

KOEN DE TEMMERMAN

CRAFTING CHARACTERS

HEROES AND HEROINES IN
THE ANCIENT GREEK NOVEL



OXFORD

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KOEN DE TEMMERMAN

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Voor mijn ouders

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August 2013



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Abbreviations

For ancient authors and their works, I have followed abbreviations in LSJ and Lewis and Short. I have transliterated titles that LSJ: xvi–xxxviii print in Greek.

A.	Aeschylus
A.	<i>Agamemnon</i>
AAntHung	<i>Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
AC	<i>L'Antiquité classique</i>
Ach. Tat.	Achilles Tatius
AClass	<i>Acta Classica</i>
Ael.	Aelian
NA	<i>De natura animalium</i>
Aeschin.	Aeschines
AFLM	<i>Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Università di Macerata</i>
AFLN	<i>Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Università di Napoli</i>
AION(filol)	<i>Annali dell'Istituto universitario orientale di Napoli, Dipartimento di studi del mondo classico e del Mediterraneo antico, Sezione filologico-letteraria</i>
AJPh	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
Alex.	Alexander Rhetor
Fig.	<i>de Figuris</i>
AN	<i>Ancient Narrative</i>
Anacr.	Anacreon
AncPhil	<i>Ancient Philosophy</i>
Anon.	Anonymous
ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i> . Berlin 1972–.
Aphth.	Aphthonius
Prog.	<i>Progymnasmata</i>
Apollod.	Apollodorus
Bibliotheca	<i>Bibliotheca</i>
Apollon.	Apollonius Sophista
Lex.	<i>Lexicon Homericum</i>
App.	Appian

<i>BC</i>	<i>Bella Civilia</i>
<i>Mith.</i>	<i>Mithridateios</i>
Aps.	Apsines
<i>Rh.</i>	<i>Ars rhetorica</i>
A. R.	Apollonius Rhodius
<i>Arg.</i>	<i>Argonautica</i>
Ar.	Aristophanes
<i>Eq.</i>	<i>Equites</i>
<i>Lys.</i>	<i>Lysistrata</i>
Arist.	Aristotle
<i>Cat.</i>	<i>Categoriae</i>
<i>EE</i>	<i>Ethica Eudemia</i>
<i>EN</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>
<i>MM</i>	<i>Magna Moralia</i>
<i>Po.</i>	<i>Poetica</i>
<i>Rh.</i>	<i>Rhetorica</i>
Aristaenet.	Aristaenetus
Aug.	Aurelius Augustinus
<i>Rh.</i>	<i>de Rhetorica</i>
A&R	<i>Atene e Roma: rassegna trimestrale dell'Associazione italiana di cultura classica</i>
B.	Bacchylides
BAGB	<i>Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé</i>
BHM	<i>Bulletin of the History of Medicine</i>
BICS	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London</i>
Call.	Callimachus
<i>Aet.</i>	<i>Aetia</i>
<i>Dian.</i>	<i>Hymnus in Dianam</i>
Cat.	Catullus
CB	<i>Classical Bulletin</i>
CHell	<i>Connaissance Hellénique</i>
Chor.	Choricius
<i>Dial.</i>	<i>Dialexeis</i>
Cic.	Cicero
<i>De Or.</i>	<i>De Oratore</i>
<i>Inv.</i>	<i>De Inventione</i>

Off.	<i>De Officiis</i>
Or.	<i>Orator</i>
CJ	<i>The Classical Journal</i>
ClAnt	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
Classica	<i>Classica: revista brasileira de estudos clássicos</i>
CMG	<i>Corpus Medicorum Graecorum</i> . Leipzig and Berlin 1908–.
cod.	codex
ColbyQ	<i>Colby Quarterly</i>
CPh	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
Curt.	Curtius Rufus
CW	<i>The Classical World</i>
C&M	<i>Classica et mediaevalia</i>
C&S	<i>Cultura e scuola</i>
D.	Demosthenes
D. Chr.	Dio Chrysostom
Or.	<i>Orationes</i>
Demetr.	Demetrius Phalereus
Eloc.	<i>De elocutione</i>
D. H.	Dionysius Halicarnassensis
Dem.	<i>De Demosthenis dictione</i>
Lys.	<i>De Lysia</i>
DHA	<i>Dialogues d'histoire ancienne</i>
D. L.	Diogenes Laertius
DNP	<i>Der neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike</i> , ed. H. Cancik and H. Schneider. Stuttgart and Weimar 1996–2003.
D. S.	Diodorus Siculus
E.	Euripides
Andr.	<i>Andromache</i>
El.	<i>Electra</i>
Hec.	<i>Hecuba</i>
Hel.	<i>Helena</i>
Hipp.	<i>Hippolytus</i>
IA	<i>Iphigenia Aulidensis</i>
Ph.	<i>Phoenissae</i>
Supp.	<i>Supplices</i>
Tr.	<i>Troades</i>

EA	<i>Epigraphica Anatolica: Zeitschrift für Epigraphik und historische Geographie Anatoliens</i>
EMC	<i>Échos du monde classique</i>
ExClass	<i>Exemplaria Classica. Journal of Classical Philology</i>
fr.	fragment
Gal.	Galen
<i>In Hipp. progn. comment.</i>	<i>In Hippocratis prognosticum commentarii III</i>
GB	<i>Grazer Beiträge: Zeitschrift für die klassische Altertumswissenschaft</i>
GCN	<i>Groningen Colloquia on the Novel</i>
Gell.	Aulus Gellius
GIF	<i>Giornale italiano di filologia: rivista trimestrale di cultura</i>
Gorg.	Gorgias
<i>Hel.</i>	<i>Helena</i>
GRBS	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>
Greg. Cor.	Gregorius Corinthius
<i>Trop.</i>	<i>Peri tropôn</i>
G&R	<i>Greece & Rome</i>
Hdn.	Herodian
Hdt.	Herodotus
Hermog.	Hermogenes
<i>Id.</i>	<i>Peri ideôn</i>
<i>Inv.</i>	<i>Peri heuresêôs</i>
<i>Stat.</i>	<i>Peri tôn staseôn</i>
Hes.	Hesiod
<i>Op.</i>	<i>Opera et Dies</i>
Him.	Himerius
<i>Or.</i>	<i>Orationes</i>
Hld.	Heliodorus
Hom.	Homer
<i>Il.</i>	<i>Iliad</i>
<i>Od.</i>	<i>Odyssey</i>
Hor.	Horace
<i>A. P.</i>	<i>Ars Poetica</i>
HSPH	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
Hyg.	Hyginus
<i>F.</i>	<i>Fabellae</i>

Iamb.	Iamblichus
Bab.	<i>Babyloniaca</i>
ICS	<i>Illinois Classical Studies</i>
IL	<i>L'Information littéraire</i>
Isoc.	Isocrates
Euag.	<i>Euagoras</i>
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JCS	<i>Journal of Classical Studies: the Journal of the Classical Society of Japan</i>
JECS	<i>Journal of Early Christian Studies</i>
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JLS	<i>Journal of Literary Semantics</i>
JNT	<i>Journal of Narrative Technique</i>
JSJ	<i>Journal for the Study of Judaism</i>
KZM	<i>Handelingen van de Koninklijke Zuidnederlandse Maatschappij voor Taal- en Letterkunde en Geschiedenis</i>
Lewis and Short	<i>A Latin Dictionary. Based on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary. C. T. Lewis and C. Short. Oxford 1963.</i>
LGPV	<i>A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names. P. M. Fraser et al. Oxford 1987-.</i>
Lib.	Libanius
Prog.	<i>Progymnasmata</i>
LIMC	<i>Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae</i> , ed. H. C. Ackerman and J. R. Gisler. Zurich 1981-99.
LSJ	<i>A Greek-English Lexicon. H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, rev. H. S. Jones et al. 9th edn. Oxford 1996.</i>
Lucian	Lucian
DMar.	<i>Dialogi Marini</i>
Dom.	<i>De Domo</i>
Philops.	<i>Philopseudes</i>
Syr. D.	<i>De Syria Dea</i>
Tox.	<i>Toxaris</i>
LWU	<i>Literatur in Wissenschaft und Unterricht</i>
Lys.	Lysias
MCSN	<i>Materiali e contributi per la storia della narrativa greco-latina</i>
MD	<i>Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici</i>
Men.	Menander
Mon.	<i>Monostichoi</i>
Men. Rh.	Menander Rhetor

MH	<i>Museum Helveticum: revue suisse pour l'étude de l'Antiquité classique</i>
Minuc.	Minucian
MP	<i>Modern Philology</i>
NECN	<i>New England Classical Newsletter</i>
Nep.	Cornelius Nepos
<i>Alcib.</i>	<i>Alcibiades</i>
Nicol.	Nicolaus
<i>Prog.</i>	<i>Progymnasmata</i>
NLH	<i>New Literary History</i>
O. Bodl.	<i>Greek Ostraca in the Bodleian Library</i> . J. Tait and C. Préaux. London 1930.
OCD	<i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> , ed. S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth. 4th edn., Oxford 2012.
OED	<i>The Oxford English Dictionary</i>
OSAPh	<i>Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy</i>
Ov.	Ovid
<i>Her.</i>	<i>Heroides</i>
<i>Met.</i>	<i>Metamorphoses</i>
Paus.	Pausanias
PCPhS	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
Petr.	Petronius
<i>Sat.</i>	<i>Satyrica</i>
Philostr.	Philostratus
<i>Im.</i>	<i>Imagines</i>
VA	<i>Vita Apollonii</i>
VS	<i>Vitae Sophistarum</i>
Phlp.	Philoponus
<i>in de An.</i>	<i>in Aristotelis de Anima libros commentaria</i>
Phoeb.	Phoebammon Rhetor
<i>Fig.</i>	<i>de Figuris</i>
Phot.	Photius
<i>Bibl.</i>	<i>Bibliotheca</i>
Pi.	Pindar
N.	<i>Nemean Odes</i>
O.	<i>Olympian Odes</i>
Pl.	Plato

<i>Grg.</i>	<i>Gorgias</i>
<i>Lg.</i>	<i>Leges</i>
<i>Phd.</i>	<i>Phaedo</i>
<i>Phdr.</i>	<i>Phaedrus</i>
<i>Prt.</i>	<i>Protagoras</i>
<i>Smp.</i>	<i>Symposium</i>
<i>Plb. Rh.</i>	<i>Polybius Sardinianus</i>
<i>Plu.</i>	<i>Plutarch</i>
<i>Alc.</i>	<i>Alcibiades</i>
<i>Alex.</i>	<i>Alexander</i>
<i>Ant.</i>	<i>Antonius</i>
<i>Arat.</i>	<i>Aratus</i>
<i>Caes.</i>	<i>Caesar</i>
<i>Cim.</i>	<i>Cimon</i>
<i>Comp. Ages. Pomp.</i>	<i>Comparatio Agesilaus Pompeius</i>
<i>Comp. Aristoph. et Men.</i>	<i>Comparationis Aristophanis et Menandri Compendium</i>
<i>Comp. Cim. Luc.</i>	<i>Comparatio Cimon Lucullus</i>
<i>Comp. Demetr. Ant.</i>	<i>Comparatio Demetrius Antonius</i>
<i>Comp. Dio Brut.</i>	<i>Comparatio Dio Brutus</i>
<i>Comp. Lyc. Num.</i>	<i>Comparatio Lycurgus Numa</i>
<i>Comp. Lys. Sull.</i>	<i>Comparatio Lysander Sulla</i>
<i>Comp. Pel. Marc.</i>	<i>Comparatio Pelopidas Marcellus</i>
<i>De amic. mult.</i>	<i>De amicorum multitudine</i>
<i>De def. orac.</i>	<i>De defectu oraculorum</i>
<i>De sera num.</i>	<i>De sera numinis vindicta</i>
<i>De virt. mor.</i>	<i>De virtute morali</i>
<i>Mul. virt.</i>	<i>Mulierum Virtutes</i>
<i>Per.</i>	<i>Pericles</i>
<i>Phoc.</i>	<i>Phocion</i>
<i>Pomp.</i>	<i>Pompeius</i>
<i>Quaest. conv.</i>	<i>Quaestiones Convivales</i>
<i>Sert.</i>	<i>Sertorius</i>
<i>Sol.</i>	<i>Solon</i>
<i>Sull.</i>	<i>Sulla</i>
<i>Them.</i>	<i>Themistocles</i>
<i>Thes.</i>	<i>Theseus</i>

PMLA	<i>Publications of the Modern Language Association of America</i>
Poll.	Pollianus
<i>Onom.</i>	<i>Peri onomasias</i>
Polyaen.	Polyaenus
Polyb.	Polybius
Porph.	Porphyry of Tyre
VP	<i>Vita Pythagorae</i>
P. Oxy.	<i>The Oxyrhynchus papyri</i> . London 1898–.
PP	<i>La parola del passato: rivista di studi antichi</i>
pr.	prooemium
Prisc.	Priscian
<i>Praeex.</i>	<i>Praeexercitamina</i>
Ps.-Arist.	Pseudo-Aristotle
<i>Phgn.</i>	<i>Physiognomonica</i>
VV	<i>De virtutibus et vitiis</i>
Ps.-Aristid.	Pseudo-Aelius Aristides
<i>Rh.</i>	<i>Technai rhêtorikai</i>
Ps.-Callisth.	Pseudo-Callisthenes
Ps.-Cic.	Pseudo-Cicero
<i>Rh. ad Her.</i>	<i>Rhetorica ad Herennium</i>
Ps.-Hdn.	Pseudo-Herodian Rhetor
<i>Fig.</i>	<i>de Figuris</i>
Ps.-Hermog.	Pseudo-Hermogenes
<i>Prog.</i>	<i>Progymnasmata</i>
PSI	<i>Papiri greci e latini: pubblicazioni della Società italiana per la ricerca dei papiri greci e latini in Egitto</i> , ed. G. Vitelli. Florence 1912–79.
Ps.-Rufinianus	Pseudo-Rufinianus
<i>De schem. dian.</i>	<i>De schematis dianoëas</i>
PT	<i>Poetics Today</i>
P&P	<i>Past and Present</i>
QUCC	<i>Quaderni urbinati di cultura classica</i>
Quint.	Quintilian
<i>Inst.</i>	<i>Institutio oratoria</i>
RBPh	<i>Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire</i>
RE	<i>Paulys Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , ed. A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll. Stuttgart 1893–1980.

REA	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
REG	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
<i>Rhetorica</i>	<i>Rhetorica. A Journal of the History of Rhetoric</i>
RhM	<i>Rheinisches Museum</i>
RL	<i>Revista de letras</i>
RMeta	<i>Review of Metaphysics</i>
Rutil.	Rutilius Lupus
<i>Schem. lex.</i>	<i>Schemata lexeos</i>
S.	Sophocles
Aj.	<i>Ajax</i>
Ph.	<i>Philoctetes</i>
Tr.	<i>Trachinae</i>
Sall.	Sallust
Cat.	<i>Catilina</i>
SCO	<i>Studi classici e orientali</i>
SIFC	<i>Studi italiani di filologia classica</i>
SIG	<i>Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum</i> . W. Dittenberger. Leipzig 1915–24.
SM	<i>Speech Monographs</i>
SO	<i>Symbolae Osloenses</i>
SPh	<i>Studies in Philology</i>
SR	<i>Studies in Religion</i>
Stat.	Statius
Silv.	<i>Silvae</i>
Stob.	Stobaeus
Str.	Strabo
Suet.	Suetonius
Calig.	<i>Caligula</i>
Dom.	<i>Domitianus</i>
SyllClass	<i>Syllecta classica</i>
Syrian.	Syrianus
<i>In Hermog.</i>	<i>In Hermogenem commentaria</i>
Tac.	Tacitus
Ann.	<i>Annales</i>
Or.	<i>Dialogus de oratoribus</i>
TAPhA	<i>Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association</i>

TAPhS	<i>Transactions of the American Philosophical Society</i>
Tert.	Tertullian
<i>Virg. Vel.</i>	<i>De virginibus velandis</i>
Th.	Thucydides
Theoc.	Theocritus
<i>Id.</i>	<i>Idylls</i>
Theon	Aelius Theon
<i>Prog.</i>	<i>Progymnasmata</i>
Thgn.	Theognis
Thphr.	Theophrastus
<i>Char.</i>	<i>Characteres</i>
<i>HP</i>	<i>Historia Plantarum</i>
Trypho	Trypho
<i>Trop.</i>	<i>Peri tropôn</i>
Verg.	Vergil
<i>Aen.</i>	<i>Aeneid</i>
<i>G.</i>	<i>Georgics</i>
WJA	<i>Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft</i>
WS	<i>Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie und Patristik</i>
X.	Xenophon
<i>Ages.</i>	<i>Agesilaus</i>
<i>An.</i>	<i>Anabasis</i>
<i>Cyr.</i>	<i>Cyropaedia</i>
<i>Eq. Mag.</i>	<i>De equitum magistro</i>
<i>HG</i>	<i>Historia Graeca (Hellenica)</i>
<i>Mem.</i>	<i>Memorabilia</i>
<i>Smp.</i>	<i>Symposium</i>
X. Eph.	Xenophon of Ephesus
YCIS	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
Zonae.	Zonaeus
<i>Fig.</i>	<i>de Figuris</i>
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

Editions and Translations

Throughout this book, I have used the following text editions and translations of novels unless indicated otherwise. For Achilles Tatius, Garnaud (1995²) and Whitmarsh and Morales (2001); for Chariton, Reardon (2004 and 2008*b*); for Heliodorus, Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1994³, 1960², and 1991³) and Morgan (2008*a*); for Longus, Morgan (2004*a*) (who reproduces the text of Reeve 1982); for Xenophon of Ephesus, O'Sullivan (2005) and G. Anderson (2008); and for the fragments, Stephens and Winkler (1995). Occasionally, translations have been slightly modified where necessary or appropriate.

When references to primary texts include names of editors (or their abbreviations), numbers immediately preceding these names refer to pages (preceding the point) and lines (following the point) (e.g. Aphth. *Prog.* 45.5–14 Sp. II = page 45, lines 5–14 in Spengel vol. II).

While mostly using Greek transliterations of nouns (e.g. *sôphrosynê*), I have opted for Latin transliterations when these are arguably more common in scholarship (e.g. *ecphrasis* and *ethopoeia* rather than *ekphrasis* and *êthopoiia*). I have used Latin transliterations of Greek names (e.g. Heliodorus).

Introduction

Character, techniques of characterization, and the ancient Greek novel

In the fourth book of the ancient Greek novel *Aethiopica* (*Ethiopian Tales*), the heroine, Chariclea, asks the hero, Theagenes, to swear that he will respect her virginity. In response, he complies with her request but at the same time protests that it is not fair (*ἀδικεῖσθαι*) that aspersions should thus have been cast on his probity of character (*τὸ πιστὸν τοῦ τρόπου*) before it could be put to the test;¹ he would now not be able to display the power of moral choice (*ἐπιδείξειν προαίρεσιν*), for people would think (*νομιζόμενος*) he was acting merely under duress (*κατηναγκάσθαι*)—out of fear of heaven’s wrath (4.18.6). This reaction features notions of interest to the student of characterization in ancient narrative literature. Theagenes’ comment, firstly, foregrounds the *performative* nature of character: it is something to be consciously displayed by the self (*ἐπιδείξειν*) and observed by others.² But it is not observable simply from behaviour or a specific course of action as such (i.e. sexual abstinence) but only from a demonstrable spontaneous, free choice to adhere to such behaviour. This foregrounding of moral choice, or *proairesis*, as a *sine qua non* for character revelation is central to ancient theory of character from Aristotle onwards (and is later picked up in Stoic ethics).³ Oaths, for their part, in the eye of the beholder replace an agent’s spontaneous choice with compulsion and therefore ‘cut away from beforehand’ (*προὑποτίμνεται*) the possibility of demonstrating character.

In Longus’ novel *Daphnis and Chloe*, another oath concerning *erôs* (and one again met with resistance) thematizes similar concerns, albeit implicitly.

¹ On *tropos* as a denotation of (ethical) character, see Traill (2008: 82–3) (and Plu. *De sera num.* 551e).

² On performance in this passage, see also M. Jones (2012: 156). On performance generally, Goldhill (1999).

³ Arist. *Po.* 1450^b8–10 is fundamental on *proairesis*. See, among others, Woerther (2005: 3–7), Wisse (1989: 30–1), and de Carvalho (1988).

When Daphnis swears by Pan that he will not live without Chloe, she, unlike Chariclea, is not content and protests that, given Pan's reputation with nymphs, Daphnis might not trouble to keep his oath (2.39.3). *Her* assumption is that the presence or absence of moral compulsion (straightforwardly accepted by Theagenes and Chariclea) depends on the object by which one swears rather than on the moral code of the person swearing. Therefore she asks him to swear a *second* oath, this time not by Pan but by his flock of goats. Daphnis, for his part, *enjoys* being mistrusted (ἡδετο . . . ἀπιστούμενος, 2.39.5) and goes on to swear the second oath. Like Theagenes, Daphnis is keen to be able to display his character spontaneously and Chloe's rejection of the validity of his first oath presents him with precisely this opportunity. It creates the space in which he can act in a way indicative of moral character, not by acting without the guidance of any oath at all, as Theagenes would have preferred, but by freely agreeing to Chloe's request to swear a truly reliable oath and thus showing his trustworthiness. Chloe's subsequent reaction is significant: ἐπίστευεν, 'she trusted him' (2.39.6).

Moral choice and performance as two interrelated constituents of character will emerge again and again in the present study, which deals with five ancient Greek prose narratives commonly known as 'ideal' Greek love novels. But as I will suggest, 'ideal' is probably not the most felicitous label, despite its recent reaffirmation in Tilg (2010). These narratives were written by Chariton, Xenophon of Ephesus, Achilles Tatius, Longus, and Heliodorus during the first few centuries of the Common Era.⁴ Together with three Latin narratives (Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, Petronius' *Satyricon* and the anonymous *Historia Apollonii regis Tyri*), an ever increasing corpus of fragments, and a few narratives preserved in Byzantine summaries, they are now commonly referred to as the 'genre' of the ancient novel.⁵ The fragments in particular show that ancient novelistic fiction covered a much wider and less unified spectrum

⁴ Although I list them (and discuss them in this book) in what is possibly their chronological order, their chronology is not a straightforward matter. Both absolute and relative chronology (especially that of Chariton/Xenophon and Achilles Tatius/Longus) is debated. Most scholars now date Chariton to one or two decades either side of AD 50 (see Tilg 2010: 36–79 for details), although there is no certainty (O'Sullivan 1995: 145–70, 2005, for example, places him *later* than Xenophon, and M. Jones 2012: 15–16 n. 73, 63 n. 123 interestingly raises the possibility of a 2nd-cent. date). Heliodorus is usually dated to the early second half of the fourth century (Morgan 1978: ii–xxxvii, 2003a: 417–19) but has also been situated in the 2nd (Feuillâtre 1966: 147–8) and 3rd cents. (Bowie 1999: 55–6). Information on dating of the other novels is provided in the individual chapters. See Swain (1996: 423–5), Bowie (2002), and Whitmarsh (2008a: 378–84) for useful, general starting points.

⁵ The term 'novel' is, of course, anachronistic. Antiquity itself does not provide a generic label for these texts (see Ruiz-Montero 2003c: 32–7 for an overview of various ancient denominations). For good reasons why we group them together as one 'genre', see Goldhill (2008: 190–6). Recent introductions to this corpus of texts are Graverini, Keulen, and Barchiesi (2006) and Whitmarsh (2008a). Reardon (2008a) offers an English translation of the extant narratives and Stephens and Winkler (1995) edit, translate, and comment upon all the fragments.

of registers, styles, and themes than attested by the extant texts.⁶ Within this broad field, the five ‘ideal’ love novels form a structurally and thematically coherent group, which is the main reason why I have chosen to limit my enquiry to these texts. Even if they differ considerably from each other in many respects, they all revolve around the reciprocated, heterosexual love of a young couple who are separated and, after travels, trials, and adventures, happily reunited and reintegrated into their home societies.⁷ This broad narrative pattern sets them apart from the comic-realistic Latin novels, the Greek so-called ‘ass novels’⁸, and a broad range of generically hybrid fiction combining novelistic and biographical narrative strategies.⁹ The reason why I limit myself to *extant* narratives has to do with my focus of investigation: even though a number of fragments (such as *Ninus*, *Chione*, and *Metiochus and Parthenope*) seem to resonate with themes from the five extant novels, I have omitted them as objects of investigation because I focus on sustained characterization of a sort only observable in a full narrative. However, I occasionally include material from them for purposes of comparison and contextualization.

In narrative, characters are often of central thematic importance. They cause or undergo events, can be invested with ideological meaning, and trigger reader responses such as identification and recognition.¹⁰ As far as the Greek novel is concerned, this importance is reflected by many contributions in the towering bibliography on these texts which inevitably touch upon one or two aspects of characters.¹¹ However, many such depictions are limited to general observations and broad descriptions of (often topical) character traits. The same applies to the (few) general discussions of characterization across several of the texts.¹² Whereas many individual novel characters have, of course, long been the subject of discussion,¹³ systematic studies have only recently explored

⁶ Stephens and Winkler (1995: 4, 18), Morgan (1998b).

⁷ On these defining markers, see Lalanne (2006: 12–13) and Whitmarsh (2011: 6).

⁸ On Ps.-Lucian’s *Lucius or the Ass* and Ps.-Lucian of Patrae’s *Metamorphoses* (and their relationship to Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses*), see Holzberg (2006: 95–9).

⁹ Well-known examples are Ps.-Callisthenes’ *Alexander Romance*, Philostratus’ *Life of Apollonius*, and early Christian *Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles*. Holzberg (2003) and (contributions to) Schmeling (2003a: 555–653) and Karla (2009) are helpful starting points.

¹⁰ On this central position of character generally, see Glaudes and Reuter (1996: 6–7), Palmer (2004: 12), and Jannidis (2004: 1).

¹¹ Introductions to text editions and studies of one particular novel, for example, typically dedicate a number of pages to depictions of one or more characters. Examples are Sedelmeier-Stoeckl (1958: 105–69), Schönberger (1960: 12–16), Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1960: lxxxix–xc), Feuillâtre (1966: 19–22), Schmeling (1974: 130–59, 1980: 118–24), Philippides (1978: 96–106), Sandy (1982a: 56–74), Garnaud (1995: xii–xvi), G. Anderson (1997: 2284–5), Morales (2004: 77–95), and Morgan (2004a: 10–4).

¹² G. Anderson (1984: 62–74), Billault (1991: 121–90, 2003).

¹³ Gerschmann (1974: 31–40), Hani (1978), Cresci (1978), Sandy (1982b), Napolitano (1983–4), Pernot (1992), Kytzler (2003: 343–5), Álvarez Siverio (2000–1), and Watanabe (2003a, b).

areas that impinge on the realm of characterization in significant ways.¹⁴ And even if gender studies, for their part, have traditionally produced a steady stream of relevant scholarship on the behaviour of Greek novel characters,¹⁵ much less attention has been paid to the *literary* question of how novelists adopt various narrative techniques to semantically invest their characters with characteristics.¹⁶

This hiatus in scholarship is arguably due to many scholars' intuitive awareness that literary character as a concept is difficult to grasp.¹⁷ But it should also be explained as a consequence of a long-standing scholarly disdain for the ancient Greek novelistic genre in general as being of mediocre literary quality, stylistically inferior, and intellectually sterile. This view goes back at least as far as Rohde's monumental study (1876),¹⁸ which founded modern scholarship on the genre. His low estimation¹⁹ was unquestioningly accepted until at least the 1970s, causing scholars to feel the need to identify an ancient readership of these texts qualitatively different from that of other, 'serious' literature.²⁰ This disdain long precluded any serious research into characterization in the genre. Scholars assumed, intuitively and dogmatically rather than on the basis of research, that (psychological) characterization and character development must be absent in such a mediocre genre.²¹ Over the last three decades, scholars have decisively moved away from such low estimations of the genre as a whole, and, on the contrary, have come to firmly acknowledge the novels' literary, rhetorical, intertextual, and narratological wealth, and their ingenuity and sophistication. Moreover, both literary and papyrological

¹⁴ Lalanne (2006), van Mal-Maeder (2007: 115–45), and Whitmarsh (2011).

¹⁵ Winkler (1982), Egger (1990, 1994*a, b*), Konstan (1994), Goldhill (1995), Haynes (2003), and M. Jones (2012).

¹⁶ Pérez Benito (2005: 141) acknowledges this gap. On the importance of such aspects, see Schmeling (1974: 152) and G. Anderson (1997: 2284–5). One book-length study on this topic, Helms (1966), has a number of obvious, fundamental flaws: it distinguishes only three techniques that construct character and is insensitive to the difference between a character's own speech as an indication of character and characterization by *other* characters in the story. (He awkwardly treats both as subtypes of 'quoted speech'.) In any case, his actual 'analysis' of characters does not draw upon the original Greek text, but on an English translation, and rarely goes beyond an enumeration and paraphrase of passages illustrative of specific characteristics.

¹⁷ The absence of a comprehensive theory of character has become a *topos* in literary theory—see Jannidis (2004: 1–7).

¹⁸ In this work, I refer to its third edition (1914) throughout.

¹⁹ He highlights the weakness of the entire genre ('Schwächlichkeit der ganzen Gattung') in the very opening lines of his introduction (1914³: 1).

²⁰ It has been argued that the novels were primarily read by children (Perry 1967: 5), 'young or naïve people of little education' (Perry 1967: 56) or women (Egger 1994*a, b*). See also Lesky (1966: 865) on the novels as 'literature whose scope is as wide as its level is low'. On the ancient novels as modern-style pulp literature, see also Hägg (1983: 90).

²¹ In Perry's (1967: 118) view, for example, its preoccupation with childishly fanciful and spectacular themes tends 'to preclude any concern with the portrayal of character or the study of human nature on its own account'. Helms (1966: 13–14, 22) takes a similar view. G. Anderson (1997: 2284) also touches upon this tendency in secondary literature.

research has demonstrated that the readers of these texts are to be counted among the educated, the *pepaideumenoi*.²² Scholars have come to realize that literacy in the first few centuries of the Common Era most probably did not exceed 15 per cent of the population,²³ which makes problematic any imposition of our modern concept of ‘pulp literature’ on an ancient context. Consequently, the Greek novels are now mostly treated as entertainment literature with highly developed literary ambitions and sophistication, written by and for a literary elite.²⁴ Against this background, it is time, I think, to pay close attention to the issue of characterization in them.

Like any analysis of characterization in ancient literature, my project raises questions about conceptualization. Our term ‘character’ broadly refers to the mental and moral qualities distinctive to an individual, while at the same time suggesting an interest in recognizing patterns in human behaviour and analysing the psychological structures underlying these patterns.²⁵ This term, as Halliwell (1990: 33) notes, is not one ‘which we can afford to explore from the starting point of a fixed definition or a set of terminology’. No ancient term or definition offers an unproblematic equivalent of it or, for that matter, of related modern terms such as ‘individuality’, ‘personality’, ‘self’, ‘personhood’, or ‘identity’, which are all more or less heavily burdened with modern (often Romantic) connotations of idiosyncrasy, singularity, uniqueness, complexity, and originality.²⁶ The nearest ancient Greek equivalent to our modern notion of ‘character’, *êthos*, is a polysemous term. Most famously, it refers to one of Aristotle’s three rhetorical techniques of persuasion and designates the intellectually (*φρόνησις*, wisdom) and morally (*ἀρετή*, virtue) positive self-portrayal that an orator constructs in speech to enhance his credibility (*ἀξιόπιστον*).²⁷ This close association with speech also surfaces in the term’s designation of a specific stylistic category (*idea*) in later rhetorical treatises.²⁸ Whereas these meanings privilege the idea that speech is a prominent performative tool with which to *display* character, the term’s original meaning (an area where animals and men are accustomed to be despite the (attempted) imposition of external influence)²⁹ foregrounds habituation as a factor involved in *shaping* it.

²² See Bowie (1992, 1994, 2003a), Stephens (1994), and Morgan (1995: 137–9).

²³ See Harris (1989) and Cole (1981).

²⁴ On this concept, see Whitmarsh (2008c: 73–6). Zanetto (1990) and Paulsen (1995) argue for differentiating between different ‘types’ of (more and less educated) readers.

²⁵ *OED* and *OCD*⁴ s.v. character.

²⁶ Gill (2006: xiv).

²⁷ Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.3–6, 2.1.1–6. See, among others, Patillon (1993: 222–3), Garver (2004: 1–12), and Robinson (2006). Patillon (1988: 248) incorrectly limits this meaning of *êthos* to a moral quality.

²⁸ As in Hermog. *Id.* and Ps.-Aristid. *Rh.* See also Anon. *Ἐπιτομή ῥητορικῆς* 647 Walz III, Georgius Plethon *Συντομὴ περὶ τινῶν μερῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς* 563–4 Walz VI, and Anon. *Κεφάλαια τοῦ α’ βιβλίου τῶν ἰδεῶν* 78 Walz VII. On this category: Kennedy (1983: 100) and Patillon (1988: 250).

²⁹ See Chamberlain (1984a: 97–9) on the etymology of the term.

But it is not just that modern terms do not map neatly onto ancient ones or that ancient terms are themselves semantically complex. In fact, the modern concept of (literary) ‘character’ itself is anything but semantically unproblematic. The different images conveyed by the etymology of lexemes denoting it in different languages illustrate some of its complexity. The English term, for example, is grounded in the ancient Greek noun *kharaktêr*, which by the time of Menander signified, among other things, a type of person or a set of traits (*ἀνδρὸς χαρακτήρ ἐκ λόγου γνωρίζεται*, a man’s character is known from his speech; fr. 72). Given its derivation from the verb *kharassô* (‘to engrave’), it etymologically privileges a connotation of *visible* marks that indicate distinctiveness and authentic type.³⁰ In Chariton’s novel, the notion of distinctiveness is palpable when Dionysius uses the verb (*ἐγκεχαραγμένον μεγάλως*, 2.6.3) to characterize the Syracusan general Hermocrates as a leader with a distinguished record. Similarly, in Heliodorus’ novel, Chariclea’s mother singles out *sôphrosynê* as ‘the only marker’ (*μόνη . . . χαρακτηρίζει*, 4.8.7) of female virtue. Part of this connotation also underlies the common German term for a (literary) character, *Figur*, which etymologically (*figura*, Lat.) also suggests a shape or form in contrast to a background. But the equally common term *Person* (*persona*, Lat.), on the other hand, etymologically designates a mask through which the sound of the voice of an actor is heard, and therefore highlights, like the Aristotelian concept of *êthos*, the *performative* aspect of character rather than its authentic, distinctive constellation.³¹

As one would expect, the study of literary characters represents a likewise highly diversified field. In fact, character itself is a relative concept: its definition often depends on the scholarly approach taken. A mimetic approach, for example, defines character in ways different from, say, psychoanalytic, semiotic, or cognitive approaches and, as we will see in the section on methodology (§0.4), even a literary sub-discipline such as structuralist narratology offers divergent views of character.³² My own approach is to follow the most common definition, which regards literary characters as fictive persons or fictional *analogia* to human beings.³³ I focus on two questions concerning *characterization* (or *construction* of character): (1) how (i.e. through the use of which narrative techniques) are characteristics or traits, in the sense of relatively stable or abiding personal qualities,³⁴ ascribed to characters

³⁰ Worman (2002: 32–3). For a history of the meaning of the term, see Körte (1928). In the novels, the verb is repeatedly used in its original sense to refer to the engraving of words *vel sim.* (Chariton 8.4.4, Hld. 4.8.1, 4.8.4, 10.14.1, 9.22.3).

³¹ On *Figur* and *Person*, see Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider (2010: 7).

³² Margolin (1983: 1–4, 1987: 107–8, 1989: 1–5, 1990a: 843–7, 2010) and Jannidis (2004: 151–95) offer overviews of definitions of ‘character’ in different scholarly approaches.

³³ See Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider (2010: 7). See Margolin (2007: 67) on fictional characters in general and Whitmarsh (2008b: 3) on the ‘wholly invented characters’ in Greek novels. On adjacent terms such as ‘identity’ in literary theory, see Fludernik (2007) and Bamberg (2009).

³⁴ Chatman (1978: 126), Garvey (1978: 63, 68–9).

throughout a narrative text and (2) to what effect? Depending on the kinds of traits taken into account, definitions of characterization in literary theory tend to vary from restrictive (for example, the ascription of psychological and social traits only³⁵) to inclusive (covering other properties as well as details about outer appearance and physiology, habitual actions, circumstances, and relationships³⁶). As will become clear, I adhere to the latter definition. Of course, these questions form part of, and interact with, related issues in literary theory such as focalization, the entwining of character and narrative structure, and thought representation.³⁷

This book cannot be an exhaustive study of characterization in the novels; indeed, the concept is so wide and potentially all-encompassing that it would be possible to write a monograph-length study on a single character.³⁸ Rather, I focus on the characterization of the novels' protagonists, although I will occasionally discuss other characters for reasons of contextualization or comparison (on the importance of such intratextual embedding, see p. 35). This limitation is partly the result of a practical choice to keep the length of this book within reasonable limits and in any case resonates with the fact that, as far as we can judge from ancient literary criticism, the distinction between protagonists and other, usually minor, characters was likely to have been as meaningful to an ancient audience as to a modern one.³⁹ More specifically, this book sets out to test three interdependent questions about Greek novel protagonists that have been addressed in varying degrees by (and at the same time have influenced) modern-day scholarship. The first question is whether these protagonists are depicted primarily as character types or rather show signs of individuation. Secondly, are they to be read as ideal figures or does their depiction also show traces of lifelikeness? And finally, do they remain static throughout the narrative or is their character shown to change? Generally speaking (and generalizing perhaps), common opinion tends to favour the first set of possibilities. In any case, all three questions raise important issues relating to ancient conceptions of character, to which I now turn.

³⁵ See e.g. Chatman (1978: 121–38).

³⁶ See e.g. Jannidis (2009: 21–2). For a survey of definitions of the term in literary theory, see Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider (2010: 30–2).

³⁷ Eco (1979a: 147–55, 163–8; 2011: 69–119), Culler (1975: 230–8), Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 59–71), Bal (2009: 112–33), and Margolin (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990a) offer theoretical accounts covering various such aspects.

³⁸ See e.g. S. L. Maguire (2005).

³⁹ See Nünlist (2009: 244–5) on the ancient distinction between characters who 'hold together the plot' (*suynektika prosôpa*) and minor ones (who do not provide such narrative coherence). For modern literary theory on the distinction between protagonists and (different types of) minor characters, see Harvey (1965: 58–68).

0.1 TYPIFICATION AND INDIVIDUATION

Much scholarship discusses characters in the Greek novels in terms of character types.⁴⁰ Some classifications take the characters' role or function in the story as their main criterion (distinguishing, for example, between protagonists, antagonists, parents, and friends⁴¹), whereas others revolve around prototypical characteristics (distinguishing, for example, between beautiful and hapless heroines, handsome and often passive heroes, rascally or noble brigands, and resourceful slaves⁴²) or intertextual resonances (New Comedy as well as rhetorical declamations, for example, shares numerous character types with the novels⁴³). In the novels, it is true, the concepts of *physis* and *êthos* often document behaviour by referring to types rather than to a specific individual. An example is the benevolent treatment of Heliodorus' protagonists by Thyamis, a brigand who imprisons them.⁴⁴ Rather than adducing individualized motivations or past experiences (Thyamis has not always been a brigand, as the reader of the novel learns soon afterwards), the narrator explains his benevolence as an instance of 'a brigand's *êthos*' (ληστρικὸν ἦθος, 1.4.3) being vanquished (ὑποτάττειν καὶ κρατεῖν) by noble appearance (εὐγενείας ἔμφασις) and beauty (κάλλους ὄψις). The idea that one type of person dominates another (beauty and *eugeneia* are, of course, typical markers of novelistic protagonists⁴⁵) is further enhanced by a concomitant visual inversion of normal, generically expected power relations. Thyamis dismounts from his horse, sets his prisoners on horseback and accompanies them on foot: the master appears as a servant (δουλεύειν ὁ ἄρχων) and the captor chooses to minister to his captives (ὑπηρετεῖσθαι ὁ κρατὼν τοῖς ἐαλωκόσιν).

Such play with stereotypical patterns of behaviour is not what modern readers might readily expect from the construction of literary character.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ See e.g. Marcovaldi (1969: 38), Amundsen (1974), G. Anderson (1984: 69), Kuch (1989), Edsall (1996), Brioso Sánchez (1987, 1987–8, 1989a, 1990), Hock (1997a), and Petermandl (2002: 451–63).

⁴¹ See e.g. Haynes (2003: 101–55), G. Anderson (1984: 63–9), and Molinié (2001: 15).

⁴² See Reardon (1991: 26) on this 'gallery' of romance types in Chariton. For an overview of character typologies in literary theory, see Jannidis (2004: 85–108).

⁴³ See e.g. Johnes (1988, 1989), Billault (1991: 144–51, 2003: 117), and van Mal-Maeder (2001, 2007: 115–45).

⁴⁴ Other examples (centring on brigands, pirates, barbarians, eunuchs, and pederasts) include Hld. 1.19.2 (βάρβαρον . . . τὰ ἦθη), 1.30.6 (τὸ βάρβαρον ἦθος), 2.17.5 (ληστρικὸν . . . τὸ ἦθος), 8.6.2 (φύσει . . . εὐνούχων), Chariton 7.2.7 (Τύριοι . . . φύσει), 7.6.6 (ἐμφυτον . . . τῶν βαρβάρων), X. Eph. 3.11.4 (φύσει βάρβαροι), Ach. Tat. 2.17.3 (φύσει πειρατικός), Longus 4.11.2 (φύσει παιδευαστής), and Iamb. Bab. fr 85 (78a10) (τὰς φύσεις . . . οἱ βάρβαροι).

⁴⁵ On this novelistic *topos*, see Létoublon (1993: 119–20) and Liviabella Furiani (1996b: 118–20).

⁴⁶ The distinction between typification and individuation is well documented in modern literary theory: Wenger (1935), Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 30–1, 39), and Margolin (1998: 198). On types as 'character models', see Jannidis (2009: 18–19) and Porter Abbott (2002: 129–31).

Whereas the characterization of both Thyamis and the protagonists in the previous paragraph is easily recognizable as an example of what Woloch (2003: 69) calls ‘compression’ (one outstanding quality is substituted for an entire personality),⁴⁷ ‘characterization’ to most modern readers may imply the analysis of complex and individualized psychological motifs and peculiar, idiosyncratic characteristics. In such a conception of character, the self is seen as a strictly inner, private locus of awareness, emotion, conscious deliberation, and unconscious impulses. It has by now been well established, however, that we cannot simply transpose this conceptual vocabulary, with all its implied associations, into the ancient Greek context.⁴⁸ As students of Greek literature have emphasized, the concept of character is not a universal entity but, quite the opposite, culturally determined.⁴⁹ Our hankering for the idiosyncratic has rightly been called ‘a strange and recent prejudice’⁵⁰ and its applicability to works of the classical past is problematic.⁵¹

In ancient narrative literature, just as in other areas of ancient artistic expression,⁵² credible, realistic characterization is often a matter not of psychological individuation but of conforming to pre-existing or familiar literary, mythological, historical, or socially recognizable (and often morally significant) character types (‘typification’).⁵³ Famous examples of typification are Idomeneus’ depictions of the coward (*deilos*) and the brave man (*alkimos*) in an ambush in the *Iliad* (13.276–86), Semonides’ description of ten types of wives (fr. 7 West), and Herodotus’ description of the monarch (3.80). The same concept also underlies the claim of Plato’s *Ion* that he knows ‘what is appropriate for a man to say, for a woman, for a slave, for a free person, for a subject, and for a ruler’ (540b).⁵⁴ Similar conceptualization is borne out by ancient literary criticism in general (where characters’ behaviour is explained in the light of commonsensical notions of psychology and typical human behaviour⁵⁵) and in particular by ancient rhetoric, the predominant literary theory in the time of the novelists, which first described and later theorized aspects of

⁴⁷ Seidensticker’s (1994: 281–3) notion of ‘pointierte Komprimierung’ is comparable.

⁴⁸ See also Gill (1996: 3).

⁴⁹ See, among others, Goldhill (1990: 100–5) and Halliwell (1990: 33). See also Konstan (2006: 29) with similar thoughts on emotions.

⁵⁰ Pelling (1990b: 253).

⁵¹ See e.g. Pitcher (2007: 102–3) on historiography.

⁵² In sculptural portrayal, for example, representation of selfhood is commonly accepted to revolve around semanticized typology rather than individuation. See Hölscher (1987: 37–61, 65–74) and Jaeggi (2008).

⁵³ On types and credibility in literary discourse, see Arist. *Po.* 1451^b8–10, 1454^a23–36 and Hor. *A. P.* 157–72.

⁵⁴ See Diggle (2004: 5–9) and Volt (2007: 24–32) for a more detailed discussion of these (and other) examples.

⁵⁵ See e.g. Nünlist (2009: 252–3) on Aristotle’s (fr. 150 Rose) explanation of Paris’ behaviour in Hom. *Il.* 3 as typical of a man in love.

literary character.⁵⁶ Hermogenes' clarification of the term *êthikos* as 'peasants, gluttonous people, and the like' (γεωργοί, λίχνοι, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, *Stat.* 134.4–5) is illustrative of the importance accorded to typification.⁵⁷ Again, the importance of typification is easily understood as an instrument for creating credibility or realism.⁵⁸ Orators should be able to assimilate themselves to certain types of audience⁵⁹ and create a credible *êthos* of themselves and opponents.⁶⁰ To this end, character types provide an easily accessible stock of ready-made material to work with.⁶¹

When Morgan (1993: 228), then, points out that ancient novelists 'did not need individuation of character to engage readers' belief' and were more concerned with generic appropriateness ('Kings must act like kings, slaves like slaves'), he is certainly right to some extent.⁶² Indeed, a number of scholars limit the notion of characterization to typification.⁶³ But how can we tell that this is the whole story? Surely, we should not assume that the realistic potential of typification in ancient narrative is mutually exclusive of any other form of characterization that goes beyond these boundaries.⁶⁴ The mere fact, for example, that Ninus' depiction as a warrior in the eponymous fragmentarily preserved novel activates typified notions of heroism going back all the way to Homer does not prevent the narrator from individuating his hero with touches of tenderness and sensitivity.⁶⁵ Indeed, ancient literary criticism at times emphasizes the importance of both typification and individuation⁶⁶ and studies of the notion of personhood in antiquity also suggest a

⁵⁶ On 'overlaps' of poetics with rhetoric and the importance of character construction to both, see Kennedy (1999: 135–6) and D. A. Russell (1983: 37–9). On typification in Latin novels and connections with the rhetorical tradition, see Santoro L'Hoir (1992: 172–96).

⁵⁷ Doxapater (*Πητορικαὶ ὁμιλίας εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ἀφθονίου προγυμνάσματα* 500 Walz II) adds that even the notion of 'compound' character (as opposed to 'simple'; *πρόσωπον σύνθετον* v. *ἀπλοῦν*) implies no more than a combination of different such types.

⁵⁸ Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.19 is explicit about this function (*credibilia*).

⁵⁹ Arist. *Rh.* 2.12.3–14.4, 2.15.1–17.4 discusses typical characteristics of audiences of different age categories and social backgrounds.

⁶⁰ See Quint. *Inst.* 7.2.28–35 (esp. 7.2.28) and Cic. *Inv.* 2.8.9.

⁶¹ T. S. Barton (1994: 110–11). Quintilian (*Inst.* 10.1.71), for example, points to characters in Menander's plays as models for aspiring orators 'since they must adopt multiple *personae* according to the circumstances'. He singles out, among others, fathers, sons, bachelors, husbands, soldiers, and farmers. See also *Inst.* 11.3.74 (on character types and emotional expression) and *Inst.* 3.8.51 (on character types in comedy and declamation).

⁶² See also M. Jones (2012: 46–50) on the behaviour of *pepaideumenoi* as 'kingly' (as opposed to the behaviour of tyrants).

⁶³ Examples are Volt (2007), Bucher-Isler (1972: 79–83), Joly (1962), and Korfmacher (1934).

⁶⁴ For a similar thought on ethical types in Plutarch, see Dihle (1956: 69–76). On individual character in Lysias, see Usher (1965).

⁶⁵ On these characteristics, see Stephens and Winkler (1995: 23).

⁶⁶ Nünlist (2009: 253): 'The single character must strike a good balance between being individualized and idiosyncratic on the one hand, and being typical and representative on the other. Excess in either direction prevents the character from having the desired effect on the readers.'

more complex conceptualization of the self than mere notions of typification allow.⁶⁷ It has been shown, for example, that Cicero consciously combines the generic approach to character with an interest in the person as an individual.⁶⁸ Legitimate as the treatment of novelistic characters in terms of types may be, then, it involves the risk of *a priori* neglecting the mere *possibility* of character individuation.⁶⁹

The concepts of typification and individuation resonate with notions more broadly informing ancient thought. One reason why character in ancient Greek thought is less centred on the unique, unrepeatable, private, inner world of the individual is what Halliwell (1990: 50) refers to as ‘the most important fact about Greek conceptions of character’: their tendency to evaluate character in overtly ethical terms. Character was an evaluative concept, conceived in terms of right and wrong and assessed in terms of the possession or lack of *aretai* (excellences or virtues).⁷⁰ Character, revealed as it is by actions that result from conscious, moral choice, conforms to or diverges from moral standards. Consequently, character is very much about a person’s *enduring* traits that account for patterns of action and predictability of behaviour. This ethical conception of character is widespread in ancient philosophy⁷¹ and literature⁷² alike and, indeed, borne out by the two examples with which I began this book.

Instrumental in observing how the ethical strand of character is conducive to an approach to character in terms of typification is Gill’s distinction between the concept of ‘character’ (revolving around moral *judgement*) from that of ‘personality’ (revolving around *understanding* an individual’s qualities).⁷³ Since character is concerned with *assessing* conformity of behaviour to societal standards and moral norms, it easily subsumes individuals under (moral) categories or types so as to situate them on a continuum between good and bad.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ See e.g. Farenga (2006) and Gill (1996, 2006).

⁶⁸ Gill (1988) on Cic. *Off.* 1.

⁶⁹ G. Anderson (1984: 62–3) is an example of such a reductionist approach: ‘The major characters tend to be lacking in everything except perfection . . . It is much more useful to see the hero and heroine as a *Liebespaar*, a single organism trying to unite itself. They are lovers first, intriguers second, and characters third.’ His view is echoed almost literally by Paulsen (1992: 42), who sees Heliodorus’ protagonists not as independent individuals, but as two parts of the same organism (‘zwei Teile ein und desselben Organismus’) with identical aims and desires. Similar views can be found in Reardon (1991: 81–2, esp. 26) and Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1960: xxi–xxii).

⁷⁰ See also OCD⁴ s.v. character and Gill (1984: 151).

⁷¹ On Aristotle’s ethical writings, for example, see Deslauriers (1990: 86–9), Reiner (1991: 68–9), and Curzer (2005).

⁷² Aristotle’s *Poetics* (1448^a1–5, 1454^a16–22) is, of course, foundational on moral character in tragedy. See also Goldhill (1990: 102) and Duff (1999: 13–14) on character in tragedy and biography respectively.

⁷³ Gill (1983: 470–3, 1986, 1990a: 4–5).

⁷⁴ See e.g. Pelling (1990b: 255) on the taste for the ethically exemplary impeding an interest in individual differences.

Illustrations of how such subsumption may facilitate the depiction of exemplary morality are Theophrastus' famous exploration of the behaviour of thirty character types, Aristotle's treatment of virtues as constituting the mean between the polar vices of excess and deficiency (*EE* and *EN*) and pseudo-Aristotle's discussion of excellences (virtues) and their corresponding vices (*VV*).⁷⁵

In the Greek novel, too, concerns with ethical character often individuate characters in ways that we find limited. Broad oppositions between goodness rewarded (by a happy ending) and badness punished (often by death) facilitate readings of character in terms of moral categories opposing 'good' heroes to 'bad' enemies and sexual predators.⁷⁶ Occasionally, scholars have even gone so far as to observe a strict dichotomy in the novels between these two moral poles.⁷⁷ Not only do such readings approach characterization in terms of antithetical moral typification; they also pay exclusive attention to—in Gill's terms—'character' and none to 'personality'. On both fronts, I argue, matters are more complex. Firstly, there is no need for a detailed study to point out that any strict dichotomy between good and bad is a generalization that fails to capture characterization in these narratives. Brigands forced into crime by previous injustice, for example, cannot be accommodated in such terms: even if Xenophon's Hippothous, Heliodorus' Thyamis, and, possibly, Daulis in the eponymous fragment are best read not as individualized characters but as instantiations of the character type of 'the noble brigand', they are essentially neither wholly good nor wholly bad.⁷⁸ Moreover, scholars have made a good case that depictions of Dionysius, Artaxerxes, and Calasiris in the realm of sexual ethics function as a testing ground for subtle explorations of moral questions.⁷⁹ And, of course, some novels also raise the question of whether their *protagonists* can simply be referred to as 'morally good' characters. Any careful reader realizes that Chariton's heroine Callirhoe is not a perfect human being. Neither is her husband Chaereas, who kicks her into a coma in an uncontrollable rage in the first pages of the novel. And Clitophon, the hero in Achilles Tatius' novel, is a far from ideal character by any standards. But it remains to be examined just how subtly or ambiguously the moral categories underlying the protagonists in these narratives *are* organized.

⁷⁵ See Sherman (1989: 1) on character providing predictability and accountability generated by such classifications of *êthê*.

⁷⁶ See e.g. Del Corno (1989: 81) and Fusillo (1989: 12) on 'good' protagonists and Hopwood (1998) on robbers as negative paradigms.

⁷⁷ See e.g. Létoublon (1993: 104–5) on the novels as propagating a 'Manichean' dichotomy between good and bad.

⁷⁸ See Scarcella (1995), Watanabe (2003a, b); and, on Daulis, Stephens and Winkler (1995: 375–6).

⁷⁹ See Repath (2007b: 64–8, 78–9), Montiglio (2010: 27–9), and M. Jones (2012: 20–91).

Secondly, moral issues, although important, are not the only concerns in novelistic characterization. I therefore turn to Gill's concept of 'personality', which he sees as more conducive than 'character' to explorations of an individualized idiosyncratic self because it privileges insight into perceptions, memories, and emotional responses and envisages a response to people that is empathetic rather than moral. It attempts, in other words, to identify oneself subjectively with another person, to 'get inside his skin', rather than to assess objectively 'from the outside'. Basically, 'personality' differs from 'character' in two complementary ways: it is concerned with *understanding and exploring* rather than assessing; and it examines the expression or manifestation of personal *individuality or distinctiveness* rather than favouring a person's subsumption under a category.⁸⁰

Gill maps these oppositions onto differences between ancient ('objective') conceptions of character (in epic, tragedy, classical Greek philosophy, and Hellenistic-Roman thought) and modern ('subjective') concerns with personality (going back essentially to Cartesian philosophy of mind).⁸¹ Although I do not argue (of course) that the ancient Greek novels explore notions of idiosyncratic self in a Cartesian sense, I hope to demonstrate that specific notions associated with Gill's concept of 'personality' have some role to play in these narratives. To be sure, Gill's sweeping claim has already met with some resistance from students of biography, who (quite rightly) observe that Plutarch's *Lives*, for example, at times show an interest in personality-related features such as individuation and psychological understanding, even if these are not always a priority.⁸² On the other hand, it remains true that even in these cases such features allow for a portrait quite different from what we today would expect from individual and psychological introspection.⁸³ Similar observations have been made about character(ization) in other genres.⁸⁴ Herodotus, for example, is principally interested in a pattern of tyrannical behaviour; all his tyrants are different, but only in limited ways (Cyrus with his peculiar ability and drive, Cambyses with his madness, Darius with his insight, Xerxes with his vacillation and even a bizarre weakness).⁸⁵ In tragedy, likewise, characters such as

⁸⁰ See already Dihle (1956: 77–8, 86–7) for a distinction between moral character and its 'purely psychological' description.

⁸¹ Gill (1983: 473–8, 1996: 1–18, 2006: 338–42).

⁸² On Plutarch's *Lives* generally, see Duff (1999: 54) and Ingenkamp (1992). On specific *Lives*, Duff (1999: 69–70), Pelling (1989: 231, 1990a: 228–35, 2002b: 321–2), and Swain (1989a: 63–4) (the last of which also deals with some of Plutarch's theoretical treatises such as *Quaest. conv.* 8.9.732b and *Mul. virt.* 243c).

⁸³ Swain (1992: 104–5), for example, remarks that we find qualitative differentiation of characters not so much where there are wide differences, but where there are large areas of similarity, and individuality is difficult to determine.

⁸⁴ See e.g. Sorabji (2006: 137–53) on ancient philosophical thought, Danove (1996) on the Gospel of Mark, Ussher (1985) on *mimiamboi*, and Franko (1996) on Plautus.

⁸⁵ Pelling (1990b: 258). See also Pitcher (2012: 277–80) on Herodian.

Medea, Philoctetes, and Antigone may well be grasped and realized as distinct and different as a result of significant detail or their particular combination of traits, actions, and choices in response to particular circumstances,⁸⁶ but at the same time they mostly present traits which group naturally rather than providing idiosyncratic quiriness of paradoxical or unique combinations.⁸⁷ In comedy too, character individuation is present but not to the extent that it may easily be opposed to typification.⁸⁸

Against this background, I test two aspects associated with Gill's concept of personality. I argue, first, that one important thematic area of novelistic characterization is concerned with the notion of *understanding*. More specifically, I aim to show that novelists explore how their protagonists learn to build up control and power over their environment. (I further clarify this thematic strand in §0.3.) On my reading, such depiction invites the reader to monitor the behavioural processes underlying such a learning process rather than merely to assess them in moral terms (although moral judgement is, as we will see, never completely absent). Secondly, I argue that the depiction of novelistic protagonists is, at least to some extent, also informed by character individuation. Generally speaking, this concept has mainly been noticed in a number of minor characters,⁸⁹ but attention has recently been drawn to protagonist-related notions associated more readily with individuation than with typification, such as the importance of conflicting emotions.⁹⁰ Moreover, some novelistic representations of character types have been shown to accommodate a development in emotions and behaviour rather than simply to reiterate the simple stereotypes from the rhetorical exercises.⁹¹ And the recent observation that different novelists use the concepts of moral dilemma and psychological conflict in different ways⁹² raises the question of whether such differentiation is reflected in characterization at large. What remains to be examined in particular is the extent to which (and how exactly) protagonists are individualized and/or differentiated from each other and how such characterization operates alongside instances of character typification.

⁸⁶ Pelling (1990*b*: 251). On Sophocles (whom tradition associates with good characterization), see Easterling (1977, 1990: 93–9). On Euripides, Gellie (1988), Gill (1990*b*), and Griffin (1990).

⁸⁷ Easterling (1977), Goldhill (1986: 174), and Pelling (1990*b*: 254).

⁸⁸ On Menander, for example, see Webster (1950: 164), van Groningen (1961), MacCary (1970, 1972), Arnott (1995), and Fusillo (1989: 49). On his Cnemon (and some individualizing characteristics) in particular, see Papamichael (1976: 16) and Traill (2008: 79–129).

⁸⁹ See Rohde (1914³: 478) on 'schärfere[r] Charakterisierung' of minor characters. See also Feuillâtre (1966: 20), Schmeling (1980: 107), Sandy (1982*a*: 56), Fusillo (1989: 49), and Holzberg (2006: 63).

⁹⁰ See Repath (2007*b*), Alexander (2008: 185–9), and Daude (2009).

⁹¹ e.g. van Mal-Maeder (2007: 129–33) on the *noverca* in novels and declamations.

⁹² Montiglio (2010).

0.2 IDEALISTIC AND REALISTIC CHARACTERIZATION

A recurrent claim about protagonists in Greek novels pertains to one specific type of typification: their idealization. Typically, scholarly attention is drawn to their astounding physical beauty and noble birth as a means of casting them as embodiments of physical—and in some cases moral—perfection.⁹³ This tendency is traceable to Rohde's (1914³: 476–7) view that the protagonists are soulless puppets ('seelenlose Gestalten', 'Gliederpuppen'), invested with an empty and lifeless ideality ('leere und leblose Idealität'). While it has not been lost on common-sense scholarship that Rohde's view is an undue generalization,⁹⁴ no dedicated study has explicitly challenged or substantially contested his judgement, which still has some influence in the field. It is common practice, for example, to oppose idealizing characterization with more lifelike or *realistic* character depiction. This opposition is used either to contrast whole novels with one another (those of Chariton and Xenophon with the later ones, for example⁹⁵) or to set (supposedly ideal) protagonists apart from (more realistically depicted) *minor* characters.⁹⁶

Here, scholarly opinions once again intersect with broader concerns about the genre of the novel in general. The five extant Greek novels are commonly grouped together as the 'ideal novels' because, we are told, they deal with ideally beautiful and high-born protagonists whose many adventures in pursuit of their ideal love are concluded by reunion and a happy ending.⁹⁷ This 'ideal' conception of the Greek texts has, for some scholars, long justified their banishment to the category of 'romance', a term aptly characterized by Doody (1996: 15) as one connoting 'a certain low section of the bookstore appealing to women only'.⁹⁸ Indeed, realistic (or lifelike) characterization is often put forward as an essential prerequisite for ancient and modern texts alike to be deemed worthy of the title 'novel'. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* (7th edn., 1982), for example, tells us that a novel is a 'fictitious prose narrative of book

⁹³ Examples are numerous. See, among others, Dalmeyda (1962: xviii) on 'les types exemplaires', Billault (1991: 178) on 'le héros page blanche', Létoublon (1993: 119) on 'une sorte de fiche-type', Napolitano (1983–4: 86) on a 'forte processo di idealizzazione', Del Corno (1989: 84) on 'una figura ideale, per non dire irreal', Brioso Sánchez (2004: 123) on 'una idealización ejemplarizante', Calero Secall (2005: 106–11) on 'rasgos idealizadores de la ficción', and Fick (2002: 517–9) on heroization and idealization.

⁹⁴ Perry (1967: 120), for example, suggests that the main interest in the novel 'may be centred in the characters and their psychological experience, rather than in external events, as is the case in the *Daphnis and Chloe* of Longus, and in many parts of Chariton'. His view echoes Blake (1934: 288) and Thiele (1890: 128).

⁹⁵ Perry (1967: 98–101) and Holzberg (2006: 112) find more realistic character in the later ones, whereas Tilg (2011: 49–50) finds Chariton's novel more realistic than others.

⁹⁶ See e.g. Reardon (1991: 26) and Holzberg (2006: 63).

⁹⁷ See e.g. Goldhill (2008: 194).

⁹⁸ See also Crewe (2009: 602) on the categories of 'romance' and 'novel' in modern scholarship.

length portraying *characters* and actions *credibly representative of real life* in continuous plot' (my italics). Similarly, Frye (1957: 304) is explicit that the conception of characterization is the essential difference between novel and romance: 'romance does not attempt to create "real" people so much as stylized figures.'⁹⁹

But of course, the two concepts thus foregrounded ('realism' and 'novel') are profoundly problematic when straightforwardly used to assess ancient texts. First, demands for 'realistic' characterization in 'novels' are largely anachronistic: they originate in the nineteenth-century novelistic tradition of realism, which famously and abundantly dissects the complex psychological deepening of characters' inner lives in minute detail.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, such demands have influenced the expectations of literary critics regarding the concept of 'character' in the Greek novel.¹⁰¹ Some scholars have assessed the ancient novel against such modern standards, often to condemn it because of its allegedly limited literary and interpretative value. Bakhtin's reading of character as a constituent of the adventure chronotope underlying the genre of the Greek novel, seen itself teleologically as a relatively primitive genre in a series building up to the nineteenth-century realistic novel, might well be the most famous example.¹⁰² On the other hand, scholarship on the ancient novel as well as on other genres has been explicit about the pointlessness of judging texts by their correspondences with or deviations from externally imposed aesthetic evaluative frameworks alien to the texts themselves.¹⁰³ In keeping with these insights, this book sets out to read character in the Greek novels from an analytic point of view compatible with ancient rather than modern concerns. I therefore anchor my methods of analysis in ancient rhetoric (on which, see §0.4).

In this book, I use the term 'realistic' to refer to lifelikeness as discussed in a number of ancient sources. Aristotle, for example, is explicit that (tragic) characters should show similarities with people in real life (*to homoion*, *Po.* 1454^a24–6) and Aristophanes of Byzantium praises lifelikeness in Menander's

⁹⁹ See also Beer (1970: 10) on 'simple heroes' in romances and Turner (1968: 15–24) on realistic characterization and the private, subjective experience of individuals in novels. See Schmeling (1980: 106–8) on Xenophon of Ephesus and Kestner (1973: 168–9) on Longus.

¹⁰⁰ Laird (2008: 205) rightly points to some stylistic devices that are instrumental in such psychological portraiture in modern novels and are absent from their ancient predecessors.

¹⁰¹ Selden's (1994: 45–7) observation that studies of characterization in this genre 'tend to be not descriptive, but judgmental' acknowledges the difficulty of *not* reading character through eyes predetermined by modern and post-modern expectations.

¹⁰² Bakhtin (1981: 86–110). On Bakhtin's genealogy of the modern novel, see Branham (2005). Pérez Benito's (2005: 141) advice to look upon ancient novels with benevolence, because their scant psychological profundity is so different from the complexity ('complejidad interior') of what we are used to in modern novels, does not do much to improve things.

¹⁰³ See Fusillo (1989: 11) on the anti-historical ('antistorico') character of such assessments and Hägg (1987: 204) on their 'absurdity'. See Gill (1996: 3, 60), Murnaghan (1994: 88–9), and Goldhill (1990: 100–5) similarly on character in philosophy, epic, and tragedy respectively.

comedies, which famously share motifs and character types with the novels¹⁰⁴ ('O Menander and life, which of you copied the other?').¹⁰⁵ In the novels, lifelike character depiction will be shown often to revolve around psychological motivations that complicate ideal stereotypes or infuse them with ambiguity. Again, this notion of lifelikeness deviating from ideal standards is in line with ancient conceptions of character.¹⁰⁶ According to Aristotle, for example, Sophocles claims that while he himself fashions characters *as they ought to be* (οἷους δεῖ ποιεῖν), Euripides fashions them *as they are* (οἷοι εἶσιν, *Po.* 1460^b34). In Aristotle's ethical writings too, there are instances of lifelike rather than idealized interpretations of virtue¹⁰⁷ and other genres also feature characters who make notions of idealism problematic.¹⁰⁸

The second problematic concept informing scholarly opinion on what 'character' in 'novels' is supposed to look like is, of course, the opposition between 'romance' and 'novel'. To be sure, the question of which of these generic designations best fits the ancient narratives is in itself irrelevant (and, indeed, limited to the English language). But, as Goldhill (2008: 192–3) points out, the scholarly adoption of the labels 'romance' and 'novel' has proved to be a fairly reliable barometer of scholarly appreciation of these texts. Whereas studies of the texts up to the 1970s prefer 'romance',¹⁰⁹ several decades of critical re-evaluation have led the majority of scholarship nowadays to refer to them as 'novels'.¹¹⁰ Similarly, one of the reasons why Greek novels had been banished to the category of 'romance', whereas their Latin cognates were allowed to sail under the banner of 'novel', was precisely their purportedly ideal nature, often opposed to the (so-called 'realistic' and/or 'comic') concerns of the Latin novels with their low-life milieus of sex and comedy. Any such strict opposition has by now been exposed as a generalization (papyrus fragments such as *Iolaus* and Lollianus' *Phoenician Story* constitute evidence of the existence of such a tradition of comic and sexually explicit low-life

¹⁰⁴ See Brethes (2007a: 13–63) (with references).

¹⁰⁵ Syrian. In *Hermog.* II, 23 Rabe (1893). See van Groningen (1961: 96) on Aristophanes' concern with the resemblance of character to real people. Plutarch (*Comp. Aristoph. et Men.* 853a–4d, esp. 853d–e) is another who praises these comedies for their lifelike portrayals of character.

¹⁰⁶ See, among others, Nünlist (2009: 252) on realism as lifelikeness and its importance as a criterion of propriety in ancient literary criticism.

¹⁰⁷ Curzer (2005).

¹⁰⁸ See e.g. Roncace (2004) on ambiguous characterization in Josephus, Öhrman (2008) on 'good' characters with problematic connotations in Roman elegy, Shay (1995) on opposing strands in Homer's depiction of Achilles, Podlecki (1964) on ambivalent character in Aeschylus, and Shipley (1997: 25) on failure of character and weaknesses in Plutarch's *Lives*.

¹⁰⁹ Examples are numerous (Goldhill adduces two of these): Perry (1930, 1967), Hadas (1953), Kirk (1960), Helms (1966), Scobie (1969, 1973), Hägg (1971a), etc.

¹¹⁰ Of course, this is by no means a clear-cut distinction. There are exceptions (such as Hardin 2000 and Whitmarsh 2011), whose adoptions of the term 'romance' do not necessarily imply evaluations of the qualities of the texts.

fiction in Greek narratives too¹¹¹). Nevertheless, the five extant Greek novels remain obviously very different from their Latin counterparts. Of course, I do not argue that characterization in these texts is ‘realistic’ in the sense used in scholarship to refer to the Latin novel. Rather, I aim to demonstrate that lifelike characterization in them is often too much a matter of ambiguity, playfulness, and awareness of psychologically motivated behavioural patterns to fully deserve the common label of ‘ideal’ or ‘idealistic’.¹¹²

0.3 STATIC AND DYNAMIC CHARACTERS

The notions of lifelikeness and plausibility are bound up with what is considered to be a major point of difference between ancient and modern conceptions of character: the issue of character change. In modern literary theory, the distinction between ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ character (not changing throughout the story versus changing on one or more levels, either suddenly as a character shift or gradually as an evolution) has become standard.¹¹³ Aristotle (*Po.* 1454^a32), however, adduces Iphigenia in *Iphigenia in Aulis* as an example of *inconsistency* (τοῦ . . . ἀνωμαλίου) because as a suppliant she ‘is nothing like (οὐδὲν . . . ἔοικεν) the *later* Iphigenia (τῇ ὑστέρᾳ)’. Of course, the idea that an individual’s behaviour is, or can be, consistent and, therefore, predictable is in itself a realistic assumption present in much of ancient narrative literature.¹¹⁴ In Greek novel scholarship, one of the most frequent claims about the protagonists is that their characters are static.¹¹⁵ For Bakhtin (1981: 104–10), the static hero is one of the cornerstones of the adventure chronotope, of which he sees the Greek novel as the prototypical incarnation. In his view, the entire plot ‘changes nothing in the life of the heroes and introduces nothing into their life’ (90). Frye (1976: 86) is equally explicit when reading the importance of preserved female virginity in these narratives as synecdochic of their concerns with non-changeability in general.

¹¹¹ See, among others, Sandy (1994, 1997: 241–53), Stephens and Winkler (1995: 3–19), Alpers (1996), and Barchiesi (2006: 193–209).

¹¹² Wehrli (1965: 133–54), Fusillo (1988), Barchiesi (1986, 2006: 203–6), Goldhill (1995: 1–45, esp. 44–5), and De Temmerman (2009*b*) all point to less than ideal elements in the extant novels.

¹¹³ See e.g. Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 40–2). Forster (1927: 67–78) presents change as an indication of ‘round’ character, but see Ewen (1971: 7) and Prince (1982: 72–3) on the flaws of the flat–round distinction.

¹¹⁴ On consistency over time as a realistic assumption (and its absence in Aristophanic comedy), see Silk (1990). On the presence of this assumption in historiography and biography, see Pitcher (2007: 103–4), and Pelling (2002*b*: 329) respectively.

¹¹⁵ Again, character change has more frequently been dealt with in a (limited) number of *minor* characters. See e.g. Alvares (1995: 393–4, 399–404) and Watanabe (2003*a*, *b*).

Such interpretations, which have become widespread in scholarship on the novels,¹¹⁶ resonate with the traditional view among scholars of ancient genres as diverse as oratory, historiography, and biography (from the late Roman Republic and early Empire in particular), in which, it is said, character is something fixed, given at birth, and unchangeable during life.¹¹⁷ Arguably, one reason is long-standing awareness of the influence on this literature of the Platonic–Aristotelian notion of stable, adult character.¹¹⁸ This notion explores character as the result of the combined effects of inborn nature, habituation,¹¹⁹ and reasoned choice and therefore regards it as relatively permanent and determinate: whether good or bad, character has been formed in a particular way and stays that way.¹²⁰ Therefore, the normal expectation is that a developed adult character is unlikely to change, and apparent change of character requires special explanation.

But how credible is the scholarly view of static heroes in the novels? For one thing, fictional journeys such as those in the novels have since the *Odyssey* proved a sophisticated literary device for exploring character development of some sort¹²¹ and it would be rather odd to view the novels as exceptions to this tendency altogether.¹²² Of course, much depends on what exactly ‘change’ means. While Morgan (1996b: 177–8), for example, is correct to note that in the novels trials do not correct a character’s defects (Chaereas, for example, remains a jealous man), the way in which characters *deal* with some of their defects *does* change (Chaereas acquires control over his anger¹²³). In fact, some scholarly readings tantalizingly question the widely held ‘static’ view by addressing various sorts of development. It has been observed, for example, that the protagonists’ identity at the end of the story is at least partly shaped by their experiences of travel, trials, and misfortunes.¹²⁴ The protagonists

¹¹⁶ See e.g. Morgan (1996b: 165–6: ‘the critical consensus is that the novels’ heroes are emotionally static’), MacAlister (1996: 19–23), Fusillo (1989: 213–19; although he makes an exception for the *Aethiopica*), and Sandy (1982a: 56: ‘Two aspects of characterization not to be expected in any ancient romance are development and subtle delineation’).

¹¹⁷ See e.g. Fuhrer (1989: 69), who calls the notion of character development (‘Charakter-entwicklung’) anachronistic. Other examples are May (1988: 6, 16, 22, 75, 163), Riggsby (2004), Syme (1958: 421), Goodyear (1972: 37–40), R. Martin (1981: 105), and Dihle (1956: 76–7; but 81–2 give a more nuanced view).

¹¹⁸ See e.g. Dihle (1956: 57–87) on the importance of Aristotelian theory for ancient biography.

¹¹⁹ On character (*êthos*) as formed by habit (*ethos*): Pl. *Lg.* 792e, Arist. *EN* 1103^a11–^b25, *EE* 1220^a38–^b7, *MM* 1185^b38–1186^a8, and Plu. *De sera num.* 551e–f (Duff 1999: 74 n. 6, A. B. Miller 1974, A. D. Smith 1996).

¹²⁰ Swain (1989a: 65–6), Gill (2006: 413).

¹²¹ On such fictional journeys (but not in novels), see Mossman (2006: 281). On Odysseus as a hero who *learns* from suffering, Marincola (2007: 20–8).

¹²² Montiglio (2005: 223, 226) suggests as much when observing awareness in the novels of the psychological benefits of travelling as well as of the alienating effects of wandering.

¹²³ See Scourfield (2003).

¹²⁴ Billault (2003: 127–8), for example, suggests in passing (but does not demonstrate) that some heroes change through suffering.

themselves, in any case, repeatedly consider these misfortunes as meaningful experiences.¹²⁵ The impact of such experiences has been explored most extensively in the erotic realm¹²⁶ and, more recently, in that of *paideia*.¹²⁷ The novels' typical tripartite structure in particular (union, separation, and reunion/reintegration into the home society) has been read as conducive to development of some sort. Lalanne (2006: 101–28), for example, discusses the organization of political, moral, and social values around this structure as well as the concomitant evolution of the protagonists' status from childhood to mature adulthood (from *parthenos* to *gynê*, for example).¹²⁸ Whitmarsh (2011: 16–18, 100–7, 155, 216, 254–5), for his part, argues that this structure's teleological implications (the restoration of an initial state) privilege sameness but at the same time allow transformative elements so that notions of development are infused with ambiguity ('the protagonists both are and are not the same at the end', 17). Even if, in all these cases, 'change' does not imply any profound transformation of existential or psychological outlook of the sort found in the modern *Bildungsroman*,¹²⁹ these readings nevertheless suggest that character development has a role to play in these narratives. How, then, is such development constructed by the novelists and how can it be described qualitatively?

Ancient writers were aware of controversy about the possibility of character change and seem to have been troubled by the question. Plutarch, for example, reports that Theophrastus is undecided (*διαπορήσας*, *Per.* 38.2) about the matter. An oft-heard alternative to the possibility of character change is the theory of (more or less gradual) character *revelation*, which assumes that the characteristics of a person have always been there but remain hidden until circumstances provide an external stimulus. Tacitus, for example, states that Tiberius veiled his debaucheries (*obtectis libidinibus*) as long as his mother lived but finally (*postremo*) plunged into (*prorupit*) every wickedness (*Ann.* 6.51).¹³⁰ Plutarch gives a similar explanation in the case of Philip V (*οὐκ . . . μεταβολὴ φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξις . . . κακίας . . . ἀγνοηθείσης*, *Arat.* 51.4). But on the other hand, ancient writers also explore the notion of character *change*. In Stoic-Epicurean thinking, for example, formation of character is conceived as the realization of the (universal) natural capacity

¹²⁵ Montiglio (2005: 242–6, esp. 243).

¹²⁶ See Konstan (1990: 193–4, 1994: 55–9) on the development of the protagonists' love from an initial spark to mutual fidelity, Laplace (1991, 1994a, 1994b, 2007: 40, 719–42) on novels as an 'éducation amoureuse' and a 'roman de formation', and Morgan (1996b) on the possibility that love creates an 'educative process' in characters.

¹²⁷ See Lalanne (2006: 184–8) and M. Jones (2012: 41–3, 74–5, 79–89) on novelistic *paideia* as a quality to be acquired gradually through maturation and experience.

¹²⁸ See also Couraud-Lalanne (1998: 532–42).

¹²⁹ See e.g. Fusillo (1989: 218) and Morgan (1996b: 188). On one novel as a *Bildungsroman*, on the other hand, see Tagliabue (2012).

¹³⁰ On the possible dynamics between a person's 'root tendencies' and circumstantial, external factors in historiography, see Pitcher (2007: 116).

for perfection, which involves progressive development.¹³¹ And even if the Platonic–Aristotelian conception of adult character is, as we have seen, informed primarily by the notion of stasis, the *creation* of character before adulthood is conceptualized as a process allowing change, as it involves formation, education, and the influence of individuals such as parents and teachers, as well as society at large.¹³² Quintilian echoes this notion when he presents both habituation and character as results of upbringing (*educatio*, *Inst.* 1.2.6; *fit ex his consuetudo, inde natura*, 1.2.8): it is, in his view, not just that one’s character needs the right circumstances to develop (although this too is the case: *natura* needs *cura* to attain moral goodness, 1.2.4), but that character is also the very *product* of such circumstances.

Much scholarly attention has been paid to the (possible) development of specific characters in a variety of ancient narrative genres.¹³³ Biography and historiography in particular have been shown to adhere to the idea that an innate essence (*physis*), even if relatively stable, may change¹³⁴ and in any case is not the only element to determine character.¹³⁵ Just as in ethical philosophy, character in youth and childhood is assumed to be in the process of formation¹³⁶ and can change as a result of external influences,¹³⁷ social factors,¹³⁸ chance (*tychê*), and environmental circumstances.¹³⁹ According to Polybius in his account of Hannibal, for example, circumstances can compel (*ἀναγκάζεσθαι*, 9.22.10) people to speak and act contrary to their moral choices (*παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν προαίρεσιν*) or real character (*τὴν ἐναντίαν τῇ φύσει . . . διάθεσιν*, 9.23.4). He adduces a number of examples of people whom circumstances thus forced to change (*ἀναγκαζόμενοι ταῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μεταβολαῖς συμμετατίθεσθαι*). Similarly, Plutarch argues that Sertorius’ cruel treatment of hostages did not expose his mildness as a calculated pose, but was rather an instance of character changed (*συμμεταβαλεῖν*) because of circumstances (*Sert.* 10.5–6).¹⁴⁰

¹³¹ Gill (2006: 127–203, 413–14). On character change in ancient philosophy more generally, see Gill (1983: 469).

¹³² Gill (1983: 469, 476).

¹³³ See, among others, Held (1987), Gregory (1996), and Beck (1999) on Hom.; Chamberlain (1984a: 100) on Hes. *Op.* 699, Hdt. 2.30, and S. *Aj.* 595; Lawrence (1988) on E. *IA*; Pitcher (2012: 277–80) on Hdn.; Ash (1999: 112–8) on Tac.; and Pitcher (2007) on historiography in general.

