora illa declarant (i.e. 143 A, 144 E), istud ὃν expungere non dubitavi' Heind. It is true he excludes the ὃν of his ἐν εἰ ἔστι in the passages cited, but his having first of all emphasized the ἔστι has in his view given a new character to the ἐν which, even when he proceeds to dwell on ἐν αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτό, does not forsake it again. It still is the ἐν of his ἐν εἰ ἔστι, and he reminds us of that in here summing up—ὅν is to be retained therefore.

142 B-145 A. (1) Thus far his first result is that ἐν ὃν is ἐν καὶ πολλά: and so he has made it to appear, not unjustly. Yet if he still speaks of it as the ἐν of which we speak in arithmetic, his division of it into many is open to objection on Arist.'s ground (Introd. lxiii.) that, in number, 'one' is an indivisible minimum, a unit of measurement. Phys.

III. 6-7, 206 b 31, 207 b 7, ἡ γὰρ μονὰς ἐλάχιστον—δὲ ἀριθμός ἐστιν ἔνα πλείω καὶ πόσο' ἄπτα ὥστ' ἀνάγκη στῆναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἀδιαιρέτον; Met. IX. 1, 1052 b 16-34. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαιρέτῳ ἐστὶν εἶναι πανταχοῦ γὰρ τὸ μέτρον ἐν τι ἵζούσι καὶ ἀδιαιρέτον. XII. 9, 1085 b 33, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων σύγκειται, τὰ δὲ μεγέθη οὐ. If Pl. divides a numerical unit he makes fractions of it. If it is the most elementary thing, or idea, with which thought can deal, then he may plead, as he does here, that this very condition makes it a thing admitting of further and ever further division, whose parts (and not the assumed whole) must be the 'one'—and so on εἰς τὸ ἀπειρον. To be justly divisible it must be an existent ἐν συνεχεῖς. (2) And this is equally true if his second contention is to hold—that it is ὅλον καὶ μόρια, for, if the ἐν is to be an arithmetical unit, its μόρια must be fractions alone, in no sense units in and by themselves, but parts, whose sole raison d'être is to be joined in one. (3) As to his third concl. πεπερασμένον καὶ ἀπειρον πλήθει we may quote Arist. (as above 207 a 14), τέλειον δὲ οὐδὲν μῆτ ἔχον τέλος τὸ δὲ τέλος πέρας. διὸ βέλτιον οἰητέον Παρμενίδην Μελίστου εἰρηκέναι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ (M.) τὸ ἀπειρον ὅλον φησίν, ὁ δὲ τὸ ὅλον πεπεράνθαι μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές. This refers to Parm. 102-4 Mullach, Αὐτάρ ἐπεὶ πειρας πύματον τετελεσμένον ἔστιν,¹ πάντοθεν εἰκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγικιον ὅγκῳ¹ μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντη etc. Parm. however, here speaks of τὸ ὅν, while in the dialogue he strives as far as may be to speak of τὸ ἐν, ignoring τὸ ὅν. Without discussing the question raised by Arist. whether οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀπειρον ἐντελεχείᾳ σῶμα αἰσθητόν, we may note that Pl. holds the one here as ἀπειρον τῷ διαιρέσει, to quote A.'s lang.—cp. De Coelo ad init. συνεχὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά.—i.e. as admitting of indefinite sub-div. And if it is ἀπειρον in this sense it cannot, says Arist., be a mere numerical unit. On the other hand Arist. points out that the latter unit is, like a moment of time, ἀπειρον κατὰ πρόσθεσιν—you can add on successive units ad infinitum—while this cannot be said of an αἰσθητὸν σῶμα. It is to be noted in conclusion that we have here a single antithesis under three forms—ἐν v. πολλά, ὅλον v. μόρια, πεπερασμένον v. ἀπειρον πλήθει. For the rest we have no duty laid on us to

discuss Pl.'s doctrine on the development of number—whether it grows by 'two twice etc. and every combination of even and odd,' or, as in what Arist. (Met. XII. 6, 1080 a 30) calls mathem. number, by units, ὁ μὲν μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμέται μετὰ τὸ ἐν δύο, πρὸς τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἐνὶ ἄλλῳ ἐν, καὶ τὰ τρία πρὸς τοὺς δυσὶ τούτοις ἄλλο ἐν, καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς δὲ ὥσταύτως. He wants to develop multitude; the special device he tries is indifferent to us. If he gets the length of thinking 'this is one, that two' he has multitude already: as Dam. says § 96, 240, πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τῆς μονάδος ἐστὶ προποδισμός. As there is no question above of ideal time, there is none here of ideal number, or of number in connection with the ideal theory.

ὅλον ... ἀρχὴν etc. This feature of a whole has already been noted. It involves a σῶμα αἰσθητὸν (or mental picture of one), or ἐν συνεχέσ. It seems natural to say that a whole has beginning, middle, and end, yet it is rather pedantic. The sort of whole to which it applies strictly is that to which Arist. especially applies it (Poetics), viz. an action. To an action, occurring as it does in time, beginning and end are not convertible terms, but represent an inherent distinction. To an object, on the other hand, extended in space, beginning and end—so long as organic structure lies out of the question—are very much what you please to make them. Such objects would be more simply described as having a μέσον or ἐντός, and a περιφέρεια, περιέχον, πέρας or σχῆμα (τὸ γὰρ σχῆμα πέρας, Proc.-Dam. vi. 263). Why then is this triple distinction dwelt upon (cp. 137 D)? Possibly Pl. may be thinking of the ὅλον as in motion, or in process of growth or change—as 138 c-e—in which case the side which entered another position first, or with which change began, would be the beginning and the other side the end. This idea appears clearly in 153 b-d. At the same time the Greeks often exhibit a tendency to dwell upon the number three, and Thoms. may be right in referring here to Oriental and other mystical speculations. He cites 'Iambl. sect. ii. c. 7, ἐν δὲ τούτοις τοῖς τρισὶν ὅροις τριπλῆς τάξεως, ἀρχῆς καὶ μεσοτητος καὶ τέλους, ὅλα τὰ γένη κατενέματο. Ideo veteribus deus dicebatur ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχειν apud Plat. lib. iv. de Leg. quae autem desumpta sunt ex Orpheo.'

The ref. is IV. 715 E, ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων. The words as given by T. are thus seen to be misleading, and more clearly so when we turn to 'Orpheus' Mullach Frag. II. line 33 etc. ἔστι δὲ πάντως¹ αὐτὸς ἐπουράνιος, καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ πάντα τελευτῆ² ἀρχὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μέσατον ἡδὲ τελευτήν³ ὡς λόγος ἀρχαίων, ὡς ὑλογενῆς διέταξεν—that is, God accomplishes all things upon earth, having their beginning, middle, and end in his own hand. If this be really old it may be the source of the phrase in both Pl. and Arist.

καν τὸν ἐν ὄτιον ‘ita scripsi cum Schleierm. pro καν τὸν ἐν (so Ut) ne opus sit corrigerε ἐνός, quod verit Fic.: “et si quid ipsorum ab eo, quod unum, distat”’ etc. Heind. Perhaps this is best, the sense being καὶ ἐὰν ἐν ὄτιον αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ τινός, as in 144 B, τῶν ὄντ. τον ἀποστ. Still we have concords neglected above—e.g. 143 B, τῷ ἐν, and E, τῷ τε δύο ... καὶ τῷ τρίᾳ—and the MSS. reading as turned by Fic. is quite good, being = καὶ ἐὰν ὄτιον αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ τὸν ἐν. For ἐθελήσει ἔτι Bek. represents Υ and other MSS. as reading ἐθελήσει τι. But Ut both give ἐθελήσει ἔτι, which may justify either reading. Heind. cps. 149 begin. For ἔχοι ἀν ... ἔχοι: he also cps. 148 E, ἄπτοιτο ἀν τὸ ἐν ... ἄπτοιτο: Stallb. adds, 147 A, ἀν ἥδη ἐκφεύγοι ... ἐκφεύγοι. and ἡ καν οὕτω μετέχει ... μετέχειν: But where more than the verb is repeated we have the ἀν given, e.g. below, μετέχου ἀν τὸ ἐν ... μετέχου γὰρ ἀν. ἡ τοι εὐθέος, ... ἡ τινος etc. τοι with the first ἡ emphasizes the fact that it must have some shape, the special one being indiff. Had τοι gone with either of the other cases of ἡ the emph. would have fallen on that particular shape: cp. 131 A. For εὐθέος see 137 E. ἐν ἄλλῳ; Stallb. notes the want of the art. here and 145 E, and, contrasting this with τοῖς ἄλλοις etc., 146 B and D, says the art. is omitted ‘quia non significatur id, quod omnino ac simpliciter ab ipso uno discrepat, while τὰ ἄλλα significant ea quae formis unitatis intelligibilis, h.e. ideis, plane opposita sunt.’ That is, he takes ἐν to represent the unity or unifying principle involved in the ideas, and τὰ ἄλλα as the many of sense, and declares that ἄλλο in this passage means something different from the many of sense. It may be so: the variation as to the art. is a fact, and occurs often—e.g. 138, 140, 141—

but it is doubtful if such a distinc. is meant by it. Cp. with this variation that between ἄλλο and ἔτερον—e.g. 140 B—and again that between τὰ ἄλλα itself as used largely through the work, and τὰ πολλὰ so distinctly specified in 136 A, which distincs. convey no change of meaning. It is just possible that ἐν ἄλλῳ here may = ἐν ἄλλῳ τόπῳ. But what does Stallb. gain by his view? No doubt τὰ πολλὰ and τὰ ἄλλα are terms often used of the multiplicity of sense—e.g. in the opening of the dial—but Soc. there wishes to see that distinc. shown to exist within the ideal world, and we were told that the ideal world could not be known by our faculties, so that in any case our course has not been rigidly consistent. Nor is anything said throughout which should distinguish τὰ ἄ. from τὸ ἐν as sense is divided from the ideas. We are simply bringing our mental faculties to bear upon the relations of ‘one’ with ‘many’ or ‘others,’—these ‘one,’ ‘many,’ and ‘others’ being all such as are λογισμῷ λαμβανόμενα, and being understood to exhaust existence between them in the same way in which A and not-A do so. If ἐν ἄ. refers to something different from τὰ ἄ. it must refer to another εἶδος such as Stallb. holds τὸ ἐν to be; but in that case there should be a great gulf fixed between its character and theirs. Where is that gulf? The only difference is the omiss. of the art. It would seem that Pl. having started with the antithesis ἐν—τὰ ἄλλα (τὰ πολλὰ), does not always thrust that distinc. forward in his argt., but occasionally forgets the art. without giving up any feature of the antithesis in doing so. Arist. Phys. iv. 3, init. reckons the various ways in which one thing may be in another—τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ—τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν—εἶδος ἐν γένει—γένος ἐν εἴδει—εἶδος ἐν ὑλῇ—ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ—ἐν τῷ τέλει—ἐν τόπῳ. Pl. has nothing so clear as this.

C τῶν μερῶν ... περιέχεται; We have seen that the ἐν as ὅλον was ἀπειρον in the sense of being endlessly divisible. The fact that all its parts are rigidly circumscribed by its πέρας as a whole precludes the idea of its being ἀπειρον in the sense of being of unlimited extent: οὐ γάρ οὐ μηδὲν ἔξω, ἄλλ' οὐ δεῖ τι ἔξω ἔστι, τοῦτο ἀπειρόν ἔστιν. Arist. Phys. iii. 6.

καὶ μὴν...τὸ ἐν ἔστιν; The art. here with both subj. and pred. indicates (Clyde Greek Synt., Art. § 9)

‘the convertibility of the terms of the proposition’—τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔστι τὸ ἐν = τὸ ἐν ἔστι τὰ πάντα μέρη. So just below ἔστι δὲ τὰ τε πάντα τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ ὅλον. In both cases it is doubtful if τὸ ἐν is subj. or pred. Whichever it be it is not to be coupled with αὐτὸν τὸ ὅλον in the last case. οὐτε τι πλέον Σ οὔτετὸν, τι οὐτέτι. The text as printed seems necess. The frequent use of the art. hereabouts may have misled Σ or his orig.

ἐν ὅλῳ Why no art.? One could better understand his beginning with ‘a whole’ and afterwards speaking of ‘the whole’—he has already spoken so, 145 A—but here he has used the art. four times in the same connec. before thus omitting it.

αὐτὸν ἐν ἁυτῷ εἴη: Not within itself as the centre is within the circle, but only as ‘the rectangles contained by the whole and each of the parts are together *within* the square on the whole line.’ The argt. would be more just thus ἀρ' οὖν (see B above) οὗτος ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ;

οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρ...ἐν γε ἀπασιν είναι. Pl. has just urged that πάντα τὰ μέρη = τὸ ὅλον = τὸ ἐν, and has thence inferred that πάντα τὰ μέρη are ἐν ὅλῳ. He now denies the converse. This would be correct were the whole something other than the sum of the parts. But that distinc., as we have seen on 144 E, Pl. does not recognise, and here it is expressly excluded. Καίτοι γε—Proc.-Dam. vi. 264,—εὑροται καὶ δ τοιούτος τρόπος τοῦ ‘ἐν τινι,’ ὅτι περιεκτικόν ἔστι τὸ ὅλον τῶν μερῶν τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου οὐ. The text of this comment in Stallb. seems unsound and the argt. is obscure; but we get a sugg. from it. We must remember that τὸ ὅλον = τὸ ἐν, and that each part is also ἐν: and D. says τὸ γοῦν ἐν ἐνὶ μὴ τηρηθὲν ἐν πῶς ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐν τηρηθήσεται; Can he mean ‘as a whole which is “one” is not found in *one* part, how can you expect to find it, being “one,” in a *number* of parts (which are not one)?’ That is, after first viewing the several parts of one as mere parts whose sum makes the one or whole, Pl. it seems now turns round and regards each part as ‘one,’ and therefore more likely to contain a whole which is one than a plurality of them is—each was a mere portion of a ἐν συνεχές, now each is ἀριθμός ἐν. This, while sophistical, would be intelligible. And two lines of argt. do seem to be used. A word

on the text. If there were any authority in \mathfrak{U} for doing so, one could almost read with Schleierm. $\text{oὐτε } \epsilon\text{ν τοῖς}$. Pl. would thus state a general concl. that 'the whole is not in the parts either in all or in some' and then proceed to prove the first half of his concl. in $\epsilon\text{i γάρ } \epsilon\text{ν πᾶσι ... οὐδαμῶς}$: and the second in $\text{oὐδὲ μὴ ... ἀδύνατον γάρ}$: But besides the want of authority, the succeeding words, after $\gamma\acute{a}r$, make for the text, $\epsilon\text{ν πλέοσιν ... } \epsilon\text{ν } \epsilon\text{νὶ ... } \epsilon\text{ν ἄπασι}$. As to the whole not being in all the parts, he proves this by saying—'if it were in all it must needs be in one,' and leaves us to add the other limb of the argt., 'but it is not in one therefore it is not in all.' One can understand how it is not in one, as he next declares that it is not in some, because the greater would thus be in the less. But if the only reason for its not being in one or in some of the parts be that it is bigger, then, as it is expressly said not to be bigger than all the parts, why may it not be in them? Because, according to Pl., if in all it must also be in each. But if that is so the character of the 'whole' is quite altered. After treating it like the day and the sail—131 B—part of which rested on each portion of space covered by them, and the whole upon all the portions collectively, he now implies that it is not extensive but intensive, that the whole has an essence which is imparted perfectly to each of its portions.

$\epsilon\text{τὸ τοῦτο... οὐδαμῶς}$: This he regards as clear proof of his contention. 'Si autem haec una pars aliqua est de his omnibus' Refertur hoc $\tauοῦτο$ $\tauὸ \epsilon\text{ν}$ ad praecedens illud $\epsilon\text{ν τινὶ } \epsilon\text{νὶ}$, ad ἀπάντων autem supplendum est $\tauι$, more pervulgato. Heind. 'Vulgarum $\epsilon\text{ν ἔσται$ jam Thoms. vidit in $\epsilon\text{νέσται}$ mutari oportere. Pro $\epsilon\text{νὶ$ autem Heind. restituit $\epsilon\text{νὶ}$, Stallb. \mathfrak{U} both read $\epsilon\text{νὶ$ $\epsilon\text{σται}$, while \mathfrak{U} gives $\epsilon\text{νὶ$ and $\tau \epsilon\text{νὶ}$. The change to $\epsilon\text{νὶ$ is a great improvement. With regard to $\epsilon\text{νὶ$ $\epsilon\text{σται}$ see on 131 A etc. Here it is poss. that $\epsilon\text{νὶ$ may have been confused with the $\epsilon\text{ν}$ above; but it is also poss. that this very juxtaposition and the fact that $\epsilon\text{νὶ$ and $\epsilon\text{ν}$ recur, may have put the scribe (either John or a predecessor) on his guard. And one may even sugg. that the constr. is $\tauοῖς πᾶσιν \epsilon\text{ν}$ 'the entire number of ones,' as $\tauῷ \epsilon\text{ν}$ 143 B. He could hardly say $\tauοῖς πᾶσιν \epsilon\text{σίν}$: and in 146 E etc. he speaks of $\tauὰ μὴ \epsilon\text{ν}$. Arist. again has got the length of $\tauὰ \epsilon\text{να}$ —Phys. III. 7, 207 b 7, δ δ' ἀριθμός $\epsilon\text{στιν}$

$\epsilon\text{να πλείω καὶ πόσ' ἄττα}$. Met. XII. 8, 1083 a 25, $\alpha\text{τοπον γάρ τὸ } \epsilon\text{ν μὲν } \epsilon\text{ιναὶ τι πρῶτον τῶν } \epsilon\text{νῶν ὥσπερ } \epsilon\text{κένιοι φασι} \dots$ Such a remark gives a force to $\tauῶν ἀπάντων$, and marks his line of argt.:—If this one is but a sample of the entire number, and the whole is not in it, how after that will it be in all the ones together? He seems to be back for the moment at the old argt. on the particip. of $\epsilon\text{δη}$. Has he made out his contention? It would have been more to the point to have urged that a whole when reached is a new creature, and that to speak of it as in all its parts is to disintegrate and destroy it.

$\epsilon\text{γάρ ... } \delta \epsilon\text{στιν ἀδύνατον}$: The 'which is imposs.' would have justified $\eta\text{ν}$ for $\epsilon\text{η}$. The lang. recalls Euclid, e.g. I. 39, $\tauὸ \Delta\text{ΒΓ } \alpha\text{ρα τρίγωνον } \tauῷ \text{ΕΒΓ } \epsilon\text{στιν, } \tauὸ \muεῖζον } \tauῷ \epsilon\text{λάσσονι, σπερ } \epsilon\text{στὶν ἀδύνατον}$.

$\mu\text{η } \delta\text{ν } \delta'$ etc. One would almost expect another step in the argt. Thus $\mu\text{η } \delta\text{ν } \delta' \dots \tauὸ \delta\text{λον } [\text{oὐκ } \epsilon\text{ν } \epsilon\text{αντῷ } \epsilon\text{στίν}: \text{oὐ } \gamma\acute{a}r : \mu\text{η } \delta\text{ν } \delta' \epsilon\text{ν } \epsilon\text{αντῷ}] \text{oὐκ } \alpha\text{νάγκη } \epsilon\text{ν } \epsilon\text{τέρῳ}$ etc.

$\mu\text{ηδαμοῦ } \mu\text{ν}$ etc. Thus the $\epsilon\text{ν } \delta\text{ν}$ as $\delta\text{λον}$ exists ϵ under conditions of space and (as we shall see 151 E) time, and is not an $\epsilon\text{δος}$. See also 151 A. $\epsilon\text{ν } \delta\text{λλῳ}$ is repeated twice and is preceded and followed by $\epsilon\text{ν } \epsilon\text{τέρῳ}$ with no diff. of meaning.

$\tauὰ πάντα ... (\text{sc. } \tauὸ \epsilon\text{ν}) \tauυγχάνει$, One would look for $\delta\text{ν}$: but 'cave corrigas $\delta\text{ν}$. Sic solent Graeci et verba et participia praegresso proxime nomini accommodare. Menon. p. 91 C, $\omega\text{ντοὶ γε φανερό } \epsilon\text{στι λώβῃ } \tauε \text{ καὶ διαφθορὰ } \tauῶν συγγιγνομένων.'$ Heind. He also cps. 153 A below, which is cited Jelf § 389, 2, $\epsilon\text{τέρον } \mu\text{ν } \gamma\acute{a}r \delta\text{ν}$ which is said of $\tau\delta\lambda\lambda\alpha \tauοῦ \epsilon\text{νός}$.

$\alpha\text{ντό } \tauε \dots \epsilon\text{ν } \epsilon\text{τέρῳ}$: As Stallb. says, the order would be better $\epsilon\text{ν } \epsilon\text{αντῷ } \tauε \alpha\text{ντὸ } \epsilon\text{ιναι } \text{καὶ}$. But he adds that $\alpha\text{ντό } \tauε \epsilon\text{ν } \epsilon\text{αντῷ}$ form a phrase such 'ut unam notionem efficiant nec commode possint divelli,' and cites 151 B, E, 155 C, and 159 A.

$\epsilon\text{στήρκε } \mu\text{ν } \piον$ It is stationary in the sense that $\omega\text{ν μεταλλάσσει χώραν } \epsilon\text{τέραν } \epsilon\text{ξ } \epsilon\text{τέρας}$, but (so far as this argt. goes) it is quite free, as $\tauὰ πάντα \mu\text{έρη, } \pi\text{εριφέρεσθαι } \epsilon\text{ν } \tauῷ \alpha\text{ντῷ } (\text{sc. } \tauῷ \delta\text{λλῳ})$ —to use his own lang. 138 C. It might even be maintained, in view of its double char. as $\tauὰ πάντα \mu\text{έρη}$ and $\tauὸ \delta\text{λον}$, that $\text{καὶ } \delta\text{λλοίωσίν } \gamma\text{ε } \kappa\text{ινεῖται}$.

$\epsilon\text{ν } \tauῷ \alpha\text{ντῷ } \dots \alpha\text{ιὲ } \epsilon\text{ιναι}$; We have admitted that it ¹⁴⁶ may be stationary if $\alpha\text{ιὲ } \epsilon\text{ν } \epsilon\text{αντῷ}$, but in truth it need not. Admitting that such a thing as motion

exists—which Pl. here assumes in spite of Z.'s dialectic—then Achilles is in motion when chasing the tortoise, but all the while he is *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ* if that means *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*. He is far from being *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*, however, if that means *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ*—a meaning which Pl. must give it in his second use of it in order to infer of the ‘one’ that *ἔστὸς δῆ που ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι*. Pl., as the Theaet. shows, knows what the Eleatics think, and is for the moment in accord with them. Thus the verses of Parm. after saying *αὐτῷ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πέρατι δεσμῶν*¹ ἐστὶν etc. go on thus, 85 etc., *τωύτον τ' ἐν τωύτῳ τε μένον καθ' ἑωντό τε κεῖται·*¹ οὕτως ἔμπεδον αὐθὶ μένει· *κρατερὴ γάρ ἀνάγκη*¹ *πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει τε καὶ ἀμφὶς ἔργει.* Parm. does not prove this dialectically: he lays it down as his view. Pl. seeks to prove that the *ἐν δὲ* is bereft of motion, and he has not done it. The neuter *ἔστὸς* for *ἔστὸς* seems, from Veitch, to be confined to Pl. It occurs in this dial., in Theaet. 183 E, *οἱ ἐν ἔστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν*, said of the Eleatics, and Sophist 249 D, where Herm. reads *τὸ πᾶν ἔστηκός*. Note further *εἶναι ἔστὸς* in the sense *ἔστάναι* first above; its sense is *ἀκίνητον εἶναι*.

p. 20. τὸ ἐν ἔτέρῳ ... ἔστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; Another sophism. If the one is *ἐν τῷ ἔτέρῳ* it cannot indeed be *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ* *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*; but it can be *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτέρῳ*, and if it is ‘always there’ it is as much motionless as it would be if ‘always in itself.’

B τοῖς ἄλλοις ... εἶναι, The dat. need not be under the govt. of *ταύτον*, for then *τῶν ἄλλων* must be underst. after *ἔτέρον*, but is rather a dat. of gen. ref. ‘and as regards the others.’ Stallb. says of *τοῖς ἄλλοις* here ‘non esse ideas ab aliis ideis diversas aut iis contrarias, sed potius res sub sensus subjectas.’ Yet if the argt. hitherto in regard to *ἔτέρον* and *ἄλλο* does not refer to sens. objects but to the ideal world, how do we get from it any infer. as to same-ness or difference of the one in regard to the sensible world? The whole argt. moves on just as it did previously—the only change being the art. Proc.-Dam. vi. 266 says, *ποιεῖται δὲ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τι· ἐπεὶ τὸ ταύτον καὶ τὸ ἔτέρον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν ταύτον γάρ τινι (ταύτῳ?) ταύτον, καὶ ἔτέρον ἔτέρον ἔτέρον.*

πῶν που πρὸς ... ἡ ἔτέρον. Thoms. well cps. Arist. Met. ix. 3, 1054 b 15, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ἀντικειμένως

[λέγεται] καὶ τὸ ταύτον, διὸ πᾶν πρὸς ἄπαν ἡ ταύτη ἡ ἄλλο and below πᾶν γὰρ ἡ ἔτέρον ἡ ταύτη ὅ τι ἀν γὰρ ὅν.

ἡ ταύτην ... δλον δν εἴη. This seems to mean that in speaking of any two things we may say that they are related either (1) as A – A, or (2) as A – not-A, or (3) as A – $\frac{A}{n}$, $\frac{A}{n}$ – A, (not-A – $\frac{\text{not-}A}{n}$, $\frac{\text{not-}A}{n}$ – not-A).

‘Nam quod partem vel totum cuiuspiam rei conficit, id nec ταύτην est, nec omnino ἔτέρον.’ Stallb. This depends on our adopting his further note ‘verba πρὸς δὲ οὕτως ἔχει referas ad praegressa ἐὰν μὴ ταύτην γὰρ μηδὲ ἔτέρον,’ in a very definite sense. A moment's thought will show that these might conceivably and grammatically mean that the second thing stood to the first in either of the following relations A – $\frac{A}{n}$, A – $\frac{\text{not-}A}{n}$, since it is only A – A and A – not-A that represent accurately the cases of *ταύτην* and *ἔτέρον*, Pl. having chosen to raise the ques. of part v. whole. At the same time what Pl. means is that anything, whether δλον or μέρος, having the marks of not-A will be *ἔτέρον* to A; and that it is only where there would be *ταύτης* but for difference of size that the question of δλον and μέρος enters at all. This appears from the following words. But how again does this square with his argt. 145 D, *ἐν τινι γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ δὲ οὐκ ἀν ἔτι που δύνατο ἐν γε ἄπασιν εἶναι?* If a ‘whole,’ regarded even in its extended sense merely, must be in each of its parts under penalty of not being in all of them taken together, much more must this hold true if the ‘whole’ be regarded as the ‘same’ intensively, i.e. in character, as its part irrespective of area. In that view of it size has nothing to do with the question. Arist. Met. ix. 3, 1054 b 15 (see above) continues as follows: *τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔτέρον ἡ ταύτη δὲ τοῦτο πᾶν πρὸς πᾶν λέγεται, οὐσα λέγεται ἐν καὶ δὲν ... διαφορὰ δὲ καὶ ἔτέροτης ἄλλο. τὸ μὲν γάρ ἔτ. καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτ. οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τινι ἔτ., πᾶν γὰρ ἡ ἔτ. ἡ ταύτη ὅ τι ἀν γὰρ ὅν τὸ δὲ διάφορον τινὸς τινὶ διαφ., ὥστ' ἀνάγκη ταύτο τι εἶναι ως πρὸς; but t has ἡ ως which is clearly required, and the ἡ might easily have dropped if dictated — ἔχει ἡ representing three very similar vowel sounds.*

οὐδὲν ἄρα ως ... μέρος δὲν: This is perfectly clear; and (although Cornarius suggested πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος μὴ

ον, which yields a good meaning of its own ‘since it is not a part towards itself’) the reading is not doubtful. But the intricacy of the statement may cause confus., and the constr. may be disputed. Pl. has all he needs when he has reached ειη, the words reading as if they stood ονδ̄ ἄρα αὐτὸ ειη ἀν δλον αὐτοῦ ως πρὸς μέρος, the last three words being equal to ως μέρους, as in 147 B, δλον ως μορίων. It is just poss. that the αὐτὸ may not be the subj. of ειη, but may be in the acc. as part of ως πρὸς μέρος αὐτό. But this is unlikely, both because αὐτὸ would have been the better reading, and because the αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ of the prev. sent. makes for the parallel use of αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ in this one. Pl., as we say, might have stopped here; but, wishing to be very emphatic, and to bring more clearly forward the contrad. involved in the case, he adds πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ον. The constr. here might be = οὔτως ον μέρος πρὸς ἑαυτό, or as Heind. puts it redundantly, οὔτω γὰρ ἀν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ἀν ειη, ‘since it would thus be a part towards itself—which we have just declared in the previous sentence that it could not be.’ It might also be taken in close epexegetic connec. with the prev. ως πρὸς μέρος thus—αὐτοῦ δλον ως πρὸς μέρος, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ-μέρος-ον. ‘It could not be whole of itself as towards a part, rather towards itself turned for the moment into a part.’ So Stallb. following Schmidt, in which view μέρος ον is in the acc. agreeing with ἑαυτό. Either way there is some awkwardness.

αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ... οντος ἑαυτῷ, οντος agrees with ἑαυτοῦ, not with αὐτό, which is really redundant, and is present only in obedience to the Greek idiom. The sense is ‘If a thing be elsewhere than itself when that self is in the same place with itself, is not that thing of necessity other than itself?’

c οὔτω μὴ ... τὸ ξν = ἐφάνη μὴν τὸ ἐν οὔτως ἔχον. οὔτω refers both back and forward, what follows being but a restatement of what has just been said. He points back to 145 E, ἢ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν δλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν. Here μὴν=attamen: Ast. gives several cases, e.g. Soph. 217 D, συμβούλῳ μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τινὰ αἰρήσει with which cp. 216 B, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἀνῆρ οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεός μὴν. In all the sense would be brought out by using δὲ μῆν.

Ἐτερον ἄρα ... ταύτῃ ἀν ‘Non sine causa ταύτη dicit. Significat enim huius tantum rei habita ratione unum

a semet ipso diversum esse.’ Stallb. We may cite Arist. Soph. Elench. 5, 167 a 11, οὖν εἰ, λαβὼν τὸν Αἰθίοπα εἶναι μέλανα, τοὺς δόδοντας ἔροιτ’ εἰ λευκός· εἰ οὖν ταύτη λευκός, ὅτι μέλας καὶ οὐ μέλας, οὕοιτο διειλέχθαι συλλογιστικῶς τελειώσας τὴν ἔρωτησιν. Proc.-Dam. vi. 267 puts the present argt. thus, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀπεφάνθη. τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ον, ἐτέρωθι γεγονὸς ἐτερον ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ· ἐτέρωθι γὰρ γέγονεν ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οντος—οὗτω γὰρ ἀπεφάνθη· ἐτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ. But he prefixes this ἔστι δὲ σοφιστικὴ ἡ ἐπιχείρησις. ἔλεγον γὰρ οἱ σοφισταὶ Κορίσκος ἐτερος ἑαυτοῦ· ὁ γὰρ νῦν μὲν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ, νῦν δὲ ἐν Στοῇ, ἐτερος· ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐξελέγχει Ἀριστ. Arist. Soph. Elench. 5, 166 b 28, gives among the παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς παραλογισμοὶ—οὖν εἰ δὲ Κορίσκος ἐτερον ἀν θρώπου αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἐτερος· ἔστι γὰρ ἀνθρωπος. ἢ εἰ Σωκράτους ἐτερος, δ. δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνθρωπος, ἐτερον ἀνθρώπου φαὶν ὑμολογηκέναι διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκέναι, οὐδὲ ἔφησεν ἐτερον εἶναι, τοῦτον εἶναι ἀνθρωπον. How to meet these he shows chap. 24. Proc.-Dam. means that Pl. here proves a thing to be different from itself παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς—by a mere difference of place—while according to Arist. this is no ground of difference. Ἐτερα δὲ λέγεται δὲν ἡ τὰ εἴδη πλείω, ἡ ἡ ὕλη, ἡ ὁ λόγος τῆς οἰούσιας· καὶ δλως ἀντικειμένως τῷ ταύτῳ λέγεται τὸ ἐτερον. Met. IV. 9, 1018 a 10. εἰ τού τι Άτ εἰ τουτὶ.

Θσα μὴ ξν...τῶν ἄλλων: Thoms. speaks here of τὰ ἄλλα and τὰ πολλὰ being used for the objects of sense, which is quite true (as Stallb. says and said above); and quotes appositely Proc. (in Parm. Ms. Lib. v. fol. 32) “Ἐθος γὰρ ήν περὶ (l. παρὰ) τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἐν μὲν προσαγορεύειν πάσαν τὴν ἀσώματον καὶ χωριστὴν οὐσίαν ἄλλα δὲ τὴν σωματικὴν καὶ ἐν σώμασιν ὑφεστηκύναν [N.B. he does not say τὰ ἄλλα]. But what evidence is there throughout of a distinc. between ἐν and πολλὰ or τὰ ἄλλα of this fundamental kind? The one and the many are contrasted, but as correlatives and, to use a modern phrase, on the same platform: if the one is an εἶδος the many are other εἴδη, if they are sensible objects the one is such. He does better when he says “differunt hic τὰ ἄλλα ab uno uti ἡ διάκρισις differt ab unitate. Ita Dam. de hac quam Parm. statuit differentia aperte scribit. ηδε ἡ ἐτερότης οὐκ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὴν ταύτητα, ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν, ὡς διάκρισις πρὸς ἔνωσιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἐν πάντα ἔστι κατὰ τὸ ἐν, ὅτι πάντων ἔστιν ἔνωσις, οὔτω

καὶ ἡ ἑτερότης αὐτῇ τὸ πάντων πλῆθος ἔστιν τὸ διωρισμένον.'