¹³⁴ Plutarch, for example, points to the possibilities of revealed (*ἀποκάλυψις*) as well as changed *physis* (*κίνησις . . . καὶ μεταβολὴ φύσεως*) to account for Sulla’s transition from moderate and civilized to violent and inhuman (*Sull.* 30.4–5). His *Comp. Cim. Luc.* 1.4 also suggests that *physis* may change. Duff (2008b: 22–3) observes that static and developmental models of character coexist in Plutarch’s *Lives*.

¹³⁵ Gill (1983: 473–4) and Halliwell (1990: 32–3).

¹³⁶ Shipley (1997: 67–8) and Duff (2008b: 2).

¹³⁷ See Swain (1992: 102) and Pelling (1988a: 258).

¹³⁸ Swain (1989a: 63–4).

¹³⁹ See Swain (1992: 102; 1989a: 64–5 and 1989b on *tychê*).

¹⁴⁰ On (other examples of) character change in Plutarch, see Tröster (2008: 52), Duff (2003: 95, 1999: 25), Swain (1989a: 65–8), Pelling (1988b: 16), Gill (1983: 473–5), Polman (1974: 176–7), D. A. Russell (1966b: 144–7), and Bergen (1962: 62–94).

A number of these notions are easily identified in the novels too. The connection between *physis* and innateness, for example, is foregrounded on several occasions.¹⁴¹ *Êthos*, on the other hand, is at times associated more readily with *cultured* or learned qualities. When, in Heliodorus' novel, Cybele attempts to indirectly and ambiguously (κύκλω . . . καὶ δι' αἰνιγμάτων, 7.19.7) communicate Arsace's sexual desire for Theagenes, the depiction of her character (τὸ ἦθος, 7.19.7–8) overtly focuses on social and cultural sophistication (while at the same time being couched in sexual innuendo).¹⁴² Furthermore, like the narrative genres discussed above, the novels also foreground the notion that human behaviour is not only determined by innate essence and/or *êthos*, but also by *circumstances*. Sometimes circumstances emphatically work alongside *physis* in determining behaviour. In Heliodorus, for example, Theagenes, enslaved and acting as a waiter at his mistress's table, is explicit that he does not need to be taught (Οὐδὲν . . . διδασκάλων, 7.27.2) the art of cup bearing because both his natural ability and circumstance (ἡ φύσις . . . καὶ ὁ καιρός) indicate to him what is to be done. In other cases, circumstances operate *against* one's character, upbringing, or background. When Thermouthis, a brigand in the same novel, is threatened with death by Theagenes and falls pleading to his feet, the narrator is explicit that this supplication is the product of circumstances (ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, 2.13.4) rather than character (τοῦ τρόπου). Thermouthis, in other words, is forced by circumstances (like Hannibal according to Polybius) to act in a way contrary to what we would expect from a ferocious brigand. Another brigand forced by circumstances to act out of character is Thyamis: he is said to be not a complete savage (οὐ παντάπασι βάρβαρον, 1.19.2) 'as far as his character is concerned' (τὰ ἦθη) but a gentle type (ἤμερον γένος) who has come from a distinguished family (τῶν ἐπὶ δόξης) and has taken up his life as a brigand only out of necessity (πρὸς ἀνάγκης). In Thyamis' case, then, circumstance is presented as impacting his entire way of life to the point that it is out of tune with both his character and family background.

Physis can be complicated not only by circumstance but also by moral choice or *proairesis*. Achilles Tatius' Callisthenes claims that his former

¹⁴¹ Examples are Hld. 10.9.5 (τῆς φύσεως ἀρχήθεν), Longus 4.23.2 (φύσις makes Daphnis behave towards his newly discovered parents as if he had known them all his life), and passages where *physis* refers to aspects of human nature that are, by definition, established at birth and unchangeable (fatherhood, Hld. 2.23.2, 7.14.6, 10.16.2, 10.16.7; motherhood, Hld. 9.24.8, 10.29.4; brotherhood, Hld. 7.5.5; one's sex, Hld. 2.33.6, 4.21.3, 7.21.2; see Kōvendi 1966: 173–8 on some of these instances).

¹⁴² Arsace is depicted, for example, as 'accessible' (εὐόμιλος, a term that plays, of course, on the double meaning of *homilia* as both 'company' and 'sexual intercourse'; 7.19.7), as deriving pleasure 'from vigorous and sophisticated young men' (τοῖς ἀβροτέροις καὶ ἀγερωχοτέροις), as sophisticated herself (φιλαβρον, 7.12.5), a philhellene (φιλέλληνα, a term that equally refers to her love for *Greeks*) and fond of the company (again *όμιλίαν*, 7.14.2) of *Greeks*. See Hld. 2.33.4 for a similar example.

actions (such as abducting Calligone out of sexual desire) were motivated by youthful, violent nature (νεότητος φύσει πέπρακται, 8.18.2), but that the more recent ones (such as respecting her chastity) are the result of personal choice (προαιρέσει). The opposition played upon is that between *physis* and moral character: whereas the former is presented as a given and beyond Callisthenes' own control, the latter is revealed by his free choice, through which he succeeds in replacing his negative natural inclinations by positive ones. Conscious decision-making, then, is presented as an acquired ability to master natural impulses. The same opposition can also play out the other way around: Calasiris states that, if some people have a malignant effect on others, it is the result *not* of volition (οὐχ ὁ βούλονται, Hld. 3.8.2) but of an innate characteristic (φύσει . . . ὁ πεφύκασι). In such people, that is, *physis* determines their behaviour *in spite* of their own will.

The examples of Thyamis and Callisthenes also touch on another aspect of ancient theory regarding character development relevant to my analysis: the connection between moral development and rationality. As is well known, Aristotle in his ethical writings states—and ethical theory contemporary with (some of) the novels reiterates—that moral (as well as intellectual) virtue is the end point of a development.¹⁴³ This process of moral growth is often presented as marked by a growth of rationality. Following Pythagoras' and Plato's division of the soul into a 'rational' and an 'irrational' or 'passionate' part,¹⁴⁴ Plutarch presents character as the balance between the rational and the irrational sides of the soul and makes it dependent on the extent to which its rational part is able to influence and change, through habit, the irrational (the extent, that is, to which *aretai* prevail over *pathè* or vice versa).¹⁴⁵ The process of becoming an adult, then, is firmly associated with the development of rationality: the person becomes, in principle, capable of playing a major role in his own character formation through reasoned reflection and decision. Even in adulthood, when a settled character is supposed to have been attained, character may still be improved through the continuing application of reason and good habits,¹⁴⁶ and adult character may be more or less stable or unstable depending on the extent to which nature has been 'mixed' with or tempered by education and reason.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ See e.g. EN 1103^a19–20 on both moral and intellectual virtue as the result of development and *Cat.* 13^a22–31 on change from good to bad and vice versa (Di Muzio 2000, Bondeson 1974: 59–65). On this view in Plutarch's moral essays, see Lombardi (1997: 378).

¹⁴⁴ Plu. *De virt. mor.* 442a. On the (complex and debated) question of philosophical influences, see Duff (1999: 72 n. 1–2).

¹⁴⁵ Plu. *De virt. mor.* 443c5–d10. See, in more detail, Gill (1983: 469–70, 479–80; 1996: 71–2, 249–50), Chamberlain (1984b: 183), Pelling (1988a: 257), Swain (1992: 105), and Duff (1999: 74).

¹⁴⁶ See e.g. Plu. *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* (*How to recognize that one is making progress in virtue*) 79c (on *epanorthôsis êthous*).

¹⁴⁷ Duff (2008b: 2).

I argue in this book that novelistic representation not only of self-control but also of control over *others* acts as a testing ground for the novelists to explore the development of the rational as a marker of adulthood. The prominence of self-control (and the lack thereof) in the novels has been repeatedly observed. Emotional outbursts revealing the protagonists' state of mind, for example, are clearly constructed as opposed to the contemporary ideal of self-control,¹⁴⁸ but at the same time several episodes thematize the characters' attempts to control themselves.¹⁴⁹ Heroines such as Callirhoe and Chariclea repeatedly and consciously try to keep their emotions hidden from public perception,¹⁵⁰ and Chaereas' gradually developing ability to learn how to control and express his anger has been read as a marker of mature adulthood.¹⁵¹ My focus on the characters' establishment and maintenance of control over *others* complements such readings of self-control. The importance of notions of controlling and being controlled is obvious even from a superficial reading of the novels. A recurrent characteristic of the protagonists in these narratives (and, in fact, in ancient novels generally) is that they are controlled by divinities who have a grudge against them.¹⁵² They are also controlled and manipulated by fellow characters, in which case control either takes on a blatantly palpable form (such as physical imprisonment or attempted rape) or is exercised more subtly.¹⁵³ Such interpersonal types of control may function on different levels (sexual, psychological, rhetorical, etc.), a matter over whose manifestations in Latin novels more ink has flowed than in their Greek cognates.¹⁵⁴ It is a long-standing assumption that the centrality of *tychê* to the arrangement of novelistic plots precludes any bestowal of control upon the protagonists themselves and makes them, in fact, powerless against misfortunes and lacking in control over their own lives.¹⁵⁵ This book, on the other hand,

¹⁴⁸ Jouanno (2000: 79–81) and Alexander (2008: 185). On the assumed code of good behaviour, see Gleason (1995: 55–81).

¹⁴⁹ See e.g. M. Jones (2012: 50–5).

¹⁵⁰ e.g. Chariton 1.1.14, 1.3.6, 1.11.2, 2.5.7 and Hld. 4.6.1, 6.9.4.

¹⁵¹ Balot (1998) and Scourfield (2003).

¹⁵² Chaereas' misadventures are the result of Aphrodite's anger (8.1.3) and in Xenophon's novel Habrocomes' love for Anthia is brought about by Eros, who is infuriated by Habrocomes' dismissive attitude towards him (1.2.1). On divine control in Chariton, see also Helms (1966: 118–26).

¹⁵³ See Woronoff (2001) on types of power relations in Heliodorus; Whitmarsh (2010: 330–2) on parental control (and its subversion) in Achilles Tatius; King (2012) on the heroine's agency in the same novel; Romm (2008: 113–4) on collisions between sexual and political power in the novels generally; Brioso Sánchez (1999a: 72–5) and de Carlos Villamarín (1990) on deceit (as a defence mechanism among other things); and Haynes (2001: 83, 2003: 50–1), Dowden (2009: 93–5), and Robiano (2002) on manipulatory female characters (heroines and others).

¹⁵⁴ See De Temmerman (forthcoming) for references.

¹⁵⁵ See Rohde (1914³: 296–7), Reardon (1982: 13), MacAlister (1996: 24–32), and Montiglio (2010: 32–3). The question of whether divine interventions and free will are reconcilable echoes, of course, a similar scholarly debate on Homeric epic. Nünlist (2009: 269) points to at least one instance in ancient literary criticism where Homeric characters are *not* necessarily considered to be mere puppets of the gods.

explores to what extent and how power *is* invested in the protagonists and how their changing ways of handling it may be read as a marker of rational development.¹⁵⁶ In a number of instances, the protagonists' (developing) ability to navigate their social environments will be shown to interact profoundly with a rational and conscious exploitation of rhetorical skills. This, in turn, tunes in with a long rhetorical and literary tradition that foregrounds psychological understanding of, and impact on, others as a crucial part of rhetorical aptness (see, for example, the rhetorical qualities of Homer's Odysseus, Thucydides' Nicias and Alcibiades, and Plato's and Aristotle's famous discussions of the impact of rhetoric on the psychology of audiences). Particularly in biography, self-control and effective psychological response to others are conceptualized as interdependent, parallel skills (where *paideia* is foregrounded as a driving force behind both and rhetoric regarded as a valuable touchstone of educational qualities).¹⁵⁷

Finally, my concern with protagonists' control over others is also bound up with yet another dimension of ancient thought on character: the idea that characters and their ethical choices are not isolated, autonomous, or self-standing entities, but embedded in the codes of a society and defined, at least partially, through their social interrelations. This is what Gill calls the 'participant' strand of ancient character (as opposed to the individualist strand of modern Kantian thinking, where the 'I' and its autonomous will are regarded as the centre of ethical thought, and individuality is often contrasted with society as a self-determining decision-maker).¹⁵⁸ Achilles in *Il.* 9, Sophocles' Ajax, and Euripides' Medea and Hippolytus, for example, are all distinct characters making ethical choices, but they are hardly autonomous or independent of society.¹⁵⁹ Rather, their characters interact with, and are part of, societal categories. A comparable dimension of character has been discussed by Foucault (1984, 1988) as one aspect of the concept of self-fashioning in society (the so-called 'technologies of the self'); in this or other forms, a 'participant' strand of character has been noticed as operative not only in tragedy¹⁶⁰ and epic¹⁶¹ but also in narrative literature from the imperial period

¹⁵⁶ An interesting starting point is Lowe (2000: 48–54), who singles out a character's power (his/her practical ability to achieve a given aim) as one of the variables that affect action in any narrative economy.

¹⁵⁷ Pelling (2000: 334, 339) and Duff (1999: 203). On similar concerns in Plato's dialogues and tragedy respectively, see Welliver (1977) and Foley (2001).

¹⁵⁸ Gill (1996: 1–18, 2006: 338–42). Woloch (2003) offers a compatible theoretical approach to character in narrative as part of, and defined by, society.

¹⁵⁹ On the figure of Hippolytus, for example, see Gill (1990b).

¹⁶⁰ See e.g. Michelini (1980) on character change induced by social environment and changes in social status in E. *Supp.* and Thumiger (2007: 107–61) on 'the relational self' in tragedy.

¹⁶¹ See e.g. Taplin (1990: 61–70) on political and social relationships as significant for characterization in the *Iliad*; Adkins (1970) on Homeric man vis-à-vis his fellows and the gods; Van Nortwick (1980) on the interaction of characters with other models of selfhood;

and mostly, but not exclusively, in Plutarch's *Lives*.¹⁶² Moreover, it has been observed that the dynamics of social interaction and exchange are singled out in biography as crucial elements in the process of self-formation and development.¹⁶³ As I will argue, the 'participant' strand is a constituent of character in the Greek novels too. To be sure, I am not the first to claim that the novels show an interest in relating people to their societies,¹⁶⁴ but I set out to explore these dynamics in the realm of character construction and in terms of interpersonal relationships in particular. I argue that the novels explore the 'participant' dimension of character by thematizing notions of interpersonal power and control and that they closely intertwine these dynamics with the notion of development.

0.4 TECHNIQUES OF CHARACTERIZATION: ANCIENT RHETORIC AND MODERN NARRATOLOGY

My central argument is that as we move through a narrative text we build up competence in reading character by building databases of associations and becoming aware of axes of differentiation—a process which ultimately leads us to an awareness of the totality of characteristics attributed to a given character. Given this argument, the methodology adopted is a close reading of characters as they play out throughout each individual novel. (Hence the structure of this book.) This close reading pays attention to various techniques of characterization and my approach to these techniques involves the merging of two broad areas of literary theory, one ancient and one modern: ancient rhetoric and (mainly, but not exclusively, structuralist) narratology.

Given the central importance of character in narrative literature, its construction is often closely related to, and continuously interacts with, plot and theme.¹⁶⁵ Indeed, the novel of Heliodorus, as we will see in Chapter 5, takes this relation to extreme complexities. Understandably, then, influential twentieth-century critical approaches conceptualize character first and foremost as a narrative *agent*, a function of plot types. This notion, which may

Zanker (1994) on competition as a cooperative device generating social cohesion; Ready (2011) on simile as a site of such competition; R. P. Martin (1989) on the agonistic verbal orientation of Homeric characters towards each other; and Nagy (1999: 42–58) on interpersonal conflict.

¹⁶² See Pelling (2002*b*: 324), Swain (1989*a*: 63–4), Frazier (1996: 141–68), and Tröster (2008: 28) on Plutarch and Bergen (1962: 5) on Tacitus.

¹⁶³ Larmour (2005: 42–3, 48, 51).

¹⁶⁴ See, most recently, Whitmarsh (2011: 32, 41, 140) on the individual as a social and ethical being in relation to communities.

¹⁶⁵ See e.g. Pelling (1990*b*: 261) generally, and Taplin (1990) and Gill (1990*a*: 7) on Greek tragedy.

ultimately be traced back to Aristotle's conception of characters as 'doers' (*hoi Prattontes*, *Po.* 1449^b31; *hoi drôntes*, 1448^a28),¹⁶⁶ is taken as a starting point by formalists¹⁶⁷ and further developed by structuralists.¹⁶⁸ Both groups reject 'mimetic' approaches to character: to them, character is not (or in any case not in the first place) a semantically invested concept but an element in a narrative syntax that carries forward the action of the plot.¹⁶⁹

My approach to characterization, on the other hand, belongs to a school that rejects such 'syntactical' views and pays attention to the semantic complexity of character. Most notably, Chatman (1978: 127) regards character as a paradigm of traits, a 'vertical assemblage intersecting the syntagmatic chain of events that comprise the plot'.¹⁷⁰ In his view, character consists of qualities that unfold before the reader in the course of a narrative, thus requiring the reader to engage in a continuous process of negotiation, revision, and redefinition: s/he acquires new information about the characters throughout his/her reading of the story and accommodates it (or not) against the set of traits established thus far. Thus, reader interpretation is situated within the bounds of narrative (a structuralist notion informing Chatman's view), but at the same time is an open concept, subject to speculation, enrichment, and revision.¹⁷¹

Although my reading of the Greek novels will primarily pay attention to the *construction* of character by narrators (and/or focalizers, as we will see below), I will also explore how the reader is encouraged to monitor such construction as it 'builds up' through the process of reading.¹⁷² My emphasis on the participatory role of the reader takes its cue from Chatman's 'open' view of reader interpretation as well as from theories of reader response and cognitive narratology, whose models of reader processing of narrative have been particularly influential in literary theory on character.¹⁷³ Here, the most

¹⁶⁶ See also Arist. *Po.* 1450^a15–16 and 1450^b3–4.

¹⁶⁷ See, most notably, Propp (1968: 25–65) and Tomashevski (1965: 296). Ruiz-Montero (1981a, 1988) analyses the Greek novels in Proppian terms.

¹⁶⁸ See Greimas (1967, 1970) on 'actants', Bremond (1966, 1973) on 'roles', and Todorov (1966) on characters as part of a narrative grammar. More detailed overviews in Chatman (1972: 57–68), Culler (1975: 230–8), Hochman (1985: 17–21), and Glaudes and Reuter (1998: 41–73).

¹⁶⁹ See Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 34–6) on 'doing' vs. 'being' and Porter Abbott (2002: 123–6) on 'action' vs. 'character'. Heidbrink (2010: 79–85) offers a discussion of scholarship on both positions.

¹⁷⁰ Full discussion is in Chatman (1972, 1978). Earlier occasional discussions of the semantic side of character are Walcutt (1966: 5, 17) and Harvey (1965: 11–29, 70–99). Detailed overviews can be found in Margolin (1990b) and Phelan (1984, 1987, 1989a: 1–23, 1989b).

¹⁷¹ Chatman (1978: 119, 126).

¹⁷² On narrative progression as fundamental for the construction of character, see Phelan (1987, 1989a: 1–23, 26–60, 165–88, 1989b).

¹⁷³ See Iser (1978: 108–18, 140–51), Eco (1979b: 40–2), Grabes (1978), and Schwarz (1989) on the role of the reader and characterization. Introductions to cognitive theory of narrative are Ibsch (1990) and Herman (2003).

comprehensive and influential work is that of Margolin (1983, 1986, 1989: 14–15, 2007: 76–9, 2010), who minutely maps different phases and forms of reader interpretation of textual cues.¹⁷⁴ In this book, I see such interpretation as necessarily complementary to the construction of character by narrators (and/or focalizers). With others, therefore, I regard the portrayal of character as an open, dynamic *process* involving a permanent interaction between (different forms of) attribution of characteristics by narrators (and/or focalizers) on the one hand ('characterization') and the continuous interpretation of such attributions by the reader, who patterns, repatterns, negotiates, and accommodates new information against the background of already acquired sets of data and assumptions.¹⁷⁵ Reader interpretation is inevitably complex: it is influenced by intratextual context (information about plot or character communicated to the reader at an earlier point in the story¹⁷⁶), intertextual material (a name such as Gnathon in Longus' novel, for example, is sufficient to evoke a whole series of characteristics of the well-known comic stock type) and genre-specific competences, which may trigger (and/or frustrate) expectations. (We are guided, for example, not only by actions and attributes of a given character, but also by formal expectations about the roles that need to be filled.¹⁷⁷) In addition, it depends on (and interacts with) different kinds of everyday knowledge intrinsically bound up with social, cultural, historical, and other frameworks in which the narrative is (supposed to have been) written and read.¹⁷⁸

Important as the mimetic dimension of character may be, then, scholars have rightly pointed out that the analysis of character should not be limited to this aspect.¹⁷⁹ A literary character, after all, is *not* an autonomous human being but a literary *construct* that is articulated by, depends on, and interacts with textual subtleties, narrative dynamics, and literary traditions. Character, in other words, is not only a matter of 'people' but also of 'words'.¹⁸⁰ As Barthes (1970: 184) has argued, from a critical point of view it is as wrong to

¹⁷⁴ Margolin has been particularly influential: see Koch (1991), Culpeper (2001), Schneider (2001), Jannidis (2004: 151–95, 229–35), Palmer (2004: 2, 12, 112–13, 176, 207), Eder (2008), and Vermeule (2010). See Culpeper (2001: 26–34) for theoretical premises.

¹⁷⁵ On this continuing process, see Jannidis (2004: 209, 2009: 15, 22–3) and Palmer (2004: 40). See O'Neill (1994: 49–50) and Heidbrink (2010: 88–9) on steps and 'codes' involved in psychologically processing character.

¹⁷⁶ See e.g. Palmer (2004: 42).

¹⁷⁷ See Culler (1975: 230–8) and, more generally, Jannidis (2009: 14) and Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider (2010: 42–5).

¹⁷⁸ See Culpeper (2001: 34–8, 57–70, 86–99) on 'prior knowledge' and 'memory stores'.

¹⁷⁹ Gass (1971: 34–54) is an example. An extreme form of opposition to mimetic readings is the post-structuralist denial of any semantic presence of character altogether (Cixous 1974, Hull 1992).

¹⁸⁰ On these two poles, see Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 31–4), Margolin (1989: 2–5, 2007), and Eder (2008: 373–425). See Heidbrink (2010: 72–9) for a discussion of scholarship informed by this duality.

suppress character as it is to take it off the page and turn it into a psychological being. He therefore suggests a third dimension complementing actantial and mimetic approaches: character is a combination of ‘semes’, and textual processes of construction underlie the final product. Character and discourse, in his famous *dictum*, are each other’s ‘accomplices’.

In Barthes’ wake, various scholars have emphasized that such textual processes are never neutral but always value-laden: they are intrinsically rhetorical¹⁸¹—a view that in itself is a specific instantiation of the broad tenet developed in modern literary theory that narrative is fruitfully approached as a rhetorical construct.¹⁸² This insight has not been lost on classical scholars¹⁸³ and is accommodated in this book, which pays attention to a whole array of textual techniques adopted by narrators to construct character.¹⁸⁴ I will refer to these as ‘techniques of characterization’. Paradoxically, however, although the relevance of form (*technique*) for meaning is a notion central to narratology,¹⁸⁵ the formal component of character has never been fully addressed even on a theoretical level.¹⁸⁶ To be sure, scholars have drawn attention to the importance of such variables as quantity, frequency, and distribution of techniques of characterization;¹⁸⁷ and it is fairly common, both in literary theory and in scholarship on ancient literature, to distinguish between two broad types of techniques of characterization: direct (or explicit) and indirect (or implicit) ones.¹⁸⁸ Whereas the former describe character *explicitly* through overt evaluation or the attribution of characteristics and epithets, the latter leave the characteristics themselves *implicit* and merely provide attributes from which they can (and should) be inferred.¹⁸⁹ Such indirect techniques depict characters by registering, for example, what they do,

¹⁸¹ See, most importantly, Phelan (1996: 27–42, 2007) and R. Walsh (2007: 151–62).

¹⁸² This tenet, to be sure, ultimately goes back to Aristotle, who uses the same discourse in *Po.* 1456^a37–1456^b1 and *Rh.* 1.2.3–6 to refer to tragedy and oratory respectively (on which see Gill 1984: 153–5). In modern literary theory, Booth (1961) is fundamental on how narrative *techniques* provide a privileged avenue to the examination of authorial control over readers. Analyses of narrative as broadly rhetorical are Phelan (1996) and Kearns (1999), to name just two.

¹⁸³ See e.g. Goldhill (1990: 108), Easterling (1990: 83–4), and Danove (2003: 16–20).

¹⁸⁴ Theoretical discussion of such techniques goes back to Aristotle’s (*Poetics*) interest in how character traits are represented. See, among others, Deslauriers (1990).

¹⁸⁵ On *form* as the central object of narratological research, see de Jong (2004b: xii, 1999: 10–11).

¹⁸⁶ Jannidis (2004: 5, 106) is explicit about this gap.

¹⁸⁷ See e.g. Jannidis (2004: 198–207, 219–21) on ‘Figureninformationen’.

¹⁸⁸ In literary theory, the distinction is old and widespread: Scherer (1888: 156–7), Brooks and Warren (1959: 169–70), Tomasjevski (1965: 293–4), Ewen (1971: ii), Margolin (1987: 113), Bal (2009: 131–2), Culpeper (2001: 167–229), O’Neill (1994: 49–50), Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 61), and Jannidis (2004: 199–201, 206–7, 209–11). In Classics, it is used by, among others, Vogt (2006: 264), Volt (2007: 24), and Duff (1999: 53–4).

¹⁸⁹ On such inference, see Jannidis (2004: 210–11, 214–19).

say, or think and have therefore been described as more covert than overt direct characterization.¹⁹⁰

Although this distinction makes sense of some sort, it should give us pause. It is important, of course, not to conceptualize the notion of reader inference as completely absent in direct and present only in indirect characterization. Indeed, it often depends on cultural, social, and other contexts as to whether a 'direct' verbal ascription is directly understood to refer to a certain disposition or not.¹⁹¹ We will see, in fact, that the Greek novelists seem to explore different interpretative strategies connected with different techniques of characterization.

A second and related reason for caution is that the distinction between direct and indirect characterization itself needs refinement. Some theoretical discussions inadvertently illustrate this need by lumping together as 'indirect' what are, in fact, qualitatively very different techniques of characterization.¹⁹² Indirect techniques may relate to character in two different ways, each of which coincides with one of two rhetorical tropes that have received considerable attention in twentieth-century literary theory as means of literary expression:¹⁹³ metaphor and metonymy. As is well known, the distinction between these tropes is as old as ancient rhetorical theory, where they are opposed to each other.¹⁹⁴ As the *brevitas* form of comparison, metaphor replaces a term (*verbum proprium*) by another term on the basis of similarity.¹⁹⁵ Metonymy, on the other hand, replaces a *verbum proprium* by a term contiguously related to it.¹⁹⁶ Applied to (indirect) characterization, this distinction entails that a characteristic may be replaced by an attribute relating to it either by contiguity (metonymical characterization) or similarity (analogy or contrast; metaphorical characterization).¹⁹⁷ In other words, in the case of metonymical characterization, a narrator *shows*¹⁹⁸ character (rather than

¹⁹⁰ Chatman (1978: 197–262, esp. 197–8, 1998: 907).

¹⁹¹ See Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider (2010: 33).

¹⁹² An example is O'Neill (1994: 50–1) on action, speech, appearance, and contrast as indirect techniques of characterization.

¹⁹³ Jakobson (1971) is foundational.

¹⁹⁴ See Cic. *Or.* 92 (*res consequens v. similitudo*) and H. Lausberg (1998: §§558–64, §§565–71).

¹⁹⁵ H. Lausberg (1998: §558, §846).

¹⁹⁶ See e.g. Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 4.32.43 (*ab rebus propinquis et finitimis*, 'from objects closely akin or associated').

¹⁹⁷ On this distinction, see Koch (1991: 128–35) and Herman and Vervaeck (2005: 68–70). In scholarship on ancient literature, Späth (2005) also connects metonymy and metaphor to character, but posits tropical relations between characters and the whole of a literary work (characters in historiography are said to interact contiguously with each other and the plot, whereas in biography they are paradigms of virtue and vice; see also Woloch 2003: 198–207 for similar views of (metonymical) positionality and (metaphorical) significance of character). Larmour 2000 comes closer to my approach when pointing to both metonymy (e.g. telling incidents) and metaphor (e.g. association) in ancient biography.

¹⁹⁸ On the traditional distinction between telling and showing, see Herman and Vervaeck (2005: 14–16).

depicting it explicitly) through actions,¹⁹⁹ speech (both content and style;²⁰⁰ directly, indirectly, or otherwise represented²⁰¹), appearance, emotions, and (social or other) setting.²⁰² Metaphorical characterization, on the other hand, means that a character (e.g. a novel heroine; *comparandum*) is aligned/compared/contrasted with someone or something (e.g. Artemis; *comparans*), either explicitly or implicitly, on the basis of a certain resemblance (e.g. chastity; *tertium comparationis*).

Even if deconstructivist and cognitive linguistic approaches have done much to demolish the opposition between metaphor and metonymy in other contexts,²⁰³ the distinction remains heuristically useful for analysis of characterization. In general it allows us to conceptualize techniques of characterization less confusingly than is often the case in literary theory.²⁰⁴ Moreover (and more specifically relevantly for my purposes), it underlies the conceptualization of such techniques in ancient rhetoric, which, as is well known, offers guidelines for the representation of character and life.²⁰⁵ (The very notion of *techniques* fits in with the importance of *form* in ancient literary theory more generally.²⁰⁶) Many of these are discussed in detail in rhetorical treatises more or less contemporary with the Greek novelists and arguably very much part of their literary and educational culture. Some of those treatises, such as the handbooks of preliminary rhetorical exercises, the *progymnasmata* of Ps.-Hermogenes (2nd cent.) or Aphthonius (4th–5th cent.), postdate at

¹⁹⁹ See Margolin (1986), Doležel (1998: 63), and Jannidis (2004: 221–9). Palmer (2004: 123–4), on the other hand, points to complications in the apparently straightforward relations between action and character.

²⁰⁰ On idiom as a technique of characterization in modern literary theory, see R. Walsh (2007: 94–8). On its importance in ancient Greek literature, see Worman (2002).

²⁰¹ Good starting points on speech representation are Jahn and Nünning (1994: 294–5), Fludernik (1998: 319–20), and Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 110–11).

²⁰² All these techniques are widely discussed in (mainly structuralist) narratology: Herman and Vervaeck (2005: 68–9), Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 61–7), Lotman (1977: 334–41), Raban (1968: 81–132), de Beus (1979), and Harvey (1965: 35).

²⁰³ See Fludernik, Freeman, and Freeman (1999: 386), Barcelona (2000: 8–15), and Steen (2005: 307–8) for overviews.

²⁰⁴ Examples of such confusion are Margolin (1983: 7–8), Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 60), and Jannidis (2009: 22), the last of whom allocates similar techniques to different categories and, conversely, places different techniques in the same category. Herman and Vervaeck (2005: 47), for their part, do distinguish between metonymical and metaphorical characterization but confuse the two when arguing that telephones on James Bond's desk characterize him *metaphorically* as an important man.

²⁰⁵ Quintilian (*Inst.* 5.10.23–31, 7.2.27–35), for example, lists a broad range of categories through which character can be approached: lineage (*genus*), nationality (*natio*), country (*patria*), sex (*sexus*), upbringing and training (*educatio, disciplina*), physique (*habitus corporis*), fortune (*fortuna*), mental essence (*animi natura*), pursuits (*studia*), claims (*quid adfectet quisque*), past actions and words (*ante acta dictaque*), emotion (*commotio*), plans (*consilia*), disposition of mind (*habitus animi*), and name (*nomen*). See also Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.30, Cic. *De Or.* 3.204 (*morum ac vitae imitatio*), and Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 63–5.

²⁰⁶ See e.g. Rutherford (1998: 31–6) on the importance of ‘techniques’ in ancient stylistics (for example, *methodos* defined as a ‘way of adapting a thought’).

least some of the novels but are likely to preserve much earlier material. The rhetorical style of the Greek novels has frequently been observed and is part of a wider tendency of ancient rhetoric to pervasively influence literary composition from at least the first century BC.²⁰⁷ The connection between rhetoric and Greek novels in particular is a long-established one. Little as we know about the authors of the novels, they have traditionally been depicted as rhetors or associated with rhetorical professions.²⁰⁸ In the thirteenth (or fourteenth) century, Joseph Rhacendytes describes the novels by Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus as ‘rhetorical stories’ (ταῖς ἀφηγηματικαῖς ῥητορικαῖς ἐννοίαις)²⁰⁹ and even if Rohde’s (1914³: 361–87) description of the novels as direct products of rhetorical classroom exercises has been contested,²¹⁰ the rhetorical nature of the novels themselves has never been doubted.²¹¹

Of course, I do not maintain that novelists use and readers decode direct and indirect techniques of characterization *because* (and only if) they have studied such techniques in rhetorical education. Like many rhetorical phenomena, direct as well as indirect characterization was universal in real life and literature alike long before it was described (and, later, prescribed) in rhetoric.²¹² Indeed, character markers such as action, speech, and behaviour played an important role in real social life as techniques of self-presentation as well as character inference.²¹³ What I *am* saying, rather, is that the ways in which narrators characterize characters is never neutral: why, for example,

²⁰⁷ See Kennedy (1999: 3) on this evolution from ‘primary’ to ‘secondary’ rhetoric (that is, from the adoption of rhetorical techniques in juridical, political, or epideictic speeches to their adoption in literature to serve the author’s (or a character’s) ideological and/or narrative agenda). On the increasing convergence of rhetoric, historiography, poetry, and even philosophy from the imperial age onwards, see also Cizek (1994: 237). Specifically on *progymnasmata* as building blocks in literary composition, see Cichocka (1992).

²⁰⁸ Chariton presents himself as a secretary (ὑπογραφεύς, 1.1.1) of a rhetor (see Rojas Álvarez 1998); Iamblichus became an accomplished rhetor according to a scholion in manuscript A of Phot. *Bibl.* (Stephens and Winkler 1995: 181); P. Hordeonius Lollianus, who might have been the author of the *Phoenicia* (Stephens and Winkler 1995: 316–18) is said by Philostratus (VS 526–7) to have been a sophist and the ‘first to have held the chair of rhetoric in Athens’; and the same Philostratus claims that a certain Celer was the author of an erotic work of fiction (*Araspes the Lover of Panthea*) as well as of technical works on rhetoric (τοῦ τεχνολογίου) while at the same time being ‘a good imperial secretary’ (προστάτης, VS 524).

²⁰⁹ Joseph Rhacendytes *Σύνοψις ῥητορικῆς* 521 Walz III.

²¹⁰ e.g. by Barwick (1928). See van Mal-Maeder (2007: 116 n. 3) for more references.

²¹¹ See Hock (1997b) and Ruiz-Montero (2003c: 67–8); the latter calls the novel and rhetoric ‘inseparable travelling companions . . . from the beginnings of the genre’. Another illustration of the highly rhetorical writing style of the novels is the fact that it is often not even clear whether some particular papyrus fragments were part of narrative fiction or a rhetorical exercise (Stephens and Winkler 1995: 462, 469–72 provide details).

²¹² Aristotle (*Po.* 1452^b34–1453^a12) is explicit about our spontaneous application of similar types of ethical standards to figures in poetry and real life alike (on which, see also Gill 1996: 99–100). On this intuition in literary theory, see Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider (2010: 7).

²¹³ See Worman (2002: 3–7) on such ‘performance theories’ by Bourdieu (1980) and Foucault (1984, 1988).

characterization through the registration of behavioural patterns rather than through the evocation of paradigms or, more overtly, explicit depiction or assessment? What are the implications for clarity, straightforwardness, and ambiguity and how do these tune in with narrators' rhetorical agendas? Moreover, techniques of characterization will repeatedly be shown in the ensuing chapters to be used *by characters themselves* as rhetorical tools aiming at, among others things, persuasion, performance, (self-)presentation, and (self-)positioning. On both levels, characterization *is* an intrinsically rhetorical activity and the tropical distinction between metonymical and metaphorical techniques of characterization is heuristically useful for examining it in detail. Moreover, to judge by the presence of these techniques in ancient rhetorical treatises (to which I turn now), the distinction is likely to have struck not just modern readers and writers but also ancient ones as a sensible conceptualization of potential indices of character.

This book, then, approaches rhetoric in novelistic characterization as pervasively interwoven with narrative texture and operative also *outside* the well-delineated set-pieces where it has long been recognized as playing an important role (such as *ecphrases*, courtroom and other speeches, and lamenting monologues).²¹⁴ This does not mean that this book offers an exhaustive analysis of the novelists' use of rhetoric to depict character; rather, it analyses narrative techniques of characterization which are intrinsically rhetorical. In the following paragraphs, for reasons of methodological consistency, I will show that these techniques also have a grounding in the most important literary theory of the time.

One such technique is name-giving. It is used frequently in the novels,²¹⁵ dealt with as a *locus* in ancient rhetorical invention and epideictic theories,²¹⁶ and singled out (together with one's *qualitas*) as one of the *significancia* of a person.²¹⁷ Conversely, the rhetorical trope of *antonomasia* (i.e. the substitution of a proper name by a word or paraphrase)²¹⁸ can be equally relevant to characterization (*αὐτὸν χαρακτηρίζειν πειρώμεθα*).²¹⁹ Ps.-Cicero (*Rh. ad Her.* 4.31.42) also highlights its characterizing potential by pointing to its ability to indicate (*demonstrat*) through the use of a kind of adventitious epithet

²¹⁴ See e.g. S. Bartsch (1989), Schwartz (1998, 2001), and Birchall (1996*b*). On scholarship on rhetoric in the novels generally, see Webb (2007) and Hock (1997*b*).

²¹⁵ See Hägg (1971*b*) on X. Eph. and M. Jones (2006) on Hld.

²¹⁶ See De Temmerman (2010*a*: 46–51) for references. On name-giving as a technique of characterization in modern literary theory, see e.g. Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider (2010: 37).

²¹⁷ Aug. *Rh.* 8, 141 Halm and Anon. *Excerpta rhetorica* 586 Halm (*persona constat duobus modis, nomine et qualitate*).

²¹⁸ See H. Lausberg (1998: §580) for an overview of ancient definitions of *antonomasia*, which is explicitly referred to as a trope by, among others, Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.29–30, Trypho *Trop.* 204 Sp. III, and Greg. Cor. *Trop.* 223 Sp. III.

²¹⁹ Anon. *Περὶ τρόπων* 213 Sp. III. On the characterizing potential of *antonomasia* in Statius' *Thebaid*, see Keith (2002: 388).

(*cognomine quodam extraneo*) what cannot be called by its proper name (*id quod suo nomine non potest appellari*).

Ancient rhetoricians also conceptualize the *direct* and *indirect* techniques of characterization that narratology deals with as well as the two above-mentioned subtypes of indirect characterization: metaphorical and metonymical. While they do not explicitly address the differences between these, they do discuss a number of specific techniques of characterization that can all be classified in these terms.²²⁰ Although the Greek term *kharaktêrismos* (χαρακτηρισμός) mostly refers to a description of physical features,²²¹ it is also well attested as referring to *psychic* (ὑποτύπωσις ιδιώματος ψυχῆς²²²) and *moral* characteristics (*aut vitia aut virtutes*²²³). The term refers not only to direct but also to indirect characterization, for example through speech²²⁴ or (re)action.²²⁵

Among the indirect techniques of characterization, I first discuss those that construct character metaphorically. This type of characterization is established by a comparison (σύγκρισις/*comparatio*; παραβολή/*parabole*) or a paradigm (παράδειγμα/*exemplum*): both align a *comparandum* with a *comparans* on the basis of a *tertium comparationis*. When distinguishing between comparisons and paradigms, I follow an ancient distinction: whereas objects and animals function as comparisons (παραβολή/*parabole*), mythological, historical, or literary persons/characters function as paradigms (παράδειγμα/*exemplum*).²²⁶

The rhetorical preoccupation with concepts conveying similarity and difference is part of (and at the same time stimulates) a long tradition that highlights the overall Greek tendency to evaluate by means of opposition and contrast.²²⁷ The use of comparison in *encomia* is recommended from Aristotle (*Rh.* 1.9.38–9) onwards and practised by Isocrates (*Euag.* 37–8) and

²²⁰ Nünlist (2009: 246, 248) observes a similar situation in scholia: these do not explicitly discuss (the distinction between explicit and) implicit characterization, but their interpretations reflect awareness of the phenomenon. On similar treatment of other literary concepts: Nünlist (2009: 23, 74, 129, 319).

²²¹ De Temmerman (2010a: 40–1) gives references.

²²² Plb. *Rh.* Περὶ σχηματισμοῦ 108 Sp. III. ²²³ Rutil. *Schem. lex.* 16.2 Halm.

²²⁴ See e.g. Plb. *Rh.* Περὶ σχηματισμοῦ 108–9 Sp. III on Patroclus' reference to Achilles' speech act (αἰτιώωτο) as an indication of character (δενδὸς ἀνὴρ) in *Il.* 11.653–4. See also Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 4.63 (*Nonne vobis videtur dicere*) on *notatio*, the common Latin counterpart of *kharaktêrismos*. See Cizek (1994: §1.1.1.3) on *notatio* as a description of inner characteristics (*hominis natura*).

²²⁵ Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 4.63–4. See also H. Lausberg (1998: §818) on *kharaktêrismos* as 'the characterization . . . of individuals by means of personal description as well as depiction of their behavior'.

²²⁶ See e.g. Aps. *Rh.* 372–3 Sp. I. Admittedly, this is only one of the occurring distinctions; see Minuc. Περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων 418–19 Sp. I for another definition and Demoen (1997: 139 n. 49) for details.

²²⁷ See Duff (1999: 243–5) on *synkrisis* as an important means of moral characterization and the Greek tendency to construct identity by means of a set of mutually exclusive polarities (Greek v. barbarian, male v. female, citizen v. alien, free v. slave).

Xenophon (Ages. 9.1–5), who praise their subjects through comparison with a past or contemporary Persian king.²²⁸ Throughout narrative literature, the creation of similarity and contrast is widely attested as a technique of characterization.²²⁹ It is not uncommon, for example, to find one specific difference between two persons highlighted through the construction of a set of similarities.²³⁰ One of the most omnipresent types of metaphorical characterization in the ancient Greek novels (and indeed, much of ancient narrative in general) is the association of characters with (or dissociation from) intertextual paradigms. As is well known, Greek novelists paint on a very broad intertextual canvas and instances of metaphorical characterization accordingly range from epic through lyric and drama to philosophy and historiography.²³¹ Sometimes paradigms are evoked explicitly, but sometimes the evocation is merely implicit. Chariton's heroine Callirhoe, for example, is repeatedly aligned with Penelope although this name never occurs in the novel (see Chapter 1). But metaphorical characterization can also function *intratextually*: characters are associated with (or dissociated from) other characters within the same work.²³² In Heliodorus' novel, for example, Theagenes' *andreia* is fleshed out by reference to Cnemon's *deilia*, and vice versa.²³³ The evil Arsace, for her part, is aligned with the heroine by her beauty, intelligence, and pride but at the same time emphatically depicted as her moral opposite in the realm of sexual ethics. Both fall in love at a ceremony (τὴν πανήγυριν, 3.1.1; τῆς . . . πανηγύρεως, 7.2.2) but react very differently. Such intratextual contrasts are not only illustrative of the Greek novels' tendency to work with broad moral contrasts between the protagonists and some of the antagonists, but may also be read as instantiations of the general insight that in any given narrative a protagonist is simultaneously dependent on and shaped by his/her place vis-à-vis other characters.²³⁴

With regard to metonymical characterization, ancient rhetorical theory distinguishes six relevant techniques: emotion, group membership, action, speech, appearance, and setting. I briefly present each in the paragraphs which follow.

²²⁸ Duff (1999: 243–4), McGing (1982: 15). See also Nünlist (2009: 253–4) on a predilection of ancient scholiasts for 'contrastive comparison' of moral character.

²²⁹ See Ash (1999: 85) on this technique in ancient literature in general, Pitcher (2007: 113) on 'juxtaposition' in historiography, Bergen (1962: 23) on characterization 'durch die Kontrastierung mit einer anderen' in Tacitus (on which, see also McGing 1982), Keith (2002) on Statius, Foulkes (1999) on comparison of individuals in Livy, Bucher-Isler (1972: 62–6) on 'Charakterisierung durch Vergleich' and 'Folienfiguren' in Plutarch, and Georgiadou (1992a) on contrast and similarity in the same author. On *exempla* as transmedial ethical devices more generally, see Roller (2004: 28–50).

²³⁰ See e.g. Duff (1999: 141) on a vital difference between Phocion and Cato Minor in Plutarch.

²³¹ Doulami (2011) is a recent starting point. On intertextuality and characterization in particular, see also Graverini (forthcoming a).

²³² See e.g. Panayotakis (2002: 104–5) on *Historia Apollonii regis Tyri*.

²³³ Lalanne (2006: 186) and M. Jones (2012: 128).

²³⁴ Woloch (2003: 17–18, 21–4, 37–124).

(1) *Emotions*: the traditional, psychological distinction in ancient ethics and rhetoric between *êthos* (permanent characteristics) and *pathos* (emotions, temporary feelings more easily influenced than *êthos*)²³⁵ informs discussions of *ethopoeia* or ‘characterization through speech’ in the *progymnasmata* (which distinguish ‘ethical’ from ‘pathetical’ *ethopoeia*)²³⁶ and is well attested in other rhetorical theory as well.²³⁷ That emotions are considered to be indications of character is also suggested by their presence as *loci a persona* in invention theory.²³⁸ Plutarch too, who praises Menander for paying attention to both *êthos* and *pathos* in characters,²³⁹ lists *pathos* unambiguously next to speech and action as a device for characterization.²⁴⁰

(2) The characterizing potential of one’s *group membership* is apparent from invention and epideictic theories, where *loci* are listed that can be roughly subdivided into three categories, each of which relates to membership of a particular group in society:²⁴¹ the macro-social group,²⁴² the micro-social group,²⁴³ and the educated-intellectual peer group.²⁴⁴ As one observes even from a superficial reading of the Greek novels, membership of each of these groups is consistently used to anchor characters in their social contexts. The protagonists are all of high birth (*eugeneia*) and belong to the educated-intellectual elite (*pepaideumenoi*).²⁴⁵ Furthermore, their belonging to a city or people is often a prominent marker of final homecoming and identity (and, indeed, elaborated into a long search for true identity in Heliodorus’ *Aethiopica*).²⁴⁶ And in general, social station is often (but not always) connected with moral evaluation.²⁴⁷

²³⁵ On *pathos*’ openness to external influences, see Arist. *Rh.* 2.1.8. Gill (1984) discusses the distinction in ancient literary criticism.

²³⁶ See e.g. Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 15.31–16.3 Sp. II and Aphth. *Prog.* 45.6–14 Sp. II. On *ethopoeia* in general, see pp. 37–9.

²³⁷ See e.g. Ps.-Cassiodorus *Liber de rhetorica* 501–3 Halm; Anonymus Seguerianus *Τέχνη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου* 6.1–7; and Iulius Victor *Ars rhetorica* 439 Halm. (Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.9 acknowledges the distinction, even though he rejects it in favour of another one.)

²³⁸ See, among others, Cic. *Inv.* 24–5, Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–8, Chirius Fortunatianus 2.1, 102–3 Halm.

²³⁹ Plu. *Comp. Aristoph. et Men.* 853d–e.

²⁴⁰ Plu. *Quaest. conv.* 715f and *De def. orac.* 432a.

²⁴¹ See De Temmerman (2010a: 24–8) for references to the primary texts.

²⁴² e.g. one’s fatherland (*πατρίς/patria*) and city (*πόλις/civitas*).

²⁴³ e.g. one’s noble birth (*εὐγένεια*), social station (*τύχη/fortuna*), parents (*γονεῖς, πατέρες/parentes*), and wealth (*πλοῦτος, κτήματα/divitiae, pecunia*).

²⁴⁴ e.g. one’s *paideia* (*παιδεία*) and education (*ἀγωγή/educatio*).

²⁴⁵ See e.g. Létoublon (1993: 119–24).

²⁴⁶ See Whitmarsh (2011: 25–135) on how these, and other, markers interact with identity.

²⁴⁷ See e.g. Chariton’s characterization of the evil and socially marginal Theron (a brigand) and Artaxates (a slave) in opposition to the high-born and morally superior Callirhoe (see §1.3.1). A counter-example is, of course, the socially elevated but (barbarian and) morally inferior Arsace. On connections between morality and social standing in other ancient narratives, see for example Braun (2004) (on Xenophon of Athens).

(3) It was generally assumed in antiquity that character could best be understood by examining one's *actions* (*praxeis*). Ethical theory presents *êthos* as deductible from observable *praxis*²⁴⁸ and identifies causal relations between an agent and his/her actions as relevant to moral responsibility.²⁴⁹ Aristotle is explicit that in tragedy the actions of characters (*τινῶν πραττόντων . . . πράξεις . . . τοὺς πρᾶττοντας*) indicate qualities (*ποιοὺς τινὰς*) regarding character (*τὸ ἦθος*) and thought (*τὴν διάνοιαν*).²⁵⁰ Of course, examples of this type of characterization in narrative literature are legion²⁵¹ and so is discussion in ancient rhetoric. Aristotle (*Rh.* 2.6) explains several actions as originating in the character of the agent, *progymnasmata* discuss at length the characterizing potential of anecdotes²⁵² (widely used in biography but much less in the novels), Theon simply equates comparing persons (*τῶν προσώπων*) with comparing their actions (*τὰς πράξεις*),²⁵³ and (almost all) authors in invention and *encomium* theories alike single out a person's actions as points of attention.²⁵⁴

(4) The notion that *speech* indicates character is also very common in rhetorical handbooks.²⁵⁵ Arguably the most important concept is *ethopoeia* (*ἠθοποιία*). In its broadest sense, the term refers to the construction (*ποιία*) of *êthos* in general, which is loosely meant to include both direct and indirect characterization through action or speech.²⁵⁶ But in most cases, the notion of characterization *through speech* is central: the term can refer, for example, to a rhetorical thought figure (*σχῆμα τῆς διανοίας/figura sententiae*) in which the orator/author represents another person's words in direct speech,²⁵⁷ to an orator's ability to depict *himself* in his speech as good and trustworthy (a technique admirably mastered by Lysias, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus²⁵⁸), and, perhaps most famously, to a *progymnasma* that trains students to speak 'in the character' of a (possibly fictitious)²⁵⁹ person. The *progymnasmata*

²⁴⁸ See e.g. Plu. *De virt. mor.* 443c–d (on which, see D. A. Russell 1966b: 144–7 and Halliwell 1990: 32–3, 46–7).

²⁴⁹ Meyer (1993).

²⁵⁰ Arist. *Po.* 1449^b35–1450^a7 and 1454^a17–19.

²⁵¹ X. *Ages.* 1.6a foregrounds typifying deeds (*erga*) as the best way to gain insight into character (*tropoi*) and includes such deeds in his catalogue of heroic characteristics; Isoc. *Euag.* 65 also discusses *praxeis* as fundamental to characterization. Other examples can be found in Halliwell (1990) and Duff (1999: 15).

²⁵² See De Temmerman (2010a: 34, 37–8).

²⁵³ Theon *Prog.* 112.23–6 Sp. II.

²⁵⁴ De Temmerman (2010a: 46–51) gives the references.

²⁵⁵ See e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 11.1.30.

²⁵⁶ See e.g. Ps.-Cicero *Rh. ad Her.* 5 and Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.58 (*et in factis et in dictis*). For further discussion of definitions of the term, see Ventrella (2005: 179–212) and De Temmerman (2010a: 34–6).

²⁵⁷ See, among others, Alex. *Fig.* 21 Sp. III, Zonae. *Fig.* 162 Sp. III, and Anon. *Περὶ τῶν σχημάτων τοῦ λόγου* 177 Sp. III.

²⁵⁸ D. H. Lys. 8.2. See also Hagen (1966: 37–9). Similar judgements about Lysias in Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.51 and Rutil. *Schem. lex.* 12.5–14 Halm.

²⁵⁹ See Aphth. *Prog.* 44.24 Sp. II (*πλαττομένη . . . τὸ ἦθος*).

authors invariably mention characterization in their definitions of this exercise²⁶⁰ and some (Latin) authors specifically focus on the importance of *ethopoeia* for moral characterization.²⁶¹ In ancient narrative literature, *ethopoeia* is a frequently used literary tool.²⁶² In the Greek novels, the presence of *progymnasmata* in general and *ethopoeia* in particular has long been observed.²⁶³ However, although the link between *ethopoeia* and characterization is etymologically self-evident, scholars have not always been receptive to it. Rohde's view that *ethopoeia* in the novels is concerned with 'ganz andere Dinge als die Charakterzeichnung'²⁶⁴ has been influential, not only in his own day²⁶⁵ but also in more recent times, when the critical re-evaluation of these texts was already well under way.²⁶⁶ Indeed, some contributions even depict *ethopoeia* as an *obstacle* to character depiction and see rhetorical performance as mere 'display'.²⁶⁷ For ancient writers and readers alike, however, *ethopoeia* precluding characterization would have been a contradiction in terms. Since the essence of rhetoric is precisely the 'display' of *êthos*, such conceptual exclusiveness is at odds with the very essence of ancient rhetorical conception. Fortunately, this insight has not been lost on recent scholarship on the novels, which in a number of cases does examine *ethopoeia* as a marker of character (in some cases even of the heroes).²⁶⁸

Ancient rhetoric discusses not just *ethopoeia*, but also maxims (or *gnômai*; γνώμη/*sententia*) as tools of moral characterization—and in some novels, they are so used.²⁶⁹ As Aristotle suggests, the use of *gnômai* makes speech *êthikos*

²⁶⁰ Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 15.7 Sp. II, Aphth. *Prog.* 44.21 Sp. II (μίμησις ἥθους), Nicol. *Prog.* 64.1–3 Felten (λόγος . . . ἥθος ἢ πάθος ἐμφαίνων ἢ καὶ συναμφοτέρα), Prisc. *Praex.* 45.8 Passalacqua (*imitatio sermonis ad mores*), and Emporius *De ethopoeia, de loco communi, de demonstrativa et de deliberativa materia* 561–2 Halm.

²⁶¹ See e.g. Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 4.65 (*sermones ad dignitatem adcommodatos*), Aquila Romanus 24.1–2 Halm (*vel ad improbitatem . . . vel ad dignitatem*), and Ps.-Rufinianus *De schem. dian.* 62.23–5 Halm (*non sine reprehensione*).

²⁶² See e.g. Tompkins (1972, 1993) on Thucydides and Georgiadou (1992b: 4242) on Plutarch. In some accounts, (public) speeches are presented as a sub-division of action: D. A. Russell (1966b: 144).

²⁶³ Hock (1997b: 455–9) gives an overview. Often, research into this aspect of novelistic writing is descriptive rather than interpretative or analytic: G. Anderson (1993: 156–8, 163) and Ruiz-Montero (1991) are examples.

²⁶⁴ Rohde (1914³: 511).

²⁶⁵ See e.g. Schwartz (1896: 145) on novelistic characters as 'deklamierende Puppen' whose rhetorical activity does not contribute to characterization.

²⁶⁶ Ferrini (1988, 1990: 63, 1991), Paulsen (1992: 57), and Doulamis (2002: 156) tantalizingly overlook characterization as a function of lamenting monologues in the novels. Berranger-Auserve's (2006: 22–3) overview of functions of direct speech in Xenophon does not mention characterization either.

²⁶⁷ See e.g. Perry (1930: 115), G. Anderson (1984: 69), Brioso Sánchez (1999b), and Ferrini (1987–8: 151–2).

²⁶⁸ The most notable example is van Mal-Maeder (2007: 128–45). See also Bowie on speech as an indication of emotions (1999: 48–9) as well as character (2006: 35–7).

²⁶⁹ Morales (2000: 77–88) and Whitmarsh (2003: 193).

because it reveals the moral disposition (*προαίρεσις*) of the speaker.²⁷⁰ Likewise, Nicolaus emphasizes the moral dimension of gnomic utterance when claiming that ‘a maxim always teaches either the choice of good or avoidance of evil’ (ἡ μὲν γνώμη πάντως ἢ αἴρεσιν ἀγαθοῦ ἢ φυγὴν κακοῦ εἰσηγείται).²⁷¹ Quintilian equally acknowledges the ‘ethical’ potential of maxims when arguing that they are capable of commending a speaker to an audience.²⁷²

(5) That *physical appearance* can act as an indication of character is the central premise of ancient physiognomy, which provides a set of instruments geared towards such inference.²⁷³ In the Greek novels, there are almost no invariable physical characteristics mentioned at all,²⁷⁴ but *variable* physical features (body language) are relevant in many instances. Although ps.-Aristotle’s *Physiognomonica*, the first extant treatise on physiognomy (3rd cent. BC), states that only invariable physical features constitute the object of physiognomy *stricto sensu*,²⁷⁵ it nevertheless lists instances of body language as possible objects of physiognomic inference (e.g. movements (τῶν κινήσεων) and the voice (τῆς φωνῆς)).²⁷⁶ Moreover, he observes that, even if variable features are not direct indications of *êthos*, they are indications of one’s temporary (μὴ μένοντος) condition or *pathos*, a condition that can, in turn, be indicative of *êthos*. He defines blushing, for example, as an indication of shame (τὸ πάθος . . . τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις) and then points out that this feature, if recurrent (‘blushing often’), is an indication of shyness (that is, the permanent characteristic of inclination towards shame: αἰσχυνητοί).²⁷⁷ And finally, the importance of variable physical features is also suggested by the social relevance of physiognomic skills as powerful tools of strategic self-presentation and self-performance.²⁷⁸ Physiognomy, like rhetoric, played a role in a larger strategy of deciphering a man’s behaviour on the one hand, and of moulding effectively one’s own conduct and reactions on the other.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁰ Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.16. As is pointed out by Woerther (2005: 22–3), the term ἡθικός in this instance refers to what is capable of *representing êthos*.

²⁷¹ Nicol. *Prog.* 25.13–14 Felten.

²⁷² Quint. *Inst.* 8.5.32 (*sententia . . . dicentem commendat*).

²⁷³ See Boys-Stones (2007) and Elsner (2007) for introductions. All extant physiognomic treatises are edited by Förster (1893) (and some more recently in Swain 2007).

²⁷⁴ The detail of the ‘squashed nose’ of Daphnis’ father in Longus (σφιγνῶ, 3.32.1) is one of the few exceptions. The contrast between this feature and Daphnis’ own beauty is connected with notions of nobility and rusticity.

²⁷⁵ Ps.-Arist. *Phgn.* 806^a7–12.

²⁷⁶ Ps.-Arist. *Phgn.* 806^a26–33. See also Porph. *VP* 13 on physiognomy (φυσιογνωμονήσαι) as the study of movements of the body (τὰς κινήσεις καὶ τὰς ἡρεμίας τοῦ σώματος). On facial expression as one of Homer’s favourite methods of characterization, see Nünlist (2009: 254).

²⁷⁷ Ps.-Arist. *Phgn.* 812^a30–3.

²⁷⁸ See Gleason (1990: 389, 1995: 55) on the society of the imperial period as a ‘face-to-face society’.

²⁷⁹ See e.g. Aulus Gellius (1.9), who emphasizes the importance of body language (*de oris et vultus ingenio deque totius corporis filo atque habitu*) when relating how Pythagoras submitted his pupils to physiognomic screening (ἐφυσιογνωμόνει).

Unsurprisingly, physical appearance is also discussed in the *progymnasmata*, where authors explicitly include persons (πρόσωπα) as possible objects of description (*ecphrasis*).²⁸⁰ In narrative literature, the notion that character can be depicted through appearance is often exploited in an ambiguous way. Of course, there are examples of physical appearance straightforwardly reflecting character, such as Homer's famous and detailed depiction of Thersites' physical ugliness (*Il.* 216–19) and concomitant rhetorical, social, and moral inferiority (*Il.* 2.211–69).²⁸¹ Xenophon of Ephesus' depiction of Cyno, who combines uncontrollable passion with hideous ugliness (3.12), is another example. But in other cases, the very notion of straightforward reflection of external appearance in internal characteristics is made problematic. Hesiod, for example, implies the possibility of physical appearance *masking* the mind (*Op.* 714). Appearance and body language, in other words, can be used and moulded consciously by characters as a tool of self-presentation²⁸²—a notion, as we will see, explored to some extent in the novels.

(6) The importance of *setting* for characterization is only touched upon occasionally in ancient rhetorical theory, even though place (τόπος) is, like character (πρόσωπον), conceptualized as one of the basic components of narrative.²⁸³ A good example of such occasional attention is found in Demetrius' *De elocutione* (130), where it is suggested that the Cyclops' terrible (δεινόν) character is better illustrated by his words than by action (the eating of Odysseus' companions) or setting (the door and the stick depicted in the Homeric passage). While highlighting the importance of speech, Demetrius does acknowledge the fact that setting, like action, is at least a potentially significant indication of character, even if in this case the characterizing potential of speech may be higher. In actual ancient literary practice, characterization through setting occurs more frequently (albeit not nearly as often as, say, characterization through action or speech).²⁸⁴ In the *Iliad*, for example,

²⁸⁰ See Theon *Prog.* 118.8–9 Sp. II, Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 16.12–14 Sp. II, and Aphth. *Prog.* 46.16–17 Sp. II. In fact, ancient rhetoric harbours a broad range of more or less synonymous terms referring to the vivid description of persons (or objects). See Evans (1935: 43–5), H. Lausberg (1998: §810) and De Temmerman (2010a: 40–1) for details.

²⁸¹ For other examples, see M. C. Parsons (2006; with 31–4 briefly on Apuleius).

²⁸² See also Hyperides fr. 196, on which, see Halliwell (1990: 44). See also Wardman (1967) on the relation between appearance and character allowing for creative interpretation and Worman (2002: 1–16) on self-presentation through visible style and on the performative nature of ancient setting.

²⁸³ Theon *Prog.* 78.16–20 Sp. II. Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.52 provides guidelines for the credible representation of places (*loca*). See also H. Lausberg (1998: §328).

²⁸⁴ See e.g. M. H. Shaw (1975) and Foley (1982) on the spaces of *oikos* and *polis* as important ideological (and gendered) markers of virtue in 5th-cent. drama. On characterization as one of the functions of space in Greek narrative, see most of the contributions to de Jong (2012). On the Greek novels in particular, see De Temmerman (2012a: 497–500, 2012b: 512–15, 2012c: 533–4) and Morgan (2012a: 545–6, 2012b: 568–71).

Paris is often depicted in the women's quarters rather than on the battlefield, which documents his predilection for female company and his problematic *êthos* as a warrior. Achilles Tatius, as we will see, like Demetrius, in one passage evokes precisely the Cyclops' cave for reasons of characterization. And in Chariton's novel, setting is explicitly addressed by narrators and characters alike as a technique of characterization. The people chosen by Theron to rob Callirhoe's tomb, for example, are depicted in harbours (1.7.1, 3; 3.4.11) and spend their time in brothels and taverns (1.7.3). The narrator is explicit that their presence in these environments makes them 'an army fit for such a commander' (1.7.3).

But it is not only through metonymy that setting documents character; in some instances, it rather characterizes through similarity. In Longus' novel, for example, the eroticization of landscape often thematically mirrors the stage of affective development that the protagonists have reached.²⁸⁵ This example also illustrates the different interpretative strategies required by metonymical and metaphorical characterization. Whereas setting as a metonymical technique of characterization implies (and appeals to readers' awareness of) a causal relationship that is also operative in real-life inference (Paris, for example, prefers to be in a certain place *because of* his character), a metaphorical technique implies no such real-life relationship (Daphnis and Chloe cannot be said to go to a certain place *because* they reach a new stage in their affective development) but rather functions exclusively at the level of *literary* construction. I return to the connection between metaphorical characterization and literariness in Chapter 2.

The various techniques of characterization, then, theorized in ancient rhetorical treatises and/or literary praxis can be summarized as follows:

1. Name-giving and *antonomasia*
2. Direct characterization (*χαρακτηρισμός*)
3. Indirect characterization
 - 3.1 Metaphorical characterization: comparison (*σύγκρισις*, *παραβολή*) and paradigm (*παράδειγμα*)
 - 3.2 Metonymical characterization: emotions (*πάθη*), membership of a specific group (macro-social, micro-social, educative-intellectual), actions (*πράξεις*), speech (*ῥηθοποιία*, *γνώμη*), and appearance (guidelines from physiognomy: invariable and variable physical characteristics).
 - 3.3 Setting (either metonymically or metaphorically relevant)

²⁸⁵ Morgan (2012a: 545–6). See Koch (1991: 127, 261) for a theoretical discussion on setting and character.

The question of *who* uses these techniques in narrative—the (primary) narrator or a character—brings us back to narratology.²⁸⁶ Bal's (2009: 6–9, 145–65) distinction between narrator(s) and focalizer(s) is useful here. That a 'narrating I' in a narrative is to be referred to as a *narrator* (as distinct from an author) is a basic narratological tenet that has become generally accepted. The main idea behind Bal's view of focalization is that not only narrators but also focalizers play a crucial role in the way in which any story is told.²⁸⁷ When reading a narrative text, the reader comes across different characters, whose actions constitute a series of events (whose chronological order, the *fabula*, can be abstracted). In any given *story*, these events are not presented straightforwardly: they are interpreted, ordered, and/or ideologically coloured. This interpretative activity resides, in Bal's view, with a focalizer, who *can* be identical to the narrator but can also be a character in the story.²⁸⁸ Just as a narrator can have his characters narrate (character text), he can also have them focalize (without necessarily ceding speech to them): he can narrate how they see/feel/think about/hear/interpret/understand certain events or other characters (personal focalization).²⁸⁹ This conceptualization of focalization is instrumental in approaching characterization.²⁹⁰ It allows us to identify *who characterizes* (the/a narrator, a speaking character, or a focalizing character) and, consequently, to examine whether perspectives of different characterizing subjects coincide or diverge. But focalization itself can also function as a metonymical technique characterizing the focalizer: the way in which someone sees or interprets events or other persons is often contiguously related to his/her character just as his/her actions or words are.²⁹¹

The relevance of these questions and distinctions is illustrated by Chariton's construction of what at first sight seems to be one of the most unproblematic characteristics in the genre and is indeed a central hallmark of Greek novelistic heroism: the protagonists' *eugeneia*. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the narrator presents this characteristic, together with their beauty, as a marker of association between them: the combination of both results in the arousal of their mutual

²⁸⁶ On ancient critics' comparable interest in whether a person is characterized by the self or by others, see Nünlist (2009: 247–9). On altero-characterization v. self-characterization in modern literary theory, see Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider (2010: 33).

²⁸⁷ The term focalization was coined by Genette (1969: 191; see esp. 1972: 206–11) to generally denote narratorial, personal, or neutral perspectives ('who sees', as distinct from 'who tells'). The body of literature on this concept is vast: Jahn (2007: 96–102), Niederhoff (2009), O'Neill (1994: 85–95), and Schmid (2010: 89–99) are useful starting points.

²⁸⁸ See also de Jong (2004a: 31–6) on the focalizer as an interpreter.

²⁸⁹ On such focalization in Chariton's novel, Schenkeveld (1993) offers insightful observations.

²⁹⁰ See also Palmer (2004: 51–2) on the usefulness of Bal's conception of focalization within the context of fictional minds.

²⁹¹ See Margolin (2007: 73) and, in a different context, Gill's (1990a: 4) emphasis on the importance of the 'adoption of perspective'.

love at first sight (1.1.6).²⁹² To similar effect, the protagonists themselves conceptualize Chaereas' *eugeneia* in particular as a marker of Greekness that dissociates him from non-Greek characters who cross his path.²⁹³ The attribution of *eugeneia* to Callirhoe, on the other hand, foregrounds related, yet different, rhetorical dynamics. When Callirhoe explicitly addresses her own *eugeneia*, the concept again generates contrast, but this time between two time periods rather than between two characters. In a series of self-reflexive, ambiguous instances, she characterizes herself explicitly as *eugenês* precisely when she is a slave or a prisoner—when, that is, she is *deprived* of the freedom and high social status intrinsically connected with *eugeneia* (1.11.3, 1.14.9–10, 2.5.12). Such self-characterization works on two levels. At the level of Callirhoe's own perception (the so-called argument function), the circumstances (captivity, slavery) in which she repeatedly addresses her original status as a free woman indicate that she evaluates her present vis-à-vis her former social position.²⁹⁴ For the reader, on the other hand (at the level of the so-called key-function),²⁹⁵ there is ambiguity involved in that, even if Callirhoe has become a slave, her very laments about past *eugeneia* indicate, precisely, that she still is *eugenês*. To be sure, the contrast between present and past is widespread in novelistic lamentations²⁹⁶ and reminiscent of a progymnasmatic guideline that foregrounds the contrast between present misfortunes (*χαλεπά*) and former happiness (*πολλῆς εὐδαιμονίας*) as a typical element of *ethopoeia*.²⁹⁷ But in Callirhoe's case, the duality ambiguously reworks the common notion that *ethopoeiae* should represent the speaker's social origin or *tychê*:²⁹⁸ while consciously lamenting her *new* social station, she, in fact, testifies to the mental continuation of her original one. Moreover, Callirhoe's reversal of social status (rich to poor, free to enslaved) and the particularly contrastive way in which it is evoked also recall tragedy, where it is a well-known theme (*peripeteia*) often

²⁹² Even if the passage is partly illegible (*κάλλους <...>γενεῖ συνελθόντος*), the connection is recognizable (see also Cobet 1842, who reads <τῇ εὐ>γενεῖ<α>). This novelistic *topos* frequently resurfaces in Chariton's novel (Schmeling 2005: 41, Manuwald 2000: 104–5).

²⁹³ Callirhoe, for example, evokes her *eugeneia* in a contrast between Syracusans (Chaereas) and Persians (Artaxerxes) (6.7.10) and Chaereas makes reference to it in order to set himself and his soldiers apart from other people in general and their Phoenician enemies in particular (*διαφέρειν*, 7.3.8; *διαφέρουσιν*, 7.3.10).

²⁹⁴ Even when she is no longer a slave but Dionysius' legitimate wife, she keeps referring repeatedly to the misfortune of having been deprived of her freedom: *πέπραμαι, δεδούλευκα*, 5.5.2.

²⁹⁵ On this distinction between possible meanings of a literary device or phenomenon for the readers and those for a/the character(s) in the story, see Andersen (1987: 1–13). It is applied to embedded narratives in Homer by de Jong (1997a).

²⁹⁶ See Birchall (1996b: 10–11), Fusillo (1989: 38), and Doulamis (2002: 153).

²⁹⁷ Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 16.4–7 Sp. II, where this contrast goes together with that between present misfortunes and even worse conditions in the future (*πολλῶ δεινότερα*).

²⁹⁸ See e.g. Theon *Prog.* 116.2–3 Sp. II (*ἕτεροι λόγοι ἀρμόττοιεν ἄν... διὰ τύχην δούλω καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ*).

vocalized in lamentations similarly polarizing present and past (and often future).²⁹⁹ Her repeated and conscious rehearsal of her own noble descent when her social status has deteriorated casts her as a tragic heroine conceptualizing her own life as the object of a dynamic process of degenerative change and reversal.³⁰⁰

When *other* characters address Callirhoe's *eugeneia*, finally, the rhetorical dynamics are again different. She is referred to particularly often with one specific *antonomasia* ('Hermocrates' daughter') by *male* characters in contexts that bear upon their *own* social or political positions.³⁰¹ Chaereas, for example, uses this *antonomasia* to undermine Dionysius' right to Callirhoe (5.8.5) and, later, to gain access to the Egyptian army (7.2.3). His father (and Hermocrates' political opponent) Ariston, for his part, views Callirhoe's descent as jeopardizing any possible relationship with his son (1.1.9). Dionysius considers Callirhoe's high birth an argument for marrying her in public (3.2.7–8) and Artaxerxes argues that his responsibility for Callirhoe is connected with international politics (5.8.8). In all these cases, the *antonomasia* functions as an indirect address of Callirhoe's *eugeneia* by male characters who see her ancestry as an element in the moulding or reinforcing of their own social or political position. As this brief overview indicates, then, even for an omnipresent and seemingly unproblematic characteristic such as *eugeneia*, it is worthwhile paying attention to its construction and narratological distribution in the narrative. Characters are not simply delineated by one voice; they are multifaceted figures, constructed by an interplay of different voices, each of them informed by a specific rhetorical agenda.

To conclude this introduction, a few words about unity and diversity in the following chapters. *Eugeneia* is just one of the topical characteristics that determine the approach adopted. Physical beauty and *paideia* too feature frequently as important markers of novel protagonists. And *sôphrosynê*, another important part of the protagonists' characterization because of the erotic nature of these stories, will of course also play an important role in this book. Other characteristics that provide unity throughout the different chapters are the protagonists' ability successfully to position themselves in their social environments and deal with external threats through rational skills, their rhetorical qualities, and (often changing) ability to control themselves and establish and maintain control over others. On the other hand, important

²⁹⁹ See e.g. E. *El.* 207–9, where Electra contrasts her present poverty away from home with her earlier presence in her father's house; and E. *Tr.* 98–152, 466–510 and 1156–206, where Hecuba in her lamentations similarly thematizes a contrast between her earlier happiness as queen of Troy and her present (and possible future) misery as a slave. See also Whitmarsh (2011: 215–16) on the latter parallel.

³⁰⁰ See also Galaz (2000) on feminine figures as tragic characters (in Plutarch).

³⁰¹ I do not take into account the passages where Hermocrates himself refers to Callirhoe as 'my daughter' (1.5.6 and 3.4.16 (in character text), 8.6.8 and 8.7.2 (in personal focalization)).

differences between individual novels account for a good deal of diversity in the different chapters. As this book will demonstrate, the extant novels are far from homogeneous in the ways they deal with topical or other character strands. It is not just that some novels more than others invert or question the topical notions of *eugeneia*, *paideia*, and *sôphrosynê*, or complicate them, for example through the construction of conflicting views among different characters or even the two protagonists; it is also that the techniques adopted by different novelists are sometimes radically different. Consequently, there is a large amount of discussion of intertextual characterization in the chapters on Chariton and Heliodorus, for example, but not in that on Xenophon of Ephesus, whose narrative technique, I argue, avoids intertextual practice of the kind found in Chariton and Heliodorus and is built around a number of *other* techniques. In the chapter on Achilles Tatius, attention is paid to characteristics that are also discussed in other chapters but this novel's homodiegetic narrative technique along with its conscious exploration of the issue of fictionalization has inevitably led much of the discussion to centre around Clitophon's self-presentation, his depiction of Leucippe, and the question of how these activities intersect with issues of credibility, authority, fictionalization, and narratorial (un)reliability. Similarly, the notably labyrinthine narrative structure of Heliodorus' novel will be shown to affect character constructions in a number of ways found only in this novel. This book, in other words, aims to show that an approach that is sensitive, not just to the similarities between individual novels, but also to their differences and unique narrative strategies, is indispensable for unearthing the complexity behind constructions of character in these texts.

Chariton

1.1 INTRODUCING ‘IDEAL’ CHARACTER

Chariton’s *Callirhoe* has traditionally been regarded as one of the most interesting ancient Greek novels in terms of psychologically lifelike characterization.¹ The protagonists’ introduction is emblematic. Introductions of characters were recognized by ancient writers and critics alike as important *loci* for the insertion, often implicit, of material that becomes functional later in the narrative.² Chariton’s introduction does precisely this. The topical, micro-social anchoring of the protagonists in their noble families (*eugeneia*) and the equally topical emphasis on physical beauty take centre stage from the first lines of the novel and immediately construct the protagonists in a conspicuously symmetrical way.³ The notion of symmetry is further highlighted by the image of Eros making ‘a yoke of his own devising’ (ζεύγος ἴδιον, 1.1.3) to unite the love couple and by the rhetorical figure of *chiasmus* that symmetrically organizes *eugeneia* and beauty around the image of the yoke (Callirhoe’s *eugeneia*—Callirhoe’s beauty—ζεύγος ἴδιον—Chaereas’ beauty—Chaereas’ *eugeneia*).

But there are cracks in the symmetry. As is well known, the novel’s narrative structure, Callirhoe’s double marriage, the sheer number of pages devoted to her whereabouts, and the presumed title of the novel (*Callirhoe*) have been identified as elements constructing an asymmetrical relationship between the protagonists.⁴ The topical markers in their introduction anticipate this

¹ As early as Dunlop (1814: 59), Dionysius is singled out as a psychologically interesting figure. On this character and others in Chariton, see also Blake (1934: 288), Helms (1966: 127–8), Perry (1967: 99), Schmeling (1974: 157–8), Billault (1981a: 206), and Montiglio (2010: 26–34).

² See e.g. Nünlist (2009: 51–7) on ancient scholiasts’ discussions of character introduction, Papamichael (1976: 31) on ‘Grundzüge’ of a character in prologues to comedies and Duff (1999: 163) on the establishment of important themes in an introductory context in Plutarch’s *Lives*. On novelistic character introduction in particular, see Hägg (1972: 547–56) and Effe (1997).

³ See Fusillo (1989: 186–96) and Konstan (1994: 7, 14–59).

⁴ Fusillo (1989: 191–3) and Konstan (1994: 73–9).

asymmetry: Chaereas' father, for example, is only the *second* citizen of Syracuse, after Callirhoe's father (1.1.3). This social inequality resurfaces when he judges it impossible that Callirhoe's father will allow his daughter to marry Chaereas since 'he has so many rich and royal suitors for her' (1.1.9).⁵ Callirhoe's beauty differs from that of Chaereas as well in that it attracts admirers from far and wide and evokes amazement and awe in its beholders (1.1.1–2). It has a public dimension and makes her *periboêtos*, a 'celebrity',⁶ which aligns her with other ancient novel heroines such as Xenophon's Anthia (1.2.5–8) and the daughter of King Antiochus in the *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri* (1.4–6). Chaereas' beauty, on the other hand, does not make him a public figure. Indeed, the fact that throughout the entire novel not a single woman falls in love with him has been read as an inversion of the novelistic *topos* that dictates that the hero typically attracts admirers, just like the heroine.⁷ Chaereas' beauty will only result in public admiration in the final stage of the narrative (8.6.8), an episode to which I will return. A number of well-chosen paradigms underline this asymmetry: Callirhoe's beauty is illustrated by paradigms taken from the divine sphere (Nereids, mountain nymphs, Aphrodite⁸) and echoing the narrator's explicit remark that her beauty is not human but divine (οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ θεῖον, 1.1.2).⁹ This much is possibly also borne out by the narrator's reference to her as an *agalma* (1.1.1), a term that often refers specifically to the statue of a god, rather than to that of a person (for which the term *eikôn* is more common).¹⁰ Chaereas' beauty, on the other hand, although likewise conceptualized in terms of visual art (πλάσται καὶ γραφεῖς <ἀπο>δεικνύουσι, 1.1.3), is illustrated only with non-divine (or semi-divine) paradigms taken from mythology (Achilles, Nireus, Hippolytus) and historiography (Alcibiades). This is proleptic of the absence of divine paradigms in his characterization in the rest of the novel, which again places him apart from most other male novel protagonists, who normally get their share of assimilation to divine paradigms.¹¹ Chaereas' beauty is said to surpass all other men's, but it nevertheless lacks the divine dimension of Callirhoe's.

⁵ Mason (2002: 24–5) aptly suggests that at the beginning of the novel Chaereas is depicted as a *secondary* character from New Comedy with an accordingly *low* social status (all in contrast with Callirhoe).

⁶ Similar instances are 4.1.8 and 4.7.6. See Schmeling (2005: 39–41) and Nimis (2003: 261).

⁷ Habrocomes, for example, is sought after by everyone in Ephesus and in the rest of Asia (X. Eph. 1.1.3, 1.12.1) and Theagenes is also publicly admired (Hld. 3.3.4). See Konstan (1994: 76) and Kaimio (1995: 119).

⁸ Laplace's (1980: 124–5) suggestion of reading 'Athena' instead of 'Aphrodite' is not followed by most editors.

⁹ Her divine beauty is also emphasized by various characters (1.10.7, 1.14.1, 2.2.2, 5.2.6, 6.3.5, 6.5.2). See Cuny (2005: 221) on Callirhoe's divine beauty.

¹⁰ See LSJ s.v. ἄγαλμα, A.3, Edwards (1985: 177–8), Scott (1938: 383–4), and Hunter (1994: 1074). Hld. 1.7.2 uses the term, equally referring to the heroine, in a context of religious architecture.

¹¹ See e.g. Clitophon's and Theagenes' assimilations to Apollo (Ach. Tat. 1.5.5; Hld. 5.5.4). On Daphnis' assimilation to the divine, see chapter 4, pp. 235–6.

Thus, both protagonists are marked by the so-called ‘ideal’ characteristics of *eugeneia* and beauty, but these very characteristics at once suggest that one protagonist is apparently ‘more ideal’ than the other. Similar questions about the notion of the ideal are raised by the four paradigms with which Chaereas is associated.¹² Sure enough, the explicit reference to sculptors and painters explicitly foregrounds physical beauty as the *tertium comparationis* (εὐμορφον, πάντων ὑπερέχον, 1.1.3), which seems to underscore a straightforward idealizing reading of the paradigms as suggested by some.¹³ Achilles and Nireus (in this order) were the two most beautiful soldiers in the Greek army outside Troy.¹⁴ Alcibiades and Hippolytus too were paradigms of male beauty in ancient tradition.¹⁵ But on the other hand, the association between portrait painting and depiction of *inner* character is a common one in literary and rhetorical traditions. (Plutarch, for example, is explicit that his *Life of Alexander* reveals character just like portrait painting¹⁶ and Rutilius compares characterization to a painter’s attribution of colours to figures.¹⁷) Chariton is aware of this association and puts it to specific use. All four paradigms, I argue, function as implicit ‘seeds’¹⁸ of Chaereas’ character.¹⁹ The crucial point is that all four have much more in common with Chaereas than mere beauty. As Achilles’ anger is the starting point of the *Iliad*, Chaereas’ anger will be the starting point of the many adventures making up the love story.²⁰ The figure of Alcibiades is proleptic of Chaereas’ brilliant military leadership at the end of the novel, but, on the other hand, it undoubtedly evokes impetuosity and recklessness.²¹ Just as Chaereas’ name, which evokes the hot-tempered and passionate character type of the *adulescens* that often bears this name in New Comedy,²² the presence of Alcibiades may be read as an implicit foreshadowing of Chaereas’ impetuous jealousy (*zēlotypia*, 1.2.5–6, 1.5.4), the later result of which is a fatal assault on his wife (1.4.12).²³ Indeed, one of the very first attestations of

¹² See also De Temmerman (2010b: 472–4).

¹³ Morales (2004: 66 n. 93) is an example: ‘the comparison both serves to suggest Chaereas’ gorgeousness . . . and . . . makes his desirability less individualised and more generic’. James (2010) offers a similarly idealizing reading of Chaereas’ introduction and Tilg (2010) of the novel as a whole.

¹⁴ See Hom. *Il.* 2.673–4 (*Νιρεὺς, ὃς κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ὑλιον . . . μετ’ ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα*).

¹⁵ See Hunter (1994: 1079), with references to Plu. *Alc.* 1.3 and D. S. 13.68.5 on Alcibiades.

¹⁶ Plu. *Alex.* 1.3. See also Duff (1999: 14–17).

¹⁷ Rutil. *Schem. lex.* 16.1–3 Halm. X. *Mem.* 3.10.1–8 and Arist. *Po.* 1450^a27–9 offer comparable imagery. See Duff (1999: 17 n. 11) for more references.

¹⁸ A seed is an insertion of a piece of information, the relevance or significance of which becomes clear only later. See de Jong and Nünlist (2007: xiii).

¹⁹ Brethes (2009: 72) briefly acknowledges the simultaneous presence of aesthetical and ethical qualities in this passage.

²⁰ See also Hirschberger (2001: 169).

²¹ See Cueva (2004: 24–5) and S. D. Smith (2007a: 199–244).

²² See Bowie (2002: 55) and Mason (2002).

²³ Chaereas’ erotic jealousy is repeatedly emphasized throughout the novel, both by the narrator (5.1.1) and characters (1.2.6, 6.6.7, 8.1.3, 8.1.15, 8.4.4, 8.7.6).

zêlotypia in Greek literature famously documents, precisely, Alcibiades' behaviour in an erotic context (Pl. *Smp.* 213d).²⁴ And finally, Callirhoe's reference to Chaereas' *lovers* (τοὺς ἐραστάς, 1.3.6) may again evoke the figure of Alcibiades, who is traditionally associated with suitors and lovers (as attested, for example, by Plutarch, *Alc.* 4.4–6, 6.4).²⁵

Hippolytus too has more in common with Chaereas than mere beauty. Not only is he cast as a symbol of erotic jealousy in Athenian drama,²⁶ but Phaedra's passion for her stepson is also a punishment by Aphrodite because Hippolytus has neglected her.²⁷ It is significant, therefore, that Chaereas' misfortunes are clearly presented as a punishment by Aphrodite for the mistreatment of his wife (e.g. 8.1.3). Nireus, finally, is notorious for being a weakling (*ἀλαπαδνός*), having only a small number of soldiers under his command.²⁸ As such, this paradigm may be taken to foreshadow Chaereas' general attitude in the first six books of the novel. Thus, although the narrator qualifies the similarity between Chaereas and the four mythological figures by referring to their representation by sculptors and painters, thus explicitly drawing the reader's attention to the physical similarities between Chaereas and his paradigms, the implicit *tertia comparationis* addressed by these four paradigms ominously deal with important *inner* strands of Chaereas' characterization (impetuosity, erotic jealousy, divine punishment, and weakness) that the novel will set out to develop.

Chariton's blending of physical and inner depiction is not unique. In a fragment from *Metiochus and Parthenope*, painters and, possibly, sculptors (ζωγράφοι καὶ π[λάστα]ι, II.71) are mentioned in a context that deals with two of the implicit *tertia comparationis* found in Chaereas' introduction (impetuous anger, δ[ι]ργῆς, II.66 and erotic jealousy, οὐδεμίας ἐρασ-, II.67). The fragmentary nature of the material does not allow firm conclusions but a more substantial parallel can be found in Plutarch's *Life of Sulla* (2.1), where Sulla's appearance, like Chaereas', is discussed through reference to statues (not of mythological figures this time, but of himself). Plutarch also seems to resist the heroization and idealization invited by such a mode of depiction and alternates general reference to beauty, elegance, and strength with specific, individualized features that deviate from what he regards as normal and usually signal a defect, peculiarity, or disagreeable aspect of Sulla's personality.²⁹ Like Plutarch, then, Chariton adopts reference to statues and physicality in

²⁴ Fantham (1986: 47–50). Simultaneously, Chaereas' erotic jealousy and violence establish comic resonances (e.g. Menander, *Perikeiromenê*. 724), on which, see Brethes (2007a: 30–2).

²⁵ Duff (1999: 215–17). ²⁶ S. D. Smith (2007a: 99).

²⁷ On Hippolytus as a paradigm not only of beauty but also of chastity, see Hunter (1994: 1079) and *OCD*⁴ s.v. Hippolytus (1).

²⁸ Hom. *Il.* 2.675 (*παῦρος*...*λαός*). See also Cueva (2004: 24–5). I do not agree with S. D. Smith's (2007a: 100) characterization of this paradigm as 'unproblematic'.

²⁹ Georgiadou (1992a: 4617–21).

general to draw attention not simply to physical idealism but also to psychologically realistic inner aspects of character.

1.2 AMBIGUOUS SÔPHROSYNÊ

One of the characteristics explored most ambiguously in Chariton's novel is another profoundly topical one: the heroine's marital fidelity or *sôphrosynê*. Callirhoe is directly characterized as *sôphrôn* in a number of instances,³⁰ but the crucial question is, of course, how a woman who marries a second husband while already married can possibly be called *sôphrôn*.³¹ Before her marriage to Dionysius, there could be little doubt about her *sôphrosynê*. Indeed, her very first words in the novel underline precisely her love for Chaereas. Immediately after her first encounter with him, she addresses Aphrodite: 'Mistress, give me (μοι . . . δός) the man you showed me for my husband' (1.1.7). It is no coincidence that Callirhoe's *last* words of the novel are also addressed to the goddess of love. In the prayer closing the novel, she refers explicitly to her first encounter with Chaereas and thanks Aphrodite for *once more* (πάλιν, 8.8.15) having shown her Chaereas in Syracuse, where 'as a maiden (παρθένος) I saw him at your desire'. Callirhoe at the end of the story self-consciously defines her earlier self as a *parthenos*. By now, this *parthenos* has become a woman (*gynê*)³² who has known two husbands, and, as she mentions herself in the prayer, has been confronted by many misfortunes (ὧν πέπονθα, 8.8.16). Maybe we might even infer from the use of a *request* in her last speech (δέομαί σου), as opposed to the imperative in her first words (μοι . . . δός), that she has lost the juvenile impulses of a young girl, and has evolved to use the caution and circumspection of an adult woman in addressing the goddess.³³ But the core of both direct discourses remains *unchanged*: she wants to be with Chaereas. His rage, resulting in her apparent death, separation, and marriage to another man have not affected her love. In connecting the two episodes in a ring-composition, the novel seems to communicate one of the essential truths in

³⁰ 2.8.4, 2.9.1, 2.10.7, 2.11.5, 6.4.10. The term consistently refers to her refusal to respond to advances of other men. See Rademaker (2004: 260–1) on this meaning of the term.

³¹ See e.g. Montiglio (2010: 30–1) on Callirhoe's ambivalence with regard to both the marital bond and marital sentiment and Schmeling (1974: 101–3) on her marriage (and concealment of her pregnancy) as a morally problematic deviation from novelistic idealism. Reardon (1982: 23) and Perry (1967: 138), on the other hand, ascribe Callirhoe's second marriage to Chariton's pseudo-historiographical inclination towards assimilating his story to the life of the historical figure Hermocrates (i.e. his daughter's marriage to Dionysius I of Syracuse).

³² See Hunter (1994: 1072) and Lalanne (2006: 93–5) on changing denominations (*parthenos*, *korê*, *gynê*) underlying a change of status.

³³ See Ach. Tat. 1.9.6 (τὸ . . . ἐν ὥρᾳ τῆς ἀκμῆς ἐπείγουν) for such an association between female impulsive behaviour and youth.

the novelistic genre: even if love at first sight is tested throughout the novel's many trials and ultimately results in lifelong commitment, the notion of what exactly it means to love is not shown to change qualitatively.

And yet Callirhoe's stay in Miletus puts her *sôphrosynê* severely to the test: because of her pregnancy, she is forced to marry Dionysius. I will discuss this episode, and its implications for Callirhoe's characterization, in due course. For the moment, I will focus on how the compromising of Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê* is elaborated throughout the novel and repeatedly infuses the heroine's characterization with ambiguity. At times, well-chosen direct characterization has precisely this function. In two instances, for example, Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê* is explicitly connected to her *philandria*. The ambiguity inevitably evoked by the latter term (it can mean both 'love for one's husband' and 'love for men'³⁴) is highlighted by a comparison of its collocation in each passage: Dionysius uses the term (5.6.7) to cast himself as the object of Callirhoe's love, but the narrator uses it to refer to her love for Chaereas (6.4.10). In this love novel, then, even direct attribution of such a thematically central characteristic is not straightforward.

More often, the construction of ambiguity involves broader narrative patterning, and metaphorical characterization in particular.³⁵ Two of the most important intertextual patterns in the novel are Callirhoe's associations with both Helen and Penelope. Scholars have drawn attention to the Homeric template of the erotic triangle underlying Chariton's story of a Greek married woman going east to become the wife of another man.³⁶ Like Helen, Callirhoe is a woman consecutively possessed by different men.³⁷ Biraud (1985: 24–7) suggests that ambiguity in Callirhoe's character is generated by her simultaneous assimilation to Penelope (as a paradigm of chastity) and Helen (as a paradigm of its opposite). In my view, however, any clear-cut opposition between Callirhoe's two paradigms is made problematic by the fact that each of these paradigms is *individually* invested with notions of ambiguity. The novel, for one thing, also thematizes significant *differences* between Callirhoe and Helen. Dionysius, for example, explains that, for a moment, he considered himself happier than Menelaus, not only because Callirhoe is more beautiful than Helen (οὐδὲ . . . τὴν Ἑλένην εὐμορφον οὕτως, 2.6.1), but also because she is so adept at rhetorical persuasion (ἡ τῶν λόγων πειθώ, 2.6.2). With the latter assertion, he refers to the fact that Callirhoe has recently persuaded him to promise that he would send her back to her native country, although he himself is utterly unhappy with this prospect. Her persuasive tactics include appeals to Dionysius' Greekness,

³⁴ See LSJ s.v. *φίλανδρος*.

³⁵ Some of the paradigms discussed in the following paragraphs are also dealt with in De Temmerman and Demoen (2011: 9–17).

³⁶ See e.g. Biraud (1985: 24–7), Fusillo (1988: 20, 1990: 40–1), and Laplace (1980).

³⁷ See Schmiel (1980: 96) on Helen's 'fate to be possessed' (by, among others, Theseus, Menelaus, and Paris).

philanthropy, and *paideia* ('Ελλην . . . φιλανθρώπου καὶ παιδείας, 2.5.11), all of which she identifies as characteristics of which her release would be an index. She even presents her release as an aspect that would align Dionysius with Odysseus' Phaeacian host Alcinous—a rhetorical strategy involving an appeal to both philanthropy and *paideia* simultaneously. Moreover, this Homeric paradigm testifies that Callirhoe herself is characterized by an equally well-developed *paideia*.³⁸ Callirhoe, in other words, implicitly aligns herself with her host and makes it virtually impossible for him to keep a *pepaideumenê* woman captive. Conversely, she presents a possible refusal to let her go as an aspect that would align Dionysius with the tomb robbers who sold her in Miletus (τοῖς τυμβωρύχοις ὅμοιος). Finally, she assures her new master that he would earn a good deal of money by returning her to her father, whom she portrays as 'not ungrateful' (οὐκ . . . ἀχάριστος), thus transforming her *request* into an *offer* difficult to refuse. In short, it is not surprising that Dionysius is impressed by the woman's rhetorical skills.

At the level of the key function, Dionysius' emphasis on these skills evokes the verbal versatility associated with Helen since Homer³⁹ but simultaneously generates a significant *contrast* between Callirhoe and her paradigm. Whereas some traditions highlight the role of Paris' *peithô* in seducing Helen away from her husband,⁴⁰ Callirhoe is not the object but the subject of rhetorical persuasion. Moreover, she adopts rhetorical persuasion to *return* to her husband. This generates a double dynamic. First, Dionysius is exposed as misreading the various associations in this passage.⁴¹ Whereas he aligns himself with Menelaus, the reader observes that his evocation of this mythological episode actually casts Chaereas in the Menelaus role and him in that of Paris.⁴² Secondly, the inversions point out that Callirhoe cannot simply be aligned with the mythical woman who, as Suzuki (1989: 37) puts it, is 'overdetermined by that one act in her life' (i.e. leaving her husband for Paris). The simultaneous association and dissociation echo the complexity traditionally surrounding Helen's moral characterization in antiquity from Homer onwards. In the *Iliad*, Helen blames both herself (3.180, 6.344) and Paris (6.350), while

³⁸ See also Hirschberger (2001: 174) and Daude (2006: 198).

³⁹ See Worman (2002: 13, 44, 47–65) on Helen's rhetorical versatility. On broader connections between the alluring power of *peithô* and that of sexual love in literary representation, see Feeney (1993: 235–7).

⁴⁰ e.g. Gorg. *Hel.* 8 ff. (on the power of speech), on which, see, among others, Basta Donzelli (1985).

⁴¹ Tilg (2010: 150) clearly confuses the levels of character and narrator/author when suggesting that it is *Chariton* who misreads these associations. He awkwardly takes *Dionysius*' 'wrong' self-associations to indicate that *Chariton* did not take the Trojan myth as his 'primary model'.

⁴² His self-association, again misdirected, resurfaces in 5.2.8: he has by then married Callirhoe, believes Chaereas dead, and again casts himself in the role of the true, legitimate husband (Menelaus). But he does so precisely at the time he takes his Greek wife away from her Greek environment to the east, which conspicuously aligns him, of course, with Paris.

Priam is explicit that not she but the gods are to blame (3.164).⁴³ The *Odyssey* offers harsh condemnations of Helen (Eumaeus, for example, wishes her dead because of her responsibility for the war, 14.68–9), but also juxtaposes different, and at times contradictory, versions of her story (such as those told by herself and by Menelaus; 4.238–64 and 4.266–89).⁴⁴ After Homer, different versions of the myth give different accounts of Helen's responsibility for accompanying Paris to Troy. Whereas the tragedians mostly condemn her for adultery,⁴⁵ other versions, and most notably Stesichorus' palinode, are more prone to exonerate her.⁴⁶ In Chariton's novel, this ambiguity is extended from Helen's to Callirhoe's characterization. Moreover, the mere fact that Helen is narrativized in different ways, both in Homer and in subsequent tradition, is another element aligning her with Callirhoe. Dionysius, as we have just seen, makes Callirhoe part of a narrative constellation which is not straightforwardly compatible with the reader's. Callirhoe's story is not one that can be told in a straightforward or unambiguous way.

Next to Helen, the paradigm of Penelope also underlies, and further complicates, the construction of Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê*.⁴⁷ One of the most unmistakable associations of Callirhoe with Penelope occurs at a crucial moment at the end of the story.⁴⁸ When reunited, the protagonists relate their adventures to each other, fall in each other's arms, and 'gladly turned to the pact of their bed as of old' (8.1.17). In the *Odyssey* (23.296), exactly the same words narrate the reunion of the hero and his wife. In Chariton, it is aptly introduced at this stage of the narrative, since not only the lovers' reunion but also the ideas of exchanging stories (τερπέσθην μύθοισι, *Od.* 23.301; πάντα . . . διηγῆσατο, 8.1.17) and enjoying love (φιλότῆτος ἑταρπήτην ἑρατεινῆς, *Od.* 23.300; περιπλακέντες ἀλλήλοις, 8.1.17) are common to both episodes.

Throughout the narrative, various such assimilations occur. They all appear in contexts thematizing marital love and fidelity and, I submit, all bear upon Callirhoe's characterization as a *sôphrôn* (or not) heroine. Callirhoe's

⁴³ On the moral ambiguity of Homer's Helen, see Suzuki (1989: 36–7), Reichel (1999: 291–5), Worman (2002: 47–65), and Collins (1987: 227, 1988: 41–67).

⁴⁴ On these 'competing narratives', see L. Maguire (2009: 115–16) and Winkler (1990a: 140–1).

⁴⁵ e.g. A. A. 62 on this 'woman of many men' (πολυάνωρος) and E. *Tr.* 35 on her just (ἐνδίκως) imprisonment.

⁴⁶ See Laplace (1980: 85–8) and *OCD*⁴ s.v. Helen. Stesichorus' version is taken up by E. *Hel.* On the Euripidean intertext in Chariton, see Marini (1993), Haynes (2003: 48), and Ruiz-Montero (2003c: 50). For a concise survey of different stances on the ancient literary tradition on Helen's guilt, see L. Maguire (2009: 109–24).

⁴⁷ Nowhere in the novel is Penelope explicitly mentioned. The mere fact that she is a paradigm for Callirhoe has been overlooked by most scholars, most conspicuously so by Cueva (2004: 15–34). Two exceptions are Biraud (1985: 23–7) and Manuwald (2000: 112–13).

⁴⁸ Some of the Homeric allusions explored in this section have been discussed by Manuwald (2000: 107–15), who, however, is primarily interested in what they tell us about Chariton's intertextual writing style (and the place of epic therein among other genres).

depiction during the trial episode in Babylon is a fine example. She enters the courtroom 'looking like Helen as the divine Homer describes her (οἷαν ὁ θεὸς ποιητῆς τὴν Ἑλένην ἐπιστῆναί φησι) appearing among the elders' (5.5.9). These words are immediately followed by a Homeric quotation from Helen's arrival at the Scaean gate which mentions some of the oldest Trojans sitting beside Priam⁴⁹ ('around Priam and Panthous and Thymoetes', *Il.* 3.146). This verse, evoking the impending duel between Paris and Menelaus that Helen comes to witness, is proleptic of Mithridates' and Dionysius' imminent rhetorical duel for Callirhoe.⁵⁰ The military background of the Iliadic episode is further highlighted by the fact that the trial in Babylon is explicitly compared to a war (πόλεμον, 5.4.1). Like the duel in the *Iliad*, furthermore, the duel between Mithridates and Dionysius will remain *undecided*, this time not because one of the contestants unexpectedly disappears (as Paris does in *Il.* 3.380–2), but because a third person—Chaereas—will equally unexpectedly *appear*, 'raised' as a *daimôn* by Mithridates in a theatrical scene (5.7.10). Whereas the Homeric quotation, then, supports the explicit comparison between Callirhoe and Helen (the obvious *tertium comparationis* being the amazement aroused in their beholders: θάμβος, σιωπῇ⁵¹), the narrator also adds a second quotation (πάντες δ' ἡρήσαντο παραὶ λεχέεσσι κλιθῆναι, 5.5.9). This time, it is taken from the *Odyssey*, where it twice refers not to Helen but to Penelope. More specifically, it describes the suitors' desire to share her bed (*Od.* 1.366 and 18.213). The passage as a whole, then, assimilates Callirhoe to Helen and Penelope simultaneously.⁵² For the educated reader of Homer in the first centuries AD, the figure of Penelope traditionally evokes two important characteristics:⁵³ she is not only thoughtful (περίφρων, the famous epithet attributed to her throughout the *Odyssey* and in one of the above-mentioned passages, *Od.* 1.329), but also the prototype of marital fidelity.⁵⁴ The simultaneous alignment of Callirhoe with both Helen and Penelope is emblematic of the question that surrounds Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê* all along: is she a Helen or a Penelope?

This question is raised again when Callirhoe, on her way from Miletus to Babylon, is compared to Artemis and Aphrodite, again through a Homeric quotation (Ἀρτέμιδι ἰκέλη ἢ χρυσεῖη Ἀφροδίτῃ, 4.7.5). At the level of the

⁴⁹ For an approach to Homeric quotations in Chariton different from mine, see Müller (1976). On poetic quotation in Greek novels, and in Chariton in particular, see Robiano (2000).

⁵⁰ See also Laplace (1980: 96–8). Biraud (1985: 22–3) shows that a number of Homeric quotations in Chariton create and/or frustrate readers' expectations and, occasionally, contribute to characterization. But she does not discuss this passage.

⁵¹ For Laplace (1980: 86), the primary similarity is the fact that Callirhoe, like Helen, will be 'le présent qui corrompt le juge'.

⁵² See also Manuwald (2000: 112–13).

⁵³ See Biraud (1985: 24) on Penelope's image in the archaic, classical, and Hellenistic periods.

⁵⁴ See *OCD*⁴ s.v. Penelope and Rademaker (2004: 62–8, 260).

argument function, the comparison emphasizes Callirhoe's extraordinary beauty: because Rumour announces to all (πάσιν ἀνθρώποις, 4.7.5) that Callirhoe is as beautiful (τὸ μέγα τῆς φύσεως κατόρθωμα) as the two goddesses, innumerable people flock to behold her beauty. And even then, what they see surpasses even those expectations (τῆς φήμης . . . κρείττων, 4.7.6). At the level of the key function, the passage operates in a more complex way. For one thing, the simultaneous association of the heroine with the love goddess as well as the chastity goddess does its fair share to create ambiguity. (Possibly, the ambiguity is further enhanced by the fact that the Artemis of Chariton's time may best be read not simply or not only as a chastity goddess but as showing overlaps, both in cult and representation, with fertility goddesses such as Cybele.⁵⁵) Secondly, the quotation originally appears in *Od.* 17.37, where Penelope is compared to the two goddesses as she greets her son Telemachus at his homecoming. This implicit association of Callirhoe with Penelope may be read as adding to the construction of Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê*, inviting the reader to infer that, no matter how many people Rumour mobilizes to lustfully behold Callirhoe's beauty, Callirhoe will remain faithful to Chaereas.

However, association with Penelope has a more complex function: in another passage where Callirhoe is associated with Penelope in the context of Telemachus' homecoming, *questions* are raised—both in the epic and the novel—about *sôphrosynê*. After hearing from Mithridates that Callirhoe has married Dionysius, Chaereas wants to go to Miletus to claim his wife, but Mithridates advises him to write her a letter first. His advice features a Homeric quotation taken from a speech by Athena, who encourages Telemachus to go home and prevent the suitors from consuming Odysseus' property. In the part quoted in Chariton, Athena argues that Penelope's father and brother are urging her to marry Eurymachus (*Od.* 15.16–17) and warns Telemachus that a woman 'wants to make thrive the house of the man who weds her' (κείνου βούλεται οἶκον ὀφέλλειν, ὅς κεν ὀπύιῃ, 4.4.5; from *Od.* 15.21). Mithridates adduces this verse to suggest that Callirhoe might have forgotten Chaereas now that she is married to Dionysius. Accordingly, Athena's warning that women tend to forget their loved ones once they have died (οὐκέτι μέμνηται τεθνηκότος, *Od.* 15.23) fits aptly in Mithridates' discourse, since he knows that Callirhoe considers her husband to have been killed in Miletus (3.9.11). But Athena's and Mithridates' rhetorical aims are very different. Whereas Athena tries to persuade Telemachus to travel home and secure Penelope, Mithridates tries to *prevent* Chaereas from travelling to Miletus and securing Callirhoe. In the *Odyssey*, of course, Penelope does *not* forget Odysseus. Chaereas' readiness to believe the opposite about Callirhoe marks his problematic attitude towards his wife's *sôphrosynê*.

⁵⁵ On Artemis' early assimilation to other goddesses in general, see Burkert (1977: 233–7). For imperial times in particular, see Goldhill (2006: 160) on Artemis' image in polytheism's shifting traditions, and Praet (2009: 291–6) on Artemis and her variants in Philostr. VA.

I will have more to say about this attitude (pp. 59–61); for now suffice it to say that the doubts generated chime with the ambiguity traditionally surrounding Penelope's *sôphrosynê*. Telemachus' concerns with his mother's chastity are emphasized as early as the beginning of the *Odyssey*, when he introduces the theme of women's sexual unreliability.⁵⁶ In the books leading up to Odysseus' homecoming, Penelope's chastity as well as her attitude towards her suitors is more than once invested with indeterminacy and ambivalence.⁵⁷ Athena, for example, is explicit that Penelope continually yearns for Odysseus' return but at the same time offers hope to all the suitors (πάντας . . . ἔλπει, *Od.* 13.380), makes promises to each man (ὑπίσχεται ἀνδρὶ ἐκάστῳ), and sends them messages (ἀγγελίας προῖείσα, 13.381). Telemachus, for his part, depicts his mother as hesitating about whether to respect the marital bed or to marry the suitor who offers the most gifts (16.73–7), a dilemma echoed by Penelope herself (19.524–34).⁵⁸ After her reunion with Odysseus (but before she is fully convinced of his true identity), the alternative scenario is again hinted at when people outside the palace interpret the sound of dancing as a sign that she has married one of the suitors (23.149–51). And at one point Penelope even confesses to her housekeeper that her heart longs to show herself to the suitors (18.158–65)—a passage of which there might be a remote echo in Chariton's Homeric quotation in the courtroom scene (5.5.9), where Callirhoe is aligned with Penelope by being explicitly presented as the object of lustful male gazes. These instances, framed as they are by the traditional notion that presents the moral character of men as more stable than that of women,⁵⁹ have infused Penelope's virtue with ambiguity in the subsequent literary tradition. Penelope acts as a paradigm of female faithfulness and loyalty but these qualities are inextricably bound up with notions of resourcefulness, cunning (*mêtis*), verbal disguise, and elusiveness.⁶⁰ Statius (*Silv.* 3.5), for example, is explicit that his wife, *unlike* Penelope, is *straightforwardly* faithful (she would rather fight suitors with arms than with verbal disguise).⁶¹ Just like the paradigm of Helen, then, that of Penelope plays an

⁵⁶ *Od.* 1.215–16 ('My mother says that I am his [i.e. Odysseus'] child, but I myself do not know. For never yet did any man know his parentage of his own knowledge'; Loeb trans.). See also L. Maguire (2009: 115–16).

⁵⁷ See e.g. Murnaghan (1994: 84) on the ambivalence underlying Penelope's sexual desires, Felson-Rubin (1987, 1994: 43–123) on conflicting points of view about her, and Katz (1991: 77–113) on her sense of agency. See also Suzuki (1989: 74–91), Kurtz (1989), and Foley (2001: 129).

⁵⁸ Lawrence (2003: 32) suggests that Penelope leans towards the second option.

⁵⁹ See Peradotto (2002: 9) on women's volatility and potential for significant moral swings, mainly motivated by sex.

⁶⁰ On these aspects in Homer, see Winkler (1990a: 140–3) and Chaston (2002). See also Katz (1991) and Felson-Rubin (1994: 15–42).

⁶¹ On this passage, see Fögen (2007: 257–8). On similar concerns (i.e. in *Ov. Her.* 1), see Green (2004: 369–72).

important role in Callirhoe's characterization, most notably in simultaneously constructing and complicating *sôphrosynê*. Moreover, the mere fact that the paradigm of Penelope, unlike that of Helen, is only implicitly invoked suggests that the reader is repeatedly invited to adopt a 'deeper' reading than that which the text literally tells him/her. Like the metaphorical characterization in Chaereas' introduction, that of Callirhoe suggests that character in this novel is not to be taken unproblematically at face value.

Another metaphorical strand is added to Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê* by intertextual interplay evoked by associations of Chaereas with Patroclus. When Callirhoe deliberates about the future of her unborn child, Chaereas appears to her in a dream, telling her that he entrusts his child to her care: 'A vision of Chaereas stood over her, like him in every way, like him in stature, fair looks and voice, and wearing just such clothes' (2.9.6). In *Il.* 23.66–7, this description refers to Patroclus, who appears to Achilles in a dream, reproaching him for not having buried his corpse. Whereas at this point in the story, Chaereas is alive (and Callirhoe has no reason to believe otherwise), the same Iliadic episode is again alluded to during the long period (3.10.2–5.8.1) in which Callirhoe does believe Chaereas to have died in an attack in Miletus. Dionysius, who also believes Chaereas to be dead, encourages Callirhoe to build a tomb for her deceased husband: 'Imagine that he [that is, Chaereas] is standing over you saying "Bury me so that I may pass through the gates of Hades as soon as possible"' (4.1.3). Chaereas' words echo those used by Patroclus in urging Achilles to bury him (*Il.* 23.71). At the level of the argument function, Dionysius' choice of this paradigm marks his attempt to establish psychological control over Callirhoe. As the narrator points out, although Dionysius wants to arouse his wife's sympathy by showing his concern (4.1.3–4), he also wants her to become reconciled to her first husband's death (4.1.2). Not only his proposal to organize a funeral ceremony (despite the absence of the corpse), but also his evocation of a *dead* paradigm should encourage her to forget Chaereas for good.⁶² Since the reader, for his/her part, knows all along that Chaereas has actually survived the attack (see e.g. 4.1.1), the two evocations of this paradigm are meaningfully connected at the level of the key function: in both cases, the *dead* Patroclus serves as a paradigm for the *living* Chaereas. Moreover, Callirhoe eventually complies with each of the requests made to her—and in both cases her *sôphrosynê* is implicated. Her acting upon Chaereas' advice to keep the unborn child (2.9.6) will eventually lead to her marriage with Dionysius, by whom she is then persuaded to erect a tomb for Chaereas (4.1.4). In both passages, then, Chaereas' assimilation to Patroclus contributes to the construction of

⁶² Hirschberger (2001: 175) acknowledges the psychological importance of this paradigm but sees it as an indication of Dionysius' own desires ('Dionysios wünscht nichts sehnlicher, als dass Chaereas möglichst schnell in den Hades komme').

Callirhoe's transgressive status as the wife of two husbands (albeit that this happens more subliminally in the first passage than in the second).

The same issue resurfaces, again through a Homeric paradigm, when Dionysius sees Chaereas alive and well in the courtroom in Babylon. He cannot believe his own eyes and cries out: 'What Protesilaus is this (ποῖος οὗτος . . . Προτεσίλεως) who has come back to life (ἀνεβίω) to plague me?' (5.10.1). Protesilaus, the leader of the Thessalians, was the first Greek to land, and die, at Troy. After his death, however, he returned to his wife Laodamia for three hours, after which she killed herself.⁶³ Similarly, Chaereas appears in this scene to see his wife for the first time since his alleged death in Miletus. In Dionysius' view, clearly, Chaereas, like Protesilaus, has conquered death. In the *Iliad*, Protesilaus is connected with Patroclus, and with his death in particular, because it is near Protesilaus' ship that Patroclus enters the battle in which he will eventually be killed (16.286). In Chariton, the two heroes are also connected, albeit by contrast rather than contiguity: whereas Patroclus illustrates Dionysius' attempt to erase Chaereas' presence from Callirhoe's mind as well as the temporary apparent success of this attempt (Callirhoe agrees to bury Chaereas), the figure of Protesilaus marks its ultimate futility. But the figures of Protesilaus and Laodamia, so prominently foregrounded in the trial scene as a paradigm of unshakable eternal love, also raise less reassuring questions. As Isbell (2004: 116) observes, Laodamia's letter to Protesilaus in Ovid's *Heroides* 'concerns itself with a nearly ideal love between a man and his wife. While others of the heroines argue that love must and certainly can be clandestine, here there is nothing to hide. . . . There are no rivals, for there is no jealousy'.⁶⁴ To any reader of Chariton, it is clear that the love of Chaereas and Callirhoe is more complicated: it is deliberately constructed *not* to meet such standards in any straightforward way. Even if the novel ultimately celebrates the love between the two protagonists, the entire story revolves around the fact that, in their love, there *are* things to hide, there *are* rivals, and there *is* jealousy. Callirhoe's letter of farewell to Dionysius, which she hides from Chaereas (ἀπέκρυψε, 8.4.7) because of his innate jealousy (ζηλοτυπίαν, 8.4.4) is a good example of all three points. These observations, of course, destabilize any straightforward alignment of Callirhoe with Laodamia. Whereas Laodamia kills herself after the death of her husband, Callirhoe buries Chaereas when she believes him to be dead after having married another man.

⁶³ *Il.* 2.698–702. See *OCD*⁴ and *LIMC* s.v. Protesilaus.

⁶⁴ Protesilaus' and Laodamia's love is documented by *Ov. Her.* 13, Cat. 68.73–130, and *Hyg. F.* 103–4 (on which see Öhrman 2008: 78–101). In Chariton, this couple may also be echoed by an image of Chaereas on Callirhoe's ring (τὴν εἰκόνα, 1.14.9), which she kisses (καταφιλοῦσα) and to which she addresses words as if it were Chaereas himself (ὦ Χαιρέα, 1.14.9). Famously, Laodamia also has an image of Protesilaus, which, in *Ov. Her.*, she says she embraces (*amplexus meos*, 13.154) and talks to (*verba dicimus*, 13.153–4).

Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê* is further documented (and complicated) by Chaereas' perception of it, which is often problematic. First, Chaereas' handling of the direct characterization of his wife is significant. Nowhere in the whole novel does he *consciously* characterize her as *sôphrôn*. This in itself is striking enough, since *sôphrosynê* is repeatedly attributed to Callirhoe not only by the narrator and Callirhoe herself, but also by other characters (see n. 30 for references). Moreover, the only two passages where Chaereas is described as characterizing his wife as *sôphrôn* are provided with an ironic twist by the narrator. In one of these, a soliloquy by Callirhoe in Miletus, she imagines that Chaereas realizes after her alleged death that she did not commit adultery ('You [i.e. Chaereas] are mourning for me . . . proclaiming my chastity (τὴν σωφροσύνην) now that I am dead', 1.14.10). Callirhoe's words, predicating Chaereas' belief in her fidelity, evoke irony because in fact Chaereas *did* think, at least until learning the truth (1.5.2), that Callirhoe had committed adultery—this is what initiated the sequence of adventures in the first place. Callirhoe, who does not know whether Chaereas has ever found out about her actual innocence, *imagines* (or *hopes*?) that he acknowledges her chastity. But if Chaereas had really been convinced that she was innocent, she would not be uttering this soliloquy in Miletus. Similar irony underlies Chaereas' conversation with a messenger (7.6.12) about a female prisoner in the army under his command. Since the woman refuses to consider marriage with him, Chaereas characterizes her as *sôphrôn* (7.6.12). The irony lies in the fact that the reader, unlike Chaereas, knows that this woman is none other than Callirhoe. Chaereas, then, *does* characterize Callirhoe as *sôphrôn*, but unwittingly. In both passages, the narrator flags Chaereas' disbelief in his wife's *sôphrosynê* and, thus, his problematic relationship with his wife.

Chaereas' perception of Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê* is intertwined with his self-positioning within the narrative. Here again, metaphorical characterization is operative. Chaereas' ambiguous association with Theseus is a case in point. It is established in an episode depicting what is arguably the most dramatic crisis of Chaereas' belief in his wife's *sôphrosynê*, namely his uncontrolled outburst of jealousy and anger resulting in her apparent death in Syracuse. At her funeral, the crowd see her lying in her bridal clothes on a bier decorated with gold, and compare her to the sleeping Ariadne (πάντες ἔκαζον αὐτὴν Ἀριάδνην καθευδούσῃ, 1.6.2). The *tertium comparationis* underlying this comparison is that both women have been unjustly treated by the man they love.⁶⁵ But a little later, Chaereas *himself* adduces another version of the myth (attested by Homer), which has as its central theme the *infidelity* of Ariadne.⁶⁶ He finds

⁶⁵ See, among others, Paus. 1.20.3 and Plu. *Thes.* 20.1. See also Cueva (2004: 16–17) and S. D. Smith (2007a: 101–2).

⁶⁶ *Od.* 11.321–5. See S. D. Smith (2007a: 101–4) in more detail on Chariton's ambiguous use of (diverging versions of) this myth. On the moral ambiguity traditionally surrounding Theseus

Callirhoe's tomb empty and compares his wife's disappearance to Ariadne's and Semele's abductions by Dionysus and Zeus respectively (3.3.4). Not only does Chaereas assume his own innocence by casting himself in the role of the husband who has been *deprived* (ἀφείλετο, 3.3.5) of his wife rather than the one who has abandoned her himself,⁶⁷ but his conceptualization of his wife as the object of famous seduction stories also entails a profound problematization of her *sôphrosynê*.

Both Chaereas' self-depiction and his depiction of the role of his wife contain markers of irony and ambiguity. Since this episode is part of a flashback narrated immediately after Callirhoe's marriage to Dionysius (3.2.13–17), the reader realizes that by then Callirhoe *has* become the object of erotic seduction, like Ariadne and Semele. And of course, the obvious phonological resemblance between Dionysus and Dionysius cries out to be read as playing upon this connection.⁶⁸ Moreover, Chaereas in the same monologue connects his own narrative of abandonment (ἀπελείφθην, 3.3.6) to a third mythological episode: he identifies Callirhoe as a goddess who dwelt briefly with mortals, and contrasts her with Thetis, who stayed with Peleus (παρέμεινε) and bore him a son (νίδον . . . ἐξ αὐτῆς, 3.3.6). Chaereas' sense of victimhood is particularly fleshed out by the ironic twist underlying this mention of Peleus' son. The theme of pregnancy connects Thetis with the other two mythological women adduced by Chaereas.⁶⁹ And again, the point is, of course, that the reader has been informed that Callirhoe *is* pregnant by Chaereas, while Chaereas himself does not know this and contrasts Peleus' paternity with his own childlessness. On the one hand, then, while Chaereas adduces Peleus and Thetis as paradigms *ap' enantiou* (or *e contrario*) to emphasize his own deplorable situation, the reader is invited to read these paradigms as *aph' homoiou* (or *e simili*).⁷⁰ Peleus and Thetis are not so much *unlike* Chaereas and Callirhoe as Chaereas believes: like Thetis, Callirhoe will bear her husband a son. On the other hand, of course, the fact that this child will be born (and forever known to all) as the child of *another* man (Dionysius) raises the question of how inappropriate Chaereas' comparison *really* is. The question becomes all the more urgent given that Chaereas' belief draws upon only one specific version of the myth, sometimes implied by Homer. In other versions, Thetis' faithfulness is often depicted as much more

as a love hero and his treatment of Ariadne in particular, see Pieper (1972), M. H. Shaw (1982: 5–10), and Shapiro (1991).

⁶⁷ For a different reading of Callirhoe's association with Ariadne, see Robiano (2008: 428–9).
⁶⁸ Scourfield (2010: 301) also touches upon the irony generated by this wordplay.

⁶⁹ According to one version of the myth of Ariadne, ascribed to Paeon of Amathus by Plutarch (*Theseus*), Ariadne was impregnated by Theseus before being abandoned by him on Naxos (Cueva 2004: 15–34). Semele, for her part, is famous for being the mother of Dionysus, who gestates in Zeus' thigh (Apollod. *Bibliotheca* 3.4.3).

⁷⁰ On both types of paradigm in ancient rhetorical theory, see Demoen (1997: 136).

elusive than Chaereas assumes. Peleus has to capture Thetis while she assumes different forms to escape him (Ov. *Met.* 11.221–65), and, more importantly, most sources say that, once married, she *abandons* Peleus after her unsuccessful attempt to make the infant Achilles immortal.⁷¹ While Chaereas, then, narrativizes an ‘ideal’ version of the myth (Thetis stays with Peleus and bears him a son) and contrasts it with his own non-ideal love, the reader is left observing that Callirhoe’s story cannot simply be pigeonholed in terms of *ap’ enantiou* or *aph’ homoiou*. Whereas Chaereas’ narrativization is clearly characterized by ignorance in some respects, it also contains truth in others. The story of the novel hero’s wife cannot be conceptualized in unambiguous terms.

1.3 UNDERSTANDING CALLIRHOE

1.3.1 Two dilemmas and a doublet

If Chaereas doubts Callirhoe’s *sôphrosynê* from the very earliest pages of the novel, the reader has a fairly unproblematic view of it until the Milesian episode, which documents in great detail her decision to marry her master Dionysius. The narrator emphasizes that, when she learns that he has fallen in love with her, she initially remains adamantly faithful to Chaereas despite all the efforts of Dionysius’ slave Plangon (πανταχόθεν ἀήττητος ἦν καὶ ἔμενε Χαιρέα μόνῳ πιστή, 2.8.2).⁷² But her pregnancy changes things. It generates two consecutive dilemmas in Callirhoe, both of which fundamentally affect her perception of a number of characteristics central to her self-definition.

The first dilemma is whether or not to keep the child. As soon as she is informed of her pregnancy, she tries to induce an abortion by hitting her own belly (2.8.7). The reason she takes this drastic course of action is that ‘becoming mother to a slave’ (τέκω δοῦλον, 2.8.6; see also δοῦλε, 2.8.7) would be yet another misfortune. Her first reaction, in other words, is to prioritize (her child’s) *eugeneia* over her motherly love (or *philostorgia*, 2.9.1). This concern with *eugeneia* is in tune with her self-conscious evaluation of her loss of social status which is so prominent in this episode (see pp. 43–4 above) and resurfaces in her subsequent soliloquy (δεσπότη τὸν Ἑρμοκράτους ἔκγονον, 2.9.2), where it again makes her argue in favour of abortion (φθεῖραι, 2.9.1).⁷³

⁷¹ OCD⁴ s.v. Thetis. Thetis raises the issue of her own ambiguous status among the gods (ἀτιμοσάτη) in *Il.* 1.516, on which, see Collins (1987: 226).

⁷² On the military imagery underlining Callirhoe’s resolve, see M. Jones (2012: 163–4).

⁷³ See S. D. Smith (2007a: 115) on Callirhoe’s projection onto her unborn child of her own concerns about freedom and slavery.

And even when she finally changes her mind (*μετενόει*) out of pity for the child (*ἔλεος*, 2.9.3), *eugeneia* is again at the forefront of her thoughts—she adduces as *exempla* a number of sons of gods and kings who were born in slavery but nevertheless came into their rightful ancestral rank (2.9.5).

Callirhoe explores her agonizing dilemma in emphatically moral terms. Disgusted by her initial inclination to perform an abortion, she characterizes herself as ‘most wicked of all women’ (*πασῶν ἀσεβέστατη*), 2.9.3) for adopting the ‘reasoning of Medea’ (*Μηδείας λαμβάνεις λογισμούς*). Her self-characterization as ‘even more savage’ (*ἀγριωτέρα*, 2.9.4) than the famous child-murderess results from her awareness that Medea kills her children to hurt her husband once he has become her enemy (*ἐχθρόν*), whereas Callirhoe finds herself entertaining the possibility of killing the child of a husband whom she loves. At the level of the key function, the profound moral dilemma and the explicit reference to Medea firmly cast Callirhoe in the role of tragic heroine. This characterization resonates with other such associations,⁷⁴ but in this instance in particular is emblematic of her profoundly fissured and morally divided self. Gill (1996: 216–26) adduces Euripides’ Medea as one of the key examples in Greek poetry of what he identifies as the ‘objective’ strand of ancient character.⁷⁵ One characteristic aspect of this strand involves a presentation of the self and internal decision-making on the model of external discussion as a dialogue between internalized voices. Such a dialogue, which Gill defines as an important device for assessing moral character, is particularly frequent in tragedy and also informs Medea’s famous monologue in which she is torn between carrying out and abandoning her murderous plan (*Med.* 1021–80). This dialogic model is equally prominent in Callirhoe’s monologue (2.9.2–5), which consists of two parts presenting arguments in favour of, as well as against, abortion. The two parts are juxtaposed, neatly separated from each other by a narratorial comment (2.9.3), and presented as the result of a dynamic between reason (*λογισμούς*, 2.9.3) and emotion (i.e. pity, *ἔλεος*)—a conspicuously Euripidean alternation.⁷⁶

Such a juxtaposition of conflicting voices documenting agonizing decisions is a technique fairly rare in contemporary narrative⁷⁷ but in Chariton it is repeatedly used to flesh out character through moral dilemma. Dionysius, for example, who is torn between his desire for Callirhoe and a reasoned attempt to oppose it (*ἀντέχεσθαι*, 2.4.4), is presented as fighting a battle between reason and emotion (*ἀγῶνα λογισμοῦ καὶ πάθους*) and his soliloquy is explicitly called a ‘dialogue with himself’ (*αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι*, 2.4.6). Similarly, Artaxerxes’

⁷⁴ See pp. 43–4.

⁷⁵ On Medea’s notoriously divided self, see also Foley (2001: 243–71).

⁷⁶ On the Euripidean flavour of Callirhoe’s soliloquy (including the emphasis on reason and emotion), see S. D. Smith (2007a: 111–16).

⁷⁷ See Pelling (2002b: 324–5) on its absence from Plutarch’s *Lives* and its suitability for the depiction of (tragic) character through ‘great moments’.

awareness that he is presiding over the trial of a woman whom he loves generates a moral dilemma (ἐραστῆς ἢ δικαστῆς, 6.1.10) which, again, is presented as an internal conflict (ἐννοούμενος καθ' αὐτόν, 6.1.8) and a 'struggle against himself' (ἀνταγωνιζόμενος σεαυτῷ, 6.3.8).⁷⁸ In Callirhoe's case, the use of such 'objective' juxtaposition as a means of tackling moral questions is made even more palpable by the fact that her dilemma remains unsolved until yet another voice is added to the debate. Her moral self-condemnation, that is, does not suffice to make her reject abortion as a possible course of action.⁷⁹ She continues deliberating throughout the entire night (2.9.6) and it is only when she has seen Chaereas in a dream, entrusting her with the child (παρατίθεμαί σοι... τὸν υἱόν, 2.9.6), that she decides to keep it. Chaereas' imagined voice is thus added to her own two diverging voices and makes her revise the relative importance of *eugeneia* and *philostorgia*, privileging the latter over the former.

A similarly 'objective' conceptualization underlies Callirhoe's second dilemma, which is clearly presented as adding an extra layer of complexity to the first one. It arises as soon as Callirhoe communicates to Plangon her decision to keep the child. Plangon immediately rejects this scenario as impossible (because Dionysius will kill the child out of jealousy, 2.10.1–2) and suggests as the only viable alternative to abortion that Callirhoe marry Dionysius and bring up the child as *his* (2.10.5). At this point, Callirhoe's pregnancy (and thus her *eugeneia* and *philostorgia* thematized so far) becomes inextricably bound up with her the *sôphrosynê*. Bringing the child up as Dionysius' son would safeguard her *philostorgia* as well as the *eugeneia* of both herself and the child, but would compromise her *sôphrosynê*. Plangon, for her part, is confident all along that the *sôphrosynê* of the *wife* will yield to the *philostorgia* of the *mother* (νικήσει σωφροσύνην γυναικὸς μητρὸς φιλοστοργία, 2.9.1)—a prediction that will eventually turn out to be correct. But at first, the hierarchy envisaged by Plangon does not correspond to that favoured by Callirhoe herself. Callirhoe so much abhors the prospect of marrying Dionysius that she immediately reconsiders abortion ('Better for it [i.e. the child] to die', 2.10.5), despite the fact that she has just taken this option off the table (2.9.6). Moreover, at this point she makes it clear that she considers *sôphrosynê* more important than both *eugeneia* and *philostorgia*: 'I want to die Chaereas' wife and his alone (Χαιρέου μόνου γυνή). To know no other husband—that is *dearer to me than parents or country or child* (γονέων ἥδιον καὶ πατρίδος καὶ τέκνου)' (2.11.1). As has been observed, this phrase is an adaptation of a phrase from the *Odyssey* ('nothing is sweeter than a man's own land and his parents', ὥς οὐδὲν γλύκιον ἤς πατρίδος

⁷⁸ See M. Jones (2012: 55–7) on Dionysius' moral struggle and Montiglio (2010: 27–9) on parallels with Artaxerxes' moral conflict (and on Platonic–Aristotelian imagery of the divided soul in Chariton's depiction of moral dilemma generally, 26–34).

⁷⁹ On this point, see also Trzaskoma (2010b: 221–2).

οὐδὲ τοκήων, *Od.* 9.34), and helps to underline Callirhoe's prioritizing in contrast to Odysseus' (for whom fatherland and parents come first).⁸⁰ The point of this hierarchy is, I think, that it is part of a more complex self-positioning that Callirhoe later revises. Whereas this hierarchy is consistent with her view of *sôphrosynê* as expressed earlier (e.g. 2.2.8), it is reshuffled during a second imagined interplay of voices (2.11.1–3). And once again, these voices are presented as resolving the dilemma. This time the voices are those of Chaereas as well as the unborn child, who both argue against abortion and thus outnumber Callirhoe, who until then prioritizes *sôphrosynê* over *philostorgia*. It is then, and *only* then, that she decides to invert this hierarchy and marry Dionysius (2.11.3). When she addresses *eugeneia*, *sôphrosynê*, and *philostorgia* in a prayer to Aphrodite after the marriage, it is clear that she has revised their relative importance. *Sôphrosynê*, to be sure, is still more important than *eugeneia*: she makes it clear that she finds marrying Dionysius harder to bear (*βαρύτερον*) than the slavery (*πέπραμαι, δεδούλευκα*) and all the other misfortunes that have befallen her (3.8.9). But her love for the child now takes absolute priority: she begs the goddess to preserve her fatherless child (*σῶζέ μοι τὸν ὀρφανόν*) and stipulates that this one favour (*μίαν . . . αἰτοῦμαι χάριν παρὰ σοῦ*) comes at the price of the *totality* of her misery (*ἀντὶ πάντων*) (which covers, we may assume, both her marriage and enslavement). This phrasing clearly echoes an earlier prayer to Aphrodite (*before* she met Dionysius and found herself pregnant), in which she likewise asked for 'one favour' (*μίαν . . . αἰτοῦμαι παρὰ σοῦ χάριν*, 2.2.8). Whereas back then, this favour concerned her *sôphrosynê* ('grant that I attract no man after Chaereas'), it now concerns the well-being of her child. Plangon's prediction about the primacy of *philostorgia* has turned out to be correct after all: it now appears at the top of Callirhoe's list, followed by *sôphrosynê* and *eugeneia* (in that order).

The morality of Callirhoe's second marriage is depicted ambiguously. As we have seen, the first dilemma (abortion or not) is emphatically presented in *moral* terms by Callirhoe herself, who also adopts an 'objective' procedure traditionally associated with weighing moral questions. On the other hand, as far as her second dilemma (abortion or marriage) is concerned, the narrator invites the reader *not* to judge Callirhoe's character on the basis of her final decision. He explicitly presents the marriage as a *necessity* (*τὴν ἀνάγκην*, 5.1.1). His view corresponds with Callirhoe's own perception: she repeatedly indicates that she feels *forced* to marry because of her pregnancy (*τὸ τέκνον με προδίδωσιν*, 2.11.5; *με προύδωκε τούτο τὸ βρέφος*, 3.2.13). This emphasis on the necessity of the marriage seems to go some way towards absolving the heroine from guilt. Since she is forced by circumstances, the marriage is presented as not supported by free choice or *proairesis* and,

⁸⁰ Montiglio (2005: 233).

therefore, as morally void. But even if the narrator invites us not to morally assess Callirhoe's *character* on the basis of her marriage, this does not mean—to use Gill's distinction—that her *personality* remains undocumented. In fact, the process by which Callirhoe is outmanoeuvred by Plangon and forced into marriage is presented in minute detail. This process, I submit, is part of a larger depiction of Callirhoe as an object of interpersonal control. The narrator invites us to *understand* her course of action and whereas some scholars have regarded Callirhoe as a dupe of *Fortune*,⁸¹ such understanding in my view is informed mainly by her depiction as a dupe of *human* manipulation.⁸²

Generally speaking, Callirhoe is repeatedly and emphatically cast as the object and victim of interpersonal power relations in key episodes of the early stages of the narrative. In the scene that results in her separation from Chaereas, for example, she is kicked into a coma as a direct result of his anger—an incident that tangibly visualizes the asymmetrical power relations that Konstan (2006: 57–8) defines as essential to the dynamics of anger. Shortly after, she is transported to Miletus and, as she self-consciously summarizes, sold as a mere chattel (ὥς σκευός, 1.14.9)—an objectification that resonates with many other such images throughout the novel (φορτίον, 1.12.4; τὸ ἄθλον, 4.4.1, 5.8.4; θήραμα, 6.4.9; γέρας, 8.5.10; τῶν λαφύρων, 8.1.6) and aligns her with famous epic female captives such as Chryseis and Briseis, equally objectified as possessions and war-booty.⁸³ Two episodes are of particular importance. And, I suggest, they are meant to be read as a doublet—a well-known technique of juxtaposition in other novels too.⁸⁴ The first of these episodes narrates Callirhoe's confrontation with Plangon (2.2.1–3.2.17) and leads up to her decision to marry Dionysius. The second episode, which both presents Callirhoe's concern with her chastity in a confrontation with a socially inferior character and explores issues of control and manipulation, narrates her confrontation with Artaxerxes' eunuch Artaxates (6.3.1–6.13). In my view, a number of similarities between these two episodes invite the reader to read the latter in relation to the former. In other words, whereas Callirhoe's character is constructed, as we will see, by direct and metonymical techniques (mainly speeches and (re)actions) in the Plangon episode, these techniques are complemented in the Artaxates episode by metaphorical characterization (involving significant contrasts and similarities with the Plangon episode).

⁸¹ Montiglio (2010: 29–32) is an example. On the agency of Fortune in Chariton more generally, see Doulamis (2012: 22–4).

⁸² This aspect is part of a broader thematic concern central to this novel: power. On its political dimension, see S. D. Smith (2007a).

⁸³ On such objectification in epic, see de Jong (1987: 110, 119 n. 9).

⁸⁴ See e.g. Ségol (1984), Morgan (1998a), Nakatani (2001), and Stephens and Winkler (1995: 184).

First, the Plangon episode. As we have seen, throughout the entire Milesian episode, *eugeneia* is one of Callirhoe's major concerns. The way she tries to deal with her new status as a slave is significant. When servants praise her beauty and bring her fresh clothes, she refuses to wear them, saying that they are not appropriate for a slave (2.2.3). Instead, she orders them to bring a slave's *chitôn*, which is more appropriate to her new status (2.2.4). At the level of the key function, her words again highlight the character of a freeborn person who has not yet reconciled herself to her new fate. And again, the paradox at work is that even if she realizes that she is, in fact, a slave, her very speech act is that of a free woman. At the level of the argument function, on the other hand, we might discern a specific aim behind her words. Since the narrator specifies that the servants' praise of her beauty makes her sad and that she realizes that her beauty will cause her trouble in the future (2.2.3), it seems logical that she prefers to wear a slave's *chitôn* instead of clothes that would enhance that beauty.⁸⁵ Her effort, however, soon appears to be vain: her beauty is too overwhelming to be restrained by a change in clothing (2.2.4). On both levels, the passage is emblematic of Callirhoe's position in the entire Plangon episode. On the one hand, she continuously, agonizingly, and often paradoxically contemplates her loss of freedom. On the other hand, any attempt to exert some sort of control over her environment is consistently frustrated.

In the Plangon episode, Callirhoe's *eugeneia* is closely connected with her inexperience (*apeiria*). Both characteristics are attributed almost simultaneously (2.10.7) and put into relief by the depiction of Plangon, Dionysius' *serva callida*⁸⁶ repeatedly characterized by the term *peira* ('experience', 2.8.2 and 2.8.5). Plangon's introduction into the story as 'quite an experienced creature' (ζῶον οὐκ ἄπρακτον, 2.2.1) immediately emphasizes the aspect of her character that will determine the entire episode: she draws upon experience that Callirhoe herself does not possess. At this point, the reader has already been alerted to Callirhoe's inexperience of evil (*ἄπειρος κακότητος ὑποψίας*, 1.2.6) by another character who, like Plangon, eventually exploits this inexperience by using a ruse or *technê*—a term repeatedly adopted in both episodes to refer to schemes by which Callirhoe is misled (1.2.5, 1.4.1, 2.7.7, 2.8.2).⁸⁷

Plangon's first words to Callirhoe aim at winning the girl's confidence by reassuring her that she has come to a welcoming house (2.2.1). The success of

⁸⁵ See Kaimio (1995: 128); see also Helms (1966: 57), who rightly identifies Callirhoe's request for slave clothes as an indication of her intelligence. Simultaneously, Callirhoe's discontent with her own beauty has tragic resonances (see e.g. Easterling 1977: 122 on Deianira and Iole in *S. Tr.* 24–5 and 464–5 respectively).

⁸⁶ On this (comic) character type in the novels, see Billault (2003: 117). Of course, the nurse whose dominant trait is devotion to her mistress or master is also a tragic motif, on which, see Flygt (1934: 510–11).

⁸⁷ Other resemblances between both episodes are listed by Laplace (1980: 110–11).

this approach is soon illustrated when Plangon's absence is singled out as the main reason for Callirhoe's helplessness: amidst things strange to her (πάντα . . . ξένα, 2.3.9), she focalizes Plangon as 'familiar' (συνήθη, 2.3.9). Accordingly, Plangon is the only character to whom Callirhoe confesses that Chaereas might have arrived in Miletus (3.9.3).⁸⁸ Once Dionysius has instructed Plangon to arouse love for him in Callirhoe (2.6.5), the narrator is explicit about the slave's cunning and manipulative attitude. After preparing her case secretly (ἀφανής), she *displays* (ἐπεδείκνυτο) sympathy for Callirhoe and wants to be credible as an adviser (ὥς σύμβουλος).⁸⁹ Her attitude (and Callirhoe's defencelessness against it) is further illustrated by significant actions (and Callirhoe's reactions). The first such illustration is an incident between Dionysius and Plangon's husband Phocas. Although the incident itself is said to be of little importance (2.7.2), Plangon takes the opportunity to persuade Callirhoe to beg Dionysius for Phocas' life. Dionysius realizes immediately that Callirhoe's intervention is the result of Plangon's ruse (τὸ στρατήγημα, 2.7.6; τῆς τέχνης, 2.7.7; ἐστρατήγηται, 2.8.1). Callirhoe feels obliged on account of Plangon's earlier help (ταῖς ἐνεργεσίαις ὑπ' αὐτῆς, 2.7.3) and emphasizes her gratitude (χάριν, 2.7.5) and her trust in Plangon as if she were her daughter (ὥς θυγατέρα).

It is in the context of Callirhoe's pregnancy that the contrast between Plangon's experience and Callirhoe's inexperience is documented in most detail. Significantly, the pregnancy is first discovered not by Callirhoe herself but by Plangon (συνήκεν, 2.8.5), who, the narrator adds, has 'experience in women's affairs' (πεῖραν . . . τῶν γυναικείων). Callirhoe's *apeiria*, then, applies not only to her inability to detect Plangon's ruses but also to a lack of knowledge about herself and her own body. And in both aspects, her inexperience is contrasted with Plangon's experience. As soon as Callirhoe is found to be pregnant, Plangon realizes that this turn of events offers the perfect opportunity to bring her closer to Dionysius. Her (feigned) disagreement with Callirhoe's decision to keep the child results in a striking illustration of how she manipulates Callirhoe. Callirhoe desperately begs Plangon to help her find a *technê* to bring up the child. At this point, however, the reader has repeatedly been informed (2.7.7, 2.8.2) that a *technê* is precisely what Plangon is using to manipulate Callirhoe. Cleverly, Plangon takes up this term when describing her solution to the problem (a marriage to Dionysius) as a *technê* (2.10.3).

⁸⁸ Callirhoe's confidence in and dependence on Plangon are also observed by other characters (2.5.2, 2.6.5).

⁸⁹ The words 'ὥς σύμβουλος' are ambiguous as to whether fakery is involved on the part of Plangon. We may be invited to translate 'as if she were her adviser', rather than simply 'as an adviser' (Reardon 2008b: 45) or 'en la conseillant' (Molinié 2002: 84). A similar use of 'ὥς' occurs in X. An. 1.1.2 (ὥς φίλον) and is discussed in Ps.-Aristid. Rh. 2.42 as a marker of fakery. However, since Chariton often uses 'ὥς' without fakery being implied (for example, 2.7.5, 2.11.5 and 6.4.10), we cannot be sure.

After approving this solution, Callirhoe again uses the same term in a prayer to Aphrodite, begging the goddess that the ruse (τὴν τέχνην, 3.2.13) will not be discovered. The verbal echo highlights Callirhoe's naivety in two ways: not only is she the victim of Plangon's ruse, but she also considers herself the *accomplice* to this ruse—a self-perception that further highlights her actual defencelessness against Plangon's manipulation.

A closer look at the method adopted by Plangon to persuade Callirhoe to marry Dionysius documents yet another aspect of their relationship: the radical asymmetry underlying their access to each other's character. Following Callirhoe's negative reaction to the initial suggestion of marriage (2.10.5), Plangon feigns (κατειρωνεύσατο, 2.10.6) approval of Callirhoe's refusal but immediately adds that this decision will prevent her from ever seeing her native country again (2.10.6–7). Obviously, this remark plays on Callirhoe's profound concerns with *eugeneia* (of which Plangon has been well aware all along, as her very first words indicate: 'My child, of course you miss your own people', 2.2.1). But Callirhoe does *not* realize (οὐδὲν ὑπώπτει, 2.10.7) that Plangon merely feigns consent because, the narrator is careful to add, she, unlike Plangon, is 'a young lady (μείραξ) of high birth (εὐγενής) who knows nothing about the tricks of slaves (πανουργίας ἄπειρος δουλικῆς)'. Again, it is a paradox that Callirhoe is described as *eugenês* and incapable of understanding slaves precisely when she *is* one. Clearly, her noble descent as well as her young age invest her with a mentality that does not allow her access to the mentality of slaves, even when she has become one. Callirhoe cannot even conceptualize Plangon's way of thinking, characterized as it is by knavery or *panourgia*,⁹⁰ and is therefore utterly defenceless against it.

Plangon, on the other hand, *does* have access to Callirhoe's character. This is made absolutely clear in her account of Callirhoe's decision to marry Dionysius. In this speech, addressed to Dionysius, Plangon pretends to quote Callirhoe literally. But the reader is invited to compare Callirhoe's original speech (2.11.5) with Plangon's purported recitation through Dionysius' explicit request to be told of Callirhoe's *exact* words ('tell me her actual words. Do not omit or add anything. Report exactly what she said', 3.1.5–6). Callirhoe's original words addressed to Plangon, are these:

'The child is betraying me; it is not what I want (τὸ τέκνον με προδίδωσιν ἀκούσης ἐμοῦ). You do what is best. But I am afraid (δέδοικα) that even if I put up with his lust (τὴν ὕβριν), Dionysius will treat me contemptuously, in my misfortune (τῆς τύχης); he may treat me as a concubine rather than as a wife (ὡς παλλακὴν μᾶλλον

⁹⁰ This characterization aligns Plangon with some notorious villains in Chariton's story, such as the tyrant of Acragas (1.2.5), his accomplice (1.4.3), and Theron (1.7.1, 1.13.2, 3.3.12, 3.3.17). It does not mean that Plangon is necessarily depicted as an equally bad character, but it clearly dissociates her from Callirhoe's naivety.

ἢ γυναῖκα) and refuse to bring up the child born from me;⁹¹ and I shall lose my marital fidelity (τὴν σωφροσύνην) for nothing' (2.11.5)

Callirhoe's alleged words as quoted by Plangon to Dionysius are:

'She said, "I belong to the first family of Sicily; I have suffered misfortune, but I still have my pride. I have been deprived of my country (πατρίδος) and my parents (γονέων); the only thing I have not lost is my nobility (τὴν εὐγένειαν). So if Dionysius wants to have me as his concubine, if he wants to enjoy the satisfaction of his own desires, I will hang myself rather than give my body up to outrage fit for a slave (ὑβρεὶ δουλικῇ). But if he wants me as his legal wife, then I too want to be a mother, so that Hermocrates' line (τὸ Ἑρμοκράτους γένος) will be continued. . . . If he does not want to be a father, he shall not be my husband either.'" (3.1.6–8)

Despite Dionysius' request, Plangon both adds and omits elements.⁹² She declines to mention that Callirhoe feels *forced* to marry Dionysius because of her pregnancy (τὸ τέκνον με προδίδωσιν) and that she ultimately agrees to do so against her own will (ἀκούσης). The additions are twofold. First, in Plangon's version, Callirhoe proudly stipulates her conditions for marrying, whereas the original version highlights her fear (δέδοικα) that Dionysius may not be willing to recognize her as his legitimate wife. Secondly, Plangon twice foregrounds Callirhoe's willingness to be the mother of Dionysius' child. Only one element from Callirhoe's original speech resurfaces in Plangon's version. This element is Callirhoe's unwillingness to be Dionysius' concubine (*pallakê*) rather than his legitimate wife (*gynê*) and perfectly represents Callirhoe's central concern about the preservation of her social status.

Plangon's speech, then, is an *ethopoeia*, constructed 'in character' for Callirhoe. It is a speech that Callirhoe *could have* pronounced herself (but did not). Callirhoe's main concern is the same in her original speech and in Plangon's adaptation of it. But whereas Callirhoe is psychologically broken when she decides to marry Dionysius (the narrator is explicit that she weeps in distress, 2.11.5), Plangon's version presents the words of a noble and proud woman. In fact, her adaptation of Callirhoe's speech is so credible that Dionysius believes that these are indeed her words and, consequently, takes up the central issue of *eugeneia* in his answer to Callirhoe, assuring her that she will be his legitimate wife (3.2.2). Plangon, in short, knows precisely how to construct a speech in character for Callirhoe. The fictionalization implied may constitute a metaliterary moment regarding the construction of fictional character in general. Plangon, that is, resembles the novelist in that both

⁹¹ I here follow Trzaskoma (2010a), who suggests 'ἐξ ἐμοῦ' ('from me') instead of the manuscript's reading of 'ἐξ ἄλλου' ('of another man').

⁹² Pace Lucke (1985: 23 n. 21), who concludes from a number of verbal echoes that Plangon's speech is meant to be read as a literal citing of Callirhoe.

construct character through speech. Moreover, Plangon's *ethopoeia* resonates with the traditionally strong association of this technique with fictionality. Rhetorical handbooks clearly stipulate that *ethopoeia* deals with what a character 'would say' (not: did say) in a given situation⁹³ and, even when used in so-called non-fictional genres such as historiography, it is conceived of not as a literal representation of a speaker's actual words but as a technique of characterization that may imply fictionalization.⁹⁴ Plangon, similarly, does not faithfully quote Callirhoe's words, but deliberately constructs her character in a specific way. Whereas the entire episode, then, characterizes Callirhoe as a defenceless girl at the mercy of the *technai* of a cunning and experienced slave, Plangon's *ethopoeia* goes even further and shows us a version of Callirhoe as reduced to a mere fictional construct determined by Plangon's communication strategies.

A number of elements from the Plangon episode are picked up in the narration of Callirhoe's confrontation with Artaxates, the eunuch of the Persian king Artaxerxes at the Babylonian court. Artaxerxes has fallen in love with the heroine and sends his eunuch to persuade her to reciprocate. Artaxates' position as a *servus callidus* sent by his master and acting as a go-between to satisfy his master's desires aligns him with Plangon. The issues of *eugeneia* and *sôphrosynê* are immediately given centre stage when Artaxates himself thinks that he has been entrusted with an easy task (τὴν πρᾶξιν ῥαδίαν, 6.4.10), but the narrator ascribes this assumption to his ignorance 'as a eunuch, a slave, and a barbarian' (ὡς εὐνοῦχος, ὡς δοῦλος, ὡς βάρβαρος) of 'the spirit of a well-born Greek' (φρόνημα Ἑλληνικὸν εὐγενές). Ideological polarization of Persians and Greeks, to be sure, is a major theme in Chariton and this episode in particular thematizes ethnic and moral aspects of Callirhoe's characterization by contrasting her with a Persian.⁹⁵ As a barbarian, Artaxates cannot possibly gauge Callirhoe's qualities of pride and nobility. But of course, Artaxates is not only a Persian, but also a *slave*. Like the Plangon episode, this episode contrasts Callirhoe's *eugeneia* with a character situated on a lower social level. Again, the difference in social status implies a difference in mentality: the mentality of a *eugenês* person and a slave again appear to be incompatible. This time, however, it is the slave who cannot understand the mentality of the freeborn person.

When his first approach has been unsuccessful, Artaxates assesses Callirhoe's character more correctly, realizing that she will not give him the occasion

⁹³ The standard phrasing is 'ἀν' ἐμοί' (see e.g. Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 15.8 Sp. II, Aphth. *Prog.* 45.21 Sp. II, Theon *Prog.* 115.14 Sp. II, and Nicol. *Prog.* 64.11 Felten). On this technique in school curricula, see I. H. Henderson (2003: 24–5).

⁹⁴ See Wiseman (1993: 132–5).

⁹⁵ Bowie (1991: 189) and Daude (2001). Adducing Persian characters in metaphorical characterization as a foil for positively valued markers of Greekness is a well-known technique. See e.g. Tröster (2008: 39) on Mithridates as such a foil in Plutarch.

(*καιρόν*, 6.7.3) to approach her in public. Therefore, he arranges to meet her in private. The fact that Callirhoe plays a role in determining the *kairos* of their conversation provides another contrast with the Plangon episode, where Plangon herself controls the *momentum*: both the disagreement between Dionysius and Phocas and Callirhoe's pregnancy are explicitly presented as an opportunity or *kairos* for Plangon (*εἶρε . . . καιρόν*, 2.7.2; *καιρός ἐπιτήδειος*, 2.9.1). Significantly, when Callirhoe asks for time to think about the pregnancy (*καιρόν*, 2.10.7), Plangon's reply twice echoes the term *kairos* in order to force Callirhoe to hasten her decision (2.10.8 and 2.11.5). In the Plangon episode, then, it is the *serva callida* who controls the *kairos* of interaction with Callirhoe; in the Artaxates episode, on the other hand, the *servus callidus* realizes that it is Callirhoe who, at least partially, controls the *kairos*.

Another contrast concerns the representation of Callirhoe's emotional self-control. In Miletus, her reaction to the news of her pregnancy consisted of an uncontrolled attempt to perform an abortion (2.8.7), followed by an emotional appeal to Plangon (2.10.2). And when Plangon brought up marriage as a possible solution, her impulsive, spontaneous rejection, as we have seen, made her vulnerable to manipulation. In Babylon, on the other hand, she controls her emotions more effectively, to the point of dissimulation. When Artaxates informs her of the king's wish to share her bed, the news, to be sure, pierces her heart 'like a sword' (6.5.6). But this time, she *pretends* (*προσποιεῖτο*, 6.5.6) not to understand. And when the eunuch speaks more plainly, her first impulse is to attack him physically and to scratch his eyes out (6.5.8), but she manages to control her anger (*τὴν ὀργὴν μετέβαλε*) and instead feigns (*κατειρωνεύσατο*) unworthiness with regard to the king's request. Only when she is on her own (*καθ' αὐτὴν γενομένη*, 6.6.2) does she start lamenting and resolve to commit suicide if forced to have sex with the king. According to the narrator, her ability to control her anger is an indication of *paideia* and intelligence (*πεπαιδευμένη καὶ φρενῆρης*, 6.5.8).⁹⁶ This ability aligns her with Dionysius, whose emotional self-control is also presented as an indication of *paideia* (5.9.8, 8.5.10–11), and dissociates her from Artaxates, thus activating a dynamic of ideological differentiation between Greekness and Persian barbarism⁹⁷ as well as between *eugeneia* and slavery. The ideological triangulation also involves an aspect of rhetorical skilfulness. The reason why Callirhoe decides to suppress her anger is that she quickly remembers 'where she was, who she was, and who it was who was talking to her' (*τὸν τόπον καὶ τίς ἐστὶν αὐτὴ καὶ τίς ὁ λέγων*, 6.5.8). Her subsequent speech (6.5.9–10) shows that she indeed takes into account these three pragmatic factors: since she is at the mercy of the king at the Persian court in Babylon

⁹⁶ On Callirhoe's *paideia*, see M. Jones (2012: 35–9).

⁹⁷ The intrinsic connection between Greekness and *paideia* is again highlighted in 7.6.5, on which, see Bowie (1991: 189).

(τὸν τόπον), she realizes that straightforward protest would not be helpful⁹⁸ and therefore casts herself (τίς ἐστὶν αὐτῇ) in the role of a slave of Dionysius not worthy of the king's attention. In addition, she characterizes the eunuch (τίς ὁ λέγων) as a brilliant observer (συνετώτατος, 6.5.10) who nevertheless overlooks the fact that the king's feelings towards Callirhoe are philanthropy and compassion rather than love. The explicit mention of the speaker, the addressee, and the setting of the speech echoes the *progymnasmata*, where it is made explicit that *ethopoeia* should take into account each of these elements.⁹⁹ This echo functions on different levels. It testifies to the *paideia* of the novelist, who displays his knowledge of rhetorical handbooks by making his heroine speak 'by the book'. At the same time, it documents Callirhoe's intelligence and rhetorical versatility, which is further highlighted by her self-presentation as Dionysius' *slave*. This aspect recalls the importance of one's social position, or *tychê*, singled out by Theon as one of the determining aspects of one's speech.¹⁰⁰ But, of course, at this point in the narrative Callirhoe is not Dionysius' slave but his legitimate wife. Just as in the Plangon episode, then, Callirhoe's speech involves fiction. But this time, her words are not usurped in fictionalized discourse by another manipulative character; rather, it is Callirhoe herself who, through her speech, fictionally moulds her self-presentation to her own rhetorical agenda.

The heroine's rhetorical skilfulness is further underlined by the narrator's interpretation of Callirhoe's speech as an example of the rhetorical trope of *eirōneia* (κατειρωνεύσατο, 6.5.8). This trope activates a series of contrasts with the Plangon episode, where exactly the same term surfaces (κατειρωνεύσατο, 2.10.6), also in narrator text and also as the interpretation of speech. Whereas this trope in rhetorical speech genres can only function adequately if recognized and identified as such by the audience,¹⁰¹ the point of its use in both passages is precisely that the addressee does *not* realize that his/her interlocutor is applying it. But whereas the lack of understanding resides with Callirhoe in the Plangon episode, it resides with Artaxates in the second episode. Callirhoe, who was defenceless against the *serva callida*'s adoption of *eirōneia*, now uses *eirōneia* herself to control the *servus callidus*. Moreover, Plangon's *eirōneia*, as we have seen, is aimed at exploiting Callirhoe's wish to regain her freedom (2.10.6–7). In the second passage, Callirhoe's *eirōneia* denies,

⁹⁸ Kaimio (1995: 129) observes that the Artaxates scene 'sums up nicely Callirhoe's policy of survival: to grasp the situation realistically, to avoid argument, to appear meek but to keep her own counsel'.

⁹⁹ See Theon *Prog.* 115.23 Sp. II and Nicol. *Prog.* 64.4 Felten (on the speaker, τοῦ λέγοντος), Theon *Prog.* 115.24 Sp. II and Nicol. *Prog.* 64.5 Felten (on the narratee, πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος/πρὸς ὃν λέγει), and Theon *Prog.* 116.9–13 Sp. II (on setting and circumstances, τόποις καὶ καιροῖς). On this point, see also Brethes (2007a: 131–2).

¹⁰⁰ Theon *Prog.* 116.2–3 Sp. II (ἐτεροι λόγοι ἀρμόττειεν ἄν . . . διὰ τύχην δούλω καὶ ἐλευθέρω).

¹⁰¹ See H. Lausberg (1998: §582) on irony and context.

explicitly, her own *eugeneia* by casting herself in the role of Dionysius' slave. And whereas Plangon's *eirôneia* is explained as 'slaves' knavery' (*πανουργίας . . . δουλικῆς*, 2.10.7), with which Callirhoe is unfamiliar because of her young age and high descent, Callirhoe's use of the trope is evaluated as an index of her intelligence and *paideia*. Her young age is no longer mentioned; her high descent is no longer an obstacle to understanding *eirôneia* but, on the contrary, becomes the object of her own ironic play; and her inexperience has made room for clever and *paideia*-driven agency.

Callirhoe's rhetorical versatility in the Artaxates episode is in itself noteworthy, as it constitutes a sharp contrast with the striking *absence* of such versatility in certain other novel heroines. What is left of the *Ninus* novel, for example, seems to thematize rhetorical skilfulness as an exclusively *male* province: Ninus' long and spirited speech on marriage (A.I.38–IV.13) is contrasted with his beloved's inability to utter as much as a single word on this subject, even if her feelings are similar to his (A.IV.20–5). Longus too, as we will see, thematizes rhetorical ability as a quintessential male quality. In contrast, Callirhoe's resourcefulness in general aligns her much more with heroines like Xenophon's Anthia and Iamblichus' Sinonis. Her *paideia* and rhetorical versatility in particular she has in common with Parthenope and Heliodorus' Chariclea.¹⁰² In Chariton, now, Callirhoe's rhetorical performance in the Artaxates episode generates extra layers of meaning when read in relation to the Plangon episode and is, I believe, indicative of a dramatic change in Callirhoe's way of handling external forces attempting to exert control over her and her decisions. The impossibility of psychologically accessing the mindset of a social unequal shifts from Callirhoe in the Plangon episode to the slave in the Artaxates episode. Correspondingly, in the latter episode the rhetorical ability to determine the *kairos* of a conversation and to adopt *eirôneia* as a means of controlling the narratee no longer characterizes the slave but Callirhoe herself. Whereas Callirhoe is manipulated and controlled by Plangon in Miletus, by the time she has arrived in Babylon she has become psychologically armed against such manipulation and capable, rather, of dissimulating emotional expression and exerting control over other persons herself.

1.3.2 Evolving craft

The Plangon and Artaxates episodes indicate that Callirhoe's character—and, more specifically, its 'participant' strand (i.e. her character as defined by and embedded in relationships with other members of a community)—is not static.

¹⁰² On Parthenope's rhetorical abilities and education, see Stephens and Winkler (1995: 78, 92). On Chariclea, see Chapter 5.

By the time Callirhoe arrives in Babylon, she is not the same as when she arrived in Miletus. How is this change accounted for? To be sure, the macro-structure of the novel seems to be conducive to accommodating notions of change. As has been observed, the succession of clearly marked political spaces that act consecutively as settings of the plot (democratic Syracuse, liminal Miletus, despotic Persian empire) progressively places the protagonists deeper in ever more alien, barbarian, and threatening environments, and this movement corresponds to a series of abductors and rivals of ever increasing social status (the brigand Theron, the servant Leonas, Miletus' first citizen Dionysius, the Persian satrap Mithridates, and, finally, the king Artaxerxes himself).¹⁰³ Within this macro-structural design, the narrator goes some way towards explaining what has happened between the Plangon and Artaxates episodes. It is significant that the one passage where the possibility of character change is overtly addressed is found between these two episodes and, like them, combines the themes of Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê*, *eugeneia*, and the social control involved in challenging or protecting them. This passage comments on Callirhoe's marriage to Dionysius (3.2.16) and the birth of her child (3.7.7) and precedes her discovery of Chaereas' apparent death, which concludes the third book. This book has been read as building up to a point where Callirhoe's entire life is, as far as she knows, destroyed.¹⁰⁴ This is true up to a point, but in addition I would argue that the narrator has also marked this (transitional) book by signals pointing not only to what Callirhoe has lost, but also to competence and abilities (in the realm of social interaction) that she has now begun to gain (and will continue to build up from this point onwards).