146 D-E. We may note the complications of the passage:—(1) The 'different' is 'different from the different': (2) the 'not-ones' are 'different from the one' and the converse: (3) the 'one' is 'different from the others': (4) the 'same' is 'opposed to the different' and vice versa: therefore (5) the 'same' is never 'in the different' and vice versa: therefore (6) the 'different' is never 'in any existent thing': therefore (7) the 'different' is never 'in the not-ones or the one': therefore (8) the 'one and the not-ones' do not 'differ by the different': and as (9) the 'one and the not-ones' cannot differ 'by themselves without the different' it follows that (10) the 'one and the not-ones escape from differing' (and are therefore 'the same'). Why this series of rather sophistical statements? His aim being to infer that the one does not 'differ' from the not-ones, he might have founded at once on the concession that Only the different differs, and differs from the different. As neither not-ones nor one is the different these do not differ. Possibly because this might seem abrupt he chooses a widely different course which is itself startling. After the admiss. that It is the different that differs, he flies off at a tangent, affirming that The not-ones differ from the one—and the converse; and that the one differs from the others. Next he finds that the 'same' will be of use, and declares that the same and the different are *ἐναντία* which obviously means that they differ, since he has assumed above that, setting aside the possibility of whole versus part, everything is either same or different relatively to everything else. The truth seems to be that one, other, many, different, whole, part, not-one etc. are all different: but that when we speak of them as differing each becomes for the moment the different, relatively to that from which it differs, and so only the different differ mutually. Returning now to No. 5 above we see Pl. quibbling with 'the same' as he has done before. If the same and the different are two entities, no doubt it may follow that the one of them will never be in the other; but it does not follow that either of them is never in the same or a different position. It would be quite fair to retort upon him thus, If the different is never in the same,

then the different is always in the different: the different therefore is always in that same thing the different: accordingly the different is always in the same: or The same differs from the different: but only the different can differ: the same therefore is the different. It is not clear whether Pl. is throughout consciously sophistical or partly confused. His views on this relation of contraries seem clearer in the Phaedo, although expressed in terms of his ideal theory. There he says, 102 etc., that if Simmias is taller than Socrates he is so not qua Simmias but τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων, and if from being taller he becomes less, it arises from σμικρότης expelling μέγεθος—οὐδὲ ἀλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὅν ὅπερ Ἰν [ἴθελε] ἄμα τούναντίον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἥτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Applying this here we may say, if the one is different from the not-one it is so, not qua one but τῷ ἑτέρῳ ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχον and so on. The same percep. of possible and impossible combinations with a like crudeness of lang. appears in the Soph. 252 C-260.

εἰ γὰρ ὅτιν' [χρόνον] etc. Proc.-Dam. vi. 268 E says οὐδέποτε ἐν ταῦτῳ χρόνον τινά. Pl. mixes up pres. and abs. in space and time with logical agreement and difference. We have here an accurate condit. sent. εἰ γὰρ εἴη ... ἐκεῖνον ἀν ... εἴη τὸ ἑτερον. A less accurate one precedes εἰ ἄρα ... ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔσται, and a still less careful one follows ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ... ἔστιν, οὐδέποτε ... ἀν εἴη. Throughout there are several only the apod. of which appears.

οὐδέποτε ἐν τινι etc. He quibbles again. The different is not in the 'same' so it can be in nothing; for if it were in anything for so much as an instant it would thus be in the same. 'The same' at first is a thing so called; it changes to ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος or τὸ αὐτὸν πρᾶγμα. Proc.-Dam. explains—πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἔκαστον ἔστιν ἐν ταῦτῳ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ ἑτερον ἐν ἕαυτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τινι.

τῷ ἑτέρῳ ... ἔαντοι 'by reason of the different ... of themselves.' We must, as Heind. says, suppose ἑτερον after τὸ ἐν from τὸ μὴ ἐν ... ἑτερα.

οὐ πάντη ἀν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ A question to which ¹⁴⁷ the answer is—Yes ἐκφεύγοι [ἀν]. 'Recte, quam parum Latine, Cornarius: "penitusne jam effugerint, ut ne inter se alia sint." Frequens hic usus est voculae μὴ post verba *fugiendi abstinendi* et similia illatae. Soph. 235 B, ὥστε οὐκέτ' ἐκφεύγεται

τόδε γε ... τὸ μὴ οὐ ... εἶναι etc.' Heind. He adds examples, and Stallb. cites Crito 43 c, ἀλλ' οὐδέν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται η̄ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανάκτεῖν. A better case is Phaedo 117 c, οἱ πολλοὶ ... οἵοι τε ἥσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν. Proc.-Dam. vi. 268 says κάντεῦθεν ἐκφεύγοι ἀν ταῦτα, τὸ τε ἐν δηλονότι καὶ τὰ μὴ ἔν, τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔτερα—δηλονότι 'τὸ εἶναι ἔτερα' πλεονάζει γὰρ ἀττικῶς τὸ 'μὴ' εἰς 'τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔτερα.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν ... ἀριθμόν γε έχοντα: Again we have variety in the condit. sents. By strict rule we should have οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἔν—(εἰ γὰρ μετέχειν) οὐκ ἀν μὴ ἔν ἢν ἀλλά ... : ἀληθῆ: οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸς ἔσται ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἔν—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν οὗτω μὴ ἔν παντάπασιν εἰ ἀριθμόν γε εἴχειν. The first sent. is the basis of his premiss That the not-ones have no connection with the one, and the result is naturally a foregone conclusion (ἄν ήν). Having fortified his premiss he draws as inference That the not-ones will not be number; but puts that in a politely problematic form (οὐδὲ ἀν ... εἴη). But he at once clinches it by a reason which he holds as unanswerable (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν ... ήν). The οὗτω refers back to the οὐ γὰρ ἀν just above. They can no more be not-one if they possess number than they can if they share in one. We may put his syllog. in Aristotelian form, τοῦ ἐνός γε οὐ μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἔν· ἀλλ' ὁ ἀριθμὸς μετέχει τοῦ ἐνός· οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸς ἄρ' ἀν εἴη τὰ μὴ ἔν. τὰ μὴ ἔν not τὰ οὐχ ἔν is the form throughout: he speaks hypothetically.

ἢ καν οὗτω μετέχει=η̄ καὶ οὗτω (=εἰ μόρια ἤν τὰ μὴ ἔν τοῦ ἐνός) μετέχειν ἄν. The answering μετέχειν like the ἐκφεύγοι omits ἄν. Above on 145 e.

p. 21. B μορίων ... μόρια. Η̄ μορίου ... μορίου, τὸ μορίου ... μόρια. The text seems clearly needed. Whether in majusc. or in early minusc. *μορίου* and *μόρια* have a strong likeness. It is less easy to explain the corrup. of *μορίων*. Perhaps an early scribe had omitted the *ω*, and after writing MOPIN had placed a diminutive *ω* above. A little *ω* in majusc. might easily be taken for *ον* (or *α*), and a later scribe—e.g. Joannes—might so read it and think that it was to be put in place of the *N*, thus giving *μορίου*. The repeated use of the same word in different constrs. might naturally cause difficulty. The note of Proc.-Dam. vi. 269 reads ἔτει γοῦν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν οὗτοι μόριον τῶν μὴ ἔν ἔστιν οὗτε ὅλον ω̄ μορίου.

πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἔν So τ, and the sense requires it. Η̄

has τὸ for τά, and Proc.-Dam. also reads ώστε τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἔν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα ... τοῦ λόγου. Common sense, as well as Pl.'s reasoning, tells us that the one is the same with itself and different from the others. But the others here must stand for the different, and as the argt. advances, another synonym is the not-ones. That the one is different from itself has been made out above only sophistically, apart from the objection that, on Pl.'s own showing, only the different and not the one can differ. His final thesis that the one is the same with the others requires much argt. He starts by laying down four possibilities (practically three) as open to two things when under comparison—they may be the same, or they may stand related as whole to part, or they may be different. He then aims at reaching the truth by elimination. First the different must have no connec. with the one and the others (or, as the latter are now called, the not-ones), and thus the one and the not-ones 'escape altogether (he feels how narrowly) from differing.' Next he takes up the question of whole and part. He gets rid of the possibility that the not-ones or others can be simply a number of ones instead of a single one—it is noteworthy that they are never called τὰ πολλὰ or πλήθος here. They must have no connec. with one—a curious preliminary to their being the same with it. But the absence of connec. is needed to prevent their standing related as whole and part; there is no one in the not-ones, no not-ones in the one, so they cannot be whole and part. It remains then that they must be the same. No wonder Aristoteles says 'from the course of the argument there is a risk of their appearing so'—which is but another way of saying that Pl. knows how narrowly he has escaped failure. We may meet his reasoning in several ways. 1. The one and not-ones *are* different. It is a παραλογισμὸς παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός to say that the different has no connection with them, and that they cannot differ. The term 'different' is applied to two objects as a result of their comparison. They are found not to have the same qualities, and to express that fact they are called different—a term which is applied to them κατὰ συμβεβηκός and adds nothing to their characteristics save the accidental circumstance that they have been compared. 2. Pl. would

have made out a better quartette of tests for distinguishing two objects if he had said they may be (*a*) the same, (*b*) different, (*c*) part v. whole, or (*d*) parts of a whole. In fact one and not-ones are both parts—not extended but logical parts—of one complex concep. Give what name you please to this concep. it is certain that they are the two necessary factors in it, that you cannot think the one of them without the other to help you. 3. And we may, if we choose, call them in *this* sense the same, because they play the same part or have the same function in the thought in which they occur. But our calling them the same because of the function they fulfil does not prevent them from differing when compared each with the other.

τοιως: ἐπειδὴ γ' οὖν 'Very likely,' says Aristoteles, like one who does not really see his way but gives up courting controversy. 'Well, at all events,' replies Parm., 'they both differ equally.'

τί γὰρ διν: The meaning of this answer will be seen if we put the passage differently. οὐκ οὖν οὔτως ἔτερον ἀν τῶν ἄλλων εἴη... καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον ἔτερον οὔτε ἄττον; Tί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔτερον η̄ ἄττον ἀν εἴη;

η̄ ... τῷ ἐνι: = γ̄ [τὸ ἐν] πέπονθεν εἶναι ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τάλλα ἐκείνους ὡσαντως, ταύτη τό τε ἐν πέπονθὸς ἀν εἴη ταῦτὸν τοὺς ἄλλοις, καὶ τάλλα τῷ ἐνι. 'In the way in which the one has the experience of being different from the others and the others likewise than it, in that way the one would have an experience identical with (that of) the others and the others with (that of) the one.' Fic.: 'Porro si uni contingit' etc.; so he read εἰ for γ̄, which would need other changes. The two are sometimes interchanged; but the MSS. agree here.

D **ἔκαστον ... καλεῖς;** We find in this connec. καλεῖν τινὰ ὄνομα (or τι). = to call one a name, something: καλεῖν ὄνομά τινι which is much the same, but resembles our 'to call names to one': καλεῖν ὄνομα ἐπί τινι which Jowett renders here 'You give a name to a thing?' Heind. also gives 'Unumquodque nomen nonne rei cuiquam tribuis?' And L. and S. seem to agree. Would it not be better thus, with Ast and Engelm. 'Of the names in use you employ each on some ground'? Thus in Soph. 218 c, of the name Sophist he says νῦν γὰρ δὴ σὺ κάγὼ τούτου πέρι (sc. τοῦ σοφιστοῦ) τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχομεν (=καλοῦμεν) κοινῆ· τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐφ' ϕ καλοῦμεν ἐκά-

τερος τάχ' ἀν ιδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχομεν. Neither this nor the other cases cited (e.g. Cratyl. 433 E, Rep. v. 470 B etc.) nor the case in E seems to clash with such a meaning, though the other sense is quite possible. Cp. Proc.-Dam. vi. 270, πᾶν ὄνομα ἐπὶ σημασίᾳ τινὶ λέγεται. Arist. Met. x. 5, 1062 a 13, δει τοίνυν τῶν ὄνομάτων ἔκαστον εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ δῆλον τι, καὶ μὴ πολλά, μόνον δ' ἐν· ἀν δὲ πλείω σημανή, φανερὸν ποιεῦν ἐφ' ὃ φέρει τοῦνομα τούτων.

πλεον. η̄ ἄπαξ; Fic. 'vel saepius vel semel,' and so Thoms., Ast, Engelm., and Jowett. But would not this need η̄ πλεονάκις η̄ ἄπαξ;? As it stands the choice seems exclusive, in which case ἔγωγε has no meaning, and the answer would be πλεονάκις. Müller gives 'mehr als einmal' = 'oftener than once,' with which cp. Rep. III. 409 D, πλεονάκις δὲ πονηροῖς η̄ χρηστοῖς ἐντυγχάνων (δι δικαστῆς) σοφώτερος η̄ ἀμαθέστερος δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις. This seems preferable, the important thing being that a name may be given oftener than once. Perhaps the transl. incline to the other because ἄπαξ and πολλάκις are contrasted in what follows. But that is met in the latter rendering—if you use a word oftener than once you must use it once also, which gives the material for contrast.

οὐπέρ ἔστι τοῦνομα, Cp. οὐπέρ η̄ν ὄνομα and η̄σπερ η̄ν τοῦνομα in E. Taking these in order Fic. gives 'cujus est nomen, cujus hoc nomen est, cujus proprium nomen est'; Ast repeats 'cujus est nomen,' and others treat the phrases as identical. Substantially they are; yet one feels a difference in mental attitude, although it is hard to define. Should not τοῦνομα be the subj. and ὄνομα part of the pred.? Cp. on 126 B; and contrast the following, τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ἐκείνος οὐπέρ τὸ ὄνομα ἔστι and τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ἐκείνος οὐπέρ ἔστιν ὄνομα. The formula might be completed thus, τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ἐκείνος οὐπέρ τὸ ὄνομά ἔστιν ὄνομα, which gives material for both expressions. Heind. would read τοῦνομα in all three cases. ταῦτὸ ὄνομα the use of ταῦτὸ and ταῦτὸ seems capricious. Here if anywhere ταῦτὸ might be expected. ἐὰν φθέγξῃ cp. δῆλαν φθέγγη below. So in Proc.-Dam.'s notes, vi. 270. The common distinc. between aor. and pres. is that the former makes a passing allus. in narrat., the latter rather a pictorial allus. in descrip. If there be any distinc. here it may be shown by the

conjuncs.—*εάν* ‘should you utter,’ *ὅταν* ‘whenever, as often as, you are uttering.’

καὶ τὸ ἔτερον = καὶ ‘τὸ ἔτερόν’ ἔστιν ὄνομα. Proc.-Dam., *ἔστιν οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων (ὄνομάτων)* καὶ τὸ ἔτερον ὄνομα ἐπί τινι σημασίᾳ ... ὅταν τοίνυν φθέγγῃ τὸ ἔτερον τοῦτο ὄνομα, εἰ μὲν ἀπαξ, ἀπαξ δηλοῖς τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐ τὸ ὄνομα ἦν ... διὸ εἰπόντες τὸ ἔτερον ἐπ’ αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει περὶ ἣς ἀποφαινόμεθα, ἐπ’ ἐκείνῃ δὲ λέγομεν ἣς ἦν τὸ ὄνομα.

Is the precisely similar *ταῦτὸ ὄνομα above = τὸ ὄνομα ‘αὐτό?’* Prob. not, and the sense is clear otherwise.

E *ὄνομάζεις ... λέγομεν,* A number of more or less synonymous verbs have been used in the course of this illustration from names, and it is not easy to preserve the distinctions in translating. *λέγειν* wavers in sense as it repeats itself; *εἴπειν* and *φθέγγεσθαι* both apply here to physical utterance.

ἢ etc. Here and in 148 A, B Υ wavers, reading ἢ here and ἢ in the three following cases, the first of them having an eras. above, and the second one after. t reads ἢ here and ὢ in the others. ὢ seems necess. Fic. and editions before Steph. seem to have had εἰ, between which and ἢ, ἢ, ὢ, confus. is easy. In ὢ ἄρα ἔτερον ... τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Υ reads ἢ ἄρα ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν, καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, κατὰ ταῦτὸ ἔτερον πεποιθέναι, οὐκάλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀνπεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· which needs alteration: t reads ἢ ἄρα ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός. κατὰ ταῦτὸ ἔτερον πεποιθέναι [in the margin a later and fainter hand writes carelessly πεποιθεν εἶναι], οὐκ ἄλλο. ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Except as regards ἢ for ἢ and the marginal read., the two agree. The words as printed show less change from MSS. than is usual. Their construc. is ὢ ἄρα ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν, καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός [ἔτερα]. κατά τ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔτερον πεποιθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ‘in the same way therefore in which the one is different from the others they likewise are different from the one; while again to the extent of this experience of difference the one would have, not another but, the same experience with the others.’ This gives the proper course to the argt. and that with virtually no change—for the iota subscr. (ὦ) is often omitted, while accents (ὦ, αὐτὸ) and word division are matters in which scribes vary. The editors and Dam. regard ὢ ...

τοῦ ἐνός as a single supposition from which some other conclus. follows, not as containing both suppos. and conclus. They have thus to alter from 148 κατὰ onward. Thoms. says ‘Melius legeretur καὶ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔτερον πεποιθέναι. Nec dubitandum veram hanc esse lectionem, maxime cum Dam. (in Ms. at Oxford) eam suo comprobet suffragio’: Bek., following Heind. and followed by Ast, reads κατὰ τὸ ταῦτὸν ἔτερον πεποιθέναι ‘to the extent of experiencing the same difference’: Stallb. κατὰ ταῦτὸν τὸ ἔτερον πεποιθέναι ‘secundum id ipsum quod videlicet τὸ ἔτερον habet etc.’ After all, accepting their view of what goes before, the Ms. reading κατὰ ταῦτὸ ἔτερον πεποιθέναι in the sense κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ‘ἔτερον-πεποιθέναι’ might almost do as it is.

τὸ δέ που ... δροιον may mean either τὸ δέ που ταῦτὸν-πεπονθὸς’ ὄμοιόν ἔστι, or δέ που ταῦτὸν πεποιθεν ὄμοιόν ἔστιν.

ἢ δὴ ... ἔτερόν ἔστι: Everything is like everything because everything is different from everything. Any two things mutually differ; and this sameness of difference makes them pro tanto like each other. This may be so, but it is not the conclus. proposed 147 C, ἔαντῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. That implied that there were but two sides to the antith., ἐν ν. τὰ ἄλλα as a group. If we are to speak of ἄπαν ἄπαντιν we must apply the same reasoning to one in its relations to each part of the others and to each of these in relation to every other. His one becomes a selected atom, and his others are the remaining infinity of atoms, which may each in turn be chosen as the one. At this point he does look as if he would carry out in detail the original scheme of 136 C. τῷ ἀνομοίῳ so t; Υ=δροίῳ, and in the paradoxical state of the argt. there is some excuse for it. τῷ αὐτῷ; (sc. ἔναντιον) so Υt, but the latter has in the marg., by a similar if not the same hand, τῷ ταῦτῷ. This would suit the repeated use of ταῦτὸν above; but τῷ αὐτῷ may mean that. Cp. Arist. Met. iv. 9, 1018 a II, ἀντικειμένως τῷ ταῦτῷ λέγεται τὸ ἔτερον.

τούναντίον ... τῷ ἔτερον etc. = τὸ δέ εἶναι ταῦτὸν τοῖς β ἄλλοις τούναντίον γε πάθος ἔστι τῷ εἶναι ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων.

ἀνομοίσται This word, ‘praeter analogiae leges et propter oppositionis rationem formato’ (Stallb.), seems peculiar to Pl. Rep. VIII. 546 B, ὄμοιούντων

τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων is the only other case of the act. in Ast.; but there are several cases of the pass. Stallb. however refers to Lobeck Phrynic. 563. By praeter analogiae leges does he mean that you don't have privative verbs formed from affirmative ones? If so, it may be that *ἀνομοιώ* is not from *δημοιώ* but from *ἀνόμοιος* as the other is from *δημοιος*. *ταῦτόν, ἡ οὐκ ἐναρτίον ἔσται* (sc. *τοῦτο τὸ ταῦτόν*) *τῷ ἑτέρῳ*—*t has τὸ ταῦτόν, as above τῷ ταῦτῷ*, in marg.

p. 22.C *Ἐχει γὰρ ... λόγον*: From the *τόνδε* it seems that *τοιοῦτον λόγον* form one express. and that *τοιοῦτον* is not a neut. nom. descriptive of the argt. just closed. But the expression is odd. 'Talem ut videtur rationem habet' Fic., whom Thoms. copies; and this is the best rendering. The force of the particles might be brought out thus: 'I agree; for, strange as it may seem, it is true that the statement has some such reason in its favour.' Instinct bids one expect *τὸν* or *τινὰ* with *τοιοῦτον*. In this passage, *ἔχει...ἀνόμοιον εἶναι*, Proc.-Dam. seems, vi. 271, inclined to take *ἔχει ... ἔχει* as spoken by Parm., leaving only *τίνα*; to Aristoteles; and if we may judge by his words he seems to have read *ἔχει μὲν οὖν δὴ* here. *οὐκ ἐνέμεινε τὴν συγκατάθεσιν τοῦ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἐπικρίνει καὶ τὸ πᾶν λέγει, ὡς θαρρῶν καὶ ἄλλως ἀποδεῖξαι. ἢ τὸ ‘ἔχει μὲν οὖν δὴ’ ἀπολογία ἔστι καὶ κατάνευσις τοῦ προσδιαλεγομένου καὶ ἐκ τότε ἐπιφέρει ἀποδεξάμενος οὖν τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ‘καὶ γὰρ καὶ τόνδε ἔχει’· εἴτε οὖν οὕτως εἴτε ἐκείνως, η ἐννοια σώζεται.* The *ἔχει* has no very definite subj. here or above. We may supply 'your contention.' Then we must add some words, e.g. *τίνα*; *τὸ έν, ὃ ταῦτὸν πεπονθεῖ, μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθεῖναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δε πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον εἶναι, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δ' οὐ δημοιον εἶναι. ὃ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ οὐ δημόμοιον εἶναι: ταῦτόν τε ἄρα δον ... καὶ ὅτι ἔτερόν ἔστι*, the particip. constr. is exactly parallel to *ὅτι* or *ἐπεὶ* as below, with the indic. giving a reason. *κατὰ ἐκάτερον* so both MSS. as *μετὰ ἑαυτὸν ε.* The editors give *καθ'*. Note this insistence on the clear recognition of each method and both, repeated also below. 'Secundum ambo haec et secundum horum utrumque' Fic. *καὶ ἐκάτερον* so *Ι*; *t* repeats the *κατά*, probably rightly.

147C-148D. Here we have a demonstr. that the one is like and unlike itself and the others. How does he reason? 1. He takes pains to establish

that the one is like the others (147 C-148 A). The argt. ends by proving that everything is like everything; and that because all things differ by difference—that is, by the same thing. Were he speaking as in the first part of the dial. and in the Phaedo he would say they differed by having the *εἶδος* of difference, which of course is always the same thing. But one is tempted to think that Pl. wants us to confound this with the idea of differing to an equal extent. One, two, and three are alike in differing each from the other, but one and two are not alike in the extent of their difference from three. Arist. as usual does a service when he notes that in practice the word 'different' has several senses. Now, while Pl. proves likeness through sameness of difference, and recalls his own remark that *τὸ ταῦτὸν πεπονθὸς δημοιον*, save for his wish to make each new quality of the one spring from its predecessor, is there any need for the argt.? One would say that sameness includes likeness, and, as he proved sameness, he might infer likeness. We may also ask, supposing one and not-ones (or others) are like, *how* like are they? Pl. would lead us to fancy that they were so like as to exclude divergence—although, of course, unlikeness is proved very soon. And there is something to justify such a view in this case, for, when speaking of mere existent one-ness and comparing it with mere existent other-ness, and proving these like or unlike, we feel that the latter qualities may rank on the same level with the former, and that we say as much about a monad when we call it 'like' as we do when we call it 'one.' On the other hand he has been speaking about one and not-ones now for some time, and we have had a sense of growing complexity in these as the argt. has advanced. One has become One-being-whole-parts-different-same-in-itself-possessing-shape etc., and if to all these qualities we add but one more—likeness—we add little, something that might be called a mere separable accident, not an essential feature. Of course if likeness were the outcome of all combined—if one were like not-ones *παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα*, then likeness would be a very important feature in its character. 2. He next proves unlikeness between one and others very briefly—it was in virtue of difference that they appeared to be like, that being so they must in

virtue of sameness be unlike (148 A-B). This would be unanswerable if we were sure of our terms. Pl. has said that all words retain the same sense through all uses. Now when we speak of two things as different we think of the characteristics in which they don't agree—one is square-white-flat, the other round-black-solid, and that is the sense in which Pl. uses the word at present. On the other hand we have used the word 'different' in regard to both these things, and not a bit more or less in regard to the one than in regard to the other, and to that extent the two things resemble—by the *μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ήττον* of their difference. It was in this latter sense that Pl. used the word when he proved by it that one and others were like. In other words he proved them like by difference not qua difference but qua the sameness which it suggests. If then they were like in virtue of the sameness of their difference they need not necessarily be unlike through sameness. 1+2. Having now sought to show that one and others are both like and unlike, he shows his doubt as to the result by re-proving it on the converse ground (148 C). The two are 'like' *ἢ ταῦτὸν πέπονθε* (leaving the *ἔτερον* out of sight), and 'unlike' *ἢ ἄλλο πέπονθε* (leaving *ταῦτὸν* out of sight): a proof which is assented to with much greater readiness than the previous one—*ἀληθῆ λέγεις—ἰδού καὶ οὕτως ἀποδείκνυται τοῦ ἐνὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὸ δόμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον*. Proc.-Dam. VI. 272. But he won't give up the former proof: on the contrary he maintains (*ταῦτὸν τε ἄρα... ἀνόμοιον τοῦς ἄλλους*) that the case is made out by the two methods jointly (*κατ' ἀμφότερα*) and severally (*κατὰ ἑκάτερον*). 3+4. In proving that one is both like and unlike itself he says merely—See previous argts. jointly and severally (148 D). One is like itself both by equality of difference from itself—which must be held as proved 146 C—and by *ταῦτὸν πεπονθέναι ἑαυτῷ*; and unlike itself by sameness with itself (146 B-C), and by *ἄλλο πεπονθέναι*. Proc.-Dam. VI. 272 says *κατὰ ἑκάτερον—κατά τε τὸ ταῦτὸν, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔτερον, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς προτέρας ἀποδεξεως*. But when he adds *καὶ κατ' ἀμφότερα—δόμοιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ δόμοιον ἄλλοις· οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον—κατά τε τὸ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τὸ (?) ἄλλοις*, he surely mistakes.

¹¹ περὶ τοῦ ἀπτεσθαι etc. We must take ἀπτεσθαι ...

ἄλλων, as a phrase equivalent to a noun whose art. is *τοῦ* and which is govd. by *περί*, = *περὶ τοῦ τὸ ἐν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων*' = *περὶ τοῦδε*, sc. εἰ τὸ ἐν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴτε μή, σκόπει, αὐτὸ γάρ... ἐφάνη ὅν... τὸ ἐν; See 145 B-E. Heind. objects to the repetition of *τὸ ἐν*. But it may be due to the fact that when the one was shown to be in itself as whole it was so as *πάντα τὰ μέρη*, while when it was shown to be in the others it was again *ὅλον ἐν ὅν*.

ἢ μὲν ... ἑαυτῷ δν: Thoms. refers to the opp. conclus. reached in Dem. I. 138 A and cites Proc. in Theol. Plat. Lib. 2 Cap. 1, 'ubi tandem ita concludit ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ἢ αὐτοῦ χωρίς ἐστιν, ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπτόμενον' εἴη γάρ οὗτω πεπονθός τὸ ἀπτεσθαι καὶ τὸ χωρίς· τὸ δέ γε ἐν πέπονθεν οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρ' αὐτό.' But this refers to the one in whose case existence was not pressed. We deal now with the one which 'is.' Again he points out that 'alia est ratio materialium alia immaterialium. Sic Porph. Sent. τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀσώματα, αὐτὸ δὲ κρείττον παντός ἐστι σώματος καὶ τόπου πανταχῆ ἐστιν, οὐ διαστατῶς ἀλλ' ἀμερῶς. Ita in Phaedo de Anima ὅταν μὴ προσομιλοῦσα τῷ σώματι ἡ ψυχή, ἀπτεσθαι τοῦ ὄντος.' Which is of course true, and the ἀπτεσθai in the Phaedo is a metaph. And so of any *ἄψις* among the *εἰδη?* Whether the one is here to be material or not is hard to say; but if it is not material it is at least a mental picture of an extended thing to which the idea of touch has a natural application. Proc.-Dam. VI. 273 says *περὶ τοῦ ἀπτεσθαι ... οὐκ ἀνεσκεύασεν ἐν ταῖς ἀνασκευαῖς, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἐμήσθη* (but see 138 A) διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν τίθησιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὴν ἀνασκευὴν πλὴν προτέραν τὴν κατασκευὴν (positive side, θέσις) διὰ τὴν τῶν λοιπῶν κατασκευῶν συνέχειαν, καὶ ἐπειτα τὴν ἀνασκευὴν (negative side, ἀναίρεσις) ποικιλωτέραν. As to lang. in *τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἀπτεσθαι* the position of *τῶν μὲν ἄλλων* would suggest that they depend directly, as they might, on *ἀπείργοιτο*, *ἀπτεσθai* being = ὁστε μὴ ἀπτεσθai αὐτῶν. But the constr. is probably *ἀπείργοιτο ἀπτεσθai τῶν ἄλλων*: yet here we miss a neg. with the vbs. But both usages are found: cp. Laws XI. 929 C, *ἐάν τις ... νιὸν βούληται θέσθαι, μηδὲς νόμος ἀπειργέτω ποιεῖσθαι*, and VIII. 837 D, *δεῖ κωλύειν τὸν νόμον ἀπειργοντα μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἥμιν*. *ἀπτοιτο*: as 147 A, ἀν om.

ἅρ' οὐ πᾶν ... ἡ αὐτός ἐστιν : The lang. is peculiar. First the usage of the verb to touch is uncertain throughout, 148 E-149 A. In Η we have τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψεσθαι, τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι, οὐ μέλλει ἄψεσθαι; and the future is usual, as 141 C; but with this we have οὐ μέλλει ἀπτεσθαι 148 E, and εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι 149 A, which also is a recognised construc. t corresponds in the three cases 148 E, but reads as follows in 149 A: τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι, οὐ μέλλει ἀπτεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι. Thus all possible construcs. appear, and in the order of their normal frequency—fut., pres., aor.: this last, however, is probably wrong considering its surroundings. Of course μέλλει here means purpose rather than futurity. Some would change οὐ μέλλει ἀπτεσθαι to fut.; but μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι still remains, while Proc.-Dam. in his note uses οὐ μέλλει ἀπτεσθαι thrice. Next we have the words ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἡ ἀν μετ' ἐκείνην ὁ ἔδρα, ὁ ἀν κέρται ἀπτεσται. (Cp. Dam. § 14, 28, ἔκαστα μένει τὰ εἴδη, κατέχοντα τὴν ὑποκειμένην τοῦ σώματος ἔδραν) Notes 1. The text shows that κατέχον had been omitted; nor does it seem to have been soon supplied—Introd. lxxxvi., xci. Otherwise the text is as in Η, save that ἡ has a smooth breath, as well as the rough. t agrees, having κατέχον and ἡ in the text: and the remainder of the sent. also corresponds, with ἐν added before ἡ αὐτός ἐστιν: in Η this last ἡ has the acc. above a scrape. As Η has omitted κατέχον, t seems in this place the better authority, and probably ἐν should be read. But granting this, the words quoted above still contain some ambiguity. Their general purport is clear, and corresponds to what follows about the one. Fic., as Stallb. says, seems to render correctly, the crux of the passage being in ἡ ἀν etc. ‘Nonne quodcunque tacturum aliquid est, prope illud quod tacturum est jacere oportet, atque eam sedem occupare quae sequitur illius sedem—in qua cum primum fuerit, tanget?’ The descrip. of the position ends with ἔδρα, and the sent. might end there. But Pl. chooses to add ‘if it assumes *that* position it touches.’ This surplusage has parallels, e.g. 146 B, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μέρος ὅν, and 146 C, εἰπερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἐσται; The only difficulty in the way of this interpr. is the use of ἐκείνην where one would rather look for μετ’ ἐκεῖνο or μετ’ ἐκείνου ἔδραν referring to τοῦς above. Nec tamen

opus est corrigere μετ’ ἐκείνου says Stallb. The nom. ἔδρα is a little harsh, but may be part of the pred. to ἡ. Those who find the text incomplete do so because they assume these last words to be an integral part of the descrip. of the position necessary for the thing that intends to touch something. Corrections usually follow Heind., ἡ ἀν κέρται οὐ ἀπ., and with this they either change ἔδρα to accus. or omit it. Heind. reads ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἡ ἀν μετ’ ἐκείνην ὁ [ἔδραν], ὁ ἀν κέρται [ἐκείνου] οὐ ἄψεσται. This gives a good meaning, and the οὐ might have been om. through confus. with the one above. But Heind. sees what others seem not to notice, that ἀπτεσται must in that case be made fut. The pres. is an addit. argt. for the text as it stands, and for the interpr. Fic. puts upon it, notwithstanding his tangent. Pl. says virtually ‘if one thing is going to touch another it must take up a position by the side of that in which the other is—when there it *touches*.’ Heind. makes it ‘by the side of that position in which lies the thing which it is *going to touch*.’ It is just possible that the text may once have stood ἐφεξῆς δεῖ καθιεῖ ἐκεινῷ οὐ μέλλει ἀπτεσθαι—ἡ ἀν κέρται ἀπτεσται and that an early reader, not being certain of its meaning, added a gloss borrowed from the lang. of the foll. sent., which gloss after being itself patched has been inserted in the text in the form ταύτην ... ἔδρα. And it is worth noting that in the passage which follows χώρα, not ἔδρα, is used twice. ἐκείνης ἡ Bek. and Stallb. read ἡ. ἐν ἡ though neither collated t in this dial.

χωρὶς δὲ ... ἐναι : Clear but irreg. The first half 149 might be χωρὶς δεῖ εἶναι ἐφεξῆς δὲ ἐκεινῷ. The second introduces τρίτον as a new subj. To be regular we should have either τρίτον δὲ δεῖ etc. or else τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι ἐφεξῆς μὲν δεῖ εἶναι, τρίτον δὲ ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν ἔχειν.

διλγοστὸν So Η, Notes 1. Bek. after Gais. wrongly puts the accent on ι. τοῖν δνοῖν ὄροιν ... ἔξῆς, Η oddly writes ἔξ ἡς; but both MSS. give ο τοῖν δνοῖν ὄροιν, of which Heind. says ‘Istud ὄροιν quis ferre potest, quum de rebus ipsis non de earum terminis hic agi appareat?’ After the 2nd Bâle ed. he omits τοῖν and reads ἔαν δὲ δνοῖν ὄντοιν, while Bek. and Stallb. bracket ὄροιν. Herm. says ‘ὄροιν librorum consensu traditum nec cum Tur. in

δόμόροιν mutare nec cum Stallb. cancellis notare libuit; ὅροι nunc opponuntur ἄψει, ut Phileb. c 7, διαστήμασι, Rep. viii. 3 et Tim. c 8 διαστάσει, quarum ipsarum absentia ἄψει oriuntur; nec neutrum τρίτον offendit, quia tertium illud non tanquam ὅρος accedit, sed accedendo demum ὅρος fit. Immo ipsos ὅρους pro numeris accipi ostendunt sequentia καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μαζὰ ἐλάττους εἶναι, ubi recte jam Stallb. Heindorfii conj. τὸν ἀριθμὸν a BT receptam abjecit.' We retain ὅρου, although Herm. is not quite clear. The τρίτον refers to τρίτον above and means τρίτον τι. Observe that ὅρους is introduced only after the suggest. of a τρίτον coming ἐν μέσῳ. May not this convert the previous δύο into the two ὅροι of a row of three? Pl. wishes us to see that he means those two, so he uses the dual and calls them ὅρους (below he calls them τὰ πρώτα δύο), that we may not suppose one of them and the τρίτον to be meant—for if we did the conditions of ἄψη would not be violated, only another than the original δύο would be meant. That ὅρους existed at an early date is made prob. by Proc.-Dam. vi. 275, ἡ δὲ ἄψη τὸ ἐλάττον (?) ἐν δυὶς καὶ μεταξὺ τρίτον οὐκ ἔσται,—εἴ μὴ ἄρα ἔξωθεν, καὶ τότε δύο ἄψεις εἰσὶ τριῶν ὅρων ὄντων [he uses it as = terms?], καὶ ἀεὶ οὕτως παρὰ μίαν αἱ ἄψεις πρὸς τοὺς ὅρους, καθὼς Ἀριστ. ἔλεγε περὶ τε τῶν ὅρων καὶ τῶν προτάσεων τὰ γὰρ δύο πρώτα τὸ ἐν [sense = τὰ γὰρ δύο πρώτα παρὰ τὸ ἐν] πρὸς τὴν μίαν ἄψην ἐπλεονέκτησε καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτω γίγνεται. After quoting this Stallb. adds 'ex his verbis origo glossematis explicari poterit,' i.e. ὅρους crept into the text from this passage? In that case Dam. must have written prior to the date of the archetype of both our MSS. Do we know that? And if he is to account for glosses can we cite him as corroborating the text?

τὰς ἄψεις ... ἐλάττους εἶναι. 'ipso tactus a numerosum multitudine uno exsuperari.' Fic. That is, ἐλάττους govts. τοῦ πλήθους, and that τῶν ἀριθμῶν, which word means the δύο, τρία etc. that touch. 'Non opus est cum Heind. et Bek. praeter fidem omnium librorum corrigere τὸν ἀριθμὸν [i.e. κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν on the analogy of the phrase which follows].' Stallb.

φ γάρ etc. Notes 1. So Η with ΔΠΔΡ, t reads ἐπλεον. τῶν ἄψεων. The latter is universally adopted

(though by editors who had not collated t) while no one discusses ἄλλων at all. ἄψεων certainly makes the sense obvious, but does it not also suggest the probability that εἰς τὸ πλείω ... τὰς ἄψεις is a gloss, explaining ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἄψεων? Alternatively, in view of the fact that the conflict arises over τῶν ἄψεων, may that not have been put in the margin, the text having been τὰ πρώτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι etc., a reading which would account for Η having ν at the end of the verb? But again, what of the repeated plural, when from the nature of the case only one touch can be meant; and what of the lang. of Proc.-Dam. above, τὰ γὰρ δύο πρώτα τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὴν μίαν ἄψην ἐπλεονέκτησε καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτω γίγνεται? It would not meet this last objec. but it would simplify matters otherwise if some such view as the following were adopted. He is all the while discussing the relation of ἐν to τὰ ἄλλα and he wishes to bring out two facts of the case, if the one touches the others—(1) that there will always be one touch less than the whole number (of others, let us say), (2) that number does not exist in the others; on both of which grounds, but chiefly on the second, the idea must be abandoned. Suppose now that some early reader had put in the margin τῶν ἄλλων as a gloss on τῶν ἀριθμῶν to show that, so far as the present argt. goes, the latter must mean the former. Without following the argt. one would not see the point of this, and at the same time one might note that ἐπλεονέκτησε had no case. Assume further that ἄλλων was in old minuscule, but written small and with a slight running of the ink at the λλ. Now when λ occurs double it closely resembles ψ, both being approximately a +. When then this τῶν ἄλλων comes to be read and copied both scribes think it belongs to ἐπλεονέκτησε; one of them reads it correctly and puts it down, the other sees no sense in it and takes it for a blotted ἄψεων, which he thinks more suited to the context. In any case this paragraph on touch has been somewhat tampered with. τῷ ισφ τούτῳ refers back to φ. Fic. 'quanto, tanto'; but 'by this equal amount' seems an odd phrase. Might τούτῳ be govd. by τῷ ισφ, and alone refer to φ, 'by an amount equal to this, by the equal of this amount'? The amount of course is one. ἐπειτα like λοιπὸν

carries out the idea of starting at one and adding C on numbers in a row. *ἐν τε τῷ σο Υ; τ ἔντετῷ c.*

ἄλλα μὲν implies that the units follow in a line.

p. 23. **οὐκοῦν ... οὐ γάρ:** Fic. alters the tense of φαμέν, makes it govern the sent., and assumes φαμὲν in the answer. φαμὲν is so far parenth. as to leave the constr. independent, and the sent. is neg. in sense but interrog. in original form. ‘Is it not the case then, we say, that the others-than-the-one neither are one nor have part in it?’ = But as a fact, we say, the others neither are nor have? In τὰ ἄλλα·τοῦ·ἔνδος as one, the τοῦ ἔνδος are intentionally added to fortify the concl.

ἴνστιν ... ἐνόντος So Υ, but with ‘and’ and ‘patched. Notes 1.: t gives *ἐν ἔστιν* and *ὄντος*. One can sympathize with the uncertainty. The feeling that the sense might be *οὐδὲν ἄρα εἰς ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις* may present itself. Fic. ‘Ex iis conficitur ut non sit in aliis numerus unus quippe cum unum illis minime adsit’; and Thoms. adopts *ἐν ‘non ergo unus numerus est in aliis’*—both apparently meaning ‘the number one.’ On the purport of the statement Thoms. refers to Plotin. Enn. v. 5, 4, and quotes Hierocles in Aur. Carm. xx., *ἡ μὲν γὰρ μόνας ὡς ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ τὰς πάντων δυνάμεις ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνέχει.* He further quotes Sext. Emp. Contra Phys. Lib. x., following the Pythagorean μόνας and ἀόριστος δύνας, and finally cps. 147 A. It must be remembered that if number even to the extent of ‘one’ crept into the others the argt. is upset, for that one with ‘the one’ = ‘two,’ and two give touch. But if Pl. had meant *ἐν* he would have worded his statement more clearly.

D **οὐτε ἄλλον ... οὐδέν:** The constr. is *οὐτε [ἴστιν τὰ ἄλλα] ἔχοντα δύνομα οὐδὲν ἄλλον ἀριθμοῦ = οὐτε ἔχει δύνομα* etc. Exspectabam *οὐδενός*. Heind.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα ... οὐ, καὶ etc. Heind. and Bek. following Schleierm. reject the second *ἐν* referring to c, *εἰ δὲ γε ἐν μόνον ἔστιν.* Stallb. seems right in objecting: but he seems to treat the words as = *τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἔστιν ἐν μόνον.* Why not ‘only the one, therefore (and not the others), is one; and thus two cannot exist?’ In c on number Pl. declared that if we had only one and no two, touch vanished. He now applies this to the one and the others, and finds that, so far as they are concerned, (1) the necessary one exists only in the one, (2) the absence of one and

of number from the others shuts out the existence of two also. If, after directly referring to the others, he said, *τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἔστιν*, would he not deny existence as well as number to them?

I48 D-I49 D. The question of touch was mentioned I38 A, but only to prove that the one could not be either in itself or in another. Here we have the one in itself and in the others, therefore it touches in each case. Thus far touch is dealt with from the point of view of one thing inside and one thing outside another, and in I38 A the phrase used is *πολλαχῆ κύκλῳ ἀπτεσθαι*. 1. Now he urges that the one is in ‘the others,’ and therefore touches them, I48. He does not prove that it is, but assumes it from what has gone before. In Dem. I. I38 A he speaks of the one being *ἐν ἄλλῳ*, and in II. I45 E he says *ἐν ἄλλῳ* and *ἐν ἔτερῳ*: in I46 D-E we have *ὅσα μὴ ἐν ἔστιν ἀπανθ' ἔτεροι τοῦ ἔνδος, ἔτερον ἄρα ἀν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν ... ἐνείη ἀν τὸ ἔτερον*, but that seems to be the utmost that can be urged as proof that it is in the others. We must assume that *ἐν ἄλλῳ*, *ἐν ἔτερῳ*, *ἐν ἄλλοις*, mean the same thing: and the touch is that of neck and necklace. 2. Next the one is in itself, and touch of the same kind occurs. I45 C affirms that one as parts is within itself as whole: which is true in the sense that the bricks are in the wall. But the wall does not touch the bricks, nor they it. To get touch we must have at least a film in addition to the parts, as we have in the roe of a fish. But at once the objection urged in I38 B applies—*οὐκ οὖν ἔτερον μὲν ἀν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον.* 3. So far his case is not strong. He now chooses a way of his own to subvert it. Touch, it seems, is external only: and if one is to touch itself *δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κεῖσθαι—ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν.* The touch is now that of two beads: and one cannot touch itself. 4. But the stress comes when he seeks to show that the one cannot touch the others. Touch being external, it is immaterial to say that the one is in the others locally: his cue now is to prove that it is not in them logically. Three ideas run through his argt.—touch is external: it needs number as far at least as two: it goes in a straight line, so that there is one touch less than the things touching. He then shows that the others have no number in them, on the logical ground

that the idea 'others' excludes 'one'—see 147 A. If this holds, his case is made out. 'The one' gives 1, and if 'the others' yielded even another 1, then $1 + 1 = 2$ and touch may exist. Why then the idea of a straight line? There seem to be two reasons. 1. If touch went in a circle, as we have it in a rosary, there would be as many touches as there are things touching, and this would seem to him somehow to clash with the idea that two things are needed to make one touch, while he must have 'two' or his argt. from number fails. 2. If he can make out that—given a number of 'ones'—there will be a touch less than that number; then in the event of the others being such a collection of ones, touch will fall short of overtaking them. If these do not account for the introd. of this bizarre idea it is hard to explain its presence. We might ask, Would the one touch the others as a body or as individuals? But this is shut out by his line of argt. Thoms. says 'Unum quatenus est supra omnia tactus omnis est expers, quatenus autem cum aliis conjugitur tangere dicitur et tangi Procl. in Theol. Plat. Lib. 6, cap. 24, τὸ δὲ ἀπτόμενον τῶν ἄλλων ἐν, καὶ οὐχ ἀπτόμενον, καὶ συνέζευκται πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὑπερίδρηται αὐτῶν (l. -δρυται). Super and ὑπερ imply something above argt.; but Pl. professes to argue throughout.

τον̄ ἔστι In Η (Notes 1.) the gap between *ἴστον* and *ἔστι* represents an eras. of several letters. Some early blunder had been made. As to the statement Thoms. says 'in semet ipso esse, i.e. stare Pythagoraei aequalitati tribuebant, in alia autem transire seu moveri inaequalitati competere credebat. Sext. Empir. Lib. x. adv. Phys., Τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐναντίων ἔλεξαν ἄρχειν—γένους τάξιν ἐπέχον—τὸ ίστον καὶ τὸ ἀνιστον ἐν τούτοις γάρ ή πάντων τῶν ἐναντιούμένων θεωρεῖται φύσις ολον μόνης μὲν ἐν ισότητι, κινήσεως δὲ ἐν ἀνισότητι, ἐπιδέχεται γάρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥσσον.' τὸ ἐν η̄ τάλλα η̄ ἐλαττον, it is odd to find η̄ τάλλα thus followed by η̄ ἐλαττον, espec. when the genit. of comp. occurs immediately, τὸν ἐνός. η̄ αὐτὸν η̄ τάλλα, Notes 1.

ἄρα οὐκ ... ταῖς οὐσίαις οὐκ here goes with what follows and is strengthened by οὐτε οὐτε: ἄρα begins to tell at εἰ μέν, and the whole might stand ἄρα (οὐκ ἀν ... οὐσίαις ἄλλα) εἰ μὲν πρὸς ... ἐλαττον; ἄρα indicates interrogation; but, to make the interrog.

form expecting an affirm. answer correct, we must understand οὐκ twice—ἄρα οὐκ (οὐκ ἀν ... ἄλλα) εἰ μὲν etc. Both MSS. read ἄρα, which would be better but for its position. Considering the repetition of ἀν and the awkward turn of the sentence, the reading οὐκ ἄρα τῷ μὲν would be welcome if there were any authority for it. And all objcs. would vanish if we simply omitted ἄρα here as an early confus. with ἄρα οὐν above; or alternatively read εἰ ἄρα μεῖζον εἰη ... οὐκ ἀν As Stallb. says, καὶ τάλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός = καὶ τῷ τάλλα εἶναι ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός. The words τῷ μὲν ἐν ... τοῦ ἐνός, and αὐταῖς γε ταύταις οὐσίαις explain each other: the one and the others are not equal or unequal καθ' αὐτὰ or in virtue of their own nature, but by receiving into themselves equality etc. [ἄλλο] is bracketed as having no meaning. It may be due to confus. with the τάλλα above. For ἐκάτερα one would almost expect the sing.; but τάλλα are themselves plural, which may decide the writer's bias. The word goes with ἔχοεν not with τοιαῦτα εἶναι. τὰ δὲ σμικρότητα, so both MSS., and the τὰ may be used carelessly in antith. to τὰ μέν, though it refers to the one, and edd. read τὸ δέ. Phps. it is a feeling of this diffic. as well as a sense of the repeated use of μὲν δὲ in the sent. that leads t to write τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ as a guidē to the connec. The relation of the particles throughout seems to be as follows:—

οὐκ ἀν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι—ἄλλα εἰ ἔχοεν [= ἄλλὰ τῷ ἔχειν, οτ τῷ δὲ ἔχειν]

εἰ μὲν [= τῷ μὲν ἔχειν]	ἄλληλα·	εἰ δὲ [= τῷ δὲ ἔχειν]
-------------------------	---------	-----------------------

[η̄] τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ	η̄ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν—σμικρότητα δὲ
-------------------	----------------------------------

ὅποτέρῳ μὲν ... φ δὲ ...

and the whole might stand εἰ τὸ ἐν μεῖζον η̄ ἐλαττον εἰη τῶν ἄλλων, η̄ αὐτὸν τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, οὐκ ἀν αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ—τῷ ἐν καὶ τάλλα εἶναι—μείζω η̄ ἐλαττον ἐν εἰη ἄλλήλων' ἄλλὰ τῷ μὲν ἐκάτερον ἔχειν πρὸς τούτῳ ισότητα ίστα ἀν εἰη, τῷ δὲ τὸ μὲν μέγεθος ἔχειν τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα τὸ μὲν μεῖζον τὸ δὲ ἐλαττον ἀν εἰη. μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἐν is his second altern., but it is one which would not apparently be thought of by a Pythagorean. Thoms. quotes Sext. Emp. as above, ἄλλὰ η̄ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ η̄ ἐλλειψίς κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀορίστον δύναδος λόγον τέτακται: also Auctor Theol. Arithm.

ἐκάλοντι δὲ τὸ ἵστον τάξιν συμφωνίας ἐν μείζονι καὶ ἐλάττονι οἱ περὶ Ἐμπεδ. καὶ Παρμ. καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν, φάμενοι τὴν μοναδικὴν φύσιν ἑστίας τρόπον (like the hearth) ἐν μέσῳ ἰδρύσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἴσόρροπον φυλάσσειν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔδραν. τῷ εἶδει so both MSS. and the word is quoted by Proc.-Dam., ὅποτέρω μὲν εἴδη (-ει?) ἐκ τούτων, η̄ τῷ ἐνὶ η̄ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγεθος προσείη (vi. 276). Yet we have the word in the next line. There it is used in its well-known ideal sense of αὐτὸν τὸ μέγεθος and αὐτὴ η̄ σμικρότης: here it is used of τὸ ἐν and τὰ ἄλλα in which these ideas are to be found. Thus (1) if the sense is the same in both cases then we have quite unexpectedly and in isolation a practical illustr. of μέθεξις of εἴδη by εἴδη such as S. spoke of at the beginning, which disposes at once of the view which pervades Stallb.'s commentary that τὸ ἐν is an εἶδος but τὰ ἄλλα not: these are on the same footing in that respect—both or neither: (2) if we have not this μέθεξις then τῷ εἶδει must be used in a different sense from εἴδη, and as a fact Ast classes the expression with such as ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει, τὸ τῶν Ἰπποκενταύρων εἶδος; while Jowett calls it 'class.' But why choose this particular place to speak of τὸ ἐν as an 'appearance' or 'class' or 'shape'? It is certainly as little reasonable as the use of ὅρων (B) which troubles edd. Yet ἐν τοῖς οὐσίαις ἐγγιγνοίσθην below makes for this view. εἴδη entering into τὰ τῆδε is sound Platonic doctrine; but if τὰ τῆδε are in this case to be themselves εἴδη the fact is broached with little ceremony, while it is as well worthy of elucidation as the question whether one is equal to the others.

ἔστον τέ τινε etc. Both MSS. give τε, yet edd. naturally prefer γε. Heind. wishes τὼ before εἴδη and in t a τω is erased and εἴδη written. The article however would throw the whole stress upon ἔστον = do not these two εἴδη exist?, while its absence makes the noun part of the predicate = οὐκοῦν τούτων ἔστον τινε εἴδη. Below he says μὴ διτέ γε = εἰ μὴ εἴτην, which in turn rather makes for ἔστον in the sense of existence. Nothing would be lost to the present argt. if οὐκοῦν ... πᾶς γάρ ἀν: were dropped. It is a mere aside, to justify once again the existence of εἴδη. If it does anything more it adds to the unlikelihood of the view that ἐν and τὰ ἄλλα are meant here to be εἴδη, by its

leaving them—the principals in the discussion—unmentioned.

οὐχὶ η̄ εἰ τοι ... μεῖζων: This alternative of sup- ¹⁵⁰ posing that when one thing is in another the two may be equal, or one may be bigger and contain the other, is not dwelt upon when ἐν is called ὄλον and πάντα τὰ μέρη (145). These are indeed regarded as two views of the same ἐν, yet the whole contains all the parts and not the converse, so that it must be the bigger of the two. It is noteworthy that he here reverses the view of μέθεξις of the εἴδη given in 131. There the diffic. was how to divide the εἶδος among many partakers: here he asks whether the partaker receives the whole εἶδος in the whole or part of itself. Contrad. arises under both views.

πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους etc. = to assume the rôle of, perform the function of. Does he mean playfully to bid smallness mind its own affairs καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν? Rep. IV. 433 A, ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτὸν πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἔστι.

οὔτε γε etc. The οὔτε is unusual standing alone. ^B The sense of course is (ἀλλ' ...) ναὶ scarcely breaking it οὔτε ἐν ὅλῳ, οὔτε γε ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ μέρει. It reads οὔτι, which has good parallels in Pl., e.g. Phaed. 81 D, εἰκὸς μέντοι, ... καὶ οὔτι γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ... ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων. So Bek. reads; while Heind. says 'Malim οὐ τοι γε = neque tamen.' Herm. says 'οὐδέ γε Herm. ex Oxon. vestigiis ubi est οὔτε γε: editi οὔτι γε, quod foret certe non ut Phaed. c. 30 [the passage quoted above]; cf. nos ad Lucian. Hist. Conscr. p. 183.' If he means that Ι shows signs of patching he seems wrong. Perhaps οὔτε may stand, as showing the orig. design of the sent., which was found to need ἀλλ' ... μέρει as it went on. L. and S. cite a case of οὔτε alone, Arist. Phys. III. 8, 1, οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα η̄ γένεσις μὴ ἐπιλείπῃ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνεργεῖᾳ ἀπειρον ἐναι σῶμα αἰσθητόν. With ἀλλ', εἴπερ Stallb. cps. 138 D, εἴπερ γε δή: and Heind. quotes many cases of ellipse with εἴπερ; we may add Arist. Met. VI. 1, 3.

Δὲ μὴ for this phrase after a neg. (= otherwise), Heind. cps. 132 E, and we may add Arist. Met. VI. 5, 1030 b 34. Διὸ ἀποτον τὸ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς τοιούτοις τό τι ἦν εἶναι εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἰς ἀπειρον εἶσιν. ταῦτα ποιήσει, Notes I. ποιήσῃ must be wrong.

τὸν δύτων The proof really is a general one, although he deals only with *τὸ ἐν*.

c μεῖζον γὰρ etc. He overstrains: he has admitted above A that when one thing is in another it may be ἔξιστον αὐτῷ πεπαμένον. The argt. holds, however, as μεῖζον cannot be ἕτον any more than σμικρότης can. In ἀλλο, καὶ πλῆν Heind. wants καὶ first. καὶ gives emph. in either case, and where it stands it may point the anal. to πλῆν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος which precedes: καὶ ταῦτα just below is still stronger; ἔκεινο, i.e. τὸ ἐν. καὶ ταῦτα ... γὰρ μέγα. The ταῦτα is idiomatic, we use the sing. Heind., Bek., and Stallb. all take αὐτοῦ to be the read. here, and Heind. shows acuteness in changing it to αὐτῷ [=ἔκεινῳ τῷ μεῖζον]. But see Notes 1. The sense is 'nor will bigness be in it either. For thus there would be something else bigger—ay, independently of bigness itself—that namely within which bigness was; and this moreover when it is not furnished with smallness, the thing which it is essential that it should surpass if it really is big.' Of course a plea might be urged for αὐτοῦ, which Stallb. reads. He rightly notes that smallness is not here annihilated, but only excluded from meeting bigness within the one.

D. 24. αὐτὸν μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλον etc. Stallb. justly cites 133 C. In οὐτε ἄρα ... οὐτε αὐτὸν ἐν P!. chooses to begin with τὰ ἄλλα on which he has led no explicit proof, and end with τὸ ἐν on which the whole proof has turned. We would expect οὐτε ἄρα τὸ ἐν ... οὐτε αὐτὸν τούτω ... οὐτε αὐτὸν τὰ ἄλλα (which are included but by implication only—see οὐδὲ ἐνὶ ... τῶν δύτων B). This freedom of order is common in Pl., and still more that of passing from one illustr. to another analogous. So Arist., e.g. Met. vi. chap. 7, after μέρος τῆς οἰκίας οἷον οἱ λίθοι, gives η οἰκία πλινθίην ἄλλον πλίνθου, and again ὁ ἄνδριας οὐ λίθος ἄλλα λίθινος [usually χαλκοῦς] followed by οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἄνδριας ξύλον ἄλλα παράγεται ξύλινος: so χαλκὴ σφαῖρα and χαλκοῦς κύκλος are interchanged. Note the negs. here. First οὐτε οὐτε οὐτε: then within the sphere of the first and last of these μήτε μήτε: finally within the sphere of the last τούτων οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων and μεῖζον οὐδὲ ἔλαττον. The inference may be that had he been using μὴ in the last cases he would have put μήτε τούτων μήτε τῶν ἄλλων and μήτε μεῖζον μήτε ἔλαττον. But he cannot use οὐτε

τούτοιν οὐτε τῶν ἄλλων etc., lest confus. should arise with the main οὐτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ τούτῳ so t. Notes 1.

ἴχετον So t. Υ ἔχέτω. There is a small final ν like a ν which if written after an ο might be taken for the latter half of a careless ω, p. cxi.

οὐτε αὐτὸν ἐν τούτοιν So t. Υ οὐτε αὐτῷ ἐν τούτοιν which cannot be right. Notes 1. He deals with three entities, ἐν, τὰ ἄλλα, and τούτω, i.e. smallness and bigness.

ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν etc. Thoms. quotes Porphyr. Sent. 36, τὸ δύτως δύν οὐτε μέγα οὐτε σμικρόν ἔστι—τὸ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κυρίως ὅγκου ὕδια.

οὐκ οὖν καὶ τόδε etc. Notes 1. We must supply 151 mentally something with τόδε. Stallb. justly cps. 141 C: there are many examples.

μηδὲν εἶναι ... τῶν ἄλλων: This is explicit. He uses, as we have seen, several antith. to the one, τὰ πολλά, τὸ ἔτερον, τὰ ἄλλα, ἄλλο and τὰ μὴ ἐν. The last is best here; for ἐν—μὴ ἐν, = A—not-A, include all possibilities. Arist. indicates in various places that τὸ ἐν is used in different senses, generally giving four. Thus Met. IV. 6, 1016 b 10, καὶ γὰρ ἀριθμοῦμεν ὡς πλείω η τὰ μὴ συνεχῆ, η δύν μὴ ἐν τὸ εἶδος, η δύν ὁ λόγος μὴ εἰς: and below ἔτι δὲ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμόν ἔστιν ἐν, τὰ δὲ κατ' εἶδος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν,—ἀριθμῷ μὲν δύν η ὑλη μία, εἰδεῖ δύν ὁ λόγος εἰς, γένει δύν τὸ αὐτὸν σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας, κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ὅστα ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. So again Met. IX. 1, 1052 a 34, λέγεται μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐν τοσαυταχῶς—τὸ τε συνεχὲς φύσει, καὶ τὸ δύλον, καὶ τὸ καθ' ἔκαστον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου.

καὶ εἶναι πον ... ἐν τῷ δύν We have more than one condit. of exist. laid down in the dial. for τὸ ἐν. Here we have apparently the condit. of space (we have τὴν ἔχομένην χώραν 148 E), and although he speaks metaphor. of a νοητὸς τόπος he can hardly be held as speaking so here. If he speaks literally then τὸ ἐν cannot be an εἶδος. But Stallb. interprets καὶ εἶναι πον as 'aliquam habere cum alio necessitudinem et conjunctionem,' which is a logical 'being in somewhere,' not a spacial one.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν etc. The one has been proved somehow or other to be in another, or in the different. This is the first case in which it is proved—per imposs.—to be ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. The argt. is—all that exists must be somewhere: the one and the others are all that exists: therefore the

one and the others are in each other. Here too Stallb. holds his ground: 'Meminerimus enim necesse est haec omnia ita disputari ut rerum sub sensu cadentium rationes ad ipsas ideas transferantur.' Thoms. argues, 'Unum quidem est in aliis sed omnia implet et nusquam est. Plotin. Ennead. 3, Lib. 9, cap. 3, πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς πλῆθος; ὅτι πανταχοῦ οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ὄπουοῦν. πάντα οὖν πληροῖ. πολλὰ οὖν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα εἴδη· αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ εἰ μόνον πανταχοῦ, αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ τὰ πάντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ γίνεται, τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτό, ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἔκεινο. Conf. Procl. in Theol. Plat. Lib. 1, cap. 2. Patebit ex his quomodo respondendum fuissest ad propositam quaestionem anne aequale sibi sit unum et aliis et inaequale, quae his premissis nititur, quod unum in se sit et in aliis, quod majus sit et minus se ipso et aliis.'

149 E-151 B. The stages of the argt. upon equality and inequality are as follows:—*a.* (1) The one and the others, if equal or unequal between themselves, are so only through having in them the ideas equality, bigness, or smallness—for there are such ideas in existence. (2) But the existence of these ideas in the one and the others leads to a series of contrads., and the conclus. is that (149 E-150 D. 3) the one and the others cannot be equal or unequal one towards the other, because they have not equality, bigness, or smallness in them, and because those ideas have their respect. relats. only towards each other. Here we have an almost startling return to the argt. of the first sect. of the dial. In Dem. I. the present conclus. was reached without this machinery. There (140 B-D) the argt. which immediately succeeds this did effective duty—equality meant the same number of measures, and so of parts, and the one had no parts. Here that argt. will not apply, because the one as existent has already been proved to have parts. Now it may be granted—although this is not how Pl. uses the argt.—that the conceps. of one and others in themselves do not involve ref. to size; and that if size is to enter it does so κατὰ συμβεβηκός. To Pl. for the present, it seems that the only means by which size can come in is by the entrance of three ideas; and as these cannot enter, size remains out. But note that he does not argue out the case as regards *ισότης*—perhaps for the reason that there is no

absurdity in fancying equality as occupying the whole of the one, and so being equal to it. The absurdity here would arise only if *μέγεθος* also occupied the same ground and became equal to equality. If we read the whole argt. fairly over from *εἰ μείζον* 149 E to *φαίνεται γε* 150 D, we can hardly help feeling, notwithstanding, the express. ὅποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἴδει (149 E), that *ισότης μέγεθος σμικρότης* as *εἴδη* stand in one class, and that *τὸ ἐν* and *τὰ ἄλλα* are grouped together as co-ord. members of a totally diff. class (if Stallb. is right in thinking *τὸ ἐν* an *εἴδος*, then again *τὰ ἄλλα* must go with it, for they are treated alike); and for the second time it is proved that *εἴδη* have no useful function in metaphys. In arguing that the one and the others are not equal or unequal because they don't possess the ideas of equality etc., Pl. seems to make two mistakes. He fails to see that he should have a single idea of inequality, though this is a small matter: and he fails to ask—how then are the one and the others 'one' and 'others' without the interpos. of suitable *εἴδη*? He speaks of their being such *τῷ ἐν εἶναι* and *τῷ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι*—is this then what Arist. would call their *ὑποκείμενον* which is postulated as a substance whereof size in its various forms is to be predicated by the aid of *εἴδη*? *ἀπορήσειε δὲ ἀν τις*, as he would say.

b. (1) The one and the others, not having in them bigness and smallness, cannot exceed or be exceeded. (2) Two things which mutually neither exceed nor are exceeded must be equal: so (150 D-E. 3) the one and the others are equal. Here we have the argt. by exclus., as we have had on several occasions: but it will scarcely serve in its present position. Why does he not say—Things which, viewed in regard to size, possess neither 'bigness' nor 'smallness' must possess 'equality'? And if they are equal merely by not possessing bigness or smallness, are they not equal *τῷ ἐν εἶναι* and *τῷ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι*, which was impossible? It is true that the one and the others when viewed as the two factors of a compound concep. may be called equal, in the sense of being co-ord. or equally essential. But Pl. is speaking of equality not logically but spacially.

c. (1) The one, being in itself, is also around itself: so (150 E. 2) the one is bigger and smaller than itself. Here we get clear away from the

$\epsilon\delta\eta$ again. The process began with the absence of exceeding and being exceeded as steps to prove equality, and now it is complete. We may talk of the one and the others as being equal and unequal without reference to $\epsilon\delta\eta$ at all. But his conclus. is reached by falling back on the view which he took in 138 A and 145 C, and which he adheres to in what remains of the argt. (d), that if one thing be in another, or in itself viewed as another, bigger and smaller are the only terms which can be used in describing the situation. Now he has just contended (150 A) that 'smallness' might, if in the one, 'play the part of equality,' because of being $\xi\zeta \iota\sigma\omega\tau \tau\hat{\eta} \epsilon\nu \delta\iota'$ δλού αὐτοῦ τεταμένη. If then smallness might thus be equal to the one, it seems still more natural that the one might in the same way be equal to itself, and not bigger or smaller.

d. (1) The one and the others represent all that exists. (2) Whatever exists must be somewhere: so (151 A-B. 3) the one and the others must be in each other, and thus (4) must be greater and smaller than each other. This cancels the idea of $\chi\omega\rho\alpha$, which was assumed in the argt. on touch (148 E), where the one and the others lay outside of each other and the latter occupied $\tau\hat{\eta}\nu \dot{\epsilon}\chi\omega\rho\mu\eta\eta$ χώραν to the former. Or alternatively the one and the others must include space between them. Yet he adheres to the view indicated at several points that existence is spacial—whatever is must be somewhere—and as this is contrary to the nature of the $\epsilon\delta\eta$ which are in a νοητὸς τόπος, the one and the others cannot be $\epsilon\delta\eta$. If they are, we must suppose Pl., as Stallb. does, to be speaking figuratively throughout—yet what would be his motive? But again he does not prove his conclus. The one and the others comprise all that is; but they are not necessitated to be in each other unless they are first precluded from being each in itself, while the one has been expressly declared to be in itself. It must be admitted that the lang. throughout Dem. II. is ambig. and confus. Before leaving the subj. we may raise another point on this reappear. of the $\epsilon\delta\eta$ of smallness, bigness, and equality. Since mentioning these before he has talked freely of the infinite divisib. of the one. Now, as Arist. points out (Met. ix. 1 and elsewhere), if you speak of one as a starting point, a unit of measurement, $\delta\delta\iota\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon$

τὸν τὸ ἐν ή ἀπλῶς η̄ γ̄ ε̄ν : it is your terminus a quo. But if you are searching for that which you may call one because it does not admit of being made smaller—for one as your terminus ad quem, as an atom—you will fail to find it; φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι πᾶν συνεχὲς διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά (Phys. vi. 1 etc.). Now this has a bearing on Pl.'s idea of $\sigma\mu\kappa\rho\tau\eta\varsigma$. That is an idealized minimum of extens. At 132 the process by which $\epsilon\delta\eta$ are reached is said to be comparison—smallness then should be gradually attained by compar. of smaller and smaller things. He admitted there that this was an endless process. Since then he has (144) exhibited the one as $\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\pi\alpha$ τὸ πλῆθος. And smallness is by the nature of it to be smaller than the smallest part of one—how is it then to be got at? Again when got at it is *not* to be smaller than anything save bigness, which in turn is bigger (?) than the biggest of sensible objects.