As soon as she has given birth to her son, we are informed, she quickly recovers and grows stronger and bigger (*κρείττων ἐγένετο καὶ μείζων*, 3.8.3), 'reaching the prime no longer of a girl, but now of a woman' (*οὐκέτι κόρης, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς ἀκμὴν προσλαβοῦσα*). This comment, at first sight merely referring to Callirhoe's physical condition, may also hint at a growing *psychological* maturity. Indeed, as Chaereas' introduction reminds us, it would not be the first time that the narrator conveys implicit information on *inner* characteristics while drawing explicit attention to *outer* appearance (see §1.1). Let us not forget that when Callirhoe decides to marry Dionysius, two changes occur in her social status.¹⁰⁵ The marriage gives her back her original, free status (for her, this is an essential condition of the marriage; 2.11.5) and makes her at once the mistress of the house (*δέσποιναν . . . τῆς οἰκίας*, 3.7.7). Significantly, from the moment that she *knows* she will marry, her behaviour anticipates her new free status. Whereas in a previous episode she went to Aphrodite's temple on Plangon's advice (2.2.5), she now *herself* wants to pray

¹⁰³ Lowe (2000: 229–30).

¹⁰⁴ Trzaskoma (2010b: 227).

¹⁰⁵ See Couraud-Lalanne (1999: 85–9) and Lalanne (2006: 93–7) on (terms designating) Callirhoe's social status.

to the goddess and dismisses all other people present in the temple (πάντας ἐκβαλοῦσα, 3.2.12). Giving orders to others is an action repeatedly characterizing Callirhoe from this point onwards (3.8.6, 5.1.4, 8.3.3) and servants are shown to *obey* her (ὑπακούσασα, 3.9.1). Phocas' reluctance to inform Dionysius about the presence of Chaereas and Polycharmus in Miletus also highlights her new position in the household: Phocas is afraid not of his master Dionysius (οὐ Διονύσιον δεδουκώς, 3.9.6) but of Callirhoe, who might destroy him and his family (αὐτὸν ἀπολεῖ καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ) if she finds out what has happened. Whereas as a slave she was being controlled by other people (such as Theron and Plangon), she has now become someone to be reckoned with.

Her request to Dionysius to free his slave Plangon is another good indication of her acquired sense of interpersonal control. She pretends that she asks this favour out of gratitude for the servant (χάριν, 3.8.2), which echoes her previous request on Plangon's behalf (χάριν, 2.7.5). But unlike the first time, Callirhoe now has a hidden agenda: the narrator is explicit that her real motive is that Plangon is the only person who knows she was already pregnant when arriving on Dionysius' estate (3.8.1). By setting her free, Callirhoe intends to assure herself of Plangon's loyalty (τὸ πιστὸν παρ' αὐτῆς), 'not just as a matter of sentiment (μὴ μόνον ἐκ τῆς γνώμης) but on the basis of her social status (ἐκ τῆς τύχης)'. Callirhoe's motivation, then, is double: she wants to secure Plangon's gratitude (which, she hopes, will result in her silence about their secret), but she also seems to assume that Plangon cannot fully be trusted as long as she is Dionysius' *slave* (τῆς τύχης). Sure enough, this notion is in line with similar ones in the preceding episode, where Plangon's 'slavish knavery' (πανουργίας . . . δουλικῆς, 2.10.7) has repeatedly been emphasized along with her devotion to her master and her manipulatory skills. It also resonates with ancient notions of character as determined by and subsumed under status (slaves act like slaves and cannot be expected to act otherwise) (see §0.1). Not content to rely on the discretion of a *slave*, Callirhoe now manipulates Plangon's social position because she feels that her secret will be safer with a free woman. Plangon's liberation thus draws attention to the fact that the long preceding narrative sequence of pregnancy, marriage, and birth now ends with not just one but *two* reversals of social status. And in both cases, these reversals are concomitant with changes at the level of character: a changed psychological maturity in Callirhoe (that now allows her to control the people around her, instead of being controlled by them), and, in Callirhoe's view at least, a changed level of reliability in Plangon.

At the same time, social status is not the only factor influencing Callirhoe's behaviour. As indicated above, her inexperience, first observed by the tyrant of Acragas and then thematized in the Plangon episode, also provides some continuity. It is only after her second marriage and the birth of her child that this inexperience disappears: she has married a man and fooled him into

believing that he is the father of the child she is carrying; she has learned how to manipulate her environment. Simultaneously with her change from a young girl to a woman, her inexperience, innocence, and naivety have gone.

Does the narrator, then, stage Callirhoe's marriage to Dionysius, the re-acquisition of her original social status, and the birth of her son as a turning point in terms of character? Is it (just) that one episode of fundamental impact divides her life into a 'before' and an 'after' (as exemplified by the Plangon and Artaxates episodes respectively)? Even if this is broadly true, a closer look at Callirhoe's behaviour in a number of other instances encourages us to conceptualize her character change in more gradual terms. Her marriage to Dionysius does not offer a sharp break with the past in every respect. Already during her enslavement, for example, she once or twice shows traces of an ability to exert influence on people around her. The episode where she persuades Dionysius to send her back home (2.6.1) is a fine example, although it is of course significant that he is never made to keep this promise. Dissimulation too, exemplified during the Artaxates episode, informs her behaviour when she is abducted by Theron (προσποιεῖτο, 1.11.2). But again it is significant that she cannot influence his plans in any way. Conversely, Dionysius' rhetorically successful attempt to make Callirhoe bury Chaereas (4.1.3) is an example of an instance where she *is* psychologically controlled *after* her marriage.

Callirhoe's own perception of her (lack of) control over other characters also blurs any simple before-and-after opposition. As we have seen, Plangon encourages Callirhoe to see herself as an accomplice in their joint deception of Dionysius. And after Callirhoe has been requested to approach Dionysius on Phocas' behalf, she is given the impression that her intervention with Dionysius has been successful. The reader knows that Callirhoe is being fooled by Plangon and Dionysius, but Callirhoe herself is convinced that she is responsible for the reconciliation between Dionysius and Phocas—a thought that she first presented as unlikely given her slave status (δούλη καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἔχω παρρησίαν, 2.7.3) but now makes her exceedingly happy (χαίρουσαν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδομένην, 2.7.7). It is significant that this emotion is focalized by Plangon (ἐθεάσατο), the controlling force behind the entire scheme, who now monitors Callirhoe's reactions. Even if, at the level of the key function, this emotion is a clear indication of Callirhoe's naivety, at the level of the argument function it suggests that the outcome of her intervention makes her believe that she, as a slave, *can* exert some influence. For the first time in the story, she is made to believe that she *can* make a difference. This instance of self-perceived empowerment makes problematic any absolute opposition between a controlled 'before' and a 'controlling' after. The qualities as well as the exact location in time of Callirhoe's lack of control over others, it seems, are relative concepts: they differ according to *who* does the telling.

Finally, there is one specific metonymical technique of characterization that also contributes to conceptualizing the heroine's establishment of interpersonal control in gradual terms: the heroine's blushing, all instances of which document her relationship to Dionysius and occur in the context of either their premarital meetings or (reference to) their marriage.¹⁰⁶ On the first two occasions, at the beginning of the Plangon episode, Callirhoe is about to address her new master (*ἡρυθρίασεν*, 2.5.5; *ἐρυθρήματος ἐνεπλήσθη*, 2.7.5). Both times, her blush is accompanied by bowing the head (*κάτω κύψασα*) and uttering words softly (*ἡρέμα εἶπεν*, 2.5.5) or with difficulty (*μόλις δὲ ὁμῶς ἐφθέγγετο*, 2.7.5). Neither the narrator nor Dionysius interprets either of these blushes, but the most obvious cause is a feeling of shame¹⁰⁷ as a result of her lost freedom. This concern is prominent in the entire Milesian episode, but foregrounded particularly clearly in the first blushing instance, where her blush is an immediate reaction to Dionysius' enquiry about her past and his question about whether she has been sold. Moreover, the concept of shame is often implicated by the Greek term *aidōs*,¹⁰⁸ a trait explicitly attributed to Callirhoe when she is, as here, the object of the attention of others (*αἰδουμένη*, 2.3.9) and typically associated with body language that marks her behaviour in this episode: blushing,¹⁰⁹ bowing of the head,¹¹⁰ and speaking softly.¹¹¹

The next time Callirhoe blushes, she has, as a result of Plangon's skilful machinations, decided to marry Dionysius. Here too she blushes (*ἐρυθρίασασα*, 3.2.3) just before addressing him and again her awareness of her deteriorated social status surfaces as an explanation, as she states that she does not trust her own fate (*τῇ ἐμῇ τύχῃ*, 3.2.3) since 'it has already brought me low, from a greater and better position' (*ἐκ μειζόνων ἀγαθῶν*). But now the blush also occurs when she kisses Dionysius gently (*ἡρέμα κατεφίλησεν*) and calls her future husband not by his title, as in the speech following her second blush (*κύριε*, 2.7.5), but by his name. Moreover, this is an episode crucial to the completion of Callirhoe and Dionysius' marriage: the reference to her changed *tychê* serves to motivate her request (as communicated to him, as we have seen, by Plangon) to become his legitimate wife rather than his

¹⁰⁶ Some aspects of the following discussion have also been dealt with in De Temmerman (2007a).

¹⁰⁷ The connection between blushing and shame is made explicit by Ps.-Arist. *Phgn.* 812a.30–3 (on which see p. 39). On this connection, see also C. Barton (1999: 214–22).

¹⁰⁸ D. L. Cairns (1993: 14–47).

¹⁰⁹ See e.g. Poll. *Onom.* 2.87 and Phlp. in *de An.* 1b3.

¹¹⁰ See e.g. Lucian, *Philops.* 29.20–1 (*ἡρυθρίασα καὶ κάτω ἔνευσα αἰδεσθείς*), Ael. NA 3.1 (*αἰδοῦς ἡσυχῇ καὶ κάτω βλέπων*), Polyæn. *Strategemata* 8.52.1, and Basil of Caesarea, *Against the prophet Isaiah* 3.123.15–17 (*εἰς γῆν κατανέουσα ὑπὸ αἰδοῦς, ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω καθελκόμενον ἔχει τὸ πρόσωπον*).

¹¹¹ See e.g. E. Tr. 654 (muted lips and quietly downcast eyes as markers of submissiveness). See also D. L. Cairns (1993: 6–7, 2002: 76–81) and Llewellyn-Jones (2003: 158–9, 2005: 86–7).

concubine and she persuades him to swear (ὄμοσον, 3.2.5) that he will regard her as such. Dionysius' agreement implies that he declares himself prepared to be the father of Callirhoe's children (παίδων . . . νίων, 3.2.2), but of course, he does not know that she is already pregnant by Chaereas. Thus, when she makes Dionysius swear the oath that makes possible their marriage and her social rehabilitation, she rhetorically manipulates her future husband by withholding information immediately relevant to the very oath that he is swearing. Her blush can be read as a marker of her hidden agenda. Again, then, we see Callirhoe engaged in establishing control over another character even before the marriage. Whereas such control was effective only in her own mind during her intervention on Phocas' behalf, she now *is* the agent of control in the reader's view as well. Her awareness of the ability to control other people is no longer an illusion.¹¹²

The connection between blushing, marriage and oath-swearing evokes a tradition that goes back to Callimachus' (fragmentarily preserved) version of the story about Cydippe and Acontius (*Aet.* frs. 67–75) as attested by Ps.-Aristaenetus (*Epistles* 1.10.40–7). When Cydippe inadvertently reads out an oath inscribed by Acontius on an apple, thus involuntarily swearing that she will marry him, she immediately rejects this oath full of shame (αἰδουμένη) and blushing (ἐξεφονίχθη τὸ πρόσωπον). The narrator is explicit that she leaves out the final word (γαμοῦμαι, 'I will marry'), since it mentions marriage (γάμον), 'something an honourable maiden (σεμνή παρθένος) would have blushed at (ἡρυνθρίασε) even if it was spoken of by another'. This connection between blushing and (shame about) marriage is recycled in a number of instances throughout the literary tradition¹¹³ and also occurs in Heliodorus (1.21.3, 10.24.2), by whose time, it has been suggested, it has become a literary commonplace.¹¹⁴ Even if the specific plot lines involved in Cydippe's and Callirhoe's blushing scenes are quite different (and I do not necessarily assume a direct line of influence), it is possible that the connection between female blushing and oath-swearing about marriage in Chariton 3.2.3 forms part of the Callimachean tradition. This background points to the less than ideal implications of Callirhoe's blush: like Cydippe's blush, Callirhoe's is presented as being inextricably bound up with the notions of oath-swearing and marriage, but rather than merely indicating a sense of shame characteristic of an 'honourable girl' (like Cydippe), it coincides with the psychologically more realistic issue of rhetorical manipulation. These concerns are also highlighted, again by contrast, in a passage from the *Ninus* novel, where the heroine, like Cydippe, is too ashamed (τῇν αἰδῶ, A.IV.36–7)

¹¹² See also Kaimio (1995: 124–32), who explores a number of instances where Callirhoe acquires some control over her environment.

¹¹³ Cat. 65.24; Ov. *Her.* 20.5–6, 20.97, 20.202, 21.111–12; Verg. *Aen.* 12.64–70.

¹¹⁴ F. Cairns (2005: 198–203, esp. 203).

to even speak about marriage: instead, no word comes out of her mouth, she bursts out in tears, and blushes (ἤρυν[θαίνο]ντο, A.IV.35).¹¹⁵ Callirhoe's blush, in contrast, occurs precisely when she *does* speak about marriage: it marks things other than mere shyness.

Following this episode, Callirhoe does not blush again until the final book of the novel, when she does so (ἐρυθριῶσα, 8.4.9) while leaning a little (ἡρέμα προσκύψασα) towards Statira and giving to her a letter of farewell to Dionysius. This episode echoes even more clearly some of the psychological concerns observed in the previous episode. The blush clearly indicates a certain sense of guilt, first towards Dionysius, since, with this letter, Callirhoe abandons a man who she made believe was the father of her child—a lie which she repeats explicitly in this very letter;¹¹⁶ secondly, towards Chaereas, as the narrator makes it clear that in recounting the story of her past adventures to Chaereas, Callirhoe is silent and ashamed about her marriage to Dionysius (ἐσιώπησεν αἰδουμένη, 8.1.15). This much is emphasized again when the narrator tells us that the writing of the letter is the only instance of her deeds that Callirhoe keeps hidden from her husband (τοῦτο μόνον ἐποίησε δίχᾳ Χαιρέου . . . λαθεῖν, 8.4.4) and when he subtly adds that she *hides* the letter from him (ἀπέκρυψεν, 8.4.7). Thus, this blush is again a clear indication of something far less pure than the innocent *aidôs* which coloured Callirhoe's face at the beginning of the story. In addition to Callirhoe's problematic *sôphrosynê*, it thematizes the social and emotional control that she manages to establish over her husband when narrativizing her *sôphrosynê* to him.

There is one recent reading of Chariton with which my interpretation of the blushing scenes is not compatible. Tilg (2010: 146–55) argues that all four instances of Callirhoe's blushing relate to her bigamy or 'adultery tale' and that, therefore, they should be read in the context of (and as a reaction to) the *Sybaritica*, a tradition of low-life narrative in which adultery plots ('the most popular kind of low-life novellas', 148) can reasonably be assumed to have played an important role. He therefore reads all blushes of Callirhoe indiscriminately as signs of embarrassment and shame about *her* adultery story that characterize her 'as an ideal heroine who has overcome an infamous line in her literary ancestry' (149). But there are problems with this reading. For one thing, Tilg's basic assumption that all four instances of the blushing relate to Callirhoe's bigamy is simply not correct: two of these episodes (2.5.5, 2.7.5) occur well before the option of marriage is even so much as suggested to Callirhoe (2.10.5) (even if the reader is informed as early as 2.4.5 about

¹¹⁵ Just as in Cydippe's and Callirhoe's cases, there is also an oath involved (ἐὐορκήσας, A.II.1), probably relating to the wedding, but given the fragmentary nature of the text, it is less clear whether and how it relates to the blushing. On this scene, see Hägg (2006: 148–9).

¹¹⁶ On (legal assumptions about) Callirhoe's decision to entrust her child to Dionysius' care, see Schwartz (1999).

Dionysius' desire to marry her). Shame about adultery, then, cannot explain these instances because there is not even the slightest intention of it on her part. And in the other two episodes, where adultery is part of the context, I hope to have shown that Callirhoe's blushes are motivated by concerns for which Tilg's label of 'ideal' is hardly appropriate. One problem with Tilg's reading of these episodes is unnecessarily rigid and schematic conceptualization. Even if Chariton in some instances wants us to imagine his story as a deviation from the *Sybaritica*,¹¹⁷ there is no reason to conceptualize this deviation in terms of a strict opposition between the so-called 'realism' of this tradition and the 'idealism' with which Chariton purportedly responds to it. In other words, the mere (and obvious) fact that Callirhoe is no low-life character like those inhabiting Sybaritic traditions does not mean that, therefore, she must necessarily be simply and wholly 'ideal' without qualification. Rather than adopting such a dichotomy, I would suggest allowing some room for other than ideal concerns in Callirhoe's characterization (such as, precisely, the psychologically realistic concerns underlying the last two blushing scenes). Such 'realistic' concerns are, of course, qualitatively very different from the low-life 'realism' presented in *Sybaritica*¹¹⁸ but—and this is my point—they are also very different from the unproblematic type of idealism that Tilg defends.

Tilg takes his cue in part from Hansen (1997), who interprets the tenderness of Callirhoe's white skin (2.2.2) as another instance of idealization of existing material: what used to be a comic trait of the Sybarites becomes an ideal characteristic of Callirhoe. This may be correct as far as it goes: the detail of Callirhoe's skin occurs shortly after Callirhoe's allegedly Sybaritic origin is mentioned for the second time (2.1.9) and is part of a depiction that foregrounds her divine beauty through imagery of light and radiance (which at least since Chariton constitute standard *topoi* to construct extraordinary beauty in novelistic heroines and heroes¹¹⁹). I agree with Hansen, then, that this passage can safely be said to idealize Callirhoe's beauty. But of course, this does not mean, as Tilg assumes, that such idealization automatically and

¹¹⁷ Tilg (2010: 147) rightly cites Fakas' (2005) (quite plausible) argument that Chariton metaliterarily refers to, and at the same time dissociates himself from, the tradition of the *Sybaritica*, for example when Theron attributes a Sybaritic origin to Callirhoe (1.12.8, 2.1.9), which is later denied by Callirhoe herself ('Sybaris I have never seen', 2.5.5).

¹¹⁸ On my use of the term 'realism' as lifelikeness, see §0.2. Fakas (2005), for his part, assumes some thematic overlap when arguing that Callirhoe's alleged 'Sybaritic' origin makes her a complex heroine who shares characteristics of both the low-life and the ideal tradition of story-telling.

¹¹⁹ See e.g. Chariton 2.2.4, 4.1.8–9, 5.9.7, 5.3.9 (Callirhoe), 1.1.5 (Chaereas), Ach. Tat. 1.4.2 (Leucippe), and Hld. 1.2.3 (Theagenes). A white skin in particular is recurrent in the depiction of novel heroines: Leucippe has white cheeks (λευκή, Ach. Tat. 1.4.3), Chloe's face and body in general are white (λευκότερον, Longus 1.17.3; λευκόν, 1.24.3, 1.32.1), and Chariclea's white skin (λευκήν, Hld. 10.14.4) is, of course, intrinsically tied up with the core of her identity.

indiscriminately informs *all* aspects pertaining to Callirhoe. In fact, the narrator of this novel makes it clear as early as the introduction of the protagonists (another episode where ideal beauty is so powerfully present) that he is perfectly capable of pointing to less than ideal *inner* characteristics alongside (and in some cases precisely through) the depiction of external idealization.

The notion of psychological and/or rhetorical control as present in two of the four blushing scenes is also foregrounded by a passage where Callirhoe does not blush herself, but *makes* Chaereas blush towards the end of the novel (8.3.1). In general, the cause of the blushes of male characters resides, directly or indirectly, with Callirhoe. Mithridates and Artaxerxes, for example, blush because their feelings for Callirhoe are about to be discovered (4.2.13, 6.3.1). But her role in Chaereas' blushing is more active. This blush is a response to her question about whether he plans to take Statira and Rhodogune with him to Syracuse now that they have become war prisoners. This blush may indicate Chaereas' unease at being 'caught',¹²⁰ but the episode also documents Callirhoe's sense of agency. Immediately before, she takes Chaereas by the hand (*λαβομένη Χαιρέου τῆς δεξιᾶς*, 8.3.1) and leads him aside (*μόνον αὐτὸν ἀπαγαγούσα*). At this point in the story, the reader has come across three episodes where characters behave exactly like Callirhoe (and where exactly the same terminology is used to represent it).¹²¹ In all three cases, this behaviour documents the establishment of dominance over, and/or malicious manipulation of, one of the protagonists. Chaereas, for example, is led away (*ἐμβαλὼν αὐτῷ τὴν δεξιὰν ἀπήγαγεν*, 1.4.5) by a man who is about to tell to him the false story of, Callirhoe's adultery. Theron, for his part, takes Callirhoe by the hand to lead her out of the tomb in which he found her (*λαβόμενος οὖν τῆς χειρὸς ἐξήγαγεν αὐτήν*, 1.9.7), only to sell her as a slave after pretending that he will give her back to her parents. And Artaxates takes Callirhoe by the hand and leads her away (*ἐμβαλὼν τὴν δεξιάν . . . ἀπήγαγε*, 6.7.5) when he is about to explain to her the choice which she faces at that moment: either pleasing the Persian king sexually whenever he wants or experiencing what enemies of the king undergo. Consequently, at 8.3.1, where Chaereas is led away by Callirhoe, the reader remembers the wicked manipulation associated with this gesture earlier in the story. Whereas this action involving hero(ine) and bad character evokes wickedness, it is now—between the heroes themselves¹²²—transformed into a rather harmless but significant incident: Callirhoe, who was once defenceless and manipulated, becomes in this passage—quite literally—the *manipulator* (sic!) herself.

¹²⁰ Lateiner (1998: 175).

¹²¹ I do not consider 5.9.3, where Statira takes Callirhoe's hand (without leading her away) to comfort her.

¹²² Brioso Sánchez (1999a: 75–6) gives some examples of manipulation between lovers in the novels but does not mention this passage.

1.4 HEROIC CHANGE?

The developing ability to control one's social environment is also central to Chaereas' characterization, where, as we will see, it is linked to a developing *self-control* more emphatically than in Callirhoe's case. Again, I argue, these notions raise psychologically realistic concerns.¹²³ I have built this section of the chapter around an aspect of Chaereas' characterization that has triggered a notable amount of disapproval among students of the genre from Rohde (1914³: 527) onwards: the sudden, so-called 'character shift' in the seventh book.¹²⁴ (For reasons that will become clear, I prefer the phrase 'behavioural shift'.) In the first six books of the eight-book novel, Chaereas is characterized by passive behaviour that sharply distinguishes him from the resourceful heroine Callirhoe. Unlike her, he hardly ever undertakes any action to resolve his problems and spends most of his time lamenting his separation from her. Such passive and uncontrolled behaviour has been recognized as a stereotypical marker of novelistic heroes,¹²⁵ but in the seventh book Chaereas' behaviour changes dramatically: he joins the Egyptian army in revolt against the Persian king Artaxerxes, turns out to be a brilliant soldier, succeeds in occupying the impregnable city of Tyre, and in less than no time becomes the admiral of the whole Egyptian fleet.

The military side to this transformation is often read as providing a necessary step towards Chaereas truly becoming a hero worthy of the heroine and reintegrating into his community.¹²⁶ Others rightly add that his transformation is also informed by a developing ability to learn how to control and utter emotions appropriately and suggest that this ability represents the young man's personal growth towards a 'full adult-male status'.¹²⁷ Part of the argument in this chapter sets out to show that the two dimensions are complemented by an important third one: the establishment of control over *others*. I proceed in two steps. I first survey a number of striking before-and-after differences that surround Chaereas' transformation. I then discuss the transformation itself in more detail.

¹²³ Such concerns have long been thought to be absent in Chaereas' character. Helms (1966: 129), for example, is explicit about such absence. Alvares (1993: 90) and S. D. Smith (2007a: 64 n. 29, 199–248) are more sensitive to such issues.

¹²⁴ See also Haynes (2003: 100) on the inconsistency involved.

¹²⁵ See e.g. Konstan (1994: 15–26) on the contrast between the resourceful Greek novel heroines and their helpless male counterparts.

¹²⁶ As in Schmeling (1974: 135). See also Balot (1998: 156) on Chaereas' martial valour as the fulfilment of 'the central virtues appropriate to his gender, training, and elite status', Haynes (2003: 100) on Chaereas' generalship as 'proof of masculinity', and Lalanne (2006: 91–2) on the language of *andria* in books 7–8. See also Mason (2002) on Chaereas' 'growth' in social status.

¹²⁷ Scourfield (2003: 175). See also Brethes (2009) and Guez (2009). On self-control in a sexual context, see Redondo Moyano (2002–3: 55–6, 60–4).

1.4.1 Before . . .

The first thematic area where Chaereas' behaviour is amply documented in the first six books and significantly inverted from book 7 onwards is that of control over the self, which usually implies a reasoned ability to detect one's own interests and to act accordingly (an ability often identified as *sôphrosynê* in the case of male characters¹²⁸). Chaereas' *inability* to exercise self-control in the first six books is presented as morally problematic as early as the first pages of the novel, where his inclination towards erotic jealousy (*ζηλοτυπία*, 1.2.5–6, 1.5.4) repeatedly results in uncontrollable anger¹²⁹ and directly causes the apparent death of his wife (1.4.12).¹³⁰ Such behaviour seems to constitute a gender-role reversal of traditional stereotypes¹³¹ as they are found, for example, in Heliodorus, where jealousy is presented explicitly as a sickness naturally affecting women or, equally significantly, eunuchs.¹³² And even if Heliodorus' novel, to be sure, also features male characters affected by jealousy (e.g. Petosiris in 7.2.4), the specific combination of anger and jealousy which we see in Chaereas marks the behaviour of a number of *heroines* in other novels. Photius' summary of Iamblichus' *Babyloniaca*, for example, narrates how Sinonis, the heroine, flares up in anger (*ὀργήν*) after Rhodanes, the hero, has kissed another girl, and subsequently turns on her 'like a madwoman' (*καθάπερ τις ἐμμανής*) in order to kill her (*Bibl. cod.* 94, 76b22–30).¹³³ In a fragment preserved from a novel commonly known as *Calligone* (*PSI* 981), furthermore, it is again the heroine who is marked by destructive fury,¹³⁴ whereas a male character called Eubiotus represents reasoned self-control. He

¹²⁸ On *sôphrosynê* as such a 'social virtue', see Frazier (1996: 191–3). Rademaker (2004: 50–4) discusses the term more generally and De Temmerman (2009a: 240–1) its polysemy in Chariton. On (the lack of) this virtue in Chariton, see also Jouanno (2000).

¹²⁹ 1.3.3–5 (*ἐνθουσιῶν . . . ὀργήν . . . χόλου*), 1.4.10 (*οὐκέτι κατέσχευεν*), 1.4.12 (*κρατούμενος δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς*), on which, see Scourfield (2003: 163–75). On the usual markers of emotionality in these episodes (crying, tearing clothes, inability to talk properly and to control movements), see Jouanno (2000). On bloodshot eyes (*ὕφαίμοις τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς*, 1.3.5) as a marker of anger in particular, see Ps.-Arist. *Phgn.* 812a.35–6 (*οἷς δὲ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐπιφονίσσουσιν, ἐκστατικοὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς*).

¹³⁰ On moral problems involved in anger (and in particular its implications of impulsiveness and loss of control over passions), see Konstan (2006: 65) (on Stob. *Anthologia* 3.19.1) and Duff (1999: 87) (on Plutarch).

¹³¹ See e.g. Hawley (1995: 259–60) and Kraus (2007) on associations of women with *pathos* in ancient rhetorical traditions.

¹³² Hld. 7.21.5 (*τὴν γυναικῶν ἔμφυτον νόσον*), 8.6.2 (*φύσει . . . τὴν εὐνούχων ζηλοτυπίαν νοσῶν*), and 9.25.5 (*ζηλότυπον ἔμφυτον τὸ εὐνούχων γένος*).

¹³³ Both *Bibl. cod.* 94, 77b16–17 (*ὀργῆς τε καὶ ζηλοτυπίας*) and Iamb. *Bab. fr.* 61, 9 (*ὀργῆς*) and 33 (*ζηλοτυπίας*) are explicit about the combination of anger and jealousy at work. Another instance combining female anger and jealousy is provided by *Metiochus and Parthenope* (*ὀργῆς*, II.66; *οὐδεμίας ἔρασ*-, II.67), but its fragmentary nature does not allow certainty as to whether and to what extent these emotions lead the heroine to act in any uncontrolled way.

¹³⁴ Stephens and Winkler (1995: 267) align Calligone's and Sinonis' behaviour with Chaereas' in passing.

clears the room using a pretext (8–11) and furtively takes the weapon she is carrying (30–1), thus preventing her from carrying out the death threat she has uttered. In Chariton, significantly, it is Mithridates who acts as such a voice of reason when pointing out to Chaereas the necessity of careful deliberation (βουλευσασθαι δεῖ περὶ τῶν ἐξῆς φρονιμώτερον, 4.4.2) before the latter risks exposing himself to danger by going to Miletus and claiming his wife back from Dionysius (4.4.2). Although the reader knows that Mithridates is only pretending to be concerned about Chaereas' safety (4.3.11), his words clearly highlight the fact that Chaereas rushes ahead with his plans (σπεύδεις), guided by emotion rather than reason (πάθει μάλλον ἢ λογισμῷ), and is unable to foresee the consequences of his envisaged action (μὴδὲν τῶν μελλόντων προορώμενος).

The use of a foil like Mithridates, who (often through instructions or comments of his own) exposes someone else's lack of *sôphrosynê*, is a technique as old as the *Iliad* and present in other novels too.¹³⁵ In Chariton, such (metaphorical) characterization is foregrounded as instrumental as early as the first paragraphs when the tyrant of Acragas contrasts Chaereas and Callirhoe specifically with regard to emotional self-control. Whereas Callirhoe, according to the tyrant, possesses stability (*eustatheia*) (1.2.6), Chaereas is presented as an easy prey to the vices typical of young people (*νεωτερικῶν ἀμαρτημάτων*) and to erotic jealousy (*ἐρωτικὴν ζηλοτυπίαν*) in particular.¹³⁶ The passage is emblematic of the first six books of the novel, where Callirhoe's behaviour is indeed repeatedly shown to indicate *eustatheia*. This quality aligns her with the one other character thus explicitly characterized, Dionysius (3.2.1, 5.9.8, 8.5.11), in whose case the term consistently refers to his ability not to express grief impulsively in public, but to *control* its expression and restrict it to the private sphere.¹³⁷ Callirhoe also often chooses her setting carefully: she makes sure, for example, that she is *alone* when crying¹³⁸ and in other instances tries to control her emotions in the presence of an interlocutor (albeit unsuccessfully, e.g. 2.5.7, 3.7.4).¹³⁹ Her handling of the veil is another metonymical indication of her awareness of the importance of control over emotional

¹³⁵ See Burke (1978) on the *Iliad*. In Ach. Tat. 5.19.3–4, the lack of foresight of the male hero is similarly exposed by another character.

¹³⁶ On young people as particularly inclined towards uncontrolled emotions, see Arist. *Rh.* 2.12.3 (*νέοι ἐπιθυμητικοί*).

¹³⁷ On such self-imposed seclusion as indicative of *paideia*, see M. Jones (2012: 63). On the wider thematization of (self-)control in Chariton, see also Balot (1998: 145–61) and Scourfield (2003: 163–75). On the (at times permeable) boundary between public and private in the novels, Jouanno (2000: 77–9) and Whitmarsh (2005*d*: 119–22).

¹³⁸ In such instances, the absence of other people is emphasized (*μόνη* . . . *γενομένη*, 1.14.6; *φανερῶς* versus *ἡσυχῇ καὶ λανθάνουσα*, 6.2.5; *ἐρημίας λαβομένη*, 3.10.4).

¹³⁹ The *Sesonchosis* novel possibly thematizes similar attempts, also in the realm of female characterization (*P. Oxy.* 3319, III.22–3). For a discussion of such attempts as indications of mostly *male* qualities, on the other hand, see M. Jones (2012: 15–16, 50–5).

expression. She uses it not only to withdraw her *beauty* from public gaze¹⁴⁰ but also to hide her *emotions* from the outside world. When she is in love with Chaereas, for example, her behaviour (she lies crying on a couch, veiled and silent, 1.1.14) is said to result from a sense of shame (*αἰδουμένη*) and her silence is opposed to Chaereas' readiness to inform his parents about his love (1.1.8). Similar self-isolating behaviour resurfaces when she starts crying in her first marital dispute with Chaereas (she turns away from him (*ἀπεστράφη*, 1.3.6) and covers her face with a veil (*συγκαλυψαμένη*)) and in other instances.¹⁴¹ The self-conscious introversion guiding her behaviour is further highlighted by its inversion of a well-known tragic tradition that connects the expression of raw emotion of female characters with *unveiling* (famous examples are Phaedra in E. *Hipp.* 170–239, Cassandra in A. A. 1265, 1267, 1287, and Hermione in E. *Andr.* 830–4).¹⁴² Callirhoe's use of the veil, then, as well as her attempts to control the setting in which she cries, highlights the fact that she has a good deal of control over the expression of her emotions.¹⁴³

Chaereas, on the other hand, although he occasionally adopts similar, self-isolating behaviour when grieving,¹⁴⁴ does not usually give much thought to withdrawing from public sight: he is found crying in front of the Syracusan assembly (3.4.4), tries to commit suicide in front of a whole crowd (*πλήθος*, 3.5.7), and utters emotional lamentations (3.3.4–7, 3.3.15–16) in public (cf. *πάντες*, 3.3.2) and in the presence of Polycharmus (5.2.4–5, 7.1.5–6).¹⁴⁵ One specific index of Chaereas' lack of *sôphrosynê* is a frequently surfacing and impulsive desire to die, often leading to actual suicide attempts. Again, metaphorical characterization is central to its depiction. It plays not only on the contrast with Callirhoe, who does not attempt suicide,¹⁴⁶ but also on that with Polycharmus, who, as Chaereas' friend, repeatedly prevents him from

¹⁴⁰ e.g. 1.13.10 and 5.3.10, on which, see Whitmarsh (2004: 194). A normative discussion of the need for a young woman to cover her head because she 'must necessarily be endangered by the public exhibition of herself, when she is penetrated by the gaze of untrustworthy and multitudinous eyes' is offered by Tert. *Virg. Vel.* 14, on which, see B. D. Shaw (1993: 4).

¹⁴¹ See e.g. 1.11.2 (*ἐγκαλυψαμένη*), 7.6.9 (*συγκεκαλυμμένη πεσοῦσα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔκειτο*), and 8.1.7 (*ἐρριμμένην καὶ ἐγκεκαλυμμένην*). In the final instance, veiling as a marker of hidden grief is played out against the sudden *unveiling* of herself (*ἀπεκαλύψατο*, 8.1.8) when she realizes that she has found Chaereas.

¹⁴² On this tradition, see Llewellyn-Jones (2005: 93).

¹⁴³ See also D. L. Cairns (2001: 25) on veiling as a manifestation of self-control and Llewellyn-Jones (2003: 283–314) on the veil as a tool for empowerment. On the tragic resonances of the motif of the (un)veiled woman (particularly in Heliodorus), see Crismani (2003). On (un)veiling in epic and tragedy, see Ferrini (1990: 66 n. 35).

¹⁴⁴ Examples are 3.3.14 (where he is depicted crying and veiled in his ship's hold), 5.2.4 (where he tries to hide his tears from Mithridates), and 5.10.6 (where he waits until he is alone to lament).

¹⁴⁵ On the gender role reversal involved, see Scourfield (2003: 180) and De Temmerman (2009a: 252–3).

¹⁴⁶ See Konstan (1994: 17) and G. Anderson (1984: 47).

killing himself (1.5.2, 1.6.1, 3.3.1, 5.10.10, 6.2.8, 6.2.11).¹⁴⁷ The motif of enduring friendship, which evokes a long tradition and frequently surfaces in imperial Greek literature,¹⁴⁸ thematizes in Chariton, among other things, a sharp contrast between Polycharmus' *sôphrosynê* and Chaereas' lack of it. The enslavement of the two on Mithridates' estate is a good example: Polycharmus, in giving an account of himself and Chaereas to Mithridates, makes it clear that they both bear slavery with *sôphrosynê* (σωφρόνως, 4.3.3), but the narrator emphasizes the *difference* between the two:¹⁴⁹ Chaereas is depressed by various events, desires death (ἀποθανεῖν... βουλόμενον, 4.2.1), is unable to work (ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενον, 4.2.2), and is whipped frequently, whereas Polycharmus accomplishes the work of two people in order to *save* his friend (περισώσει τὸν φίλον, 4.2.3). This reasoned behaviour in view of their interests and well-being leaves little doubt: it is Polycharmus, and not Chaereas, who acts with *sôphrosynê* during this episode.

Next to Chaereas' (in)ability to exercise control over the self, his (in)ability to exert control over *other* characters is an essential thematic strand in his characterization.¹⁵⁰ This concept of control is of a rhetorical nature, comprising the protagonist's ability to influence the behaviour of other characters through speech.¹⁵¹ The distribution of Chaereas' speeches, including public speeches and private conversations,¹⁵² is significant. In the first six books (before his transformation, that is) Chaereas speaks in public only twice. The last two books feature no fewer than seven such speeches. Chaereas' first public speech (a self-accusation after his apparent murder of Callirhoe, 1.5.4–5) has been read correctly as an example of neutralization of the power of rhetoric:¹⁵³ Chaereas adduces none of the arguments in favour of his defence but instead asks the jury to be sentenced to death. Moreover, his speech in the end fails to generate the desired effect: the audience forgets about the dead general's daughter and starts to commiserate with Chaereas (ἐπένθουν, 1.5.6). When the jury finally acquits Chaereas, the protagonist himself, unhappy with this decision, thinks of possible ways to kill himself

¹⁴⁷ See Brioso Sánchez (1987: 65–6) on this typical action of 'friends' in Greek novels.

¹⁴⁸ See e.g. D. L. 3.81.7, Plu. *De amic. mult.* 93e7, and Lucian *Dom.* 23.5–6 and *Tox.* 1.1, 2.1–2 on one such example of enduring friendship.

¹⁴⁹ On checking a character's direct speech against the narrator's account, see Hägg (1971a: 253).

¹⁵⁰ S. D. Smith (2007a: 83–4) briefly touches upon the connection between self-control and control over other characters as an element underlying the characterization of Dionysius and Artaxerxes.

¹⁵¹ On the importance of rhetoric as a tool in establishing social control, see also Webb (2007: 529–41) for the novels in general and Kasprzyk (2006: 302) for Chariton in particular.

¹⁵² On these two types of speech in Chariton and other novelists, see Bost-Pouderon (2006: 333–44).

¹⁵³ S. D. Smith (2007a: 126), pointing to an equation between Chaereas' emotional expression and the sincerity of his inner state.

(1.6.1). The neutralization of rhetoric in Chaereas' speech is given an ironic twist by the fact that the narrator goes out of his way to surround this speech with markers of judicial rhetoric. Not only do self-accusations (*prosaggeliai*) constitute a well-known speech type in ancient rhetoric,¹⁵⁴ but Chaereas' speech is also said to be part of a trial (*κρίσιν*) taking place in the town square (*τὴν ἀγοράν*) and is addressed to a jury (*δικαστήριον*); it is presented as a response to a preceding *katêgoria* and as containing none of the elements appropriate to an *apologia* (1.5.4)—a feature that the narrator self-consciously casts as a 'novelty in court' (*πρᾶγμα καινὸν καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ μηδεπώποτε πραχθέν*, 1.5.4). This highly charged rhetorical environment, then, makes all the more poignant the fact that Chaereas' speech itself is void in terms of rhetorical persuasion.

Chaereas' second public speech (when he returns from a search for Callirhoe and brings Theron to Syracuse, 3.4.5–6, 3.4.15) foregrounds equally paradoxically his rhetorical inability in a highly rhetorical setting.¹⁵⁵ Framing this speech, the narrator takes pains to indicate that Chaereas has trouble assuming the self-control that might be expected from an orator addressing his audience: he is pale and unwashed (*ὠχρός, ἀνυγμῶν*, 3.4.4), weeps for a long time (*ἐπὶ πολὺν ἔκλαε χρόνον*), and is unable to address the public verbally (*φθέγγασθαι θέλων οὐκ ἠδύνατο*) or visually (*μόλις . . . ἀναβλέψας*, 3.4.5). Moreover, Chaereas' first words emphasize that it is not the right time for rhetoric, but for mourning (*καιρὸς οὐκ ἦν δημηγοροῦντος ἀλλὰ πενθοῦντος*, 3.4.5). As in the first speech, the power of rhetoric is neutralized—this time explicitly. Again, this neutralization is signposted by Chaereas' failure to achieve the aim envisaged by his public performance:¹⁵⁶ when he asks that Theron's life be spared in order to facilitate the search for Callirhoe (3.4.15), his request is denied. The assembly follows Hermocrates' counter-arguments and Theron is executed (3.4.18).

In neither of the two speeches, then, is Chaereas capable of persuading his audience to grant his requests. A comparable lack of control over his interlocutors characterizes his private interactions in the first six books. In these dialogues, in fact, Chaereas himself is systematically manipulated by them. The first example is the dialogue with the tyrant of Acragas' accomplice, who fools him into believing that his wife Callirhoe has been unfaithful (1.4.7–8).¹⁵⁷ Chaereas is devastated by the news and urges his interlocutor to let him witness the adultery with his own eyes. This request plays, of course,

¹⁵⁴ See, among others, D. A. Russell (1990: 209–12) on Sopater and Libanius.

¹⁵⁵ This time, the speech is addressed to an assembly (*ἐκκλησία*, 3.4.3–4) held in a theatre (*θέατρον*, 3.4.4). It is part of what Hermocrates defines as a legal enquiry (*νομιμωτέραν . . . ἀνὰ κρῖσιν*) that may require judges (*δικαστῶν*) (3.4.3).

¹⁵⁶ For a (complementary) discussion of Chaereas' performance as showing awareness of ethical sensitivities, on the other hand, see M. Jones (2012: 67–70).

¹⁵⁷ On the importance of rhetorical manipulation in this episode, see Kasprzyk (2007: 95–9).

right into the hands of the conspirators, as it allows the interlocutor to set up the meeting between Chaereas and Callirhoe's alleged adulterer that will directly lead to Callirhoe's apparent death.¹⁵⁸ This episode echoes one of the first scenes in the novel, where Chaereas also becomes the victim of a ruse (μηχανήσασθαι... ἐπινοίας, 1.2.6; τέχνης, 1.4.1) engineered to drive a wedge between him and his wife and, as a result, reproaches her (1.3.5). Even if the protagonists are reconciled immediately afterwards, his initial misguided reaction indicates the temporary success of the suitors' ruse and anticipates similar reactions throughout the novel. This characterization of Chaereas as an object of deception by other characters is echoed consistently in his depiction as a narratee in the first six books of the novel.

Another example of Chaereas as dupe is his conversation with Mithridates (4.4.2–5), when Chaereas has just been informed by Mithridates that Callirhoe has married Dionysius in Miletus. Chaereas asks Mithridates' permission to go to Miletus and claim his wife from Dionysius. Mithridates, however, advises against this plan and suggests that Chaereas write a letter to Callirhoe first. He prefaces his advice by saying that he does not want Chaereas to be separated from his wife even for one day (4.4.2) and thus aims at fooling Chaereas into believing that he is truly concerned about Chaereas' love for Callirhoe. But the reader knows that Mithridates' real concern is to *appear* to be helping a friend (δοκῇ φίλῳ βοηθεῖν, 4.3.11) because he himself is in love with Callirhoe (4.1.9, 4.2.4) and hopes that, while Dionysius and Chaereas quarrel about Callirhoe, he himself will be able to become her lover (4.4.1). Chaereas, on the other hand, has no idea about his host's plan and thinks that he truly wants to help him.¹⁵⁹ This scene clearly aligns Chaereas with Callirhoe in the Plangon episode. In both cases, the protagonist is manipulated and deceived by the ruse of a character whom s/he trusts. The above speeches, both public and private, characterize Chaereas in a similar way. In public speech, he is not able to persuade his audience to approve his requests. In private conversation, his lack of control is highlighted by the control exerted over him by other characters.

1.4.2 ... and after ...

Chaereas' lack of self-control as well as control over others changes dramatically from the beginning of the seventh book onwards. When both Artaxerxes and Dionysius have left Babylon to fight the Egyptians, Chaereas once again

¹⁵⁸ On Chaereas being manipulated into an impossible situation, M. Jones (2012: 79–89) is excellent.

¹⁵⁹ He calls Mithridates his 'benefactor' (τὸν ἐμὸν εὐεργέτην, 4.4.7) and a true friend (ἐν τοῖς φίλτατοις, 8.8.4).

becomes the victim of a deceptive ruse (στρατήγημα, 7.1.3; *εὐξαπάτητον*, 7.1.4). Dionysius, in an attempt to deprive him of all hope of winning Callirhoe back, fools him into believing that the king has assigned Callirhoe to *him*. Chaereas' reaction is one of ultimate despair and rehearses the three elements marking earlier reactions to deception: instant belief (*ἐπίστευσεν εὐθὺς*, 7.1.4), uncontrolled expression of emotions (he rends his clothes, tears his hair, and beats his breast, 7.1.5–6), and a desire to commit suicide.¹⁶⁰ More specifically, he conceptualizes his own death as conducive to future commemoration of the king's (supposed) injustice and, therefore, as an appropriate means of inflicting political damage upon him in revenge ('why not cut my throat in front of the palace . . . ? Let the Persians and Medes know how the King passed judgement there', 7.1.6).

The one aspect consciously crafted as different from everything that precedes is *Polycharmus'* reaction (even if, to be sure, his advice to *think* echoes earlier episodes): he who has up to this point consistently saved Chaereas at such aporetic moments, sees that this time it is impossible to bring consolation (*ἀπαρηγόρητον*) or to save him (*ἀδύνατον σωθῆναι*, 7.1.7). In a speech with clear metaliterary resonances about the role of friends of novelistic protagonists, Polycharmus draws attention to the many times that he has consoled Chaereas (*παρεμυθούμην*, 7.1.7) and restrained him from suicide (*ἀποθανεῖν ἐκώλυσα*), but then indicates that this time (*νῦν δέ*) Chaereas' death-wish *is* justified (*καλῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι*). He also supports Chaereas' idea of using suicide as a means of inflicting damage (*φθόνον . . . αἰσχύνην . . . εἰς ἄμυναν . . . λυπήσαντας . . . ἀντελύπησαν*, 7.1.7–8) but at the same time replaces the idea of political damage with that of *military* damage: dying in the service of Artaxerxes' military enemy would be a more effective way (*τρόπον . . . βελτίων*, 7.1.7) to take revenge while at the same time ensuring future commemoration of the injustice done (*ἀδικηθέντες*, 7.1.8). Polycharmus' intervention is ambiguous as to whether he is really in favour of Chaereas' suicide plan, or only *pretends* agreement while suggesting the military scenario to prevent Chaereas from committing suicide on the spot—as is Chaereas' explicit intention (*τί . . . βραδύνω*, 7.1.6). The consistent depiction up to this point of Chaereas as an object of rhetorical persuasion and manipulation certainly invites us to entertain the latter possibility.

Once Chaereas has been persuaded to join the Egyptian army, his behaviour is characterized by a number of features that invert much of what precedes. Lack of self-control disappears altogether. Lamenting monologues, for example, which in the first part of the novel so often accompany uncontrolled

¹⁶⁰ In addition, Chaereas' characterization as 'easily misled' (*εὐξαπάτητον*, 7.1.4) may echo one last time the novel's earlier association of the hero with *female* emotional behaviour: according to Iamb. *Bab.* fr. 35, 25–6, for example, being easily misled is a characteristic of women (*εὐξαπάτητον . . . εἶναι δοκεῖ γυνή*).

expressions of emotions and suicide attempts,¹⁶¹ entirely cease. But other features are dealt with in a more subtle way—and again metaphorical characterization plays a key role. Chaereas' desire to die is an example. After his consent to Polycharmus plan to die in battle (7.1.11), he is brought before the Egyptian rebel leader, to whom he emphasizes his desire to die with a Homeric quotation presenting Hector's final words before fighting Achilles: 'No, let me not die without effort, without glory, but after some great exploit that even our descendants will know about' (7.2.4 = *Il.* 22.304–5). The idea that his death will be known to future generations echoes his original motivation to commit suicide, but the appearance of Hector *inverts* an earlier instance where the same Iliadic episode evokes this hero in a context equally foregrounding suicide: Chaereas' departure for Miletus and his parents' supplications that he stay (3.5.6). The episode is modelled on an Iliadic scene in which Priam and Hecuba beg their son Hector *not* to fight Achilles (*Il.* 22.38–76 and 22.82–9) and plays on the contrast between Hector's and Chaereas' reactions to these pleas: whereas Hector is determined to fight Achilles and cannot be persuaded by his parents to stay (οὐδ' Ἑκτορι θυμὸν ἔπειθε, *Il.* 22.78; οὐδ' Ἑκτορι θυμὸν ἔπειθον, *Il.* 22.91), Chaereas tries to commit suicide by jumping into the sea, as he is unable to face the choice between embarking on his search for Callirhoe and honouring his parents' wish.¹⁶² Even if it is possible, as has recently been suggested, to read Chaereas' behaviour in a more exonerative way,¹⁶³ there remains a clear contrast between the desperation in the first novelistic scene and the calculation in the second one: whereas at the beginning of the novel the narrator adduces the paradigm of Hector to characterize his protagonist, in the second instance Chaereas casts *himself* in the role of the epic hero.¹⁶⁴ His conscious self-assimilation to a warrior who is about to be defeated and killed in combat might even establish ambivalence as to whether he really desires to die when entering the Egyptian army. One could easily argue that he adopts this paradigm to construct a favourable self-portrait as an avenger who is ready to die for his cause—a classical rhetorical technique of persuasion.¹⁶⁵ (We have seen that he uses at least one other rhetorical

¹⁶¹ 3.3.4–7, 3.3.15–16, 3.6.6–8, 5.2.4–5, 5.10.6–9, 6.2.8–11, and 7.1.5–6. See Doulamis (2002: 165–6) on four of these monologues.

¹⁶² See Konstan (1987: 9–11, 1994: 16–17) and Brioso Sánchez (1989*b*). MacAlister's (1996: 26) reading of Chaereas' course of action as *similar* to that of Hector (no suicide attempt but 'a deliberate gamble with death from which he emerges with a renewed commitment to his mission') is not supported by the text. The narrator makes it clear that Chaereas *wants to die*: ἀποθανεῖν θέλων (3.5.6).

¹⁶³ In M. Jones' (2012: 134–5) view, Chaereas' suicide attempt makes him more emotionally rounded than his paradigm.

¹⁶⁴ On self-association as a rhetorical device, see also S. D. Smith (2007*a*: 104).

¹⁶⁵ Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.4. S. D. Smith (2007*a*: 88) correctly identifies this speech as the first instance of Chaereas' participation in 'the same rhetoric of self-representation adopted by other Syracusans in the story'.

technique to facilitate his access to the Egyptian army.¹⁶⁶) Similar self-associations occur, again in a highly rhetorical context, when Chaereas, as a general, in a speech to his soldiers associates himself with Leonidas (explicitly at 7.3.11 and implicitly at 7.3.9) and Othryades (7.3.11),¹⁶⁷ two other war heroes who famously died in battle.

Such an ‘instrumental’ reading does not exclude the possibility that Chaereas’ assimilation to these paradigms truly reflects his desire to die as well. I believe, rather, that it reflects his changed way of handling this desire. As a result of Polycharmus’ advice (‘we should think carefully about what would be the best way to die’, 7.1.7), this desire is now transposed to the battlefield, which of course rehearses the traditional link between death in battle and the concept of heroism from Homer onwards.¹⁶⁸ From this point, Chaereas is able to *control* his desire to die and to decide for himself when and how to activate it. His desire to die as such has not changed; but now he adapts it in function of a higher aim (inflicting damage upon his enemy, Artaxerxes). Chaereas’ desire to die remains as the basis of his conduct. But, unlike before, he is now able to channel it in a ‘*sôphrôn*’ way.¹⁶⁹

Chaereas’ changed ability to exert self-control is also documented through military performance during the battle of Tyre. Of course, skilful military leadership is a marker of male heroism in more than one Greek novel: novelized versions of stories about legendary heroes such as Ninus and Sesonchosis include successful military adventures¹⁷⁰ and Photius informs us that in Iamblichus’ *Babyloniaca* the hero is outfitted as a general (κοσμεῖ στρατηγικῶς, *Bibl. cod.* 94, 78a34) and sent to fight a war in which he is victorious (νικᾷ, 78a39). In Chariton, Chaereas’ military *aristeia* constitutes the only episode where he is explicitly characterized as *sôphrôn*, which generates a powerful contrast not only with earlier instances of his notable *lack* of *sôphrosynê* but also with the other characters present in the episode (in the chaos of the fight, *only* Chaereas manages to act in a cool-headed way, μόνος ἐσωφρόνησε Χαιρέας, 7.4.9). His characterization as a war hero is strengthened,

¹⁶⁶ See p. 44.

¹⁶⁷ I here follow D’Orville’s (1750) *editio princeps*, which corrects the manuscript (L) reading of ‘Μιθριδάτου’ into ‘Οθρυάδου’ and is followed by Molinié (2002) and Goold (1995). However, Blake (1938) and Reardon (2004) read Μιλτιάδου.

¹⁶⁸ See C. P. Jones (2010: 22) on this connection and D. A. Miller (2000: 120–32) on the traditional urge towards self-annihilation as an element of heroism.

¹⁶⁹ This interpretation complements Scourfield’s (2003: 174–5) reading of Chaereas’ changing (in)ability to control anger.

¹⁷⁰ Ninus claims to have mastered ‘so many people who submitted to my spear’ (A.II.9–10) and his effectiveness as a military leader is amply underlined by recurrent active verb forms in the description of his campaign (ἀναλαβών, B.II.7; ἐξαγαγών[ν], B.III.3; τάξας, B.III.29). A substantial part of what we have left of the *Sesonchosis* novel deals with the hero’s defeat (τὴν ἥτταν, *P. Oxy.* 2466, 19) of the Arabians. See Stephens and Winkler (1995: 248) on (structural) similarities between both novels.

once again, by metaphorical characterization: he is simultaneously assimilated to a number of Homeric heroes. And again, these assimilations invert earlier ones.¹⁷¹

First, Achilles. When Chaereas leads his troops to Tyre, the narrator remarks that they look far fewer than they are, having ‘shield pressed against shield, helmet against helmet, man against man’ (ἀσπίς ἄρ’ ἀσπίδ’ ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυν, ἄνθρωποι δ’ ἀνθρώποι, 7.4.3). This Iliadic verse associates Chaereas’ troops with the Greek army marching towards Troy (*Il.* 13.127–8)¹⁷² and with the Myrmidons in particular after Achilles has given them permission to join the battle (*Il.* 16.215). The obvious contrast between the epic and the novelistic scenes is that, whereas Achilles returns to his hut (αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς βῆ ῥ’ ἔμειν ἐς κλισίην, *Il.* 16.220–1), Chaereas leads his own troops into battle (ὁ Χαιρέας ἐκείνους ἡγάγεον, 7.4.3). At the level of the key function, the contrast with Achilles characterizes Chaereas as the superlative of courage in battle.¹⁷³ The evocation of Achilles picks up this paradigm’s presence since the beginning of the novel. When Chaereas has been lured into believing that Callirhoe is unfaithful, his behaviour is marked by physical deficiency (he is unable to speak or raise his eyes from the ground, 1.4.7) and by a Homeric quotation (1.4.6) that in the *Iliad* conveys Achilles’ loss of consciousness and uncontrolled emotional gestures at the news of Patroclus’ death (*Il.* 18.22–4). At this point in the novel, this sudden appearance of death might ominously foreshadow that Chaereas will kill and bury Callirhoe immediately after (1.4.12) as a direct result of the conversation in which the quotation is embedded. But the evocation of the Iliadic scene also underlines that Chaereas does not, like Achilles, lament the death of his beloved but her alleged unfaithfulness. His reaction can be interpreted as an index of (unjustified) jealousy and disbelief in his wife’s fidelity. Later in the novel, part of this quotation is again applied to depict Chaereas’ despair in comparable circumstances: this time, Callirhoe *has* become another man’s wife, and Mithridates encourages Chaereas not to approach her and to hide himself instead (5.2.4).

Yet another evocation of Achilles again conveys Chaereas’ jealousy, self-pity, and troubled attitude towards his wife’s fidelity: on the verge of committing suicide, he cites Achilles apostrophizing Patroclus, who still lies unburied by the ships (‘Even if in Hades people forget the dead, even there I shall remember you, my dear’, 5.10.9; *Il.* 22.389–90). Again, his motivation to consider suicide is not that his beloved is dead (as in Achilles’ case), but

¹⁷¹ My reading both nuances and complements studies of Chariton that emphasize the *analogy* between Chaereas and his epic (and dramatic) models, such as Hirschberger (2001: 170–2) and Cueva (2004: 24–5).

¹⁷² Both in the *Iliad* and in Chariton, the battle array described specifically applies to the best soldiers (οἱ ἀριστοί, *Il.* 13.127–8; τοὺς ἀρίστους, Chariton 7.3.8).

¹⁷³ See also Scourfield (2003: 174): ‘Chaereas, in achieving both glory in battle and *sophrosunè*, outdoes his chief epic model.’

that, out of respect for her new husband (ἄλλον ᾗδεῖτο, 5.10.7), she has not immediately embraced him after discovering he is alive. The irony is enhanced by the fact that Chaereas adopts Achilles' words, referring to the *dead* Patroclus, precisely when he has seen Callirhoe *alive* for the very first time since her apparent death in Syracuse. Again, then, the intertextual dynamic raises questions about the reasons underlying Chaereas' loss of self-control, because they *dissociate* Chaereas from his epic paradigm. This dissociation emphasizes the banality of Chaereas' melodramatic behaviour, his jealousy, sense of victimhood, and profound doubts about his wife's fidelity.¹⁷⁴ In short, Chaereas' associations with both Hector and Achilles are the site of drastic inversions organized around his behavioural shift at the beginning of book 7. The technique adopted could be described as 'doubly metaphorical': character is depicted through the (intertextual) association of Chaereas with Achilles and Hector, and at the same time these associations (intratextually) evoke, and invert, earlier instances of the same paradigm. Whereas after this shift the paradigms function to highlight heroic qualities such as a controlled desire for death on the battlefield and consciously mustered military courage, they systematically highlight less than ideal character strands before this shift, such as his uncontrolled desire to die, his jealousy, self-pity, and sense of victimhood.

Other Homeric paradigms documenting Chaereas' depiction as a war hero are Odysseus and Diomedes. The narrator marks Chaereas' attack on Tyre with a Homeric quotation (7.4.6) that in the *Iliad* (10.483) refers to these two heroes' attack on Thracian soldiers and in the *Odyssey* twice describes Odysseus' slaughter of the suitors in his palace (22.308 and 24.184). The subsequent comparison of Chaereas and his troops to lions ('falling on an unguarded herd of cattle', 7.4.6) picks up the Iliadic scene in particular and echoes Diomedes' pursuit of the Thracian soldiers (ὥσπερ λέοντες εἰς ἀγέλην βοῶν ἐμπεσόντες ἀφύλακτον ~ ὥς δὲ λέων μῆλοισιν ἀσημάντοισιν ἐπελθών, αἴγειςιν, 10.485–6). All three Homeric passages highlight Chaereas' courage and martial excellence by firmly casting him in the role of the (both intellectual and physical) superior soldier about to kill his weaker enemies (the Thracians/the

¹⁷⁴ In addition to these less than ideal strands in Chaereas' experience of his love for Callirhoe, it is worth floating the idea that the potentially erotic nature of the relationship between Achilles and Patroclus might in itself constitute another such strand (on Chariton's view of this relationship as homoerotic, see Sanz Morales and Laguna Mariscal 2003). The friendship of this epic couple is explicitly presented as an example of that between Chaereas and Polycharmus (1.5.2), which might raise the question at least for a minute of whether their friendship is invested with similarly erotic undertones and therefore offers an implicit, non-ideal subtext to the love story of the protagonists. The presentation of stories about homoerotic love as impacting, contrasting, resembling, or documenting the central love story is not unusual in novels (see e.g. X. Eph. 3.2 on Hippothous and Hyperanthes and Ach. Tat. 1.7.1–8.11, 1.12.1–14.3 on Clinias and Charicles; Konstan 1994: 26–30). On possibly homoerotic undertones in the relation between Xenophon's hero Habrocomes and his friend Hippothous, see Schmeling (1980: 52) and Alvares (1995: 398–9); M. Jones (2012: 207–8) argues against such undertones.

suitors/the Tyrians).¹⁷⁵ But the reader is again invited to assess retrospectively allusions to these paradigms *before* Chaereas' behavioural shift. While Odysseus is, of course, a perfect paradigm to illustrate Chaereas' military qualities as well as his changed ability to exert self-control and to adopt reason rather than passion, Diomedes is a far less evident choice in this respect. In fact, the latter is well known precisely for his impulsiveness and rashness (mainly in combat (*Il.* 5.85–6), which sets him apart from Chaereas' *sôphrôn* behaviour in combat). These characteristics evoke, of course, Chaereas' behaviour in the first six books. Moreover, Diomedes is similar to Chaereas in being a Peloponnesian (*Ἀργεῖ*, *Il.* 6.224; *Δωριεύς*, Chariton 7.3.8) well known for his problematic relationship with Aphrodite (he wounds her in battle, *Il.* 5.330–40).¹⁷⁶ The assimilation of Chaereas to Diomedes, then, retrospectively adds to his characterization as rash and violent, and simultaneously reinforces Callirhoe's similarity to Aphrodite: just as Aphrodite is wounded by the rash Diomedes, Callirhoe is wounded by Chaereas in an episode memorably thematizing his loss of self-control.

Chaereas' transformation comprises not only a military dimension, but also a rhetorical one.¹⁷⁷ It has been observed that the power of rhetoric, absent from his early speeches, is amply demonstrated in the speeches of *other* male characters (such as Dionysius and Artaxerxes, who, unlike Chaereas, rationalize personal emotions by means of subtle rhetorical self-fashioning¹⁷⁸), but Chaereas' *own* share in exemplifying the power of rhetoric has never seriously been considered. On the contrary, Haynes (2001: 73–92, 2003: 87) singles out Chaereas as emblematic of what she identifies as 'a consistent tendency' in the novelistic genre 'to remove eloquence from the public sphere, or to dispense with it altogether as a defining male characteristic'. But as I will point out, Chaereas' rhetorical self-fashioning from the seventh book onwards provides what is possibly the most significant counterpart to his early speeches and clearly thematizes the importance of the power of rhetoric.

Although Chaereas' rhetorical behaviour changes dramatically only from the beginning of book 7 onwards, his first verbal resistance has already occurred during the Babylonian trial, limited though this is to the interjection of brief reproaches to Dionysius and a number of arguments supporting his claim (5.8.5). The rhetorically invested setting (a courtroom) echoes previous such settings (where, as we have seen, Chaereas' rhetorical ability is neutralized) and at the same time is proleptic of the important place that rhetoric will

¹⁷⁵ His physical superiority is underlined by his military victory; his intellectual superiority by the fact that he uses a ruse to capture the city (7.4.5).

¹⁷⁶ S. D. Smith (2007a: 94) also touches on Diomedes as 'a transgressive figure whose power was so great as to wound even Aphrodite in battle'.

¹⁷⁷ A number of aspects of the following discussion have also been dealt with in De Temmerman (2009b).

¹⁷⁸ S. D. Smith (2007a: 126–7).

occupy in Chaereas' life once he decides to take control of his own destiny. Moreover, the narrator's language assimilates this trial to warfare (πόλεμος, 5.8.4; μαχόμενοι, 5.8.6),¹⁷⁹ thus implicitly marking Chaereas' first attempt to intervene actively in the course of events as an emblem of two major areas in which he will excel in the succeeding books: war and rhetoric.¹⁸⁰ While Lalanne (2006: 184–5) is right to single out heroic combat as the realm in which Chaereas' manliness is underlined in these books, I argue that this domain is complemented by that of rhetorical excellence—and both are foreshadowed in the courtroom episode. Even if episodes like these might be taken to smoothen Chaereas' transition to some extent,¹⁸¹ the beginning of book 7 still provides much of a turning point in his rhetorical behaviour. When he and Polycharmus have been taken prisoner by the Egyptians, who regard them as spies (7.2.2), his speech is emblematic of a new strand in his characterization. As we have seen, he relies on his ties to Hermocrates, his homeland, and noble descent to secure safe admission to the Egyptian army and expresses his and his friend's desire to die fighting against the Persians (7.2.3; pp. 44 and 90–1). Significantly, Chaereas' rhetorical strategy is successful: the Egyptian leader welcomes them into the army and provides them with arms and a tent. Chaereas thus succeeds in effecting the plan suggested by Polycharmus earlier (7.1.11) and, in this speech for the first time, takes rhetorical control over his narratee.

From this point onwards, such control is recurrent in all his public speeches, and a number of rhetorical techniques are adopted to achieve it. One such technique is, again, self-association with mythological and historical paradigms. Chaereas' speech in the assembly of the Egyptian army generals (7.3.4–5) is a case in point. Since the impregnable city of Tyre is an obstacle to the Egyptian military advance, their leader proposes to retreat. At this proposal, all are silent and downcast (σιωπή πάντων ἐγένετο καὶ κατήφεια, 7.3.3), except Chaereas (μόνος δὲ Χαιρέας ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν). The narrator clearly models this episode on a passage in the ninth book of the *Iliad* (9.17–28 and 9.32–49), where Agamemnon's proposal to return to Greece is countered by Diomedes. Like the Egyptian leader, Agamemnon addresses the members of the assembly as 'friends' (ὦ φίλοι, *Il.* 9.17; Ἄνδρες σύμμαχοι . . . τοὺς φίλους, 7.3.2) and proposes returning home. Like the Egyptian leader's speech, Agamemnon's speech produces silence (πάντες . . . σιωπῇ, *Il.* 9.29) and sadness (τετιγότες, *Il.* 9.30) in the audience. The reaction of the audience to Diomedes'

¹⁷⁹ Lalanne (2006: 16).

¹⁸⁰ Kasprzyk (2006: 295–302) discusses some aspects of Chaereas' changing rhetorical abilities, which he primarily reads as a function of his transition to becoming a *stratēgos*. See also Connolly (2007: 95) on military images as recurrent tropes of rhetorical activity in rhetorical writings.

¹⁸¹ Similarly, M. Jones (2012: 65–7, 74–5, 79–89, 117–19, 139–40) singles out a number of instances *before* the seventh book where Chaereas' later *andreia/paideia* seems to be anticipated.

speech also coincides with the assembly's reaction to Chaereas' speech: in the Iliadic episode, *all* listeners (πάντες, *Il.* 9.50–1) loudly applaud Diomedes' speech; in Chariton, likewise, *all* listeners (πάντες, 7.3.6) are too ashamed *not* to approve Chaereas' proposal. And finally, Chaereas' answer itself unmistakably evokes Diomedes', as it adapts the conclusion to Diomedes' speech¹⁸² and evokes Diomedes' forecast about Agamemnon's plan to abandon the war ('But if you insist on going, leave a few volunteers with me; I and Polycharmus will fight, for it is at a god's behest that we have come', 7.3.5). As we have seen, Diomedes also functions as a paradigm of Chaereas a little later in the novel (this time in a military context), but what is important is that here not only the narrator, but also Chaereas *himself*, cast Chaereas as an epic hero adopting a Homeric quotation to this effect.

Again, his strategy is successful and he achieves his aim: the Egyptian leader abandons his plan to retreat and gives Chaereas as many soldiers as he wants to capture Tyre. A similar pattern appears almost immediately afterwards, when Chaereas addresses 300 Peloponnesian soldiers (Πελοποννησίους, 7.3.7) whom he has chosen to capture the city (7.3.8–10). In this speech, which is an adaptation of the speech delivered by Xenophon to his men before they engage in battle against their Persian enemy (*X. An.* 3.2.7–32),¹⁸³ Chaereas aligns himself with his audience by stating that he is a Dorian (Δωριεύς, 7.3.8) and assimilates himself to Leonidas and Othryades (7.3.11),¹⁸⁴ two other leaders of 300 Spartans/Dorians (at Thermopylae and at Thyrea respectively). Again, these associations foreshadow the result of Chaereas' speech, which is that his soldiers declare him their leader.

As well as assimilating himself to historical and mythological paradigms, Chaereas adopts other rhetorical techniques to persuade audiences. As the admiral of the entire Egyptian fleet, he informs some of his troops that their Persian enemies have beaten the Egyptian land forces and killed their leader (8.2.10–11). The success of this speech, which is to persuade the soldiers to abandon the war and return home, is achieved mainly by two techniques. First, the narrator emphasizes that Chaereas carefully *selects* his audience. His speech is not directed towards the entire army, but to his captains, the 300 Greek soldiers and 'all the Egyptians whom he saw to be well disposed to him' (εὖνους ἑώρα πρὸς αὐτόν, 8.2.9). Secondly, Chaereas subtly controls and manipulates his audience's decision-making process. Before depicting their hopeless military position and addressing the fact that they are surrounded by enemies, he reminds his soldiers of the importance of unity in their previous

¹⁸² *Il.* 9.48–9 (νῶι δ', ἐγὼ Σθένελός τε, μαχησόμεθ' εἰς ὃ κε τέκμωρ // Ἰλίου εὕρωμεν· σὺν γὰρ θεῶ ἐιλήλουθμεν) ~ Chariton 7.3.5 (νῶι δ', ἐγὼ Πολύχαρμός τε μαχησόμεθα... σὺν γὰρ θεῶ ἐιλήλουθμεν).

¹⁸³ For details, see S. D. Smith (2007a: 172–5).

¹⁸⁴ For details on the text, see also n. 167.

naval military successes (ὁμονοοῦντες ἐκρατήσαμεν τῆς θαλάσσης, 8.2.10)¹⁸⁵ and suggests capitulation as the only possible solution. His audience's refusal to agree does not come as a surprise—either to the reader or to Chaereas himself. Finally, one of the soldiers proposes returning to Sicily. While everyone applauds this suggestion (πάντες, 8.2.13), Chaereas alone *pretends to disapprove* (προσεποιεῖτο μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι), adducing the length of the journey as a pretext (προφασιζόμενος) for his scepticism. The narrator, for his part, informs the reader that Chaereas only wants to test the audience's firmness of purpose (ἀποπειρώμενος) by pretending to disagree. When the troops insist, Chaereas is 'persuaded' to go home. His ability to pretend aligns him with Callirhoe, who adopts the same strategy in the Artaxates episode (προσεποιεῖτο, 6.5.6). But Chaereas' rhetorical strategy is also an example of a *logos eschêmatismenos* ('figured discourse'), a rhetorical trope that deceptively aims to achieve the opposite (return home) of what is literally being proposed (no return home)¹⁸⁶ and that occurs in at least one other novel as a marker of leadership.¹⁸⁷ In Chariton, Chaereas' use of this trope fleshes out his leadership in the realm of the political communication of military strategy: it allows him to reach a consensus about terminating the war and returning home without proposing this solution himself.

In this speech echoes have been found of both Xenophon's *Anabasis* and Isocrates' *Philippus*,¹⁸⁸ but I think that it also establishes a complex network of Homeric resonances. Chaereas' reaction to the proposal to return home clearly echoes Agamemnon's famous attempt to manipulate the army in *Iliad* 2.53–154.¹⁸⁹ In this passage, Agamemnon proposes withdrawal from the war and urges the soldiers to return home (φεύγωμεν σὺν νηυσὶ φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν, *Il.* 2.140). As announced by the narrator (*Il.* 2.55) and by Agamemnon himself in a speech directed only to the members of the council (*Il.* 2.70–5), this is a ruse, ultimately intended to make the soldiers more eager to participate in a planned attack on Troy. Both in Homer and Chariton, then, the general's attempt to manipulate the army is designed to test the soldiers (πειρήσομαι, *Il.* 2.73; ἀποπειρώμενος, Chariton 8.2.13). The crucial difference between the two episodes is, of course, that Agamemnon's stratagem fails and results in chaos: the soldiers immediately run to the ships to prepare for departure. Significantly, order is not restored until Odysseus' rhetorical skills 'in a lordly manner brought the army under control' (*Il.* 2.207). Unlike

¹⁸⁵ See S. D. Smith (2007a: 97).

¹⁸⁶ See e.g. Phoeb. *Fig.* 44.2–3 Sp. III (ἕτερον μὲν προσποιεῖσθαι, ἕτερον δὲ λέγειν). The notion of *simulation* involved (προσποιεῖσθαι) is made explicit in Chaereas' case (προσεποιεῖτο, 8.2.13).

¹⁸⁷ See Morgan (2006) and also pp. 297–8 on this trope in a speech of the Ethiopian king Hydaspes in Heliodorus' novel.

¹⁸⁸ See Trzaskoma (2011: 30) for details.

¹⁸⁹ The implicit presence of this Iliadic episode in Chariton has been touched upon by Goold (1995: 375) and S. D. Smith (2007a: 97), but has not been dealt with in any detail.

Agamemnon, Chaereas does not propose returning home, but subtly paves the way for this suggestion by proposing capitulation to the Persian king, well aware that his audience will not agree. In both cases, the audiences agree with the proposal to return home, but whereas Agamemnon expects the opposite reaction from his troops, Chaereas' subtle demagoguery aims at triggering exactly this response.¹⁹⁰ The Iliadic subtext, therefore, depicts Chaereas as a non-Agamemnon: whereas Agamemnon eventually needs Odysseus' rhetorical skills to restore order after his own unsuccessful rhetorical performance, Chaereas, like Odysseus, successfully controls his audience.

However, the famous Iliadic 'test episode' is not the only subtext underlying Chaereas' speech. The context also evokes the above-mentioned discussion between the Egyptian leader and Chaereas in the seventh book. Both speeches deal with the question of whether or not to abandon the war and the parallel is further highlighted by the narrator's twofold explicit statement that Chaereas' reaction to the proposed solution in both cases is different from that of the rest of the audience (πάντων/πάντες v. μόνος Χαιρέας, 7.3.3 and 8.2.13). More importantly, however, the assimilation of the latter episode to the former reactivates the Iliadic episode of the disagreement between Agamemnon and Diomedes (*Il.* 9). In all three episodes, a military commander depicts the army's hopeless position, after which the possibility is raised of abandoning the war and going home.¹⁹¹ The crucial difference between the two episodes in Chariton, however, is that, whereas the first episode associates Chaereas with Diomedes, the second portrays Chaereas himself as the leader of the army who informs the troops about their hopeless military position. This role again compares him, of course, with Agamemnon. Moreover, the result of Chaereas' speech is, in the end, precisely the aim also envisaged by Agamemnon in book 9, namely that of abandoning the war and returning home. Significantly, the point of the association again lies in the obvious difference between the two heroes: whereas Agamemnon's proposal is criticized and, in the end, rejected, Chaereas manages to achieve his aim. And since he does so without *proposing* this solution but by creating the illusion that he himself is being persuaded by a suggestion from the audience, he is able to order withdrawal from the war without running the risk of being characterized by his troops as a fool or a coward, two characteristics attributed to Agamemnon by Diomedes after his proposal to withdraw.¹⁹²

Like the echoes of *Il.* 2, then, the echoes of *Il.* 9 also depict Chaereas as a non-Agamemnon. This characterization resonates with a recurrent

¹⁹⁰ On Chaereas' characterization as a demagogue in this passage, see also S. D. Smith (2007a: 98).

¹⁹¹ For the verbal echoes underlining this association, see De Temmerman (2009b: 256).

¹⁹² *Il.* 9.32 (ἀφραδέοντι) and 9.39 (ἀλκὴν δ' οὐ τοι δῶκεν).

depiction in (mainly Greek) imperial literature of Agamemnon as *not* a suitable model for good leadership and with the popularity of the disastrous test episode in particular.¹⁹³ This image is exploited in Chaereas' characterization and firmly anchored in the depiction of his changed rhetorical behaviour: unlike Agamemnon, Chaereas controls his listeners by giving them the impression that they themselves are in control.

Another rhetorical technique adopted by Chaereas to control his audience is distortion of the truth, which increasingly becomes part of his rhetorical strategy.¹⁹⁴ His public speech in 8.2.5 provides an excellent example.¹⁹⁵ When he, as the admiral of the Egyptian fleet, has been informed by a messenger of the defeat of the Egyptian land forces, he tells the sailors that the Egyptian army has defeated the Persians, and orders them to set sail without specifying their destination. Interestingly, Chaereas' use of this ruse (τέχνης, 8.2.5) results from Callirhoe's intervention: she swiftly persuades him (ταχέως ἐπέισθη) not to make the bad news public. Her explanation of why Chaereas should not give an accurate account of what has happened clearly foregrounds the issue of controlling and being controlled: she argues that it would cause revolt among the troops and that 'we shall be captured again and shall be worse off than ever'. Chaereas' ensuing public address to the naval troops clearly generates the desired effect: thanks to the *technê*, Chaereas restrains his troops from mutiny and manages to keep them under control.

This depiction of Chaereas as a manipulatory general (and of Callirhoe as his adviser) draws on different traditions that invest his (and her) character with a certain amount of moral ambiguity. The strategy, first of all, resonates with discussions of rhetoric as a skill closely related to manipulation and cunning¹⁹⁶ and to legitimate uses of deceit (*fraus/mendacium*). Cicero, for example, explores whether it is morally acceptable to conceal and/or misrepresent the truth.¹⁹⁷ He focuses in particular on 'certain doubtful cases' (*quibusdam causis dubiis*) where moral rectitude (*honestas*) interacts with expediency (*utilitas*, *Off.* 3.56). Quintilian, for his part, makes it clear that, although being a good orator in principle is equated with being a morally good man, even the best orator is allowed to lie occasionally (*aliquando bonum virum . . . mendacium dicat*, *Inst.* 12.1.38). Secondly, and more specifically, Chaereas' behaviour is contextualized by that of manipulatory statesmen and generals in other narrative literature from the imperial period, where

¹⁹³ See e.g. Kim (2010: 124) on D. Chr. Or. 11.80 and Champlin (2003: 297, 305) on D. Chr. Or. 3.46, Plu. *Ant.* 81.4, *Pomp.* 67.3, *Caes.* 41.1, *Comp. Ages. Pomp.* 4, Suet. *Calig.* 22.1, *Dom.* 12.3, and App. *BC* 2.67.

¹⁹⁴ On 'falsification de la vérité' in Chariton, see Liviabella Furiani (1990: 204–5) and Kasprzyk (2006: 300).

¹⁹⁵ Other examples occur in 7.2.1 and 7.4.5.

¹⁹⁶ On this characterization of rhetoric, see Connolly (2007: 88).

¹⁹⁷ Cic. *Off.* 3.52–62.

the moral assessment of deception and trickery is negotiable and often dependent on context.¹⁹⁸ In Plutarch's *Life of Pericles* (15.2), for example, the people are characterized as inaccessible to rational arguments and, therefore, in need of a political leader who manipulates them.¹⁹⁹ Especially if the achievement of a greater end is envisaged, as in Chaereas' case, a statesman's manipulation of the common people's irrationality is often approved.²⁰⁰ The fact that Chaereas' trickery and manipulation occur specifically in the context of a war also echoes a long literary tradition on the moral acceptability of military trickery and deceit, which are often seen as characteristics of good generalship.²⁰¹ Lying is justified in particular if it contributes to saving the country by deceiving an enemy (*hostis pro salute patriae fallendus <sit>*).²⁰² Chaereas, for his part, primarily deceives his own soldiers, which may flag a potentially problematic aspect of his behaviour, but on the other hand, his obvious success in ultimately safeguarding his army from the enemy may help to justify his intervention.²⁰³ The ambiguity is further enhanced by the fact that cunning and trickery were considered particularly characteristic of *Spartans*, a notion that constituted a traditional testing ground of both positive and negative moral assessments of deceit²⁰⁴ and in the novel, of course, is picked up in Chaereas' Dorian background as a Syracusan (7.3.8).