καὶ ἀριθμῷ Heind. would change this to ἀριθμόν, c to accord with τὸ πλῆθος and τὸν ἀριθμὸν in D: but At are clear, and to be consist. he needs τόν.

καὶ ιστον ισων etc. As Stallb. notes we must understand. p. 25. έαυτῷ with ισων from the preceding έαυτοῦ, and conversely extract αὐτοῦ for πλειόνων and ἐλαττόνων from αὐτῷ, the last construc. being (Heind.) ident. with ισων ... αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις above. Just before that in B we have the other altern., ισων τε καὶ μεῖζον ... αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, and again in the summing up below E.

151 B-E. This argt. may be compd. with that at 140 C. He uses the concep. of $\mu\acute{e}trōn$ or $\mu\acute{e}trā$ solely as a lever to prove something else, not as a separate attrib. of the one, and brings it in quite incidentally as a thing of course. But if he possesses a 'measure' without assistance from the $\epsilon\delta\eta$, can he not determine equality and inequality without reference to them? And does he not perceive that in a well-regulated world of $\epsilon\delta\eta$ an $\epsilon\delta\oslash$ of 'measure' would be much more useful than one of 'bigness,' 'smallness,' and 'equality'? Again, is not a measure simply a unit, a one? Is it a suspicion of this that causes Pl. to insert (140 D) εὶ δέ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἴη ισων ἀν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ—for he is measuring a one? When he speaks of one as the source of number (148 E-149 D), he is treating his one as itself a $\mu\acute{e}trōn$: and when again he speaks of his one as divisible into parts he is

treating it as a *μετρητόν*, as a *ἐν συνεχέσι*. The quest. naturally arises why in both cases Pl. mentions measures after he has referred to equality and inequality. An extended thing will contain measures whether we know that it is equal to any other thing or not. Pths. he does so because equality and inequality more than any other terms apply to extension—as Arist. says, Met. iv. 13, 1020 a 23, *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα λεγόμενα, τοῦ ποσοῦ πάθη καθ' αὐτά*. When Pl. extends his inference about measures and numbers etc. to the others, he of course turns his back upon the contention in 149 B-C that the latter had no one and no number.

E *ἔναι μὲν πον* The *πον* here has not the local sense which it had A, *καὶ εἶναι πον δεῖ*. It means ‘I presume,’ as in *οὐ γάρ πον* 152 B below. *τὸ δὲ εἶναι ... τὸ ήν ... τὸ ἔσται*. Analog. would require infns. throughout. There is of course no infn. for *ην*: but he comes nearer to uniformity in 141 C, *καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔστεσθαι*.

152 *κοινωνία*: The MSS. on which Aldus, Stephanus etc. relied have *κοινωνίας*: but Steph. said ‘*substituendus nomin.*’ and so Η. *μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου*, t and others read *μετέχειν*, which apparently has led to a reading *μετέχειν μὲν ἄρα ἔστι χρόνου*. Heind. does not doubt ‘*quin post ἄρα textu exciderit ἀνάγκη quod expressit in vers.*’ Fic.: “*ergo si ipso esse participat, necesse est temporis quoque esse particeps.*” *Nisi quis scribere maluerit: μετέχον μὲν ἄρα ἔστι.*” A good case of conjecture going wrong.

πορευομ. τοῦ χρόνου; Thoms. ‘*Strato tempus compositum esse dicebat ἐκ μερῶν μὴ μενόντων apud Dam. fol. 280.*’ *μεμνήμεθα* refers to 141 A-B.

B *αὐτοῦ οὗτο*; Had the pron. been ill-formed in the archet.? *ἢ ἀν τον, and t αὐτοῦ **.

ἔστι δὲ ... τὸ νῦν: The *ἔστι δὲ πρεσβ.* gains force from preceding *ἄρα*. Ast cps. 147 A above, *τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρα μόριά ἔστιν*; and cites other cases of the usage. *ἡ γιγνόμενον*, the part. is predicative = *ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι, ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ*; being a stage more indep. of *ἡ* than it is of *τύχη* in *ὅ τι ἀν τύχη γιγνόμενον* D below. It is only to onlookers that this is an isolated act on the part of the one, as he says below D, *τό γε μῆν νῦν ἀεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἐνὶ* etc. Carlyle is fond of calling the present time the meeting point

of two eternities, but this too is a judgment from without. The one if conscious knows of the future only that it is the next moment, and of the past that it is the sum of the moments up to the passing one.

ἐπίσχει τότε etc. ‘*Hoc significat Parm., praesentis c temporis articulum a futuro esse sejunctum ac separatum, ita ut τὸ ἐν, dum in eo versetur, nondum temporis particeps sit futuri.*’ Stallb. The present moment is a punctum saliens: we must think of it in both its capacities. Unless we can seize it as a separate entity, being in the sensible world does not exist: *οὐδὲ ἀν ποτε ληφθεῖη*. That is the aspect of the question on which Heraclitus and his followers dwelt, in so much that Cratylus *τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν φέτο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλεῖτῷ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι διτὶ δις τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι*’ *αὐτὸς γὰρ φέτο οὐδὲ ἄπαξ.* Arist. Met. III. 5, 1020 a 12. Of course as a fact the present is a good deal more than *τὸ νῦν*: our memory unconsciously extends it. Proc.-Dam. vi. 282 says *μεταφέρει δὲ λεληθότως τὸ γίγνεται εἰς τὸ ἔστιν, ὃ ἔστι μεταξὺ τοῦ ἡνὶ καὶ ἔσται· τὸ γάρ γιγνόμενον κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον ‘ἔστι’ λέγεται ... εἰ γὰρ πρόειστι κατὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι πάντως οὐ κρατηθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν.* It does not occur to Pl. either here or above 141, to discuss what time is: he merely treats of one as influenced by an accepted conception called time. We gather incidentally that time is to him a something which may be partaken of, which passes, and which has a present moment of brief duration called now. The one, again, while passing through time, becomes; but when at now, is. We shall hear of this later, 156. The passage seems to have struck some reader—perhaps Arethas—as ‘seasonable’ and suggestive, for he has marked it with the usual contr. for *ώραν*.

προῖδεν ... ληφθεῖη (= *κρατηθείη* in Dam.) i.e. *εἴ γάρ προίσιοι οὐκ ἀν* etc.: he does not use the indicative, though he must assume the condit. as denied.

πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμ. may be either in the acc. as subj. to *παρελθεῖν* while understood in the nom. as subj. to *ἐπίσχει* and *ἡ*, or the exact converse. In favour of the former view is the point that *παρελθεῖν* would have to wait for its subj. and be left unprovided: in favour of the latter it may be urged that in its present position, following *ἀνάγκη* and *μή*, the phrase should rather have been *μηδὲν τῶν γιγνομένων*. The grammar would have been safer had he written *πᾶν*

δὲ τὸ γυγνόμενον εἰ γε ἀνάγκη etc. Our pointing makes the phrase nom. to ἐπίσχει.

p. 16. D Ιντύχῃ τῷ νῦν, etc. So t, and it is clearly necess.: Υ τὸ, νῦν. If the passage were dictated τῷ might be confused with τό, and νῦν taken momentarily as going with ἐπεσχειν. This last is a sudden appearance of the aorist, and may be used both in its momentary and in its iterative capacity. It is an odd instance of the difficulty we have in expressing τὸ ληφθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν: the present tense is too continuous, and whilst we are using the instantaneous aorist the present has become the past. The present moment is a present moment; but if we are to realize it and think of it as such, we do that in the *next* moment, and retain this one in the memory to be dwelt on as an atom of the past. οὐκοῦν οὐπέρ ἔγιγνετο so t, and it can hardly but be right: Notes I. τό γε μῆν νῦν δὲ etc. Thoms. ‘Hinc illud Platonicum “aeternitas manet in uno.”’ Quod enim nec futuro nec praeterito tempori est obnoxium, sed semper in praesenti est, id demum est aeternum. Plotin. Ennead. 3, Lib. 7, cap. 2, δο οὖν μῆτε ἦν μῆτε ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἔστι μόνον, τοῦτο ἔστως ἔχον τὸ εἶναι, τῷ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ ἔσται μηδ' αὐτὸν μεταβεβληκέναι, ἔστιν δὲ αἰών. Hinc τὸ νῦν τὸ ἵχνος αἰώνιον dicitur. Dam. fol. 282.’

E πλείω δὲ ... ή τὸν ἔστον; Fic. ‘Quin etiam longiusne vel brevius tempus est aut fit quam ipsummet; an potius aequum?’ From this appearance of vel brevius and from the general use of ‘more, less, and equal’ in the work, Cornar., followed by Steph., suggested ή ἐλάττω after χρόνον; and Heind. would agree but finds no authority. The words occur neither in Υτ nor in any of Bekker’s MSS.; and Proc. - Dam. vi. 283 says ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ πλείω χρόνον αὐτὸν ἔστιν ή γίγνεται κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαινόμενον, ἔστον ἄρα. Stallb. thinks Pl. gets all he needs by the words as they stand, and cps. 157 B, ἐκ σμικροῦ ... εἴη ἀν̄ for needless meddling by Cor.

οὔτε νέωτ. ... οὔτε γίγνεται: So both MSS. But scholars find a diffic. in the last οὔτε and give altern. changes. (1) If οὔτε is to stand we must have οὔτε ἔστιν to balance it, and Heind. cps. 155 C, κατὰ δὴ etc., while Stallb. quotes Rep. II. 382 E, οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλος ἔξαπατ̄, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὐθ' ὑπάρ οὔτ' ὄντα. (2) If no οὔτε precedes ἔστιν we must read οὐδὲ γίγνεται,

for while τε has a coupling power and is repeated, δὲ has a disjunctive power and may stand alone. Heind. cps. 155 B where the connec. is οὔτε τὸ ἐν ... οὔτε τάλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ... γίγνεται ἀν̄ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον. And cp. further 150 D, where we have on the one hand οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὔτε, and μήτε ... μήτε twice repeated, and on the other a single οὐδὲ twice repeated, τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων, μείζον οὐδὲ ἐλάττον. Certainly as a rule οὔτε requires οὔτε, and it is οὐδὲ which can be used singly. But does this rule hold δὲ καὶ ἔξ ἀνάγκης (Arist.) or only ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ?—If the latter it may have exceptions κατὰ συμβεβηκός: and while we often have οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ for οὔτε ... οὔτε, we may perhaps have a single οὔτε in the sense of a single οὐδὲ. We have it in poetry, see L. and S. οὔτε II. 5 b. If the text is to be changed it seems all one as to sense which change is adopted: ‘neither is nor becomes’ will suit as well as ‘is neither younger etc. nor yet becomes so.’ Edd. read οὐδέ.

τι δαι, τῶν ἄλλων: ‘quo autem modo ad alia se ¹⁵³ habet?’ Fic. A loose rendering: Ast’s is better, ‘Quid vero? num ceteris? (i.e. junius aut senius est vel fit.)’ Gen. govd. by compars. underst.

εἴπερ ἐτερά ... ἀν̄ ἔχοι: ‘Nusquam Parm. τὸ ἄλλο aut τὸ ἐτερον in hac disput. sua memoravit, sed constanter numero plurali usus est. Cujus rei causa posita est in eo quod ideae natura sua unitatem habent, res adspectabiles autem per se omni carent unitate, quam per idearum demum vim accipiunt.’ Stallb. as usual. It may be that Parm. does not say τὸ ἄλλο or τὸ ἐτερον, but we have seen that he says ἄλλο and ἐτερον while meaning apparently the same thing. As for δο agreeing with ἐτερον, not with τὰ ἄλλα, Heind. contrasts 145 E where τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα is said of τὸ ἐν. The concord recurs in πλῆθος δὲ ὄν. Note the change of form in the cond. sents. ἐτερον μὲν γὰρ δο [=εὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐτερον ἦν τὰ ἄλλα] ἐν ἀν̄ ἦν and ἐτερα δὲ ὄντα [=εὶ ἐτερα ἔστι] πλείω ἐνός ἔστι, καὶ [εὶ πλείω ἐνός ἔστι] πλῆθος ἀν̄ ἔχοι. In (1) the suppos. is held as denied and the concl. as one to be rejected: in (2) the suppos. is held as true and a very obvious concl. is directly drawn: in (3) from that concl. as a suppos. a new concl., to which exception has formerly been taken, is drawn but not dogmatically. This last again is followed by another in the same form.

πλῆθος δὲ ... τοῦ ἐνός : This one is not, of course, the one of the dial, but the one of number. Yet he might equally have said *ἡ τὸ ἐν*, where the one of the dial, would have been meant. Proc.-Dam. (vi. 284) is less distinct, *πλῆθος δὲ ὅν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος τοῦ ἐνός μετέχοι ἄν*.

δλιγυστον Notes i. Ι has a scratch over -ov which recalls the δλιγυστὸν of 149 A; but there seems to be no eras. in the second u. Proc.-Dam. has τὸ δλιγυστὸν δέ. Thoms. says—‘Dam. περὶ Ἀρχ., Ms. fol. 2, invehitur in Speusipp. quod unum omnium rerum duxerit esse minimum, cum Parm. nihil uno esse majus defenderit. Sic Parm. in versibus apud Simpl. et Platon. in Soph. Sed vocat h. l. Parm. unum minimum utpote primum, cuiusque magnitudo non sit ex mole metienda. Ita Auct. Theol. Arithm. ἐκ μονάδος πᾶς ἀριθμός, η δὲ μονὰς τὸ ἔλαχιστον ἔστιν ἀριθμοῦ ἑκάστουν. Et ut evincat Parm. unum esse omnium primum, supponit hic alia numero constare, quod antea sustulerat,’ i. e. 149 B-C. The passage quoted, Sophist. 244 E, does not say of τὸ ὅν nihil uno esse majus, but that as regards shape it is σφαιρῆς ἐναλλγικιον ὅγκω, and οὐτε τι μεῖζον οὐτε τι βαιστέρον πελέναι χρέον ἔστι τῇ η τῇ.

B **πρῶτον δέ γε ... γεγονός** refers back to πρῶτον γέγονε as if nothing had intervened to interrupt. τὰ δὲ ὕστερον so Ι with ΠΔ, but t (whence the other MSS.) has ὕστερα which also occurs in Proc.-Dam. with τοῦ προτέρου γεγονότος.

τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν Proc.-Dam. vi. 285 says of this proof προσχράται δέ τῷ λήμματι τῷδε ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν τὸ ἐν οὐ γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἵνα εἰς οἰκεῖον τέλος καταντήσῃ τὸ ἐν ... διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τέλος οἰκεῖον λαμβάνει τὸ πῦρ ἀμα κινούμενον τὴν αὐτοῦ (?) κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν εἰδοποιηθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ὕσταται καὶ κινεῖται πρὸς τὰ ἄνω, καθὼς Ἀριστοτέλης φιλοσοφεῖ. προσχράται δὲ πρὸς τῷ λήμματι τούτῳ ... καὶ ἀλλῷ ὅτι μέρη ἔχει, καθὼς καὶ πρότερον ἀπεδείκνυε—144 B etc. As to the natural order of the one Dam. § 86, 201 says πάντα γάρ ἐν πρὸ τοῦ οἰκείου πλήθους (whether μέρη, σπουχέα, ορ εἶδη) ἔστι τῇ ἔαντον φύσει ... χαλαται τὸ ἐν εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν πολλῶν ... χώραν καὶ τούτοις παρεχόμενον εἰς ὑπόστασιν etc.

C **πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ** Heind. would like η here, but the statement is in general terms, and it may simply resume the word ἀρχὴν immediately before. Do π. πρ. mean as we say ‘first of all’ or ‘in the

case of all things first’? Probably the latter. So Proc.-Dam.—he also has η—οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πρότερον η ἀρχῆ.

καὶ τὰλλα πάντα Heind. would omit καὶ; but the MSS. give it, though Stallb. notes that Fic. does not.

καὶ μὴν ... ἐνός The order here is καὶ μὴν φήσομεν ταῦτα πάντα τὰλλα εἴναι μόριά γε τοῦ ... ἐνός. He repeats the τὰλλα πάντα of the previous sent. = these aforesaid, ‘all the rest.’ Stallb. seems almost annoyed at the presence of τὰλλα—‘quid enim? estne ipsum quoque initium pars τοῦ ἐνός atque totius?’ Cur igitur Parm. de iis solis loquitur quae principium excipiunt? He is right about the ἀρχῆ. The lang. is a little careless. But is not Stallb. thinking that he would rather not see ‘importunum istud τὰλλα’ standing for anything but sensible objects?

αὐτὸν τὸ ἐν Heind. would make τὸ ἐν a gloss p. 27. D wrongly included. It is the only use thus far of αὐτὸν τὸ ἐν, and its natural sense is not τὸ αὐτὸν-ἐν but ‘the one itself’ as distinct from the parts whose genesis he describes. ἀμα τελευτῇ ἀν ... ἀν probably the repeated ἀν is to enforce the nat. order of growth for the one—it follows the two important words. His argt. has been—Every whole must come into being in its natural order; i.e. cannot have come till all of it has come; i.e. must come last in order. He applies this in condensed form ὥστε ... γίγνεσθαι: ‘Thus, assuming that the one itself (the whole one) must come into being in its natural order alone (εἰπερ ... γίγνεσθαι), [it would arrive simultaneously with the end, and] if it has come into being simultaneously with the end, it would be its nature to come into being last of all.’ The Greek would be εἰπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμα τελευτῇ ἀν γεγονός εἴη, ὥστε, εἰπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν ἀμα τελευτῇ γεγονέναι, πεφύκος ἀν εἴη γίγνεσθαι ὕστατον τῶν ἄλλων. This should be ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων or ὕστατον πάντων: but Pl. wishes ὕστατον to make sure of its being *last*, and he wishes τῶν ἄλλων to say νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων.

νεώτ. ... πρεσβύτερα: Proc.-Dam. vi. 285-6 says ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐτέθη ὅτι οὐ παρὰ φύσιν [εἴναι], ἀλλ' ἀμα τῇ τελευτῇ (ὡς κατὰ φύσιν κινούμενον) γέγονε, ὕστερον ἀν τῶν ἄλλων μορίων—ταῦτα γάρ ἔστι τὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἄλλα, πρὸς ἄσυγκρίνεται τὸ ἐν—ἔσται. πρεσβύτερα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ οὕτως εὑρέθη ἀνάπταλιν τὰ ἄλλα

τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα. He sees the double dealing with τὰ ἄλλα.

ἀρχὴν ... μέρος γε δν; ἀρχὴν put first rhetorically. The order is οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον—ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος δ τι οὐν ... ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὅν;

E οὐκ οὖν ... ἐν τῇ γένεσι: Note the growing confidence in the change from γίγνοιτ' ἀν to ἀπολείπεται. Or are we to make a break in the sense, as though the words were καὶ οὕτως οὐδενὸς ἀπόλ. ? The ind. in Proc.-Dam. vi. 286 takes preced. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἐν καὶ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ μέρει ἐν διατηρηθῆσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολειφθείη τινὸς τῶν μερῶν ἔως οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἐσχατον, τὰ πάντα διελθόν, γένηται. For the sense of ἀπόλ. see L. and S. c. II. The following words mean ‘the others as they come into being, whichever it be that in each case succeeds which.’ The sent. is redund. for emphasis: it might end with γένηται. So also ὅτῳ οὖν might be omitted, since, of course, if the one chosen be the sixth it must follow the fifth, if the ninth the eighth, and so on. ἐν γένεσι τ: Η and its family ἐγγένεται, with which contrast 138 D, Notes I. Here we have a glaring double use of ἐν, first as any part, then as δλον ἐν. The end of Proc.-Dam.’s note just cited shows that he sees this change. ἐπεὶ γοῦν διερχόμενον τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἀπερ ἐστὶ μέρη ἐκείνου καὶ ἐν ἐκάστῳ τούτων γιγνόμενον ἔξισάζει.

154 περὶ τοῦ γιγ. ... γίγνεσθαι; The words between the two infns. inclus. form a noun govd. in the gen. by περί: αὐτὸ and τὰλλα are subjs. to the infns.; τοῦ ἑνὸς might in the circs. have been αὐτοῦ. In ἄρα ... ἔχει the sent. divides at οὗτῳ, an ἔχει being underst. after εἶναι. εἰ καὶ ... ἐτέρον, is quite clear, only we must understand a second ἐστὶν after πρεσβ. which Π. supplies at the wrong place—εἰ καὶ ἐστιν καὶ ἐστιν ὅτι. t places the ὅτι before εἰ and so the edd., Notes I. It is to be said for Η that its reading is the less likely to have been invented, and that the ὅτι from its position in the line—marking a new paragr.—could hardly have been the subject of a blunder. ἐτέρον ἐτέρον make the statement general, as ἄπαν ἄπασιν 148 A. γίγνεσθαι γε Η has τε, t seems to have γε. Notes I. Herm. defends τε, ‘at respondent inter se πρεσβύτερον et νεώτερον, quanquam gradatio structurae ad posterius οὐδ’ αὐτον addidit.’ This would seem to mean that οὐδ’ αὐτὸν νεώτερον stands for τό τε νεώτερον. It is difficult to

accept this; and γε gives emphas. to γίγνεσθαι which suits the passage. It has an exact antith. in οὐκ ἄρα τό γε οὖν below.

πρεσβ. ἔτι ... οὐτι δύνατο, πρεσβ. ἔτι means ‘still older,’ as ἔτι νεώτ. means still younger, and is explained by ἢ ... τῇ ἡλικίᾳ; the second ἔτι goes with οὐκ and means it would no longer be able—could not go the further length of becoming still older. The clause ἢ ... τῇ ἡλικίᾳ makes the constr. awkward, = ἢ τὸ πρώτον, ἢ πρίν, ἢ κατ’ ἀρχάς.

χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἀλλῳ The close connec. here almost gives a plural sense such as may agree with ἀνίστοις; yet we need two times, and two of everything in the circs., which makes it more likely that the dat. is used in the sense of ἐν or ἐπὶ χρόνῳ—in the case of time and of everything else. For διαφέρειν why not διενεγκεῖν, with διήνεγκε διενέγκῃ? οὐκ ἄρα ... τοῦ ἑνὸς ... νεώτερον, edd. after Schleierm. reject οὖν here: but the MSS. are clear. On the other hand the preceding οὖν is upon a scratch in Η, and suggests an orig. οὐν. The sense is οὐκ ἄρα τό γε οὖν πρεσβύτερον τοῦ ὄντος νεώτερον καὶ γίγνοιτ' ἀν πρεσβύτερον ἔτι, οὐδὲ νεώτερον. For οὐδὲ here cp. οὐ οὔτε γίγνεται 152 E; and here t gives οὔτε. τὴν ἡλικίαν does just the same duty as τῇ ἡλικίᾳ above.

πρεσβ. τόδε, νεώτ. δ’ αὐτ: Η πρεσβ. τόδε: νεώτ. δ’ οὐ: t γεγονε πρεσβ.: τὸ δὲ νεώτερον γίγνεται δ’ οὐ: And so the edd., supplying mentally τὸ μὲν before πρεσβ., as is not rarely done. This is quite satisf., and is very likely the true reading. The text is an attempt to adjust Η so as to yield a satisf. meaning. After pointing out the scope of the argt., Proc.-Dam. vi. 287-8 says ἐστι δὲ ἡ ἔφοδος ἥδε—τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον τόδε τοῦδε δν, καὶ ἔτι πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι (παρὸ ὡς πρότερον γεγονε πρεσβύτερον) χώραν ἔχει [it is possible for what is older to become relatively older still!], καὶ γίγνεται ἔτι πρεσβύτερον καὶ πρεσβύτερον τὸ δὲ νεώτερον οὐ χωρεῖ καὶ ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ὥστε τὸ εἶναι μὲν καὶ γεγονέναι τι νεώτερον ἄλλον τινὸς ἐστι λέγει [λέγειν?], αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δν νεώτερον νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἔαντον ἢ ἄλλον [οὐ] χωρεῖ [yet this is but the correlative of the previous statement!]. This can hardly mean that he had the reading of Η in 154 C, νεώτερον δ’ οὐ; for he soon adds εἶναι μὲν καὶ γεγονέναι πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον δοτέον ὥστε κατὰ τὴν προτέραν διαφορὰν καθ’ ἦν εὐθὺς διήνεγκε, γίγνεται δ’ οὐ [the reading of t]—

οὐτε νεώτερον (οὐ γάρ ὀπισθοδρομεῖ), οὐτε πρεσβύτερον (ἄπαξ γάρ τὴν πρώτην πρόσθεσιν ἵστως τοῦ χρόνου ἐλαβεὶ καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, ἔπειτα δὲ ἵσψ διαφέρον ἑαυτῷ κατὰ τὴν προτέραν πρόσθεσιν πρεσβύτερον οὐ γίγνεται καὶ ἔτι). The text of D., as given in Stallb., is not always quite clear. ὅν ... ὅντων here as above we must understand τὸ ἐν ὅν πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον τῶν ἀλλων ὅντων νεωτέρων ἢ πρεσβυτέρων.

ὅρα δὲ ... γίγνεται: After the long proof upon one side, we might expect ὅρα δὲ with the opening of the opposite argt. Heind. wishes the adjs. in the sing., but Stallb. seems right in assuming that the suppressed subj. is αὐτά, i.e. τὸ ἐν καὶ τάλλα.

p. 28. D. πλέονι ... τῷ ἵσψ μορίῳ The πλέονι refers to the elder, the ἐλάτ. to the younger; and we add equal times. He now asks if they differ by the same portion as before: and here we see that his use of the word ἡλικία, above B., was a little unhappy. If he wished to prove that the diff. between an older and a younger never changed, he should have said διήνεγκε τῷ χρόνῳ, ἵσψ διαφέρει δεὶ τὸν χρόνον: and no doubt that is what he meant. Here it is at once conceded that the two do not continue to differ τῷ ἵσψ μορίῳ [τῆς ἡλικίας] while it is certain that they do continue to differ τῷ ἵσψ μορίῳ τοῦ χρόνου. A boy is one year old when his brother is two; he is younger in time by a year, and in age by $\frac{1}{2}$. He is 79 when his brother is 80; he is younger in time by a year, and in age by $\frac{1}{80}$.

οὐκ ἄρα ... τὸ ἔπειτα, = ὅ τι περ τὸ ἐν ἥν διαφέρον ἡλικίᾳ πρὸς τάλλα τὸ πρώτον, οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο ἔσται διαφέρον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα. ὅ τι περ and τοῦτο might be replaced by ὅσον περ and τοσοῦτον. τό γε ἐλαττον διαφέρον = ὅ γε ἔστιν ἐλαττον διαφέρον, ὅ γ' εἰλαττον διαφέρει. πρὸς τι becomes at once, in applic. to the case, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, πρὸς ἄ. In τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ... ὕστατως all the change of age is, of course, relative; and πρὸς ἀλλήλω must be understood although not used thus far.

155 Ιόντε γάρ ... γίγνεσθον etc. Ωἱόντε γάρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλουν. γίγνεσθον. τὸ μὲν νεώτερον, πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον. νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου. Our text makes this clearer by reading αὐτῶν and connecting γίγνεσθον with what follows. But τι repeats τὸ ἐναντίον. This admits of αὐτοῖν, in a sense equivalent to ἀλλήλουν; connects γίγνεσθον with the latter word; and makes

τὸ μὲν νεώτερον etc. an explanatory adjunct:—thus ιόντε γάρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθον—τὸ μὲν νεώτερον etc. All edd. adopt this; and it would be easy to omit one of two successive phrases such as τὸ ἐναντίον in copying.

γενέσθαι ... εἰν ἄν. etc. The dual is not kept up. He gives an odd reason for their not being able actually to transpose their positions, while always getting apparently more nearly within reach of doing so. They fail, not, it would seem, because there is a limit which, while admitting of infinite proportional reduction, cannot be surmounted, in the shape of the original difference of time at birth, but because we are speaking of them as becoming at present and not as become! No doubt if they became differently placed they would be so: ‘he that will to Cupar maun to Cupar’: but that is hardly an argt.

γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβ. The μὲν has no answering δέ, with which Heind. cps. Theaet. 197 c, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ ... παραγεγονέναι, and there cites other cases—Theaet. 201 B, οὐδαμῶς ... ἀλλὰ πείσαι μέν: Phileb. 37 B, ἀρ' ὅτι δόξῃ μὲν ... etc. ὅτι πρεσβ. ... ὅτι ὑστερα, a neat paradox. You can only ‘reduce’ a lead’ by having a lead to reduce. The constr. is interrupted to emphasize the parad. and to avoid hopeless involution of relations: the omission of γίγνεται would make it more of a piece.

τάλλα οὗτοι πρὸς For οὗτοι τι gives τούτῳ, which gives a good meaning if = κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τούτῳ λόγον καὶ τάλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἵσχει.

οὐκ οὖν ἢ μὲν ... τῶν ἀλλων: This sent. is balanced as a whole, though with variation in detail, thus:—

οὐκ οὖν	$\widehat{\text{ἢ}} \mu\acute{e}n$	[οὔτε (neg.)]
-	-	οὔτε
-	-	-
-	-	$\widehat{\text{ἢ}} \delta\acute{e}$
-	-	τε (pos.)
-	-	καὶ

The irreg. arises from the diff. of form in the words following $\widehat{\text{ἢ}} \mu\acute{e}n$ and $\widehat{\text{ἢ}} \delta\acute{e}$ respectively. Had the second corresponded it would have run thus— $\widehat{\text{ἢ}} \delta\acute{e}$ πάν παντὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται καὶ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἀλλω μορίῳ ἀλλήλων δεὶ διαφέρειν, πρεσβύτερα τε ... γίγνεται τά τε ἀλλα τοῦ ἐνδος καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀλλων. κατὰ τὸ ἵσψ etc., i.e. the numerical diff. between them is constant; but it is an ever lessening frac. of the ages under discussion. Proc.-Dam. is surely wrong (ut sup. 290) καθδ μὲν γάρ φησι;

κατὰ τὸ ὥφι ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ
ἄλλα, ὡς ἵστα ἔχοντα μέρη ἀλλήλους καὶ ὥστα ὅντα etc.
D καὶ τὸν πρεσβ. ... γίγνεσθαι, He has just inferred
this in χρόνου μετέχει—it ranks with the succeeding
infers. For the repet. εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; Stallb.
cps. 138 A, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν ... εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη.

p. 29. καὶ ἔη ἄν ... τὸ ἐν ἔστιν: Here are general state-
ments followed by partic. illustrs.; but in the re-
versed order of χιασμός. ἔκεινῳ is exemplified in
ὄνομα and λόγος, and ἔκεινον in ἐπιστήμη δόξα αἰσ-
θησις. Proc.-Dam. says (291) εἴη μὲν ἔκεινῳ τὸ ἦν
καὶ τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἔσται· ταῦτα γάρ οὐκ ἔκεινον τι
ἄλλ' ἔκεινῳ προσόντα [so O. Apelt for ἔκεινον προσόν-
τος and other variants] ὡς ἐν χρόνῳ ὅντι. ἔκεινον δὲ
ἡ ἐπιστήμη etc., περὶ ἔκεινον γὰρ ταῦτα ὡς ἐπιστητοῦ
etc.—πλὴν οὐχ ἄμα τὰ τρία ταῦτα. Nothing he
says would preclude the idea that ὄνομα and λόγος
are ἔκεινῳ. It is true that the preds. ἦν ἔστι ἔσται
are also ἔκεινῳ; but is that sense conveyed here? Dam.
seems to hold that the constr. makes καὶ ἦν
καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται τὸ ἔκεινῳ καὶ ἔκεινον. Perhaps his reason is the diffic. noted by Heind. that
(if we construe = καὶ εἴη ἄν τι ἔκεινῳ καὶ ἔκεινον, καὶ
ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται τὸ ἔκεινῳ καὶ ἔκεινον) we really
repeat εἴη ἄν in ἔστι. But Heind.'s explan. seems
sound, 'verba εἴη ἄν in universum τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι,
illa ἦν ἔστι ἔσται temporis rationem designant,' i.e. if
the one (or the others) be in time there would be something
for it and of it, and that something was and is
and will be of it and for it according as the one itself
was or is or will be; or as Fic. 'Esset quoque illi
aliquid et illius,—eratque et est et erit.' Any diffic.
in the way of this interp. arising out of the use of
εἴη ἄν and ἔστι is much less than would arise if we
take Dam.'s view. Pl. expressly says that ἐπιστήμη
etc. are αὐτῶν (= ἔκεινον), and that ὄνομα and λόγος
are αὐτῷ (= ἔκεινῳ): the passage is thus balanced
as we said by χιασμός. Now if ἦν ἔστι ἔσται are to
be taken as Dam. takes them, not only is the balance
disturbed, but there is nothing save infer. to
decide whether they are examples of αὐτῶν or αὐτῷ.

εἴπερ ... πράττομεν: i.e. εἴπερ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ δοξά-
ζομεν καὶ αὐθανόμεθα says Heind. rightly. This is
rather a bizarre argumentum ad hominem: Parm.'s
args. against the existence of the one would fall
equally well under the categ. πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν.
But does not this frank adm iss. that the one is

a subj. of δόξα and αἴσθησι no less than of ἐπιστήμη
tend to support the view that the one is not an
idea? συστερ τῶν τοιούτων go together 'et quot- e
cunque ejusmodi in aliis reperiuntur' etc. Thoms.
It does not seem as if τὰλλα were used in a tech-
nical sense here: rather it means that the one is
named, discussed etc. just like any other thing.

142 B-155 E. Here closes what Grote calls Dem.
II. He points out that while I., starting from a neg.
propos., proceeds (like the second figure in the
syllog.) to prove double negs.—Unum is *neither ... nor*—in II. the concls. are all *both ... and*. Of two
contrads. first both are false, next both are true.
'This offends doubly against the logical canon,
which declares that of two contradictory propositions
one must be true, the other must be false. We
must remember that in the Platonic age there
existed no systematic logic ...'—Prantl (in his
Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. 3, 3, pp. 70-73) main-
tains, if I rightly understand him, not only that Pl.
did not adopt the *principium identitatis* ... but that
one of Pl.'s express objects was to demonstrate the
contrary of it, partly in the Phileb. but especially
in the Parm. ... I understand these Antinomies as
ἀπορίαι to be cleared up, but in no other character.
Prantl speaks (p. 73) of "die antinomische Begründung
der Ideenlehre im Parm." etc. This is the
same language as that used by Zeller ... Introd.
lx.-lxiii. The ancients are clear for the priority of
one to being. After arguing the point with special
reference to ἀπλότης, Dam. says, § 21, 37, πανταχῶς
ἀρα τὸ ἐν πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος: this is the ἀπλῶς ἀμέθεκτον
ἔνταῦθον ἐν. Proc. speaks in the same sense. Com-
pared with this ἐν the ἐν-ὸν of Dem. II., or ἐν ἡνω-
μένον, is markedly less abstract in their eyes. While
to later students the materials for this distinc. may
appear in Pl.'s text, it is not drawn by him, and we
may doubt if, as thus formulated, it was even present
to his thought. In Hegel the distinc. is transposed.
There Being comes first, and 'process' has advanced
appreciably before One is reached: and if the latter
be as abstract as ἐν the former must be more abstr.
not only than ὄν but than ἐν itself—Dam. sometimes
in a sort of despair admits that the ἀρχὴ is too
elementary to be grasped or defined. We may
note that H., constructing ab intra, says No thought
no being: these ancients, surveying ab extra, hold

that process has 'crept gently crusting' past both ἐν and ὅν ere νοῦς emerges. Is their νοῦς his Self-consciousness? Lastly of this ἐν-ὅν—When Arist. (Met. IX. 2-end) says ὅτι δὲ ταῦτδ σημαίνει πως τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅν, δῆλον (1) τῷ τε παρακολουθεῖν ισαχῶς ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐν μηδεμιᾷ, ... (2) καὶ τῷ μὴ προσκατηγορεῖνθαι ἔπειρόν τι τὸ εἰς ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τὸ τί ἡ ποιὸν ἡ ποσόν, καὶ τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι τὸ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι—he seems to be speaking of both as a logician and κατὰ συμβεβηκός, not as a metaphys. and καθ' αὐτά. Now of Pl.'s argt. It was said in the Introd. that Dem. II. v. Dem. I. = synthet.-construct. v. analyt.-destruct. This is true; and Pl., either consciously or half so, shows it by his efforts to make each step lean on the previous one. But the great constructive step is the first, that of adding ὅν to ἐν. All else might almost be called an analysis of what that synthesis implies. And while much is extracted from it, the ἐν-ὅν even at the close remains a very abstract concep., in no way more advanced than atoms and the void. When Dam. talks (§ 88-89, 214-17)—not as a commentator—of a σειρὰ through πολλά, στοιχεῖα, μέρη, εἴδη towards σωματοειδὲς ἄπαν he is far beyond this dial. As Pl. goes step by step, and secures progress by διαιρεσίς, it may be assumed that his first distinc. is as primary as he can make it. We shall not seek to determine what is the most elementary difference from one—not-one, many, others, or what not. Dam. (§ 104, 270) speaks in this connec. of τὸ ἐν μόνον ἀντιδημρημένον πρὸς τὸ ὅν, κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐτερότητα φανεῖσαν. ξοικε γὰρ ἡ ἐτερότης αὐτῇ, χωρίσασα τὸ ἐν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας, ὁφείλειν τὸ ἐν ἀπλῶς προτέξαι ἀπάντων—εἴτα τὰς πολλὰς ἀμεθέκτους ἐνάδας, μεθ' ἣς ἐφεξῆς τὰς μετεχομένας ὑπὸ οὐσιῶν, καὶ ζύων, καὶ etc. ἀλλ' ὁ Πλ. μετὰ τὸ ἀδιάκριτον ἐν ὃν τοὺς δύο στίχους ἀντέθηκεν τῶν μεθεκτῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν οὐσιῶν etc. at greater length than we can quote. This is an early form of Grote's objec. to Pl.'s course at 143 A, and seems to mean that if Pl. took that course he should have gone from ἐν (without ὅν) to πολλαὶ ἀμέθέκτοι ἐνάδες then to αἱ μετεχόμεναι, in place of running δύο στίχοι downwards εἰς ἄπειρον. Pl.'s course indeed seems almost to refute the importance of the addition of ὅν, and to make us ask, Does he really add a vital new predicate to ἐν which

advances it to greater concreteness, or does he merely mean in a loose way that he will not push the one so hard as in Dem. 1.? Dam. can justly say (§ 91, 226) τὸ ἐν τούτῳ ὅπερ καλοῦμεν ἀπλῶς ἐν ἔξει πλήθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ προῆλθε—elsewhere he gives (§ 33, 63) the dialectical reason, which Pl. does not, ὡς κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἀντίθεσις μία ... οὕτω καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ μία τις ἀντίθεσις ... καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν. He makes a further direct comment (§ 98, 253), ὁ Πλ. τρεῖς τάξεις ἡμῖν παραδέδωκε τοῦ νοητοῦ κατὰ τὸν Παρμ.—τὴν μὲν πρώτην καλέσας ἐν-όν, τὴν δὲ μέσην ὅλον καὶ μέρη, τὴν δὲ τρίτην ἀπειρον πλήθος: with which cp. 142 B–143 A. Dam. (§ 122, 314) says again ὁ Πλ. τοῦτο μὲν [τὸ ἥνωμένον?] διακρίνας εἰς ἐν καὶ δὲ ὅμως εὑρισκεν ἐκάτερον τὸ συναμφότερον γιγνόμενον, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐκ μερῶν ὅλον ἐποίει τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τοῦ ὄντος. But when he goes on to say of πολλά—ἄλεγομεν εἶναι π. πρὸ ἀριθμοῦ παντός, ὅθεν τὸ ἀπειρον πλήθος (cp. 143 A), ὅτι ἀνάριθμον φύσει καὶ πρὸ παντὸς ὅρου ἀριθμητικοῦ οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἀριθ. ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἀπειρον ... ἀλλὰ τὸ πλήθ. ... ἐπέκεινα τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάντων ὑποστάσεως—we must qualify his words. It is true that Pl., 143 A, speaks of ἀπειρον πλήθος before he elaborates number; but this does not isolate the one from the other. On the contrary the culmin. of the deduc. of number is stated thus (144 A) ἦ οὐκ ἀπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει ... γίγνεται;

Ἐτι ... ἀνάγκη: As he does not qualify *οἷον διεληγ.* we must hold that he refers to the whole course of the argt. up to the present stage. Of this he assumes that every aspect has been established and is to be accepted: he does not regard Dem. 11. as abrogating 1.

ἀρ' οὖν ... ὅπθεσ: From the answering οὐχ οἶδόν τε it seems that οἶδόν τ' does not agree with τὸ ἔν, but means 'will it be possible' not 'will it be able.' He here suggests an explan. of the contrad. involved in his conclusions regarding the one. Grote has urged that they imply disregard or ignorance of the law of contrad. Now, men reasoned before they wrote logical treatises; and, although the dialectic of Zeno was a great advance, yet in practice they were always guided by innate feeling for logic, so that this law would be accepted in fact before it was formulated by Arist. And his formula is, Met. III. 3, 1005 b 19, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἄμα ἵπάρχειν

τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό. We thus see that καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸν is all that Arist. adds to the argt. which Pl. here employs. Pl. knew in principle the law of contrad., and is here applying it, although when in ‘his altitudes’ he does not always regard it. Cp. Introd. ix. etc. There is a diff. between science in process of becoming, and science when checked by tests in its results. As Arist. says, Met. III. 5, 1009 a 35, δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἄμα ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία, ἐντελεχεῖρ δ' οὐ. But there is a flaw in the reasoning of a different kind. He has said that the one is one and many, and neither one nor many. Now, although this may exclude the possibility of existence for the one, he does not actually say that the one is and is not, unless we interpret the words ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν ... ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν in that sense, in spite of their manifest reference to what has just preceded. Yet with this limitation of his language he, as Proc.-Dam. (293) points out, goes on to infer non-existence absolutely from non-existence as one, though the latter may merely mean existence as many: πλὴν ὅρα τὸν παραλογισμὸν ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ ‘μήτε ἔν’ δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ ‘οὐχ ἔν ἔστι,’ τὸ ‘οὐκ ἔστιν’ ἀπλῶς λαμβάνει [-neui Ms.], καὶ μὴ μετέχειν αὐτὸν οὐσίας κατὰ τοῦτο φησίν.

156 *οὗτος χρόνος* Stallb. explains the want of the art. by saying that *οὗτος* is loco subjecti while *χρόνος* is instar praedicati. This would justify the omiss.; but is *οὗτος* thus subject? The sense is ‘is there not then also this point of time, viz.’ etc.—which in better Eng. becomes, as in Jowett, ‘is there not also a time?’ Fic., ‘numquid est id tempus?’ Jelf says of the art., § 453, 1, ‘In prose it is sometimes omitted when the substantive is ... a collective noun used as a proper name; as Thuc. II. 74, ἐπὶ γῆν τίνδε.’ This comes nearer what we need. For the lang. cp. Arist. Phys. VI., 10, 241 a 17, οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἔσται χρόνος ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ τὸ πᾶν ἐν χρόνῳ κινεῖσθαι.

ἐν δὲ καὶ ... πάντες: Just above *ἐν* is the subj. of both γίγνεται and ἀπόλλυται: here it is the subj. of γίγνεται, but is it of ἀπόλλυται? Fic., ‘desinit esse multa’ and ‘desinit esse unum,’ which might seem to favour the view that it is the subj. What then are we to make of the τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι of *Ἄτ?* Fic., one would think, must have read τά, the constr.

being ἀπόλλυται, if even that be a possible one. But on the suppos. that *ἐν* is the subj. we would need to treat τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι as a phrase in the accus. of descrip., ‘dies so far as being many is concerned.’ The altern. is to make that subj. to ἀπόλλυται—as Jowett and Müller do—the only objec. to which is the sudden change in that respect. Stallb. seems to take this view, ‘posteaquam Unum ipsum et oriri et interire docuit, etiam singula ejus attributa eandem subire vicissitudinem ostendere instituit.’

ἐν δὲ ... ισοῦσθαι; Two examples of χιασμὸς occur here in the arrangement of the infns. Proc.-Dam. 293-4, διακρίνεσθαι δ' αὐθίς ἐν τῷ ἔξ ένδος πολλὰ γίγνεσθαι κατασκείσθαι and καὶ ἐκ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ὄμοιον, ὡς ἐλεγε κατὰ τὰς προτέρας ὑποθέσεις (πλὴν ἀδορίστως, καὶ οὐ λέγει ‘ἴσαντῷ’ η ‘τοῖς ἄλλοις,’ ὡς ἐκεῖ ἐλεγε ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἐαυτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ δοκιμάσθαι καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὰ πολλά, ὅπερ μετὰ ταῦτα ποιήσει), ὄμοιοῦσθαι· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἀνόμοιον, ἀνομοιοῦσθαι· ὅρα γάρ, πῶς προσβιβάζει συνάπτων τὸ γίγνεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις, καὶ ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι ὅπερ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἐθήρασεν. ἐλεγε γὰρ ἐν τῷ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν γίγνεται, ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι γοῦν η μεῖζον η ἐλαττον η ἵστον κατὰ τὰς προτέρας ὑποθέσεις αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ισοῦσθαι. He urges two points here: (1) that Pl. gets in all his predication in the wake of τὸ γίγνεσθαι, (2) that these are here used abstractly—the one becomes like, equal etc., but not to anything.

ἐτ’ αὐτὸν δὲ κινοῦμ... εἶναι; etc. As Proc.-Dam. has said, and says in his next note, Pl. has carefully developed everything thus far through γίγνεσθαι: he adds καὶ ταῦτα πάντα διὰ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἐν χρόνῳ—note the last words. Pl. now assumes motion abruptly, without reference to becoming, or to any other source. It is not even certain at the moment what sort of motion he means. The lang. suggests φέρεσθαι (138 B), but the associations would favour ἀλλοίωσις. Not till we reach Ε is the ref. to motion in space established. μηδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ is very emphatic. The expression τὸ νῦν, used in 152, is not adequate, and must be replaced by a better. πῶς δῆ: does not seem to mean ‘how should it?’ implying acquiescence—as πῶς γάρ: seems to do—but rather ‘how can that be?’ implying doubt, which the foll. sent. clears up. In ἔστος τε ... ταῦτα πάσχειν: the

last two words are (Stallb.) superfl. The constr. is, as it were, broken at ἐστάραι, which might be followed by a dash. Stallb. seems right in objecting to Heind.'s sugg. ἀνευ μήν, and in saying that the μὲν is taken up by χρόνος δὲ which follows. Proc.-Dam. 295 says οὐδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐστῶς κινεῖται καὶ κινούμενον ἴσταται καὶ οὐδέποτε μένει, and again ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἐν τινὶ χρόνῳ οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐστάναι ἐστὶν οὔτε ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι.

πότε οὖν μ. This opening use of πότε is not frequent, and rather arrests attention.

D οὗτε γὰρ ἐστὸς οὖν etc. Η ἐστὸς οὖν, which makes ἐστὸς an adj. such as ἀκίνητον. No one seems bold enough to take this view, yet we have a fair analogy in 157 B, οὐτε αὐξανόμενον ... φθίνον ... κινούμενον εἴη ἀν: and in e.g. ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα ἀν εἴη 158 E; indeed in 159 A καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστῶτα are directly under the infl. of the preced. ἀν εἴη. It seems to give ἀν for οὖν, and the accepted course is to adopt this and read μεταβάλλοι. We hesitate to make a double change in Η and so read οὖν, not with any great conviction, the position being strained and the word occurring four times rapidly. Possibly the orig. might be οὐτε γάρ οὖν ἐστός?

ἅπ' οὖν ἔστι ... τὸ ἔξαιφνης. ἔστι seems to express existence here. τοῦτο may naturally be used for τόδε as some descrip. precedes, back to which τοῦτο partly refers. It is hard to disting. τὸ ἔξαιφνης from τὸ νῦν, save so far as the latter refers to the τὸ ἔξαιφνης of the present, while the former is a νῦν not necessarily contemporaneous with our sensations. Yet a distinc. is necessary, both because τὸ ἔξ. is assumed not to be in time, and because you construct time out of successive τὰ νῦν, which you cannot do if these have individually no time. 'Differt hoc ἔξαιφνης a νῦν, cuius ante aliquoties mentionem fecerat Parmen. τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἔ. ἀμερές ἔστι τῇ ἰδιότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρονον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ χρόνου μέτρον ἦν καὶ διάστημα, scribit Dainasc., Ms. fol. 295.' Thonis. Proc.-Dam. 295 describes the instantaneous as πάντως ἐν ἀκαρεῖ, and τὸ ἐν ἀνεπαισθήτῳ χρόνῳ—but this last, which comes from Arist., gives up the point. Even when speaking of that which must have no time, Pl. is forced to say ἐν φτότ' ἀν εἴη ὅτε.

Ἄς ἐκείνου ... εἰς ἑκάτ. This is not easy to transl. The meaning would be got better from ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ

μετ. τὸ ἐν εἰς ἑκάτερον, or still better from τοιούδε τι ἔσικε σημαίνειν ἐξ οὐ μετ., or again ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ ἐνός: 'certum quiddam significat ex quo in utrumque transitur.' Fic. The meaning is that the one (or anything), whatever state it may be in, passes through τὸ ἔξαιφνης into the corresponding counter-state—'No pause the dire extremes between, He made me blest—and broke my heart.'

οὐ γάρ ... κινδύνεις: This brings out the full agony of the crisis. The one is stock-still until instantaneously motion is in full swing. Proc.-Dam. points the paradox by showing that, in order to effect this sudden transfor., motion and rest must themselves not be in time (295), ἐν μηδενὶ γάρ χρόνῳ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα ἐκ τούτου εἰς τὸ ἴστασθαι μεταβάλλοι, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἴστασθαι ἵνα ἐκ τούτου εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλοι, and again on the other types of trans. (296), οὐ γάρ ἐν τινὶ χρόνῳ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ εἶναι οὐτε μὴν ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι, ὅπερε κατὰ τὸ ἔξαιφνης καὶ τούτων γιγνομένων οὐτε ἔστιν οὐτε οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν οὐτε γίγνεται οὐτε ἀπόλλυται. Pl. begins by assuming that τὸ γίγνεσθαι in all its forms is in time; he is now eager to effect the change from motion to rest with absolutely perfect abruptness, and says that the point at which the one is in *neither* state cannot be in time. Thus rest endures in full force until the one is already in the instantaneous, while motion has acquired perfect action before it comes out: in other words, motion and rest, which we might infer were in time, are now shown to be in the instantaneous and therefore out of time, i.e. non-existent. And with the disappearance of time disappear all the characteristics just assigned to the one διὰ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἐν χρόνῳ.

οὐδ'... οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ The sense of οὐτε ... οὐτε is not quite given here in the last two cases; the first of course coalesces with ἐνί. The sense of the whole would, if accurately stated, stand thus: εἰ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἔξαιφνης ἀν μεταβάλλοι καὶ οὕτως ἐν οὐδὲ ἐνὶ χρόνῳ ἀν εἴη· εἰ δὲ οὐδὲ ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἴη οὐδὲ κινοῖται τότε οὐδὲ ἀν σταίη, 'and if it were in no portion of time, neither would it move then, nor yet stand.' We have learned, 152 A, that a thing μετέχει μὲν χρόνου εἰτερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι.

πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μ. Έχει, He introduced motion and rest abruptly without any statement that they resembled the characteristics already assigned to the

one; here he assumes that they do, and are but one type of *μεταβολή*. He seems to think that he can reach $\tau\delta \xi\acute{\alpha}\phi\nu\eta\varsigma$ more readily through them.

¹⁵⁷ οὐτε ἔστι ... οὐτε, οὐτε ... οὐτε etc. These seem to constitute two pairs, and may without violence be rendered strictly; 'and neither is then nor is not, neither becomes nor perishes.' The same arrang. is continued. Contrast $\dot{\epsilon}\phi'$ $\dot{\epsilon}n$ with $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\dot{\iota}$ $\dot{\alpha}\nu\mu.$, $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\dot{\iota}$ $\dot{\delta}\mu.$, $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\dot{\iota}$ $\dot{\iota}\sigma\sigma\varsigma$, and the repeated cases of οὐτε unelided. $\epsilon\dot{\iota}s$ $\tau\dot{\alpha}$ $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\tau\dot{\iota}\alpha$ He does not say $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\dot{\iota}$ $\tau\dot{\alpha}$, the phrase being used apparently much like $\tau\dot{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\dot{\iota}\dot{\iota}\dot{\o}$, 'towards big and towards equal, and the converse—and vice versa.' οὐκ $\dot{\epsilon}\omega\kappa\epsilon$. Steph. reads $\dot{\epsilon}\omega\kappa\epsilon$ saying 'alia est lectio οὐκ $\dot{\epsilon}\omega\kappa\epsilon$ quam et Fic. agnoscit'; and Bek. says 'οὐκ om. AEF.' Does this give us the Ms. authority on which Steph.'s edition rests?

^{155 E-157 B.} We have seen Dem. II. conflicting with I., and within itself containing contradictory proofs that the one 'both is and is not' something or other. Pl. in Dem. III., while not giving up any previous conclus., calls in a reconciling element. If the one 'is' it 'partakes of time and πορευόμενον τοῦ χρόνου (152 A)', and we have only to understand that 'is and is not' apply to different portions of time in order to comply with the law of contrad. and to save every characteristic of the one. But Pl. seems to be possessed by the concep. of 'is and is not,' and he has already dealt with that very small portion of time called $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$. Apparently under these two influences he proceeds to prove even here that the one 'both is and is not,' the medium of proof being a refinement upon $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$. The more one thinks of $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$ the less one is able to distinguish it from $\tau\delta \xi\acute{\alpha}\phi\nu\eta\varsigma$. Pl. describes $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$ as the point at which the one οὐ γίγνεται ἀλλ' ἔστι—which seems clearly to assume that at $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$ we have a *μεταβολή*: and $\tau\delta \xi\acute{\alpha}\phi\nu\eta\varsigma$ is simply $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$ reduced to so fine a point that time vanishes. But can $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$ itself be other than a timeless instant? If it can, then it has duration, and before we reach its end its beginning is past, has ceased to be $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$ and become $\tau\delta \pi\alpha\pi\eta\lambda\theta\varsigma$. 'Some of the Stoics,' says Grote, 'considered $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$ as μηδὲν—and nothing in time to be real except $\tau\delta \pi\alpha\pi\eta\lambda\theta\varsigma$ and $\tau\delta \mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\varsigma$ (Plut. De Commun. Notitiis contra Stoicos, p. 1081 d).' He adds 'The doctrine (of $\tau\delta \xi\acute{\alpha}\phi\pi$) served the purpose of the

Platonic Parmenides, as ingenious, original, and provocative to intellectual effort, but it did not acquire any permanent footing in Grecian dialectics.' Something must be said here, but within modest limits, on Time and Change.

TIME.—I. Both Pl. and Arist. accept the popular idea of time. Pl. hardly discusses it now: A. after disc. decides thus, $\tau\dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\dot{\alpha}\nu$ δ' ὄντων ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν χρόνον συνεχῆ εἶναι· λέγω δὲ συνεχὲς τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά (Phys. vi. 2). Both are influenced by the analogy of space; but A. notes (what Pl. assumes) that while space has six (our three) dimensions (iv. 1), time has but two (our one) $\pi\rho\acute{\o}\tau\pi\pi\varsigma$ and $\nu\sigma\pi\pi\varsigma$, and that neither of these exists while we speak (iv. 10 etc.). He also raises the question whether if motion and souls observant of it ceased time would remain (iv. 14)—a step towards the Kantian standpoint. Of time Pl. assumes that it 'passes,' the one *μετέχει πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου*, ¹⁵²—quite a popular view. A.'s may come to the same, but it involves much deeper analysis: he says time is our measure of change— $\tau\dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\dot{\alpha}\nu$ γάρ ἔστιν δὲ χ., ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότ. καὶ νότ. (iv. 11). 2. Over against this both elsewhere speak of αἰών, our eternity. A. draws a fine distinc. in this connec.—οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν-χρόνῳ-εἶναι τὸ εἶναι-ὅτε-δὲ-χ.-ἔστιν ... ώστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα, γε ἀεὶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ ... σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὅτι οὐδὲ πάσχει οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ χ. (iv. 12). Thus the law of contrad. exists during the writing of this note and the discuss. of Supply in the House of Commons, but is unaffected thereby—it is ἀεὶ ὄν. Of αἰών Dam. says (§ 150, ii. 31) συνελίπτειν ἔθελει καὶ συναιρεῖν εἰς ἐν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὄλον τὰ μέρη, ὡς δὲ χρ. διαιρεῖν. 3. To both the effective existing portion of time is $\tau\delta \nu\bar{\nu}$. Popularly Now may include a good deal, but Pl. and A. agree in treating it technically as a part of time, but an extremely small part. A. says—and Pl. would probably agree—that $\nu\bar{\nu}$ may be infinitely small, time being divisible εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά, and makes this play a part in his reply to Zeno (vi. 6 etc.). 4. Pl. makes a further step in $\tau\delta \xi\acute{\alpha}\phi\pi$. It is not easy to say whether he means by this merely a generalized and infinitely reduced $\nu\bar{\nu}$, or whether he creates a timeless time, so to speak: probably the latter, as he calls it φύσις ἀτοπός τις ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδὲ ἐν οὐσίᾳ. A. uses the term, but in the other sense, $\tau\delta \delta$

ἔξαιφ. τὸ ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἔκστάν (iv. 13).

CHANGE, again, is the insoluble crux, the vital question in the philosopher's brief. 'If, indeed, you are able to instruct *that* point, Mr. Fairbrother—' 'If I am indeed able to instruct that point, my Lord, I trust not only to serve my client, but ...' We cannot instruct that point. Pl. does not even treat it in a strictly metaphys. manner. Metaphys. explanations do not so much explain it as explain it away. Pl. is directed by Zeno towards physical becoming or change; whether in the form of *κατὰ τόπον κίνησις* or of *ἀλλοίωσις* he does not admit Z.'s reduction of it to impossibility: he seeks to construct a physical theory which will explain the physical facts. He said (152 B etc.) that in past time the one has been becoming older and younger than itself, but that when it reaches 'now' it 'ceases to become and is' older and younger—for if it went on becoming it 'would not be caught by now.' And this now holds on to it as long as it 'is,' which seems to mean that to us at each successive now the one 'is,' while when we look back, from each to all that have passed, it seems to have been 'becoming' all the while. There is the crux: it is conceded that change is gradual and takes time (e.g. 138 C, and A. Phys. iv. *passim*), but when you put that time under the microscope you find that at each instant the changing thing 'ceases to become and is.' To put it in terms of A.'s dictum (i. above), if 'now' as a 'measure of change' reveals change going forward, it *eo ipso* breaks up into as many nows as the stages of change which it reveals, and at each of these the thing 'ceases to become and is.' From one 'now' to the next we find, it may be, different being; but being, not becoming, is what we find: we *can* not catch change in the fact. Pl. then in despair says Change is *extra-temporal*: time advances thus—*νῦν, ἔξαιφ., νῦν, ἔξαιφ., νῦν, ἔξαιφ.* *εἰς ἄπειρον*: at each *νῦν* the changing thing 'is' in some phase (not the same phase, yet not more than one phase), and at each *ἔξαιφ.* the change from phase to phase (or from place to place) is effected. It would need a minute knowledge of A.'s works to ascertain clearly his final view on change, but he seems to be driven to the same conclus. as Pl. He says *μεταβολὴ δὲ πᾶσα φύσει ἔκστατικόν* (iv. 13), and again ἐν ᾧ δὲ πρώτῳ

(hunting change into a corner) *μεταβέβληκε τὸ μεταβεβληκός, ἀνάγκη ἀτομον εἶναι* (§VI. 5). Here *ἀτομον* conveys the same idea as Pl.'s *ἐν οὐδὶ ἐνὶ χρόνῳ*, and might even prompt a wrong-headed critic to read *φύσις ἀτομός τις* for *ἀτομος* at 156 D. To Pl. then change is resolved into the series 'is, is-not, is, is-not ...,' and perhaps one influence that leads him to such a concep. may be that while Heraclitus (Introd. p. 1.) had taught him that 'becoming' is not a subject of science, 'is and is-not' may be subjects of science. Another influ. is of course to hand in the fact that, when Pl. lands the changing thing in that which is not time, he may—having made time a condition of being—declare that it 'is not' in an absolute sense. He is thus able to say in Dem. 111. as in 11. that each attribute of the one both is and is not.

τί δαὶ ... σκεπτέον; For *τί δαὶ* see pp. lxxxi., xcii. But this case is peculiar. Elsewhere the *τί δαὶ* either stands alone, or is coupled with *δῆ*, or again with *τῷδε* or *τόδε*, to form a brief prelim. question introducing a longer one which is complete in itself. The only apparent excep. seems to be *τί δαὶ, τῶν ἀλλων*; (153 A). This however does not mean 'but what of the others?' *τῶν ἀλλων* is govd. by *πρεσβύτερον* in the line above and corresponds with *ἴαυτοῦ*. In the present case *τί* is an integral part of the main quest., in close connec. with *προσήκουι ἀν πάσχειν*. Had it been like the others the lang. might have been *τί δαί*: *ἄρ' οὐ σκεπτέον τί τοῖς ἀλλοῖς προσήκουι ἀν πάσχειν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν*; This case seems to show that *δὲ* was the orig. word rather than *δῆ*, and so t.

οὐτε So *Alt*; but nothing responds; whence Buttm. (Heind. agreeing) reads [*οὐτε τᾶλλα ἔστι τὸ ἐν*] *οὐτε τὸ ἐν ἔστι τᾶλλα*, which may perhaps have been in Pl.'s mind, but is surely redundant. Stallb. reads *οὐδέ*. May not the following *οὐδὲ* meet all requirements—the intervening *όρθως*: being a mere *ἀνάπαυλα* to Parm., and no interrup.? Engelm. suggests *οὐτι* referring back to 150 B. The note of Proc.-Dam. 297—which as usual reflects the text while commenting upon it, contains *οὐτε ... οὐτε*: but the lang. seems to need correc., which takes from its value as evid. For the sense Thoms. cites Plotin. Ennead. 5, lib. iii. cap. 15, *Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ὅτι εἴ τι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ἄλλο δὴ παρ' αὐτό· ἄλλο δὲ ὅν,*

οὐχ ἔν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἡν ἐκεῖνο. With οὐ γὰρ ἀν ... ἡν
suppl. τάλλα, εἰ ἔν ἡν.

c οὐδὲ μὴν ... πῇ δῆ: Notes I. t gives μετέχει πῃ.
The text is as near Ι as possible: it assumes that
αὐτός—not unsuitable to the context—had been in the
orig., that it had been overlooked and inserted in
the marg. or above, and that the writer, influenced
by στέρεται, had supposed the intention to be that
μετέχεται (*αὐτός = αὐτός*) should be the reading.

τοῦ ἔνδος seems to go closely with τὰ ἄλλα, and
yet it may be a case of hyperbatón: the sense in
any case would be given thus: δῆτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ
ἔνδος μόρια ὡς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνδος εἴη.

δὲ δὲ δλον ὥ; So t; and the sense needs it.

ἄλλα μήν etc. This intricate argt. is meant to
show that ὁλον-μόρια are strictly correl. He
seemed to find no diffic. before (145 A), and his
argt. now is not easily followed. If a part is not
part of a ‘whole’ (τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὁλότητος, Proc.-Dam.
297), it must be part of a ‘many’ or ‘all’: that is,
if it is not part of a many in their collective sense
it must be so in their distributive and individual
sense—must be part of each, including itself. For
if so much as one be excluded then it cannot be
part of ‘all,’ and by hypothesis it is not part of the
‘whole.’ If the argt. is sophistical (Stallb.) it is
so mainly because it undertakes to prove that which
hardly admits of proof, or needs it. The sophistry
arises in the statement that ‘if it is not part of each
it will not be of any.’ Proc.-Dam. takes (298) a
different view. He says the parts must be part of
some ‘one’ thing—τινὸς μόριον ἀν εἴη οὐ δὴ πολλῶν,
τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ διακεκριμένα ἔστιν—if therefore it is
to be part of ‘all’ which are not a ‘whole,’ it must
be so by being part of each ‘one’ of the all. This
it cannot be—ὅτι, φησίν, ... ἔσται μόριον ἑαυτοῦ [τὸ]
μόριον, δὲ ἀδύνατον. It thus is not part of each one,
ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντων τῶν πολλῶν οὐκ ἔγχωρεῖ μόριον εἶναι
D τὸ ἔν ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ ἔνδος ἐκάστου (ἔσται) τῶν ἄλλων and
so can be part only of the whole-less many en
masse—πλὴν γὰρ ἔνδος αὐτοῦ καὶ μόνου τῶν ἄλλων
ἔσται ἄμα, καὶ οὕτως ἀναιρέται τὸ ἐκάστου εἶναι μό-
ριον, μὴ δὲ ἐκάστου μόριον οὐδεὶς τῶν πολλῶν
p. 37. ἔσται. In the closing sent. μηδενὸς δὲ etc. δὲ (t)
seems essential. Heind. and Stallb. object to εἶναι
after ἀδύνατον as useless, and as probably due to the
previous εἶναι. It would be easy, with a slightly

different length of lines to imagine the second nearly
below the first, and so to account for the presence
of the latter; but the MSS. agree, and (as Stallb.
adds) Proc.-Dam. agrees with them. The sent.
may be rendered ‘and to be something of all those
things, of none of which it is anything—whether
that something be a part or what else you please—
is a thing which cannot happen.’ (φησὶν) δῆτι ἀδύ-
νατον εἶναι. Proc.-Dam.

δέας This does not seem to be used technically, E
Thoms. quotes here his Dam., ‘ἔστι μὲν γὰρ τὸ δλον
ἔν ἐν τῇ γενέσει μεριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐν πεπληθυσμένον,
ἄλλ’ ὅμως ὥ ἐν καὶ ὥ δλον, τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ
περιείληφεν. Inde Pythagoraeis Monas dicebatur
ἀρρενοθήλην test. Macrob. ... Totam rem vero aperit
Plut. in Quaest. Platon. οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ, inquit, Μόνας
ἀριθμόν, ἀν μὴ τῆς ἀπέριου δυνάδος ἀψηται ποιήσασα
δὴ οὕτως ἀριθμόν, εἰς στιγμάς, εἴτα γράμμας, ἐκ δὲ
τούτων εἰς ἐπιφανείας καὶ βάθη καὶ σώματα πρόσειτι,
καὶ σωμάτων ποιότητας ἐν πάθεσι γιγνομένων.’

εν δρα So t, and rightly. Ον μόρια ἔχον Proc.-
Dam. 298 says καὶ συνέγραψε ταῦτα εἰς τὸ ἔχειν
μόρια ἵνα μή, ἐν ὅντα, οὐκ ὥ [Ms. ἡν] ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνδος.
καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐδείκνυεν τὰ μόρια δλον καὶ τελείον μόρια
—καὶ οὕτε ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν οὔτε
τῶν πάντων τὸ ὅμοια ποιεῖ, i.e. he calls none of these
others τέλειον? αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν μορίων. τό γε So 155
t: Η τό τε, less good. τ γ easily confused, p. cxi.

οὐ γὰρ ... αὐτὸν ἔν· = εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνδος ἡν οὐκ
ἀν μετέχειν etc. The — suggests that some writer
or reader thought the form αὐτοέν—like αὐτοέκαστον
in Arist.—the proper one. Notes I. The word,
however, would convey the idea of an εἶδος τοῦ ἔνδος,
which is not meant here, but rather that the others
‘in place of being partakers of the one would be
the one itself.’ Proc.-Dam. 299 says τὸ μετέχον τοῦ
μετεχομένου ἄλλο τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ... μετέχει γοῦν ἐκά-
στον τῶν μορίων τοῦ ἔνδος καθὸ ἐν μόριον, καὶ ἄλλο τι
δὲ μετέχει τοῦ ἔνδος. In νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ ... που the first
ἐνὶ is a notable case of attrac. We expect ἐν with
εἶναι; yet the dative is used through the action
upon the writer’s thought of the succeeding constr.
ἀδύνατον μέν που παντί, πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ, ἐνὶ εἶναι.
The δὲ of νῦν δὲ answers to a suppressed μὲν in οὐ
γάρ, while the ἐνὶ μὲν is answered by μετέχειν δέ.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ... μόριον δλον: Heind. is prob. right
in taking τὸ μὲν as separate from the following ἐν,

and τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν as corresponding—only it seems better to couple ἔκαστον with the latter. The sense will thus be ‘for the former (the whole) will be one whole of which the parts are parts, while again each of the latter, i.e. whatever is part of a whole (ὁ ἄν γὰρ μόριον ὅλου) will be one part of the whole.’ This is quite intellig.; but excep. is taken to the clause in brackets, although Ηt agree. As it stands, Heind. renders it ‘quaecunque tandem est pars illa totius sive magna sive parva—sive ei commensurabile est τὸ ὅλον, sive non commensurabile,’ and this gives excellent sense, although no ref. to size has been made hitherto. Bek. again, following ΞΣΥ and followed by Ast and Herm., reads οὐδὲ ἄν γὰρ μόριον ὅλου ‘will be one part of the whole—of that whole of which it is a part,’ but there is no such gain as to justify the change. And so of the suggest. of Schleierm., ὁ ἄν γὰρ μόριον ὅλον (altered to μορίων and called egregia by Stallb.), ‘one part of the whole, of that one which happens to be whole of the part (or parts).’ The clause, like some we have met, is redundant, but neither of these changes helps much.