The moral ambiguity raised by Chaereas' rhetorical behaviour as a general lines up with one of his literary paradigms famous for moral ambivalence as well as rhetorical qualities: Alcibiades.²⁰⁵ This figure is directly relevant to Chaereas' last public speech (8.7.9–8.11), which is addressed to the Syracusan public assembly upon his return home. It has been shown that the scene leading up to this speech is reminiscent of Alcibiades' triumphant return to Athens after exile and is filled with elements that consistently trigger incorrect inferences on the part of the Syracusan people about what is happening.²⁰⁶ The issue of deception activated by these elements provides the

¹⁹⁸ Duff (1999: 171). ¹⁹⁹ See Saïd (2005: 16–17). ²⁰⁰ See Duff (1999: 131–5).

²⁰¹ Arguably the most famous novelistic example is Heliodorus' Hydaspes, in whose depiction trickery as an accepted element of sensible warfare is also apparent (M. Jones 2012: 149–51). This notion may be traced back to the positive valorization of military deceit in Xenophon's *Eq. Mag.* 4.7–5.15 and *Cyr.* 1.6.1–2.11, on which, see Duff (1999: 171–2).

²⁰² Quint. *Inst.* 12.1.39.

²⁰³ On a similar valuation of success at the cost of strict morality in Plutarch, see Duff (1999: 97–8).

²⁰⁴ See Duff (1999: 172–3) on cunning as a mark of either Spartan perfidy (in 5th-cent. Athenian comedy and tragedy) or good Spartan generalship (in Xenophon's *Ages.*).

²⁰⁵ On Alcibiades as a figure escaping moral classification in the usual categories of virtue and vice, see Duff (1999: 227–8) and Frazier (1996: 87–9). On his rhetorical competence (for example in *Plu. Alc.* 10.3), see Pelling (2000: 335) and Verdegem (2010: 169–71).

²⁰⁶ S. D. Smith (2007a: 231). In Smith's view (22, 64, 95–8 216, 244, 248), the figure of Alcibiades raises questions about Chaereas' political and rhetorical ability to succeed Hermocrates in Syracuse. On the similarly looming presence of Alcibiades behind another character (Theseus in *E. Supp.*), see Michelini (1997).

framework in which Chaereas' speech should be read and I argue that this speech, accordingly, thematizes some important issues of manipulation and distortion of the truth already present in earlier speeches.²⁰⁷ Significantly, this speech, in which Chaereas reports his adventures to the Syracusan people upon his homecoming, constitutes Chaereas' new identity before his fellow Syracusans.²⁰⁸ The narrator gives some important background information. First, it is not Chaereas who insists on telling the story, but the Syracusan crowd who insist on hearing it, after having led him to the theatre (8.7.3). Secondly, Chaereas starts with the *last* events of his story (*ἀπὸ τῶν τελευταίων*) because 'he did not want to cause the people sorrow by telling them of the grim episodes at the beginning'. When the crowd protests, however, insisting that he should not omit anything (*μηδὲν παραλίπης*), Chaereas hesitates (*ῥκνεί*, 8.7.4) because he is 'ashamed (*αἰδούμενος*) to talk about many events that had not turned out to his satisfaction' (8.7.4). The combination of the audience's explicit request not to omit anything and the narrator's equally explicit statement about Chaereas' hesitation must surely alert the reader as to whether the information provided in Chaereas' speech is actually complete.

Chaereas' account of his adventures in some instances diverges significantly from the narrator's account in the foregoing chapters of the novel. The first example is Chaereas' account of his and Polycharmus' discovery of Callirhoe's statue in a Milesian temple. He maintains that the sight of this statue gave him 'great confidence' (*ἐγὼ μὲν εἶχον ἀγαθὰς ἐλπίδας*, 8.8.1) in a good outcome, a prospect that he subsequently presents as frustrated by a brigands' attack. The reader, however, recalls that Chaereas, in fact, fainted when he saw the statue of his wife—a reaction emphatically marked with a Homeric quotation by the narrator (3.6.3). The temple servant even had to bring water to resuscitate him. The narrator emphasized Chaereas' lack of self-control in this episode by contrasting him with his friend Polycharmus, who *was* able to control himself (*σωφρονῶν*, 3.6.5) and prevented Chaereas from betraying who they were. And when alone, Chaereas threw himself on the floor and bemoaned his situation in a lamenting monologue. Before the Syracusan assembly, however, Chaereas chooses to omit all this in *his* version of the story and present himself more favourably.

Secondly, regarding the reason why Callirhoe married Dionysius, Chaereas says that, when Callirhoe realized she was pregnant by him, she found herself compelled (*ἀνάγκην*) to marry Dionysius, 'because she wanted to preserve your fellow citizen' (*σῶσαι τὸν πολίτην ὑμῖν θέλουσα*, 8.7.11). That Callirhoe is *compelled* to marry Dionysius, is, indeed, confirmed by the narrator (*ἀνάγκην*,

²⁰⁷ Kasprzyk's (2003: 143–71) reading of this speech (as Chaereas' *catharsis*) differs from mine.

²⁰⁸ See S. D. Smith (2007a: 142).

5.1.1). Chaereas is equally correct in adducing his child as the reason for her decision to marry. The *antonomasia* used to refer to the child, however, is significant. By calling his child ‘your fellow citizen’, Chaereas seems to be suggesting that Callirhoe’s loyalty towards her home city played a role in this decision²⁰⁹—which was not the case according to the narrator’s version. Chaereas thus colours his story in order to generate the audience’s sympathy for his wife.

A similar desire to generate sympathy for Callirhoe might be responsible for the distortion of some other details. In his account of his imprisonment on Mithridates’ estate, he states that Polycharmus uttered his name (εἰπέ μου τοῦνομα, 8.8.3). The reader, however, recalls that Polycharmus did not utter Chaereas’ name, but Callirhoe’s. This utterance was part of a fierce reproach and an unambiguous identification of Callirhoe as responsible for all their misery (‘Callirhoe, it is because of you that we are suffering like this! You are the cause of all our troubles (τῶν κακῶν αἰτία)’, 4.2.7). Callirhoe could obviously not be held accountable for the attack by a Persian garrison (3.7.3) that had resulted in their imprisonment (which she learns about only in 3.10.2), but Polycharmus might be referring to what he has learned from a temple servant in Miletus: that Callirhoe has married ‘the first citizen of the Ionians’ and is now ‘the mistress of the estate’ (3.6.5). Polycharmus’ reproach, therefore, might hint at the contrast between Callirhoe’s allegedly luxurious life after her new marriage and his own (and Chaereas’) miserable servile condition, which results from their determination to find her. The same contrast is played upon in Achilles Tatius’ novel, where Leucippe forcefully reproaches Clitophon that because of him (διὰ σέ, 5.18.4) she has been shipwrecked, has endured bandits, has been sold as a slave, but has had the strength to hold out (διεκαρτέρησα, 5.18.5) amidst so many trials whereas *he* got married (γαμεῖς). The misfortunes evoked in this scene are the topical misfortunes that novelistic heroes encounter, some of which Chaereas and Polycharmus also experience after their imprisonment in Miletus. To recount Polycharmus’ true words in front of the entire Syracusan people, now, would be embarrassing both for Polycharmus and for Callirhoe. In Achilles Tatius, significantly, Clitophon makes it clear that Leucippe’s accusation is justified and that her reference to his marriage in particular makes him blush with shame (δίκαια ἐγκαλεῖς . . . ἡρυσθρίων ἐφ’ οἷς μοι τὸν γάμον ὠνείδιζεν . . . ἡσχυνόμην, 5.19.5–6). It is reasonable to assume that Chaereas does not want to attach to Callirhoe a similarly shameful accusation and therefore decides to omit this detail in his version of the story.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ See also S. D. Smith (2007a: 223).

²¹⁰ On omission as a well-known rhetorical technique of ‘déguisement’ in other writings, see Malosse (2000).

Chaereas' account is also characterized by a tendency to emphasize his own achievements at the expense of those of others. When recounting his arrival amongst the Egyptian army, for example, he extensively surveys his desire to take revenge, subsequent great feats (ἔργα μεγάλα διεπραξάμην), single-handed capture of 'impregnable Tyre' (Τύρον δυσάλωτον... ἐχειρωσάμην αὐτός), appointment to admiral, victory over Artaxerxes, imprisonment of the Persian queen, and confiscation of her wealth (8.8.8–9). During this tale of his glorious achievements, he completely omits the role played by Polycharmus. As the reader will recall, Chaereas actually burst into a lament and wanted to commit suicide on the spot after hearing the false report of Callirhoe that he presents here as the starting point of his personal *aristeia* (7.1.4–7). It was Polycharmus who came up with the idea of harming their enemy *in battle* (with their own death), but Chaereas simply omits this detail, which would reveal his own embarrassing lack of reasoned foresight or *sôphrosynê*.

The same pattern is repeated in Chaereas' account of how he managed to secure the Persian king's friendship for the Syracusan people (φίλον ὑμῖν ἐποίησα, 8.8.10). He mentions the release of the queen and other prisoners as a token of his leniency, but the reader will vividly recall that it was Callirhoe's idea, not Chaereas', to release the Persian queen (8.3.1). *His* original idea was to keep the queen as a prisoner, and it was *she* who referred to this plan as madness (μανίαν, 8.3.2). Whereas Chaereas presents the king's friendship for Syracuse as his personal achievement, the reader realizes that there would not be any such friendship if Callirhoe had not intervened. Interestingly, in his letter to Artaxerxes, Chaereas does admit that it is not his but Callirhoe's idea to release Statira (οὐκ ἐμέ... ἀλλὰ Καλλιρόην, 8.4.3), but in his *public* speech in Syracuse he credits himself with her achievement.

These observations might well go some way towards explaining why Chaereas is at first not willing to recount his adventures. The story contains a number of episodes about which he should rightly be ashamed. At this point, the reader will remember Hermocrates' words preceding Chaereas' speech and encouraging his son-in-law, specifically *not* to be ashamed (μηδὲν αἰδεσθῆς, 8.7.4) to tell his story to the Syracusans, 'even if you have painful or unpleasant things (τι λυπηρότερον ἢ πικρότερον) to tell us'. Indeed, Chaereas manages in his speech to distort and cover up all the 'painful or unpleasant' episodes. And if Hermocrates emphasizes that the brilliant ending (τὸ... τέλος λαμπρόν) overshadows all such earlier events (ἐπισκοτεῖ τοῖς προτέροις ᾗπασι), the reader realizes that, in fact, they have been even more 'overshadowed' by the speaker's equally brilliant rhetorical skills.

By the end of the novel, Chaereas has become an orator who manipulates the material of his speech for rhetorical purposes. It is equally noteworthy that, after his final speech, his request that his sister be given in marriage to Polycharmus is *accepted*. Unlike in his two earlier speeches to the Syracusans, Chaereas returns to Syracuse as an orator able to control his audience. These

observations are in line with and complement existing readings of Chariton's novel as a story of the transition of political leadership from Hermocrates to Chaereas²¹¹ or, more generally, growth from childhood to mature adulthood.²¹² In the case of Chaereas, Chariton's novel thematizes the importance of rhetorical skilfulness as yet another essential quality of male adulthood.²¹³ In addition to the military achievements marking Chaereas' entry into manhood from book seven onwards, his ability to perform successfully on the battlefield of rhetoric is at least as important.

Chaereas' rhetorical skills are also presented as concomitant with an ability to fashion himself self-consciously and publicly as a victorious war hero. On his triumphant arrival in Syracuse, he deliberately positions himself and Callirhoe for public admiration. The tent which the Syracusans in the harbour detect on the deck of the ship (and which, as they will soon learn, hides the protagonists) is said to be 'veiled' (*συγκεκαλυμμένην*, 8.6.5) with tapestries. This term, repeatedly adopted earlier in the story to refer to the actual action of veiling (see pp. 84–5), invites the reader to see the tapestries as a metaphorical veil. Once the tapestries are drawn back, 'Callirhoe could be seen (*ὥφθη Καλλιρόη*) reclining on a couch of beaten gold, dressed in Tyrian purple; Chaereas, dressed like a general (*σχῆμα ἔχων στρατηγού*), sat beside her' (8.6.7). Both the figurative discourse of veiling and the display resulting from the 'unveiling' make this scene part of a series of scenes where Callirhoe is deliberately veiled or unveiled to protect her from, or expose her to, the public gaze aroused by her extraordinary beauty.²¹⁴ Theron, for example, unveils (*ἀποκαλύψας*, 1.14.1) her and loosens her hair before selling her to Leonas. His preparations have an instant effect: all (*πάντες*, 1.14.1) are astonished and think that Callirhoe is a goddess. This passage is complemented by a passage where Callirhoe is not *unveiled* but *veiled*—albeit metaphorically—by another character. Dionysius, terrified by the public attention drawn to his wife in Babylon, invites her to continue the journey in a wagon whose canvas he closes (*συνεκάλυψε τὴν σκηνήν*, 5.2.9) to hide her from the lustful gaze of onlookers. When, eventually, Callirhoe is metaphorically unveiled by leaving the wagon, her impact on all (*πάντων*, 5.3.9) is, again, overwhelming. The discourse of veiling as well as the implied concerns with the protection of female beauty is here used figuratively to depict Dionysius' concerns with controlling the spatial positioning of his wife's beauty.²¹⁵ Whereas Callirhoe herself, as we have seen, uses the veil primarily to hide her grief from the outside world, male characters see her veil as an instrument to be manipulated

²¹¹ S. D. Smith's (2007a: 244–8).

²¹² See Lalanne (2006: 16).

²¹³ See also Webb (2007: 534) and M. Jones (2012: 67–72) on the link between rhetoric and novelistic masculinity.

²¹⁴ See Whitmarsh (2004: 194) on this function of (literal) veiling in Chariton's novel.

²¹⁵ See Llewellyn-Jones (2003: 189–214) on (other types of) interaction between veiling and (domestic) space.

for hiding and exposing her physical beauty. On her arrival in Syracuse, now, she is again the object of metaphorical veiling and unveiling by a male character. But this time, that character is none other than Chaereas. The distribution of active and passive verbs is significant: whereas Chaereas is shown as actively fashioning his own physical appearance (ἔχων), Callirhoe is *looked at* (ὤφθη) as soon as the tapestries are drawn back. Moreover, the fact that the Syracusan onlookers first infer that the tent covers spoils (φόρτον, 8.6.6) but then see Callirhoe again objectifies the heroine, just as in earlier episodes. Chaereas, on the other hand, is now in control of the metaphorical ‘veiling’ and ‘unveiling’ of Callirhoe and he decides when Callirhoe will be gazed at. Although Callirhoe has built up competence in establishing interpersonal control, her *public* role on their arrival in Syracuse is emblematic of the female conformism to male dominance that consolidates the end of most novels²¹⁶ and in particular fleshes out Chaereas’ mastery over his public environment.

But Chaereas’ newly developed skills of self-representation are also thematized in his private communication. His letter to Artaxerxes, written after regaining Callirhoe, offers a good example. In this letter, Chaereas states that he has now been given back Callirhoe by war, which he describes as ‘the fairest judge of all’ (τῷ δικαιωτάτῳ δικαστῇ, 8.4.2) and ‘the ultimate judge’ (ἄριστος κριτής) between stronger and weaker’ (τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ χείρονος). In this maxim, which applies both to Chaereas (τοῦ κρείττονος) and Artaxerxes (χείρονος), Chaereas clearly casts himself in a position of both authority and superiority over his narratee.²¹⁷ The metaphorical depiction of war as the ‘ultimate judge’, of course, criticizes Artaxerxes for having failed to restore Callirhoe to him during the trial in Babylon over which he presided as the (real) judge. It is also documented by Chaereas’ awareness of Artaxerxes’ own love for Callirhoe: Artaxerxes is not only Chaereas’ military opponent but also his rival in love. Through the blending of war and love, Chaereas characterizes himself as the only ‘legitimate’ husband, who has been given by the highest judge what a human judge (such as Artaxerxes) could not give him.

Chaereas’ opposition of his own strength and Artaxerxes’ weakness involves not only the recovery of his own wife but also his power over Artaxerxes’ wife Statira, who is a captive in his army and will be freed and sent back to her husband. Chaereas’ explicit contrasting of his own swiftness in releasing Statira with Artaxerxes’ slowness (τὴν βραδυτήτα, 8.4.3) in restoring Callirhoe to him also highlights the inversion of power relations that has taken place: Chaereas now controls the wife of Artaxerxes, instead of vice versa. The paradigm evoked here is Alexander the Great, whose leniency towards Darius’ wife after the battle at Issus is a famous theme in, among others, Diodorus

²¹⁶ See Lalanne (2006: 129–53) on the ‘silencing’ of heroines towards the end of novels.

²¹⁷ See also Seitel (1969: 150–1) and Lardinois (2000: 642–3) on maxims that convey superiority over narratees.

Siculus, Plutarch, and the *Alexander Romance*.²¹⁸ This is not the first time that the narrative assimilates Chaereas to the great Macedonian conqueror. Chaereas' capture of Tyre (7.4), although replete with Homeric echoes, clearly reminds the reader of Alexander's famous capture of this impregnable city.²¹⁹ And of course, Alexander's famous association with hot temper and loss of self-control aligns him with key episodes documenting Chaereas' behaviour in the first half of the book, even if Chaereas changes from impulsive and uncontrolled to rational and controlled while Alexander rather takes the opposite route (growing more impulsive in the later stages of his life).²²⁰ Like that of Diomedes, then, the paradigm of Alexander is most visible in an episode documenting his *changed* behaviour, but simultaneously and retrospectively may activate concerns pertaining to his previous behaviour too.

But Chaereas' self-portraiture in his letter as militarily victorious (τοῦ κρείττονος) is not entirely justified: unlike Darius, Artaxerxes has not yet been defeated in a military sense. On the contrary, whereas Chaereas' navy has been victorious at sea, the Persian army has annihilated the Egyptian army on land. In Chaereas' discourse, then, not the military decision but the acquisition of Callirhoe is presented as crucial to the ultimate outcome of the war (οὗτός μοι [Καλλιρόην] ἀποδέδωκεν, 8.4.2). This does not correspond with Chaereas' initial stimulus to participate in the war, which was the desire to inflict *military* damage upon Artaxerxes at a moment when he thought that he had lost Callirhoe for good. But in this letter, notwithstanding the fact that her retrieval happened by mere accident, he presents the war as if it has been fought about Callirhoe. The rhetorically contrived confluence of military and erotic victory underlying Chaereas' claim is highlighted by contrast with Iamblichus' *Babyloniaca*, where, according to Photius' summary, Rhodanes' victory over a Syrian king is presented as factually coinciding with his recovery of the heroine (νικᾷ καὶ τὴν Σινωνίδα ἀπολαμβάνει, Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 94, 78a39–40). In Chariton, there is no such factual coincidence; the coincidence, rather, is a rhetorical one constructed in Chaereas' letter.

At the level of the key function, Chaereas' presentation of the war as fought over Callirhoe inevitably reactivates Callirhoe's association with Helen. Correspondingly, the blending of military and erotic achievement evokes the comparison of Chaereas with the wounded *aristeus* warrior that was used to

²¹⁸ D. S. 17.38.4 (where the leniency shown in this instance is applauded as Alexander's greatest and most memorable deed), Plu. *Alex.* 21.1–5, and Ps.-Callisth. *Alexander Romance* 1.41.12.

²¹⁹ See e.g. D. S. 17.40–8, Curt. 4.4, and Plu. *Alex.* 24.4–25.3. See also Laplace (1997: 60–2) on this famous episode in Chariton's novel.

²²⁰ See e.g. Mossman (1988: 85) on the tension between Alexander's hot temper and his self-control in Plu. *Alex.*, Sansone (1980) on the volatile nature of his character, and Whitmarsh (2002b: 180–1) on his ambiguous behaviour as that of both a self-controlled philosopher-king and an intolerant tyrant.

mark his very first erotic encounter with Callirhoe (ὥσπερ τις <ἄρισ>τεὺς ἐν πολέμῳ τρωθεὶς καιρίαν, 1.1.7). The image of love wounding its object evokes, of course, a long tradition, but this early passage introduces into the novel a specific assimilation of Chaereas to the paradigm of the Homeric *aristeus* hero.²²¹ As such, the comparison is proleptic of the moment when Chaereas will be a *real aristeus* warrior and will be echoed throughout the novel in the many explicit and implicit assimilations of Chaereas to epic heroes. At the same time, the comparison evokes the world of rhetorical performance, where the *aristeus* was a famous stock character.²²² At the beginning of the novel, then, we have a blending of *military* and *rhetorical* characterization in the context of *erotic* experience. This blending is activated in Chaereas' characterization throughout the final two books of the novel in general, and resurfaces in his letter to Artaxerxes in particular. At the end of the novel, Chaereas' depiction of the war as initiated because of Callirhoe echoes the Trojan war and casts Chaereas, once again, as a victorious epic hero. By then, Chaereas has become an *aristeus* himself in the three domains anticipated by the comparison at the beginning of the novel: military, erotic, and rhetorical. The letter to Artaxerxes is emblematic of all three: its skilful blending of military and erotic victory testifies to Chaereas' qualities as an *aristeus rhêtôr*.

1.4.3 ... Chaereas' transformation

I have discussed a number of thematic strands of Chaereas' character that are constructed by significant before-and-after differences revolving around the beginning of book 7. I now turn to the question of the plausibility of the behavioural change which they document. To what extent does the narrator account for such change? To be sure, organizing narratives around a textual turning point is not entirely unusual in ancient literature²²³ and instances of abrupt character change are no less common. In Iamblichus' *Babyloniaca*, for example, the possibility that the hero Rhodanes is invested with courage comparable to that of the heroine only at an advanced stage in the narrative has led scholars to compare him with Chaereas.²²⁴ Outside the domain of novelistic literature, Plutarch's *Lives* have been shown not (always) to reflect the traditional philosophical (Aristotelian) concern with virtue being *gradually* acquired through moral improvement²²⁵ but rather to observe an alteration in a character's stance between two points in time and then look for

²²¹ See Brethes (2001: 182–4).

²²² M. Jones (2012: 118–19).

²²³ See e.g. Tröster (2008: 50) on Plutarch's treatment of Lucullus.

²²⁴ Stephens and Winkler (1995: 188).

²²⁵ Frazier (1996: 78–9, 92–3, 136) and Pelling (1988a: 261).

an explanation.²²⁶ One instance of such a ‘Plutarchan’, abrupt character change may have been picked up by Achilles Tatius in his depiction of Callisthenes, who is introduced into the narrative as morally defective (*ἄσωτος . . . τοῖς ἀκολάστοις, ὕβρις* 2.13.1; *τὴν ἀκολασίαν*, 2.13.2) but at the end of the novel is said to have undergone ‘a sudden, miraculous transformation’ (*τὺς ἐξαίφνης . . . θαυμαστὴ μεταβολή*, 8.17.4). Not only are the notions of abruptness and suddenness (implicit in the case of Chaereas’ transformation) made explicit in the case of Callisthenes (*τὸ αἰφνίδιον*, 8.17.5), but the subsequent, explicit comparison of Callisthenes’ moral ascent to that of Themistocles²²⁷ may recall Plutarch’s discussion of Themistocles’ changeability (*Them.* 2.7: *μεγάλας μεταβολάς*).²²⁸ In any case, Plutarch and Achilles Tatius can reasonably be assumed to echo an existing tradition that foregrounds Themistocles as an example of changeability and possibly originates in reconciling diverse and often paradoxical traditions about this notoriously paradoxical character.²²⁹

Although Themistocles is not mentioned explicitly in Chariton’s novel, he is far from absent in it. In fact, Athenian historiography has been shown to be a pervasive and profound presence in Chariton’s novel, and Chaereas’ military trajectory in particular is dotted with allusions to famous episodes such as Alexander’s capture of Tyre and Xenophon’s retreat from the Persian empire with the Ten Thousand.²³⁰ Chaereas himself, as we have seen, is repeatedly aligned with famous generals throughout the last two books. Against this background, he broadly but unmistakably resembles Themistocles in that he becomes a great navy general (*στρατηγεῖν . . . τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως*, 7.5.7; *ναύαρχος*, 7.5.9) who defeats the Persians (7.6.1). The novel even recalls Themistocles’ celebrated victory at Salamis explicitly in the context of both military achievement and Chaereas’ characterization (6.7.10).²³¹ Moreover, Chaereas’ rhetorical ability and manipulative skills in the last two books also evoke the figure of Themistocles, who was well known for his rhetorical

²²⁶ See e.g. Frazier (1996: 90–3) on Plut. *Alex.* 42.2, 13.3–4; Swain (1989a: 65–8) on Plutarch’s depictions of Philip V (*Arat.*), Sulla, and Sertorius; and Goodyear (1972: 37–8) on Suetonius’ Caligula.

²²⁷ Who ‘had a great reputation for licentiousness in his earliest youth, but later (*ὕστερον*) surpassed all the Athenians in wisdom (*σοφία*) and manly excellence (*ἀνδραγαθία*)’ (8.17.7).

²²⁸ See also Repath (2007a: 119–20) and Whitmarsh (2011: 107 n. 190) on Themistocles in Achilles Tatius and Plutarch.

²²⁹ See Podlecki (1975: 47–142), Frost (1980: 3–39), and Marr (1998: 4–5) on remarkably different traditions about Themistocles in antiquity, and Blösel (2001) on paradoxical depictions in a single author. On Themistocles’ changeability/instability, see Zadorojnyi (2006: 262) and Duff (2008b: 9). On a reputation for changeability as originating from reconciling different traditions, see Gribble (1999: 38) (on Alcibiades).

²³⁰ See Alvares (2007: 13), Luginbill (2000), S. D. Smith (2007a: 153–248), and Trzaskoma (2011, 2012).

²³¹ On the inextricable association between Themistocles and the Persian wars in even the earliest literary evidence, see Podlecki (1975: 47–65).

brilliance as well as trickery, deceit, and cunning from Herodotus and Thucydides onwards.²³² And of course, Themistocles famously becomes a renegade, well known for shifting political and military camps.²³³ Is it a coincidence that the reversal in Chaereas' behaviour materializes precisely when he goes over from one army to another? It is at least worth floating the idea that behind Chaereas' sudden behavioural shift might be lurking, among other things, an echo of Themistocles.

Equally relevant is another—some would say *the* other—great combat general in Athenian history, Alcibiades, who is explicitly compared with Chaereas at the very beginning of the novel (1.1.3).²³⁴ In some respects, this figure is remarkably similar to Themistocles—and the association is well known from the literary tradition.²³⁵ And what is more, most of these similarities (their history as renegades, tendency to go over to political and military enemies, military brilliance, trickery, deceit, and rhetorical competence) are all central to Chaereas' depiction in the last two books. S. D. Smith (2007a: 199–248) offers a detailed analysis of Alcibiades as a paradigm of Chaereas throughout the novel and argues that conceptualizing Chaereas as an Alcibiadean character helps to remove the problem of implausible transformation altogether. In his view, the transformation is accounted for by the fact that the Alcibiadean connection accommodates a number of paradoxes in Chaereas' characterization: 'Just as Chaereas can appear to be both *erastês* and *erômenos* simultaneously (1.1.3, 1.3.6), so too can he simultaneously sustain masculine and feminine personae' (230). I agree that Alcibiades is a key to interpreting paradoxes and ambiguities in Chaereas' characterization (a reading that resonates well with other scholarship on notions of ambivalence and paradox in this novel,²³⁶ and with my own reading of such notions in Callirhoe's characterization in particular). But I am less sure that, as a consequence, 'we need not envision a rupture in the depiction of Chaereas' (230). Surely, the often-noted problem with Chaereas' character is precisely that he sustains different personae not simultaneously (as S. D. Smith has it) but *consecutively* (that is, with the beginning of book 7 as a fairly clear turning point, as suggested by all

²³² See e.g. H. Martin (1961), Frost (1980: 6–7, 25), and Blösel (2001: 195) on, among other passages, Hdt. 8.58–60, 8.83, and 8.108–10.

²³³ See e.g. Th. 1.135–8 and Plu. *Them.* 27.1. On material about the last years of Themistocles' life in Chariton, see Schwartz (2003: 380–1).

²³⁴ On Themistocles and Alcibiades as the two greatest combat generals in Athenian history, see Frost (1980: 22). On Alcibiades' military ability in particular (for example in X. *HG* 1.4.20, 1.4.22–3), see Verdegem (2005, 2010: 40–2).

²³⁵ See Gribble (1999: 27, 85, 191, 193, 222). Frost (1980: 22) suggests a causal connection between some of the similar elements in the two traditions ('no doubt, men would conjecture, Themistocles too [i.e. like Alcibiades] had lived life to the fullest during his youth').

²³⁶ See e.g. Trzaskoma (2011) on the ambivalent interplay between historiographical intertexts (i.e. from Xenophon's *Anabasis*).

before-and-after differences discussed above).²³⁷ It is therefore important to note that Alcibiades is a famous paradigm not just of the human ability to unite inconsistent, paradoxical, and ambivalent character traits, but also of the very notion of behavioural *change*—and often sudden change at that. Plutarch famously discusses Alcibiades' ability to assimilate and adapt himself to others (*συνεξομοιοῦσθαι καὶ συνομοπαθεῖν*, *Alc.* 23.4; see also *Alc.* 2.1) and emphasizes the abruptness and suddenness of such adaptations by stating that he assumes 'more violent changes (*ὀξυτέρας τροπομένῳ τροπᾶς*) than the chameleon (*τοῦ χαμαιλέοντος*)',²³⁸ an animal used also by Aelian (*NA* 2.14) as a paradigm for human changeability.²³⁹ Alcibiades' anomalous ability to practise different *bioi* in different circumstances is also discussed in Cornelius Nepos (*Alcib.* 11) and possibly originated as early as the Hellenistic period in an attempt, again, to harmonize diverging versions.²⁴⁰ Plutarch locates Alcibiades' 'chameleonic' abilities primarily in interaction with different societal circumstances as well as in his construction of different political alliances, two details that correspond to Chaereas' switching from the Persians to the Egyptians at the time of his behavioural shift.

It may be, then, that Chaereas' sudden change in behaviour is meant to be read as a *tertium comparationis* aligning him with both Themistocles and Alcibiades, two famous paradigms of changeability in the literary tradition and two generals who combine military brilliance and rhetorical competence. Let us not forget, finally, that Chaereas' association with military leaders known for their emotional volatility may have been evoked as early as his introduction. His very name has been read as a reference to two such leaders: Chabrias, a historically attested Egyptian admiral serving during an attack on Syria in 360 BC and associated, like Chaereas, with hot temper (Plu. *Phoc.* 6.1 describes him as 'uneven and violent', *ἀνώμαλον καὶ ἄκρατον*);²⁴¹ and Cassius Chaerea, the tribune of the Roman praetorian guard who murdered Caligula in AD 41. Not only did the latter establish a top military career (like Chaereas), but he was also, according to Tacitus (*Ann.* 1.32), a 'wild-tempered young man' (*adulescens animi ferox*).²⁴² It is possible that Chabrias and Cassius Chaerea,

²³⁷ See also Trzaskoma (2011: 24–9) on Chaereas' 'anabasis' as starting at the beginning of book 7.

²³⁸ For a detailed comparison of Alcibiades' depiction in Plutarch's *Life* with that of Chaereas, see S. D. Smith (2007a: 212–25).

²³⁹ See also Duff (1999: 235). On Plutarch's Alcibiades as an example of inconsistency and change, see also Verdegem (2010: 119–21, 304–5, 419–22), Gill (2006: 418), Duff (2003: 94–5), and Lombardi (1997: 387–91).

²⁴⁰ Gribble (1999: 38). See Campos Daroca and López Cruces (1990) and Verdegem (2010: 35–58) on different portrayals of Alcibiades in the literary (historical, rhetorical, and philosophical) tradition and Bruns (1896: 493–521) and Duff (1999: 222–9) on contradictory traditions about his character as early as the 5th and early 4th cent.

²⁴¹ See Hunter (1994: 1057) and Tilg (2010: 48).

²⁴² Bowie (2002: 55) suggests that both aspects might align him with Chariton's hero.

just like Themistocles and Alcibiades, act as paradigms documenting important strands in Chaereas' behaviour.

The most explicit narratorial comment on Chaereas' (changed) character occurs immediately after his admission into the Egyptian army. When he is invited to share the leader's table and is formally appointed as his adviser, the narrator adduces character as an explanation for this swift promotion: 'for (γάρ) Chaereas was showing (ἐπεδείκνυτο) good sense (φρόνησιν) and courage (θάρσος), and loyalty (πίστιν) as well, true to (οὐκ ἀπρονόητος) his noble nature (φύσεως ἀγαθῆς) and upbringing (παιδείας)' (7.2.5). This claim surely strikes the reader as paradoxical to some extent: Chaereas' qualities of *phronêsis* and *tharsos* are 'new' in the sense that they have not been borne out by his behaviour in the first six books and, indeed, are introduced only at this point in the story; on the other hand, their novelty is immediately made problematic by their intimate connection with Chaereas' inborn nature (*physis*) and education (*paideia*). Whereas the reference to *paideia* might itself imply an idea of gradual acquisition,²⁴³ that to *physis* implies, rather, that the two qualities have been naturally present in Chaereas all along. At the same time, the fact that Chaereas is said to be *showing* (ἐπεδείκνυτο) these qualities, draws attention to character as a performative concept: the narrator does not say explicitly that Chaereas' character *changes*; rather, Chaereas is portrayed as demonstrating behaviour (unspecified for the time being) that the narrator (or the Egyptian leader, if we agree that it is he who focalizes Chaereas at this point) identifies as an indication of *phronêsis* and *tharsos*. The simultaneous emphasis on the performative aspect of character as well as on *physis* and *paideia* as motivations for such performance might suggest that Chaereas' *phronêsis* and *tharsos*, even if they constitute completely new information, have always been present *in nuce* but were never manifested up to this point. This passage, in other words, raises the question of whether we are dealing with an instance of character *revelation* rather than character change.

This possibility gains plausibility when put into context by episodes where the manifestation of *physis* is, indeed, conceptualized as dependent upon circumstance.²⁴⁴ When Dionysius discovers that Chaereas is not dead, for example, he attempts (ἐπειράτο, 5.9.8) to endure his emotions in a spirit of nobility (γενναίως). Here too, *physis* and *paideia* are singled out as the main motivation for (attempted) behaviour: he draws 'on the steadfastness of his *physis* (φύσεως εὐστάθειαν) and the diligence of his *paideia* (παιδείας ἐπιμέλειαν)'.²⁴⁵ But in this case, the narrator makes it clear that the unbelievable

²⁴³ See M. Jones (2012: 64–5).

²⁴⁴ See also M. Jones (2012: 140) on circumstances determining when Chaereas is able to *show* his manliness.

²⁴⁵ The combination of *physis* and *paideia* as motivations for behaviour is not unusual in the novels (see e.g. Hld. 7.2.3 on Theagenes' *sôphrosynê*) or other ancient narrative (see e.g. Duff 1999: 224 on the importance of both natural ability and education in the depiction of Plutarch's

disaster that has befallen him (i.e. Chaereas' sudden appearance; τὸ . . . παράδοξον τῆς συμφορᾶς) is sufficient to drive even the bravest man (τὸν ἀνδρειότατον) out of his mind. Dionysius' (attempted) behaviour, then, is motivated by *physis* and *paideia*, but at the same time acutely affected by circumstance.

The importance of circumstances for the manifestation (or not) of *physis* is similarly highlighted when Polycharmus acts as a foil for Chaereas' lack of *sôphrosynê*. The narrator makes it clear that Polycharmus is able to do the work of two because 'he is manly by nature (ἀνδρικός τὴν φύσιν) and not enslaved by love' (μὴ δουλεύων ἔρωτι, 4.2.3). The implication is that Chaereas' inability to do what Polycharmus does results not so much from an unmanly *physis* as from the fact that he, unlike Polycharmus, is in love.²⁴⁶ In Polycharmus' case, then, *physis* again acts as the motivation for action and the importance of the right circumstances (Polycharmus is not in love) is again presented as a crucial condition for its manifestation.

In other novels too, this interplay between *physis* and circumstance is often addressed. In Achilles Tatius, the story of Tereus' rape of Philomela is emphatically presented as an example of (barbarian) *physis* (τῇ φύσει) brought out in (and as a result of) the right circumstances (καίρος, 5.5.2–3). In Heliodorus too, Theagenes draws attention to the role of circumstances in his own changed perception of his *physis*: he states that he has always rejected affection for women until the day that Chariclea's beauty demonstrates that he is not 'naturally proof' against temptation (φύσει καρτερικός, 3.17.4) but has simply never set eyes upon a woman worthy of his love (ἀξιεράστου γυναικὸς . . . ἀθέατος). In other words, (changed) circumstance (Theagenes' meeting with Chariclea) stimulates not a *change* in *physis* but rather a revelation of it at the level of self-perception (all of a sudden, Theagenes' true *physis* is revealed to himself).

As these examples indicate, it is not uncommon for the novels to explore, explicitly or implicitly, the revelation of *physis* as a result of (the right) circumstances. The presentation of Chaereas' praiseworthy behaviour in 7.2.5 also raises this possibility: the characteristics of *phronêsis* and *tharsos* may have been present in Chaereas all along as part of his *physis*, were nurtured by his *paideia*, but remained hidden because circumstances did not allow their manifestation. But if so, what circumstances *are* conducive to their manifestation? The military context provided by the Egyptian army and the concomitant opportunity to distinguish oneself in battle may be one such

Alcibiades). *Physis* in particular as a motivation for action is common in Chariton (1.4.5, 1.12.6, 2.3.3, 2.6.5, 2.7.2, 3.3.16, 5.2.6, 6.7.9, 6.9.2, 7.2.7, 7.6.7, 8.6.5) as well as in other novels (X. Eph. 3.11.4, Ach. Tat. 2.17.3, Longus 4.11.2, 4.23.2, and Hld. 7.5.5, 8.6.2).

²⁴⁶ The narrator makes it clear that Chaereas is worn out with digging because he is weighed down by many things but 'above all his love' (τούτων μᾶλλον ὁ ἔρως, 4.2.1).

circumstance. On one level, Chaereas' transformation may be read as an instantiation of the well-known ancient concern with character typification: generals should behave like generals. But at the same time, another complementary possibility presents itself. In the case of Polycharmus and Dionysius, as we have seen, love for Callirhoe is presented as the crucial circumstance affecting (or not) one's *physis*. For Dionysius, it is precisely his increased erotic desire (ἐξεκάετο . . . σφοδρότερον, 5.9.9) that risks compromising his natural attempts at noble behaviour; and the *absence* of such love explains why Polycharmus, unlike Chaereas, is capable of such behaviour. The conceptualization of love as a circumstance operating next to (or in addition to) *physis* and affecting its revelation becomes even clearer when contrasted with a passage in Achilles Tatius, where the condition of being in love is presented in opposite terms: not as a circumstance facilitating or impeding the manifestation of *physis* but as an expression of *physis* itself (being opposed, as it happens, by circumstance). When Clitophon has fallen in love with Leucippe, but his father has selected another girl for him to marry, this problem is presented as a war between Clitophon's *physis* and the necessity for him to obey his father (ἀνάγκη μάχεται καὶ φύσις, 1.11.3). Clitophon's love (for Leucippe), in other words, is here identified as a natural disposition being opposed by circumstantial necessity. In both the Polycharmus and Dionysius episodes in Chariton, on the other hand, love *is* such circumstantial necessity.

Given this conceptualization of love as a circumstance facilitating or prohibiting the manifestation of *physis*, it may be significant that Chaereas' character apparently changes just when he believes that Callirhoe is lost forever: he is convinced not only that she has been assigned to Dionysius but also that she will commit suicide when separated from him (οὐ . . . ζήσεται Καλλιρόη, 7.1.6). Moreover, Polycharmus makes it exceptionally clear that, unlike before, there is no hope left. Is part of the circumstances conducive to the manifestation of Chaereas' *phronêsis* and *tharsos*, then, a fatalistic neutralization of the power of *erôs* by the profound belief that his beloved is lost for good anyway? Ancient authors suggest, in any case, that such a scenario is not implausible: Plutarch's analysis of Alcibiades' behavioural reversals, for example, assumes that *physis* is not revealed straightforwardly (if, indeed, revealed at all) but affected by circumstances.²⁴⁷ And Polybius (9.22.9), for his part, registers that, while circumstances can in some cases cause character to change (see p. 21), in other cases they *bring out* (ἐλέγχεσθαι . . . ὑπὸ τῶν περιστάσεων) the natures of people (τὰς φύσεις) and cause these natures, which have up to that point completely maintained their secrecy (ὄλως . . . ἀναστέλλωνται), to 'become apparent' (καταφανεῖς γίνεσθαι). More specifically, he explicitly lists *misfortunes* (ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχαίαις) as one such

²⁴⁷ Plu. *Alc.* 23.5. See Duff (1999: 235) and Frazier (1996: 87–8) on Alcibiades' anomaly as a result not of *physis* but of changed circumstances.

circumstance particularly conducive to revealing *physis*. Chaereas' behaviour at the beginning of book 7 may be read in such terms: the narrator depicts him explicitly as a victim of *misfortunes* (*δυστυχῶν*, 7.1.4). Possibly, Chaereas' extreme suffering at this point in the story is to be read as another element in a constellation of circumstances conducive to a revelation of his *physis*.

1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

How do different techniques of characterization in Chariton's novel shape the three broad strands of character that I discussed in the introduction to this book (typification v. individuation, idealistic v. realistic depiction, static v. dynamic character)? As one would expect, a number of characteristics are attributed directly (on the most overt level of communication, that is) and (further) documented indirectly through behavioural patterns and metaphorical characterization. This is the case, for example, with the famously topical characteristics of *eugeneia* and beauty. In these cases, the ancient concern with typification is prominent: of course, both characteristics define Callirhoe and Chaereas in their roles as novel protagonists from the very first page, but at the same time differentiate them vis-à-vis each other. The episodes where Callirhoe's *eugeneia* is thematized most emphatically depict her in opposition to two slave figures (Plangon and Artaxates) and centre entirely around the idea of mental incompatibility between a *eugenês* person and a slave. In these terms, the individuation involved is limited: Callirhoe, as a *eugenês* and inexperienced person, is likely to have been defenceless against *any servus/a callidus/a* sent her way rather than specifically Plangon. But at the same time the narrator takes care to account for the psychological plausibility of the situation. Just like other characters who read Callirhoe's *eugeneia* as part of their own rhetorical, social, or political agenda, Plangon uses the girl's *eugenês* mentality and concomitant naivety to engineer a marriage to Dionysius. Although the narrator absolves his heroine from guilt (and therefore discourages analysis of this event in terms of moral character), we are given a detailed depiction involving direct (*eugeneia*, *apeiria*), metonymical (behavioural patterns and speech documenting the relative importance of *eugeneia*, *philostorgia*, and *sôphrosynê*) and metaphorical characterization (Callirhoe v. Plangon) that allows us to *understand* how Callirhoe is forced into something so generically inappropriate as marrying a second husband. Even if this episode essentially revolves around the confrontation of two incompatible character types, the narrator's primary concern seems to be with plausible exploration of strands reminiscent of Gill's concept of 'personality' rather than with the moral assessment of 'character'.

More often than not, however, things are more complicated than mere (indirect) confirmation of (direct) characterization. The very implicitness of metaphorical and metonymical techniques is here exploited to good effect. The four paradigms supporting Chaereas' ideal physical beauty in his introduction, for example, implicitly explore important, and not so ideal, strands of *inner* character as they will emerge (through behaviour) in the remainder of the narrative. Similarly, while the narrator explicitly acknowledges a change in Callirhoe's *physical* appearance after the birth of her son, her behaviour points to a concomitant change in social self-positioning, which reveals that the narrator's concern with understanding Callirhoe's behaviour is part of a broader depiction of her loss of inexperience and, concomitantly, her growing ability to control her social environment. This change is constructed implicitly through a combination of metonymical (e.g. blushing) and metaphorical characterization (her behaviour in the Artaxates episode significantly inverts that in the Plangon episode).

In yet other instances, indirect characterization in Chariton *complicates* overtly attributed characteristics. The most striking example is another topical virtue of novelistic heroines that in Chariton is turned into a testing ground for the exploration of less than ideal character: Callirhoe's chastity (*sôphrosynê*). In fact, even overt direct attribution presents this virtue ambiguously (*philandria* refers to different characters in different passages, and Chaereas' explicit but unintentional characterization of his wife as *sôphrôn* highlights, specifically, his doubts). And although the narrator presents the one action that compromises her *sôphrosynê* as a necessity, the ambiguity is consistently consolidated through metaphorical characterization: Homeric and other mythological paradigms (Helen/Menelaus/Paris, Penelope/Odysseus, Achilles/Patroclus, Laodamia/Protesilaus, Ariadne/Theseus/Dionysus, Semele/Zeus and Thetis/Peleus) raise disconcerting questions about Callirhoe's chastity in the mind of both the reader and Chaereas. Chaereas' cool-headedness (*sôphrosynê*) is another example. The only direct attribution pertains to his behaviour in battle after his transformation and is supported by paradigms (Hector, Achilles, Odysseus, Diomedes) appropriately highlighting a controlled death-wish and military bravery respectively. But at the same time these paradigms systematically invert earlier occurrences and thus draw attention to a number of episodes *before* Chaereas' transformation where they highlight a *lack of sôphrosynê* as well as a number of other less than ideal characteristics such as self-pity, jealousy, and a sense of victimhood.

This last example is also illustrative of the structural role that metaphorical characterization plays on an intratextual level in Chariton's novel: Chaereas' characterization in the final books is constructed not only directly and metonymically, but also through significant contrasts with previous episodes, just as Callirhoe's character in the Artaxates episodes is shaped by contrasts with the Plangon episode. And conversely, intratextual *analogy* invites us to read

Chaereas' transformation as a doublet of Callirhoe's character change earlier in the novel. Of course, there are notable differences between the two episodes (more abrupt v. more gradual, revelation v. change) but nevertheless they explore the same thematic ('participant') area of character, concerned with establishing and maintaining control over one's social environment. And of course, their roughly symmetrical positions within the narrative invite comparison: Callirhoe's change after two books, Chaereas' with two more books to go. In both cases, notions of *change* indicate that neither Callirhoe nor Chaereas is to be read as a static novel hero. And in both cases (but primarily in Chaereas' case), we can read their increasing ability to control others as complementary to the ability to control the self. But whereas Chaereas' transformation is explored on the public stage (as a warrior on the battlefield and as a public speaker through his harnessing of the power of rhetoric), Callirhoe's covers a less public realm of human interaction and is limited to an interpersonal level. It is Callirhoe who advises Chaereas in their bedroom to mislead the army, but it is Chaereas, as a general, who performs the ruse. Similarly, having built up competence in interpersonal control throughout the novel, Callirhoe is nevertheless publicly exposed by Chaereas in the final scene of veiling and unveiling: their return to Syracuse. Her realm of influence, then, seems to be confined to the personal, the hidden. This gender-oriented distinction between acquiring influence in public and private domains is in tune with, but at the same time seems to play on, conventional social roles of men and women—as presented more straightforwardly, for example in the *Ninus* novel, where a sharp contrast is drawn between the hero's effective marriage-related speech and the heroine's inability to utter as much as one word on the subject. In *Ninus*, the narrator explicitly connects this rhetorical helplessness with her confinement to the women's quarters (τῆς γυναικωνίτιδος ζωσά ο) ὅκ ἐμπρεπεῖς ἐπο[ίει τοὺς λό]γους, A.IV, 23–5). Callirhoe, in contrast, even if she is, like Ninus' beloved, ultimately destined to live in the shadow of her publicly visible husband, *has* learned to socially and rhetorically navigate the space that is hers.

In both Chaereas' and Callirhoe's cases, becoming an adult involves a number of abilities (such as control, manipulation, and deceit) that do not seem to fit into the box of 'idealism' in which scholars have traditionally confined Chariton's novel.²⁴⁸ Occasionally, to be sure, scholars have pointed to less than ideal elements in it²⁴⁹ as well as to the possibility that such elements are a reaction to a more ideal tradition. Callirhoe's child and bigamous marriage, for

²⁴⁸ Tilg (2010) is the most recent attempt.

²⁴⁹ See e.g. Whitmarsh (2008b: 6) on Chaereas' jealousy and Callirhoe's bigamy ('Hardly an 'ideal' love story... on any criterion'). Similar views in Billault (1981a: 206) and Reardon (1982: 23).

example, are believed to be a reaction against prior stereotypes.²⁵⁰ It is possible that fragments such as *Metiochus and Parthenope*, *Chione*, and *Ninus* offer glimpses of such a (preceding or contemporary) tradition but the scantiness of the surviving evidence (especially in the case of *Chione*) and the profound uncertainty as to the dating²⁵¹ do not allow us to go much further than speculation. My reading does not necessarily imply such a preceding tradition (nor does it reject one). My point is, rather, that less than ideal strands in this novel are not limited to one or two episodes but, on the contrary, underlie something as central to the narrative as the characterization of the central love couple. Their characterization is often too problematic, too ambiguous, and too much coloured by psychologically realistic concerns such as manipulation and deceit for the traditional and unproblematic name tag of 'ideal novel' to be appropriate for what is possibly the oldest extant representative of the genre.

²⁵⁰ Morgan (2008b: 226). For similar ideas, see Schmid (1899: 2168), Morgan (1993: 224, 1995: 140–1), Kaimio (1995: 119), and Fakas (2005).

²⁵¹ Tilg (2010: 36–127) offers a detailed overview of the dating. Even if he goes out of his way to date Chariton (as the supposed 'inventor' of the genre of the ideal novel; c. AD 40–60) before all other early novelists, he concedes (109, 125) that *Metiochus and Parthenope*, *Chione*, and *Ninus* may just as well have been written *earlier*. On the dating of *Metiochus and Parthenope* and *Ninus*, see also Bowie (2002: 52–4).

Xenophon of Ephesus

2.1 XENOPHON AND APHELEIA

Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesiaca* is arguably the most problematic text in the novelistic canon.¹ Some see it as the product of an incompetent writer.² Others have argued that the text which has come down to us is more likely to be the product of epitomization of a now lost original.³ Whereas this theory was influential in the first half of the twentieth century,⁴ today most scholars agree that it is not defensible in its original form.⁵ This does not necessarily mean, of course, that we automatically have the novel in its entirely complete or original form. As in all processes of textual transmission, (more or less crucial) passages may have fallen out, for example, and in any case the problem remains that the novel appears 'cripplingly bare and undeveloped'.⁶ In this chapter, of course, I do not offer an explanation for all the oddities that have been identified and discussed in recent decades.⁷ Within the realm of

¹ Since Locella (1796), it has often been dated to the first half of the 2nd cent. AD (see Kytzler 2003: 346–8 and Ruiz-Montero 1994: 1091–4 for details) but O'Sullivan (1995: 1–9, 168–70) argues for a date as early as AD 50. Bowie (2002: 57) suggests a date after AD 65.

² See e.g. Lesky (1966: 864) and Rattenbury (1950: 75).

³ First suggested by Rohde (1876: 401 = 1914³: 429), but more fully explored by Bürger (1892). This theory primarily draws upon the observation of a discrepancy between the abundance of detail in some passages (especially the introductory paragraphs of the novel according to Rohde 1914³: 430, and the first book and the first half of the second book according to Bürger 1892: 37) and a narrative 'skeleton' stripped of all detail in others ('auffällige Kürze und Trockenheit der Darstellung', Bürger 1892: 36). There is also the fact that the *Suda* mentions *ten* books, which is twice the number of books preserved in the *codex Florentinus* (containing the only manuscript of this novel).

⁴ See e.g. Schissel von Fleschenberg (1909), Zimmermann (1949–50), Weinreich (1962), Gärtner (1967: 2072–4), and Miralles (1968). The epitome theory has influenced Merkelbach (1962: 91–113) and Kerényi (1927: 58–63, 232–5), who argue that Xenophon's novel as we have it is the product of a 'Heliosredaktion' of an earlier text.

⁵ Notably since Sinko (1940–6: 113–14), Hägg (1966), Ruiz-Montero (1982), and O'Sullivan (1995: 69–139).

⁶ Morgan (2004b: 489 n. 1).

⁷ Factors that have been explained as indications of either authorial incompetence or epitomization include peculiarities in content (such as unmotivated actions and logical

character construction, rather, I explain a number of important features, some of which have been taken to indicate simplicity and literary mediocrity, from the perspective of ancient rhetorical theory and literary criticism.

As far as Xenophon's *writing style* is concerned, its simplicity⁸ has often been identified as an example of *apheleia* or 'simple discourse', which is one of the main stylistic categories (*ideai*) in Greek literature of the first few centuries of the Common Era. This category re-enacts oral traditions and spoken language as preserved in the style of classical authors like Herodotus and, chiefly, Xenophon of Athens.⁹ The latter was commonly recognized as a prototypical example of *apheleia* in the imperial period. Hermogenes explicitly presents him as the most important model of all¹⁰ and Ps.-Aristides, whose *Rhetorics* (book 2) is our most extensive extant discussion of *apheleia*, repeatedly adduces passages from his historiographical and philosophical works as examples.¹¹ It has been demonstrated that Xenophon of Ephesus' word order and frequent use of Ionisms, parataxis, historical present, verbal ellipses, synonyms, repetition, conjunctions, and stereotypical formulas evoke the *apheleia* writing style.¹²

Ancient treatises connect this style with specific subject matter. Demetrius (*Eloc.* 190), for example, points out that the 'plain' or unadorned style (ὁ ἰσχνὸς χαρακτήρ), which roughly corresponds to *apheleia*,¹³ is especially appropriate for representing 'small matters' (πράγματα μικρά) and Hermogenes (*Id.* 322.12–20, 323.10–15, 323.22–324.1 Rabe (1913)) states that it is particularly suitable for certain character types, such as youngsters in love (νεανίσκους ἐρώωντας), children (παίδων), women (γυναικῶν), and simple people without malice (ἀφελῶν καὶ ἀκάκων ἀνθρώπων). Ps.-Aristides (*Rh.* 2.14), for his part,

inconsistencies) and structure (such as non-organic alternations between episodes). See e.g. Hägg (1971a: 171–2, 186). Brioso Sánchez (1988), on the other hand, argues for some consistency in one such episode.

⁸ See e.g. Gärtner (1967: 2070–1), who contrasts this novel with the other four extant ones because of its linguistic poverty ('auffällige Dürftigkeit der sprachlichen Mittel') and simplified syntax ('vereinfachten Syntax').

⁹ See Schmid (1889: 11 n. 26) on *apheleia* as evoking spoken language and, more generally, Goetsch (1985) on oral characteristics in literature.

¹⁰ Hermog. *Id.* 404.22–3 Rabe (1913).

¹¹ See also D. A. Russell (1981: 140) and Sgobbi (2004: 222) on Xenophon of Athens as an example of *apheleia*.

¹² See Ruiz-Montero (1982: 306–21, 1994: 1115–16, 2003b: 222–8), González García (1986: 9–46, 1989: 225–8), Turasiewicz (1995: 178–80), and Doulamis (2002: 50–77). See, as early as the 19th cent., Mann (1896: 8–9) on Ionisms and verbal ellipses and Schmid (1887: 422, 1893: 326) on parataxis, historical present (1887: 240), and synonyms (1893: 316) as characteristic of *apheleia*. Gilfillan Upton (2006: 52–64) discusses a number of rhetorical figures in Xenophon but makes no connection with *apheleia*. On stylistic devices typical of *apheleia*, see Patillon (2002b: 32–6).

¹³ See Chiron (1993: xciii–xciv) and Solmsen (1931: 242, 249–52) on the central importance of simplicity and clarity in both the plain style and *apheleia*. See also González García (1989: 227).

contrasts *apheleia* with political discourse, which deals with the illustrious and important matters (τὰ ἐνδοξα καὶ μεγάλα) that simple discourse should avoid (μὴ διώκειν).¹⁴ In line with such ancient connections between style and subject matter, it has been suggested that Xenophon's style, formerly dismissed as 'too exclusively denotive' (as opposed to emotive) and 'misapplied' to the fantastic plot events,¹⁵ in fact corresponds very well to its 'simple' subject matter.¹⁶ Of course, the references to aphelic subject matter in the rhetorical treatises are too vague to be connected unproblematically with the novels (and even so, it would be difficult to argue that subject matter and characters in Xenophon's novel are more conducive to aphelic writing than those in other novels). Nevertheless, this argument legitimately but tantalizingly approaches Xenophon's novel as a conscious literary creation rather than a collection of flaws or a summary of something more interesting.¹⁷ But since research on *apheleia* in this novel has focused almost exclusively on single words, word order, and stylistic figures, its basis remains narrow. In this chapter, I shift attention from style to some broad patterns underlying Xenophon's narrative technique, which, I argue, provide a solid anchoring for this novel in ancient *apheleia* theory.

In Xenophon of Ephesus' days the use of *apheleia* was fashionable in literature and rhetorical education alike.¹⁸ Moreover, stylistic imitation and emulation of Xenophontic *apheleia* was a widespread trend in the early empire.¹⁹ Arrian, for example, stylizes himself as 'the new Xenophon' and Musonius Rufus also adopts Xenophon as a model.²⁰ Dio Chrysostom, for his part, recommends Xenophon as a perfect model for the young.²¹ Now, both Herodotus and Xenophon of Athens have also been identified as two of the main sources of subject matter for Xenophon of Ephesus. The names of the novel characters, for example, form a patchwork of material randomly picked

¹⁴ Ps.-Aristid. discusses political discourse in book 1 of the *Rhetorics* (Patillon 2002a) and simple discourse in book 2 (Patillon 2002b). In contrast with the subject matter of political discourse, that of simple discourse is also cast in terms of inferiority, contemptibility (τὰ δοκοῦντα φαῦλα εἶναι καὶ ἐνκαταφρόνητα, Ps.-Aristid. *Rh.* 2.14), and banality (πῶ εὐτελεῖ, Hermog. *Id.* 324.12 Rabe).

¹⁵ Schmeling (1980: 76).

¹⁶ Ruiz-Montero (1982: 320).

¹⁷ Bierl's (2006: 93) analysis of Xenophon's novel along Lacanian lines also reads a number of alleged compositional and stylistic flaws as artful devices consciously chosen to fit the erotic discourse.

¹⁸ Ruiz-Montero (2003b: 227–8).

¹⁹ See Sgobbi (2004: 219 n. 1) for references testifying to the prominence of Xenophon of Athens in literary criticism in antiquity.

²⁰ See Ameling (1984: 119–22), Fein (1994: 121 n. 152), Schmitz (1997: 46–7 n. 25, 226–7), and Whitmarsh (2001: 27, 150).

²¹ D. Chr. *Or.* 18.14–19. See also D. L. 2.57–8 (and *OCD*⁴ s.v. Xenophon (1)) on Xenophon of Athens' literary achievements. On his popularity during the Second Sophistic, see Münscher (1920: 106–81) and Capra (2009: 31–4). On his importance in rhetorical education in particular, see Rutherford (1998: 72).

up from, among others, Herodotus.²² Single details or episodes also seem to echo this historiographer (for example the mention of the distance between Ephesus and the temple of Artemis²³ and Habrocomes' miraculous rescue from the pyre echoing Croesus' execution in Herodotus²⁴). Moreover, there is a puzzling phonological resemblance between the names of the novel heroes on the one hand (Habrocomes and Anthia) and those of the main characters of the famous love story in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* on the other (Abradatas and Panthea).²⁵ And of course, Xenophon of Ephesus himself, identified by the *Suda* as *historikos*,²⁶ bears a name that may have been popular among ancient novel authors as a pseudonym alluding to the famous historiographer.²⁷

Before turning to the formal construction of Xenophon of Ephesus' narration, let me first point briefly to one characteristic of subject matter in this novel that displays obvious parallels with guidelines on *apheleia*. This characteristic is the importance of oaths. Hermogenes mentions that confirming things by oaths rather than by actions (τὸ δι' ὀρκῶν πιστοῦσθαι ὁτιοῦν ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων) is an indication of a simple character (ἀφελές τε καὶ ἡθικόν, *Id.* 326.24 Rabe (1913); ἡθικὰ καὶ ἀφελή, *Id.* 327.4 Rabe (1913)). This connection between oath-swearing and simplicity of character is highlighted by Longus. When Daphnis and Chloe have sworn oaths as proofs of their love (ὀρκῶν . . . ὥμοσεν, 2.39.1), Chloe's 'simplicity' (τὸ ἀφελές, 2.39.2) is so great that she asks Daphnis to swear another oath (δεύτερον . . . ὀρκον). The importance of oaths in Longus²⁸ has led scholars to cite his style as an example of *apheleia* and *glykýtēs* ('sweetness').²⁹ In Xenophon of Ephesus, however, oaths are even more prominent than in Longus (or, for that matter, any other Greek novel). Various characters regularly swear to respect the heroine's chastity (2.9.4, 2.13.8, 5.2.5, 5.4.7) and the protagonists refer to their initial oaths of

²² See Lavagnini (1950: 156), Hägg (1971*b*: 39–45), and Ruiz-Montero (1981*b*: 84–5 n. 7).

²³ X. Eph. 1.2.2 ~ Hdt. 1.26.2. See Lavagnini (1950: 153–5).

²⁴ After a prayer by Habrocomes, the Nile rises and extinguishes the flames (X. Eph. 4.2). Similarly, Croesus' pyre is extinguished by rain after his prayer to Apollo (Hdt. 1.87). See G. Anderson (2008: 156 n. 20).

²⁵ See Capra (2009: 37–47) on these and other allusions in Xenophon's novel to the story of Abradatas and Panthea. The story is also found in Philostr. *Im.* 2.9.

²⁶ Adler (1928–38: III, 495).

²⁷ We know from the *Suda* of two more ancient novelists who called themselves Xenophon (of Antioch and of Cyprus respectively). See Reichel (1995: 6), O'Sullivan (1995: 1), and Morgan (1995: 136) on our novelist's name as a pseudonym. Of course, we cannot be sure. The name seems to have been common in imperial times, particularly in coastal Asia Minor, where most attestations date from this period, unlike those in other regions; see LGPN s.v. *Ξενοφών*.

²⁸ In 2.4.4, 2.17.1, 4.16.2, 4.19.3, 4.22.4, 4.31.3, characters swear oaths for a variety of reasons.

²⁹ According to Hermogenes (*Id.* 335.24–5 Rabe (1913)), the methods of *apheleia* and *glykýtēs* are identical. Elsewhere (*Id.* 329.20–2 Rabe (1913)), he sees *glykýtēs* as an intensification (ἐπίτασιν τινα) of *apheleia*. On *apheleia* and *glykýtēs* in Longus, see Hunter (1983: 92–8).

chastity no fewer than eight times.³⁰ Longus' protagonists refer to theirs only three times (3.10.4, 4.27.2, 4.31.3). Of course, the importance of oaths is in no way typical or distinctive of Xenophon's novel. My general remark on this aspect, then, is not intended to provide anything more than a possible background against which to read the observations that I make in the following paragraphs, which deal not with subject matter but with narrative form.³¹ These paragraphs offer far more specific parallels between Xenophon's novel and ancient treatises on *apheleia*.

According to ancient stylistic theory, character is of central importance in the construction of *apheleia*.³² As Ps-Aristides observes, simple subject matter conveys *êthos* that 'ensures the simplicity of discourse' (τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἀφελὲς ἐτήρησεν, *Rh.* 2.10). In this passage as well as in others, he follows the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition in having *êthos* refer to the self-presentation by an author/narrator (i.e. Xenophon of Athens, from whom he adduces passages as examples). Therefore, one would expect any narrative that has been identified as an example of *apheleia* to invest its narrator at least with a certain degree of self-presentation. And yet, the opposite seems to be true for this novel. Xenophon of Ephesus' narrator is arguably *less* perceptible than most other narrators in the novelistic corpus.³³ On the level of individual characters too, if we are to believe scholarship on this novel, character construction seems to be almost absent. Xenophon's characters have been described as 'mere puppets manipulated by capricious fate'³⁴ and as narrative agents without any significant meaning.³⁵ In what follows, I adopt a more nuanced stance—and one which deals with both narratorial self-presentation and depiction of characters. It cannot be doubted for a minute, of course, that characterization in Xenophon is less elaborate than in the other novels,³⁶ but I argue that its *formal* construction is consistently modelled on guidelines on narratorial self-presentation (*êthos*) in aphelic discourse and that the limited elaboration is in line with these guidelines. I focus on three important strands, beginning with the absence of a fixed narratorial authority (§2.2). Secondly,

³⁰ They do so in direct speech (2.1.5, 3.5.7, 5.8.9, 5.14.3), indirect speech (3.5.6, 5.9.12), and personal focalization (3.5.2, 3.12.4). Other oaths are found at 3.5.5, 2.3.4, and 2.14.4.

³¹ The distinction between subject matter and form is adopted in ancient discussions of *apheleia*. See Ps.-Aristid. *Rh.* 2.1 on 'thought' (νόημα) and 'expression' (ἀπαγγελία) and Hermog. *Id.* 218.18–19 Rabe (1913) on 'thought' (ἐννοία) and a 'method to represent thought' (μέθοδος περὶ τὴν ἐννοίαν).

³² Ps.-Aristides presents *êthos* as one of the main stylistic categories of the *apheleia* style (*Rh.* 2.28–52) and Hermogenes (*Id.* 322.4–329.24 Rabe (1913)) identifies *apheleia* as one of the subcategories of *êthos*. See also Patillon (2002b: 23).

³³ See e.g. Morgan (2004b: 489). ³⁴ Fusillo (1999: 63).

³⁵ e.g. Holzberg (2006: 71) on Xenophon's characters as 'Funktionsträger'.

³⁶ Body language, for example, only sporadically informs the protagonists' emotional dispositions: 1.5.2–3 and 1.5.5 (where it underlines the protagonists' emotional distress after their first encounter), 1.9.1 (where it underlines shame and fear during their first wedding night), and 2.4.3 (where it marks Habrocomes' determination in rejecting Manto).

I deal with the importance of metonymical characterization and the concomitant relative absence of narratorial interpretation of the bare facts recorded (§2.3). Finally, I discuss metaphorical characterization and its limited use of allusion to, and engagement with, classical literature (§2.4). All three strands can be shown fundamentally to resonate with prescriptions on the construction of *apheleia*. Our most important sources about this writing style are Hermogenes' *On Stylistic Categories* (*Περὶ Ὑδρώων*) and the second book of Ps.-Aristides' *Rhetorics* (*Περὶ τοῦ ἀφελούς λόγου* or *On simple discourse*).³⁷ I do not assume (nor do I aim to establish) any direct connection between Xenophon's novel and these treatises, which are usually (but without certainty) dated to the second century (with *Rhetorics* most likely towards the end of it).³⁸ However, both treatises are of course likely to preserve much earlier doctrine and it is with such doctrine, I argue, that Xenophon of Ephesus, writing around a century before Ps.-Aristides, must have been familiar.

2.2 DISTANCING DEVICES

Xenophon of Ephesus' narrator has rightly been characterized as 'impersonal' (Fusillo 1988: 25–6) and 'neutral' (Hägg 1971a: 316) because he essentially registers events without providing interpretation or 'authorial comments' (Schmeling 1980: 88). In the realm of character construction, I first demonstrate that such 'neutrality' or 'impersonality' is to be read as part of a conscious strategy by Xenophon's narrator to distance himself from any overt judgement about his protagonists' characters. Secondly, I point out that such distancing corresponds perfectly with guidelines on *apheleia* as discussed chiefly by Ps.-Aristides.

In the realm of character construction, 'neutrality' and the lack of narratorial comment are generally manifest in a relative dearth of characterization involving overt judgement or qualification. It is true that direct characterization in general is relatively rare in Xenophon, and I will return to this point when discussing the relative importance of *indirect* (metonymical) characterization (see §2.3), but for now the important point to note is that, whenever overt judgements of characters do appear, Xenophon's narrator is careful to present them as judgements not made by himself but by characters in the story. Two techniques are adopted to this effect. The first is to locate such instances of direct characterization in the (direct or indirect) speech of

³⁷ I use the editions of Rabe (1913) and Patillon (2002b) respectively.

³⁸ Patillon (2002b: 16–17) and Rutherford (1998: 74–6). On possible relations between Ps.-Aristides' and Hermogenes' treatises, see Rutherford (1998: 118–23).

characters.³⁹ Although the narrator occasionally offers opinions in simple narrator text, these are primarily about minor characters (2.3.1, 3.11.4, 3.12.3, 4.5.1, 4.5.6, 5.1.2) and more often he offloads the judgement onto his characters (for example in 3.12.5, where it is not the narrator but Habrocomes who describes (φήσας) Cyno as a murderess (μιαυφόνῳ)).⁴⁰

The second technique adopted to create distance between the narrator and a qualification is personal focalization.⁴¹ In this case, the narrator presents a judgement, interpretation, or qualification through the eyes of a character. Again, this technique is also found in the characterization of minor characters.⁴² But in fact it is illustrated particularly well in the introductions to the story of the protagonists. Anthia, for example, is introduced as she participates in a procession honouring Artemis, and is depicted not through the eyes of the narrator but through those of bystanders. Notably, her introduction exclusively covers aspects immediately observable to, and focalized by, the public (θαυμάσαι, 1.2.5; ἰδόντες Ἐφέσιοι, 1.2.7; ὁφθείσης . . . τῶν θεωμένων). Whereas Habrocomes' introduction includes his social background (τὰ πρῶτα ἐκεῖ

³⁹ This resonates with Chew's (1998b: 210–11) observation that, from the second book onwards, gods are present only in character text and not in narrator text. She interprets this as a discrepancy between what these characters believe in, on the one hand, and what actually happens in the story, on the other ('while the characters believe in a personal *daimōn*, no such deity participates in the story's action').

⁴⁰ See also Morgan (2004b: 490). There are many other examples: 2.4.3 (Habrocomes' characterization of Leucon: *πονηρῆ, βαρβαρώτερε*), 2.3.5 and 2.11.2 (Manto's explicit characterization of herself: *ὀργῆς, βαρβάρου, ἡδικημένης*), 2.3.8 (Rhode's characterization of Manto: *βαρβάρῳ*), 2.7.4 (Anthia's characterization of Manto: *τῆς ζηλοτυπούσης*), 3.2.7 and 3.2.13 (Hippothous' characterization of Hyperanthes: *εὐνοίαν, δυστυχούς*), 3.2.5 (Hippothous' characterization of Aristomachus: *μέγα φρονών*), 5.9.10 (Anthia's description (*ἐπεξηγείτο*) of Anchialus' lack of *sôphrosynê*: *μὴ σωφρονοῦντα*), 5.9.13 (Hippothous' description (*διηγείται*) of his friendship with Habrocomes: *φιλίαν*), etc.

⁴¹ Scholars have occasionally underlined the importance of personal focalization in Xenophon. See e.g. Hägg (1971a: 121–4) and Scarcella (1979: 101–2); the latter points out that Xenophon's narrator repeatedly adopts the perspective of individual characters and thus moulds the meaning of events ('flettendo . . . la significazione degli eventi'). Chew (1998a: 52) also acknowledges instances of personal focalization from the end of the first book onwards ('the narrator tells the story mainly from the mortal characters' points of view'). On the other hand, Effe (1975: 147–8, 1997: 79) denies the presence of perspectival restriction in this novel. Stark (1984: 261–2) also denies the presence of 'figuregebundenen Erzählen', and Fusillo (2003: 283) predominantly notes Genettian 'zero focalization' (where the narrator views the events in the story as a camera eye). In fact, as my discussion points out, personal focalization is frequently adopted in the first book as well.

⁴² See e.g. 2.9.2, where Manto devises a plan (*ἐνενοίει*) to deliver Anthia to 'one of her meanest servants' (*τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων*). Soon, however, this servant will turn out not to be mean at all: he takes pity on Anthia (*οἰκτείρει*) and swears an oath to respect her chastity (2.9.4). Other examples of direct characterization in personal focalization are 5.10.7 (Habrocomes' recognition (*γνωρίσας*) of Leucon's and Rhode's thoughtfulness (*εὐνοίαν*)), 2.6.4 (Apsyrus' demonstration (*ἐνδεικνύμενος*) of Manto's chastity (*σώφρονα*)), 3.1.2 (the Cappadocians' focalization of Hippothous as one of them (*ὡς οἰκεῖω προσεφέροντο*)), 5.5.4 (Rhenaea's qualification of Clytus as a trustworthy slave (*παραδοῦσα οἰκέτῃ τινὶ πιστῷ*)), 3.12.5 (Habrocomes' rejection of (*οὐκ ἐνεγκών*) Cyno's licentiousness (*ἀσέλγειαν*)), etc.

δυναμένων, 1.1.1) and *paideia* (1.1.2) (see §2.3), Anthia's origin (the names of her parents) and age are the only external *topoi* addressed.⁴³ The latter is, of course, closely linked to her blossoming beauty, as beheld by the public and heavily emphasized in an *ecphrasis* (1.2.5–6). Her nobility is not made explicit at all. Rather, it is (perhaps) implied by her leading position in the procession (ἡρχε, 1.2.5). In short, Anthia's introduction is confined almost exclusively to aspects observable, and indeed observed, by the crowd. The narrator narrates how the crowd sees Anthia, rather than presenting any characteristics in an unmediated way.

In Habrocomes' introduction, too, personal focalization plays an important role. Even the initial statement that Habrocomes is 'much desired' (περισπούδαστος, 1.1.3) by all Ephesians and inhabitants of Asia (ἄπασιν Ἐφεσίοις . . . καὶ τοῖς τὴν ἄλλην Ἀσίαν οἰκοῦσι) introduces him through the attitudes of others. Moreover, these other characters also function as focalizers of Habrocomes' qualities. The Ephesians hope (εἶχον . . . τὰς ἐλπίδας) that he will have a distinguished position in the city and regard him (προσείχον) as a god.⁴⁴ The narrator also cedes focalization to Habrocomes himself, who has a high opinion of himself (ἐφρόνει . . . ἐφ' ἐαυτῷ, 1.1.4) and takes pride in his inner qualities and beauty (ἡγάλλετο . . . τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς κατορθώμασι . . . τῷ κάλλει τοῦ σώματος). Again, then, the narrator primarily registers the views of characters and avoids foregrounding his own interpretations.

The technique of restricting overt judgement to character speech and personal focalization informs almost all direct characterization of the protagonists in Xenophon's novel. The narrator avoids overt narratorial judgement, as direct characterization in narrator text would entail, adopting instead personal focalization and character text merely to *register* different points of view. Habrocomes' rejection of Eros is a case in point. In one instance, the narrator characterizes the protagonist as 'impervious to love' (ἀνέραστος, 1.2.9). Such a reference to the protagonist of a love novel it is true, raises questions in its own right. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Habrocomes' imperviousness is focalized differently and in morally more overt terms by a number of characters in the story. Eros, for example, intends (ἐνενοεῖτο, 1.4.5) to take revenge on Habrocomes for his *contempt* (ὕπεροψία) and is said to be merciless towards people who are *arrogant* towards him

⁴³ The contrast with the presence of inner characteristics in Habrocomes' introduction is subtly hinted at in the verbal echo of 'συνήνθει' (1.1.2) in 'ἤνθει' (1.2.5). Whereas the compound verb 'to flower along with' (συνανθέω) explicitly links Habrocomes' inner qualities (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθὰ) to his physical beauty (τοῖς τοῦ σώματος καλοῖς), the verb 'to flower' (ανθέω), echoing Anthia's name, conspicuously applies to her beauty alone.

⁴⁴ Here, as often, the shift in focalization from the narrator to characters is marked by a so-called 'shifter' (de Jong 1997b: 296). See de Jong (2004a: 33–5) and Bal (2009: 145–65) for examples.

(*ὑπερηφάνοις*, 1.2.1). Euxenus and Manto, for their part, likewise characterize Habrocomes as arrogant when referring to his refusal to comply with their sexual advances (*ὑπερηφανήσαντι*, 1.16.5; *ὑπερηφανίας*, 2.5.2; *ὑπερηφανοῦντα*, 2.5.5⁴⁵). Habrocomes himself, finally, sees both his rejection of Eros and his refusal to comply with Manto's advances as indications not of arrogance but of chastity (*sôphrosynê*, 1.4.4 and 3.12.4). Different characters, then, interpret Habrocomes' behaviour differently. The narrator merely registers their attributing these characteristics to him without intervening or interpreting himself.

I argue that this narrative technique perfectly reflects ancient guidelines on the construction of narration in simple, or *aphelês*, discourse. Ps.-Aristides makes it clear that simple discourse often presents statements as open to doubt and reservation,⁴⁶ for example *by presenting ideas as opinions not of the speaking voice but of other people* (*ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρων γνώμης εἰσάγειν*, *Rh.* 2.102).⁴⁷ Such attribution of opinions to others implies, almost by definition, a presentation of subject matter from different points of view.⁴⁸ Narratorial comments (*αἱ ἐπικρίσεις*, Hermog. *Id.* 250.7–8 Rabe (1913)), on the other hand, are presented as typical of solemn discourse (*semnotês*, *Rh.* 2.40), which is the opposite of *apheleia*.⁴⁹ Since they express knowledgeability (*εἰδότας ἀκριβῶς δεῖ λέγειν*, Hermog. *Id.* 246.11–12 Rabe (1913)) and authority (*μετ' ἀξιώματος*, Hermog. *Id.* 246.12 Rabe (1913); *ἀξιωματικά*, Hermog. *Id.* 250.11–12 Rabe (1913)), they leave no room for doubts (*οὐκ ἐνδοιάζοντας*, Hermog. *Id.* 246.12–13 Rabe (1913)) and are not suitable for simple discourse.

Ps.-Aristides' comments on the absence of overt judgement and the presentation of ideas as opinions of others correspond with the above-mentioned tendency of Xenophon's narrator to limit direct characterization mostly to speech and personal focalization. This distancing form of characterization is put to interesting use in the construction of the protagonists' *sôphrosynê*, which is by far the most heavily emphasized characteristic in this novel.⁵⁰ As in Chariton, it has different meanings—marital fidelity in the case of Anthia and, in the case of Habrocomes, a disdain for and rejection of Eros

⁴⁵ Whereas the first two instances of characterization occur in character text, the last occurs in Manto's personal focalization.

⁴⁶ Accordingly, *apheleia* also facilitates the use of legendary and other material whose factual status is uncertain (*Rh.* 2.125 and 128). See also Patillon (2002b: 32).

⁴⁷ See also *Rh.* 2.38 and Rutherford (1998: 68).

⁴⁸ As Rutherford (1998: 68) points out, Xenophon of Athens gives the impression, according to Ps.-Aristides, of 'writing without a definite purpose in view, so that the effect seems to be one of the points being thrown together at random'.

⁴⁹ Hermog. *Id.* 242.20 Rabe (1913). See also Patillon (1988: 225–6).

⁵⁰ See e.g. Schmeling (1980: 116): 'This theme [i.e. *sôphrosynê*] is present whenever either protagonist is on the stage, and before very long the reader understands it properly as an obsession rather than as a virtue.' See also Schmeling (1980: 38) and Brethes (2007a: 154–63).

in general and, later, a refusal to have sex with people other than his wife. The explicit characterization of the protagonists as *sôphrones* appears exclusively in their own direct speech (1.9.3, 4.3.4, 5.4.6, 5.5.5, 5.7.2, 5.8.7, 5.8.9, and 5.14.2) and indirect speech (ἀνωδύρετο, 3.10.1; λέγει, 3.5.6). The narrator never explicitly addresses *sôphrosynê* on his own account. At the level of the argument function, this distribution is a clear indication of the importance of *sôphrosynê* in the protagonists' self-definition. Often such references to *sôphrosynê* in character text point to their concern with their own and each other's *sôphrosynê* (for example 1.9.3 and 1.9.8) and with mutual fidelity (for example 3.10.1). At the level of the key function, on the other hand, the restriction of *sôphrosynê* to their character text sets the protagonists apart from other characters in the story and implicitly highlights their uniqueness.⁵¹ Two characters in particular serve as foils to the protagonists. They are the only other characters in the story whose *sôphrosynê* is explicitly thematized—again, not by the narrator but by other characters. One of them, Manto, is referred to as 'chaste' (σώφρων, 2.6.4) by her father Apsyrtus, who is fooled into believing that she has rejected Habrocomes' advances (while in fact the opposite is the case); the other, Anchialus, is killed by Anthia (4.5.5) because, as she later explains, his lack of *sôphrosynê* (μὴ σωφρονοῦντα, 5.9.10) leads him to try to rape her. Each passage enacts a poignant contrast between an antagonist and a protagonist. Anthia's desire to remain chaste is contrasted with Anchialus' lack of *sôphrosynê* and Apsyrtus' unwitting depiction of his daughter as *sôphrôn* reminds the reader that it is not Manto but Habrocomes who is *sôphrôn*. Typically, the narrator does not make this explicit but simply registers Anthia's and Apsyrtus' opinions.

Whereas the representation of *sôphrosynê* opposes the protagonists to other characters and therefore creates symmetry between them, such symmetry is blurred in instances where Habrocomes and Anthia seem to adopt conflicting views on *sôphrosynê*. Fusillo and Konstan identify Xenophon's novel as the most rigid example of symmetrical representation of novelistic protagonists. In their view, Chariton, Achilles Tatius, and Heliodorus offer variations of a symmetrical pattern most stereotypically seen in Xenophon.⁵² The influence that this view has exerted is exemplified by Montiglio (2010: 38), who reiterates that 'it is well known that Xenophon creates parallelisms down to the last detail so as to make the protagonists so much alike that no conflict or even contrast is possible between them'. However, close analysis of Habrocomes' and Anthia's own perception of what it means to be *sôphrôn* blurs such rigid

⁵¹ See also Brethes (2007a: 158–63) on the uniqueness of the protagonists (from a different point of view).

⁵² See Fusillo (1989: 189–91, 2003: 296) and Konstan (1994: 60–98; a chapter entitled 'Greek Novels: *Variations on a Type*' (my italics)).

symmetry.⁵³ At the outset of the novel, Habrocomes regards his newly-aroused love for Anthia as a threat to his manliness:

What catastrophe has befallen me, Habrocomes, till now manly (ὁ μέγχι νῦν ἀνδρικός), despising Eros and slandering the god (ὁ καταφρονῶν Ἐρωτος, ὁ τῷ θεῷ λοιδορούμενος)? I have been captured and conquered (ἔάλωκα καὶ νενίκημαι) and am forced to be the slave of a girl. Now, it seems, there is someone more beautiful than I am, and I acknowledge love as a god. But now I am nothing but unmanly (ἄνανδρος) and worthless. Can I not hold out (καρτερήσω) this time? Shall I not remain noble (γεννικός)? Will I not remain stronger (κρείττων) than Eros? Now I must conquer (νικῆσαι) this worthless god. (1.4.1–2)

Habrocomes identifies his former rejection of Eros as manly and explicitly opposes it to his present submission, which he casts as a military defeat ('captured and conquered'). In his view, such defeat makes him unmanly (*anandros*) and testifies to a lack of endurance. The military imagery echoes the narrator's earlier description of Eros' plans against Habrocomes, where the god is said to arm (ἐξοπλίσας) and equip (περιβαλόμενος) himself with his full armoury (πᾶσαν δύναμιν) of love potions and set out against (ἐστράτευεν) Habrocomes (1.2.1). The protagonist again adopts this imagery when finally succumbing to Eros. Again, he closely connects it with his failed enactment of manliness:

'You have won (νενίκηκας), Eros. You have set up a great trophy (τρόπαιον) over the chaste (σώφρονος) Habrocomes; he is your suppliant (ἰκέτην). In his desperation he has come for refuge to you, the master of all things. Do not abandon me or punish my harshness (θρασύν) too hard. Because I had no experience with you (ἄπειρος ὢν), Eros, I was arrogant (ὑπερηφάνουν) towards your power. But now give me Anthia. Do not be only a vengeful god against the man who has resisted you, but a help to the man you have conquered (ῆττωμένῳ)' (1.4.4–5)

The variety of concepts referring to Habrocomes' rejection of Eros reflects a rhetorical strategy. Whereas he first defends this attitude as *andreia*, he distances himself from it by identifying it as *hyperêphania* and *thrasytês* as soon as he realizes that he has succumbed to Eros for good. At this point, he also acknowledges Eros' victory over his former, chaste self ('you have set up a great trophy over the chaste Habrocomes'). With this acknowledgement, Habrocomes consigns to the past his identification of the rejection of Eros ('*sôphrosynê*') with manliness (*andreia*)⁵⁴ and now conceptualizes *sôphrosynê* (or better, what he once believed to be an instance of it) in terms of arrogance and harshness. This latter association clearly infuses the concept of *sôphrosynê*

⁵³ Brethes' (2007a: 77–86) discussion of Habrocomes and Hippothous also questions the assumption that this novel is the most stereotypical representative of the genre.

⁵⁴ Konstan (2009: 122–4) traces this alignment between *sôphrosynê* and *andreia* back to Philo of Alexandria and, ultimately, Plato.

with ambiguity. From early on in this novel, then, attention is drawn to the question of what *sôphrosynê* really is. Habrocomes changes his assessment of his own so-called '*sôphrôn*' behaviour over time from positive to negative. This transition constitutes, of course, an element of humour at the expense of Habrocomes for his misunderstanding of Eros and his power (in the Greek novels, heroes are chaste until they fall in love), but it also exposes *sôphrosynê* as the site of shifting definitions: behaviour once thought to be an indication of it can later be condemned as an indication of something far less positive (such as arrogance and harshness).

The relativity and ambiguity lurking behind Habrocomes' behaviour is further thematized by Anthia's interpretation of it, which significantly differs from his. Her initial characterization of Habrocomes as arrogant (*ὑπερηφάνω*, 1.4.6; *σοβαρός*, 1.4.7) echoes his self-presentation, but, once they are married, she calls his initial delay (*ἐβράδυνας*, 1.9.4) and neglect (*ἡμέλ<λ>ησας*) of their love unmanly and cowardly (*ἄνανδρε καὶ δειλέ*). The interplay between her and Habrocomes' views makes problematic any attempt to pinpoint Habrocomes' *andreia*. Whereas Habrocomes himself refers to his initial rejection of Eros first as manliness/courage (*andreia*) and later as rashness (*thrasytês*), Anthia identifies it as cowardice (*deilia*), which is the traditional opposite of *andreia*. The elasticity of the concept of *andreia* is, of course, nothing new,⁵⁵ but Xenophon clearly organizes it around a number of well-known stereotypes. As has been pointed out in Aristotle's ethical writings, *deilia* and *thrasytês* are two vices between which *andreia* is the mean virtue. Whereas cowardice results from a deficiency of courage, rashness results from its excess.⁵⁶ Therefore, Anthia's depiction of Habrocomes as *deilos* inverts each of Habrocomes' earlier qualifications of his own dismissive attitude towards Eros as manly/courageous (*ἀνδρικός*) and rash (*θρασύν*). The traditional distinction between *deilia*, *andreia*, and *thrasytês* surfacing in these passages highlights the incompatibility of Habrocomes' and Anthia's conflicting views of *andreia* and for a minute blurs the symmetry between them.

This incompatibility could set the stage for an interesting interplay between Habrocomes' and Anthia's diverging views on sexual abstinence to be developed in the remainder of the novel but such an interplay hardly occurs. At most, Anthia's concern with Habrocomes' *sôphrosynê* is echoed in a dream in which Habrocomes is taken from her by another woman (5.8.6–7). When awake, she laments (*ἀνεθρήνησε*, 5.8.7) and interprets the dream as a reflection of the truth (*ἀληθῆ... ἐνόμιζεν*). The events in this dream are explicitly said to occur at the beginning of their love (*τὸν πρῶτον... τοῦ ἔρωτος αὐτοῖς χρόνον*, 5.8.5), which clearly evokes the opening paragraphs,

⁵⁵ See Roisman (2003) on its similarly elastic conceptualization in the Athenian orators.

⁵⁶ See De Temmerman (2007b: 86). On arrogance, see also Vogt (2006: 274).

where Habrocomes' *sôphrosynê* is discussed so extensively.⁵⁷ Anthia's concern with his *sôphrosynê* resurfaces once again after their reunion, when she asks him if he has remained chaste (σώφρων ἔμεινας, 5.14.3) or if 'another woman has eclipsed me' (μέ τις παρευδοκίμησεν ἄλλη καλή)—a verbal echo of her misinterpretation of the dream (σοὶ δὲ ἴσως ἄλλη . . . δέδοκται καλή, 5.8.7).⁵⁸ Oikonomou (2011: 53–9) interestingly suggests that Anthia's dream is influenced by her physical environment (she is in a brothel); I would add that we can also read both the dream and its echo after their reunion as expressions of a more continuous concern with Habrocomes' *sôphrosynê* set up as early as the introductory paragraphs of the novel.⁵⁹ In any case, the episode presents Anthia's confidence in Habrocomes' *sôphrosynê* as a concept more problematic than is apparent at first sight. But apart from these occasional instances, this asymmetry is never developed, despite its rather careful setting up in the opening paragraphs.

The examples given in §2.2 show that the attribution of direct characterization in Xenophon's novel corresponds with guidelines on *apheleia* as found in Ps.-Aristides. Xenophon's narrator restricts the direct attribution of characteristics to character text and personal focalization in order to make his protagonists characterize themselves or each other. Typically, he never comments upon the divergent realities that thus emerge.

2.3 METONYMICAL CHARACTERIZATION

While instances of direct characterization of the protagonists outside character text or personal focalization are very rare in Xenophon's novel, examples of indirect metonymical characterization are much more numerous. The predominance of metonymical characterization also reflects ancient stylistic theory on the construction of simple discourse. According to Ps.-Aristides, the most important (μέγιστον) characteristic of such discourse is the presentation of bare facts (ψιλά) without narratorial interpretation (μὴ ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, *Rh.* 2.91; οὐδ' ὥς ἐπισημήνασθαι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἐπαγομένου, *Rh.* 2.22).⁶⁰ He cites (*Rh.* 2.21) the opening sentence of Xenophon of Athens'

⁵⁷ This is part of a broader pattern of references connecting the end of the novel to its beginning. See Capra (2009: 40–3), Whitmarsh (2011: 49), and De Temmerman (2012b: 512) for motifs, episodes, and details constructing a ring composition.

⁵⁸ See Plastira-Valkanou (2001: 147).

⁵⁹ On Anthia's fear after this dream, see Fernández Garrido (2003). Paglialunga (2000) discusses female jealousy in the novels but overlooks this passage.

⁶⁰ On the key word ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, see Rutherford (1998: 120 n. 2). Hermogenes also remarks that pure style (*katharotês*), which adopts the same methods as *apheleia* (*Id.* 327–8 Rabe (1913)), relates bare facts (ψιλὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, *Id.* 227.20 Rabe (1913)) without adducing any external

Memorabilia as an example: 'I have often wondered with which arguments Socrates' accusers were capable of convincing the Athenians that he deserved the death penalty in name of the city' (X. *Mem.* 1.1.1).⁶¹ He observes that, although Socrates' condemnation evoked anger and criticism (ὀργῆς . . . καὶ ἐπιτιμῆσεως, *Rh.* 2.22), Xenophon does not display either himself. In simple discourse, that is, the author (narrator) does not include overt value judgements and emphatic statements of opinion.⁶² In this way, simple discourse invites the reader to *interpret*. Demetrius, for example, prescribes that one should not talk lengthily (μακρηγορεῖν) about everything in detail (ἐπ' ἀκριβείας), but *leave certain things to be deduced by the reader* (ἐνία καταλιπεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀκροατῇ συνιέναι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, *Eloc.* 222), who thus becomes 'not only a listener (ἀκροατής) but also a witness (μάρτυς)' of what has been left out (τὸ ἐλλειφθέν).⁶³

As ancient treatises point out, this importance of readerly interpretation implies the adoption of *indirect* techniques of characterization. Ps.-Aristides (*Rh.* 2.24) observes that Xenophon of Athens characterizes Socrates by focusing on *specific* elements (κατ' εἶδος). He mentions that the historiographer depicts Socrates as capable of exerting control over his stomach and sexual desires (γαστρὸς . . . ἐγκρατῆς καὶ ἀφροδισίων) and describes his reactions to heat or cold (πρὸς χειμῶνα καὶ θέρος πῶς εἶχεν). He goes on to explain that an author of political (as opposed to simple) discourse would have used general (ἐν γένει) rather than specific judgements. Such an author would have said 'how self-controlled (σώφρων) Socrates was, how temperate (ἐγκρατής), and how he endured all suffering (πᾶσι πόνοις ἀντεῖχεν)'. Xenophon of Athens, in other words, does not characterize Socrates directly, but indirectly: he attributes to him specific actions and modes of behaviour from which the reader can *infer* characteristics.⁶⁴ Elsewhere (*Rh.* 2.34), Ps.-Aristides makes it equally clear that Xenophon constructs character (τὰ . . . ἦθη . . . ἐργάζεται) by observing particularities (τὰ ιδιώματα . . . τῶν προσώπων), contexts (τοὺς καιρούς),

material (μηδὲν ἔξωθεν συνεφέλκεται, *Id.* 227.22 Rabe (1913)). See also Hermog. *Id.* 353.20–6 Rabe (1913) on the connection between *apheleia*, *êthos*, and the presentation of bare fact (ἀπλῶς κατὰ ἀφελειαν ἡθικά, *Id.* 353.20–1 Rabe).

⁶¹ Ps.-Aristid. gives similar examples from Xenophon in *Rh.* 2.31 and 2.91.

⁶² See Rutherford (1998: 68, 119) and Ps.-Aristid. *Rh.* 2.51 (simple discourse prefers words that lack emphasis: λέξει ἀνεμφάτῳ).

⁶³ Ps.-Aristides (*Rh.* 2.31) also states that the opportunity for the reader to interpret prevents discourse from appearing insidious (ἀνεπιβούλευτον). On readers as spectators (and, more specifically, witnesses) and their participatory interpretative role, see also Nünlist (2009: 153–5, 164–7).

⁶⁴ To be sure, modern critics have observed that Xenophon of Athens occasionally does give overt statements about characters (see e.g. Bruns 1898: 43–6, Pitcher 2007: 105–6, and Hägg 2012: 23–7), but Ps.-Aristides' discussion of *apheleia* singles out systematically indirect depiction.

circumstances (τὰς περιστάσεις), past and present events, and consequences (τὰ συμβεβηκότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα . . . καὶ τὰ παρακολουθοῦντα).

Such indirect characterization and the implied necessity for the reader to interpret are central to ancient discussions of character depiction in *apheleia*. Ps.-Aristides (*Rh.* 2.29) explicitly opposes thoughts that leave nothing to be interpreted (μηδὲν προσυπακούεσθαι) with thoughts ‘that possess character’ (ἦθος ἔχειν), thus suggesting that depiction of character in simple discourse almost by definition requires interpretation from the reader.⁶⁵ He cites one sentence from Xenophon’s *Symposium* (1.8) as an example: ‘Autolycus sat down next to his father’ (Αὐτόλυκος μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸν πατέρα ἐκαθέζετο). He comments as follows (*Rh.* 2.29):

First, it is a completely noble (σεμνῶς)⁶⁶ thought to represent the young man sitting down next to his father. For such thoughts are noble. But what especially (μάλιστα) maintained (διεφύλαξεν) *êthos* is the fact that Xenophon did not insert any personal comment (τὸ μὴ ἐπεξεργασίᾳ χρήσασθαι), as when he would have said ‘Autolycus sat down next to his father, as a son who accompanies his father should (ὥσπερ ἐχρήν υἱὸν ὄντα μετὰ πατρός)’. Such an insertion is characteristic of political discourse. Instead, Xenophon allows *êthos* and nobility to be displayed (ἐμφαίνεσθαι).

To be sure, *êthos* in this passage refers not to Autolycus’ character but to Xenophon’s self-presentation as a narrator. But the point is that this self-presentation, according to Ps.-Aristides, is determined profoundly by how Xenophon characterizes characters. More specifically, the *form* of such characterization is important. The fact that Xenophon merely records Autolycus’ action without making any personal comment on it makes this passage an example of *apheleia*. It is, in other words, the *indirect* (metonymical) form of characterization that constructs *apheleia*: it is the reader who should infer Autolycus’ character from a given action without any guidance from the narrator and it is, accordingly, the adoption of this (indirect) technique of characterization that casts Xenophon as a ‘simple’ narrator who avoids explicit moral judgement. Ps.-Aristides adduces more examples from Xenophon,⁶⁷ all

⁶⁵ See also Patillon’s (2002b: 48–9) identification of simple discourse as a generalized *litotes* (‘une sorte de litote généralisée), where the full meaning of an utterance is not made explicit and the reader is invited to read between the lines (‘attention! cher public, ce que je dis donne à penser. Sache donc lire entre les lignes!’).

⁶⁶ The Greek word *semnôs* here does not refer to the stylistic category (*idea*) of *semnôtês* (see p. 126), but to a character trait. For a list of different *êthê*, see *Rh.* 2.29.

⁶⁷ One of these examples is the famous opening sentence of the *Anabasis*: ‘When Darius was ill and knew that the end of his life was near, he wanted to have both his children with him’ (*An.* 1.1.1), which Ps.-Aristides sees as indicative of Darius’ goodness (χρηστοῦ ἥθους) and fatherly disposition (πατρικὴν . . . διάθεσιν ἐνεδείξατο, *Rh.* 2.41). Another example from the *Anabasis* is ‘Cyrus went up (i.e. from the coast into Central Asia) with Tissaphernes, whom he believed to be his friend (1.1.2)’, where the words ‘λαβὼν . . . ὡς φίλον’ suffice to reveal Cyrus’ incorrect belief in Tissaphernes’ friendship and thus convey the latter’s cunning (*Rh.* 2.42).

of which emphasize the importance of clues to be interpreted by the reader rather than any explicit depiction of characteristics. For this reason, Ps.-Aristides (*Rh.* 2.42) states that narratorial self-presentation (*êthos*) in such discourse is ‘concealed’, ‘hidden’ (ἀφανὲς καὶ κεκρυμμένον . . . ἀποκρυψάμενον) and ‘inferred’ (ὑποκαθήμενον καὶ ὑπονοούμενον, *Rh.* 2.30). A narrator in aphelic discourse, that is, does not display his own character overtly (οὐ . . . ἐνσημαίνεσθαι, *Rh.* 2.31), but rather lets the reader infer it (ἐν τοῖς ἀκούουσι καταλείπεσθαι).

It is my contention that Xenophon of Ephesus’ narrator behaves according to these guidelines when depicting his characters. One of the most important modes of characterization adopted in this novel centres upon metonymical rather than explicit depiction. Xenophon’s preference for indirect characterization is observable, for example, in Habrocomes’ introduction. Whereas the opening lines, it is true, directly address the hero’s mental (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθά, 1.1.2) and physical qualities (μέγα . . . τι χρῆμα ὠραιότητι σώματος ὑπερβαλλούσης, <τοσοῦτου> κάλλους . . . κάλλος . . . τοῖς τοῦ σώματος καλοῖς, 1.1.1–2), the subsequent elaboration of these qualities proceeds indirectly through specific actions that metonymically cast Habrocomes as a paradigm of *kalokagathia*. Habrocomes acquires culture of all kinds (παιδείαν . . . πᾶσαν ἐμελέτα, 1.1.2), practises a variety of arts (μουσικὴν ποικίλην ἥσκει), and trains in hunting (θῆρα), horse-riding (ἵππασία), and fighting under arms (ὅπλομαχία). The narrator also adopts indirect techniques to depict his pride and arrogance, simply by recording his behaviour and speech: Habrocomes despises (κατεφρόνει, 1.1.4) everything that is regarded as beautiful, laughs (κατεγέλα, 1.1.5) at people praising others for their good looks, and does not recognize Eros as a god (οὐδὲ ἐνόμιζεν), rejecting him totally and considering him of no importance (πάντῃ ἐξέβαλεν ὡς οὐδὲν ἡγούμενος). Furthermore, he says (λέγων) that no one will ever fall in love unwillingly and, when he sees a temple or statue of Eros, laughs (κατεγέλα, 1.1.6) and claims (ἀπέφαινε) to be more beautiful and powerful himself. The only narratorial comment in this section is the narrator’s indication of agreement with Habrocomes’ claims of superior beauty and power (‘and it was indeed so’, εἶχεν οὕτως). And even this explicit expression of opinion presents itself as taking its cue from the reactions of people around Habrocomes, as it connects Habrocomes’ claims with the statement that no one admired any statue or praised any painting of Eros any more when Habrocomes appeared. Habrocomes’ introduction, then, is made almost entirely of indirect characterization.

In Xenophon’s novel in general, the preference for metonymical characterization can be observed in two important features. First, Xenophon’s protagonists utter an unusually high number of lamentations. Habrocomes utters nine lamentations and Anthia eleven. These numbers are higher than in any of the other novels, even though Xenophon’s is by far the shortest of the extant corpus. This high number becomes even more striking when we realize that

character text in this novel occupies only a relatively limited proportion (28.8%) of the total.⁶⁸ As is well known, lamentations were likely to be recognized by contemporary readers as examples of *ethopoeia*, a rhetorical exercise often fashioned as a lamenting monologue in ancient theory and practice.⁶⁹ Consequently, the reasons for lamentation are often indicative of character. In some cases in Xenophon's novel, one of the protagonists utters a lament because of the other's absence (5.1.12) or presumed death (3.10.3, 5.10.5) or because s/he is confronted with rivals threatening his/her chastity (2.1.4–6, 3.5.2–4, 5.5.5–6, 5.7.2, etc.). What matters here, however, is the fact that lamentations, of course, present such characteristics *indirectly*. The words pronounced by the characters have to be interpreted by the reader.

A good example of the importance of lamentations in the characterization of the protagonists is offered by Habrocomes' and Anthia's parallel lamenting monologues when they have fallen in love with each other. According to ancient rhetorical theory, lamentations by *two* characters commenting upon the same situation are good occasions for characterization because character is often revealed by the different points of interest addressed.⁷⁰ To be sure, Habrocomes' and Anthia's lamentations have a number of characteristics in common. As is highlighted by verbal echoes, both protagonists experience their newly aroused love as a calamity (φεῦ μοι τῶν κακῶν, 1.4.1; τί τὸ πέρασ τοῦ κακοῦ, 1.4.7; τί πέπονθα δυστυχῆς, 1.4.1; τί . . . ὦ δυστυχῆς πέπονθα, 1.4.6). But the lamentations also show significant differences. Anthia's lamentation addresses three main concerns: (i) she fears that her young age (παρθένος παρ' ἡλικίαν ἐρῶ, 1.4.6) makes her love for Habrocomes socially unacceptable (καινὰ καὶ κόρη μὴ πρόποντα); (ii) she finds Habrocomes' arrogance problematic (καλῶ . . . ἀλλ' ὑπερηφάνῳ . . . σοβαρός, 1.4.6–7); (iii) she regrets being kept under watch (φρουρουμένη, 1.4.7) because this makes it difficult for her to see Habrocomes (ποῦ δὲ Ἀβροκόμην ὄψομαι;). Habrocomes' experience is qualitatively different. He mainly laments the fact that his falling in love undermines his former disdain for Eros, which he regards as an essential constituent of his identity (1.4.1–3). The military metaphors used to depict this condition (ἐάλωκα, νενίκημαι, δουλεύειν ἀναγκάζομαι, νικῆσαι) and his explicit determination *not* to be controlled by Eros (οὐκ ἂν Ἐρως ποτέ μου κρατήσαι) indicate that he experiences his love for Anthia as a battle between Eros and his own identity. Thus, whereas Anthia experiences her love for

⁶⁸ By way of comparison: character text in Chariton occupies 42.5% of the total, and in Achilles Tatius 47.7%. See Hägg (1971a: 99) and De Temmerman (2006: 517–19) for the numbers.

⁶⁹ See e.g. Lib. Prog. 372–437 Förster (1915), where 12 of the 27 elaborated *ethopoeiae* are lamenting monologues.

⁷⁰ See also Birchall (1996b: 14) on laments generally: 'Their composition, even in the context of a *progymnasma*, was not a matter of following rules, but was largely a matter of exercising judgement about how different types of *êthos* and *pathos* could be communicated verbally.'

Habrocomes to be problematic for circumstantial reasons (her age, Habrocomes' arrogance, and her limited freedom), Habrocomes' unhappiness is caused by the feeling of *being in love* itself. In this respect, Habrocomes' Hippolytean behaviour as *anerastos* is implicitly highlighted by Anthia's parallel, but significantly divergent lamentation (on Hippolytus as a paradigm of Habrocomes, see §2.4).

A second indication of the novel's preference for metonymical characterization is that it accounts for one of its ways of showing character *development*. At least some notions of development have been shown to play an interesting role in this novel. Hippothous, for example, changes from being part of the civic establishment to becoming an outlaw and back again.⁷¹ And it has also been observed that the novel explores Habrocomes' inner character more fully than Anthia's. Habrocomes is the narratee of two embedded narratives in the novel (Hippothous' and Aegialeus' stories at 3.2 and 5.1 respectively) and he himself acknowledges the educational importance of at least one of them for the story of his own life.⁷² One area where his character development is depicted is his growing ability to act rationally rather than emotionally when confronted with sexual advances. This development is framed within a broad contrast between Habrocomes and Anthia. Anthia's ability to behave rationally in contexts of social interaction is heavily emphasized throughout the novel.⁷³ Often, such behaviour in public contexts is contrasted with outbursts of emotion in private. When approached by Anchialus, for example, she does not show emotion in his presence. On the contrary, she is undismayed by his threats (οὐδὲν αὐτὴν ἐδυσώπει . . . οὐ ληστῆς ἀπειλῶν) and firmly rejects his advances (πάντα ἡρνεῖτο, 4.5.3). Only when she is left alone (εἴποτε λαθεῖν ἡδύνατο) is she overwhelmed by emotion and wails repeatedly (πολλάκις ἀνεβόα). The clearest example, however, occurs when she is forced to work for a *pornoboskos*. Initially, she cries loudly (μεγάλα ἀνακωκύσασα, 5.7.1) but as soon as she is exposed to the crowd, she invents a ruse to escape danger (εὗρίσκει τέχνην ἀποφυγῆς, 5.7.4). This contrast between emotion and reason is explicitly foregrounded in her own speech, where she emphasizes the preferability of rational behaviour to lamentation: 'Why do I lament like this and not find some ruse (τινὰ μηχανήν) to guard the chastity I have preserved till now (τὴν μέχρι νῦν σωφροσύνην τετηρημένην)?' (5.7.2). In addition, the narrator highlights the rationality of her behaviour by subtly investing not Anthia but the public with an emotional response: as soon as she puts her ruse into practice (which consists of faking an epileptic fit), the people, who one

⁷¹ On this development, see Alvares (1995) and Watanabe (2003a, b).

⁷² Aegialeus' story of love enduring beyond death makes him realize that 'now I have truly learned (ἀληθῶς μεμάθηκα) that true love knows no age limits' (5.1.12). See Morgan (1996b: 174–5). On a developing conception of love in *both* protagonists, see Tagliabue (2012).

⁷³ On one such episode (and its possible importance as a marker of *her* development), see Hunter (2003: 191).

moment earlier were full of sexual desire for her (ἐπιθυμίας, 5.7.3), are now struck by pity and fear (ἔλεος ἄμα καὶ φόβος, 5.7.4). Anthia's rationality, then, establishes emotional control over others.⁷⁴ In many instances, this ability to establish control over her social environment is marked by 'devices' or ruses.⁷⁵

Habrocomes' tendency to act emotionally rather than rationally, on the other hand, also resurfaces repeatedly. He often lacks self-control in decision-making processes. More specifically, he is unable to think through what has to be done, but instead reacts impulsively.⁷⁶ Such loss of self-control is surely part of the topical depiction of novelistic heroes (see also Chaereas' lack of *sôphrosynê*, pp. 83–6), as is the contrast with the reasoned approaches adopted by the heroines (and in this case Anthia). But in this novel, impulsive rather than properly considered decision-making also relates Habrocomes to three other characters in the story. First, Manto confesses her love for him to Rhode because she 'cannot control herself any longer' (οὐκέτι καρτερούσα, 2.3.3). Secondly, Apsyrtus is characterized by the same loss of self-control (οὐκέτι ἀνασχόμενος οὐδὲ λόγον ἀκούσαι, 2.6.2) when he decides to torture Habrocomes. Finally, Hippothous' loss of self-control (οὐκέτι καρτερῶν, 3.2.10) results in the homicide of his boyfriend's lover in a fit of rage (ὀργῆς πλησθείς). In all three cases, the consequences of the loss of self-control are clearly pernicious: Manto's confession to Rhode and Apsyrtus' impulsive reaction to his daughter's accusations lead to the terrible and undeserved torture of Habrocomes, and Hippothous' loss of self-control also ultimately results in the death of his own beloved.⁷⁷ Manto, Apsyrtus, and Hippothous seem to be functioning as *exempla* illustrating the narrator's view that a lack of self-control in decision-making processes has negative consequences. Habrocomes' implicit alignment with these *exempla*, therefore, further distances him from Anthia. Unlike her, he does not demonstrate the ability to think patiently about the best course of action. In other words, he lacks *sôphrosynê*.

At the same time, however, any sharp distinction between the two protagonists in terms of emotion versus reason is problematic. Three episodes are of particular interest. In all three (2.1.3–4, 2.10.3, and 3.12.4), Habrocomes

⁷⁴ Another example is found in 3.5.8–9 (where she plays on Eudoxus' desire to return home as a means of obtaining a potion from him).

⁷⁵ Anthia repeatedly describes her own actions taken to preserve her chastity as 'devices' (τέχνas σωφροσύνης, 5.8.7; πᾶσαν σωφροσύνης μηχανήν, 5.14.2). She is also characterized by other vocabulary indicating mental activity in general (νομίζουσα, 5.9.12) and ruses in particular (σκήπτεται, 2.13.8 (Since the manuscript reads 'σκέπτεται' followed by a lacuna, we cannot be sure that O'Sullivan's (2005: 37) conjecture (σκήπτεται) is correct, but it is more than likely in any case.); σκήπτεται, 3.11.4). See, among others, Gärtner (1967: 2069–70) on Anthia's ability to adopt ruses in the face of threats to her chastity.

⁷⁶ Examples at 2.12.2 (οὐκέτι μένειν ἐκαρτέρει) and 3.10.4 (οὐκέτι καρτερῶν). On the formulaic expression conveying this impulsiveness, see O'Sullivan (1995: 60).

⁷⁷ See also Watanabe (2003a: 20–1).

describes his own rejection of sexual advances as *sôphrosynê*, but the way in which he safeguards his chastity is different in each episode. In each case, the explicit thematization of his chastity—*sôphrosynê* in a sexual context, that is—is accompanied by an implicit (or indirect) thematization of *sôphrosynê* in a social context. The Euxenus episode, for example, is emblematic of a sharp antithesis between Anthia's ability to adopt reason and Habrocomes' tendency to act emotionally—a dichotomy which will be blurred at a later stage in the story. When approached by Euxenus on Corymbus' behalf, Habrocomes is dumbfounded at first (εὐθύς . . . ἀχανής, 1.16.6) and cannot find an answer (οὐδέ τι ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἤῤῥισκεν). He cries (ἐδάκρυσε), wails (ἀέστενε), and eventually asks permission briefly to postpone his decision (βουλεύσασθαι βραχύ). His emotional reaction is contrasted with Euxenus' speech, which rationally surveys Habrocomes' options.⁷⁸ It is highlighted even more by Anthia's answer to Corymbus, who approaches her on Euxenus' behalf in the mirror scene. Like Habrocomes, she asks for a short time to consider (βραχὺν βουλεύσασθαι χρόνον, 1.16.7) and the narrator makes it clear that the content of her answer is identical to Habrocomes' (τὰ ὅμοια ἀπεκρίνατο). Such identical content highlights the different *form* in which it is communicated:⁷⁹ unlike Habrocomes, Anthia does not react emotionally. It is only when the protagonists are no longer in the presence of their rivals that their emotions are depicted as identical: they throw themselves on the ground (καταβαλόντες ἑαυτούς, 2.1.1), cry (ἐκλαίον), and lament (ὠδύροντο). Whereas Anthia succeeds in controlling her emotions in her interlocutor's presence, Habrocomes' first reaction is emphatically emotional.

Things are different in the second episode thematizing sexual and social *sôphrosynê*. When Manto makes advances to Habrocomes, his reaction is depicted in two speeches. The first is addressed to his slave Leucon, who urges him to yield to Manto's request. Habrocomes is infuriated by this suggestion:

The moment Habrocomes heard this he immediately (εὐθύς) flew into a rage (ὀργῆς). He looked Leucon straight in the eye (ἀναβλέψας δὲ ἀτενές) and said: 'You villain, worse than these Phoenicians. You have dared to speak like this to Habrocomes, and you talk about another woman in front of Anthia? I am a slave (δοῦλος), but I know how to keep vows. They have power over my body, but my soul is still free. Now let Manto threaten me if she pleases—with swords, the noose, fire, and everything that the body of a slave (οἰκέτου) can be made to bear, for she could never persuade me to do wrong against Anthia of my own free will.' (2.4.3–4)

⁷⁸ Schmeling (1980: 38–9).

⁷⁹ My reading here differs from Montiglio's (2010: 39), who discusses only the similarities between the protagonists and consequently takes this episode as an example of perfect symmetry between them: they 'speak in one voice'.

The emotional character of this speech is highlighted not only by Habrocomes' body language preceding the speech, but also, and primarily, by the main narrator's interpretation of this speech as an indication of anger (ὀργή). It is further emphasized by stylistic aspects such as short sentences, clarity, and apostrophe and contrasts sharply with the tone of Habrocomes' letter to Manto, in which he rejects her advances:

Mistress, do as you will and use my body as the body of a slave. And if you want to kill me, I am ready. If you want to torture me, torture me as you please. But I could not come to your bed, nor would I obey such a request even if you ordered me. (2.5.4)

Both the speech and the letter, then, respond negatively to Manto's approach. Bürger (1892: 39) finds such a twofold response superfluous and dismisses it as an example of rhetorical embellishment ('Ausschmückung'). From an ancient rhetorical point of view, however, Habrocomes' two types of response offer a good opportunity for characterization.⁸⁰ The messages conveyed by the speech and the letter are identical (that is, Habrocomes will not comply with Manto's request), but they are addressed to different interlocutors and, consequently, set in a different tone. This recalls a guideline in *progymnasmata* treatises that in *ethopoeia* the speaker should take into account the interlocutor (πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος/πρὸς ὃν λέγει).⁸¹ Indeed, a comparison between Habrocomes' speech and letter reveals two remarkable differences. First, whereas the former is clearly informed by anger, Habrocomes suppresses his anger in the latter. This suppression may result from Anthia's encouragement shortly before, which leaves Habrocomes in despair (ἡπόρει, 2.4.6) rather than anger. Furthermore, whereas Leucon's suggestion that he comply makes him angry, Manto's letter is said to make him *unhappy* (ἡχθετο . . . ἐλύπει, 2.5.3). Secondly, this episode also recalls the progymnasmatic prescription that in an *ethopoeia* the speaker should take into account the notion of *tychê*, or social origin.⁸² Whereas Habrocomes insults his slave, he realizes that any communication with Manto is defined by another social hierarchy: now *he* is the slave and *she* is his mistress (δέσποινα . . . ὥς οἰκέτου, 2.5.4). This awareness is made explicit by Habrocomes in his initial reaction (δοῦλος, οἰκέτου, 2.4.4) and results in a different stylistic approach. Whereas both the speech and the letter mention Habrocomes' willingness to undergo torture rather than comply with Manto's request, the letter uses a conditional clause (εἴτε ἀποκτείνειν θέλεις . . . εἴτε βασανίζω . . . βασάνιζε, 2.5.4), thus conveying his refusal less directly and more carefully than his speech, where an imperative conveys his message more bluntly (ἀπειλείτω). The determination, however, not to yield

⁸⁰ Turasiewicz (1995: 186) acknowledges the letter's potential to characterize Habrocomes (it 'wahrt die Würde eines freigeborenen Mannes').

⁸¹ Theon *Prog.* 115.24 Sp. II and Nicol. *Prog.* 64.5 Felten.

⁸² Theon *Prog.* 116.2–3 Sp. II (ἑτεροι λόγοι ἀρμόττειεν ἄν . . . διὰ τύχην δούλω καὶ ἐλευθέρω).

to Manto's request is common to both utterances and highlighted by the reappearance in his letter of the distinction between body and soul, mentioned first in his speech to Leucon and indicating that, even if Manto controls his body, she will never control his soul.⁸³ Both the speech and the letter, then, are indications of his (sexual) *sôphrosynê*.⁸⁴ The difference is that his speech expresses this characteristic in a mixed *ethopoeia* (revealing both *êthos* and *pathos*), whereas his letter to Manto expresses it in an ethical *ethopoeia* (revealing primarily *êthos*).⁸⁵ The Manto episode, then, highlights emotional as well as rational aspects of Habrocomes' behaviour. The presence of reason rather than mere *pathos* sets this episode apart from the Euxenus episode, where Habrocomes' reaction is informed almost entirely by *pathos*.

The Cyno episode, finally, shows Habrocomes' *sôphrosynê* in yet another way. The similarity between Manto and Cyno has long been noticed:⁸⁶ both women are ready to commit homicide to achieve their goals.⁸⁷ Furthermore, they falsely accuse Habrocomes (of attempted rape and murder respectively) and have him punished without giving him the opportunity to defend himself.⁸⁸ Such similarity of circumstances serves as a foil to highlight Habrocomes' changed attitude towards his own *sôphrosynê*. Whereas in earlier confrontations with sexual predators Habrocomes adduces *sôphrosynê* as a quality to be protected (2.1.3–4) and rewarded (2.10.3), he now thinks (ἐσκόπει, 3.12.4) about his chastity primarily as having done him much harm in the past (τὴν πολλάκις αὐτὸν σωφροσύνην ἀδικήσαν). This assessment harks back to the ambiguity about his *sôphrosynê* in the opening paragraphs and provides us with yet another qualification of it. This time, his qualification obviously refers to the tortures and imprisonment imposed on him by Manto after his rejection of her love.⁸⁹ When confronted

⁸³ On the Stoic overtones of this distinction, see Montiglio (2005: 244–6, 2010: 37) and Doulamis (2007: 157). M. Jones (2007: 116–17) points to such overtones in Anthia's preservation of her chastity as well. On the appropriateness of the aphelic style for the dissemination of Stoic thought, see Doulamis (2002: 117–18). On Stoicism in the novels more generally, see Perkins (1995: 77–103).

⁸⁴ See also Anthia's interpretation of Habrocomes' speech as an indication of his love for her (τὴν εὖνοιαν τὴν σὴν καὶ στέργεσθαι διαφερόντως ὑπὸ σοῦ πεπίστευκα, 2.4.5).

⁸⁵ On the distinction between ethical, pathological, and mixed *ethopoeia*, see, among others, Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 15.31–16.3 Sp. II, Aphth. *Prog.* 45.6–14 Sp. II, and Prisc. *Praex.* 45.28–46.7 Passalacqua.

⁸⁶ As early, for example, as Bürger (1892: 38–40).

⁸⁷ Manto proposes to kill Anthia (2.5.2) and later commissions Lampon to do so (2.11.3). Cyno kills her husband Araxus (3.12.5).

⁸⁸ In both cases, the narrator explicitly addresses this detail. Manto's father does not allow himself to hear a single word in Habrocomes' defence (οὐκέτι ἀνασχόμενος οὐδὲ λόγου ακούσαι, 2.6.2) and the prefect receiving Cyno's false accusation makes no effort to find out the facts (οὐκέτι οὐδὲ πυθόμενος τὰ γενόμενα, 4.2.1).

⁸⁹ As the reader will recall, the narrator describes Habrocomes' punishment by Manto as a 'pitiful sight' (τὸ θέαμα ἐλεεινόν). Without hearing a word in Habrocomes' defence (οὐκέτι ἀνασχόμενος οὐδὲ λόγου ακούσαι), Manto's father orders that his clothes be torn off (περιρρήξαι

by Cyno, now, Habrocomes clearly wants to avoid a similar scenario and therefore does not openly reject her proposal. Instead, he *thinks* about a number of options (πολλὰ ἄμα ἐσκόπει, 3.12.4) and finally agrees to Cyno's marriage proposal (συγκατατίθεται), whereupon she kills her husband the following night. Habrocomes' acceptance of the proposal is best explained as a device to gain time.⁹⁰ Such acceptance is, of course, a well-known device for novelistic protagonists to preserve their chastity as long as possible.⁹¹ And in this case the verb used also echoes Anthia's agreement to marry Perilaus (συγκατατίθεται, 2.13.8), which is clearly presented as a ruse. Moreover, when Habrocomes finally takes to his heels, he *says* that he could never share a murderer's bed (οὐκ ἂν ποτε μαιφόνῳ συγκατακλιθῆσθαι φήσας, 3.12.5), but since he was informed of Cyno's murderous plan *before* agreeing to marry her (3.12.4), this cannot be the real reason for his flight.⁹² Rather, this dissimulation is to be interpreted as an indication that he approaches his situation more rationally than in earlier similar situations. The narrator draws attention to the *mental* activity informing his behaviour, as is frequent in the depiction of Anthia. Through the episodes of Euxenus, Manto, and Cyno, then, Habrocomes' reaction to sexual advances evolves from emotional and ineffective to rational and effective. The metonymical registration of his reactions, in other words, is complemented by a metaphorical intratextual technique: in a series of three thematically consistent episodes, the second and third evoke the previous one(s) and document Habrocomes' behaviour through significant contrasts. Chariton's narrator uses such intratextual metaphorical characterization in a doublet to depict Callirhoe's character (Artaxates episode v. Plangon episode); Xenophon's narrator uses a triplet to similar effect. The combination of metonymical and metaphorical characterization depicts his preservation of sexual *sôphrosynê* as accompanied by an evolving ability to adapt *sôphrosynê* in a social context: to rationally assess his options in a given situation and in a cool-headed way choose the best course of action.

τὴν ἐσθῆτα) and that fire (πῦρ) and whips (μάστιγας) with which to flog (παίειν) him be brought. The torture itself is narrated in gruesome detail: 'The tortures disfigured his whole body (τὸ σῶμα πᾶν ἠφάνιζον); unused to servile tortures, his blood drained out (τό τε αἷμα κατέρρει), and his handsome appearance wasted away (ἐμαραίνετο). Apsyrtus submitted him to terrible chains (δεσμὰ φοβερά), fire (πῦρ), and tortured him assiduously (μάλιστα . . . ταῖς βασάνοις) . . . Then he gave orders to tie him up (δῆσαντας) and imprison him in a dark cell (οἰκήματι σκοτεινῷ)' (2.6.2–5).

⁹⁰ For different readings of this passage, see Schmeling (1980: 77) and Konstan (2007: 38–40), who both interpret Habrocomes' consent to Cyno as genuine.

⁹¹ See e.g. Chariclea in Hld. 1.22.5–6 and Clitophon in Ach. Tat. 5.14.3, 5.16.1–2, 5.16.7–8, 5.21.6.

⁹² In fact, the narrator makes it clear that Habrocomes' flight results from his disgust at Cyno's licentiousness (τὴν ἀσελγειαν, 3.12.5).

2.4 METAPHORICAL CHARACTERIZATION

The importance of similarity and contrast brings us to the subject of metaphorical characterization. As we now leave the realm of *intratextual* association, it is striking that the characterization of the protagonists through associations with historical, literary, or mythological paradigms is rare in the novel as a whole. I think this rarity is in line with Xenophon of Ephesus' intertextual practice in general and is consonant with his above-mentioned tendency to give the bare minimum of information and require the reader to do the interpretative leg-work.⁹³ Before I consider the significance of the rarity of metaphorical characterization, however, it is worth noting that it is not entirely absent. As we have seen, and just as in other novels, mirror scenes (such as Anthia's and Habrocomes' juxtaposed lamentations and the Manto and Cyno episodes) and other organizational patterns that generate intratextual similarity or contrast (for example, between chaste protagonists and extremely *unchaste* antagonists) contribute to characterization. Metaphorical characterization is also present in the protagonists' introductions, particularly that of Anthia, who is explicitly compared to Artemis (ὡς Ἄρτεμιν, 1.2.7). This comparison is extensively elaborated by a physical description: her attributes (a deer's skin, a quiver, a bow and arrows), dogs surrounding her, a tunic down to her knees and loosely falling over her arms (ζωστὸς εἰς γόνυ, μέχρι βραχιόνων καθεμένος, 1.2.6), and even her blond hair evoke the goddess' traditional iconography.⁹⁴ Moreover, the qualification of her eyes as 'fierce' (γοργοί), having the bright glance of a beautiful girl (φαιδροὶ μὲν ὡς καλῆς), yet the terrifying look of a virgin (φοβεροὶ δὲ ὡς σώφρονος) may further inform the association with Artemis, of whom not only chastity but also liability to terrify are well-known characteristics.⁹⁵ As the goddess of nature, and of wild and untamed nature in particular, she is known for harshly punishing people who thwart her plans.⁹⁶ She is also famous for being responsible for women's sudden deaths,⁹⁷ and Pausanias (4.30.5.4) even calls her 'terrifying for

⁹³ See e.g. Doulamis (2002: 112, forthcoming) on Xenophon's 'covert' practice of literary *mimesis* and its involvement with broadly generic or intertextual patterns rather than explicit *verbatim* quotations. See also Laplace (1994b) on such patterns.

⁹⁴ See OCD⁴ s.v. Artemis. Call. *Dian.* 11–12 mentions Artemis' *chiton* (ἐς γόνυ μέχρι χιτῶνα ζώννυσθαι). The mention of Anthia's arms could refer to Artemis' epithet 'λευκώλενος' (see B. 5.99). According to Anacr. fr. 3.2, Artemis is blonde (ξανθή). E. *Hipp.* 82 mentions her 'golden hair' (χρυσέας κόμης), and E. *Ph.* 191–2 describes the goddess as 'with golden tresses' (χρυσεοβόστυχον). See also LIMC 619 s.v. Artemis.

⁹⁵ Griffiths (1978: 411) refers to 'divine elements' in Anthia's description, but does not explain this qualification.

⁹⁶ She murders, for example, Niobe's children to punish her for the *hubris* shown towards Artemis' mother Leto. Furthermore, she is responsible for murdering Rhodope, Tityrus, Actaeon, Callisto, Orion, and Oeneus, and demands the sacrifice of Iphigeneia to punish Agamemnon. See LIMC 618 s.v. Artemis.

⁹⁷ Hom. *Od.* 11.171.

women's pangs of childbirth' (γυναικῶν ὠδῖσιν εἶναι φοβερὰν). The combination of chastity and fierceness in the description of Anthia's eyes can therefore be read as yet another element aligning her with the chaste, yet fierce, goddess.

Habrocomes is also characterized metaphorically. He is explicitly compared to a god (ὡς θεῶ, 1.1.3). Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, his dedication to chastity and his contempt and disdain for Eros implicitly but unmistakably align him with the tragic hero Hippolytus, whose behaviour is equally marked by the initial error of rejecting love and likewise followed by divine punishment.⁹⁸ Habrocomes also resembles Hippolytus in that he self-consciously thematizes his own *sôphrosynê*, which is then defined and conceptualized differently by other characters.⁹⁹

Despite these examples, it is important to note that such metaphorical characterization is rare in Xenophon of Ephesus. First, the images of Artemis and Hippolytus scarcely resurface in the remainder of the novel. Certainly, Habrocomes' 'Hippolytean' introduction as a novel hero who does not want to have anything to do with love seems to problematize the novelistic *topos* of love at first sight and presents a disconcertingly extreme and potentially dangerous type of *sôphrosynê*.¹⁰⁰ However, Habrocomes soon yields to Eros' power and the figure of Hippolytus virtually disappears from the novel.¹⁰¹ Artemis, for her part, does not resurface at all as a paradigm of Anthia, who gets married immediately after her introduction and thus ceases to be a virgin.

Secondly, other paradigms of the protagonists that seem to have some thematic relevance are also rare.¹⁰² Just as in Chariton, the protagonists are implicitly aligned with Odysseus and Penelope at their reunion,¹⁰³ but one

⁹⁸ See X. Eph. 1.2.1 (Μηνιᾷ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ Ἔρως· φιλόνεικος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὑπερηφάνοις ἀπαραίτητος· ἐξήτει δὲ τέχνην κατὰ τοῦ μειρακίου) and E. Hipp. 21–2 (ὃ δ' εἰς ἑμ' ἡμάρτηκε, τιμωρήσομαι // Ἴππόλυτον ἐν τῇδ' ἡμέρᾳ). See also Giovannelli (2008: 277–80), Dalmeyda (1962: xviii), Susanetti (1999: 127–9), and Cueva (2004: 39) on similarities between Hippolytus and Habrocomes.

⁹⁹ See Gill (1990b: 80–1, 85–6) on Hippolytus' characteristic mode of presenting himself as *sôphrôn* and on the polysemy of this concept.

¹⁰⁰ See D. L. Cairns (1997: 54–60) and Griffin (1990: 137–8) on Hippolytus' marked hostility to sex as a problematic and dangerous concept in Euripides. See Flygt (1934: 512–3) on Phaedra's *sôphrosynê* as normal in comparison to Hippolytus'. On how virtue is at times presented, in narrative roughly contemporary to Xenophon (Plutarch's *Lives*), as dangerous if insensible to circumstances, see Frazier (1996: 187) and Duff (1999: 158).

¹⁰¹ Habrocomes' association with Hippolytus is only reactivated when Manto falsely accuses him of attempted rape. This motif also evokes the stories of Stheneboea and Bellerophon (Hom. Il. 6.160–5, E. *Bellerophontes* 348–67 Kannicht 5.1) and Potiphar's wife and Joseph. See Giovannelli (2008: 283–8), Turasiewicz (1995: 182), Laplace (1994b: 463), Cueva (2004: 37), and Dalmeyda (1962: xxii). On this motif in Euripides (and Heliodorus), see, among others, Schmeling (1980: 42–8).

¹⁰² It is significant that Giovannelli (2008), in an article whose title claims to deal with Euripidean echoes ('echi euripidei') in Xenophon of Ephesus, in fact only discusses the evocation of *Hippolytus* in the opening scene and the Manto episode.

¹⁰³ See Capra (2009: 41–2) on this scene in Xenophon's novel.

would be hard-pressed to see how this allusion is part of a larger network systematically exploring thematic connections between, for example, the heroine and Penelope (as in Chariton). Another instance where the *Odyssey* is tangibly present is the *ecphrasis* of the tapestry covering the protagonists' marriage bed (1.8.2–3), which echoes the famous description of Ares' and Aphrodite's bed (*Od.* 8.266–332). This evocation of the divine but adulterous couple has surprised scholars,¹⁰⁴ but it appropriately highlights, by contrast, the central role played by *sôphrosynê* in the story.¹⁰⁵ The evoked story contrasts sharply with that of the two protagonists, whose love is sanctioned from the very beginning by lawful marriage, which, nevertheless, will be repeatedly threatened until the end of the novel. Once again, however, the imagery developed is not sustained in the rest of the novel—and this is also true for a number of other possible literary paradigms identified as such by scholars (but not always equally persuasively).¹⁰⁶ The contrast with Chariton, for example, is striking. Whereas in Chariton a whole array of paradigms (such as Helen, Penelope, Patroclus, Laodamia, Protesilaus, Ariadne, Semele, and Thetis) playfully and often ambiguously converge upon the underlining, elaborating, and complicating of Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê* (see §1.2), the protagonists' *sôphrosynê* in Xenophon's novel, although without doubt the most prominent characteristic, is constructed almost exclusively through direct and metonymical characterization. The—non-sustained—paradigms of Hippolytus and Artemis and the Euxenus-Manto-Cyno triplet provide the only metaphorical dimensions.

The sparsity of metaphorical characterization is in line with Scobie's observation that comparisons and metaphors in general are almost absent from the novel.¹⁰⁷ It is also in line with the widely acknowledged dearth of literariness in this novel. Direct, metonymical, and metaphorical characterization, that is, are functions of the literariness of a narrative text¹⁰⁸ because they highlight

¹⁰⁴ Schmeling (1980: 28), for example, wonders: 'Why put such a scene over the marriage bed of especially chaste lovers? Does Xenophon know what he is doing? Do dirty scenes produce fertility? Passion? Or is a little humor intended?'

¹⁰⁵ See also Shea (1998: 65–7).

¹⁰⁶ Examples include Habrocomes as Poseidon famously pursuing Demeter (Paus. 8.25.5 ~ X. Eph. 2.8.2; Plastira-Valkanou 2001: 142), Apsyrus as Agamemnon (1.1.16; Schmeling 1980: 39), Anthia, Rhenaea, and Polyidus as Cassandra, Clytaemnestra, and Agamemnon respectively (Schmeling 1980: 69), and Habrocomes and Anthia as Achilles and Patroclus (*Il.* 22.389–90 ~ X. Eph. 5.8.4; Turasiewicz 1995: 181–2). Laplace (1994b), on the other hand, argues for a more sustained intertextual engagement with Plato's *Symposium* and a number of tragic texts. I find this reading ultimately unconvincing because of the patchy collection of dubious intertextual resonances (e.g. Pl. *Smp.* 191a in X. Eph. 1.9.5 and 5.13.3) upon which it is based.

¹⁰⁷ Scobie (1973: 1) observes that the number of similes in Xenophon is unusually limited (only four, whereas Heliodorus uses 120, Achilles Tatius 110, Longus 107, and Chariton 49). It is telling that the *Ephesiaca* is the only extant novel that hardly occurs in Morales' (2005) discussion of metaphor in this genre.

¹⁰⁸ See Webb (2007: 529) on rhetoric and literariness in general.

different aspects of literary character. As Morgan (1982: 222, 1993: 197–224) points out, narrative fiction is an interplay between techniques evoking fictional belief of the readers on the one hand¹⁰⁹ and techniques aiming at drawing the reader's attention to the fictionality, literariness, or artfulness of the textual surface of the narrative (for example, intertextuality) on the other. In my view, the different techniques of characterization discussed in this book aptly describe these two opposite dynamics. Direct and metonymical forms of characterization draw the reader's attention to the human or representational aspect of character.¹¹⁰ Metaphorical techniques of characterization, on the other hand, such as comparisons or literary paradigms, draw the reader's attention to the textual level of character, and emphasize precisely, among other things, that it is a *literary* construct.¹¹¹

In Kytzler's (2003: 350) view, the low number of comparisons in Xenophon's novel is an indication that Xenophon is unwilling rather than unable to adopt figurative language. I suggest that the low frequency of figurative language in general and of metaphorical characterization in particular contributes to marking Xenophon's style as an example of *apheleia*. Some ancient treatises even state explicitly that *apheleia* should avoid metaphors altogether.¹¹² Demetrius, for example, makes it clear that the most important characteristic of simple discourse is clarity (μάλιστα δὲ σαφὴ χρὴ τὴν λέξιν εἶναι, *Eloc.* 191), which is traditionally opposed to metaphorical language.¹¹³ He points out that clarity is maintained by words in their proper sense (ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις, *Eloc.* 192), as opposed to their figurative use. He also points out that figurative use of words evokes magnificence (μετενηνεγμένον μεγαλοπρεπές, *Eloc.* 190),¹¹⁴ which is in line with Ps.-Aristides' and Hermogenes' observations

¹⁰⁹ To make fiction move within the parameters of plausibility, the narrator uses markers of *realism*. He provides, for example, a recognizable setting for the events.

¹¹⁰ This is confirmed by research into the poetics of 19th-cent. realistic literature, which points out that this genre, in its effort to erase traces of fictionality, frequently draws upon metonymical language. See Jakobson (1971: 1114), Jakobson and Halle (1971: 90–6), and Hamon (1981: 235–55).

¹¹¹ This does not mean, of course, that metaphor as a phenomenon exists *only* in literary (as opposed to non-literary) language. For an 'undermining of the literariness of metaphor' in this sense, see Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Fludernik, Freeman, and Freeman (1999: 384–5). See also Silk (1990) for connections between metaphor and non-representational modes of discourse (in ancient comedy). More generally on ways in which fiction draws attention to its own crafted status and at the same time aspires to verisimilitude, see Newsom (1988: 107–64).

¹¹² Accordingly, Xenophon of Athens, the famous prototype of simple discourse in antiquity, is also known for evoking few paradigms drawn from literature (Keller 1911: 259).

¹¹³ See e.g. Arist. *Po.* 58^a18–^b4, where metaphor is opposed to clarity (σαφής) and associated with riddles (αἵνιγμα), and Thgn. 667–82, where a metaphor is presented as a riddle (ἡνίχθω, 680) and a hidden message (κεκρυμμένα). See also H. Lausberg (1998: §§ 1239–40) on tropes as a means of alienation.

¹¹⁴ See González García (1989: 227) on Xenophon of Ephesus and H. Lausberg (1998: § 1237. II) on the opposition between proper (κύριος) and figurative (μεταφορά) use of words. On metaphorical 'transferral' of meaning, see Ps.-Aristid. *Rh.* 2.20 (ὀνόμασι . . . ἀπὸ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ

that metaphors contribute to creating solemn discourse (*semnotês*),¹¹⁵ the traditional opposite of *apheleia*.

This tendency to avoid metaphor is thus likely to be connected with the predisposition of simple discourse towards readerly rather than narratorial interpretation. As we have seen, Ps.-Aristides makes it clear that *apheleia* prefers indirect characterization through specific details of a person's actions, behaviour, speech, or other attributes contiguous to a person's character. In modern narratology, such preference for specific attributes over explicit value judgements has been called 'covert' narration (as opposed to 'overt' narration, which would signify more prominent narratorial interpretation and judgement).¹¹⁶ Now, when metaphors are used in characterization, they entail a comparison of a character (*comparandum*) with something or someone (*comparans*) on the basis of similarity rather than contiguity. Given the fact that a comparison always evokes, explicitly or implicitly, a resemblance (*tertium comparationis*), it is a more overt type of characterization than the covert type offered by speeches and actions. When, for example, Xenophon's narrator aligns Habrocomes with Hippolytus, the *tertium comparationis*, even if not made explicit, is likely to be the rejection of Eros and the cultivation of chastity. Therefore, even if comparisons or metaphors surely require readerly interpretation,¹¹⁷ they also entail, by definition, narratorial guidance of such interpretation because they at least imply the characteristic conveyed (in this case, 'chastity').¹¹⁸ Therefore, the use of comparisons or metaphors is a more overt way of narrating than the mere registration of facts and events which Ps.-Aristides defines as typical of *apheleia*. It is not surprising, then, that some treatises are so explicit in advising authors of *apheleia* to avoid metaphors. In my view, this explains why there is such a dearth of metaphorical characterization in Xenophon.

ἕτερον... μεταφέροντες), 2.65 (ὀνόματα ἐπ' ἄλλων πραγμάτων κείμενα μεταφέρων ἐφ' ἕτερα), Hermog. *Inv.* 199.3–200.13 Rabe (1913), and Patillon (2002a: 56, 2002b: 41–2, 176 n. 217).

¹¹⁵ Ps.-Aristid. *Rh.* 1.30 (τροπικαῖς ἀντὶ ἰδίων) and Hermog. *Id.* 248.9–10 Rabe (1913) (αἱ τροπικαὶ λέξεις σεμναί). Hermog. *Id.* 246.17–18 Rabe (1913) points out that allegory (which is commonly defined as a sustained metaphor; see H. Lausberg 1998: §895) also creates solemnity (αἱ ἀλληγορικαὶ μέθοδοι... σεμνὸν ποιοῦσι τὸν λόγον).

¹¹⁶ See pp. 29–30.

¹¹⁷ The notion is as old as Aristotle (*Rh.* 3.10.2, 3.10.6), who classifies metaphors on the basis of the readerly interpretation required: whereas close similarity between a *comparans* and a *comparandum* generates dullness and comprehensibility, dissimilarity works conversely to generate vividness and incomprehensibility. See also Nünlist (2009: 209–12) on figurative language and implicitness as discussed in ancient literary criticism. Modern metaphor theory also emphasizes that metaphors require hermeneutic participation by the reader. See e.g. Biebuyck (1998: 89–97, 163–346), Biebuyck and Martens (2009: 119–20, 2011). A recent starting point for modern metaphor theory in general is Fludernik (2011).

¹¹⁸ See also Larmour (2000: 277) on metaphor as a sign of authorial presence in Plutarch's *Lives*.

However, notwithstanding this general dearth of metaphorical characterization, there is one striking type of it in Xenophon's novel. It occurs in a comparatively large number of etymologically significant instances of name-giving.¹¹⁹ Etymologically significant names can, I submit, be subdivided according to the three main techniques of characterization discussed so far (direct, metonymical, and metaphorical characterization). An example of directly characterizing name-giving is Eudoxus ('having a good reputation'), it explicitly conveys the characteristic central to the characterization of the old and experienced physician (3.4.1).¹²⁰ An example of a metonymically significant name is Habrocomes: his name refers to his beautiful hair, which is mentioned by Anthia (1.9.5).¹²¹ The third group—metaphorically significant names—relate to a character on the basis of similarity. The names of Anthia and Hyperanthes, for example, contain the word for 'flower' (*anthos*) or 'flowery' (*antheios*), thus echoing the oft-mentioned physical beauty of these two characters.¹²² (Of course, some metaphorically significant names evoke similarity with mythological, historical, or literary paradigms rather than through etymology.¹²³)

Metaphorically significant etymology, in fact, underlies many names in Xenophon's novel.¹²⁴ Cyno's name, for example, denotes a bitch (*κυννώ*),¹²⁵ thus highlighting her shameless sexual lust. Althaea (5.11.2), who makes only a cameo appearance as Anthia's host on Rhodes, bears the name of the white flower known as 'marsh mallow' (*ἀλθαία*).¹²⁶ One of the very few things that we learn about this woman is that she is old (*πρεσβύτιδι*). Her name, therefore,

¹¹⁹ See Hägg (1971*b*), Ruiz-Montero (1981*b*), Doulamis (2002: 115), and Bierl (2006: 90–2) on name-giving in this novel.

¹²⁰ Another example is Euxenus ('the good host'), an ironically charged name for a brigand who falls in love with Anthia from the moment that he imprisons her (1.15.3).

¹²¹ Other examples: Aegialeus (5.1.2) is indeed a suitable name for a fisherman living on the seashore (*αἰγιαλός* means 'seashore'), just as Perilaus ('among the soldiery') is for a commander in charge of peacekeeping (2.13.3).

¹²² See also Hägg (1971*b*: 35–6) on these names. Rhode's name might similarly echo the Greek word for 'rose', although I agree with Hägg that nothing in this character's characterization mentions her beauty (let alone highlights the importance of it within the narrative).

¹²³ Hägg (1971*b*: 42) singles out Psammis (3.11.2; also the name of the legendary Egyptian king in Hdt. 2.159–61) as the only example in Xenophon's novel, but see p. 121 on the possible evocation of Abradatas and Panthea through the names of the protagonists.

¹²⁴ And, to be sure, in other novels too. Examples are Chariton's Rhodogune (rose-woman, *tertium comparationis* 'beauty'), Achilles Tatius' Conops (gnat, *tertium comparationis* 'irritating busybody'), Melite (honey, *tertium comparationis* 'sweetness'), Longus' Lycaenion (little she-wolf, *tertium comparationis* '(sexual) predator'), and Heliodorus' Thisbe (*tertium comparationis* 'licentiousness'; see M. Jones 2006: 560–1, who notes that *thisbê* means not only coffin, but also prostitute).

¹²⁵ See Hägg (1971*b*: 36–7).

¹²⁶ On this plant, see Thphr. *HP* 9.15.5. Of course, Althaea is also a mythological figure (the mother of Meleager), but it is difficult to see how this association could be relevant for reading the novel (see also Hägg 1971*b*: 40: 'the associations which the names of mythical characters like Althaia . . . were likely to provoke did not apparently bother Xenophon').

might be taken to underline the colour of her hair, which is white like the homonymous flower. The fact that Althaea lives close to the sea (πλησίον . . . τῆς θαλάσσης) reinforces the flowery imagery, since marsh mallows are found primarily on the banks of rivers, in marshes, and in the vicinity of salt water, mainly near the sea. Corymbus' name ('top', for example of a mountain) metaphorically echoes his explicitly stated leading position in the pirates' hierarchy (τῶν . . . πειρατῶν ὁ ἑξάρχος, 1.13.3).¹²⁷ Finally, the name of Chry-sion ('little treasure') could be read as a metaphor highlighting her valuable position in the plot. Since this woman gives information to Habrocomes that is crucial for the success of his search for Anthia, her name reflects her importance for Habrocomes' search and, in an almost metaliterary sense, for the continuation of the novelistic plot.¹²⁸

The presence of names with metaphorically significant etymologies in Xenophon may appear to strike a dissonant note in a novel that otherwise shows few traces of metaphorical characterization or language. One way to explain this apparent inconsistency could be to endorse the well-known epitome theory of this novel and to argue that in any epitome, proper names, as crucial identifiers of the characters through whose actions the plot develops, can be considered as residues of an earlier original version. Whereas original literary and rhetorical elaboration—as well as many of the associations of characters with intertextual paradigms—are likely to be excised by an epitomizer in favour of the representation of plot lines, original proper names are, of course, more likely to survive. But again, I suggest that ancient theory on *apheleia* provides a more likely answer to this apparent paradox. Some ancient treatises do not ban metaphor from simple discourse altogether, but subject its use to strict limitations. Since metaphor is identified as relevant to many stylistic categories, such as fierceness (*sphodrotês*, Ps.-Aristid. *Rh.* 1.118), elegance (*epimeleia*, *Rh.* 1.129), and sweetness (*glykytês*, *Rh.* 1.132 and 2.65), it is reasonable to assume that the context and subject matter evoked are crucial criteria in judging its appropriateness in different types of discourse.¹²⁹ According to Ps.-Aristides (*Rh.* 2.20 and 2.96), *apheleia* does not allow metaphors that evoke 'important and noble' subject matter (μεγάλων . . . σεμνῶν, *Rh.* 2.138), which is characteristic of solemn style (*semnotês*). Rather, it should draw its material from 'lower and more ordinary' (φαυλοτέρων . . . κοινοτέρων) subject matter. As an example, he cites a passage from Xenophon of Athens' *Symposium* (1.4), where people's souls

¹²⁷ Hägg (1971b: 38), for his part, metonymically connects this name with remarks about the pirate's hair (1.13.3).

¹²⁸ Again, Hägg (1971b: 39) explains this name differently. He (somewhat vaguely) suggests reading it as ironically significant, since Chry-sion turns out to be a 'talkative old woman'.

¹²⁹ *Glykytês*, for example, uses only 'moderate' metaphors. See already Arist. *Rh.* 3.2.9 on the appropriateness (ἀρμοστούσας) of metaphors. On the importance of context, see Patillon (2002a: 187 n. 314).

are said to be ‘washed’ (ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις). Since this metaphor is taken ‘from equipment and vases’ (ἀπὸ σκευῶν ἢ ἀγγείων), he goes on to explain, it transfers meaning ‘from lower to more elevated subjects’ (μετενεχθὲν ἀπὸ τῶν κοινοτέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σεμνότερα). Therefore, Ps.-Aristides classifies it as a ‘cautious’ (πεφυλαγμένην) metaphor appropriate to simple discourse (συνήθεις . . . τῇ ἀφελείᾳ).¹³⁰ In other words, metaphor is appropriate in simple discourse if its *comparans* (‘equipment and vases’) is more ordinary subject matter than its *comparandum* (‘people’s souls’). Likewise, Xenophon of Athens’ denomination of traders following in an army’s wake as ‘attendants’ (ἀκόλουθοι, Ages. 1.30; Rh. 2.20 and 2.96) evokes ‘lower’ subject matter (ἐλάττονι ὀνόματι τοῦ πράγματος) because *akolouthoi* is primarily used to refer to slaves (δούλων, Rh. 2.20).

These guidelines may go some way towards explaining the apparent inconsistency between the presence of metaphors in name-giving on the one hand and the almost complete absence of other kinds of metaphorical characterization and language on the other. In other Greek novels, much of the metaphorical characterization of the protagonists revolves around their association with gods and mythological heroes—with *comparantia*, in other words, that are situated in ‘higher’ spheres of subject matter than the (mortal) protagonists themselves. As Ps.-Aristides explains, such associations are inappropriate in *apheleia*. Accordingly, they are almost completely absent from Xenophon’s novel. However, the *comparantia* evoked by the metaphorically significant names in this novel are consistently situated in *lower* spheres of subject matter. These *comparantia* are objects (‘top’ in the case of Corymbus and ‘gold’ in the case of ChrySION), a flower (marsh mallow in the case of Althaea), and an animal (a dog in the case of Cyno); as such, they are reminiscent of Ps.-Aristides’ comment on Xenophon of Athens’ adoption of ‘low’ objects (equipment and vases) to imagine ‘high’ subject matter (human souls). Since Xenophon of Ephesus’ metaphorically significant names respect this hierarchy between low *comparantia* and high *comparanda*, they are appropriate in simple discourse.

2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter I have identified three broad narrative techniques that closely associate the construction of character in Xenophon’s novel with *apheleia*: absence of a fixed narratorial authority in direct characterization (direct and indirect speech and personal focalization as distancing devices), a relative

¹³⁰ See also Patillon (2002b: 42, 89).

importance of indirect (metonymical) characterization (showing rather than telling), and a dearth of metaphorical characterization (and of figurative language in general, except in name-giving). Unlike earlier contributions on Xenophon, these observations point out that *apheleia* in this novel is not only a matter of stylistics but is also concerned with broader issues of narrative technique and the presentation of material. I suggest, then, that the invisibility of the narrator and the limited (generic rather than *verbatim*) engagement with earlier literature should not necessarily be read as oddities pointing either to the incompetence of the author or to the possibility that the text is an epitome of a longer version. Instead, I argue, these features can also be read as intrinsically connected to Xenophon's overall 'aphelic' writing style, even if they do not appeal to present-day aesthetics and judgements about literary achievement. They represent conscious efforts to mould the overall presentation of the narrative as an example of *apheleia*, a writing style that in Xenophon's novel becomes a substantial ideology underlying its rhetoric and characterization. Within the parameters and limitations of this writing style, moreover, the novel occasionally develops character more thoroughly than has been acknowledged in secondary literature (the main examples being the registration of the protagonists' conflicting views on chastity and the metonymical depiction of Habrocomes' evolving *sôphrosynê*).

Research into the stylistic characteristics of Xenophon's novel has tried to establish an oral origin for it.¹³¹ The central role played by orality in these theories echoes earlier views, such as Merkelbach's (1962: 333–40) identification of extant novels as successors of oral miracle stories used in Graeco-Oriental mystery cults. Whereas I do not deny, of course, that elements from oral traditions may have found their way into Xenophon's novel,¹³² I suggest that these theories tend to downplay the presence and importance of a number of marked narrative techniques in Xenophon that are arguably rooted in a *literary* rather than an oral context.¹³³ Of course, evocation of *apheleia* has an oral dimension in that it approaches spoken language, but there is also a

¹³¹ See e.g. O'Sullivan (1995: 30–98) on *formulae* and Ruiz-Montero (2003a) on this novel as a product of rhetorical *mimesis* in an oral tradition. Brioso Sánchez (2000, 2001) is much vaguer about possible oral origins. An oral component in the novel's reception (by an audience rather than a readership, that is) is argued for by Hägg (1994: 59–65) and Gilfillan Upton (2006: 52–64, 108–24).

¹³² However, see Lowe (2000: 230 n. 10), Morgan (1996a: 200), and Chew (1998b: 206) for criticism of theories of oral composition. See also König (2007: 2) for a short survey.

¹³³ Hägg (1994: 59) touches upon this line of thought but does not discuss it in any detail. Instead, he focuses on elements typical of oral literature in Xenophon (and Chariton): 'To some extent, they [these elements, that is] may be explained by the mimetic attitude of the novelists: they imitate the style of classical authors like Herodotus and Xenophon, and these, in turn, preserved oral elements in their style. But this may not be the whole truth.' Recently, Biraud's (2009: 88–103) analysis of accentuation patterns in Xenophon of Ephesus has also underlined the literary (rhetorical and poetical) character of this text.

marked literary component involved. Since Xenophon of Athens was one of the main examples of *apheleia* in antiquity and the object of widespread imitation, my observations suggest that Xenophon of Ephesus might be an example of such literary imitation of Xenophontic *apheleia*. The *Ephesiaca*, as we have seen, imitates Xenophontic content and in doing so may resemble a fragmentarily preserved novel possibly dating to c. AD 175 and known as *Anthia* (although it is just as likely that *Anthia* harks back to the *Ephesiaca*).¹³⁴ My argument does not necessarily involve any direct imitation (by explicitly referring to one's model, as Arrian does, or by implicitly modelling one's work on that of the historiographer, as Musonius Rufus does). Rather, the imitation takes place on a formal and more generic level by following the guidelines of *apheleia* as foregrounded in stylistic theory (such as Hermogenes and, later, Ps.-Aristides) and thus establishing a narrative mode of discourse that is likely to have been recognized by contemporary readers as Xenophontic. From this viewpoint, the novelist's name may indeed have been a pseudonym echoing the famous historiographer, although conclusive evidence for this suggestion cannot be given.

Does all this, then, by definition turn Xenophon's novel into a highly sophisticated piece of rhetorical refinement? Not necessarily. It is true that the point of narratorial self-presentation in aphelic discourse is, as we have seen, the avoidance of visible intervention and of explicit judgement. An aphelic narrator, we may say, is sophisticated enough to depict himself as unsophisticated. But how do we distinguish between such a narrator and a narrator who simply *is* unsophisticated? In my view, the instances where Xenophon's narrator adopts techniques that are unambiguously associated with *apheleia* are too numerous to allow rejection of the possibility of *contrived* simplicity out of hand. And his systematic adoption of them throughout is too striking, especially since the use of *apheleia* was so fashionable in Xenophon of Ephesus' days in literature and rhetorical education alike. Moreover, the well-known presence of Xenophontic subject matter makes it likely that the narrative technique too is consciously Xenophontic rather than a simple coincidence. On the other hand, we should not exaggerate the sophisticated qualities of the aphelic writing style, which was arguably one of the easier modes of writing and did not necessarily require great literary sophistication. What this type of discourse in Xenophon's novel does suggest, I believe, is a certain amount of (possibly basic) rhetorical and literary education as well as the literary self-awareness and self-consciousness required to write this specific type of discourse.

Even if Xenophon of Ephesus makes himself part of an ongoing literary praxis of Xenophontic imitation, he still is doing something very different

¹³⁴ Stephens and Winkler (1995: 278, 286, 480) list similarities, discuss the dating, and raise the possibility that the author of the *Anthia*-fragment is an imitator of the *Cyropaedia*.

from the other novelists under consideration in this book. To be sure, Longus too brings *apheleia* to the realm of novel writing, but his use of it seems to be more abrupt (aiming to depict character in specific cases, as we will see) and not so much a matter of an underlying ideology of formal consistency. So *why* does Xenophon choose to develop such a formal imitation of the famous historiographer? Any answer to this question is, I think, inevitably speculative. The novel's aphelic writing style may have been a conscious attempt to harmonize the formal side of narration with what was clearly felt to be one of the most important literary constituents of the (possibly still fairly new)¹³⁵ novelistic genre. Early novel writing profoundly and often self-consciously builds on historiography, either by having historical characters as their protagonists (e.g. *Ninus*, *Sesonchosis*) or other characters (Chariton) or by introducing and systematically exploiting historiographical techniques of authentication into fiction (Heliodorus).¹³⁶ Xenophon of Athens' aphelic writing style seems to have influenced other ancient historiographers representative of the tradition of annalistic writing that he initiated, and who, like Xenophon of Ephesus, also adhere to a mode of narration that privileges showing over telling.¹³⁷ In Xenophon of Ephesus, as we have seen, the influence of Herodotus and Xenophon of Athens' *Cyropaedia* is tangible at the level of content and it is possible that a specifically Xenophontic writing style is another (but qualitatively different) attempt to transpose a historiographical mode of narration to the realm of fiction.

¹³⁵ See n. 1 at the beginning of this chapter on the dating of this novel.

¹³⁶ On Chariton's novel and historiography, see W. Bartsch (1934), Laplace (1997: 39–53), and Trzaskoma (2011). On Heliodorus, see Morgan (1982). On historiography and novelistic fiction in general, see Morgan (2007c).

¹³⁷ See e.g. Bruns (1898: 12–42) and P. G. Walsh (1961: 82–5) on Livy's tendency to characterize indirectly and his connection with Xenophon of Athens.

3

Achilles Tatius

3.1 CLITOPHON'S INTRODUCTION

Achilles Tatius' novel *Leucippe and Clitophon* is probably the most hermeneutically challenging of all extant ancient Greek novels. It notoriously inverts novelistic conventions in a number of ways¹ but tantalizingly resists any conclusive answers to the question of how we can, should, or are allowed to read it. A key concept underlying its elusiveness is the fact that almost the entire novel is presented as Clitophon's first-person (or so-called homodiegetic) narration, which, in turn, is communicated to the reader by an anonymous primary narrator.² In the novel's prologue, set in Sidon, this narrator meets a young man (Clitophon) and invites him to tell his story. Such embedding of Clitophon's story (from 1.3.1 right through to the end of the novel) in another account doubly distances the reader, who realizes that the story is filtered not only by Clitophon himself but (possibly) also by the anonymous narrator.³ Although the primary narrator never seems to intervene in Clitophon's story and the frame narrative in Sidon is apparently never resumed,⁴ the distance established in the frame narrative implies that the reader can never be completely sure of hearing *only* Clitophon's voice from 1.3.1 onwards.⁵

¹ Durham (1938), for example, reads Achilles' novel as a parody of implausible idealism in other novels and Chew (2000) reads it as a parody of conventional novel morality. Fusillo (1988: 29, 1989: 98–109), for his part, sees it as an ironical 'pastiche', whereas Mignogna (1995) reads it as an *Antiroman*. See Morales (2004: 1–3) for a useful survey of different views.

² See Reardon (1994: 89–91).

³ See Morgan (2004c, 2007a) on the novel's narratological levels and Whitmarsh (2011: 77–85) on the narrative filters at work.

⁴ On possible explanations for the absence of a return to the frame narrative, see, among others, Most (1989), Fusillo (1997), Nakatani (2003), Morales (2004: 144–5), Repath (2005), and Guez (2008: 341–3).

⁵ Whitmarsh (2003: 193 n. 9) might well come closest to blurring the borderline between both narratorial levels when suggesting that it is not always possible to tell whether maxims in Clitophon's narrator text are focalized by Clitophon or by the anonymous ego-narrator.

With that *caveat* in mind, Clitophon's story, like every first-person narrative, may be read as one long example of *ethopoeia*, or characterization through speech.⁶ In so doing, scholars have detected slippages between the perceptions of the narrator and those of the careful reader.⁷ Clitophon has been characterized as unable to distinguish life from fiction⁸ and compared to Petronius' Encolpius or Apuleius' Lucius in being an object of the novel's irony in that the novel as a whole 'invites a different response from the one Clitophon is represented as trying to elicit from his narratee'.⁹ My reading resonates with these interpretations and at the same time observes that the novel's homodiegetic narrative technique entails significant hermeneutic difficulties in pinpointing the characterization of the two protagonists. First, the heroine of the novel, Leucippe, is depicted through Clitophon's narration, and not (or at least not only) by an external narrator as in the other extant novels.¹⁰ The reader's access to information about the heroine, then, depends on the figure who is both the narrator and the hero of the story. But the characterization of this figure, secondly, is itself even more problematic to triangulate. Clitophon-the-character (like Leucippe and other characters in the story) is (re)constructed by Clitophon-the-narrator (and, possibly, the anonymous narrator),¹¹ whose character, in turn, can only be inferred from his own narration of the story, including his characterization as a character therein—and from his brief conversation with the primary narrator (1.2), as I proceed to argue below.

Crucially, Clitophon's narration provides us with no touchstones against which to assess its truthfulness. Brethes (2007a: 230) suggests that such objective touchstones can be found in the character speeches in the novel. However, given the fact that the entire story, including these speeches, is communicated to us by Clitophon, his narratorial control over what 'his' characters say (or better: what he makes his characters say) makes things more complex than is suggested by such a straightforward juxtaposition of narrator text (labelled 'subjective') and character text (labelled 'objective').¹²

⁶ See Marinčič (2007: 194) and M. Jones (2012: 70–2) on Clitophon as an orator.

⁷ Morgan (1996b: 179–80, 2003b: 172), for example, discusses a number of clues signposted by the author but not recognized as such by the narrator.

⁸ Morgan (1996b: 185).

⁹ Morgan (2004c: 500). See also G. Anderson (1997: 2285) and Brethes (2001: 191) on the similarity between Clitophon and Encolpius, and Hägg (1983: 53–4) on the author's installation of irony in the characterization of the narrator. Whitmarsh (2003: 191–205) points to problems inherent in triangulating such irony and Achilles Tatius' artful subversion of the authority of the narrator.

¹⁰ See e.g. Haynes (2003: 56–8) and Konstantinova (2000: 201). On the fundamental asymmetry implied, see Fusillo (1989: 193).