B οὐκ οὖν ... αὐτοῦ: Steph. (leaning, as Fischer says, on Fic.) wishes ἐνδὲ twice, the former being govd. by ἔπειρα, the latter by μεθέξει, but (Heind.) the art. also must in that case be repeated, while there is no diffic. in treating αὐτοῦ as govd. by both part. and verb.

αὐτά γε ... τοῦ ἐνδέ; This might end at ἔκεινα or even αὐτά, but his argt. seeks to emphasize the paradox that this is their nature, while yet it is they that partake of the one. The tense of the part. is import. and is dwelt on in what follows. The sent. contends that, as both the whole of the ἄλλα and each portion of them turns out to be more than one, we may well say they are πλήθει ἔπειρα. Proc.-Dam. (300) puts it differently—ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλο τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἐνδέ μορίου (δὴν τὸ μόριον), καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἐνδέ ὅλου (δὴν ὅλον) πλείω ἄρα τοῦ ἐνδέ ἐστιν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη πλήθη ἔπειρα εἶναι τὰ τοῦ ἐνδέ ἔκεινον μεταλαμβάνοντα.

εἰδῶμεν. So both MSS. as in 143 B. Edd. give ιδῶμεν and so Dam. ἄλλο τι might be replaced by τι δαί or the like: it introduces the quest. and assumes what the answer will be, but does not otherwise interfere. So Theaet. 159 D, ὅταν δὲ αὐτενοῦντα [με λάβῃ] ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀλη-

θεῖα οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; and others. Proc.-Dam. differs—ἄλλο τι καὶ οὐχ ἐν ὅντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐνδέ τότε μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνός, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει, ἄλλο τι ὅντα η̄ ἐν.

πλήθη ὅντα, each severally is a πλήθος.

εἴ θελοιμεν etc. An exaggerated superlat. of dimin. It might take various simpler forms: εἰ ἔθελοιμεν ἀφελεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ (μόριον) τῶν τοιούτων ὡς οἷοί τ' ἐσμὲν—or ὡς οἶόν τε—or ὅτι—δλίγυστον. Proc.-Dam. explains ἐπεὶ εἰς ἔπειρα διαιρετόν ἐστι διανοεῖσθαι ἐκείνο. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνδέ ὡς ὅλον τι διανοεῖσθαι ἀξιον. On δλίγυστον, Notes I., δλιγοστὸν has prob. been the orig. as in 149 A, unless indeed that case may have influenced this one. Αφαιρεθὲν following thus upon ἀφελεῖν is a neat illustr. of the fact that no 2 aor. pass. of the verb was in use.

οὐκ οὖν ... πλήθει: The constr. changes between σκοποῦντι and ὄρῳμεν, while ἔσται will suit either. Thomson's Dam. reads σκοποῦντες, Proc.-Dam. has σκοποῦντί σοι. Here τοῦ εἴδους means the concep. of τὰ ἄλλα, and τὴν ἐτέραν φύσιν is that aspect of it which is separate from the one—‘quatenus πολλὰ sunt τοῦ ἐνδέ μὴ μετέχοντα.’ Heind.

μόριον μόριον The former goes with ἐν ἔκαστον, but it is (by linguistic necessity) used prematurely. ἐν ἔκαστον μόριον cannot properly apply to any element of τὰ ἄλλα before it comes into connection with the one, nor even τότε ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει, but only ἐπειδὰν μόριον γένηται. He does not say whether this transform. occurs ἐν τῷ ἔξαιφνησ.

καὶ τὸ δλον etc. This is the δλον τέλειον μόρια D ἔχον of 157 E: and of course it does not, any more than the μόρια, exist until the latter are thought of as μόρια. In the phrase τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνδέ the ἐν is of course the ἐν of the dial. Does ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐνδέ refer to that also? Perhaps so, in view of the prev. express. and also of the ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων which could cover his recent argt.: yet it really is diffic. to say. He has not been speaking of τὸ ἐν for some time, and the ἐν δλον τέλειον, or even the ἐν ἔκαστον μόριον of which he has been speaking—any ἐν, in fact—would do. We must remember too, though he chooses to forget, that even τὸ ἐν only gets its πέρας when thought of in connec. with τὰ ἄλλα, and that the nature of either, if we strive to think of it out of such connec., is

ἀπειρία—so much so that the very names he gives would not be permissible. Κοινωνησάντων is seldom used in this absolute manner to mean ‘in uno communicantibus’ (Fic.). Proc.-Dam. puts τοῦ ἐνὸς under the govt. of κοινων. (301):—τοῖς ἀλλοῖς γοῦν τοῦ ἐνὸς συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐπέρ ἐκοινώησαν, γίγνεσθαι τι ἔτερον, ὅπερ αὐτοῖς πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα. We might expect δὴ πέρας αὐτοῖς πάρεσχε, but ἑαυτοῖς immediately precedes. In t we have

p. 32. ἀπειρίαν, for which a verb must be sought from παρέσχε.

E δροιά τε... ἑαυτοῖς; A formula with which cp. the familiar οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον (οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται) οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἀλλων.

εἰ μέν So Η: t ἥ, which certainly suits ταύτη. The same diverg. occurs in εἰ γε, εἰ δέ below. In this sent. Heind. would read πάντα twice, one with ἀπειρα the other with εἴη, to corresp. with the ἀπαντα—πάντα' following. In ἑαυτία... πεπονθεν the force is as if it read ἀρ' οὐκ ἑαυτία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη δ πέπονθεν;

159 κατὰ μὲν ... ἀνορούστατα: i.e. so long as we consider them all either as ἀπειρα or as πεπερασμένα in both cases they are like; but when we regard them all in both lights at once—both κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν and as τοῦ ἐνὸς μετέχοντα—then they are as unlike as possible. Here (Heind.) ἀμφοτέρως = αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις. Stallb. is brief, ‘Itaque ex quaue ratione similia erunt sibi ipsis et inter se, ex utraque autem utrinque maxime contraria et dissimilia.’

καὶ ταῦτα δὴ etc. Up to ἑστῶτα this preserves the connec. with the ἀν εἴη above, and ἑστῶτα should have had a colon.

157 B-159 A. In pursuance of the dictum 136 A-C, Parm. has now entered upon his consideration of τὰλλα αὐτὸς αὐτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δ τι οὖν (i.e. πρὸς τὸ ἔν). But we find that the discuss. becomes more and more a recapit. of argts. dealt with at length in Demos. I., II.—οὐκ ἔτι χαλεπῶς εὑρήσομεν is its key note, and inevitably. He cannot define his ἄλλα save in relation to τὸ ἔν, but he has already set forth the nature of τὸ ἔν by continuous ref. to τὰ ἄλλα: a complete discuss. of the one, however it may be formally isolated, involves so much ref. to others and many as to make a separate treatment

of these perfunctory. His difficulties here, as formerly, are that he must make ordinary lang. express abstruse ideas, and that he must treat as successive, thoughts that are correlative and simultaneous. We see still more clearly now that ‘the one’ is but a counterpart of each of ‘the others’ or ‘the many.’ Stallb. persists in regarding the latter as the sensible world and the former as the ideal; there is no distinc. in the treatment of them to justify this.

εὶ ... ἐπισκοπῶμεν Both MSS. εὶ ... ἐπισκοπῶμεν, of which the former seems diffic. to explain and the latter must be wrong, unless we assume that some words have dropped out, which would account for both. It will be seen that εὶ has an -ει nearly above and an εὶ nearly below it; if this was so in the archet. one of these might explain this one. To account for -ποῖμεν some would read ἐψημεν. But we have λέγωμεν below; and the subjunc. is employed in 142 B and 155 E. It is curious that in the former case ἐπανέλθωμεν is followed by φανείη in Η. It is just conceivable that εὶ may point in some way to a lost βούλει—οὐκ οὖν βούλει or βούλει οὖν. But Heind. suggests τι οὖν εὶ, which of course carries the optat. in both verbs. In ἀρα ... μόνον the order seems inverted: it would at least be equally clear thus, ἀρα οὔτω μόνον [i.e. ὡς ἄρτι διεληλύθωμεν] ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα ἥ καὶ οὐχ οὔτως. Proc.-Dam. (303) says ἐπισκοπεῖ δ' αὐθὺς περὶ τούτων αὐτῶν—τοῦ τε κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι, τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πεπερασμένου ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑαυτίων παθῶν—εἴπερ οὔτω μόνον ἔχει ταῦτα ὡς φανῆναι τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπόμενά τε καὶ οὐχ ἐπόμενα. Cp. 163 B, εὶ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἀπερ καὶ νῦν, ἥ ἔτερα: εἶναι; is under χρὴ or χρὴ πεπονθεν. in the prev. sent.

ἐν φ... τῷ αὐτῷ Hyperbaton for effect: = ἐν φ καθά—περ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ = ‘in quo velut in eadem sede’ Fic.

ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις This is hardly proved. He has urged that they are not, as separate things, in one third thing; and he has added that the one has not parts which could be in the others; but he has not said till now that the one as a whole may not be in the others, and he gives no reason that could justify it till he says οὐδαμῆ ἀρα ... ἐν οὐδέν:

μὴ ἔχει: Both MSS. ἔχη—phps. shows that the archet. had been partly written to dict.

τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, Not in this case one phrase, τοῦ δ ἐνός is govd. by μετέχοι. In ref. to this and what

follows Thoms. quotes his Dam., fol. 23, οὐ γὰρ ἔκεινο [τὸ ἐν] μόνον ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μετ' ἔκεινο, πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα. καὶ ὅτι μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἔκεινο, φανερόν· ὥστε διακέκριται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθόσον ἐν ἔκαστον ἀλλὰ καθόσον οὐχ ἐν. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ οὐχ ἐν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόφασις, ἀλλὰ θέσις τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἐν.

Ἐν γὰρ ... πολλὰ ἦν. Is it the form of this sent. which has led to the marg. note? If we are to regard the words as complete they are oddly assorted. A better arrang. would be ἐν γὰρ ἔκαστον αὐτῶν ἦν ἀν μόριον τοῦ ὄλου. Yet that hardly gives the sense required, which demands (as in Fic.) that ἐν should be the pred. We must then read thus: ἔκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν ἦν ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὄλου: or as Proc.-Dam. (304) ἔκαστον ἀν μόριον τοῦ ὄλου ἐν ἦν which omits αὐτῶν. Τοῦ ὄλου must be regarded as =τῶν ἀλλων or πάντων τῶν ἀλλων.

νῦν δε ... μετέχει: Here again the lang. is diffic. Fic. does not injure the sense and aids the grammar by neglecting αὐτῶν, and mentally arranging the last words as ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδαμῆ μετέχει. Possibly we should treat τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς as one phrase, since it has often been used as such, and hold αὐτῶν as sufficiently explained by the occurrence of ἐν and ἐνός.

οὐδὲ ἄρα ... ἐν αὐτοῖς, Stallb., neatly, 'Ergo τᾶλλα neque ipsa sunt duo vel tria neque hos numeros in se complectuntur.' The simplest order would be—οὐδὲ ἄρα (1) οὐτε αὐτὰ τὰ ἀλλα δύο οὔτε τρία ἔστι (2) οὐτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς (τὰ τοιαῦτα). Here οὐδὲ ἄρα connects a new neg. sent. to previous ones, as above; and οὔτε is left out before δύο.

p. 33. E οὐδὲ δμοια ... ἀνομοιότης is another sent. on the same plan. But the correl. nature of δμοια-ἀνόμ. and the corresp. nouns makes it easier than in the case of δύο τρία to use καὶ for οὔτε.

εἰ γὰρ ... τοῦ ἐνός: t has ἢ ἔχοι which makes the apod. begin here instead of at δύο που. The text is better. The contention is—where you have not 'two' you cannot have two of anything, and we saw that there could be no two where there was no one. εἴδη may or may not be used technically. Below δυοῖν is, of course, gen. by μετέχειν: we expect a τούτοις govd. by ἀδύνατον as anteced. to ἢ.

οὐτε' ἄρα ... στερομένοις: We have here three successive cases of οὔτε followed by ten successive cases of οὐδέ. Do the former three suggest the connec. 'neither-nor,' while the others are a

string of strong independ. negations to be rendered by a series of 'no nor' or 'not yet'?

δμοια μὲν γὰρ θντα μόνως, (Proc.-Dam. 304) ἡ ἀνό-¹⁰⁰
μοια μόνως, ἐνὸς ἀν τοῦ ἐτέρου εἶδους μετέχοι, ἡ τῆς
ὅμοιότητος ἡ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος· ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα
δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίον μεθέξει: and again εἰ γὰρ ὁμοιό-
τητος μεθέξει τὰ ἀλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἡ ἀνομοιότητος, ἔσται
ἡ ὁμοιότητος ἡ ἀνομοιότητης τι καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ παρὰ
τὰ ἀλλα τοῦ ἐνός: and again (305) εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν πῶς
κινηθήσεται; πῶς στήσεται; ... τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς ἀναιρε-
θέντος κατὰ τὰς ἀνωτέρας ὑποθέσεις καὶ ταῦτα ἀναιρε-
θέσεται.

οὐτως δὴ ... μὲν οὖν: This summing up seems rather

a non-sequitur. It may state facts, but if so they are not the facts on which the argt. has dwelt. Dam., cited by Thoms., says this concl. is similar to that of Dem. I. But to make it the same the very important words πάντα τέ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, which really refer to Dem. IV., must be omitted. The remainder forms a comprehensive negative pronouncement which corresponds with that of I. But granting it to be true it is not relevant. We are speaking now of the others, and the natural concl. would have been πάντα τέ ἔστι τὰ ἀλλα τοῦ ἐνός καὶ οὐδέν ἔστι, καὶ πρὸς ἑντά καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ὠσαύτως: It is very natural, then, that Heind. should expect καὶ πρὸς τᾶλλα, καὶ τᾶλλα ὠσαύτως: the introd. of καὶ τᾶλλα being but a modest acknowledgment of their prominence in this last Dem. He also points out that this summary comprehends the argts. in both IV. and V. Indeed Thomson's Dam. says that it amounts to a summary of the whole five. οὐτω δὲ ἐν ἔστι κοινὸν τοῦτο συμπέρασμα τῶν πέντε ὑποθέσεων. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, (1) καὶ οὐδέν ἔστιν, ὡς ἡ πρώτη καὶ πέμπτη—(2) καὶ πάντα ἔστιν, ὡς ἡ δευτέρα καὶ τετάρτη—(3) καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοια καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἡ τρίτη καὶ μέση τῆς ὄλης πεμπτάδος. Proc.-Dam. (305-6) observes at this stage πεπλήρωκε τὰς προτέρας δώδεκα ὑποθέσεις τοῦ εἰ ἐν ἔστι, (1) τίνα ἔπειται καὶ (2) τίνα οὐχ ἔπειται, καὶ (3) τίνα ἔπειται τε καὶ οὐχ ἔπειται:—καὶ ταῦτα τετραχῶς· τίνα ἔπειται αὐτῷ (α) πρὸς τε αὐτῷ καὶ (β) πρὸς τὰ ἀλλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις (γ) πρὸς τε ἀλληλα καὶ (δ) πρὸς τὸ ἐν' καὶ τίνα οὐχ ἔπειται ὁμοίως τετραχῶς, καὶ τίνα ἔπειται τε καὶ οὐχ ἔπειται ὁμοίως τετραχῶς [i.e. 3 × τετραχῶς = 12]. λοιπὸν εἰσβάλλει καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἐν οὐχ ἔστιν, ἐξ ὧν τὰς ἔτερας δώδεκα ὑποθέσεις συστήσει.

c. ή καὶ etc. Gram. requires either that *εἰπεῖν* should be om. or that it should be underst. after *τοῦ*.

ἢ τι ἔτερον ... τὸ μὴ ὄν; may be rendered (1) ‘that he speaks of non-existence as something distinct in its nature’ or (Müller) ‘dass er unter dem Nichtsegenden etwas Verschiedenes versteht.’ But this would rather require *τὸ μὴ εἶναι*—(2) ‘that (in each case) he says that this which is not is something distinct,’ or (Ast) ‘se diversum ac proprium quid dicere hoc quod non sit.’ This is the better. In the case before us the thing which is spoken of as *μὴ ὄν* is *τὸ ἔν*, and to it we must attach an intellig. and separate meaning as compared with *τὰ ἄλλα*. Upon ἔτερόν τι Heind. cps. Theaet. 153 D, δὲ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, (*ἰπόλαβε*) μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἔτερόν τι ἔξι τῶν σῶν ὄμράτων μηδὲ ἐν τοῖς ὄμρασι. Proc.-Dam. (306) says ἔτερον γοῦν ἔστιν ἐπὶ τούτους τὸ μὴ ὄν καὶ ἔτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὅταν οὖν εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἵσμεν δὲ λέγει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔν, ἵσμεν δὲ αὐτὸν λεγόμενον ἔν καὶ [μὴ] ἔν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ὅτι ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἔστι μετὰ τὴν κατάστασιν. With this argt. cp. Soph. 257 etc., where he not only brings out the definite exist. of what in each case is described as being *μὴ ὄν*—τὸ μὴ καλόν, *μέγα*, *δίκαιον*—but clearly shows that he is aware of his divergence in this from the views of the historic Parm. by quoting his well-known words: οὐ γὰρ μῆ ποτε τοῦτο δαμάσθ—εἶναι μὴ ἔσόντα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὃδοῦ δικήσιος εἴργε νόημα.

d. εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι ... τῶν ἄλλων. There has been an omiss. here in Η, cp. pp. lxxxiii., lxxxvi., lxxxviii., xc., xci. It probably arose from a confus. in connec. with the double *μὴ εἶναι*. A reader of the Ms. at a later date supplied the blank but omitted *γὰρ* and the second *γ* in *γιγνώσκεται*. The *γὰρ* is also absent from t, and no doubt it would be from the second family which t represents that the passage would be supplied. The word seems necessary. Heind. refers to a reading *γιγνώσκεται τι τὸ λεγόμενον*, and says that it probably points to *γιγνώσκεται ὡς τι*. The text seems better.

πρῶτον μὲν ... μὴ ἔστιν: τοῦτο refers forward to *εἶναι αὐτὸν ἐπιστήμην*, but the substance of this is already given in *ἵσμεν δὲ λέγει* and *γνωστόν τι λέγει*. We must get a governing word for *γιγνώσκεται* etc., from ὑπάρχειν δεῖ: Stallb. suggests *ἀναγκαῖον* which would cover the following infins. also.

καὶ μὴν etc. An extens. of 142 A, 155 D-E. E Proc.-Dam. (307) says τί δὲ διαφέρει τὸ ἔκείνου πρὸς τὸ τούτου; η τὸ μὲν ἔκείνου ἀναφορικόν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ τούτου δεικτικόν; οὐδὲ ἀν τι ἐλέγετο etc. = πορ³⁴ would it be called or spoken of as ‘something’ if it had no share in ‘something.’

εἶναι μὲν δὴ ... μὴ ἔστιν. Stallb. says ‘quum formula εἰ μὴ ἔστι significet negativa habere praedicata, non est difficile ad intelligendum, εἶναι nunc esse aientibus gaudere attributis. Itaque sententia verborum haec est: ubi τὸ ἔν sumserimus non nisi negantibus notis esse determinatum, aientibus s. positivis utique carere. Quod autem addit Parm.—μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν ... ἀνάγκη—his verbis significat ¹⁶¹ ideam negando finitam cum ideis aientibus eatenus habere communionem quandam quod per has ipsas negando determinetur.’ But is the one here defined by negative qualities? On the contrary, having made the single stipulation that we must ‘know what we are talking about’ when speaking of the non-existent one, Pl. proceeds to affirm for it all the qualities ascribed to the existent one. Does he then mean that when he says ‘the one is,’ a definite thing with the characteristics claimed for it exists *ἐν τῇ φύσει*; while when he says ‘the one is not’ (in his present acceptation of the term) he means that this same thing has no exist. in nature and exists only as a subject of our thought? I assume, he says, on the one hand a definite set of qualities which I call ‘one’ to enter into the sum of things as pictured by me, and on the other hand that same set of qualities to be withdrawn from the sum of things; and in each case I ask—What follows?

εἰ μέντοι ... οὐδέν. After insisting that ‘that one,’ and no other thing, is non-existent, he goes on, ‘For if the thing which is to be non-existent be neither one nor that, but rather the talk is about some other thing, then we have not a word to say.’ And so Proc.-Dam. (308), εἰ γὰρ ἔκείνο τὸ ἔν οὐκ ἔστι λέγομεν, ἔκείνο λέγομεν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο. ἐπειδή, εἰ μῆτε τὸ ἔν ἐλέγομεν μῆτε ἔκείνο μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τίνος ἄλλου δὲ λόγος ἦν ὅτε ἐλέγομεν τὸ ἔν μὴ εἶναι—οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι ἔδει ... καὶ ἔνδε μὲν—τοῦ εἶναι—οὐ μεθέξει, πολλῶν δὲ μεθέξει καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦ ἔκείνου καὶ τοῦ τούτου καὶ τοῦ τούτῳ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Stallb. finds a diffic. here, and says that what we require from the passage is this, ‘Si vero praeter unum

etiam τὰλλα negando determinarentur facile apparent (sublatis affirmantibus notis omnibus) futurum esse ut ne verbum quidem crepari oporteret? Undoubtedly if both one and others were negated there would be little to speak about, but this seems hardly what the passage requires. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ... ἄλλοια; It seems odd that ἔτερα and ἔτεροια should have to be called in before we can admit that ἄλλα are ἄλλοια. He makes a much bolder step immediately. If (εἰπερ τῷ ἐνὶ etc.) he can infer that τὸ ἐν is ἀνόμοιον because τὰ ἄλλα are ἀνόμοια τῷ ἐνί, why not infer at once that it is ἄλλο τῶν ἄλλων because τὰ ἄλλα are ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός? This comes directly under 146 D that the different differs only from the different, and so below c τὰ δὲ ἀνισα etc.

B ἔαντοῦ ὁμοιότητα Cp. 147-8 on this argt. The words below, οὐκ ἀν ... τοῦ ἐνός, admit of two senses differing slightly—(1) about such a thing the argt. could not be conducted as if it were the one (= ὡσπερ εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐν). This seems to be Müller's view, 'so könnte wohl nicht von so etwas die Rede sein, wie von dem Einen': (2) the argt. could no longer be held as dealing with such a thing as the one. The latter suits οἷον τοῦ ἐνός better. Both MSS. and edd. seem agreed that in τοῦ τοιούτου we have the art.: yet it might be του. Does not this argt. cancel the preceding one? If the one must be like itself, it must equally be unlike the others, and so ἄλλα ἔτερα ἔτεροια ἄλλοια are unnecessary.

c With δεῖ ἄρα ... ἔαντῷ cp. ἄρα οὐκ ... αὐτῷ εἶναι; above. In the former the dat. ἔαντῷ is wanting, in the latter the εἶναι—the full constr. being δεῖ ἄρα [ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη] εἶναι τῷ ἐνὶ [αὐτῷ] ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῦ ἔαντῷ.

εἰ γὰρ εἴη ... ἀδύνατα: The odd part of this argt. lies in the εἴη τε ἀν ἥδη—if the one were equal it would already have acquired being, which it has not. Stallb. points to this as coinciding with his view that the non-existent one has only neg. qualities—equality being positive. But surely likeness to itself is a positive quality, to say nothing of the others referred to 160 E. Besides Pl. has not yet decided whether the others exist or not, and yet has brought them into compar. with the non-existent one, a course which ought to involve diffics. Again he infers immediately that if one and others are not equal they must be unequal; but that altern.

holds only if they exist; at least if they exist to an equal extent, are on the same terms as to existence. And if they are equally related to existence are they not equal and like to that extent? The εἴη τε ἀν ἥδη seems one of those captious freaks of sophistry exemplified already in 155 D, εἰπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν.

ἄλλα μέντοι ... σμικρότης: 'It is, however, in connection with inequality that we have bigness and smallness.' 'Jam vero ad inaequalitatem referuntur magnitudo et parvitas' Ast.

ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ... ἐνι: This first καὶ refers to the whole express. μ. τε καὶ σ. and means 'moreover, in addition (to what has already been conceded).' ἀφέστατον is a syncopated perfect form with a present sense. One almost feels as if μεταξύ τι below were one word and αὐτοῦ a dative. But the following words contradict the idea.

τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ ... μετένη Heind., and with him most edd. read τῷ δῆ 'In his, quibus conclusio praecedentium continetur, δῆ scripsi pro δέ. Fic.: *Unigliitur* etc.' A good change; but it deserts both MSS. μετένη comes from t: for the μετή of Α cp. πραγματίαν 136 c and πραγματιώδη 137 B.

ἔχειν αὐτὸς δεῖ ... ἀνάγκη: Both MSS. read οὐτῶς ἔχη which cannot stand. Edd. change to ἔχοι: p. 35. The text gives a form which usage justifies and which is closer to the MSS. The subject to λέγειν is omitted. The contention here recalls that of Descartes, that the concep. of God postulates his existence; but it is more extrav. both because of the less vital nature of the concep. and because of its neg. charac. The fallacy lies in the sense put upon ἀληθῆ. We were told that τὸ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι is a ὑπόθεσις, and we now learn that it is not, but a statement of a fact, because our veracity hangs upon that issue. If that is so then any hypoth. which we may set up about Hippocentauras, Chimaeras, and the other πλάσθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων referred to in the Phaedr. (229), carries with it objective validity. The only truth with which we have to deal in arguing from an assump. is the truth involved in consistent adherence to the terms and conditions it imposes upon us—a truth which does not carry us into the region of objective reality. No doubt Pl. and still more Parm. set great store by the one, and would not place it in comparison

with a Pegasus or Gorgon : but the argt. ‘If the one does not exist, what follows?’—The objective existence of the non-existent one follows’ seems a circle of rather contracted radius. The *οὐτω μὲν οὖν* and *ἀνάγκη* illustrate the unreal character of the discuss. If Parm. wishes to push on or to change the subject Aristoteles will say *ἀνάγκη* to the most paradoxical assertion ; if Parm. would like to enlarge a little, he will say *πῶς δῆ* ; in a much simpler case. And this in detail, though not always in the main outline, is largely the character of Platonic dial.

^{περι} *ἔστιν ἄρα ... μὲν οὖν* : The first sent. here may have two senses (1) *ἄρα*, *ώς ἔοικε*, *τὸ οὐκ ὃν ἐν ἔστι*, but this jars with the context ; (2) *τὸ ἐν ἄρα*, *ώς ἔοικεν*, *ἔστιν οὐκ ὃν* ‘The one is non-existent, then, as would appear.’ It is diff. to form a theory of what underlies the correc. of *τῇ* in the marg. In the text is *τι*, so that the error does not go back to the archetype. Perhaps some scribe had been writing to dictation, and after confusing the sound *τι* with that of *τῇ* (an easy matter) had decided for the latter, from some odd passing notion that *ἀνήσει* was the dat. of a fem. noun. As to the corrector : there is no sign of correc. in Π or Δ , whence we infer that it was not in the marg. of \mathfrak{A} at the time when Δ or its orig. was copied. But there is another possibility. Proc.-Dam. (below) seems to have read *τοῦ πῇ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι*, and 161 E gives *οὐσίας μετέχειν πῃ*. Does *πῃ* explain *τῇ*, and is *τι* the missing accus. to *ἀνήσει* added, and was the orig. *τι τοῦ πῇ εἶναι* or *πῇ τι τοῦ εἶναι*? On *ἀνήσει* we have in the marg. of t Π (Notes 1.) the schol. *ἀφῆσει ἡ ἀναπέισει*. ‘Scholiastes Augustanus interpretatur a. ἡ a.—ut Hesychius : *Ἀνήσει* ἀναπέισει, *ἀφῆσει*. Quae quidem interpretamenta docent, librarium Codicis Augustani perperam ἀνήσει scripsisse pro ἀνήσει.’ Fisch. Why *ἀνήσει*? The only diffic. lies in *ἀναπέισει*, and it is not easy to see how that suits *ἀνήσει* better than *ἀνήσει*. May not the sense be ‘if it shall let loose a portion of being against non-being’—like a dog? (L. and S. *ἀνίημι*, III. 2). To this *ἀφῆσει* would be a suitable equiv., while *ἀναπέισει* might mean ‘hound on,’ ‘urge forward’: unless by chance it is an error for *-πέμψει*. Proc.-Dam. (310) has *ἀπολύει τοῦτο τὸ πῇ εἶναι πρὸς* which seems an equiv. for *ἀνήσει*. On the substance

of the argt. he says *ἔστιν ἄρα ὡς ἔοικε τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὃν κατ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο—ἀληθῆ λέγειν ήμᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν. δὲ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν ἔστιν οὐκ ὃν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὖτως, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀντίφασις τεθῆ (ὅπερ ἔστιν, οὐκ-ἔστι-μὴ-όν) καὶ οὗτω τὸ πῇ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, μᾶλλον εὐθὺς ἔσται ὃν. ὡς ἂν εἰ ἐλεγεν ὅτι ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὃν, λέγομεν τὸ ἐν [Ms. ὃν] οὐκ ὃν ἔστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὸ πῇ εἶναι τούτῳ παρέχομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀπόφασις τεθείη (τὸ οὐκ-ἔστι-μὴ-όν), καὶ ἀπολύει τοῦτο τὸ πῇ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι εἰς δήλωσιν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, μᾶλλον εὐθὺς ἔσται ὃν. ὅταν γὰρ τις λέγῃ τὸ ἐν οὐκ-ἔστι-μὴ-όν, ἀποφαίνεται [=ἀπόφησι here?] τὸ μὴ ὃν ἐκείνου, καὶ γίγνεται ἔστιν-όν. This means that Pl. gets round to the doctrine that ‘the non-existent one exists in a sense’ by two paths. (1) If we speak truth then the non-existent one is non-existent, and so we show that it *οὐσίας μετέχει πῃ*. (2) If we reaffirm the more strongly that ‘the non-existent one does not exist,’ we by our double neg. let existence at the one again.*

δεῖ ἄρα ... μὴ ἔσται : The first statement is this *δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ [i.e. τὸ ἐν] ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-όν* (*ώς*) δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι : and the second *ώσπερ τὸ ὃν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-όν* (*ώς δεσμὸν*) *ἴνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι* $\hat{\eta}$. In the third *οὖτως* refers to these two assumed necessities, and is explained by the following *μετέχοντα* which (Heind.) would be clearer as *εὶ μετέχει*. For the modern reader (whatever might be the case for the ancient one) this complicated statement is rendered still more trying by the introd. of Chiasm—*τὸ μὲν ὃν ... τελέως εἶναι* referring to the second statement, *τὸ δὲ μὴ ὃν ... τελέως μὴ ἔσται* to the first : and additionally so by the closing redundancies *εὶ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι* and *εὶ καὶ ... μὴ ἔσται*. We feel also the want of abstract terms, which leads to the use of parts. and infins. in a confusing manner. As regards grammar *ἴνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι* $\hat{\eta}$ would be clearer were *εἶναι* omitted, or if it had *τὸ* before it. The whole means much the same as *ἴνα αὖ ἔξη αὐτῷ τελέως εἶναι*. Again the phrase *οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὃν* etc. = ‘of the actuality of being existent, and of the non-actuality of being non-existent.’ The whole might run thus—*εἰ ἄρα τὸ μὴ-όν-ἐν μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-όν ὡς δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ωσπερ τὸ ὃν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-όν* *ἴνα τελέως* $\hat{\eta}$. *τὸ τε γὰρ ὃν εἴη ἀν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν*

οὐκ ἀν εἴη οὔτως μάλιστα, εἰ μετέχοι τὸ μὲν ὅν οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι·ὅν μὴ·οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ·εἶναι·μὴ·ὅν, τὸ δὲ β μὴ·ὅν μὴ·οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ·εἶναι·μὴ·ὅν οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι·μὴ·ὅν. ‘Accordingly if it is to prove non-existent it must have the being-non-existent as a bond of its non-existence, just as the existent must, in order to perfect its existence, have as bond the non-existence of not-being; for in this way best would both the existent be, and the non-existent not be, namely, where being shares the actuality of existence and the non-actualty of non-existence, if it is to prove truly existent, and where not-being shares the non-actualty of the absence of non-existence and the actualty of non-existence, if not-being also in turn is to be completely such.’ After paraphrasing, Proc.-Dam. (310, 311) says *τὸ γὰρ εἶναι οὐσιοῖ τοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ ὅν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν ἔμφασιν ἔχει τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. τέτταρα γάρ τινα λαμβάνει ὁν πλέον οὐχ εὑρηται—όν ἔστιν, ὁν οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ πάλιν μὴ ὅν ἔστιν, μὴ ὅν οὐκ ἔστι ... εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν τελέως οὐκ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ εἶναι οὐσίαν [Ms. σίας] παριστᾶ, ὥστε τοῦ ὅν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὅν εἶναι οὐσίας μέθεξις ἔστιν’ επί [Ms. ἐπί] δὲ τοῦ ὅν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ μὴ ὅν οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐσίας μέθεξις ἔστιν.*

οὐκ οὖν ... πῶς δ' οὗ: Heind. supplies mentally *τοῦ μὴ εἶναι* [μὴ ὅν], καὶ τῷ μὴ ὅντι τοῦ εἶναι [μὴ ὅν]. The phrase *ἐς τὸ μὴ εἶναι* corresp. to *εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι* above. Heind. suggests *εἶναι* as underst. with *φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί*. This Stallb. rejects, giving ‘also erscheint auch ein Sein für das Eins, wenn es nicht ist.’ In either case the sense is clear. When Pl. wishes to say that the non-existent one has being he presses the *ἔστι* in *εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστι*, when he wishes to say that it has not he presses the *μὴ*. Proc.-Dam. goes on (311) *οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ τῷ τε ὅντι μέτεστι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι* [Mss. *μετά τι τοῦ εἶναι*] *διὰ τὸ [τοῦ] μὴ ὅν μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ μὴ ὅντι τοῦ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ὅν εἶναι, καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἄρα—ἐπειδὴ λέγομεν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι—τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς αὐτὸν τοῦτο τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ οὐσίᾳ φαίνεται τῷ ἐνὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ αὐθις μὴ οὐσίᾳ καθ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἔστι καὶ μόνον.* This commentary as printed by Stallb. seems to have many errors; the last clause has probably something wrong.