¹¹ On the distinction between Clitophon as a narrator and Clitophon as a character, see Whitmarsh (2003: 193–8), van Mal-Maeder (2007: 143), and Brethes (2007a: 201–2).

¹² Billault (2012: 99–102, 105) adopts this juxtaposition in a similarly unproblematic way.

As I observed in Chapter 1 (see pp. 100–3), Chaereas' similarly homodiegetic account addressed to the Syracusan assembly at the end of Chariton's novel often deviates from the 'true' version told to us by the external primary narrator. In Achilles Tatius' novel, this 'true' story (or, for that matter, *any* story) is accessible to the reader *only* through Clitophon's own narration.

The only part of the entire novel that is *not* filtered by Clitophon's narration but only by that of the anonymous narrator is the introductory paragraphs (1.1–2). These reveal how Clitophon portrays himself vis-à-vis his interlocutor. At the beginning, the anonymous narrator describes his encounter with Clitophon in front of a painting of the famous abduction of Europa by Zeus disguised as a bull. As he views the figure of Eros leading the bull, he comments upon the all-conquering power of Eros (οἶον... ἄρχει, 1.2.1), whereupon a young man (νεανίσκος) standing nearby answers: 'Yes, I should know (ἂν εἰδεῖην)! Eros has dealt me enough blows (ὑβρεῖς ἐξ ἔρωτος παθών)' (1.2.1). These first words highlight two strands in Clitophon's self-presentation. First, he acknowledges the importance of Eros in his own life and thus immediately aligns himself with the primary narrator, whose interest in erotic matters (ἐρωτικός, 1.2.1) must be obvious to Clitophon through his words and particularly attentive inspection (περιεργότερον ἐβλεπον) of the figure of Eros in the painting.¹³ Given the connotations of the verb 'οἶδα' ('to know'), which, as a perfect tense etymologically related to the verb 'ὁράω' ('to see') implies knowledge acquired through perception,¹⁴ it is also tempting to read this instance as a conscious attempt by Clitophon to depict his own relation with Eros as an early affirmation of his self-professed knowledgeable ability in erotic matters. However, a textual problem (manuscript F reads ἐδείκνυν ('I would (be able to) *show* (the things depicted in the painting)') where the others read εἰδεῖην) invites caution on this point. In any case, as we will see, such knowledgeable ability does inform part of his self-presentation throughout the novel.

Secondly, Clitophon states that he is acquainted primarily with *misfortunes* caused by love. This statement makes explicit a well-known literary *topos*, which consists in the introduction of a stranger who will eventually function as the narrator of an embedded story of (past as well as ongoing) suffering.¹⁵ Once Clitophon has been invited to tell his story, his self-depiction as experienced in matters of love and his evocation of erotic *misfortunes* are likely to characterize him to any generically attuned reader as a suitable narrator of, and protagonist in, a novelistic love story.

On the other hand, Clitophon's introduction also invests his characterization with elements likely to provoke alienation in the reader. Clitophon's

¹³ See Brethes (2007a: 191–202) on Clitophon's conscious negotiation of his interlocutor's identity.

¹⁴ LSJ s.v. εἶδω.

¹⁵ Most (1989, esp. 114–20 on Achilles Tatius).

Phoenician origin, for one thing, may evoke the traditional reputation of Phoenicians for being lecherous and lusty in general, and for enjoying the sexual practice of cunnilingus in particular,¹⁶ and may therefore invest Clitophon's character with overtones potentially problematic for a novel hero. And, sure enough, the association resonates with a number of episodes throughout the narrative where Clitophon, as a character, displays a tendency to focus on the physical and sexual aspects of love (see §3.2.2). Moreover, Clitophon's Phoenician origin inverts a deep-rooted novelistic convention: in other novels, as in much other ancient literature, Phoenicians are, although Hellenized to some extent, predominantly characterized by barbarian stereotypes.¹⁷ In Xenophon of Ephesus, for example, Tyre is home to barbarians (such as Manto, who even acknowledges her own barbarian nature: *βαρβάρου*, 2.3.5) and pirates (such as Apsyrtus, Euxenus, and Corymbus). The attribution of a barbarian origin to a novel's narrator and protagonist, therefore, relocates this traditionally marginalized element to the heart of the narrative. Achilles Tatius' most prominent 'bad guy', on the other hand, is not, as is usual in the novelistic genre, a barbarian, but the Greek Thersander.¹⁸ He is a rich estate owner in Ephesus and, according to his servant Sosthenes, the highest-born man in all Ionia (*γένει . . . πρώτος πάντων Ιώνων*, 6.12.2), all of which conspicuously aligns him with Chariton's Dionysius, the prominent and not at all bad Milesian, whose similarly high station is emphasized on his introduction (*γένει . . . τῶν ἄλλων Ιώνων ὑπερέχοντα*, 1.12.6) and repeatedly thereafter.¹⁹

Even if Sosthenes' depiction of his master is, of course, hardly reliable (being part of an attempt to make Leucippe reciprocate Thersander's sexual advances), Clitophon's Phoenician origin is part of a wider inversion of novelistic conventions. On the other hand, this inversion is far from straightforward. Clitophon presents himself as a Phoenician, but speaks Greek and seems culturally Greek. It is true, of course, that Achilles Tatius is not the only novelist activating such (or similar) hybridity in mapping out the identity of protagonists;²⁰ Heliodorus' Chariclea is culturally Greek while being, in fact, (a white!) Ethiopian. But whereas in Heliodorus this is explained at least to some extent by the fact that the heroine has been brought up in Delphi from the age of seven, in Achilles Tatius, the Greek and Phoenician strands in Clitophon's identity are never really accounted for and only add another layer of complexity to the already puzzling introduction of the novel hero.

¹⁶ Morales (2004: 191–2).

¹⁷ See Morales (2004: 49), Briquel-Chatonnet (1992), Kuch (1989: 82, 2003: 218), and Scobie (1973: 19–34).

¹⁸ Morales (2004: 83–4) incorrectly characterizes him as a Thracian.

¹⁹ e.g. 2.1.5, 2.4.4, 2.5.4, 3.6.5, 4.4.3, 4.6.4, 8.7.9.

²⁰ See Whitmarsh (2011: 69–135) on the less straightforward construction of identity in Achilles Tatius, Longus, and Heliodorus than in the earlier novels.

Even before the start of Clitophon's narration, the reader is invited to wonder what sort of novel hero he actually is. The anonymous primary narrator is explicit that he sees (ὁρῶ) that Clitophon's facial appearance (τὴν ὄψιν) indicates it has not been long (οὐ μακρὸν) since his initiation into Eros' cult (1.2.2). As Repath (2005: 261) suggests, the fact that Clitophon is visibly in love would seem to indicate that his love for Leucippe is relatively recent and that he has not yet come to grips with his emotions. And yet, Clitophon himself depicts his misfortunes as finished rather than ongoing (he uses the aorist παθὼν), which immediately raises the question of why this novel hero is *alone* (that is, without the novel heroine).²¹ Right from the start, this uncoupled status implies an alienation from generic novelistic conventions, which prescribe a reunion of the hero and the heroine and a happy ending. At the end of the novel, a happy ending is, indeed, confirmed: Clitophon *and* Leucippe spend the winter in Tyre and continue to Byzantium afterwards (8.19.3).²² Is this introduction, then, a conscious attempt by the author to misdirect his reader from the very start? Does the author want to make the reader believe as early as the introduction of the protagonist that he has embarked upon a Greek novel about an *atypical* novelistic hero, whose story might *not* result in the expected happy ending?²³

Clitophon's introduction, then, raises questions as well as expectations about this figure as a character in the ensuing narrative. But in addition, his qualities as a narrator of this narrative are implicitly addressed as early as his introduction. The very first words of his story deal with his Phoenician origin (Φοινίκη γένος, 1.3.1), which, as Morales (2004: 55–6) points out, evokes the traditional ancient reputation of Phoenicians as liars, or at least as being inclined towards exaggerating the truth.²⁴ This possibility of a consciously fictionalizing narrator is further explored by the depiction of the grove that the anonymous narrator characterizes as a suitable setting for Clitophon's narration of his erotic story (μύθων ἄξιος ἐρωτικῶν, 1.2.3). Its shady plane trees (πλάτανοι) and cool, clear water (ῥόδωρ ψυχρόν τε καὶ διαυγές) conspicuously

²¹ See Repath (2005: 251).

²² This ending raises the additional question of why Clitophon is not in Byzantium at the beginning of the novel, but in Sidon. See Repath (2005: 251), Nakatani (2003), Morgan (1996b: 185), and Most (1989).

²³ On Achilles Tatius' subversion of the novelistic *topos* of a happy ending, see also Repath (2005: 258–62), who connects it mainly to the device of the unresumed frame at the end of the novel (whereas I suggest that such generic subversion is planted as early as Clitophon's introduction).

²⁴ She rightly suggests that the emphasis on Clitophon's origin at the opening of his narration might invoke a suspicion that *as a Phoenician*, he is not to be trusted and that 'at very least, Achilles is flirting with the possibility that Clitophon has fabricated his account'. See Morales (2004: 55 nn. 69–71) for references. In addition, see Apollon. *Lex.* 164.26–32 Bekker on Phoenicians as skilled in trickery (*apatēlia eidōs*).

evoke the famous *locus amoenus* of the opening of the *Phaedrus*.²⁵ The presence of this Platonic dialogue about love is, of course, highly appropriate in the opening scenes of a novelistic love story, but, as Ni'Mheallaigh (2007: 237–8) points out, it also introduces into the novel the metaliterary issue of how to interpret stories, especially their truth value. It recalls, that is, Socrates' discussion of the truth value of the myth (τὸ μυθολόγημα, Pl. *Phdr.* 229c5) of the rape of Oreithyia by Boreas (itself evoked in the novel's opening scene by the painting of Europa's abduction by the taurine Zeus), which one can either reject as a fictitious allegory or accept as truth. At the same time, the evocation of this discussion again invites us to reflect upon Clitophon's reliability as a narrator.²⁶ To what extent is the truth value of his erotic *mythos* debatable, like that of the *mythologēma* of Oreithyia and Boreas? To what extent, in other words, is Clitophon a fictionalizing narrator?

Of course, such multiple signalling of possible narratorial unreliability in the first line of Clitophon's account evokes profound questions about the fictionalization involved in the ensuing narrative. Exactly *how* (un)reliable are we to imagine this narrator to be? Are we to expect (perhaps unconsciously) problematic interpretations of past events? Or, rather, their conscious manipulative distortion? Or are we invited to read this opening even more radically as establishing an all-encompassing incredibility right down to the end of the novel? Is there, in other words, no truthfulness involved at all? Has Clitophon, as a *fabulator*, simply made up his entire narrative? Is Leucippe not with him in Sidon because she never existed in the first place?²⁷ The point is that we cannot tell. In fact, by providing one last spin to this series of questions, the author seems to make sure that we will not be able to tell: he introduces the issue of narratorial unreliability into his novel well before Clitophon even so much as appears. As soon as the primary narrator is introduced into the story, we hear that he has arrived in Sidon after surviving a severe storm (ἤκων ἐκ πολλοῦ χειμῶνος, 1.1.2), takes a tour of the city (περιῦόν), and browses among (περισκοπών) the sacred dedications. This information clearly casts him in the role of a traveller, a wanderer—exactly the kind of person that since Homer has been charged with lying and unreliable narration.²⁸ What we have to go on, then, is an anonymous narrator who evokes notions of unreliability as soon as he presents himself and who then goes on to cite the account of a Phoenician who both states that his story

²⁵ Pl. *Phdr.* 229a–b3 and 230a6–c5. See, among others, Morales (2004: 51). On the pervasive and sophisticated presence of Plato in Achilles Tatius, see Repath (forthcoming).

²⁶ See also Marinčič (2007: 174).

²⁷ M. Jones (forthcoming) argues precisely this. She suggests that the figure of a ditch digger in the painting of Europa invites us to read Clitophon's appearance at the scene as a product of the imagination of the primary narrator, who is absorbed by the vividness of the painting.

²⁸ On wanderers and unreliability, see Montiglio (2005: 251). On the characterization of the primary narrator as possibly unreliable, see Marinčič (2007: 172–4).

is ‘like a fictional adventure’ (τὰ . . . ἐμὰ μύθοις ἔοικε, 1.2.2), and also, while seeming (purporting?) to incorporate a number of markers of Greek novelistic heroism, at the same time exemplifies significant inversions of such heroism. If the events in Clitophon’s story happened at all, that is, the reader is distanced from them not by just one but *two* possibly unreliable narrators, united in a setting that conspicuously thematizes precisely the truth value of narrative. From the very first pages, then, this novel parades itself as a narratological and hermeneutic puzzle designed *not* to be solved. Thus, Achilles Tatius consciously makes himself part of a tradition in ancient fiction that thematizes the issue of fictionalization in a deviously elusive and ambivalent way early on in a narrative.²⁹ It is a tradition of which Antonius Diogenes (who, according to Photius’ summary of *The Incredible Things beyond Thule*, inserts two diametrically opposed assessments of the truth value of this text)³⁰ and Lucian (who starts his *True Histories* with a statement that the one true fact related is that everything is a lie, 1.4) are prime examples.

In this chapter, I limit myself to the realm of characterization and aim to offer an account of how Clitophon, as a narrator, (re)constructs his own self and Leucippe as characters in the story and how this activity fundamentally intersects with issues of credibility, authority, fictionalization, and narratorial (un)reliability.

3.2 CLITOPHON’S *SÔPHROSYNÊ*

3.2.1 Narrativizing

As noted above, the triangulation of Clitophon-the-narrator, as distinct from Clitophon-the-character, is hermeneutically problematic. Clitophon-the-narrator’s presentation of Clitophon-the-character’s *sôphrosynê* provides an excellent example. It is an example highlighted by the fact that the one episode in the entire novel where Clitophon provides us with explicit information about his own narrative technique deals with, precisely, narrativizing *sôphrosynê*. Towards the end of the novel (at a time, that is, shortly before Clitophon’s appearance in Sidon), Clitophon’s father-in-law Sostratus asks him to narrate his and Leucippe’s preceding adventures. Clitophon makes it clear that the strategy he adopts in doing so is aimed at presenting his own *sôphrosynê* as favourably as possible (8.5.2–3): he admits to his interlocutor in Sidon to having exaggerated³¹ (ἐξῆγγρον) his own merits in avoiding sexual intercourse with Melite,

²⁹ On this tradition, see Whitmarsh (2011: 85–9).

³⁰ See Stephens and Winkler (1995: 102–9) for details.

³¹ I here deviate from Whitmarsh and Morales (2001) and follow Nakatani (2004: 87).

to having deleted (*παρήκα*) the episode of the intercourse itself, and to having generally remodelled the events to highlight his own *sôphrosynê* (*πρὸς σωφροσύνην μεταποιῶν*)—all this, however, without having told any lies (*οὐδὲν ἐψευδόμην*)—a claim to truthfulness echoed by Leucippe a little later ('neither of us has told any lie', 8.7.5).

At this point in the novel, we know very well that Clitophon-the-character does not shy away from rhetorically constructing his own experience of sex. Earlier in the story, he makes it clear that, when it comes to sex (*τοῖς ἔργοις*, 2.37.5), his experience is limited (*πρωτόπειρος ὢν . . . μετρίως ἔχω πείρας*), since he has had sex only with prostitutes. But as others have rightly observed, this is a variation on the famous 'unaccustomed as I am to public speaking' *topos*.³² Indeed, as soon as Clitophon has given a speech on women, one of his interlocutors observes that he does not at all seem to be an inexperienced youngster, but rather 'an old hand in Aphrodite's game' (*μὴ πρωτόπειρος ἀλλὰ γέρων*, 2.38.1). In Clitophon's account to Sostratus, as we have seen, he similarly underplays his sexual experience, but this time he is more overt about his narrative strategy. Precisely this overttness, now, constructs hermeneutic ambiguity as to what his account addressed to Sostratus implies for our reading of his reliability as the narrator of the overarching narrative. On the one hand, the information provided by Clitophon about his conscious deformation of his story points to his unreliability as a narrator.³³ But then again, although Clitophon indeed distorts the story addressed to Sostratus, he is at least honest enough to admit this to his interlocutor in Sidon, who is, after all, no more than a total stranger to him.³⁴ Does this mean that the reader can trust that such honesty will also inform the rest of Clitophon's narration to his interlocutor in Sidon?

Again, then, we come to a hermeneutic stalemate. And again, Achilles Tatius has framed the episode with markers that deconstruct any straightforward reading and whose ambiguity prevents us from reaching conclusive interpretations. First of all, he carefully presents Clitophon's report of the inserted story as a *mise en abîme* of the narration of the framing narrative as a whole and thus raises questions about the latter's truth value. The identical subject matter covered by this story and the overarching narrative, for example, are highlighted not only by Clitophon's reference to his own adventures,

³² Goldhill (1995: 85) and Whitmarsh (2003: 201). See e.g. Lys. 12.3, where the speaker presents himself as fearing that a lack of skill (*ἀπειρίαν*) will lead him to give an unworthy and ineffective speech (*ἀναξίως καὶ ἀδυνάτως*).

³³ On this episode as having repercussions for our understanding of Clitophon's 'corrupt' narration of the overarching narrative, see Whitmarsh (2011: 90–3). See also Kasprzyk (2009: 104) and Morales (2004: 56); the latter suggests that, 'if we suspect the older Clitophon of being as untrustworthy as his younger self, then we might read his entire narrative as a "Phoenician lie".'

³⁴ See Marinčič (2007: 193).

which verbally echoes his reference to these at the beginning of the novel (τὰ . . . ἐμά, 8.5.3; τὰ . . . ἐμά, 1.2.2), but also by Sostratus' consistent use of the term *mythos* to refer to Clitophon's account (τὸν περὶ ὑμᾶς μῦθον . . . μῦθος, 8.4.2–3), which recalls the overarching *mythos*.³⁵ Even if Sostratus' use of the term *mythos* does not thematize the notion of truthfulness in any strong way (it is merely implied by his invitation to Clitophon to narrate his adventures), the explicit presence of this term (as well as the sameness of subject matter) helps to evoke Clitophon's own presentation of his adventures at the beginning of the novel, where truthfulness *is*, of course, of central importance. When the primary narrator there asks Clitophon about his initiation into love, Clitophon makes it clear that he stirs up 'a swarm of stories (λόγων)' and that his tale is 'like a fictional adventure (τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ μύθοις ἔοικε)' (1.2.2). This phrase emphatically rehearses the traditional opposition between *mythos* (fiction) and *logos* (truth)³⁶ to characterize his ensuing narrative as an example of the latter while simultaneously resembling the former. It can also be read as an inversion of one of the standard definitions of *mythos* in rhetorical theory. As we are reminded by the *progymnasmata* authors, a *mythos* is a 'fictitious story that gives the resemblance of truth' (λόγος ψευδῆς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν).³⁷ Clitophon, now, makes it clear that *his* story is *not* such a *mythos* resembling truth but quite the opposite: a true story (*logos*) resembling fiction (*mythos*). This formulation clearly presents truthfulness as a central characteristic while at the same time deviously indicating how intimately truth and fiction can be connected—a tenet that will turn out to be emblematic of the narrative technique that he claims to adopt in his embedded story addressed to Sostratus.

Furthermore, in a comment on his recounting to Sostratus the story of Leucippe's imprisonment, Clitophon is conspicuously open about *why* he exaggerates the truth: his own erotic (ἐρωτικῶς, 8.5.5) disposition towards Leucippe and the identity of his addressee, Leucippe's father (ἀκούοντος τοῦ πατρός). The former factor recalls his obvious focus on the erotic at the beginning of the novel, when he is about to tell his story to his interlocutor in Sidon (see p. 154 above), and invites the reader, in retrospect, to infer that it may well have influenced his subsequent narration (i.e. the entire novel) in the same way as it influences the narration addressed to Sostratus. The latter factor makes explicit a well-known progymnasmatic guideline about the importance of adapting one's speech to one's audience (πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος,

³⁵ See also Morales (2004: 56), who observes more generally that questioning the truth of *mythoi* is a repeated motif in Achilles Tatius. On this as well as other embedded *mythoi*, see Briand (2006: 165–8).

³⁶ An opposition present as early as Pindar (O. 1.29, N.7.23) and Plato (*Phd.* 61b, *Prt.* 320c, 324d). On a similar opposition (*mythos* v. *historia*), see Str. 1.2.35. On the concept of *mythos* in some ancient novels, see Tilg (2011).

³⁷ Aphth. *Prog.* 21.2–3 Sp. II and Theon *Prog.* 72.28 Sp. II.

πρὸς ὃν λέγει).³⁸ The fact that Clitophon so carefully follows this guideline when telling his story to Sostratus suggests that the identity of his interlocutor in Sidon may be equally important for his narration of the overarching story. This possibility is supported by the fact that Clitophon and this interlocutor are aligned by a number of elements. They are both depicted in front of the same erotic painting and both adopt the same imagery to depict a person in love as an initiate of Eros.³⁹ Moreover, the interlocutor's erotic disposition at the beginning of the novel (ὦν ἐρωτικός, 1.2.1) visibly echoes Clitophon's own.⁴⁰ Both men are further aligned by their common interest in beautiful women, signposted by the primary narrator's *ecphrasis* of Europa (1.1.10–12) and Clitophon's *ecphrasis* of Leucippe (1.4.2–3).⁴¹ Finally, and probably most importantly, both show a marked preference for story-telling. Clitophon's comment that his own story 'is like a fictional adventure' (τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ μύθοις ἔοικε, 1.2.2) is immediately welcomed by his interlocutor, who makes it clear that it will give him all the more pleasure if indeed his story is like fiction (ταύτῃ μᾶλλον ᾗσειν, εἰ καὶ μύθοις ἔοικε) and begs him not to hold back (μὴ κατοκνήσης). Of course, the reader recognizes the novel as such a fictional story, but perhaps this reader is also invited to explore what such an alignment between Clitophon's story and fiction implies for *Clitophon's narration of the story*. If we assume that Clitophon as a narrator takes into account the identity and appreciation of his narratee (and we know from the story addressed to Sostratus that he does), it is tempting to read the interlocutor's comment as an open invitation to Clitophon to 'mythologize', to narrate a fictionalized story resembling truth rather than, as he announces himself, a true one resembling fiction. Perhaps Clitophon himself regards it this way too. This possibility adds a new dimension to the questions raised in the opening scene about Clitophon's reliability as a narrator. Towards the end of the novel, that is, the reader is invited to consider the possibility that in his overarching story, as in this embedded narrative, Clitophon may have been tempted to adapt the narration and his self-presentation in order to make them more appealing to his narratee, who he knows is both *erôtikos* and a lover of *mythoi*.

3.2.2 Enacting

Let me now turn to Clitophon's self-presentation as a character in his own story. Just as in his account to Sostratus, he takes care to underline his

³⁸ See Theon *Prog.* 115.24 Sp. II and Nicol. *Prog.* 64.5 Felten.

³⁹ The narrator's phrase (τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τελετῆς, 1.2.2) is echoed in Clitophon's own discourse a little later (τῇ τελετῇ τοῦ θεοῦ, 1.9.7).

⁴⁰ See also Brethes (2007a: 193–4) on the characterization of Clitophon's anonymous interlocutor in the opening scene of the novel.

⁴¹ On the associations between the two *ecphrases*, see S. Bartsch (1989: 48–50).

own *sôphrosynê* well enough. However, it is significant that he is directly characterized as *sôphrôn only by himself*. He explicitly foregrounds his own *sôphrosynê* when discussing each of the two erotic relationships around which his story revolves—that with Leucippe (σωφρονεῖς, 1.5.7) and that with Melite (σωφροσύνην, 8.5.2)—but in both cases, this self-presentation is destabilized by a variety of (metonymically as well as metaphorically relevant) aspects. After falling in love with Leucippe, he hesitates and is ashamed (δκνεῖς καὶ αἰδῶ, 1.5.7; αἰδοῖ, 1.11.3) to approach her because his father has betrothed him to another girl, Calligone. After consulting both Clinias and Satyrus, his two *praeceptores amoris*, on how to seduce Leucippe, he encourages himself to exert self-restraint (σωφρονεῖς, 2.5.1). At this point, Clitophon claims that, at the point where he thinks himself persuaded to resist his passion (ἐδόκουν πεπεῖσθαι, 2.5.2), Eros speaks up in opposition (ἀντεφθέγγετο) and points out to him the uselessness of any such resistance:

So you really are arming yourself to resist me (στρατεύῃ καὶ ἀντιπαρατάττῃ), my daredevil friend (τολμηρέ)? I can fly, I can shoot and burn (τοξεύω καὶ φλέγω): how can you escape (φυγεῖν)? If you shield yourself against my bow, you will be unable to do so against my flame; and even if you should extinguish that flame with your self-control (σωφροσύνη), I shall use my very wings to catch up with you. (2.5.2)

The pervasiveness of military imagery in this speech evokes, of course, a well-known literary *topos*,⁴² but it also echoes the words of Satyrus in a dialogue with Clitophon shortly before, where Clitophon does *not* identify his hesitation in approaching Leucippe as *sôphrosynê* (as he does when addressing his interlocutor in Sidon; 2.5.1) but rather as cowardliness (δειλός, 2.4.4) and want of daring (ἄτολμος, 2.4.4). In this instance, he sees himself as a feeble athlete of Love (ἔρωτος ἀθλητής, 2.4.4) rather than as a soldier. It is Satyrus who supplants this image by a metaphor depicting Leucippe's conquest as a war and Eros and Clitophon as soldiers:

Eros admits of no cowardliness (δειλίας). You observe the military nature (στρατιωτικόν) of his accoutrements, the bow (τόξον), the quiver (φαρέτρα), the missiles (βέλη), the flame (πῦρ): all manly things (ἀνδρεῖα), and crammed with courage (τόλμης). And you are cowardly (δειλός) and timorous (φοβῆ) with a god such as that inside you? (2.4.5)

Once having been encouraged by Satyrus to approach Leucippe (παροξυνθείς, 2.5.1), Clitophon takes up the same metaphor when encouraging himself to do so: 'How long will your silence last, o man without manhood (ἄνανδρε)? Why this cowardice in a soldier (δειλός . . . στρατιώτης) in the service of a manly god

⁴² See e.g. Goldhill (1995: 75–6) on this *topos* in Achilles Tatius.

(ἀνδρείου θεοῦ)? (2.5.1).⁴³ It is after these thoughts that Clitophon briefly resolves to remain *sôphrôn* after all, upon which Eros personally intervenes. But how are we to triangulate Clitophon's position within this mix of voices? It is helpful to observe that a number of elements suggest intertextual play with an episode from Xenophon of Ephesus' novel where Habrocomes, like Clitophon, addresses the question of whether or not to give in to his erotic passion for the heroine (X. Eph. 1.4.1–2, 4–5).⁴⁴ In both cases, the novel hero contemplates resisting his desire (albeit for different reasons: Habrocomes because he has renounced love altogether and Clitophon, more pragmatically, because his father has selected another bride for him) and self-consciously identifies such resistance as *sôphrosynê* (X. Eph. 1.4.4; Ach. Tat. 2.5.2). In both cases, Eros successfully combats such self-restraint (ὁ θεὸς σφοδρότερος αὐτῷ ἐνέκειτο, X. Eph. 1.4.4; ὁ Ἔρως ἀντεφθέγγετο, Ach. Tat. 2.5.2), and in both cases the emotional conflict is organized around the poles of courage/manliness (*andreia*) and cowardliness (*deilia*, *anandria*).

It is the common imagery in particular that points up a number of significant differences between Habrocomes and Clitophon. First, while Habrocomes initially considers it unmanly and morally reprehensible (ἄνανδρος . . . πονηρός, 1.4.2) to give in to his passion, such unmanliness (ἄνανδρε . . . δειλός, 2.5.1) for Clitophon consists precisely in *opposing* his passion (i.e. not approaching Leucippe and thus allowing himself to be confined to his father's choice).⁴⁵ Secondly, whereas in Xenophon the interplay between the shifting notions of courage and cowardliness serves, as we have seen (§2.2), to highlight the protagonists' opposed views on *sôphrosynê* (Anthia identifies as *anandria* what Habrocomes identifies as *andreia*), in Achilles Tatius the use of these notions as well as the military imagery involved is remarkably consistent in the speeches of all three parties involved (Satyrus, Clitophon, and Eros). Since Eros is a 'brave god' (ἀνδρείου θεοῦ, 2.5.1), approaching Leucippe is presented as the courageous thing to do, whereas self-restraint is aligned with cowardice. Indeed, whereas in Xenophon Eros' intervention drastically and irreversibly modifies Habrocomes' attitude towards his passion (he later reassesses what he saw as courage as arrogance and harshness), in Achilles Tatius his speech does little more than take up the military imagery set up by Satyrus (and echoed by Clitophon later), which suggests that it may not have been as crucial to his

⁴³ On the motif of the *militia amoris* and possible resonances of Callinus in this passage, see Christenson (2000).

⁴⁴ Achilles Tatius' novel has been dated to the middle of the second century (Willis 1990) and to its third quarter (Plepelits 2003: 388–90). Both datings allow direct influence.

⁴⁵ Montiglio (2010: 44) mentions this contrast between Habrocomes and Clitophon in passing, but suggests (42–5) that the main intertext underlying this passage is Chariton's discussion of Dionysius' aspirations to self-restraint. Like Habrocomes, Dionysius resists passion (2.4.4), while Clitophon identifies not self-restraint but seduction with bravery.

submission to Eros as Clitophon claims.⁴⁶ What is more, the central alignment of self-restraint with cowardice is introduced not by Eros or Satyrus but by Clitophon himself (δελός, 2.4.4). And the same holds true for another recurrent association: that between *sôphrosynê* and excessive daring: Eros associates the two (τολμηρέ, 2.5.2)⁴⁷ only after Clitophon himself has identified *giving in* to his passion as ‘right daring’ (εὐτολμία, 2.5.1) and self-restraint as a *lack* of daring (ἄτολμος, 2.4.4).

The interplay of different voices, one of which is attributed to Clitophon himself and another (not to one of his fellow characters but) to a *god*, may be reminiscent of the traditional tragic model of moral internal decision-making on the basis of external discussion (as described by Gill 1996: 216–26). This model, as we have seen (pp. 62–4), is employed in the interplay of *imagined* voices that document Callirhoe’s agonizing dilemma about whether or not to kill her unborn child. But whereas in her case the model juxtaposes, and ultimately reconciles, *diverging* voices, in Clitophon’s case this function is perverted: the model no longer works as a catalyst of moral dilemma because all the voices involved defend the same stance (at times even by echoing each other’s imagery). Consequently, when Clitophon remarks that Eros’ voice comes ‘from deep down, as if from my heart’ (κάτωθεν δὲ ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς καρδίας, 2.5.2) we cannot help smiling: the remark emphatically highlights the connection between Clitophon’s view on *sôphrosynê* already present from the beginning and Eros’ speech. Eros’ words, then, are little more than a reaffirmation of Clitophon’s own view as well as the guidelines and imagery set up by Satyrus.

A final way in which Achilles Tatius cleverly reworks Xenophon is formal and relates to Eros’ identification of self-restraint with excessive daring and Clitophon’s identification of the same concept with a complete lack of daring. Although the two views might seem incompatible at first, they make sense, of course, because the implied object of the act of daring is different in each case: in Clitophon’s view, self-restraint involves a lack of daring in approaching Leucippe, whereas to Eros it implies excessive daring in resisting his power. The point of identifying the concept of self-restraint with these two opposite concepts is that the seduction of Leucippe, identified as an instance of εὐτολμία, is presented as the virtuous mean between these extremes. This organization of one virtue between two polar vices again echoes Xenophon’s novel, where, as we have seen (§2.2), the identification of *sôphrosynê* with *andreia* is organized around the two vices that represent its lack (*deilia*) and its excess (*thrasytês*). The traditional tripartite organization of virtues as means between two vices

⁴⁶ Kasprzyk (2009: 106) also reads Clitophon’s referral of responsibility to Eros as an alibi, but he does not discuss the alignment with Satyrus from which it originates. See also Montiglio (2010: 42) on Clitophon’s fight against his passion in an earlier episode (1.11.3): ‘a weakly motivated fighter—if he is fighting at all’.

⁴⁷ See Montiglio (2010: 44–5) on this ‘oxymoronic association’.

has here been reworked to highlight the perverse atypicality of Clitophon as a novel hero and his (view of) *sôphrosynê*: in his (and Eros') world view, the mean virtue is seduction of Leucippe and self restraint is marginalized to the point where it takes the polar position of a vice rather than a virtue.

Another element at odds with Clitophon's claim that he would have been able to resist his love for Leucippe if Eros had not personally intervened is his conspicuous interest in female beauty and, concomitantly, the physical aspect of sexual experience. The importance of female beauty is highlighted, paradoxically, when Clitophon contemplates chastity: one reason for momentarily considering *sôphrosynê*, to be sure, is a sense of duty (he is aware that, given his father's arrangements, he *ought* to love not Leucippe but Calligone; *ἐρᾶς ὧν σε δεῖ*, 2.5.2) but another is his observation that Calligone is 'another beautiful girl' (*ἄλλην καλήν*). His choice of whether or not to remain *sôphrôn*, then, is at least partially bound up with female physical appearance. Moreover, his tendency to pay attention to the physical aspect of sexual experience is highlighted, again metonymically, by many of his speeches throughout the novel.⁴⁸ When he consults Clinias, for example, about his love for Leucippe (1.9.1–10.7), he has not yet been given even the slightest indication that Leucippe will ever respond to his love. In this dialogue, nevertheless, Clinias professes (*μαντεύομαι*, 1.9.5) that Clitophon will soon (*ταχύ*) have sex (*τὸ ἔργον*) with her. The verbal echo (*μάντευμα*) in Clitophon's subsequent reaction and his request for specific guidelines (*Δός μοι τὰς ἀφορμάς... Τί λέγω; Τί ποιῶ; Πῶς ἂν τύχοιμι τῆς ἐρωμένης*; 1.9.7) underline his immediate interest in this prospect. Moreover, he describes Clinias' help as valuable (*μεγάλα... ἐφόδια*, 1.11.1) and hopes to achieve this aim (*εὕχομαι τυχεῖν*). These reactions suggest that he consults Clinias in the first place because he wants to have sex with Leucippe, but does not know where to start.

Clitophon's sexual morality is again questioned when, as soon as Leucippe has agreed to have sex with him, his behaviour is surrounded by markers which are morally problematic according to novelistic standards. In fact, his intrusion into the women's quarters seems to pick up a particular passage from the *Ninus* novel,⁴⁹ where the hero identifies as shameless (*ἀναιδής*, A.III.37) the course of action that, as it happens, is adopted by Clitophon to approach Leucippe. Ninus makes it clear to the mother of his beloved that he would have been shameless if he had not come to talk to her about marrying her daughter but instead had tried her virtue in secret (*λάθρα*) and stolen his enjoyment undercover (*κλεπτομένην... ἀρπάζων*), 'sharing my passion with the night (*νυκτί*), the wine-cup, the trusted servant or nurse (*θεράποντι καὶ*

⁴⁸ See also Morgan (1996b: 181): Clitophon is 'interested in his beloved's body to a degree unparalleled by any other romantic hero'.

⁴⁹ This novel was composed probably around AD 75 (and in any case earlier than AD 100); Bowie (2002: 47–8).

τιθηναι)' (A.III.37–IV4). This course of action, rejected by Ninus, is, in fact, precisely how Clitophon secures access to Leucippe's bedroom: in secret (until discovered by her mother, that is), with the help of both Satyrus and a female servant (συνεργούσης, 2.19.2) and under the cover of nocturnal darkness (νυκτός). Stephens and Winkler (1995: 57) observe that the author of the *Ninus* fragment, by having Ninus hypothesizing about a deviant standard of behaviour, 'may have been intentionally flagging what was perceived as a distinguishing feature of this genre'. It is precisely this feature that the behaviour of Achilles Tatius' hero here seems to pervert.

But it is not just that Clitophon's words and actions indicate an interest in sex generically atypical for a novel hero. Rather, his words even suggest that he is interested *exclusively* in sex. Given his father's arrangements for him to marry someone else, he makes clear his fear that any successful approach to Leucippe may be the beginning of greater trouble (κακῶν . . . μειζόνων, 1.11.1) and an inflammation leading to greater passion (πρὸς ἔρωτα πλείονα).⁵⁰ Clitophon is, to say the least, unusually explicit about his agenda. He wants to have sex with Leucippe without allowing his amorous feelings to develop into full-grown love. This, of course, is a significant deviation from generic convention that sets Clitophon apart from other novelistic heroes, for whom undying love is consistently a notion of central importance. Clitophon is undoubtedly the only novel protagonist who defines lasting love between him and the heroine as 'greater trouble'. However, as soon as Calligone, his betrothed, has been abducted by Callisthenes a few days later (ὀλίγας . . . ἡμέρας, 2.19.1), he proposes to Leucippe that they have sex and immediately presents it to her as an obligation of fidelity (ἀνάγκην ἀλλήλοις . . . πίστεως). The sharp contrast between his initial projections of a one-off sexual adventure and those of lasting love might suggest that the disappearance of Calligone is a favourable circumstance which acts as a catalyst in the development of Clitophon's fantasy of commitment-free sex into a stable and mutually faithful relationship. On the other hand, since he presents the idea of fidelity to Leucippe, it may just as well be no more than a cynical chat-up line. Similar concerns seem to inform his relationship with Melite after Leucippe's supposed death. Whereas he steadfastly fends off all her sexual advances during their marriage, he finally gives in and has sex with her *after* discovering that Leucippe is not dead after all. To his interlocutor in Sidon, he explains this changed course of action by drawing attention precisely to the fact that his sexual contact with Melite is conceived as a one-off and that he will get rid of her afterwards and be reunited with Leucippe (ἀρκεῖ μοι μία συμπλοκή, 5.26.2; μετὰ ταῦτα τῆς Μελίτης ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἔμελλον, 5.27.2).

⁵⁰ See also Montiglio (2010: 43) on the deviant morality underlying this passage.

Underlying both episodes where he thematizes his own *sôphrosynê* most prominently, then, is Clitophon's preference for one-off sexual adventures.

Similar ambivalence is evoked when Clitophon again foregrounds his own *sôphrosynê*, this time in regard to the sexual abstinence with which he initially rejects Melite's persistent attempts to have sex with him (8.5.2). This self-presentation corresponds with Satyrus' (5.11.6) and Melite's (5.22.5) own accounts, which depict Clitophon as systematically rejecting her advances, although she has been trying for two months to persuade him to marry.⁵¹ He repeatedly agrees to have sex but always manages to postpone the deed (5.14.3, 5.16.1–2, 5.16.7–8, 5.21.6)—a well-known novelistic device to protect chastity. Of course, Satyrus' and Melite's speeches are entirely part of Clitophon's narration, so we cannot be sure that they offer a straightforward and unre-fracted version of the truth; on the other hand no clues are offered by the author that might cast doubts on their validity. What *has* been suggested by the author as early as Melite's introduction, however, is that Clitophon's attempts to remain chaste with Melite will ultimately fail. Various elements in Melite's introduction into the story associate her with a woman who earlier appears to Clitophon in a dream and predicts that she will open the closed doors of Aphrodite's temple for him and make him a priest of the goddess (4.1.7).⁵² His eventual sexual encounter with Melite, then, does not come as a surprise to the reader, who has suspected all along that this would happen. The reader suspects as soon as Melite is introduced in the story that Clitophon will break his promise of fidelity to Leucippe (2.19.1), thus compromising his self-proclaimed *sôphrosynê*.

With regard to Clitophon's affair with Melite, several episodes in the novel place question marks next to his self-proclaimed *sôphrosynê*. His self-presentation to his future father-in-law as a male virgin 'as far as Leucippe is concerned' (*ἀνδρὸς παρθενία . . . πρὸς Λευκίππην*, 8.5.7) is, of course, factually correct but also reminds the reader immediately that the same could not be said with regard to Melite.⁵³ In this respect, this self-presentation is

⁵¹ Garnaud's (1995) reading of 'δύο μῆνας' (5.11.6) follows the reading of the codices. Vilborg (1955), for his part, accepts Jacobs' (1821) conjecture: *τέσσαρας μῆνας*. This last version corresponds to Melite's own words in 5.22.4 (*μηνῶν τεσσάρων*).

⁵² Melite is introduced into the story by Satyrus, who likens her to an *agalma* (5.11.5). This comparison recalls the depiction of the woman in Clitophon's dream as a statue of Aphrodite (*τὸ ἄγαλμα . . . τῆς θεοῦ*, 4.1.6). Furthermore, Satyrus explicitly presents Melite as a gift from Aphrodite (*Ἡ Ἀφροδίτη μέγα τούτῳ παρέσχευεν ἀγαθόν*, 5.11.5) and describes her eyes as 'Aphrodisiac' (*τὸ βλέμμα . . . Ἀφροδίσιον*, 5.13.2; S. Bartsch 1989: 89–92). Moreover, Melite offers herself to Clitophon as Eros' spokeswoman and Clitophon's mystic mentor (*μυσταγωγός*, 5.26.10), which recalls a promise of the woman in Clitophon's dream to initiate him in sex (Morgan 1996b: 181). She also adopts similar mystic terminology in other instances (*Ἀφροδισίους μυστηρίους*, 5.16.3; *Μνηθώμεν . . . τὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης μυστήρια*, 5.15.6).

⁵³ See also Goldhill (1995: 121) on the contrast between Clitophon's 'disingenuous' claim about his own preserved *sôphrosynê* and the 'triumphant public reaffirmation' of the hero and heroine's sexual purity in a novel such as Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*.

emblematic of the rhetorical subtlety with which Clitophon portrays his own *sôphrosynê*. First, he adopts medical terminology to assimilate his own role to that of a doctor curing Melite's lovesick soul (*φάρμακον ὥσπερ ψυχῆς νοσοῦσης*, 5.27.2; *ιασάμην*, 6.1.1) and defines sexual intercourse with her as a favour to her (*χάριν αὐτῇ παρέσχον*, 7.5.4) and a gesture of respect (*αἰδῶ*, 8.5.3) towards her feelings. Some of Clitophon's terminology may recall, again, Clinias' mode of discourse: his instructions to Clitophon also deal with the impact of love on one's soul (*ψυχὴν*, 1.9.4), and, as Goldhill (1995: 76) observes, are also pervaded by the language of medicine and science (*ἀντανακλώμενοι, ἀπομάπτουσιν, ἀπορροή*). Ironically, however, Clitophon's self-presentation is undermined by its activation (arguably unintended by Clitophon) of metaphorical characterization: his self-presentation echoes Thersander's very first words to Leucippe, in which he assures her that he will *cure* (*ιάσομαι*, 6.7.9) her sadness.⁵⁴ Moreover, Clitophon's depiction of Thersander's emotions when he sees Leucippe crying (*παθὼν . . . τι . . . ἀνθρώπινον*, 6.7.7) literally echoes one of the explanations adduced to justify his own sexual encounter with Melite (*ἐπαθὼν τι ἀνθρώπινον*, 5.27.2). Of course, these verbal echoes give an ironic twist to Clitophon's consciously constructed self-presentation as a doctor curing Melite from her lovesickness. Whereas Clitophon casts his sexual encounter with the woman in altruistic terms, this very self-presentation implicitly aligns him with one of the least *sôphrôn* characters in the novel.

Secondly, direct characterization also raises questions. The episode after Clitophon's public marriage to Melite is pervaded by an unusually high number (25) of references to him as a *moichos* (adulterer) and of his relationship with Melite as *moicheia* (15).⁵⁵ The sudden appearance in Ephesus of Thersander (Melite's first husband, who she believes is dead) does indeed technically cast Clitophon as a *moichos*, even if he does not have sex with Melite until later.⁵⁶ Interestingly, Clitophon is identified as a *moichos* by three 'bad' characters:⁵⁷ Thersander,⁵⁸ his counsellor Sopater (8.10.1–12),

⁵⁴ See also M. Jones (2012: 251–62) for a more systematic treatment of similarities between Clitophon and Thersander.

⁵⁵ Schwartz (2001: 104 n. 25) lists (most of) the passages where Clitophon is referred to as a *moichos*. On the relationship between Clitophon and Melite as *moicheia*, see 5.25.5, 6.5.3, 7.11.2, 7.6.3, 8.8.3, 8.8.12, 8.10.9, 8.10.10, and 8.10.12.

⁵⁶ See Schwartz (2001: 104).

⁵⁷ The only exception is 5.19.6, where Clitophon compares himself *inappropriately* to a *moichos* (*ὥσπερ ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ μοιχὸς κατελημμένος*) when he suddenly discovers, during his marriage to Melite (5.14.2), that Leucippe is still alive. Schwartz (1998: 173, 2001: 102–3) rightly remarks that, in both Greek and Roman marital law, a man could only be termed a *moichos* if he had a sexual relationship with a married woman, not if he simply had sexual relations with women other than his wife. Since Melite has married Clitophon on the assumption that her husband is dead, no ancient reader would have defined the protagonist as a *moichos* at this point in the narrative (as he himself does).

⁵⁸ Thersander characterizes Clitophon as a *moichos* in personal focalization (6.5.3, 6.21.2) and in character text (5.23.5, 6.9.1, 6.17.1, 6.20.2, 8.8.3, 8.8.10, 8.8.11, and 8.8.13).

and Sosthenes (6.3.5, 6.5.1, 6.17.3). Most of these instances occur *after* Clitophon has had sex with Melite (5.27.2–4), when, as the reader realizes, this characterization is, in fact, correct.⁵⁹ However, the narrator takes pains to portray these three characters negatively.⁶⁰ Thersander is characterized, both in direct characterization and in his actions, as an extremely violent man⁶¹ and base villain who deludes Clitophon into believing that Leucippe is dead (7.1.2).⁶² Sosthenes, for his part, is equally villainous and violent. Like Thersander, he is characterized as a bully, both explicitly and implicitly by his actions.⁶³ Leucippe explicitly aligns the two characters when Thersander forces a kiss on her ('You have copied Sosthenes (σὺ μιμῇ Σωσθένην), a slave to match his master (ἄξιος ὁ δοῦλος τοῦ δεσπότου)', 6.18.6). Sopater, finally, only makes a cameo appearance in the narrative to accuse Clitophon at a trial (8.10.1–12). The narrator points out that he makes 'some grand flourishes (τεραπευσάμενος) and rubs his face (τρίψας τὸ πρόσωπον)' (8.10.2), an allusion to Aeschines' depiction of his enemy Demosthenes in his *On the Embassy* (Aeschin. 2.49).⁶⁴ Ironically, the only professional orator in the entire novel is characterized by body language completely unsuitable for an orator.⁶⁵ As a narrator, then, Clitophon may have restricted the occurrences of his own characterization as a *moichos* to the speeches of three characters whom he systematically paints in a negative light. His explicit characterization as a *pornos* (8.10.9), furthermore, is similarly confined to the speech of one of these bad characters (Sopater). Again, the events in the story invite the reader to agree rather than disagree, as the term's designation of male prostitute (a meaning that resonates with Sopater's denomination of Leucippe as a prostitute (*pornê*) a little earlier, 8.10.3) highlights the fact that Clitophon has been *paid* by Melite for having sex with her. Melite not only gives him clothes but also a hundred pieces of gold (χρυσοῦς ἑκατόν, 6.1.4).⁶⁶ Although Sopater does

⁵⁹ Schwartz (2001: 104): 'The reader knows the romantic hero is in fact not only morally culpable for breaking his promise of fidelity to the heroine (which seems to be beside the point), but is also technically guilty of the crime for which he had been, until that point, falsely accused.'

⁶⁰ It is important to note that it is Clitophon, *not* Achilles Tatius, who constructs these characterizations. For Schwartz (1998: 220) to comment that 'Achilles Tatius portrays Sopater as a less subtle speaker than the priest' is misleading.

⁶¹ Both Clitophon himself (τοῦς βιαίους, 8.2.1; παρωρία, 8.2.3; etc.) and Melite characterize Thersander as a violent man (ἄγριος, 5.26.5). Actions characterizing Thersander as a bully and a perpetrator of violence (against Melite, Clitophon, and Leucippe) are frequent (5.23.5–7, 6.18.5–6, 6.20.1).

⁶² See Schwartz (2001: 99) on Thersander's characterization.

⁶³ Leucippe describes Sosthenes as an immoderate *hybristês* (μετρίωτεροι... ὑβριστής, 6.22.1–2). Like Thersander, his violent nature is underlined by an act of violence at his introduction: he has Leucippe flogged because she refused to have sex with him (5.17.6).

⁶⁴ Vilborg (1962: 134–5).

⁶⁵ See e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.121–3.

⁶⁶ See M. Jones (2012: 243–51) in more detail on Clitophon as a quasi-prostitute. Lollianus' *Phoenicica* (P. Colon. inv. 3328, A.2 recto, 9 in Stephens and Winkler 1995: 335) also contains a passage in which an ego-narrator refers to an exchange of gold (ἐδίδου τὰ χρυσία) in the context

not know this, the reader realizes that his depiction of Clitophon as a *pornos* is, again, remarkably accurate.

The sheer quantity of instances where Clitophon is directly characterized as a *moichos* invites the reader to parallel this characterization with Leucippe's equally prominent direct characterization as a *parthenos* .⁶⁷ The important difference between the two characteristics is, of course, that *parthenia* is a traditionally valorized quality of novelistic heroines, while an inclination towards *moicheia* is traditionally attributed only to bad characters in the novels (e.g. Chariton 1.4.10). And yet, the emphatically parallel construction of the two characteristics implies more than a mere opposition between good and bad. It invests both protagonists with ambiguity drawing upon the difference between factuality and intentionality. Clitophon, on the one hand, has (or, more correctly, depicts himself as having) the intention of safeguarding his *sôphrosynê* all along, as indicated by the many episodes in which he rejects Melite's advances; and yet, so he admits to his interlocutor in Sidon, he nevertheless breaks his promise of fidelity to Leucippe and passes as a *moichos* . Leucippe, on the other hand, is in fact a virgin. She has never had sex and her repeated alignment with Artemis (4.1.4–5, 7.13.2, 7.15.2, 8.9.13)⁶⁸ firmly fleshes out her chastity. On the other hand, of course, all this is both complicated and ironized by the fact that she agrees as early as the second book to have sex with Clitophon.⁶⁹ She remains a virgin until the end of the narrative only because their plan to have sex is interrupted at the last minute. Again, metaphorical characterization helps to create this ambiguity. As S. Bartsch (1989: 53–4) points out, the calmness of Europa when abducted by the bull in the opening scene of the novel may well be read as proleptic of 'Leucippe's very laxity concerning her own virginity'.⁷⁰ Selene, whom Clitophon adduces as a paradigm of Leucippe's beauty (1.4.3) and who has famously been lured into the woods by Pan,⁷¹ thematizes exactly the same question.⁷² Moreover,

of a sexual encounter (*συνουσίας*) and which may bear some relationship to the passage in Achilles Tatius.

⁶⁷ The reference to Clitophon as a *moichos* on the one hand, and that to Leucippe as a *parthenos* on the other, are the only references used so abundantly in the novel. Leucippe is referred to as a *parthenos* in 1.4.2, 1.5.1, 1.5.2, 2.5.1, 2.10.2, 2.19.4 (twice), 2.25.1–2, 4.8.3, 5.18.6, 5.20.5, 6.21.2, 6.22.1, 6.22.2, 6.22.3, 8.1.2, 8.5.6, 8.13.3, etc. Kasprzyk (2009: 11–12) also discusses the high number of references to Leucippe's *parthenia* , but does not make the connection with Clitophon's *moicheia* .

⁶⁸ S. Bartsch (1989: 90–3) on 4.1.4–5.

⁶⁹ See Goldhill (1995: 115–18) on the playfulness underlying the representation of Leucippe's chastity and, more extensively, Morales (2004: 206–20) on the problematic character of Leucippe as a virgin and a whore at the same time.

⁷⁰ See also Konstan (1994: 67) and Morales (2004: 211).

⁷¹ See e.g. *OCD* ⁴ and Verg. *G.* 3.391–3.

⁷² See also Morales (2004: 47) on associations between Selene/Astarte with sexual pleasure on the one hand, and with chastity on the other. On identifications of Astarte with Europa as well as Selene in contemporary literature (such as Lucian, *Syr. D.*), see Elsner (2001).

Thersander explicitly calls Leucippe a *pseudoparthenos* (8.3.3), which may well recall, as Brethes (2007a: 260) suggests, the Christian concept of *pseudoparthenia*, which draws upon a distinction between corporeal and spiritual virginity.⁷³ All this poignantly highlights the fact that Leucippe remains a virgin until the end of the novel, but *intentionally* has lost her virginity as early as the second book. The reversed interplay between intentionality and factuality in the cases of Clitophon's *moicheia* and Leucippe's *parthenia* makes problematic any straightforward reading of both characters as immoral,⁷⁴ but rather highlights the fundamentally ambiguous and elusive nature of their moral characterization.

In addition to intratextual metaphorical characterization, broader metaphorical patterning of mythological paradigms also contributes to surrounding Clitophon's self-presentation as *sôphrôn* with ambiguity throughout the novel.⁷⁵ In Fusillo's (1989: 102) view, Clitophon is cast as an anti-hero because he is the only novelistic hero who is not associated with heroic and/or divine paradigms. I agree that Clitophon's paradigms may indeed characterize him as a radically atypical novelistic hero. However, such characterization does not result from any *absence* of divine or heroic paradigms. In fact, Clitophon is *only* associated with divine and heroic paradigms (such as Apollo, Heracles, Poseidon, Achilles, and Odysseus), many of which are also adduced as paradigms of protagonists in other novels. In my view, the difference between Clitophon and other protagonists lies rather in how these *exempla* function within the story. First, Apollo. When Clitophon has fallen in love with Leucippe, he hears a cithara player singing a song about Apollo and Daphne. In first person narrator text, he then elaborates on the content of this song: Daphne runs from Apollo and, just as he is about to grasp her, changes into a bay tree. Clitophon also reports that this song excites his love for Leucippe even more (μᾶλλον . . . τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξέκαυσεν, 1.5.5). He comments upon this emotional response by offering some thoughts about the desire for *mimesis* generated by *exempla*:

This song inflamed my soul all the more, for erotic stories (λόγος ἐρωτικός) fuel the appetite. Even if you school yourself into self-control (σωφροσύνην), an example (τῷ παραδείγματι) incites you to imitate it (μίμῃσιν), especially when that example is a divine one (ἐκ τοῦ κρείττονος); in which case, any shame that

⁷³ This suggestion is all the more tempting because the connection between Leucippe and Christian concerns with virginity has been suggested by her speech defending herself from the advances of Thersander (6.21.1–2, 6.22.4), which, as has been observed repeatedly, conspicuously resembles Christian martyrs' speeches. See Goldhill (1995: 117), B. D. Shaw (1996: 269–71), and Ramelli (2001: 86–90, 2009: 153).

⁷⁴ As suggested, for example, by Kasprzyk (2009: 112).

⁷⁵ Some of the following paradigms have also been discussed by De Temmerman and Demoen (2011: 5–9) and De Temmerman (2012d: 169–71).

you feel at your moral errors becomes an outspoken affront to the station of a higher being (1.5.6).

With others, I would suggest that the inclusion of this erotic myth, and in particular Clitophon's reaction to it, should be read first and foremost as an indication of Clitophon's character.⁷⁶ At the same time, I suggest that this passage can also be read as a general indication of how to interpret embedded stories. It is one of the many gnomologic utterances in Achilles Tatius: through this generalizing statement of his protagonist,⁷⁷ the author seems to encourage the reader always to look for the meaning of *exempla* within the context of their evocation (their so-called *Ernstbedeutung*⁷⁸). The technical rhetorical vocabulary in this passage (τῷ παραδείγματι, μίμησιν, ἐκ τοῦ κρείττονος) emphatically indicates that we are dealing with a paradigm.⁷⁹ Clitophon himself also casts the story as exemplary of his own situation by explicitly associating himself with Apollo (Ἰδοὺ καὶ Ἀπόλλων ἐρᾷ, 1.5.7) and by remarking on his own urge to imitate (μίμησιν) the story. Establishing a model for imitation or deterrence is, in fact, a widely documented function of *exempla*, especially in later rhetoricians (more or less contemporary with Achilles Tatius).⁸⁰ The story of Apollo and Daphne clearly deals with the pernicious consequences of untempered sexual lust.⁸¹ Within the context of Clitophon's story, therefore, it becomes one of the many signposts that are placed on Clitophon's path and warn against the consequences of the reduction of love to sex—a reduction, as we have seen, which frequently characterizes Clitophon's conceptualization of love. As such, its function is similar to that of the story of Charicles and Clinias later in the novel.⁸² When Clitophon hears the Apollo myth on the very first day of Leucippe's presence in Tyre, the reader has already been well informed about his feelings for her. In the two pages (Budé edition) separating their encounter from the banquet scene, the

⁷⁶ Goldhill (1995: 73–4), for example, generally reads Clitophon's moral and rhetorical self-positioning as an ironic instance of manipulation of the lover's self. Brethes (2001: 186) more specifically reads this passage as an indication of Clitophon's exclusive attention to sexual pleasure. Billault (1998: 157), for his part, defines Clitophon's speech as an index of short-term egoism. Cueva (2004: 64), on the other hand, suggests that this erotic myth is proleptic of 'the numerous ill-fated or treacherous love stories and myths that Tatius will relate'.

⁷⁷ The generalizing character of Clitophon's elaboration is more evident in the original than in the English translation: ὑπέκκαυμα γὰρ ἐπιθυμίας λόγος ἐρωτικός. Κὰν εἰς σωφροσύνην τις ἑαυτὸν νοουετῇ, τῷ παραδείγματι πρὸς τὴν μίμησιν ἐρεθίζεται, μάλιστα ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ κρείττονος ᾗ τὸ παράδειγμα.

⁷⁸ As opposed to *Eigenbedeutung*, which denotes the meaning of evoked narratives in themselves. See Demoen (1997: 127).

⁷⁹ The expression ἐκ τοῦ κρείττονος is equivalent to ἀπὸ μείζονος, the *a fortiori* reasoning. See Demoen (1997: 136).

⁸⁰ See Demoen (1997: 130 nn. 16–17).

⁸¹ See e.g. the myth as documented by Ov. *Met.* 1.452–567, who extensively elaborates on Apollo's passion (1.490–524 and 1.530–2).

⁸² On this signpost and Clitophon's failure to interpret it as such, see Morgan (1996b: 182–3).

reader has been offered an *ecphrasis* of the girl (1.4.3), an overview of Clitophon's (very diverse) emotions triggered by Leucippe's beauty (1.4.5), a confession that he cannot keep his eyes off her (1.4.5), a description of his joy resulting from the awareness that the table setting allows him to admire her beauty (1.5.2), and the information that he is continually gazing at her during the banquet (1.5.3). When the protagonist is, at this point, listening to the myth, his reaction significantly deviates from the reader's: whereas the reader realizes that the myth conveys a warning and should therefore be taken as a model for *deterrence* (key function), Clitophon himself takes it as a model for *imitation* and confesses that the myth excites his lust *even more* (argument function). Whereas the reader may understand the *Erstbedeutung* of the myth in Clitophon's overall story, Clitophon himself does not.

Next, Odysseus' only appearance in the novel.⁸³ When Clitophon is about to enter Leucippe's bedroom and have sex with her for the first time, Satyrus informs him that Conops has been knocked out by a sleeping potion: 'Conops (*Κώνωψ*) is lying fast asleep: over to you! See to it that you play the part of Odysseus well (*σὺ δὲ ὅπως Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀγαθὸς γένη*)' (2.23.2). At the level of the argument function, Satyrus' association of Clitophon with Odysseus is part of a word play drawing upon the phonological resemblances between 'Conops' and 'Cyclops' (*Κύκλωψ*). The two figures also display thematic resemblances. Both represent obstacles that are eventually overcome by sleep. As all readers of Homer know, the Cyclops falls asleep after drinking (*Od.* 9.371–4). It is, therefore, no coincidence that Conops is also put to sleep by a sleeping potion put in his *drink* (*κύλικος* . . . ἔπειε, 2.23.2). At the level of the key function, on the other hand, Satyrus' wordplay evokes significant *differences* between Clitophon and his paradigm. These differences characterize Clitophon as a non-Odysseus. The spatial organization of this episode, for a start, is significant.⁸⁴ Whereas Odysseus puts the Cyclops to sleep in order to *escape* from a cave, Conops is put to sleep to allow Clitophon to *enter* Leucippe's room. Moreover, Clitophon does not attain his goal of sexual union with Leucippe but is discovered by her mother and escapes only at the last moment. He also admits to being afraid (*φόβου*, 2.23.3) and trembles both before and after his visit (*τρέμων τρόμον διπλοῦν*, 2.23.3; *τρέμοντα καὶ τεταραγμένον*, 2.23.6), which characterizes him, together with his flight, as a coward rather than as a courageous Odysseus. Finally, his marked dependence upon Satyrus also dissociates him from Odysseus. Whereas it is Odysseus himself who invents the plan to blind the Cyclops, Clitophon needs Satyrus' help to put Conops to

⁸³ Laplace (1991: 47–56) also discusses Clitophon's association with Odysseus, but never connects it with characterization.

⁸⁴ On the characterizing function of space in this episode, see De Temmerman (2012: 533–4).

sleep. He does little more than follow his servant's advice, which makes this episode emblematic of his behaviour throughout the entire novel.⁸⁵

With the Odyssean imagery serving Clitophon's characterization, Achilles Tatius makes himself part of a famous literary tradition of authors evoking (and often inverting) epic paradigms (that of Odysseus in particular) in order to characterize their first-person narrators. Roman elegy, for example, repeatedly employs such analogies to cast first-person narrators in an ironic or even comical light.⁸⁶ In other ancient novels too, this strategy is popular. Petronius, for example, deviously evokes Odysseus' victorious confrontation with the Cyclops (*Sat.* 101.5–7) for reasons of characterization,⁸⁷ and in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* Lucius is at times presented as a kind of epic hero but significantly falls short of Odyssean *prudentia*.⁸⁸ In Achilles Tatius, the explicit occurrence of Odysseus as a paradigm for Clitophon in an overtly sexual passage might also evoke the ambiguity that traditionally surrounds Odysseus' *sôphrosynê*. Like Clitophon, he temporarily stays with another woman (Calypso) before being reunited with his beloved.

Two more paradigms reinforce such ambiguity: Heracles and Achilles. When Clitophon unexpectedly runs into Leucippe, he greets her as his mistress (δέσποινα, 2.6.2) and subsequently explains this apostrophe by aligning himself with Heracles, who was 'sold as a slave to queen Omphale' (2.6.3). To make the association stronger, the reader at this point may think of Clitophon's and Heracles' common Tyrian origin.⁸⁹ The erotic overtones in Clitophon's reference to the myth of Heracles and Omphale are similar to Ovid's *Heroides* (9.53–118), where he describes how Heracles, as Omphale's slave, was forced to wear women's clothes and to do women's work. Feminization is a recurrent strand in Heracles' literary representation⁹⁰ and its evocation in this novel anticipates a similar episode of transvestism in Clitophon's story, where he

⁸⁵ It is Satyrus who decides that the time is ripe for Clitophon to have sex with Leucippe ('*Nῦν μὲν ἀνδρίζεσθαι καιρός*', 2.10.1). Clitophon, for his part, merely follows this advice (2.10.3). Satyrus also warns him when someone is about to interrupt his private moment with Leucippe (2.10.5). When he and Leucippe flee from Tyre, Satyrus consults her about whether she is willing to join Clitophon (2.30.1) and drugs Panthea and the doorkeeper to guarantee their safe departure (2.31.1).

⁸⁶ Öhrman (2008: 21–64). Her observation that intertexts in elegy often reveal 'a disconcerting gap between the self-image the narrator seems to wish to project and what conclusions we may draw about him from the text' (22) runs conspicuously parallel to those made by others about novelistic first-person narrations (on which see p. 153). On the importance of Roman elegy for Achilles Tatius' novel in particular, see M. Jones (2012: 168–72, forthcoming).

⁸⁷ See Morgan (2009: 37) on this episode.

⁸⁸ Graverini (2007: 165–73, forthcoming b).

⁸⁹ The connection between Heracles and Tyre is touched upon in Achilles Tatius' novel when the oracle in Byzantium orders a sacrifice for Heracles in Tyre (2.14.1–2, 8.18.1). See also Lucian *Syr. D.* 3 ('*Ἡρακλῆος . . . Τύριος ἦρωος*') and Garnaud (1995: 44 n. 2).

⁹⁰ Plutarch (*Comp. Demetr. Ant.* 3.4), for example, likens Antony to Heracles in his relationship with Omphale, who removes his club and strips him of his lion's skin (see B. F. Russell 1998: 126). On virile and feminine strands in representations of Heracles, see Loraux (1990). On the ambivalence underlying Heracles in general, see Levin (1971: 24) and Papadimitropoulos (2008).

puts on Melite's dress after having sex with her. At that point, Melite compares him to Achilles (τοιούτον Ἀχιλλέα ποτὲ ἐθεασάμην ἐν γραφῇ, 6.1.3). Since Melite adduces Achilles as a paradigm of physical beauty (ὡς εὐμορφότερος), erotic overtones are, again, part of the context. At the level of the key function, however, the reader is invited to look further, for Melite is clearly referring to representations of Achilles when dressed in women's clothes on Scyrus and thus draws attention to a highly embarrassing episode in the hero's life.⁹¹ Moreover, Heracles and Achilles are two renowned mythological seducers of women. The fact that they both occur in contexts with similarly erotic overtones (and in contexts connected by the element of transvestism at that) conspicuously draws the reader's attention to their 'erotic' reputation. Furthermore, both paradigms occur at significant points in Clitophon's love life: that of Heracles occurs when Clitophon is alone with Leucippe for the first time and that of Achilles right after he has had sex with Melite. Whereas the former can therefore be said to subtly question Clitophon's self-presentation as *sôphrôn*, the latter blatantly undermines it.

Clitophon's association with Poseidon, finally, further documents the complication of his self-proclaimed *sôphrosynê*. Melite aligns him with this god during their journey from Alexandria to Ephesus, when she tries to persuade him to make love to her. When Clitophon objects that the sea is not a suitable place for sex (5.16.2), she points to Poseidon's lovemaking at sea with his wife Amphitrite (ἐνταῦθα, 5.16.5). This alignment, again, infuses Clitophon's *sôphrosynê* with ambiguity. On the one hand, the paradigm surfaces exactly when Clitophon refuses to have sex with Melite, which, of course, underlines his *sôphrosynê*. On the other hand, Clitophon is aligned with one of the most renowned womanizers in the Greek pantheon. Poseidon's many mistresses and his numerous children from various relationships had been legendary since time immemorial.⁹² Despite Clitophon's good intentions, then, the presence of Poseidon as his paradigm is yet another implicit indication that Clitophon will make love to Melite after all.

All these paradigms, then, consistently work towards making Clitophon's self-proclaimed *sôphrosynê* problematic. As such, they complement and further reinforce the numerous instances of metonymical (most notably speech and behavioural patterns) direct and intratextual metaphorical characterization. Their evocation obviously raises questions about Clitophon's reliability as a narrator: his self-presentation does not correspond to a series of clues throughout the novel. But at the same time, this very inconsistency reveals him to be truthful in his limited way: a non-manipulative narrator, who

⁹¹ On feminine aspects of Achilles in the literary tradition, see Suzuki (1989: 43–56).

⁹² See e.g. *OCD*⁴ s.v. Poseidon 1230–1 on his various children by different women and *DNP* s.v. Poseidon 204 on the 'Macho-Gott'. *RE* s.v. Poseidon 462–8, 478 and *LIMC* s.v. Poseidon 467–8 list his many 'Geliebte' (almost all female).

unwittingly registers telling behaviour and, thus, describes his own errors and faults of character well enough.

3.3 CLITOPHON THE WISE

As a narrator, Clitophon takes care to present himself as authoritative and knowledgeable about his subject matter. Let me take as a starting point another of Clitophon's embedded *mythoi* (μῦθος, 5.5.1), this time addressed not to Sostratus but to Leucippe. This story narrativizes not *sôphrosynê* but an example of its polar opposite: a painting representing the rape of Philomela by Tereus (5.5.1–9).⁹³ In this account, particularly overt narratorial interpretation is foregrounded in two instances⁹⁴ and in both cases this overtness takes the form of a wise saying (maxim/*sententia*) which clarifies Clitophon's stance towards the characters operating in this story (5.5.2 and 5.5.7).⁹⁵ As we have seen (pp. 38–9), maxims are traditionally powerful tools for conveying character and Clitophon openly uses them to this effect. In both cases, he emphatically dissociates himself from a pernicious vice by attributing it to either barbarians or women—two groups exemplifying otherness. In both cases, however, Clitophon moral self-advertisement interacts with the surrounding plot in a specific destabilizing way.

It has been observed by others that the first maxim ('with barbarians (βαρβάρους) one wife will not satisfy Aphrodite's needs', 5.5.2) presents inclination towards adultery as a characteristic inherently connected to barbarians like Tereus (who is Thracian) and that the framing narrative will expose the hypocrisy of Clitophon's words when, in the next book, he is persuaded by Melite to have sex with her: the man for whom one woman is not enough is none other than Clitophon himself.⁹⁶ In this case, then, Clitophon inadvertently reveals his own moral character through an inconsistent combination of a display of gnomic wisdom and actions. The second maxim, I argue, functions similarly (but not identically). This maxim ('thus do the pangs of jealousy (τῆς ζήλοτυπίας) vanquish even the womb', 5.5.7) addresses the terrible consequences of jealousy and illustrates the cruelty of Procne's revenge on Tereus,

⁹³ Liapis (2006, 2008) has recently argued that Achilles Tatius bases this account of the Tereus myth on Sophocles' homonymous tragedy.

⁹⁴ See S. Bartsch (1989: 73) on Clitophon's account generally as an interpretation of the painting rather than a 'factual description'. It is, of course, difficult, given the comments above regarding Clitophon as a narrator, to unambiguously disentangle factual observation and interpretation in this account (as well as in others)—see Whitmarsh (2003: 193).

⁹⁵ *Gnômai* or maxims in Achilles Tatius have been well researched. See primarily Scarcella (1987), Morgan (1993), Morales (2000), and Whitmarsh (2003).

⁹⁶ Morales (2000: 79–80) and Whitmarsh (2003: 193).

which consists of murdering their own son. This time, the vice is ascribed not to barbarians but to women: Clitophon is explicit that ‘when wives (γυναῖκες) desire nothing other than to hurt the husband who has brought grief to the marriage-bed, they weigh up the pain of suffering against the pleasure of inflicting’. Again, however, a later episode in the novel invites the reader to take a critical stance towards Clitophon’s self-declared knowledge about the jealousy of women, which will turn out to be a delusional fantasy when he is fooled by Thersander’s accomplice into believing that jealousy (ζηλοτυπίας, 7.3.7; ζηλοτυπίαν, 7.9.12) has inspired Melite to murder Leucippe. Whereas the reader knows from the start of this episode that Leucippe is still alive, Clitophon’s soliloquy indicates that he immediately believes the news of her death (7.5.1–4). As has been pointed out by others, Clitophon’s credulity and uncritical attitude towards the story of a complete stranger are highlighted by the stated *incredulity* of Clinias, who is aware that Leucippe has been believed dead on many previous occasions (‘Has she not died many times before (πολλάκις τέθνηκε)? Has she not been resurrected many times before (πολλάκις ἀνέβίω)?’, 7.6.2).⁹⁷ Of course, the generically attuned reader, acquainted with novelistic stock motifs such as *Scheintod*, knows all along that Clinias is right.⁹⁸ The irony culminates when, in his soliloquy, Clitophon *himself* even refers to previous times when Leucippe has been believed dead (ποσάκις μοι τέθνηκας, 7.5.2) but nevertheless describes Clinias’ suggestion as sheer nonsense (ληρεῖς, 7.6.3).⁹⁹ It is more than tempting to explain Clitophon’s exaggerated credulity by his prejudiced attitude towards women’s inclination to jealousy as displayed in the maxim at 5.5.7. If he had been less prejudiced, he might have been more sceptical about the false story of Melite’s jealousy and the resulting murder of Leucippe. Instead, however, his self-proclaimed knowledge about the fatal consequences of female jealousy leads him to the equally fatal decision to commit suicide. It is, of course, highly significant of Clitophon’s characterization that it is none other than *Clinias* who serves as a contrasting figure in this episode: even Achilles Tatius’ pre-eminent misogynist, who at one point adduces no fewer than twelve mythological *exempla* to curse womankind (1.8.1–9), appears to be less prejudiced about women’s supposed inclination to jealousy than the novelistic hero.

As the two maxims indicate, the myth of Philomela and Tereus is told by an overtly present narrator who imposes his own views on the subject matter. He adduces the two maxims as *ad hoc* techniques of self-portrayal: they allow him to place himself in a position of natural superiority over barbarians and

⁹⁷ Whitmarsh (2003: 196–8) and van Mal-Maeder (2007: 143–4).

⁹⁸ Brethes (2007a: 243–4).

⁹⁹ A little later, Leucippe’s own attitude also provides a significant contrast to Clitophon’s: when she finds herself in a dangerous situation (τῶν κινδύνων, 7.13.1), she, like Clinias, is made *hopeful* by the memory of how on past occasions she has often been rescued contrary to all expectation (τοῦ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν σεσῶσθαι).

women and to condemn the injustices done by the representatives of these two groups (Tereus and Procne). However, subsequent plot developments in the overarching narrative invite the reader to be sceptical about the grounds on which Clitophon's self-proclaimed authority is based. His own deeds make him an example of the inclination to adultery that he specifically rejects and his prejudice about womanly jealousy prompts him to self-destructive delusional behaviour. In the first instance, he falls short of living up to his own moral self-portrayal; in the second, his blind belief in his own moral judgments has almost fatal consequences. In neither case, however, does Clitophon himself see the incongruities between the views propagated in the inserted story and what happens in the overarching narrative.

In a number of cases, Clitophon's sententious wisdom seems to shape not only his own behaviour as a character in the story (as in the maxim on jealousy) but also his *narratorial* praxis. An example illustrative of both dynamics at the same time is a maxim ascribing cowardice to Egyptians and connecting it with their fear (*φοβεῖται*, 4.14.9). This maxim, whose articulation accompanies an episode of physical violence (a military victory over Egyptian *boukoloi*), is echoed in the episode immediately following, which also instantiates anti-Egyptian violence¹⁰⁰ and in which Clitophon repeatedly thumps his Egyptian servant (*τὸν διακονούμενον . . . Αἰγύπτιον*, 4.15.4) in the face in order to extract confessions from him. In this passage, Clitophon explains the success of his method (confessions are made instantly) as the result of, specifically, the Egyptian's fear (*φοβηθείς*, 4.15.6). A little later in the novel, both this episode and the maxim are picked up when another maxim again connects cowardice with fear (*φοβηθῆν*, 7.10.5) and this time singles out not Egyptians but *slaves* as a representative group.¹⁰¹ Being not only an Egyptian but also a servant, then, the poor man seems to be the perfect victim to exemplify Clitophon's views on fear and cowardice. At the level of Clitophon's behaviour as a character in the story, this passage represents a marked contrast with no fewer than six passages where Clitophon is not the perpetrator but the *victim* of physical violence and where his helplessness against it is highlighted either by his complete inertia (3.12.2, 5.23.5–7, 7.14.3, 8.1.4) or by his unsuccessful attempts to defend himself (5.7.2, 7.15.4). This contrast suggests that in the one instance where Clitophon is courageous enough to initiate violence, his course of action is shaped, specifically, by his views on the fear and cowardice of both Egyptians and slaves.¹⁰²

But how to read these maxims at the level of the narration? On the one hand, the episode featuring the Egyptian slave seems very much like an example adduced by Clitophon-the-narrator to illustrate the validity of the

¹⁰⁰ On this connection, see also Brethes (2007a: 206–7).

¹⁰¹ On the connections between the two maxims, see Morales (2004: 114–15).

¹⁰² On Clitophon-the-character as a coward, see G. Anderson (1997: 2283).

sententious wisdom just delivered. One could argue, accordingly, that Clitophon's ascription of *fear* to this man is the result of deductive logic about Egyptians, slaves, and the fear that leads them to cowardice. Since he knows, or so he claims, how these groups behave or react, he can correctly assess the behaviour of this man in this particular instance. But of course, and typically, the novel also allows the opposite interpretation, which is that it is the product not of deductive but of *inductive* logic: having witnessed, as a character in his story, the fear of his Egyptian servant as he thumps him in the face, he later, as a narrator, portrays himself as knowledgeable about not only this one Egyptian slave but more generally the two groups that he represents.

The latter reading would imply, then, that Clitophon-the-narrator presents himself as enriched by his own experiences.¹⁰³ Whereas we are invited to read the maxims about adultery and jealousy as indications that Clitophon-the-narrator has *not* been enriched by his own experience (he does not see that the story of his own life makes problematic their validity), the maxims on cowardice do not allow us to make a solid choice between the two possibilities. The point is, rather, that the resonances between the maxims on cowardice and the surrounding narrative invite us to read Clitophon's narration as the result of either deductive or inductive inference and that both possibilities flirt with the notion of fictionalization. In the case of induction, we have to assume that Clitophon inferred the Egyptian servant's fear from, for example, his body language or from the swiftness of his confession and that, as a narrator, he generalizes on the basis of this one instance. But is this *really* how all Egyptians would react? In the case of deduction, on the other hand, Clitophon draws upon a general truth about Egyptians and slaves to document the emotions of someone who represents both these social groups in this specific instance. But how can we be sure that it was really fear which caused the Egyptian servant to confess?

In a number of instances, deduction (Clitophon's filling in gaps in his factual knowledge by drawing upon general truths) is implied as the only possibility. These instances involve gnomic digressions about the emotions of characters to which Clitophon, as a homodiegetic narrator, has no (or at least no obvious) access. An example is Clitophon's discussion of a range of emotions experienced by Leucippe after being reprimanded by her mother for (almost) having lost her virginity: these emotions are distress, shame, and fury (ἡχθέτο, ἡσχύνετο, ὠργίζετο, 2.29.1). Clitophon specifies the circumstances triggering each of them ('she was distressed at having been found out, she felt ashamed at being reproached, she was furious at being mistrusted', 2.29.1) and provides further information about them in a long digression discussing their origins and consequences (2.29.2–5). He concludes with the

¹⁰³ See also Zeitlin (2012: 121–3) on the problem of the sources of Clitophon's 'hyperknowingness' about, among other things, the psychology of the self.

explicit statement that his digression applies to Leucippe's emotions at this specific moment in the story: 'troubles of this magnitude (τοσοῦτων συμφορῶν), then, filled Leucippe' (2.29.5). The question here, of course, is how Clitophon knows this.¹⁰⁴ Since, according to his own narration, Leucippe was *alone* when experiencing these emotions (καθ' ἑαυτήν, 2.29.1), the only possible explanation is that he has been fully informed by her afterwards about her own emotions, but such a scenario seems unlikely and is in any case never even hinted at. But even if we are prepared to accept *ex eventu* knowledge as an explanation in this case, there is another instance of such gnomic digression for which it surely cannot account. When reporting that Thersander cries when he sees Leucippe doing the same (6.7.3), Clitophon offers a lengthy digression geared towards demonstrating that Thersander's tears are, in fact, a performance (ἐπίδειξις, 6.7.7) aimed at winning Leucippe's sympathy by showing his grief ostentatiously (καλλωπιζόμενος). This digression addresses, among other things, the 'fact of nature' (φύσει, 6.7.4) that tears are likely to attract pity in their beholders and points out that a lover (ἐραστής) visibly imitates the tears of a beautiful girl in the hope of being seen by her when doing so. Again, Clitophon concludes the digression with the explicit statement that *something like that* happens to Thersander in this episode (τοιούτῳ τι τῷ Θερσάνδρῳ συμβεβήκει, 6.7.7). But again, Clitophon was not present at the scene (logically speaking, he does not even know it has taken place) and it is simply impossible for him to know the *real* reason for Thersander's tears. This time, it seems perfectly safe to assume that Thersander never speaks to him about his emotions. Leucippe, for her part, could at most have inferred them from Thersander's behaviour and/or words. Here, then (and arguably in the Leucippe episode too), Clitophon seems to adopt maxims as heuristic devices: he bridges a gap in his factual knowledge by using deduction on the basis of what he considers to be general truths. Because of the (supposedly) universal nature of these axioms, Clitophon can (or believes he can) reconstruct the inner emotions of the subjects of his narrative. Even if Morgan (1993: 202) is right that in a number of instances in this novel maxims illustrate that the behaviour of fictional characters and their world conforms to normative statements, their function is not exclusively illustrative: for Clitophon, they become heuristic tools to approach, conceptualize, and communicate reality.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ On Clitophon's narration of events of which he cannot have been aware, either as a character at the time of the event or as a narrator afterwards, see also Reardon (1994: 85), who ascribes this phenomenon to the author's incompetence. On this episode in particular as indicative not of the author but of the narrator, see Morgan (2007a: 105–9). More generally, on the question of 'how does character X know?' as a repeated concern in ancient literary criticism, see Nünlist (2009: 120).