οἱόν τε οὖν ... ἔχῃ: It is not clear whether *οἱόντες* οὖν is impers., followed by an accus. and infin. clause, or personal with *τὸ ἔχον* as subj. to the understood *ἔστι*. *πῶς* is from t; Η πω wrongly.

γ

Ast turns the first sent. thus: ‘Num potest autem fieri ut id quod aliquo modo se habet (*ἔχον πως*) non se habeat ita, nisi transeat ex hoc habitu?’ There seems to be no special tense-meaning in *μὴ μεταβάλλον*, which = *εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλει*, ἄνευ *μεταβολῆς*. In the second sent. we look for *μεταβολὴν σημαίνει* at the close; and for some such word as *πάσχει* rather than *σημαίνει*. The latter would imply the form ‘every such case, in which we have the presence and the absence of a quality, etc.’ Proc.-Dam. says (311) *ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔχειν ἔξιν δηλοῦ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν στέρησιν, ἐξ ἔξεως δὲ εἰς στέρησιν μεταβολή τις ἔστιν, ἴδον καὶ μεταβολὴν αὐτῷ προσμαρτυρεῖ*. Here again Pl. accepts in subst. the law of contrad.

καὶ κινούμ...εἶναι ἔχον: Notes 1. It would seem as c if the archet. had not been quite clear on *ἐν πέφανται*: and we have many cases of hesitation between *ἐν* and *ἐν* in the dial. If Η is right this would appear to be the only case of the perf. of *ἔμφαίνω* in Pl., while *πέφανται* and other parts of the tense occur repeatedly. No doubt that very rarity might suggest a change here. Again we might expect to find *τὸ οὐκ ὁν* *ἐν* here, as it is the subj. of discuss. and occurs just above. Yet the very expect. of it might cause the scribe in t to write it wrongly (i.e. he expected the form and put it, but afterwards corrected himself); while on the other hand we find *τὸ ὁν* and *τὸ μὴ ὁν* without *ἐν*, and following *τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὁν* in 162 A above. *ἐμ* and *ἐν* differ much less in Ms. than in print. “*Ἔχον* corresponds with *κινούμ*, and yet one almost looks for *ἔχει* after *ἐπείπερ*. In ἀλλὰ *μὴν ... ποι*: both MSS. read *τε* for *γε*, and Η has blundered in *μηθίσταιτο*. The clause *εἰπερ μὴ ἔστιν* stands as it were in brackets.

οὐδὲ μὴν ... ἀδύνατον εἶναι: If all three forms for D ‘the same’ here were in the same case they would read *ταύτων τὸ αὐτὸν τὸ ταύτων*. Perhaps the last may mean ‘the same of which we are speaking.’ Both MSS. read *ἐν τῷ*. What is the marginal mark like a small 5 here? *μὴ ὁν ... μὴ ἔστιν*: the former neg. keeps up the hypothetical nature of the case; the latter is as it were a quot. of the former, and is as if in inverted commas.

τὸ γε μὴν ... ἔστανται: If the reason for absence of E motion be non-existence that reason will equally exclude the idea of rest. Pl. draws no distinction of a def. kind between *ἡσυχάζειν* and *ἔστανται*, but

his terms *κινέσθαι*, *έσταναι*, *ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν* imply a distinction. Prob. the last corresponds to Arist.'s *ἡρεμεῖν*, which is the true antith. to *κινέσθαι*. It is the state of being unmoved on the part of a thing which admits of being moved; both *κίνησις* and *ἡρεμία* imply duration—*χρόνον τινά*. It would seem that *τὸ ίστασθαι* is included in motion, and means its momentary arrestment with the expectation of renewal; on the other hand—οὐδὲ δὴ *τὸ ἡρεμοῦν ὅτε πρῶτον ἡρέμησέν ἔστιν ἐν ἀμερεὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἡρέμησε διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ἐν ἀτόμῳ ... οὐτε γὰρ κινεῖσθαι οὔτ' ἡρεμεῖν ἔστιν ἐν τῷ νῦν*. Phys. iv. 8, and elsewhere.

163 θηγ γὰρ ... ἀν ἀλλοιότο: One expects *καθόσον* in place of *ὅπῃ*, or *ταύτῃ* in place of *κατὰ τοσοῦτον*. The words used show that the orig. meaning of each form had been so far modified. The two presents p. 36. *ἔχει ως ἔχει* are retained as intelligible; but the *ως εἰχειν* of *t* is better. Both MSS. read *κινούμενον δέ*. Edd. prefer *δή*, and Fic. renders 'ergo unum dum movetur,' which is more approp. *Ἄ* has no *ἄν*: *t* gives it, and it seems necessary. On the argt. Proc.-Dam. (312) says *σοφιστικὸς φανερῶς ὁ λόγος* (*οὐ γὰρ εἰ κινέται ἀλλοιοῦται φαμέν, ἀλλ' εἴ ἀλλοιοῦται κινέται*). *ἢ γὰρ κίνησις καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, οὐ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν*. The brackets are put to bring out what must be the sense: the last statement being (necessarily, if it is to hold) the ground of the charge. He no doubt refers to 138 B, *ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέρουτο ἢ ἀλλοιότο ἄν*, where *κίνησις* is the genus of which *ἀλλοιώσις* is one species; and his charge is that this is here reversed in order to establish *ἀλλοιώσις* from a conceded *κίνησις*, while all that can be inferred is either change or motion in space. Despite Stallb. the charge is just, if Pl. adheres to his terminology: and he has just renewed that by saying, 162 D, *μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις*, and then treating of its kinds; cp. Arist. Phys. III. I, 201 a 8, *ώστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἔστιν εἰδή τοσαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος ... οἷον ... ἀλλοιώσις, ... αἰξῆσις καὶ φθίσις, ... γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά*. *Εἰ μὲν ... ἀλλοιοῦται*: *Ἄ εἰ ... εἴ*, and it does quite well: *t ἢ ... ἢ*, which also satisfies the passage. If this conversion is to hold *ἀλλοιώσις* and *κίνησις* must be convertible. In any other case the lang. must have been either *εἰ κινέται ἀλλοιοῦται*, *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται οὐ κινέται* or *εἰ ἀλ-*

λοιοῦται κινέται, εἰ δὲ μὴ κινέται οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται—the latter being the form which would agree with Pl.'s former definitions.

τὸ ἀλλοιόν. ... ἀπόλλησθαι; Here again *ἀλλοιώσις* stands for *ἀπόλλησθαι-γίγνεσθαι* if the conversion is to hold. But if so *ἄτολ.* and *γίγν.* are used to mean (1) any change (even one of place), (2) the very special change implied in death-birth.

ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν ... οὐ γὰρ οὖν: Here while the *B* positive *τε καὶ* are repeated twice, the negs. vary from *οὐ ... οὐτε* to *οὐτε ... οὐτε*. Of the negs. the latter form is the normal one. On the former cp. on 150 B. Jelf rightly says, 775, Obs. 2, that *οὐ ... οὐτε* is often ident. with *οὐδὲ ... οὐτε*, the *δὲ* merely linking the sent. to a previous one. The want of symmetry here is often paralleled in English—'Does not become nor perish' might well be followed by 'neither becomes nor perishes.' *t* gives *οὐτε ... οὐτε* in both cases.

160 B-163 B. Dem. B I. is to the hypoth. 'if the one is not' what A II. was to the hypoth. 'if the one is.' It is synthet. or construct, being based upon such a concep. of the hypoth. as 'admits of discussion. Grant that the subject admits of being clearly discussed, and it has in it a capacity for endless antithetic development, it 'both is and is not' many things. But like A II., B I. is much harder to work out than is the corresponding analytic one. The author makes his points in various ways—(1) by stipulating for definiteness, (2) by pressing the 'is' in 'is not' as he did in 'if the one is,' (3) by attempting determination through negation, (4) by claiming that the object of thought if you are 'truthful' exists, and withal (5) by sophistry. These various methods run into each other. With regard to the fourth, while the proposition that thought and existence are one may be strongly and legitimately defended, it is not easy to feel that Pl.'s statement of it is legitimate. One is reminded of the statement 132 C, which he regards as sufficient to refute itself, about 'thoughts that are without the power of thinking.' What he seems rather to contend for is that if any persons choose to lay down a hypoth. and reason seriously about it, their reasonings, if just, will lead to conclusions possessing objective reality. In that sense thought and being are not identical. Even Arist.'s strong assertion, Phys. III.

4, 203 b 30, 'Ενδέχεσθαι γὰρ οὐ εἶναι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἐν τοῖς διδόνοις, is guarded by the closing words. Grote says 'The meaning of the predicate is altogether effaced (as it had been before in Number 1): we cannot tell what it is which is really denied about Unum ... the proposition *Unum non est* is so construed as to deny nothing except *Unum non est Unum*, yet conveying along with such denial a farther affirmation — *Unum non est Unum, sed tamen est aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis* (160 c). Here this *aliquid scibile* is assumed as a substratum underlying Unum, and remaining even when Unum is taken away: contrary to the opinion—that Unum was a separate nature and the fundamental Subject of all—which Arist. announces as having been held by Pl. (Met. B, 1001 a 6-20). There must be always some meaning (the Platonic Parm. argues) attached to the word Unum, even when you talk of *Unum non Ens*: and that meaning is equivalent to *Aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis*. From this he proceeds to evolve, step by step, though often in a manner obscure and inconclusive, his series of contradictory affirmations respecting Unum.' As regards terminol. the close association between the ideas κίνησις ἀλλοίωσις and γένεσις is derived from the old physical philosophers. Πάντα φέντε etc. suggest the first, while Arist. Phys. I. 4, 187 a 29, οὐτώ λέγουσιν, ήν δύο τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι τούδε καθέστηκεν ἀλλοιούσθαι, couples the others.

ει ταῦτα So both MSS. Edd. may be right in reading ταῦτά: but there is nothing to call for the change. For ἀλλὰ χρή: one would expect some such echo of the previous statement as ἴωμεν δή.

C ἄρα μή etc. The query = ἄρ' οὐ τόδε σημ.

πότερον ... τό γε μή δν; μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον corresp. so far to μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν above, and phps. it is used for mere variety after the repeated φῶμεν μὴ εἰναι: μὴ ἔστι is in inverted commas. As to the sense; we are, it may be hoped, speaking as truthfully here as at 161 E, yet we can banish the one from existence with some success. The εἰναι below is found in t, and seems necessary.

D μή τι ἄλλο η̄ η̄ etc. So both MSS.; yet Heind. can justify η̄ν, 'Ita correxi vulgatum η̄, quoniam μὴ h.l. interrogandi vim habet non dubitandi.' The η̄ν would (Stallb.) refer to 156 A. Certainly μὴ interrogans in Ast goes always with the indic. As for the

colloc. of sounds cp. Phaed. 69 A, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὐτη η̄ η̄ ὥρθη ἀλλαγή. The close of the sent. might equally have run τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μετάληψις τὸ δ' ἀπόλυτις οὐσίας.

μηδὲν τούτου The fem. might be looked for, and Heind. would read μηδέν του: but αὐτὸν confirms the neuter. Cp. 157 D, μηδενὸς δὲ οὐ etc.

οὐτ' ἀν λαμβάνοι So t: Υ οὐτ' ἀναλαμβ. There is something to be said for the compound verb, but ἀν can hardly be spared. Proc.-Dam. (315), however, in paraphrasing gives οὔτε γοῦν ἀναλαμβάνει οὔτε ἀπολλύει. Was his text that of the Υ family? If he is on the right track we would have an un-Attic form in ἀπολλύει. Notes I.

τῷ έν... εἰκός: It is hard to bring out the distinc. between οὐδαμῆ and οὐδαμῶς as used throughout this passage. 'Auf keine Art und Weise' Stallb. above: 'dass das Nichtsciende keineswegs irgendwärts ist und nirgendwie an dem Sein Theil hat' Müller: 'nullo prorsus modo usquam est' Fic.: 'in no sort or way or kind' Jowett, including τῷ. Is οὐδαμῶς = nohow, and οὐδαμῆ = nowise? As to the argt., Proc.-Dam. (314), after saying that the previous Dem. discusses τίνα ἔπειται τῷ ένὶ μὴ ὅντι, goes on ἐκ τούτου δὲ ἀποδείκνυτι τὰ μὴ ἐπόμενα (an odd but intelligible phrase)... τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι, φησι, τότε λέγομεν ὅταν οὐσίας ἀπονοτίαν τούτῳ προσμαρτυρῶμεν φ ἀν φῶμεν μὴ εἰναι. οὐκ εἶναι γοῦν φαμὲν αὐτὸν πάς, πὼς δὲ εἶναι, η̄ ἀπλῶς μὴ εἶναι... ; καὶ ἀπολογεῖται ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος οὐ μόνον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ ἀπλούστατα. etc. Thoms. quotes his Dam., Ms. fol. 8, τὸ μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς δν ἀπόπτωσίς ἔστι τῆς οὐσίας. In οὔτε ἄρα... πάσχον he carries out his remarks in B.

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ... πῶς γὰρ οὐ: The assigning of the second τῷ αὐτῷ to the reply is t, not Υ, and it seems essential, while Stallb. gives ample authority for the omission of the prep.—e.g. Crat. 408 D, ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν. Τῶν γε τοιούτων, δ Σ., ει βούλει. Μήτε... μήτε... μὴ γὰρ οὖν, a neat illustr. of the compound character of μήτε as = 'both not, and not' rather than 'neither, nor.' The μὴ in the ans. takes up the double μὴ of the statement, and leaves the τε... τε as mere copulatives.

ηδη γὰρ ἀν... δντος So Υ, and it seems quite satisf. It is as if he said δντος γὰρ ἀν τούτου μετέχον, the δντος being predicative. τούτο t can hardly be right.

Bek. adopts *άν τον* from 'rc. Σ'; while Stallb. inserts *τοῦ* before *ὄντος*, which seems to take from the significance of the passage.

¹⁶⁴ οὔτε ἄρα... ἀν αὐτῷ: In the first sent. the triple *οὔτε* is reg.: in the second there would be two cases of a double *οὔτε*, but in the former of them the first *οὔτε* becomes *οὐδὲ* so that the *δὲ* may couple the second sent. to the first. t balances this *οὐδὲ* by a second before *ἔτεροι*: and gives *τε* for *γε* and *τἀλλα* for *ἄλλα*.

τἀλλα ... ἔναι; 'Is it possible that there should be a *τἀλλα* for it at all, if it be necessary that there should be nothing for it?' 'is there any respect in which it can have *τἀλλα* if it behoove to have nothing?'

^{p. 37. B} περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν A variety from *τῷ μὴ ὄντι*. So 155 E and often. Thoms. cps. Soph. 238 C for a series of negations, *συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὅρθως οὐτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἀλογον;*

^{163 B-164 B.} These two Dems., marked B I. and II., under the hypoth. of *ἐν εἴ μὴ ἔστι* correspond to Dems. A I. and II., under the hypoth. *ἐν εἴ ἔστι*, but in a reversed order. The present II. corresponds to the former I. Both are analytic or destructive, and attain their object, the present one by pressing the *μὴ*, the former by pressing the *ἐν*. And the result is much more easily and satisfactorily got at than in the corresponding synthetic or constructive cases. Indeed the course of reasoning merely tends to give clearness to the conception with which we begin. In this case *μὴ εἶναι = οὐσίας ἀπουσία*; and there is an end. Grote says 'These two last counter-demonstrations (6-7), forming the third Antinomy deserve attention in this respect—That the seventh [i.e. this one] is founded upon the genuine Parmenidean or Eleatic doctrine about Non-Ens, as not merely having no attributes, but as being unknowable, unperceivable, unnameable: while the sixth is founded upon a different apprehension of Non-Ens, which is explained and defended by Pl. in the Sophistes (pp. 258-9) as a substitute for, and refutation of, the Eleatic doctrine The negative results of the 7th follow properly enough from the assumed premisses: but the affirmative results of the 6th are not obtained without very unwarrantable jumps in the reasoning, besides its extreme subtlety.'

It was said, Introd. lxvi., that not-being is as diverse as being; and that Pl. assumes this in part here, and more clearly in the Soph. Arist. as usual has the advant. in scient. clearness when he says that not-being *ἰσαχῶς ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγεται* (Met. XIII. 2). If your Categs. are properly deduced the statement is complete. In this Dem. we deal with not-being in the Categ. of *οὐσία*, in the prev. one we did not—this corresp. with Grote above. The most import. declar. in Dems. B. I-II. is that (162) being and not-being imply each the other. If we speak of being in the popular phenom. sense this holds even under the Categ. of *οὐσία*, while of course it holds in the sense of the dictum *Omnis determinatio est negatio*. It does not hold (Grote above) in the Parm. sphere of being; hence the abortive char. of that system. Pl. in this dial. has a presentiment that it will have to hold in the ideal sphere—*ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην*—if his system is to succeed where the other failed.

ἄλλα μήν που ... λέγοτο: t μὲν which (Heind.) would suit *εἰ δὲ περί*. The *που* has probably not a local meaning, though occurring thus it suggests such at first. To be consist. Pl. should say *δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι πγ.* He has proved, or assumed, that this alone is needed 161 E-162.

ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ Cp. on 147 D 'on the same ground.' *ἔτερον δέ ... ναί:* The *τὸ* (t) seems needed to mark c the subject. For the terms see 143 B. The argt. is that 'others' as a *πρός τι* must have a correl.

μὴ ὄντος γε: In this Dem. then the sense of *μὴ εἶναι* applied to the one is the same as in the preceding—*οὐσίας ἀπουσία*.

ἄλληλων ... δρθῶς: Proc.-Dam. (316) τὸ *ἔτερον δὲ πρός τι ἔστιν ... ἔστιν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τι* (*εἰ μέλλοι [sic] ἄλλα εἶναι*) οὐδὲ *ἄλλα ἔσται ... ἐπεὶ νῦν τὸ ἐν φάνεται ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἔστι*. It seems to be idiomatic to use the pres. *λείπεται* in this sense of *λοιπόν*, cp. Ast. So *τὰ σωζόμενα* for the literary remains of an author: cp. Arist. Phys. III. 6, *λείπεται οὖν δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον. κατὰ ἐν ... ἄλλ' ἔκαστος* give a sharp contrast of hiatus and elision.

ὁ σύκος ... ἐξ αὐτοῦ: *δόξαντος εἶναι* is one of Pl.'s redundanties for emph.; while *καὶ ἀντὶ συμπροτ.* *παρμέγ.* is surely a confus. of ideas. It grows

numerous, and exhibits a case of what Arist. calls ἄπειρον κατὰ διαιρεσιν, but surely it does not increase in bulk. No doubt Arist. says, Phys. III. 6, 206 b 27, Πλ. ... δύο τὰ ἄπειρα ἐποίησεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξῆν δοκεῖ ὑπερβάλλειν καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον ἔναι, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαίρεσιν· and very likely he may regard τὰ ἄλλα collectively as ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξῆν ὑπερβάλλοντα, but he can hardly mean that τὸ σμικρότ., because it is divisible indefinitely, becomes indefinitely large. His words are probably to be qualified by πρὸς τὰ κ. ἐξ αὐτοῦ—it becomes infinitely big by comparison. On the other hand we have the extraord. paradox, as Arist. Phys. III. 6, 206 b 5, points out, of a limited bulk divisible indefinitely, and then (as regarded from the divided state backwards) augmentable infinitely—ἢ γὰρ διαιρούμενον δρᾶται εἰς ἄπειρον, ταύτη προστιθέμενον [ἀντεστραμμένως· he says above] φανέται πρὸς τὸ ὕρισμένον. Thoms. quotes ‘Procl. Inst. Theol. cap. I, Πᾶν πλῆθος μετέχει πῃ τοῦ ἐνός· εἰ γὰρ μηδαμῇ μετέχοι οὐτε τὸ δόλον ἐν ἔσται, οὐθὲ ἔκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ἐξ ὧν τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ’ ἔσται καὶ τι ἐκ τούτων πλῆθος καὶ τούτῳ εἰς ἄπειρον καὶ τῶν ἄπειρων τούτων ἔκαστον ἔσται πάλιν πλῆθος ἄπειρον. Democrit. must have believed in the ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξῆν, or as Arist. also puts it, οὐ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἱεῖ τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἔξω, since starting with ἄτομοι he held καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους δ’ ἄπειρους εἶναι κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ πλῆθος. Diog. Laert. IX. 44.

τοιούτων δὴ...τάλλα, Fic. ‘talibus, inquam, acervis diversa invicem alia praeter unum erunt,’ where invicem rather avoids the difficulty. Heind. wishes we had ὄντων after ὅγκων. Stallb. objects and says the order is τάλλα δὴ εἴη ἀν ἄλλα ἀλλήλων τοιούτων ὅγκων, but does not transl. Jowett ‘And in such aggregations the others will be the others of one another,’ which gives the gist but does not explain the structure. Pl. has already said that the others are other than one another, and he does not wish to part with the phrase, but he seeks to add his elucidation of the true character of the ἄλληλα. What we seem to need is either a mentally repeated ἄλλα—τοιούτων δὴ ὅγκων ἄλλα, ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἀν εἴη τάλλα—or a different case for the first words—τοιούτοι δὴ ὅγκοι ὄντα τάλλα, ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἀν εἴη.

E καὶ ἀριθμὸς...ὄντων: Υ δόξειν may be a reminisc. of the εἴη ἀν which has occurred more than once,

or may be due to δόξει ἐν below : t δόξει. Heind. would supply οὐκ ἀν to ἀριθμὸς δόξει εἶναι. That is the sense, carried on from ὄνδε οὐ, and recurring in οὐκ ἀληθῶς. The argt. shuts out his use of πολλὰ above.

φανεῖται, From ‘would’ (εἴη ἀν) through ‘will’ (δόξει) we reach ‘does.’ ‘Mallem φανεῖται,’ Thoms.

καὶ μὴν ... εἶναι. At δόξειν αὐτοῖς, while t reads εἶναι for ἐν εἶναι. The edd. prefer δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι, which may possibly be best, but ἐνεῖναι and ἐν εἶναι are debatable throughout the dial. Proc.-Dam. in his note follows Υ, δόξειεν ... ἐν εἶναι.

καὶ ἵστος ... ἰστότητος: Without knowing that t has

σμικροῖς here Schleierm. (whom edd. follow) suggested that for σμικρός, and it is very taking. But we must note that if we have not this direct statement that the ὅγκος from having been big becomes small, after passing through equality, we can only infer that it does from the following words which assume it. Proc.-Dam. (317) says καὶ ἔκαστος ὅγκος δοξασθήσεται καὶ ἵστος τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικρός. The form δοξασθήσεται occurs Theaet. 209 c, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμὸλ δοξασθήσεται, and this passive voice is much more frequent in Pl. than one would infer from L. and S. When the ὅγκος passes from little to big it is being closely observed and becoming many; when it passes from big to little (Heind.) each of the many is being momentarily viewed as one. The constr. of φανόμενος partly recalls the idiom προτεράος for τῷ προτεραίᾳ. The words οὐκ ἀν μετεβ. φαν. are fairly equiv. to οὐκ ἀν μεταβάνειν ἐφαίνετο, but we might bring out the force of the part. by rendering ‘for it could not cross over in its phantasmal course, in its progress of make-believe’: unless indeed we are to suppose that by some strange whim the words ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φανόμενος are meant for ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος εἰς τὸ ἔλαττον φανέσθαι. Edd. do not comment upon πρὸν δόξειν ἐλθεῖν, yet the express. is peculiar. How many cases are there of πρὸν with the fut. infin.; and why the fut.? If again we take πρὸν ἐλθεῖν, still how deal with δόξειν? t gives δόξειεν, which would do very well but that one would then expect μεταβάνοι, the whole sent. being = οὐ γὰρ ἀν μεταβάνοι ... εἰ μὴ πρότερον ... δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν. It is worth asking whether the orig. may not have been δόξαν, the part. balancing φανόμενος so far, but agreeing with τὸ μεταξὺ = πρὸν ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξαν.

οὐκοῦν ... μέσον ἔχων: Heind. would understand δοξασθήσεται εἶναι with the first ἔχων, while Stallb. assumes it with the latter only. Heind. seems right; yet it is hard to make any distinc. where all is seeming. But if, with Stallb., we assume that each ὅγκος has a limit towards every other, a considerable step has been taken towards making each 'one.' Yet Proc.-Dam. (318) takes this view, ἐντεῦθεν δείκνυσιν ὅτι ἔκαστος ὅγκος πρὸς ἄλλον πέρας ἔχων (εἴς γὰρ ἔκαστος περιορίζεται πρὸς τὸν ἔτερον) αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἔξει ταῦτα. If we take this view we must remove the comma from αὐτὸν and place it before πέρας ἔχων and also perhaps with Herm. put γε for τε against both MSS.

^{p. 38. B} θεὶ ἀεὶ ... τοῦ ἑνὸς: What is αὐτῶν? It might, so far as form goes, like the following τούτων refer to ἀρχὴν πέρας μέσον preceding, but it is better to refer it to ὅγκων = 'as often as one takes hold mentally of any part of them (the groups), as being one of these parts (i.e. as being beginning, middle, or end), so often does another beginning appear before the beginning [if it is as a beginning that we have viewed our part] etc.' The reading of Η is ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τὰ τοῦ μέσου from which edd. omit the unintelligible τὰ leaving what is the reading of t. The text gives a reading which, with a very slight change indeed, both accounts for the τὰ and yields a much better parallel to the two previous expressions. For the lang. cp. Arist. Met. IX. 4, 1055 a 20, οὗτε γὰρ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐσχατώτερον εἴη ἀν τι. The δὲ is added from t as apparently necessary. For the closing words from διὰ Fic. gives 'quia nequit unum aliquid in his accipi etc.'; but would not this require διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν αὐτῶν ἔκαστον λαμβάνεσθαι? If it stands as in the text λαμβ. must be mid., as Ast assumes, and we must borrow mentally a subj. for δύνασθαι from τις at the beginn. of the sent. = διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι αὐτόν.

θρύπτ... τῷ διανοίᾳ. There seems to be in Pl. but another case of θρύπτεσθαι used for 'break to pieces,' viz. Crat. 426 D-E, where he is speaking of the ρ-sound as indicating movement or φορά, and cites ρέντος—εἴτα ἐν τῷ τρόμῳ, εἴτα ἐν τῷ τραχεῖ, ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιούσδε ρήμασιν οἷον κρούειν, θραύειν, ἐρείκειν, θρύπτειν, κερματίζειν, βύμβεῖν' πάντα ταῦτα τὸ πολὺ ἀπεικάζει διὰ τοῦ ρῶ· ἔώρα γάρ, οἶμαι, τὴν γλωττῶν ἐν τούτῳ ἥκιστα μένουσαν μάλιστα δὲ σειομένην.

Thus we might render it 'crumble away': which the group does, as Proc.-Dam. (319) says διὰ τὸ μὴ θέλειν ἴστασθαι ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ. He twice uses the phrase λαβεῖν τῷ διανοίᾳ, cp. 130 A. Does he mean that the ὅγκοι are not physical? Whether so or not they are at least mental pictures of physical objects. "Ἄνευ ἑνὸς λαμβάνοιτο ἄν: so Η, while t gives ἀνευ ἑνὸς αἰεὶ λαμβάνοιτο ἄν, and so Fic. 'semper enim acervus unius expers accipitur.'

ἔξη γνόντι, Η ὀξύνοντι, where the small mark c looks like a small aspirate. Although Proc.-Dam. has ὀξύνοντι, it can hardly be right. Pl. does not use the word at all elsewhere, and in the sense required here it does not seem to be used anywhere. t gives ὀξὺ νοοῦντι. Perhaps the little sign is all that is left of a misunderstood γ or Γ which had been omitted and was placed above, or else it may be a sign of a lost marginal correction. The aorist seems better too in this connec. as we have the parallel δρῶντι : φαίνεσθαι :: γνόντι : φανῆναι. For the lang. cp. Rep. x. 596 A, ἐπεὶ πολλὰ τοι ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὄρωντες πρότεροι εἴδον, and Theaet. 165 D, ἵστως δέ γ', οὐ θαυμάσιε, πλέιστον τοιαῦτ' ἔπαθες, εἴ τις σε προσηγόρωτα εἴ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὀξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πόρρωθεν δὲ μῆ.

δεῖ φαίνεσθαι So t. Η has δή: wrongly—explained by δή above, or by dictation.

οἷον ... ἄλληλοις: The πάντα (τὰ ἄλλα) are identical with τοὺς ὅγκους or πᾶν τὸ ὅν. The sense is that as outlined roughly to one at a dist., they have a sketchy resemblance to units, and that as thus affected similarly they are also like; but that when one goes up to them they split into differentiated multitudes, and by an appearance of difference become unlike. ἐν πάντα φαίνομενα is subj. to φαίνεσθαι and ταῦτα πεπονθένται is pred.; καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι is the conclus. drawn in conformity with 139 E. We must assume δόξει from above to gov. the infins., which changes as we go on to ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι. Heind. cps. Theaet. 208 E, Arist. Rhet. III. 12, to show that σκιαγραφήματα were meant to be seen at a distance. In οὐκ οὖν ... πολλὰ ἔστιν the parts. and adjs. seem throughout to be govd. by ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι. In κινομένους πάσας κινήσεις we have an allus. to the distinc. in 138 B-C, 139 A, φορά, περιφορά, ἀλλοίωσις, while πάντη (t πανταχῦ) = πάσας

ε στάσεις to correspond. "Ηδη = by this time, after the practice we have had.

164 B-165 D. The result of this argt. is that in the absence of 'one' we may affirm or deny anything about the others with equal truth. But in his anxiety to make sure that the latter cannot be one he permits himself to speak as if they were many, which he has no right to do. They are simply undefinable as lacking *rò μέτρον*. But he saves himself from self-contrad. by urging that all this is only apparent, and does not stand investigation. If you are to have others without one the result is a wild phantasmagoria or chaos. 'This Dem. 8 with its strange and subtle chain of inferences, purporting to rest upon the admission of Caetera without Unum, brings out the antithesis of the Apparent and the Real, which had not been noticed in the preceding Dems. Dem. 8 is in its character Zenoian. It probably coincides with the proof which Zeno is reported ... to have given (p. 127 E, cp. 165 E) against the existence of any real *Multa* Zeno probably showed ... that *Multa* under this supposition are nothing real, but an assemblage of indefinite, ever-variable, contradictory appearances: an 'Απειρον ...: relative and variable according to the point of view of the subject.' Grote.

Ἐν εὶ μὴ... καὶ ἐν. The opening means εὶ ἐν μὴ ἔστι τᾶλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔστι. The πολλοῖς οὐσιν is an echo of ἔσται τᾶλλα and πολλὰ ἔστιν, we might view it as equivalent either to ἐν γὰρ αὐτοῖς πολλοῖς οὐσιν or ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς εἰ ἔστιν. Proc.-Dam. (320) says of this Dem. εἰπὼν τοίνυν (in the last) τίνα τὰ ἐπόμενα, τίθησι καὶ τίνα τὰ μὴ ἐπόμενα, and one sees what he means, though as above his lang. is odd.

166 Ἐτι τᾶλλα ... μὴ οὐσιν: The order here is ὅτι τᾶλλα οὐδὲ ἐν τῶν μὴ ὄντων etc. and παρά τῷ τῶν ἄλλων. The argt. rebuts the assump. both by whole and part; the ἄλλα have 'nothing whatever' to do with what is non-existent, nor has any part of either any connection with any part of the other. Stallb. would read οὐδὲ γὰρ for οὐδέν, but the MSS. agree. Heind. in order to justify μέρος, which he thinks superfluous, suggests that δόξα etc. which follow may be regarded as μέρη. And so Proc.-Dam. (321) εἰ γοῦν τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔστιν etc.

οὐδὲ ἀρα ... ἵπτο τῶν ἄλλων: As Proc.-Dam. says, νῦν ταῦτα δῆ, ἀπέρ ἐφαίνοντο εἶναι (in Dem. B III.) οὐτε εἰσὶν οὐτε φαίνονται. Cp. Rep. v. 478 B, ἀρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάζει; η ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὃν; etc. From 155 D we may infer that φάντασμα is a result of αἰσθησις. It is a startling thing to be told that the δοξάζειν is supposed, if it exists, to be carried on ἵπτο τῶν ἄλλων: no such sugg. has hitherto been made. On the contrary we have been permitted to assume that ημεῖς ... πάντα ταῦτα πράτομεν, and edd. follow Schleierm. in reading ἐπὶ against the MSS. Yet it is not more startling than that νοήματα should have νόησις, in 132 C; and if we change ἵπτο we cannot stop there, the same sense being contained in δόξα παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔστιν.

οὐδὲ ἀρα Note the series of similar negs. meaning B 'no, nor,' 'nor yet' etc. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθει, i.e. 165 D. p. 39. The sent. = ὄσα ἐν τ. π. εἴπομεν αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι. It gives τᾶλλα, and it seems better. ἐν εἰ τε ἔστιν etc. This summarises the dial.: Proc.-Dam. (321) says καὶ εἰ ἐν ἔστι καθὼς ἐν ταῖς πρόσθειν ὑποθέσεσιν ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ ἐν οὐκ ἔστιν καθὼς ἐν ταύταις δῆ ταῖς παρούσαις. As in Dems. B I. and II. he had treated of the result to the one if it is not, first after a fashion and second absolutely; so he deals in Dems. III. and IV. with the fate of the others under similar conditions. That is, I. corresponds with III. and II. with IV. With regard to the last sent., summarising the whole, it must be regarded as held subject to the conditions indicated in Dem. A III. 156 A-B, viz. that the law of contrad. operates at least roughly. As Grote points out that Dem.—which breaks up the harmony of the antinomies A I.-II., IV.-V., B I.-II., III.-IV.—must so far apply to each pair of contrary proofs as these occur. Of the conclus. he says 'The close of the Parmenides as it stands here, may be fairly compared to the enigma announced by Plato in his Republic v. 479 C, [ἔσικε καὶ τῷ τῶν παιδῶν αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ ἐνούχου τῆς βολῆς πέρι τῆς νυκτερίδος, φ καὶ ἐφ' οὐ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν] This is an enigma propounded for youthful auditors to guess: stimulating their curiosity and tasking their intelligence to find out. As far as I can see, the puzzling antinomies in the Parmenides have no other purpose There is however this difference ... The

constructor of the enigma had certainly a preconceived solution to which he adapted the conditions of his problem: whereas we have no sufficient ground for asserting that the author of the antinomies had any such solution present or operative in his mind. How much of truth Plato may himself have recognised, or may have wished others to

recognise in them, we have no means of determining. We find in them many equivocal propositions and unwarranted inferences—much blending of truth with error, intentionally or unintentionally. The veteran Parmenides imposes the severance of the two as a lesson upon his youthful hearers.' Surely this is too pessimistic.

ERRATA.—The following errors have been observed: no doubt there are others, although much care has been taken. It should be noted that, in giving the punctuation in Notes I., no attempt has been made to give the 'middle stop' where it seemed to occur. This is due partly to doubts as to the facts, partly to the trouble which would have been caused in printing. The upper or lower stop has been used according as the position in the MSS. seemed to incline.

Page xxvii., line 30, for premises	read -isses
,, liv., „ 31, „ principal	„ -ple
,, lxxv., „ 30, „ vi.	„ VII.
,, ci., „ 38, „ reproductions	„ -tion
,, 16, „ 22, „ <i>tis συλλήθδην</i>	„ <i>tis -δην</i>
,, 32, „ 14, „ <i>έστωτα,</i>	„ -ta.
,, 115, „ 1, „ <i>πορωτέρων</i>	„ <i>πορρωτέρων</i>
,, 139, „ 29, „ than	„ from
,, 8.—The 80 b 1 and 1 belong to δ ¹ λέγω in line 17.	

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

THE references in the index of subjects are to the pages of the Introduction and the Notes; the references in that of Greek words are to the pages of Stephanus which include Text and Notes. Help may also be got from the marginal notes and summaries.

- Absolute, The, xlv., xlvi.-l., 100, 103, 106.
- Abstract science, xiii. ; thinking, lxv. Dialec., Science.
- Abstraction and generaliz., xxix., xliv., xvii. Comp., Generaliz.
- Academy, The, iii. Pl., Text.
- Accident, 84, 136, 138, 141.
- Achilles paradox, lxii., 135. Motion, Zeno.
- Adimantus, xvii., 76.
- Aeschines, philos., iv. Dialogues, Panaetius.
- Age, lxvi., 119, 154-5. Time, Younger.
- Aldus Manutius, lxxiii., lxxiv., cxiii. Edits.
- Alexandria, ii. Libraries, Thrasylos.
- All, 97, 150, 162. Whole.
- Ambiguities, lxiii. etc., 138. One, Not-being etc.
- Analysis-synth., lvii., 96, 99, 157, 170. Construc., Parm., the. *ἀνάμνησις*, xxx., 95, 106.
- Anaxagoras, liv.
- Antipho, xxii., 76.
- Antisthenes, v., lx. Predic.
- Antithesis, xxxvi., 131, 138, 148.
- Aorist v. pres., imperf., 80, 92, 117, 139.
- Apellicon, lxxvii. Attic, Text, Usener.
- Aposiopesis, 109. Sentences.
- Appearance (seeming), lxviii., 173-4. Being, Cratyl.
- Arethas, cxvii. etc. MSS., Patras.
- Aristophanes of Byzant., i. etc. Libraries.
- Aristoteles, xvii., xx., xxxv., lii. ; = Aristotle? xxvi., xxvii.
- Aristotle, on Antisth., lx. ; on begin., lxiv. ; on change, lxii., 160 ; on divisib., 173 ; on dogs, 84 ; on ideas, x.-xi., xxix., xxxiii., xliv., xlvi., 88, 89, 96, 98 ; on likeness, 117 ; on motion, vi., x., 113, 170 ; on One, 111, 148, 157 ; on Pl. and his works, vi., x., xi., l. ; on relation, 102, 116 ; on Socr., xxix., xxxii., xlivi., l., lii. ; on time, 160 ; on whole etc., x. ; Metaph., viii.-x. ; refers to the Parm. ? v., vi., viii., xlivi. ; terminol. later than Pl.'s, x., xxxi., lxii., 86, 120, 134, 141, 160 ; text dub., iv., vi., vii. ; *τρόποις*, *δύναμις*. in, xii.
- Arrow parad., xxxviii. Motion, Zeno.
- Article, 81, 109, 132-3, 135, 139, 158.
- Athenaeus, xxxiv., xxxv.-vi. Parm.
- Atoms, lxvi., lxviii., 140, 161. Democ., One.
- Atticus, -ciana, lxxvii. Apellic., Text, Usener.
- Attraction, syntact., 162. Sentences.
- Authenticity of Parm., i.-xix., xxi. Aristoph., Galen, Grote, Thrasyllus, Ueberweg.
- Author's attitude, xxviii., xl., lxxiii., lxxx. Pref.
- Bast, F., xcix. MSS.
- Becoming, lxii., lxxi., 105-6, 151, 153 etc., 161 ; and perishing, xxxix., lx., 158, 159, 171. Change, Motion, Process, Time.
- Beginning, xxxix., lix., lxiv., lxvii., 75, 153, 156 ; in space, lxvi., 132.
- Being, lxiv., lxvii., 117, 128 ; confined to space (q.v.), 150 ; to time (q.v.), 122 ; chains of (q. v.), 117 ; objective, 167, 170 ; of One (q.v.), lviii., lxvii., lxxi., 106, 127, 131, 156 etc., 161 ; of Parm., xxxvii.
- Bekker, I., lxxiv., lxxv.
- Bigness, xlii., xlivi., l., 92, 148, 149. Ideas, Smallness.
- Blass, F., xciii., 129.
- Body, xlivi., 76, 96, 131-2. Sense etc.
- Bond, 168. Being.
- Boundary, 132, 133. Limit etc.
- Byzants., cxx. Subscript.
- Byzantine reckoning, cxxi. Indic.
- Caesarea, cxviii.-xix. Arethas.
- Caligraphists, -phy, cxvii.
- Campbell, Prof., xxi.
- Categories, lxx., 172.
- Cause, lxiv.
- Cephalus, xxii., xxxiv., 76.
- Chains of being etc., 75, 90, 95, 100, 117, 157 ; of ideas, xxx., 95, 101, 105.
- Change, 159, 161, 170, 171. Becoming, Process etc.
- Chiasm, 156, 158.
- Chronology, Platonic, xxiv. Sequence, Parm., the ; Teichmüller.
- Circle, 112, 133.
- Clarke, Dr., ciii. , Ms., xxxv., lxxiii.-vi., ciii. etc.
- Clazomenae, 76.
- Clinton, xxxiv.
- Cobet, C. G., lxxvii., xci., xcvi.

- Comparison and generaliz. (q.v.), xxix., 116; not same as ours, xliv., 95, 99. Abstrac.
- Constructive argt., lvii., lviii., 157. Analys.
- Continuity, -uous, lxiii. Time.
- Contradiction, Law of, etc., xxxi., lx., 156, 157.
- Copies of patterns, li., 99, 101.
- Cratylus, l. Arist., Pl.
- Damascius, 75; Dam. (Ms.), 140. Proclus.
- Day, 93, 134. Ideas, $\mu\theta\epsilon\xi\sigma$.
- Decay, viii. Change, Motion.
- Deductive argt., lvii., lxv. Analys. Construc.
- Definition, xxix., xlii., l., lii.
- Demetrius of Phalerum, ii., iii. Authent., Libr., Text.
- Democritus, iii., viii., xxxv., lxvi.-vii. Atoms.
- Demonstration, 87; -tions. Parm., The.
- Description of MSS., xciv.-cxxxv. MSS.
- Dialectic, xxxii., xlvii., lii., liv., lxviii., 78, 81, 105, 111, 117; its object, xli., xlvii., lv.
- Dialogue in Pl. (q.v.), xv., xvii., xx., 110; system in, xvi.
- Dialogues, i.; sequence of, ii.; spurious, ii., iv.-v. Parm., The; Pl.
- Dictation in MSS., 76, 96 etc.
- Different, The, 115, 116, 119, 127, 135, 137-139, 140, 167.
- Diogenes Laert., i.-iv., viii., xxxiv.-v., lxxvii.
- Discipline of philosopher, xxxii., lii., liii., lxv., 106, 107.
- Dittenberger, W., xxi. Language.
- Divisibility, lxiv., lxvi.-vii., 126, 130, 133.
- Dogs, 84.
- Editions of Pl., lxxiii. Aldus, Bekker, Heind., Steph.
- Eleatics, xli., lviii., lxvii., lxviii. Melissus, Parm., Zeno.
- Elements, x., 76.
- Enclitics, 78.
- End, xxxix., lxvi., 132.
- Equal-unequal, -lity, xlii., xliii., 92, 118, 141, 149, 151.
- Euclides, xxv., 79.
- Even-odd, 128. Number.
- Extremities, 132. Limit etc.
- Finite-infinite, lxii. Divisib.
- Finlay's Hist., civ., cxvii., cxviii., cxx., cxxi. Areth., MSS., Patras.
- Flinders Petrie papyri, xciii. MSS., Text, Usener.
- Forgery, Literary, iv. Antisth., Galen.
- Fractions, lxiii., 131. Divisib., Minim.
- Frederking, A., xxi., 77, 78, 88. Lang.
- Gaisford, T., lxxiv., cvi., cxxii. Clarke. Galen, iv., lxxvi.-vii.
- Gardthausen, cxix. Palaeography.
- Generalization, xxix., xxx., xliv., 95, 96, 99. Abstrac., Compar.
- Genus, 86, 103. Idea.
- Glauco, xvii., 76.
- God, xliv., 103, 104. Idea, Science.
- Graux, C., ci. Mélanges.
- Green, T. H., xiv.
- Grote, G., 82, 96; on the Demonstrations, lvii., ix., lxii., 123, 126, 156, 171, 172, 175; on the Parm., ix., liii., 175; on Pl.'s methods, xiv., xxxix., lx., 104; on Pl.'s text, ii.-iv. Pl., Parm.
- Hegel, 156. Being.
- Heindorf, lxxiv. Edits.
- Heraclitus, l., lxxii., 161. Becom.
- Hermann, lxxiv. Edits.
- Ibycus, 109.
- Ideas and ideal world, xli.-xliv., xlvi., 94, 97, 105, 147, 149; Arist.'s (q.v.) objects, xlvi., 88; extended? 92, 94, 96; growth of xlvi., l., 89, 90; how reached, xxix.; incomplete and inconsist., xxix.-xxx., xli., lii., 149, 150; intermingling, xxxi., l.; $\mu\theta\epsilon\xi\sigma$ (q.v.) of, xlvi.; name, 97, 103, 105; necessary for philos., xliv.; $\nu\theta\eta\mu\alpha?$ xxix., xxxvii., xlvi.-iv., xlvi., 96, 105; patterns set up in nature? xxix., xxxii., xlvi., xlvi., li., 93, 97; $\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\tau\alpha?$ xxix.-xxx., xlvi.-vi., lii., lxix., 87, 100, 105. One, Parm., Pl., Sense, Sensible Objects.
- Imperfect, 80. Aorist.
- Indiction, cxxi. Subscr.
- Inequality, 118. Equal.
- Infinite. Finite.
- Instantaneous, The, lxii., lxxii., 159, 160. Now, Time.
- Jackson, Dr., xi., xx., xxiii., xxxiii., lviii., lxviii.
- Joannes, cxvii., cxxii. Caligr., Subscr.
- Jordan, A., lxxiv., lxxvii., xcii. Schanz etc.
- Jowett, B., xvii., xxxix.
- Kant, li., lv., lxv., 96, 160.
- Knowledge, lx., 106.
- Lachmann, lxxiv. Edits.
- Language as test of date, xxi. Campb.
- Leo VI., cxx., cxxi. Stylianus.
- Libraries, ii., iii., iv.; at Patmos, civ. Alexand., Apell.
- Like-unlike, -ness, xli., 85, 117, 118, 140, 141. Same, Different.
- Limit, -less, xxxviii., lxii., lxiii., lxvii., 126, 130-1, 157, 163, 164, 173, 174.
- Lines of MSS. (q.v.), lxxvi., ci. Graux, Schanz.
- Little, 118, 173. Small, Big, Minimum.
- Logic, -cal, xxxi., lviii., lx.-lxii., lxiii., lxv., lxvii. Analys., Contrad., Metaph.
- Maass, E., cxviii., cxix., cxxii. Arethas, Mélanges, Palaeogr., Subscr.
- Mai, Card., ciii., cxix. Arethas, Vatican.
- Majuscules, lxxvi., xcix., cxvii., 138. MSS., Minusc., Palaeogr., Writing.
- Manuscripts, archetypes, lxxvi., 126, 144; comparison of, lxxxii., lxxxvii.; descrip. of Paris A, xciv.-ci.; of Clarke, ciili.-cxxxii.; of Venet. t., cxxii.-v.; families of, lxxx. etc.; form of, xcvi., cx., cxxiv.; gaps in, lxxx., lxxxvii. etc.; great, lxxv., lxxviii., cxvii.-xxii.; measurement of, lxxvi., xcvi., cx., cxiii., cxxiv.-v.; treatment of, lxxiv., lxxix., lxxxiv.-vi., xci.
- Many and One (q.v.), xl., lxiv.-v., 86, 107, 130-1, 136, 162; of sense (q.v.), xxxviii., 106, 133. Multit., One, Others, Stallb.
- Matter, xliv., lxvii. Sense etc.
- Measure, 118, 150, 175. Idea, Limit, Little, Small etc.
- Megarians, xx., xxv., xxxiii.
- Meisterhans, K., xciii., 76. Blass, Pro-nun., Flinders Petrie.
- Mélanges-Graux (q.v.), ci., cxvii., cxix. Maass, Subscr.
- Melissus, xxxviii. Eleatics.
- Metaphor, xlvi., li. Arist., Ideas.

- Metaphysics, xxxii., xxxix., lli., lviii., lxiii.-iv., lxvii., lxx., 105; begin with Pl. (q.v.), viii.
- Metaphysics of Arist. (q.v.), refer to the Parm., viii.-ix.
- $\mu\acute{\theta}\epsilon\xi\varsigma$, x., xxiv., xxv., xxviii., xli., xliv., lv., 85, 94, 100, 147. Ideas, Pl.
- Middle, lxvi., 132. Begin., End.
- Minimum of being (q.v.), lxiv., 131; of thought, lix. Small.
- Minuscules, lxvi., xcix. MSS., Palaeogr., Writing.
- Montfaucon, cxvii. Palaeogr. etc.
- Motion, xxxix., xlvi., 99, 113, 158, 159, 170, 171, 174. Becoming, Process, Rest.
- Mullach, xxxiv., xxxvi. Parm., Zeno.
- Magnitude, lxiii., 126, 128, 130-1, 132, 157. Many, Number.
- Names, naming, 139-40, 142.
- Nature, xlix., 97. Ideas, Patterns.
- Natural order, 153. Becoming, Beginning.
- Negation, -ive, xl., xlvi., lx., lxvi., lxvii.
- Being, Not-being.
- $\nu\circ\eta\tau\delta\varsigma \tau\omega\varsigma$, xlix., 105, 150. Ideas, Nature.
- Not-being, xl., lviii., lxiv., lxix., 166; ambig. (q.v.), lxv., 172; of Parm., xxvii. Being, Neg., One.
- Not-one, 138. Many, Others.
- Now, xxxviii., lxii., 151 etc., 158, 160. Instant, Time.
- Number, xxxiii., lxiii., 128 etc., 132, 145. Many, Two.
- Older. Becom., Time, Younger.
- One, abstract, lv., lviii., lix., lxiii., 111, 115, 120, 156; all (q.v.), 150; ambiguous (q.v.), lxiii., 111, 114, 116; antitheses to, lxv., lxviii., 138, 148; atom (q.v.)? lxvi.-vii., 140; + being, lviii., lxiv., lxvi., 124, 126, 127, 130, 131, 141, 156, 157, 167; cancelled, lxvii., 122-3; exists, non-existent, lviii., 168, 170; idea? lv., lxiv., 147, 149, 156; in others etc., 148, 149, 150, 164; like-unlike, 141; of it, for it etc., 156; symbolical? liv.; whole of parts, 133. Being, Idea, Many, Others, Parm.
- Opinion, xxxvi., xxxvii., xli., lxviii., 175. Science.
- Opposite, 85, 137, 155. Contrad., Different.
- Other. Different.
- Others, xxxvii., lxvii., 138, 145, 149, 164, 165, 167; = many? lxv., lxix.; and One, lxvii., 132; opinion in, 175; $\tau\acute{a}\delta\epsilon \tau\acute{a} \acute{a}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, xlili. Many, One, Not-one, Stallb.
- Palaeography, cxvii. MSS., Subscript., Text, Writing.
- Panaetius, ii., iv. Authent., Dials.
- Panathenaea, 80. Parm., Zeno.
- Parmenides, viii.; age of, xxxv.-vi., 81; views of, xxxvi. etc., xl., lili.-vi., 80, 110. Mullach, Zeno.
- Parmenides, The, analysis of, xl. etc.; conceps less developed than Arist., x., 115; contents of, xxix., xxxiv.-lxvii.; the Demonstrations, lvii., 123, 156, 160, 164, 170, 172, 175; growth of ideal theory (q.v.), xlili., lli.; historical? xxiv. etc.; language of, xxi.; $\mu\acute{\theta}\epsilon\xi\varsigma$ (q.v.) in, xi.; need of discipline, lli.; noticed by Arist. vi.-ix., xiii.; by Pl. xvii.; Part II., lili. etc., 109, 111; relation to Parm., xxxvi. etc., lili.-iv.; results of argt., lxviii.; scenery of, xxii.; sequence of, xix.-xxxiv., li., 86, 87, 95; speakers, 86, 108; spurious? xiii., 119; $\tau\acute{p}l\acute{o}t\acute{o}s \acute{a}\nu\theta\rho\mu\acute{t}$, xiii., xliv. Arist., Being, Dialect., Ideas, One, Plato etc.
- Part, xlili., lxiii., 94, 114, 125, 129, 130, 133, 135, 138, 153, 155, 162. Many, Others, Whole etc.
- Patmos, ciii. Clarke, MSS. etc.
- Patras, cxvii., cxix. Arethas, Subscript.
- Pattern-world, li. Ideas, Parm., the.
- Perceive, -ception, lxvii. Sense etc.
- Perfect whole (q.v.), 163.
- Philosopher, -phyl, xv., xl., xlvi., 105; 'Philosopher,' the, xxiii. etc. Dialec., Discipl., Ideas, Zeller.
- Physical ideas (q.v.), 91, 101; objects, xxix.-xxx. Chaius, Sense.
- Place, xl ix., 103, 114. Motion, $\nu\circ\eta\tau\delta\varsigma \tau\omega\varsigma$, Rest.
- Plato, iii.; bent of, xvi.; cause of ideal theory, lxix., 105; dialogue in, xv., xvii., xx., xxii., lli., 85, 110; differences from Arist., xxxi., lxii., 130; dualistic inconsistencies, xiv., xl., lli., lvi.; early views, xxix., xli., 1., 87; family, 76; knows views of Parm., xxxvi., 110; modes of arguing, xxxi., lvii., lxv., 113, 115, 158; refs. to own works, xv., xviii., xxviii., xxxii.-iii.; to own views, xiv., xxxix., xlili., lxix.; to Zeno, 85; second etc. hand narrative, xv., xxv.-vi., 80; sentiment in, xxiv., xli., 89, 91; sequence of works, xx. etc., xxviii.; system in, xvi., xxxix., lli.; writings, controversial? xxiv.
- Platonists, llii. Damasc., Procl.
- Porson, R., cvi., cx., cxiii. Clarke.
- Position, 143.
- Predicate, -cation, lviii. Antisth.
- Process, lxii., 75, 114, 124, 156, 161. Becom., Motion.
- Proclus, 75, 105; Proc.-Dam., contin. of Proc., 127-8; Proc. Ms., 136. Damasc.
- Pronunciation of Gk., 76, 129. Blass, Meisterh.
- Pythagoreans, xi. $\mu\acute{\theta}\epsilon\xi\varsigma$, Number.
- Pythodorus, xxii., 76. Parm., The; Ueberweg.
- Quality, xlviii., lxiv., lxv., lxvi.-vii., 88, 89.
- Quantity, lxvii.
- Quaternions, xcvi., cx., cxxiv., 29. MSS.
- Readings, 41-74, 83, 86, 89, 90, 93, 97, 125, 129, 138, 140, 144, 153, 154, 162, 164, 166, 168, 174. Editions, MSS., Text.
- Rcason. Science, Thought.
- Relation, lxviii., lxiii., lxvi.-vii., 102; ideas of, x., xlvi., 88.
- Relative terms, 102, 116, 117. Aris., Ideas.
- Resemblance, 117. Like.
- Rest, 134, 159, 169. Arist., Becom., Motion.
- Ruelle, C. E., 75.
- Same, 116-17, 134, 140; ambig., xxxix., 137. Differ, Like, One.
- Schanz, M., lxxv. etc., lxxx., cxiii., cxv., 56. Clarke, MSS.
- Schleiermacher, v., xx., xxiii., xxv.
- Scholia, cxii., cxix., cxxii., cxxiv.; series of, 3, 5, 15, 71, 76, 79, 80, 81 (two), 88, 90, 93, 109 (two).
- Science, Idea of, xlili., xlvi., lxix., lvi., 111; our, xlvi.-viii., lvi., 105; process v. result, lv., 106. Dialec., God, Ideas, Sense.

- See, xl., xlvi., xlii., lxviii., 89, 96, 106. Ideas, Knowl., Science, Sense.
- Sense, xvii.-viii., lxviii., lxx., 106, 175; transcendental, xlvi.
- Sensible objects, xl., xliii.-iv., 1., 131; exist., xl., xlvi., 106; sphere, xxx., xli., xliii., xlvi.-ix., 1., li., lv., 106. Ideas, Many, One, Science.
- Sentences, forms of, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 93, 95, 98, 103, 107, 109, 110, 112, 118, 124, 136, 138, 143, 146, 148, 152, 155, 160, 161, 165, 169.
- Sequence of dialogues (q.v.), ii., xix.-xxxiv.
- Setting of dialogues (q.v.), xxii.
- Shape, lxvi., 112, 132.
- Simplicius, viii., xxxviii.
- Size, xlvi., 92. Bigness, Smallness.
- Small,-ness, xlvi., xlii., 92, 94, 118, 149, 150.
- Socrates, met Parmen. ? xxxiv. etc.; views of, xxix., xxxii., xlvi., lli.; views as Pl., xxix., xxxvi., xl. etc., xlix., lv., 87, 91, 100; youth of, in the Parm., xxvii.-viii. Arist., Ideas, Pl.
- Soul, xxix., xlii., 96, 117.
- Space, xxxviii., lvi., lxii., lxvi.-vii., 99. Becoming, Motion, Time, Touch.
- Speusippus, iii. Acad.
- Stallbaum, vi., xiv., xxxiv., 75; places One and Many (q.v.) in diff. spheres, 132-3, 135, 147, 149, 152.
- Stephanus, lxxiii., lxxiv.
- Stichometry, lxxvi., cxiii., cxxv. MSS. Stops, ci., cxxviii. MSS., Writing. Style for date, xx., xxv. Dial.
- Stylianus, cxviii. Arethas, Leo.
- Subscriptio, lxxix., cxvi., cxviii. Areth., Clarke, Maass, MSS.
- Syllogism, xxxviii., 138.
- Synesius, xxxiv., 91.
- Synthesis, ix. Anal.
- τάδε τὰ δλλα*, xlvi. Others, Sense, Stallb.
- Teichmüller, xxiv.-xxviii. Dial., Sequence.
- Tetralogies, trilogies, i., lxxv. etc., cxxiii.
- Text of Pl., iii., lxxiii.-xciii., lxxvii., 98; chief sources, lxxviii. etc.; completeness of, v.-vi. Atticus, Editions, Flinders Petrie, Grote, MSS.
- Thompson, E. M., xcvi.
- Thomson, liv. Dam. (Ms.), Proc. (Ms.).
- Thought, apprehends ideas, xlvi., xlii.; and sensible objects? xlvi., lvi., lxx.-i.; position of thought (*νοῦς*) in being, liv., 75, 117, 156; thoughts thinking, xlv. Dialec., Ideas, Science.
- Thrasylos, i., lxxv., lxxvii.-ix. Alexander., Atticus, Authent., Cobet, MSS., Ueberw.
- Time, xxvii., lvi., lxii., lxvi.-vii., 119, 151, 153, 158, 160; divisions of, 121; kinds of, 120; non-temporal things, 121. Arist., Becon., Change, Instant., Motion, Now, Pl., Process, Space.
- Touch, lxvi., 112, 142-46. Space.
- τρίπτος ἀνθρωπ.*, viii., xii.-xiii., xliv. Arist., Dials., Ideas.
- Tübingen Ms., lxxix., lxxx., lxxxii., lxxxvii. MSS.
- Tyrannion, lxxvii. Apellie., Atticus.
- Two, 128, 144, 145, 165. Number.
- Ueberweg, v., x., xi., xxii., xxvi., xxxiv. Authent., Parm., the.
- Unit, One as, lxiii.-iv.
- Unity, lxviii.
- Universe a creature, xlvi. Ideas.
- Usener, H., lxxvii. Attic., Flinders Petrie.
- Varro, lxxvii.
- Vatican MSS. etc., lxxvi., lxxx. etc., cxix.
- Venice MSS. (q.v.) etc., lxxiii.-vi. etc., lxxxv. etc., ci. Schanz.
- Void, xxxviii., lxvi. Atoms, Democr.
- Whole, xxxi., xlvi., 94, 125, 129-135, 162; in the parts (q.v.)? 133-4, 147. One.
- Wohlrab, M., lxxv., lxxxi., xcii. Jordan, MSS., Schanz etc.
- Worlds, 106.
- Writing of Clarke Ms., cx., 128; of Paris A, xcvi.; of Ven. t., cxxiv. Caligr., Joannes, Palaeogr.
- Xenocrates, iii. Academy.
- Younger, 119, 120, 153 etc. Becon., Change, Time.
- Zeller, vii., xviii., xx., xxii., lxix. Philosopher.
- Zeno, v., xxxiii.; age of, xxxv.; views of, xxxviii., xl., liii., lv., lxii., 80, 82, 85, 88, 93, 99, 111. Achilles, Arrow, Dialec., Many, Motion, Parm., Time.

INDEX OF GREEK WORDS.

*Αβυθον φλυαρίαν, 130 D.
 αἰρεῖ, ὁ λόγγ., 141 D.
 αἰσθάνεται, 142.
 Θλη ἡ εἰκασθῆναι, 132 D.
 Θλο τι οὐκ, 137 C.
 ἀμφισβητῶν, ὁ (cp. 135), 133 B.
 ἀνάγκη ὑ, 132 C.
 ἀνάπαινα, 137 B.
 ἀναφανήσεται, 132 A, E.
 ἀνήσει, 162.
 ἀνδρὸς ... δυνησομένου, 135.
 ἀν λαμβάνοι, 163 D.
 ἀνομαιώσει, 148 B.
 ἀπαντήσεται, 144 C.
 ἀπείρογοτο, 148 E.
 ἀπίθανος, 133 B.
 ἀπτεσθαι, ἀψεσθαι, 148 E etc.
 ἀπτα, 130 B.
 αῦ που, 132.
 αῦ τῶν τῆδε ὥν, 130 C.
 αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης, 130 B.
 αὐτῆς ὅση ... ύ, 133 B.
 αὐτὸ ἔν, 158.
 αὐτοῦ δεσπότου ... δ ἔστι, 133 E.

Γέγονε, τό, ... γενηθῆσεται, 141 D-E.
 γένη τε καὶ εἰδη, 129 C, 134.
 γράμμα, 128.

Δεῖ ἄρα ... μὴ ἔσται, 162.
 διὰ χρόνου, 136 E.
 διαιεύσαι, 137 A.
 διατρίβειν πρός, 126 C.
 διαφρότης, 141 C.
 διελέχθησαν, 126 C.
 διὸ ἔστιν; 143.
 δοκῶ, 126 B.
 δόξειν ἐλθεῖν, 165.
 δυ' αἰὲν, 143.

'Εάστει, 135 B.
 ἔαντδ ... αὐτό, 138 A-B.
 ἔαντοῦ ... μόριον, 157 C.
 ἔδρα—χώρα, 148 E.
 ἔθραξε, 130 D.
 εἰ ... ἐπικοπῶμεν, 159 B.
 εἰδη—ἰδέαι, 132 C.
 εἰδῶμεν, 143 B.
 εἰπεῖν—φάναι, 126.
 εἰσοι for ἔστι, 138 E.
 ἐκεῖνό τῷ, 133.
 ἐλκυστον, 135 D.
 ἐν φ τῷ αὐτῷ, 139.
 ἐν εἴη, 138.
 ἐν εἶναι, 131 A-B.
 ἐν πέφανται, 162 C.
 ἐνδεικνυμένου, 133 B.
 ἐνλ μὲν εἶναι, 158.
 ἐξαίφνης, 156 D.
 ἐπεσχεν, 152 D.
 ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖς; 147 D.
 ἐπλεονέκτησεν, 149 B.
 ἐπὸν νοεῖ, 132 C.
 ἐπωνυμίας ἵσχειν, 131.
 ἐρεῖ, 129 D.
 ἔστὸς οὖν, 156 D.
 ἔτέραν ἐξ ἔτέρας, 138 C.
 ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, 138 D.
 ἔτοιμος ... τοῦτο, 137 C.
 εῦ μάλα δῆ, 127 B.
 ἔχει ὡς ἔχει, 163.
 ἔχετον, 150 D.
 ἔχοι ἀν ... ἔχοι: 145 B.

*Ηι ἀν κέηται, 148 E.
 ἥ ἄρα ... τοῦ ἐνός: 147 E.
 ἥδεως, 131 B.
 ἥσυχλαν ἄγειν, 139 E, 162 E.

'Ιδέα, 132 A, C.
 ἰππικῆ, 126 C.
 ἵσον μέρους, 131 D.
 ἴστιψ καταπετ., 131 B.
 ἴστω, 130 D.

Καὶ μᾶλλον, 135 C.
 καλύν τε τί, 135 C.
 καταφαλνεται (cp. 128), 132 D.
 κατέχον, -χειν, 148 E.
 κοινωνησάντων, 158 D.
 κωμῳδεῖν, with λόγον, 128 D.

Λέγειν ἔφη, 127 A.
 λείπεται, 164 C.

Μάλιστα, 127 B.
 μεσαίτερα τούτον μέσα, 165 B.
 μετέχει αῦ, 157 C.
 μετέχοντα, 129 B.
 μηδενὸς ... ἀδύνατον εἶναι, 157 D.
 μον λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς, 126.

Νοῦν ἔχειν, 136 E.

*Ο ἔστιν ἔν, 129 B.
 δ ... μόριον δλον: 158.
 οἱ ... -σθαι, 127 C.
 οἷον εἴη etc., 131 B.
 δλιγοστὸν (cp. 153), 149.
 δμως δέ ... ἐσμένι, 137.
 δξὺ γνώντι, 165 C.
 δ-περ, 128.
 ὄροιν, 149 E.
 οὐπερ, 152 D.
 οὐσία, -αν etc., 143 B-C.
 ούτε ... οὐδὲ (cp. 150 B), 157 B.
 ούτος χρόνος, 156.

Παμμεγέθη, 128 B.
 πᾶν ... ἄπαν, 146 B.
 πᾶν ... ἐπίσχει, 152 C.
 παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγ., 127 E.
 περὶ ἔτη ... μάλιστα, 127 B.
 περὶ τὰ, 155 E.
 πῦ δῆ; 139 B.
 πλάνη ἐπισκοπεῖν, 135 E.
 πλεῖον, 136 D.
 πλεῖστα νενεμημένη, 144 D.
 πλεονάκις ἡ ἄπαξ; 147 D.
 πολλὰ ἐντετύχηκε, 126 C.
 πότ' οὖν; 156 C.
 που, 126 B.
 πραγματίαν, 136 C.
 πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους, 150.
 πρωΐ, 135 C.

Σμικρὸς, 165.
 Τε, 126 B.
 τῇ τοῦ εἶναι, 162.
 τἱ δαὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς, 157 B.
 τἱ δαὶ, τῶν ἀλλῶν, 153.
 τἱ ἦν ὄνομα; 126 B.
 τἱ ἵνα, 136 D.
 τινάς ... πολλούς, 127 C.
 τἱ οὐ διῆλθες; 136 D.
 τόδε, νεώτερον δὲ αὐτὸν: 154 C.
 τοιούτον λόγον: 148 C.
 τοῖς πᾶσιν θν., 145 D.
 τον δέη τῶν τῦδε, 126.
 τοῦ εἶναι μόριον, 142 E.
 τούνομα ... ὄνομα, 147 D.
 τρὶα δῆς; 143 E.
 τῷ τε δύο ... τῷ τρὶς, 143 E.
 τῶν ἀλλῶν, 149 B.
 Ὄπερβήσεται, 152 B.
 ὑπεριθεσο, 136 C.
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν, 166.
 Φαινόμενος, 165.
 φαίμεν ... ταῦτα, 142 B.
 φράζε, 126.
 Ὄμδε, 129 E.
 φκειῶσθαι etc., 128.
 ὅν, 129 D.
 ὡς οἰδεῖν' ἐσμὲν ... δληγαστον, 158 C.
 ως πρὸς μέρος, 146 B.