¹⁰⁵ Morales (2000: 73), for her part, emphasizes yet another function of maxims (especially in Achilles Tatius): their prescriptive value.

The possible fictionalization involved in such narratorial praxis becomes clear when we put these episodes in perspective with a passage from Heliodorus' novel, where deduction is also adopted to explain a character's course of action. When Thyamis (he too an Egyptian) sets out to kill Chariclea, the narrator offers a psychological explanation that also starts from what he considers to be a gnomic general truth ('the heart of a savage (τὸ βάρβαρον ἦθος) brooks no turning back', 'when a barbarian loses all hope of his own preservation, he will usually kill everything he loves before he dies', 1.30.6) and then proceeds to state that 'because of this' (ὅφ' ὧν, 1.30.7) Thyamis acts as he does. Just as in Achilles Tatius' Leucippe and Thersander episodes, a general truth is taken as a starting point for explaining specific actions. But the difference is, of course, that in Heliodorus the episode is narrated by a heterodiegetic narrator, who, as a narrator of fiction, is not restricted to hermeneutics when documenting his characters' psychological or emotional inner world. He is omnipotent about what they do and omniscient about their reasons for doing it. Clitophon, as a homodiegetic narrator of an allegedly *true* story, has no such privileges. Unlike Heliodorus' narrator, he does *not* have an interpretative monopoly to establish unambiguous connections between general truths and (alleged) instantiations of such truths in the behaviour of specific characters. The possibility of entering someone's innermost thoughts and feelings is an exclusive privilege of narrators of fiction, as opposed to narrators of 'fact'.¹⁰⁶ Underlying Clitophon's psychological explorations of Leucippe's and Thersander's behaviour, then, is a suggestion of a fictionalizing transgression of the hermeneutic boundaries of homodiegetic narratorial possibility.

Clitophon-the-narrator's handling of gnomic wisdom is further revealed by a closer look at *who* communicates such wisdom within the story and *how* it is communicated. First, Clitophon-the-character is firmly cast in the position of pupil by the gnomic discourse of *others*. Clinias, in particular, one of his *praeceptores amoris*, assumes a position of authority over him by addressing and applying to him numerous maxims¹⁰⁷ concerning erotic matters (so-called second-person maxims).¹⁰⁸ This relationship between the two is in tune, of course, with Clinias' experience in such affairs and his age (two years

¹⁰⁶ See Cohn (1989: 4–12, 1990: 784–5, 1999: 19–30) on psychic omniscience as a 'marker of fictionality' and Hodkinson (2010: 21–32) on its use in a number of ancient narrative texts.

¹⁰⁷ Although Clinias' character text is limited (making up only 264 lines in Garnaud 1995, which equals 5.2% of the entire text), he utters no fewer than 15.6% of all the maxims in the novel (13). Nine of those occur in speeches addressed to Clitophon. See De Temmerman (2006: 322–3) for the numbers.

¹⁰⁸ e.g. 1.9.4, 1.9.5, 1.10.1, 1.10.5, 5.12.1. Other second-person maxims occur in character text of Satyrus (2.4.5) and Melite (5.16.3, 5.26.3). On the distinction between first-, second-, and third-person maxims, applying to the speaker, the addressee, and a third person respectively, see Seitel (1969: 149–50). On second-person maxims and authority, see Lardinois (2000: 643).

older than Clitophon, 1.7.1), two aspects traditionally recognized as suitable for the dissemination of gnomic wisdom.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, Clitophon-the-character makes it clear that Clinias, unlike himself, is experienced in love: *he* has already been initiated into the cult of Eros (ἔρωτι τετελεσμένος, 1.7.1),¹¹⁰ a phrase that echoes precisely the primary narrator's characterization of Clitophon in the opening scene (τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τελετῆς, 1.2.2).

At the level of the narration of his own story, on the other hand, Clitophon's preoccupation with gnomic discourse echoes the idea, attested in the work of many ancient rhetoricians, that a *sententia* has *auctoritas* ('authority')¹¹¹—which is an issue central, of course, both to rhetoric and to Clitophon's narration. This may suggest that Clitophon-the-narrator does indeed see himself as enriched by his own experience: as a narrator, he is knowledgeable about his subject matter, and his gnomic discourse illustrates this. In this respect, the ways in which Clitophon's and Clinias' gnomic discourses overlap are particularly interesting. Clitophon's description of Melite's behaviour during their first banquet is a good example. Clitophon mentions that she focuses wholly on him and barely touches the food in front of her. He contextualizes this behaviour by adducing a number of gnomic reflections:

Nothing is sweet to lovers other than the beloved (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡδὺ τοῖς ἐρώσι πλὴν τὸ ἐρώμενον): desire occupies the entire soul, leaving no room therein for thoughts of sustenance. The pleasure of the spectacle floods in through the eyes and settles in the breast, ever drawing with it the image of the beloved. This pleasure is impressed upon the soul's mirror (τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς κατόπτρῳ), leaving its form there; then the beauty floods out again (ἡ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροή), drawn towards the desirous heart by invisible beams, and imprints the shadowy image deep down inside. I understood this (*συνείς*) and said . . . (5.13.3–5)

The conclusion to the gnomic reflections that he *understands* Melite's feelings (*συνείς*) again underlines his use of (supposedly) universal knowledge as a heuristic device. In this passage, Clitophon clearly draws upon what he considers to be general truths concerning the pleasure generated by looking at the object of one's love. The digression reworks some traditional and presumably well-known material from earlier literature. The idea of vision catching the beloved's image on the soul's mirror-plate, for example, echoes Xenophon (*Smp.* 4.21) and the image of beauty flowing down through the eyes into the soul recalls Plato's famous passages in the *Phaedrus* (251*b*) and *Cratylus* (420a5–b1) and the atomist schools of Epicurus and Diogenes of

¹⁰⁹ On experience, see Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.9 and Quint. *Inst.* 8.5.8; on age, Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.9 (ἀρμόττει δὲ γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικία μὲν πρεσβυτέροις) and Tac. *Or.* 22. On Clinias as Clitophon's *praeceptor amoris* or *erōtōdidaskalos*, see also Morgan (1996*b*: 180–1) and Goldhill (1995: 73–6).

¹¹⁰ See Whitmarsh (2011: 102–3) on the contrast between the ignorant Clitophon and the experienced counsellor Clinias, who has already reached the *telos* of his romance.

¹¹¹ See H. Lausberg (1998: §872) for references.

Oenoanda.¹¹² Both images are verbal echoes directly taken from an earlier speech by Clinias (1.9.2-7), who instructs Clitophon on the importance of visual contact with the beloved (ἐν κατόπτρῳ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ εἶδωλα, 1.9.4; ἡ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροή, 1.9.4).¹¹³

But the *structure* of Clitophon's digression is of particular importance. It opens with a maxim ('Nothing is sweet to lovers other than the beloved')¹¹⁴ and reflects specific guidelines in the *progymnasmata* treatises, where the construction of maxims (*gnômai*) and their elaboration (ἐργασία) is one of the standard rhetorical exercises.¹¹⁵ Ps.-Hermogenes, Priscian, and Aphthonius, for example, point out that a maxim's elaboration draws upon a number of specific elements that support its validity. These elements are, among others, a simple statement or paraphrase of the maxim (τὸ ἀπλοῦν), an explanation of the validity of the maxim (τὴν αἰτίαν), a contrast (τὸ ἐναντίον) which highlights the implications of the maxim *not* being followed, a corroborating comparison (παραβολήν), and an example (παράδειγμα).¹¹⁶ To be sure, Clitophon's digression does not cover *all* of the elements listed above but its structure nevertheless clearly revolves around two such elements, which suffices to suggest that the narrator here adopts a mode of presenting arguments that is likely to have been recognized by contemporary readers as gnomic elaboration as described in the *progymnasmata*, especially since this digression deals exclusively with *general* truth. The initial maxim (pointing out that only the sight of the beloved, and not the food of the banquet, can satisfy a lover) is followed by a logical explanation that is likely to have been recognized as the maxim's *aitia*: given the fact that love occupies the soul in its entirety, it leaves no room for other thoughts (about food, for example). Subsequently, Clitophon gives a more detailed account or *paraphrasis* of the general statement that highlights the technicalities of the process of perception: he points out that pleasure ('ἡδονή', echoing 'ἡδύ' in the maxim) travels from the eyes to the breast, where it is installed on the soul's mirror, and then travels to the heart, where it imprints the image of the beloved (5.13.4).

This digression is not an isolated case. A similar structure also underlies digressions which do not themselves deal with erotic subject matter but which are nevertheless firmly rooted in an erotic context. When Clitophon has fallen in love with Leucippe, for example, he is unable to fall asleep. He explains this

¹¹² Bychkov (1999). For an early discussion of subject matter from both the philosophical and rhetorical traditions in paradoxographical digressions in Achilles Tatius, see Rommel (1923).

¹¹³ See Whitmarsh (2011: 104) on one other instance of Clitophon borrowing Clinias' gnomic phrasing on the subject of love (αὐτοδίδακτος... ὁ θεὸς σοφιστής, 1.10.1; Αὐτουργὸς... καὶ αὐτοσχέδιος σοφιστής, 5.27.4).

¹¹⁴ See Scarcella (1987: 271-5) on maxims about *erôs* in this novel.

¹¹⁵ On rhetorical elaboration (*epexergasia*) in literary criticism, see Nünlist (2009: 204-8).

¹¹⁶ Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 8.7-28 Sp. II, Prisc. *Praex.* 38.5-27 Passalacqua, and Aphth. *Prog.* 25.29-26.2 Sp. II.

situation by adducing a maxim saying that ‘it is a rule of nature (ἔστι μὲν γὰρ φύσει) that diseases and bodily wounds are more painful by night (νυκτί) and besiege us all the more when we are resting’ (1.6.2). Again, the subsequent digression draws upon established imagery (the metaphor picturing waves of troubles (τῷ κακῷ κυμαίνεται, 1.6.3), for example, was common since Pindar and attested by Athenaeus XIII, 564e), and again it is structured around elements discussed in the *progymnasmata* as operating in gnomic elaboration. The maxim is corroborated by an explanation, pointing to the opportunity for a wound to fester (ροσεῖν, 1.6.3) in a relaxed body, and by a contrast, indicating that during the day (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ) the eyes and ears are absorbed in many activities and help to mitigate illness by giving the soul no leisure in which to suffer (1.6.2–4).

Achilles Tatius is unique among the Greek novelists in repeatedly drawing upon the progymnasmatic constituents of gnomic elaboration. Heliodorus, for his part, also mentions the exacerbation of suffering at night (1.8.1) but does not offer a gnomic digression: he states, in merely one sentence, that the darkness of night aggravates Chariclea and Theagenes’ misery because there is no sight or sound to distract them. Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1994: 11 n. 2) are puzzled by this contrast and wonder why Achilles Tatius develops this theme ‘endlessly’ (*interminablement*). But of course, this novel’s gnomic digressions principally tell us something not about Achilles Tatius’ authorial praxis but rather about Clitophon’s narratorial praxis. What do they tell us about the latter’s deliberate shaping of gnomic authority? Scholars have rightly observed that Clitophon’s verbal behaviour is often couched in bookish knowledge (his speech in 1.17–18, for example, is drawn directly from Men. Rh. 401–2¹¹⁷) and that, accordingly, his narration of his own experiences is characterized by rhetorical commonplace and sophistic display¹¹⁸—characteristics aligning him with Petronius’ first-person narrator Encolpius.¹¹⁹ In my view, such observations are also applicable to the specific structure underlying Clitophon’s narration of erotic experience, except that they apply not to the level of purely content-related bookishness but rather to the formal level of narration. Clitophon’s moulding of knowledge taken from earlier literature and philosophy into a fixed set of schoolbook categories highlights his rationalizing approach towards erotic emotions and amorous behaviour. As Whitmarsh (2003: 195–9) points out, one possible reaction to Clitophon’s elusive character as a narrator is an awareness that he relates events with a tendency to sophistry, but at times misunderstands the true profundity of the

¹¹⁷ Morales (2004: 185–6).

¹¹⁸ See Morgan (1996b: 185), Morales (2004: 96–151), Brethes (2007a: 200–2), and, in passing, G. Anderson (1997: 2291) and Alvares (2006: 5).

¹¹⁹ On this similarity in particular, see Morgan (2007a). On the artificiality of Clitophon’s discourse, see Brethes (2007a: 197–8).

events. The particular structure of the digressions examined may point in the same direction. Clitophon reworks traditional and common material known from philosophy, historiography, and other literary sources into a limited number of progymnasmatic categories in order to come to terms with his own and other characters' erotic experiences.

But Clitophon's gnomic wisdom and the formal structures in which it is communicated also document another related side of Clitophon's narratorial praxis. They show conspicuous overlaps with how his *praeceptor amoris*, Clinias, communicates gnomic wisdom. When instructing Clitophon on how to seduce Leucippe, Clinias himself makes it clear that he can only teach him *general* principles (κοινά, 1.10.2) and not any of the *specific* guidelines that Clitophon is eager to hear (τὰς ἀφορμὰς . . . τὰς ὁδοὺς, 1.9.7). Subsequently, he points out that 'Eros is a self-taught sophist' (1.10.1) (echoing, of course, the Platonic image of Eros as a *sophistês*, Pl. *Smp.* 203d and X. *Cyr.* 6.1.14) and elaborates this maxim according to the progymnasmatic guidelines that I discuss above. He adds a comparison with newborn babies (τὰ ἀρτίτοκα, 1.10.1) spontaneously discovering where to find milk, and a paraphrase highlighting more overtly that new lovers do not need any assistance (1.10.2). Similarly, his instructions to Clitophon on the importance of gazing at one's beloved also draw upon progymnasmatic guidelines. He begins this speech with a maxim comparing the act of seeing with sex ('the sight of the beloved yields more pleasure than the act itself') and follows it with Platonic imagery providing an explanation supporting its validity ('when two pairs of eyes reflect in each other, they forge images of each others' body, as in a mirror', 1.9.4).¹²⁰ Subsequently, the comparison with sex is taken up and paraphrased at greater length, with the flowing of beauty through the eyes into the soul of the beholder cast as 'copulation at a distance'. Clinias then corroborates the prediction that Clitophon will soon have sex with Leucippe with two general arguments. The first of these is that persistent exposure is the quickest way to win a girl's heart. Its validity is underscored by an explanation ('the eye serves as the go-between of amorous feelings, and mutual familiarity is the most effective route to gratification', 1.9.5) and then corroborated by a comparison with wild animals (τὰ ἄγρια, 1.9.6), which are, like women, made docile through daily contact. His second argument is the equality of age between Clitophon and Leucippe, which will, in his view, stimulate Leucippe to respond to Clitophon's love. This time, he corroborates his point with a general comment (on the desire of women to be beautiful and loved) and a

¹²⁰ Apart from Plato's *Phdr.* 251b, the most important intertexts in this speech seem to be X. *Cyr.* 1.6.22 (ἀνυσσιμώτερον, 1.9.5), Pl. *Phdr.* 240c (Ἔχει δέ τι πρὸς παρθένον ἐπαγωγὸν ἡλικιώτης ἔρῶν, 1.9.6) and 255d (ἀντέρωτα, 1.9.6), and Aristaeus. 1.11 (Θέλει γὰρ ἐκάστη τῶν παρθένων εἶναι καλή, 1.9.6). See Vilborg (1962: 26–7), Garnaue (1995: 16–17), Whitmarsh (2001: 148), Bychkov (1999), and Repath (2007b: 69–77).

contrast (with what happens when a woman does *not* feel loved, *κἂν μὴ φιλήσῃ τις αὐτήν*, 1.9.6).

As these examples indicate, the structural disposition of Clinias' speeches shows an intimate resemblance to Clitophon's. This, of course, raises additional questions about how to pinpoint Clitophon's characterization as a narrator of gnomic wisdom. Of course, Clitophon is, like all Greek novel heroes, *pepaideu-menos*, and his display of gnomic truth, interspersed with common philosophical knowledge and structured according to guidelines in rhetorical school handbooks, can be read as conscious self-portrayal. In fact, Clinias explicitly highlights the ability to conduct oneself in a cultured milieu as an important marker of *paideia* when addressing Charicles in Clitophon's presence: 'if you were an uncultured bumpkin (*ιδιώτης* . . . *μουσικῆς*, 1.8.4), you would not know of the plays about women. But *you*, you could even lecture others.' At the same time, however, the formal similarities between Clitophon's and Clinias' gnomic elaborations invite other complementary readings. Billault (2006: 80), for example, characterizes Clitophon's rhetorical discourse as 'contagieuse' because a number of characters in the novel are shown to talk like him. But do these characters imitate him? Or does he present others as imitating him? Or does he, as M. Jones (2012: 168) suggests, project his own favourite discourse onto others? Or is he putting words into their mouths that they never said? The point is, as so often in this novel, that we cannot tell. But even so, the formal overlaps between Clinias' and Clitophon's gnomic discourses at least invite us to float the idea that Clitophon imitates his *praeceptor's* gnomic mode of discourse. It is tempting to argue that in his digressions Clitophon is indebted to Clinias in a way that goes beyond the verbal echoes of philosophical concepts. Maybe Clitophon has paid attention not only to Clinias' guidelines themselves but also to *how* Clinias rhetorically moulds them. Such a reading would cast Clinias, in turn, not merely as Clitophon's *praeceptor amoris*, but maybe also as his *praeceptor artis rhetoricae*. As we will see in Chapter 5, we find similar modes of imitative behaviour in Heliodorus' novel.

Lalanne (2006: 16) points out that *paideia* of novel heroes is primarily directed towards the acquisition of a number of basic qualities such as moderation, perseverance, and magnanimity, which are emblematic of the virtues of a civilized Greek male adult. As I point out in Chapter 1, the depiction of Chariton's hero Chaereas thematizes the importance of rhetorical skill as yet another essential quality of male adulthood. I think that Clitophon's and Clinias' clearly marked concern with rhetorical *form* offers an interesting variation on this theme of rhetorical maturity. It alerts us to the importance of rhetoric in structuring language but simultaneously highlights the limitations inherent in the undigested adoption of heuristic tools prescribed for the understanding of reality. Even if Clitophon portrays himself as knowledgeable

and enriched by his own experience,¹²¹ the reader's attention is drawn to the sterility of his attempt to capture real-life experience through the use of categories of rhetorical elaboration.¹²²

3.4 THE HEROINE

Because of the homodiegetic narrative technique employed in this novel, its heroine is depicted exclusively through the hero's narration. This asymmetrical arrangement at once makes very interesting what would otherwise be a fairly prosaic observation, namely that Leucippe's depiction remains remarkably partial, colourless, and underdeveloped throughout the entire narrative. Moreover, the few metonymical techniques (most notably speech and behavioural patterns) that document her character in the early books of the novel infuse it with a fundamental kind of ambiguity and mysteriousness. Leucippe's direct speech, for example, is conspicuously limited.¹²³ Even more striking is how little of it is addressed to her lover Clitophon.¹²⁴ The two hardly talk to each other. And the only occasion on which she *does* say something substantial to him is a long letter full of reproaches for his marriage to Melite (5.18.2–6).¹²⁵

In this novel, the homodiegetic narrative technique raises questions even about characteristics that in other novels are among the most typical of heroines, such as their love for the hero. There is no indication whatsoever that Leucippe is affected by love at first sight like Clitophon.¹²⁶ In fact, until Clitophon tricks her into kissing him (2.7.5) and confesses his love for her (2.7.6), there is not even any reason to assume that she is as much as aware of his feelings for her. (I discuss Clitophon's depiction of Leucippe's reactions to

¹²¹ On such self-presentation, see also Brethes (2007a: 201–2).

¹²² On absence of development in Clitophon's character (and the contrast with the spectacular transformation of Callisthenes), see Morgan (1996b: 186). On Clitophon and Callisthenes, see also Repath (2007a) and Kasprzyk (2009: 113).

¹²³ Leucippe's character text comprises only 3.4% of the whole. This is less than Satyrus' (3.7%), Melite's (4.5%), Clinias' (5.2%), and Clitophon's character text (10.1%). See De Temmerman (2006: 518–19). On Leucippe's silence as opposed to Clitophon's talkativeness, see Briand (2004: 87–95).

¹²⁴ Although Clitophon is the narratee of 35.4% of Leucippe's character text, this high percentage is largely the result of one monologue (8.16.1–7) in which she relates to Clitophon her past adventures and which makes up 20% of her total character text in the novel. Other instances where she talks to him are limited to two extremely short interventions during private encounters (2.6.2, 2.7.5), a short speech (4.1.3–5), one sentence (3.11.2), and a letter (5.18.2–6).

¹²⁵ See Morgan (2007a: 119) on Leucippe's letter as the one instance in which she 'pops out of the categories into which Kleitophon has boxed her'.

¹²⁶ See Hägg (1983: 51), Fusillo (1989: 99–100), Rojas Álvarez (1989: 82–3), and M. Jones (2012: 169).

his approaches in more detail on pp. 194–7) And even if Clitophon later persuades (ἐπεπείκειν, 2.19.2) her to receive him into her room, the question of whether she actually loves him is not addressed at all until later in the novel. Moreover, one other character at least seems to doubt the reciprocity of their emotions. When Clitophon plans to run away from home (φεύγειν, 2.25.3) after his failed attempt to have sex with Leucippe, Clinias assumes that Clitophon will have to *persuade* her to join him. In fact, the phrasing of this assumption (τάχα . . . πείσεται, 2.27.2) tantalizingly leaves open the question of just how successful he expects any such attempt to be. Τάχα can mean ‘quickly’ or ‘probably’, but can also carry a much more cautious connotation: ‘perhaps’. What is more, even Clitophon himself does not seem to be too confident: he deems it necessary to send Satyrus to verify (ἀποπειρασόμενος, 2.30.1) whether she is willing to join. Only after hearing that she too is desperate to leave does he set aside most of his anxiety (τὸ πολὺ τῆς φροντίδος ἀπερρυάμην, 2.30.2). But even then (and especially then) the reader is left wondering how much anxiety her words can really have taken away. Even before hearing anything about his plan to run away (πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι, 2.30.1), she herself brings up the issue of flight and begs Satyrus that he and Clitophon take her away from her mother, ‘anywhere you like’ (ὅποι βούλεσθε).¹²⁷ This request clearly evokes (and directly follows) an episode of disagreement between her and her mother resulting from the latter’s last-minute interruption of Leucippe’s attempted sexual relations with Clitophon. Leucippe is forced to repeatedly proclaim her own virginity to her mother, who does not believe her, and is left ashamed, distressed, and furious (2.29.1). But this, of course, leaves the reader wondering what role (if any) her feelings for Clitophon play in her decision to leave. On the one hand, she may want to escape home in order to facilitate sexual relations with Clitophon (although on the first subsequent occasion she refuses any such relations before marriage, 4.1.4), but on the other hand what she seems interested in most is *leaving*, not necessarily *leaving with Clitophon*.

A marked contrast to the ambiguity of Leucippe’s emotional involvement is provided by Heliodorus’ novel, where the hero and heroine also elope together in a scene that may hark back to Achilles Tatius. In Heliodorus, the elopement is emphatically staged as a robbery: Theagenes and an armed band (ἔνοπλος κῶμος, 4.17.3) snatch (ἀναρπάζουσιν, 4.17.4) Chariclea from her bedroom. The narrator is explicit that she has been informed beforehand and willingly submits to the violence (ἐκοῦσαν ὕφισταμένην). In Achilles Tatius too, Leucippe’s escape is presented as the kidnap of a willing victim because she herself invites Satyrus to ‘snatch her

¹²⁷ See also S. Bartsch (1989: 53–4) and Reeves (2007: 93 n. 18) on the ambivalence of Leucippe’s voyage with Clitophon. Konstan (1994: 67–8), on the other hand, sees mutual passion as the reason for leaving (even if he, in fact, provides evidence to the contrary by quoting Leucippe’s words indicating that she wants to escape her mother).

away' (ἐξαργάσατέ με, 2.30.1). Moreover, Chariclea's elopement, just like Leucippe's, is presented as an escape from parental control (it is engineered by Calasiris to take the heroine away from her Delphian foster-father Charicles). A striking difference between the two episodes, however, is the motivation of the heroine: Chariclea's willingness to elope is inextricably bound up with her love for Theagenes. Calasiris informs her that if she is willing to elope with him before she is compelled to marry her foster-father's marriage candidate, she will marry Theagenes (Θεαγένει . . . ἀνδρί, 4.13.2). Her answer leaves no doubt about what she really desires ('it is hard, even repugnant, to so much as speak of preferring another to Theagenes', 4.13.4). Leucippe, on the other hand, is conspicuously silent about her feelings for Clitophon and about whether or not they play any role at all in her decision to escape.¹²⁸ Does Clitophon-the-character not care about this? Is he happy as long as she comes along anyhow? Or does Clitophon-the-narrator not realize that the motive of this novelistic heroine for joining the hero in flight is unusual to say the least? The point is, once again, that we cannot be sure and that Leucippe, filtered as she is through Clitophon's narration, remains fundamentally mysterious.

After the protagonists' elopement at the end of the second book, we get not much more than sparse colourless bits of information about Leucippe for a number of books to come. The only substantial piece of information in this part of the novel is that, whereas she was willing to receive Clitophon into her room in Tyre, by the time they arrive in Egypt she abruptly refuses to have sex with him as long as they are not married (4.1.4). She explains this changed attitude by referring to a dream in which Artemis appeared to her and told her to remain a virgin until they were married. Her abrupt decision leaves the reader somewhat mystified—and perhaps this is the very point, since other occasional scarce information about her also seems to thematize chiefly her distance, invisibility, and inaccessibility to the reader. When, for example, she and Clitophon are imprisoned in the same cell, Clitophon (and, consequently, the reader) is denied any access at all to her emotions because silence is the one thing characterizing both protagonists. The asymmetry implied cannot be overlooked. Clitophon-the-narrator makes it clear that he laments in silence (ἐθρήνουν ἡσυχῇ, 3.11.1) and conceals the sound of his wailing 'by internalizing it' (τῷ δὲ νῶ κλέψας τοῦ κωκυτοῦ τὸν ψόφον, 3.10.1). He subsequently quotes in full his entire silent lamentation for his interlocutor in Sidon (3.10.1–6). Leucippe too is silent (πάντα σιγῶσαν, 3.11.2). The only words that she utters thematize, specifically, this silence as a marker of her concern about their dangerous situation ('I have lost my tongue, ahead of losing my life'). Consequently, Clitophon is not informed about any other of her thoughts or

¹²⁸ She only documents her decision much later in a letter to Clitophon, where she cynically lists her decision to leave her mother as the first of the many misfortunes that she has undergone because of him (Διὰ σὲ τὴν μητέρα κατέλιπον, 5.18.4).

emotions at the time. While we get a *verbatim* quotation of Clitophon's internalized laments, we are left wondering what Leucippe may have been thinking while sitting next to him. Of course, we never find out. Leucippe, then, is physically present with Clitophon, but it is her cognitive inaccessibility that is thematized.

In other instances, Leucippe is distanced in similar ways. When Charmides falls in love with her, his advances are thwarted by Clitophon and his companion Menelaus, who devise a trick: they fool Charmides into believing that Leucippe is willing to accommodate his advances but requires 'a few days' grace' (ὀλίγην . . . προθεσμίαν ἡμερῶν, 4.7.2). Of course, the request for such a postponement is a standard device for novel protagonists to save their chastity.¹²⁹ But the point in this instance is that the device is no more than a fiction engineered by Clitophon and Menelaus without Leucippe even entering the plot or being informed of Charmides' advances. A similarly conspicuous absence is also thematized in the next episode, where, in fact, she *does* enter the plot but is struck by madness (μανία, 4.9.2) brought about by a drinking potion—all of this, of course, beyond her control (4.9.1–11.1, 4.15.1–17.4). She acts uncontrollably, screams incomprehensibly, slaps Clitophon in the face, and, accordingly, is ashamed when she has come back to her senses and is told about her behaviour. In this one episode where Leucippe *does* occupy centre stage, she is literally not herself.¹³⁰ Again, then, the narrative tantalizingly and emphatically makes the true Leucippe inaccessible to the reader.

There is certainly some truth, then, in Lalanne's (2006: 146–9) observation that Leucippe is silenced after the opening episodes of the novel. After Clitophon-the-character sees her being kidnapped and, he believes, killed before his own eyes (5.7.2), she disappears from the narrative altogether until she unexpectedly resurfaces in Ephesus as a slave on Melite's estate (5.17.3). Even though Clitophon is soon informed about her presence there, the two remain separated until the end of the seventh book (7.16.4). It is ironic that it is precisely this long episode of separation which breaks the pattern of silencing and distancing of Leucippe and develops her character more than the previous books do (in which, paradoxically, the protagonists are together for extended periods of time). In this Ephesian episode, more specifically, Leucippe's portrayal features a number of conspicuous markers of novelistic heroism. It is striking, for example, that in this episode, when enslaved and imprisoned, she is depicted for the first time forcefully and adamantly protecting her chastity in a way that reminds us of other novel heroines, such as Iamblichus' Sinonis, who is also in bondage when she refuses to reciprocate

¹²⁹ See e.g. X. Eph. 1.16.6–7 and Hld. 1.22.5–6. See Panayotakis (2006) on the motif of the grace period in the *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri*.

¹³⁰ Clitophon, in fact, prays that she will 'come to herself' (σεαυτὴν ἀπολάβοις, 4.9.7).

the love of a man who tries to force her to marry him.¹³¹ Moreover, she is for the first time unambiguously characterized as *loving* the hero. She utters a lamentation overheard by Thersander, who interprets it as an indication of her love for Clitophon (ἔρωτος, 6.17.1). And when a little later she forcefully resists Thersander's advances, he observes that she is 'really lovesick' (ἀληθῶς ἐρωτιῶν, 6.20.1).

Her behaviour is further characterized as that of a novel heroine through metaphorical characterization: a number of elements subtly but unmistakably align Leucippe with Callirhoe in two episodes in Chariton's novel.¹³² Leucippe's situation is similar to that of Callirhoe, who is enslaved on an Ionian estate (Miletus) and becomes the object of desire of her master (Dionysius). As I have demonstrated (§1.3.1), Chariton's Milesian episode is intratextually reworked in the Babylonian one, and both, I now argue, are evoked by Achilles Tatius' Ephesian episode. The plot lines are broadly similar in all three episodes: a master orders his slave (Plangon, Artaxates, Sosthenes) to persuade the heroine to share his bed. In all three episodes, moreover, the slave praises his master's social status and/or character in an attempt to persuade the heroine.¹³³ Like Artaxates, moreover, Sosthenes makes clear to the heroine his own role as a go-between (τὸν δεσπότην τὸν ἐμὸν ἐραστὴν σοι προξενεῖ, Ach. Tat. 6.4.3; ἔχεις ἐραστὰς . . . τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα, Chariton 6.5.7). Additionally, an echo of Chariton's Babylonian scene in particular is to be found towards the end of Achilles Tatius' Ephesian episode, when the hero is tricked by an accomplice of his erotic rival into believing that he has lost the heroine forever, after which he considers committing suicide (Ach. Tat. 7.4–6; Chariton 7.1).

As well as these broad similarities, Leucippe's first appearance in the Ephesian episode more specifically evokes Callirhoe in a number of ways. The words with which she introduces herself to Melite, for example, emphasize the reversal of social status or *tychê* that she has undergone: '(I am) a free woman by birth, though a slave now' (ἐλευθέραν μὲν, ὡς ἔφην, δούλην δὲ νῦν, 5.17.3). These words pick up a motif well known from tragedy¹³⁴ that, as we have seen, is substantially played upon in Callirhoe's Milesian episode (see

¹³¹ Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 94, 74a9. M. Jones (2012: 253 n. 224) tantalizingly observes of the Ephesian episode that 'in his efforts to paint Leucippe as chaste . . . Cleitophon overdoes it somewhat'.

¹³² On the possible influence of Chariton on (other scenes of) Achilles Tatius' novel, see Brethes (2007a: 198–9, 206, 231, 257) and Montiglio (2010: 41–5).

¹³³ Sosthenes praises his master's social status (γένει δὲ πρῶτος πάντων Ἰώνων, 6.12.2), wealth (πλοῦτος), morally good character (χρηστότης), and his youth and good looks (νέος καὶ καλός). Artaxates emphasizes Artaxerxes' royal status and power (6.5.5, 6.5.7) and Plangon repeatedly advertises Dionysius' high moral standards to Callirhoe (χρηστός ἐστι καὶ φιλόανθρωπος, 2.2.1; δι' αἰδῶ καὶ σωφροσύνην, 2.10.1; χρηστός, 2.11.6).

¹³⁴ The tragic resonances are further highlighted by the use of iambic trimeter in the Greek phrasing. Whitmarsh and Morales (2001: 158).

pp. 43–4 and 66). Her silence immediately following the declaration of her original status as a free woman (ἐσιώπησε, 5.17.3) also echoes Callirhoe's reaction when she too is enslaved and asked by her new master to tell her story (ἐσιώπα, 2.5.6). In Callirhoe's case, the connection between silence and reversed social status is particularly highlighted when she requests to be allowed to 'remain silent about my *tychē*' (τὴν ἐμυτῆς τύχην σιωπᾶν). And like Callirhoe, and in similar phrasing, Leucippe emphasizes her elite lineage when revealing her true identity to Thersander.¹³⁵ Given these similarities, it is worth raising the possibility that even the name that Leucippe adopts (5.17.5) in this episode—Lacaena (Λάκαινα, 'Laconian woman')—might allude to Chariton's heroine. As a Syracusan, Callirhoe is famously Laconian in origin (Chaereas, for example, explicitly identifies himself as a Dorian in 7.3.8). And of course, Lacaena's name is one of the traditional epithets of Helen,¹³⁶ who, as we have seen, is repeatedly and emphatically foregrounded in Chariton's novel as one of the most prominent paradigms of Callirhoe.

Leucippe's confrontation with Sosthenes in particular echoes Callirhoe's confrontation with Artaxates. When Sosthenes first approaches Leucippe, he tries to manipulate her by advertising himself as her benefactor ('my arrival will bring you a heap of benefits', φέρων σωρὸν ἀγαθῶν, 6.4.2; 'this success is all down to me', τὸ . . . κατόρθωμα τοῦτο ἐμόν, 6.11.3) and makes it clear that he expects gratitude in return ('take care not to forget me in your time of good fortune', μὴ ἐπιλήσῃ μου, 6.4.2; 'remember me too', μνημόνευε δὲ κάμοῦ, 6.11.4). Both speech acts verbally echo those of Artaxates when he first approaches Callirhoe (μεγάλων . . . ἀγαθῶν . . . θησαυρόν . . . μνημόνευέ μου τῆς εὐεργεσίας, 6.5.1). Just like Callirhoe, furthermore, Leucippe uses irony (τὴν εἰρωνείαν, 6.12.1; κατειρωνεύσατο, Chariton 6.5.8) to handle the slave's attempt to manipulate her into having sex with his master, and just like Artaxates, Sosthenes, as a slave, is unable to understand (οὐ συνείς, 6.12.1) such rhetorical subtlety. Just as in Chariton, then, the heroine's *eugeneia* is thematized, albeit less explicitly, by her mastery of a rhetorical trope incomprehensible to her slave opponent.

At this point in the story, Clitophon has already drawn on novelistic material to align himself with a novelistic hero. Such self-depiction involves general allusions to novelistic *topoi* such as his use of military imagery to depict his love for Leucippe (2.4.5, 2.5.2), which aligns him with novel heroes such as Ninus (νικῶμαι, A.II.19; [αἰ]χμάλωτος . . . ἑαλωκός, A.II.30–1) and

¹³⁵ 'Do not think I am a slave, Thersander. I am the daughter of the general of Byzantium (Στρατηγοῦ θυγάτηρ), the pre-eminent woman in Tyre (πρώτου Τυρίων γυνή)' (Ach. Tat. 6.16.5) ~ 'I am the daughter of Hermocrates, the general of the Syracusans' (Ερμοκράτους εἰμὶ θυγάτηρ, τοῦ Συρακοσίων στρατηγοῦ) (Chariton 2.5.10).

¹³⁶ See e.g. E. *Hec.* 441 and E. *Andr.* 486. See Laplace (2007: 579–82) for more references to ancient sources.

Xenophon's Habrocomes (see pp. 128 and 134).¹³⁷ But it also involves specific intertextual play with, again, Chariton. Just like Chaereas, for example, Clitophon makes himself a dinner guest of an Egyptian army leader (*ῥοιστράπεζον*, 3.14.2; *ῥοιστράπεζον*, Chariton 7.2.5). The irony of this attempted self-association with Chaereas is that, whereas Chaereas' promotion is accompanied by heroic military action, Clitophon's is the result of the mere performance of a couple of military manoeuvres on horseback (3.14.2).¹³⁸ Instances like these have made scholars characterize Clitophon as 'an ordinary sort of guy' who, as a narrator of his own story, is exposed by the hidden author as consciously assimilating his life, like Encolpius, to literature in general and the canonical form of the Greek novel in particular.¹³⁹ I believe that in the Ephesian episode Chariton in particular is put to such use. Clitophon-the-narrator deliberately aligns Leucippe with Callirhoe, but at the same time is confronted with a hermeneutic crux: the protagonists are separated almost all the time and Clitophon extensively narrates events to which he has, logically speaking, no access.¹⁴⁰ He cannot know, for example, what goes on in Leucippe's hut between her and Thersander while he himself is in an Ephesian prison cell. It is ironic, therefore, that after books of ambiguous, partial, and colourless depiction of Leucippe, we suddenly get a fairly detailed picture of her precisely in an episode where it never becomes clear how Clitophon knows about her whereabouts in the first place. And it is more than striking, of course, that *then* (and only then) does she appear from Clitophon's description as exemplifying a number of important markers of novelistic heroism as thematized in Chariton's novel: she is suddenly shown to love the hero, to self-consciously evaluate her changed social status, to prefer to be silent about it to others, and to outwit with irony the slave who acts as a go-between between her and his master and who expects gratitude in return. In the Ephesian episode, in other words, we finally see Leucippe behave like a proper Greek novel heroine.

How to explain this changed depiction? We have seen that Clitophon-the-narrator often draws upon (supposedly) universal truths to fill in gaps in

¹³⁷ M. Jones (2012: 168–72, esp. 168) rightly suggests that Clitophon projects himself as an erotic warrior, 'as though conscious of his role as romantic hero. His use of the metaphor offers both his internal and external audiences exactly what they might expect in terms of narrative topoi from at tale about love at first sight.'

¹³⁸ On this point, see Kasprzyk (2012: 130), who offers an instructive discussion of the language of performance common to both episodes (but ultimately reads this episode as an example of an overall marginalization of warfare in Achilles Tatius' novel). M. Jones (2012: 129–30), for her part, discusses Clitophon's display with reference to Theagenes' performance on horseback in Hld. 3.3.7–8.

¹³⁹ Morgan (2007a: 117). See also Whitmarsh (2003: 194) on Clitophon as a 'novelized' hero: 'He possesses a generalized familiarity with the structural expectations and generic set-pieces of novelistic narrative.'

¹⁴⁰ Reardon (1994: 85–6).

factual knowledge about aspects of his narrative to which he has no access (such as the emotions of other characters). Given the prominent hermeneutic question evoked in this episode, we may be invited to wonder whether Clitophon is shown here again to be filling gaps in his factual knowledge, this time by drawing not upon general but rather *generic* knowledge: knowledge, that is, about how Greek novel heroines behave and, therefore, how his own beloved is supposed to have behaved during the long time that he spent separated from her. Are we to read this episode as the product of a narrator who depicts his beloved not as he *knows* she has behaved (because he does not) but as he *wants her* to have behaved? Or are we to accept the only logically possible solution to the hermeneutic crux—that Leucippe has filled him in later (just as, in fact, she informs him about other events in 8.16)? Possibly, but this would inevitably lead to a no less problematic (but possibly even more exciting) conclusion: the implication would inevitably be that *this* is the way in which Leucippe has presented herself to Clitophon—as a perfect Greek novel heroine—and, secondly, that Clitophon is only too happy to believe it and reproduce it as fact in his own narration. Again, we are unable to give any conclusive answer as to which scenario is more likely. But Leucippe's depiction in the Ephesian episode clearly raises the question of a narrator who might be fictionalizing, this time to make profoundly ambiguous one of the most central elements in the narrative: the depiction of the heroine.

But the Ephesian episode is not the only one that raises questions about fictionalization in Leucippe's depiction. Such fictionalization is present as early as the first two books, where it is mainly explored in instances where Clitophon depicts Leucippe's body language. In general, Clitophon considers himself expert enough in reading the body language of others to elaborate theoretically on the principle that body language (i.e. facial expression) offers important indications about people's minds (ὁ . . . νοῦς . . . τῷ προσώπῳ, 6.6.2). And certainly, he often reads Leucippe's body language as an important source of knowledge about her emotional disposition. The point is, I argue, that his comments about her body language and behaviour towards him are primarily an indication of *his own* erotic disposition rather than hers. Repeatedly, Clitophon offers an *interpretation* of her body language rather than a full description of it. Moreover, in some cases the reader is invited to question this interpretation. For example, during Clitophon's speech about the erotic behaviour of, among others, peacocks and palm trees (1.17.1–18.5), he observes Leucippe's reaction (πῶς ἔχει) but communicates to his interlocutor in Sidon no more than that she 'seemed to be signalling (ὕπεσθήμαινεν) that the experience [of hearing the speech] was not without a certain pleasure (οὐκ ἀδῶς ἀκούειν)' (1.19.1).¹⁴¹ Clitophon does not mention any specific aspect of

¹⁴¹ Liviabella Furiani (1998) discusses Clitophon's and Leucippe's body language, but does not connect this with characterization.

body language that leads him to this interpretation.¹⁴² However, his interpretation may be made problematic by the fact that, as he mentions himself in narrator text, Leucippe leaves shortly after having heard his speech (μετὰ μικρὸν ἀπιοῦσα ᾤχετο, 1.19.2). The reader, for his/her part, may suspect that what Leucippe actually *does* can hardly be read as an indication of amusement. As an explanation for Leucippe's decision to leave, Clitophon adduces the fact that it is time for her cithara lesson (1.19.2). Soon after, it becomes clear that this addition results from *ex eventu* knowledge adopted by the 'narrating I': when Leucippe leaves, Clitophon follows her and sees her play the cithara (2.1.1–3).¹⁴³ He did not know *why* Leucippe left at the time, and the causal connection between her decision to leave and her cithara lesson is created by his inference from a subsequent observation. The reader, on the other hand, is aware of the possibility that Leucippe did not leave because of her cithara lesson at all, but because she got tired of Clitophon's amorous discourse. Clitophon, nevertheless, praises himself on his speech (ἐπηνοῦμεν, 1.19.3).

It is not until Clitophon narrates his first meeting with Leucippe in private that he gives us any information about her body language in the form of a proper attribute rather than an interpretation. When he unexpectedly runs into her, he greets her as his mistress (δέσποινα, 2.6.2). The girl reacts as follows:

She smiled a winsome smile (μειδιάσασα γλυκύ); though her smile said clearly (ἐμφανίσασα διὰ τοῦ γέλωτος) that she understood why I called her 'my mistress', she asked, 'I? Your lady? Don't say that! (Μὴ τοῦτο εἶπης)'. (2.6.2)

Clitophon in this passage infers from Leucippe's smile that she understands why he calls her his mistress.¹⁴⁴ Again, however, the reader is invited to interpret something that Clitophon has merely registered (this time, Leucippe's speech). Whereas she seems to understand perfectly well the erotic implications of Clitophon's words, she explicitly tells him *not* to call her his mistress.¹⁴⁵ Clitophon then evokes the story about Heracles and Omphale to present himself as Leucippe's slave.¹⁴⁶ A poignant contrast to this episode occurs at the end of the narrative, where Callisthenes' declaration of his love

¹⁴² Konstantinova (2000: 201) also points to the vagueness of 'ὑπεσήμεναι' and suggests that 'it is not at all certain that Leucippe is indeed falling in love with Clitophon. . . . He may be, indeed, imagining such a development.' For a more straightforward reading of this passage, on the other hand, see Briand (2009: 337–8).

¹⁴³ See Reardon (1994: 82–4), Effe (1997: 82), de Jong (1999), and Whitmarsh (2003) on the alternation between the 'experiencing I' (interpreting events by means of restricted knowledge as a character in the narrative) and the 'narrating I' (interpreting events by means of *ex eventu* knowledge as a narrator) in this novel. Ancient literary criticism discusses this distinction with regard to Odysseus (*Od.* 9–12) (Nünlist 2009: 125).

¹⁴⁴ See also Brethes (2003: 119–20) and Liviabella Furiani (2000: 80–1).

¹⁴⁵ On this reaction, see also Morgan (2007a: 118–19).

¹⁴⁶ For diverging details in different versions of this story, see *OCD*⁴ s.v. Omphale.

for Calligone recalls Clitophon's speech: like Clitophon, he addresses his beloved as his 'mistress' (δέσποινα, 8.17.3) and presents himself as her slave (δοῦλον). Sostratus, the narrator of this episode, makes it clear that Callisthenes' speech is characterized by eloquence (στωμύλος, 8.17.4) and persuasiveness (πιθανώτατος) and that 'with these words and many more that were even more alluring' (ταῦτα εἰπὼν καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείονα ἐπαγωγότερα) he managed to win the girl over to his side (αὐτῷ γενέσθαι παρεσκεύασεν). The impact on Leucippe of Clitophon's comparable approach is markedly different.

The protagonists' first kiss constitutes another significant episode. It occurs as a result of Clitophon's observation that Leucippe has cured a bee sting on Cleo's hand by murmuring (ἐπάσασαν, 2.7.2) two incantations onto it. Subsequently, he pretends (προσεποιούμην, 2.7.3) to be stung on the lip and asks Leucippe to recite the incantations to heal his wound (τί οὐκ ἐπάδεις, 2.7.4). Leucippe, we are told, places her mouth upon his for the spell (ἐνέθηκεν ὡς ἐπάσουςα τὸ στόμα) and whispers something while brushing the surface of his lips (ψαύουσά μου τῶν χειλέων) (2.7.4). Clitophon, for his part, responds by kissing the girl 'silently' (κατεφίλουν σιωπῇ, 2.7.5) and Leucippe, in turn, 'turned her incantations into osculation' (φιλήματα ἐποίει τὴν ἐπωδήν). Arguably, it is Clitophon who makes the first move towards erotic contact (*he kisses her*). That she would touch Clitophon's lips (ψαύουσα) was to be expected, since it is suggested that she touched also Cleo's hand to cure it (she puts away her cithara (καταθεμένη, 2.7.2) before having a closer look (κατενόει) at the wound). Clitophon, however, suggests that Leucippe approaches him deliberately to kiss him, and *not* to cure him. The word 'ὡς' indicates that Leucippe positions her mouth *as if* (and not *because*) she wants to pronounce incantations. His narration of Leucippe's reaction shows that he imagines Leucippe to have the same erotic hidden agenda as himself. This might indeed be the case, but the problem is, typically, that the reader is not offered any factual objective indication of whether to doubt or accept Clitophon's interpretation. A factual indication is offered when he embraces her (περιβαλὼν) and kisses her openly (φανερῶς κατεφίλουν, 2.7.5; as opposed to 'silently' at first): she recoils (διασχούσα) and asks him what he is doing (Τί ποιεῖς;) and whether he is also reciting (καὶ σὺ κατεπάδεις;). When he answers that he embraces the sorceress who has eased his suffering, she smiles (ἐμειδίασε, 2.7.6). Because this smile indicates to Clitophon that she has understood what he means, he takes courage (θαροσήσας) and declares his love for her more openly. Then he embraces her more firmly (βιαιότερον περιέβαλλον, 2.7.7) and kisses her more boldly (ἐφίλουν ἐλευθεριώτερον). Again, his interpretation of Leucippe's reaction is significant: 'she endured my embraces, with a show of resistance' (ἡνείχετο, κωλύουσα δῆθεν). Where-as the reader sees that Leucippe's actual reaction is resistance (κωλύουσα), Clitophon deems it fake (δῆθεν) and concludes that she accepts his advances (ἡνείχετο). In this passage, then, a particularly sharp contrast

between Leucippe's actual action (pulling back) and Clitophon's interpretation (accepting) emerges.¹⁴⁷ The hermeneutic problems of his interpretation of her behaviour are even more forcefully highlighted immediately afterwards: when they see her servant approaching and they separate, he makes it clear that he simply does not know her feelings: 'I unwilling and suffering, she—well, I do not know what her emotions were' (οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως εἶχεν, 2.8.1). Moreover, Clitophon's interpretation is contextualized by an earlier passage in the novel, where Clinias teaches him that women, even if they are willing to have sex, put up a show of resistance and want it to look as if they have been forced (θέλουσι βιάζεσθαι δοκεῖν, 1.10.6).¹⁴⁸ The context in which Leucippe resists Clitophon's approaches can, of course, hardly be defined as sex, but his firmer embraces and bolder kisses nevertheless point out that he goes further than mere kisses. Since Clitophon feels entitled to unmask Leucippe's resistance as mere appearance, his interpretation of her behaviour is diametrically opposed to the reader's: the reader sees that Leucippe resists Clitophon's advances, but Clitophon himself interprets this resistance as an expression of acceptance. Commentators have read (pretty much like Clitophon, one could argue) Leucippe's body language in this part of the novel as an indication of Achilles Tatius' realism in presenting her interaction with Clitophon,¹⁴⁹ but I would rather suggest that realism here primarily operates on another level: it can be found not so much in Leucippe's attitude towards Clitophon, but rather in the interpretation by our protagonist-in-love of her body language. Since Clitophon is in love with the girl, he consistently interprets her body language as an indication of amusement, agreement, or invitation, even if there is no reason to do so.

The impact of Clitophon's own erotic nature on how he narrativizes Leucippe is systematically foregrounded by metaphorical techniques of characterization in particular. First, virtually all metaphorical characterization of Leucippe highlights her physical beauty. Leucippe is associated throughout the novel with a number of mythological women who are all famous for their beauty and the sexual attraction they exerted upon men or gods. When narrating his first encounter with her, for example, Clitophon compares her to Selene (Σελήνην, 1.4.3)¹⁵⁰ and explicitly identifies divine beauty (of the face in particular) as the *tertium comparationis* (κάλλος, 1.4.4). Moreover, he evokes the depiction of Selene sitting on a bull (ἐπὶ ταύρῳ γεγραμμένην, 1.4.3), which recalls the depiction of Europa, whose beauty is explicitly

¹⁴⁷ See also Brethes (2007a: 224) on this passage.

¹⁴⁸ See also Konstantinova (2000: 202): 'Cleinius has told him that a girl's "no" is in fact "yes".'

¹⁴⁹ Rojas Álvarez (1989: 83) and Sedelmeier (1959: 118) are examples.

¹⁵⁰ A number of manuscripts read *Εὐρώπην* instead of *Σελήνην*. For a survey of the manuscript readings and scholarly opinions on the matter, see Cueva (2006: 131–8). For arguments underscoring the reading of *Σελήνην*, see Vilborg (1962: 21–2), Morgan (2004c: 494–5 n. 6), and Cueva (2006: 138–43).

addressed in the opening paragraph of the novel (καλή, 1.1.3) and who has convincingly been identified by others as a paradigm for Leucippe.¹⁵¹ Similarly, Andromeda is evoked by a painting representing Perseus' rescue of her and is also clearly aligned with Leucippe.¹⁵² Again, her beauty is emphasized (κάλλος, 3.7.2) and represented with a flowery metaphor (ἀνθεῖ τὸ κάλλος, 3.7.3) that recalls Clitophon's description of Leucippe (ἄνθος, 1.4.3). Philomela, who is, like Andromeda, depicted on a painting (5.3.4–6) and can equally be read as a paradigm for Leucippe,¹⁵³ again embodies sexual attraction, as the painting presents her rape by Tereus. Finally, Leucippe is also aligned with two famously attractive nymphs. Of course, Clitophon's conscious association of himself with Apollo after hearing the famous myth about this god (see pp. 171–3) aligns Leucippe with Daphne. This alignment is evoked again when an Artemisian priest in Ephesus adduces another myth narrating the pursuit of a nymph by an amorous god, with equally tragic results. This is the myth of Syrinx and Pan (8.6.1–11), adduced as an aetiological explanation of the role of the pan flute (*syrinx*) in the virginity test that Leucippe is about to undergo. Leucippe is associated with Syrinx¹⁵⁴ to the point where Clitophon, given Pan's reputation as a lover of virgins, makes clear his hopes that Leucippe will not become 'a second Syrinx' (μὴ δευτέρα καὶ σὺ Σύριγξ γένη, 8.13.3). All these mythological women, then, explicitly or implicitly functioning as paradigms for Leucippe in Clitophon's narration, evoke famous physical beauty and (often literally) devastating sexual attraction. As such, the paradigms underline not simply Leucippe's ravishing beauty but also, and probably more importantly, Clitophon's concern with this aspect of his beloved in his narration.

Such concern is further fleshed out by other metaphorical characterizations. Clitophon's descriptions of Leucippe also adopt *comparantia* drawn from the floral world. He compares her face to a meadow (1.19.1), her mouth, cheeks, and lips to roses (1.4.3, 1.19.1, and 2.1.3), her face to a narcissus, her glance to a violet, and her hair to ivy (all at 1.19.1). *Comparantia* are also drawn from the realm of lightning and radiance (καταστράπτει, 1.4.2; ἔστιλβε . . . ἡ τῶν

¹⁵¹ See, among others, Vilborg (1962: 22), S. Bartsch (1989: 52–4), and Reeves (2007).

¹⁵² Both Andromeda (3.7.1, 3.7.4, 3.7.6, 3.7.7) and Leucippe (cf. 1.5.3, 1.6.1, 1.6.5, 1.6.6, 1.15.1, 1.19.1, 2.1.1, 2.5.1, 2.6.1, 2.9.1, 2.10.1, 2.19.2, 2.27.2, 3.15.2, 3.20.1, 3.21.1, 3.21.2, 3.22.5, 3.22.6, 5.7.1, 5.7.2, 5.20.1, 6.3.4, 6.18.2, 7.11.6, 7.15.1) are systematically referred to as 'the girl' (ἡ κόρη). Moreover, the depiction of Andromeda's cheeks verbally echoes Leucippe's introductory *ecphrasis* (τῶν παρεῶν . . . ἀφοίνικτον . . . βέβηπτται, 3.7.3; παρεῖδ . . . ἐφονίσσετο . . . βάπτει, 1.4.3). S. Bartsch (1989: 56–7) lists a number of other possible similarities between the two girls.

¹⁵³ See S. Bartsch (1989: 65–6), who reads the events happening to Philomela in the painting as proleptic of what happens to Leucippe in the story.

¹⁵⁴ Both Leucippe (6.3.4, 6.3.6, 7.15.1, 8.10.5) and Syrinx are said to be beautiful (εὐειδής, 8.6.7). The priest concludes his story by making explicit the connection between the two girls: he predicts that Leucippe has nothing to fear if, like Syrinx (παρθένος, 8.6.7), she is a virgin (παρθένος, 8.6.15).

ὀφθαλμῶν ἐμάρμαιρεν αὐγή, 1.19.1). Such *comparantia* are recurrent in depictions of heroines in other novels too¹⁵⁵ and meadows as well as flowers (roses in particular) have a long and famous tradition as symbols of female sexuality¹⁵⁶ rehearsed in rhetorical school exercises.¹⁵⁷ As in the episodes foregrounding gnomic wisdom (§3.3), then, Clitophon's depiction of female beauty seems informed by topical language and traditional imagery. This is suggested all the more by the fact that he uses exactly the same images to describe Melite's beauty later in the story. He compares Melite's cheeks, like Leucippe's, to roses (ρόδον . . . ἐμπεφυτεῦσθαι ταῖς παρειαῖς, 5.13.1) and adopts the metaphor of radiance to describe her beauty (Ἐμάρμαιρεν αὐτῆς τὸ βλέμμα μαρμαρυγῇν, 5.13.2). He uses standard tropes readily applicable to different beautiful women in the story.

When we turn, now, to Clitophon's own metaphorically elaborated characteristics, an interesting parallel emerges. Whereas the metaphorical characterization of Leucippe primarily highlights her physical beauty, Clitophon's own metaphorical characterization, correspondingly, highlights his *erôtikos* nature and thus complements and further reinforces the semantic patterns generated by the mythological paradigms that have been shown to consistently destabilize his self-proclaimed chastity. The protagonists' assimilation to peacocks is a case in point. When Clitophon sees a peacock spreading its tail in his garden, he explains to Satyrus, with Leucippe within hearing distance, that the bird is in love (ἐρωτικός, 1.16.2) and desires to seduce the peahen (ἐπαγαγέσθαι . . . τὴν ἐρωμένην). With these words he aligns himself with the peacock: the explicit characterization of the peacock as *erôtikos* highlights Clitophon's own disposition towards Leucippe at this moment in the story. Moreover, he informs his interlocutor in narrator text that his speech is meant to be overheard by Leucippe and is aimed at seducing the girl (εὐάγωγον . . . παρασκευάσαι, 1.16.1)—a verbal echo strengthening his alignment with the peacock.¹⁵⁸ Like the peacock's physical display, then, Clitophon's rhetorical display is geared towards seduction. This alignment between the two kinds of display evokes a metaphor not uncommon in Greek imperial literature aligning the physical beauty of peacocks with rhetorical display.¹⁵⁹ The alignment is further strengthened by Clitophon's conspicuous

¹⁵⁵ See Ch. 1 n. 119 for references to examples from other novels.

¹⁵⁶ See e.g. *Il.* 14.348 (where flowers spring up as a result of the erotic encounter between Zeus and Hera) and Sappho 94 (where the narrator reminds a girl of good times spent together and puts garlands of flowers (including roses) around their necks, whereupon they satisfy their desire; see Heirman 2012: 90 on this passage). On the erotic connotations of roses in particular, see Winkler (1980: 173), LSJ s.v. *rhodon* III, and J. Henderson (1991: 135; on comedy).

¹⁵⁷ See Aphth. *Prog.* 22.14–15 Sp. II and Chor. *Dial.* 9.7–8, 24.3–7 for associations between roses and Aphrodite.

¹⁵⁸ On Clitophon's association with the peacock, see also Morales (2004: 185, 190).

¹⁵⁹ See, most notably, Philostr. *VS* 617.7–9, D. Chr. 12.2–3, and Lucian *Dom.* 11. See Zeitlin (2013) for details.

use of rhetorical vocabulary to describe the peacock spreading its tail. The peacock is said to ‘stage the theatre of his feathers’ (τὸ θέατρον ἐπιδεικνύναι τῶν πτερῶν, 1.16.2), an expression that not only adopts a verb commonly used to refer to the performance of rhetorical set speeches¹⁶⁰ but also captures the visual display with a metaphor involving one of the most prominent spaces of verbal display. Moreover, this expression is immediately followed by Clitophon-the-character’s observation that the peacock does not spread its tail ‘without design’ (ἄνευ τέχνης, 1.16.2), another term that, given the preceding hints, immediately foregrounds the famous definition of rhetoric as a *technê*.

Leucippe is also associated with the peacock. The metaphorical depiction of her face as a meadow (λειμών, 1.19.2) recalls the depiction of the beauty of the peacock, whose tail is said to have ‘a meadow of flowers in his feathers’ that blossoms more richly than the peahen’s (λειμῶνα πτερῶν, 1.16.3; ὁ . . . τοῦ ταῶ λειμῶν εὐανθέστερος, 1.16.3). Since these words are equally part of Clitophon’s embedded speech on the erotic behaviour of peacocks, intended to assimilate his own love for Leucippe to the peacock’s love for the peahen (as is explicitly pointed out in 1.16.1), this metaphor clearly appropriates the term λειμών for erotic discourse and prepares the ground for the comparison of Leucippe herself with a λειμών shortly after. Such appropriation not only enacts a well-known literary *topos*,¹⁶¹ but also complicates Leucippe’s association with the peahen by aligning her with the peacock through the common imagery of the meadow. It therefore constitutes an implicit prolepsis of her explicit comparison with the peacock a little later (τοῦ ταῶ, 1.19.1), when her beauty is said to surpass his. The association of both Clitophon and Leucippe with the peacock is emblematic of a pattern underlying much metaphorical characterization of the protagonists: it highlights Leucippe’s beauty on the one hand and Clitophon’s *erôtikos* character on the other.

A comparable pattern is operative in the protagonists’ association with the phoenix. As Morales (2004: 192, 1995: 45–8) rightly points out, Leucippe is associated with this bird (φοῖνιξ, 3.25.1) in various instances. Again, the *tertium comparationis* is beauty: like Leucippe (1.19.1), the phoenix surpasses the peacock in beauty (τῇ χροιᾷ ταῶς ἐν κάλλει δεύτερος, 3.25.1) and is compared to a rose (3.25.3). Leucippe’s association with this bird, however, is complicated by the fact that Clitophon too is associated with it: the depiction of the bird’s behaviour is marked by rhetorical discourse that aligns it with that of the peacock and, therefore, with that of Clitophon in the peacock episode. Just as the peacock displays (ἐπιδεικνύναι) its tail, the phoenix displays

¹⁶⁰ See, perhaps most famously, Pl. *Grg.* 447c on Gorgias’ *epideixeis*. See also D. 18.280, Th. 3.42, and Ar. *Eq.* 349.

¹⁶¹ See Bremer (1975: 268–74) and Motte (1971: 9–10) on the erotic implications of descriptions of flowery meadows in Greek poetry. On meadows as erotic metaphors (in archaic lyric), see Heirman (2012: 99–112).

(ἐπιδείκνυται) the corpse of its deceased parent and in pronouncing an oration even becomes ‘a funeral sophist’ (ἐπιτάφιος σοφιστής, 3.25.7). But of course, the most obvious connection between Clitophon and the bird is that the true ‘Phoenix’ (which, of course, also means ‘Phoenician’) in this story is not Leucippe but Clitophon (Φοινίκη, 1.3.1).¹⁶² Whereas Leucippe’s association with the phoenix underlines her beauty, Clitophon’s association with it recalls his Phoenician origin, which, by reputation, means a keen interest in sex. This last association is picked up by the conspicuous connection between the phoenix and sex set up in the description of the bird: it shows its genitals in order to confirm its true identity.¹⁶³ The reference to genitals as ‘the things of its body not to be spoken of’ (τὰ ἀπόρρητα . . . τοῦ σώματος, 3.25.7) is not unusual¹⁶⁴ and in this instance provides a corporeal mirror image of the inner sanctum (‘the place not to be entered’, ἀδύτων, 3.25.6) of a temple from which, the story stipulates, a book is produced for the same purpose of confirming the bird’s identity. But the reference to genitals also evokes the language of secrecy associated with mystery cults¹⁶⁵ and so commonly used in this novel to evoke sex (1.2.2, 1.7.1, 1.10.5, 1.18.3, etc.).

According to Morales (1995: 48), associations of Leucippe with animals such as the phoenix ‘beastify’ her. But given the recurrent ambiguity underlying such associations (the peacock and the phoenix are not only aligned with Leucippe but also with Clitophon), the dynamic evoked by such comparisons is more complex.¹⁶⁶ Even an episode where Leucippe is emphatically objectified and simultaneously aligned with a hippopotamus is invested with such ambiguity. During a hunting party, a general’s attention to Leucippe is paralleled to the hunters’ attention to the hippopotamus: ‘While all our eyes were on the beast, the general’s were on Leucippe. He was immediately captivated (ἐαλώκει)’ (4.3.1). Even though Leucippe, like the hippopotamus, is presented as the object of male gaze, it is Charmides who is ultimately associated with the hippopotamus because it is he who is eventually captured (ἐαλώκει). This may suggest that such episodes do not act as tools for female ‘beastification’ in any straightforward way. The animals are systematically associated with the male characters too and, what is more, the associations are primarily limited to Clitophon’s (narrator or character) text. Even if we assume that Achilles’

¹⁶² Another novelist playing with the meaning of the word ‘phoenix’ is Heliodorus: see Bowie (1998).

¹⁶³ For a different reading, connecting this detail to Leucippe’s obligation to undergo a test to prove her virginity, see Morales (1995: 45–8, 2004: 192).

¹⁶⁴ See LSJ s.v. ἀπόρρητος II.5.

¹⁶⁵ See e.g. SIG 873.9 (τὰ ἀπόρρητα τῆς κατὰ τὰ μυστήρια τελετῆς) and a fragment from *Iolaus* (P. Oxy. 3010, 1: [ἀ]πορρήτων); on the latter, see Stephens and Winkler (1995: 371).

¹⁶⁶ Ballengee (2005: 153–61) also points to the ambiguity of such allegedly beastifying instances, albeit from another angle altogether. King (2012: 147) also complicates the allegedly ‘misogynistic’ character of this novel.

readers were mostly male and out for (literary) erotic adventures (and therefore arguably would want to see what Clitophon sees in Leucippe), the point of Clitophon's associations of Leucippe with birds may very well be that they inform the reader in the first place about *himself*—they highlight his conspicuous interest in female beauty and sex. Whether or not the reader is invited to do the same is a different matter.

3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Scholars have characterized Clitophon-the-character as an epic¹⁶⁷ or novelistic anti-hero,¹⁶⁸ whose deeds and words subvert heroic ethics. I, for my part, have approached both Clitophon-the-character and Leucippe as constructs crafted by Clitophon-the-narrator. I have explored how he consciously invests both his former self and his beloved with strands of novelistic heroism and how at the same time these strands are questioned and made problematic.

Just like the introduction of the protagonists in Chariton's novel, that of Clitophon simultaneously evokes and complicates readers' expectations about questions that will turn out to be of central importance throughout the novel. Clitophon repeatedly presents himself as possessing the qualities that generically characterize any novel hero: he reveals an erotic disposition, acknowledges the importance of Eros in his own life (including, possibly, a self-advertisement of his own knowledgeability), and emphasizes his own acquaintance with erotic *misfortunes* in particular. The foregrounding of these elements generates instability and ambiguity in Clitophon's self-presentation throughout the entire novel. On the one hand, they seem at first sight to align Clitophon generically with other heroes in any ancient Greek novel, who by the end of their stories have all had their share of erotic experience in general and erotic misfortunes in particular. On the other hand, Clitophon's claims contain markers of generic atypicality. This novel hero is a Phoenician rather than a Greek, he is alone after the conclusion of his adventures rather than together with his beloved, and his Phoenician origin at once infuses his self-presentation with sexual overtones and questions his reliability as a narrator. The introduction of Clitophon invites the reader, then, to be aware of the fact that this Greek novel will be about a highly unusual hero and will be narrated by an equally unusual narrator. Such instability resonates with other

¹⁶⁷ G. Anderson (1982: 30–1, 1984: 63) and Fusillo (1989: 102).

¹⁶⁸ Brethes (2001, 2007a: 202–12).

instances of ambiguity and indeterminacy in this novel, whose author is notorious for transgressing boundaries and blurring clear-cut distinctions.¹⁶⁹

It is significant that one of the most important sites where Clitophon's unstable self-presentation is thematized is *sôphrosynê*, one of the hallmarks of novelistic heroism and one of which Clitophon repeatedly and overtly casts himself as exemplary.¹⁷⁰ We learn from his account to Sostratus that in this area at least Clitophon is careful to mould narration in view of his interlocutor. In Clitophon's narration of the overarching narrative, where he may have been tempted to fictionalize the story and/or himself in order to make them more appealing to his fiction-loving and *erôtikos* interlocutor, the episodes dealing with his love for Leucippe on the one hand and his relationship with Melite on the other are aligned by the fact that they both harbour explicit self-presentations as *sôphrôn*. In both cases this self-characterization is sometimes supported (for example, through his consistent refusal to have sex with Melite, although that is set aside in the end), but mostly destabilized, by different kinds of indirect characterization (metonymical as well as metaphorical). The sexual overtones generated from the outset of the story resurface in Clitophon's conspicuous (and, before Calligone's abduction, exclusive) interest in sex with Leucippe. His dedicated attention to physical beauty is also apparent from his depiction of Leucippe. He pays conspicuously limited attention to her inner characteristics. Together with Xenophon of Ephesus' Anthia, Leucippe is the Greek novel heroine of whom the fewest characteristics are explicitly thematized. On the other hand, Clitophon *does* focus upon her physical appearance. Virtually all his metaphorical characterization of her (mythological paradigms, animals) has beauty as its *tertium comparationis*. This feature creates a significant parallel with Clitophon's own metaphorical characterization, which consistently underlines his erotic character. In his relationship with Melite, his self-portrayal as *sôphrôn* is similarly made problematic, for example by his implicit association with Thersander. Moreover, a number of paradigms, all evoked in the two episodes where he most emphasizes his own *sôphrosynê*, highlight less than *sôphrôn* aspects of his character. Finally, his *sôphrosynê* is, like Leucippe's *parthenia*, invested with an ambiguity involving the difference between factuality and intentionality.

Of course, these fissures between Clitophon's explicit self-characterization and its indirect deconstruction act as markers of unreliable narration

¹⁶⁹ Morales (2004: 60–77, 183), for example, identifies slippages between media within the novel. Guez (2005: 299–308), for his part, reads ambiguity in the depiction of space in this novel as emblematic of the 'univers indécidable' in which the story is set. See also Guez (2003: 231–8) on the axiological ambiguity of Achilles Tatius' conception of 'le romanesque'.

¹⁷⁰ See also Morgan (2007a: 117) and Kasprzyk (2009: 105–7) on Clitophon's conscious assimilation of his own life to the canonical Greek novel conventions (the latter on *sôphrosynê* in particular).

(the reader is invited to interpret things differently from the narrator), a question clearly thematized as early as his introduction. But at the same time they cast Clitophon as a non-manipulative narrator who unwittingly registers his own character faults and errors. There are also instances, however, where his fictionalizing behaviour as a narrator is informed by his purported self-depiction not as a character but as a *narrator*. Here, his self-presentation echoes (and seems to be designed to validate) his self-presentation in the introduction: he indirectly characterizes himself through a number of gnomic digressions about love, emotions, and amatory behaviour throughout the narrative as an authoritative voice experienced in erotic matters. His adoption of progymnasmatic knowledge as a tool to make his knowledge communicable—possibly in imitation of his *praeceptor* Clinias—emphasizes his rationalizing stance. But the validity of at least one maxim is contradicted by his own behaviour, while another is exposed as (almost) leading him to self-destruction. Moreover, the general knowledge displayed in maxims and gnomic digressions is often used to bridge gaps in factual knowledge ('something like this happened to X'), which surely does not act as a marker of manipulation (Clitophon may very well think that his deductions are perfectly plausible) but nevertheless implies fictionalization of some sort.

We are invited to detect similar (unconscious?) instances of fictionalization in another important area of novelistic narration: the depiction of the heroine. Generally speaking (but during the first couple of books in particular), Clitophon offers a one-sided and partial depiction of Leucippe, with a number of markers of female novelistic heroism being conspicuously absent. The ambiguity of the few bare facts recorded (such as her decision to escape from her mother, her letter of reproach to Clitophon, and her virginity intentionally given away as early as the second book) do not cast her as a typical novel heroine at all. One could argue, paradoxically, that despite such a partial depiction, Leucippe is individuated more than any other novel heroine, to the point where serious doubts are raised about whether she actually *is* one. But the point is, however, that Clitophon wants her to be such a heroine. When monitoring her reactions, for example, he sees in her body language what, given his erotic disposition, he would like to see in it and narrates accordingly. But when narrating the Ephesian episode and arguably having come to a hermeneutic crux, he suddenly depicts her as a prototypical novel heroine (Chariton's Callirhoe acts as the paradigm throughout).

Clitophon's depiction of both himself and Leucippe and his self-presentation as a knowledgeable narrator all seem to envisage deliberate connections with topical novelistic material. But in all three domains, his account implies fictionalization of various sorts. Mostly, this fictionalization does not necessarily imply conscious manipulation but is rather of a more latent kind, and, in

some cases, possibly even unconscious. Clitophon may very well believe that Leucippe *pretends* to resist when he kisses her, for example. Clitophon, in other words, appears to be truthful in his own limited way. He believes himself and Leucippe to be a hero and heroine in a Greek novel; in this respect, his story is indeed, as he announces in the introduction, *like* a fictional tale.

4

Longus

Longus' novel¹ has long been shown to internalize the traditional novelistic adventure *topos* of travel: being the only novelist whose story is limited to one geographical location (Lesbos), Longus situates the adventures in his protagonists' *psychê* rather than in remote countries.² This novel primarily revolves around the development of the protagonists from innocent and ignorant childhood to adulthood.³ It is a surprising paradox, then, to observe that scholars seem to agree that there is barely any trace of individual characterization in this novel. Bowie (1999: 57), for example, states that 'Longus makes no great effort to develop the children's characters: they are types of artless rustic teenagers, and never become individuals. Longus examines *physis*, nature, not *ethos*, character.'⁴ I agree that Longus primarily characterizes his protagonists to the extent relevant to the depiction of the psychological processes they exemplify rather than, vice versa, describing psychological processes for the creation of idiosyncratic individualized character (which may be part of our expectations of character in modern novelistic literature, but, as we have seen, is not intrinsic to ancient notions of *êthos*). It is also true that these psychological processes are concerned with how natural tendencies and inclinations (*physis*) are appropriated and complicated by cultural norms regarding sexual and social matters: throughout the process of the erotic awakening of the two protagonists, which is one of the main themes of Longus' novel,⁵ their experience of, and knowledge about, *erôs* are accompanied by a growing awareness of the social and cultural conventions regulating desire.⁶

¹ The novel is usually dated to the middle-to-late 2nd or early 3rd cent. (J. Henderson 2009: 4, Hunter 1983: 3–15, 2003: 369, Morgan 2004a: 2).

² See, among others, Reardon (1969: 301), Holzberg (2006: 124), and Morgan (1994b: 66).

³ As argued in passing by Turner (1960: 119) and Dowden (1999: 233) and more substantially argued by Teske (1991) and Repath (2011).

⁴ See Helm (1956: 51) and Van Den Broeck (1992: 242) for similar assessments.

⁵ See also Hägg (1983: 36) on the gradual awakening of love and Mittelstadt (1967: 305) on Longus' interest in 'precisely that aspect of erotic development so much taken for granted by the other romances: the flowering of attraction into erotic passion'.

⁶ See Winkler (1990b: 116–24, 1991: 21) on the socialization of desire in Longus' novel and the cultural 'protocols' or conventions required. See also Bretzigheimer (1988), Zeitlin (1990),

Even more than other novel protagonists, the figures of Daphnis and Chloe, therefore, are subsumed under (and at the same time represent) categories representative of such growth towards adulthood. On the other hand, individuation of each of the protagonists vis-à-vis each other has also been shown to play an important role in this novel. Here, the novel may take as its model the bucolic poetry that serves as one of Longus' most important intertextual frames. Theocritus' *Idyll* 8, for example, develops a gradual differentiation between Daphnis and Menalcas 'to distinguish in their emotional and psychological make-up two boys who are on the surface so much alike'.⁷ In the novel, similarly, one of the central psychological trajectories consists, precisely, in such an evolution from similarity and symmetry to differentiation and asymmetry between Daphnis and Chloe: whereas their characterization is marked by 'equivalence' at the beginning of the story, differences gradually surface as the narrative progresses.⁸ Daphnis gradually takes the 'active' part in the relationship and in exploring their sexuality. To be sure, this insight is not new. Morgan (1994*b*: 66–9) observes that the evolution of the protagonists from innocence to maturity occurs at unequal speeds: Chloe takes the lead at the beginning of the story, but Daphnis is gradually able to catch up and, ultimately, overtake her. Haynes (2003: 61–2) points to a similar distinction when observing that Chloe is the more active partner in the first two books, Daphnis in the last two. Lalanne (2006: 193), for her part, does not observe a change from symmetrical to asymmetrical exploration of sexuality until the end of the second book (the narration of the myth of Syrinx).

In this particular domain of differentiation between the protagonists, this chapter contributes to the discussion in two ways. First, I aim to broaden the ongoing discussion by drawing attention to a number of aspects that might readily be associated with ancient notions of character (*êthos*) as discussed in the introduction to this book and to the specific techniques that underlie their construction. These aspects primarily concern conscious decision-making processes and the deliberate establishment of interaction with and control over social environments. I thus set out to demonstrate that the evolution of the protagonists is a more multi-layered and multi-faceted whole of interacting aspects than has generally been assumed. I here follow the path indicated by recent scholarship, which suggests that the question of control has an important role to play in this novel. It has been observed, for example, that the protagonists' knowledge of *erôs*' name is a first step in establishing some degree

Teske (1991), Daude (1991), García Gual (1992), and Morgan (2004*a*: 10–12). M. Lausberg (2001: 192–9), who sees erotic development in Longus as emblematic of cultural progress underlying human history in general, is less useful for my purpose.

⁷ Gutzwiller (1983: 175). On the bucolic tradition in Longus in general, see, among others, Mittelstadt (1966, 1970), Cresci (1981), Effe (1982), and Bowie (1985).

⁸ Konstan (1994: 79–90), on the other hand, focuses on elements constructing erotic *symmetry*.

of control over the phenomenon.⁹ Likewise, Daphnis is sometimes ambivalently depicted in terms of interpersonal control in crucial episodes of the narrative (for example during his sexual initiation by Lycaenion, where he is the active penetrating force, but at the same time cast as the *beloved* by Platonic imagery).¹⁰

The second contribution of this chapter lies in adding detail to much previous scholarship, while broadly supporting the idea of change from similarity to difference between the protagonists. In exploring the social and the sexual realms as the main domains of Daphnis' and Chloe's psychological evolution, I aim at a richer and more detailed picture of some important strands constituting such an evolution than has previously been attempted and I hope to draw more attention to the subtle narrative techniques involved.

4.1 *PAIDEIA*, PIVOTAL MOMENTS, AND *TERPSIS*

As is well known, the concepts of change and evolution are structurally enshrined in this novel by the seven consecutive seasons which cover the story (two springs, two summers and two autumns, separated by a winter).¹¹ The protagonists' emotional, intellectual, and social development in the field of *erôs* is anticipated in a programmatic passage immediately before the beginning of this seasonal sequence. Lamon and Dryas, the adoptive fathers of Daphnis and Chloe respectively, are each charged by Eros in a dream to send their children into the fields to look after the flocks. The two men obey (*πείθεσθαι*, 1.8.2) but are dismayed (*ῥηθοντο*, 1.8.1) by this commission because the recognition tokens that they found with the children indicate an origin too high for this work (*τύχην... κρείττον*). The narrator adds that, because of this allegedly high origin, they have educated them in reading and writing (*γράμματα ἐπαίδευον*). Commentators find this passage problematically unrealistic within the story world,¹² but from a generic point of view, the presence of *paideia* as a characteristic of novelistic protagonists is, of course, a well-known *topos*: all novel heroes and heroines are *pepaideumenoî*. In Longus, however, such generically expected *paideia* as envisaged by Lamon and Dryas is short-circuited from the very start by Eros' explicit directive that the protagonists become goatherds and shepherds.

⁹ Whitmarsh (2005c: 147).

¹⁰ Repath (2011: 116).

¹¹ See Chalk (1960) for an early study which draws upon the seasonal structure of the novel to interpret the protagonists' evolution as a symbol of their gradual initiation in the Dionysus cult. See also Mittelstadt (1971: 313–15), Teske (1991: 37–8), and Morgan (1994b: 66–9).

¹² See e.g. Morgan (2004a: 156) and Herrmann (2007: 228), the latter of whom even suggests that it may be an interpolation.

Eros' design, that is, is presented as thwarting Lamon's and Dryas' plans to continue their children's *paideia*. It sets up the idea that the two children are to be educated in a *paideia* of a different kind. The real *paideia* around which this novel revolves, is, of course, *paideia* in love.¹³ Accordingly, different stages in Daphnis' and Chloe's erotic instruction are cast in didactic terms at key moments throughout the novel.¹⁴ The intervention of Eros in the adoptive fathers' plans to educate their children, then, is emblematic of one of the main themes in the novel.

Two key figures are responsible for the protagonists' erotic instruction. Whereas Eros' spokesman Philetas teaches them the name of Eros (τὸ Ἑρωτος ὄνομα, 2.8.1), Lycanion teaches Daphnis sexual technique (τὰ ἔρωτος ἔργα, 3.17.2).¹⁵ The beginning of the novel, where the protagonists are living in the 'pre-erotic' period of their lives, provides a good example of the tendency in Longus' novel to subsume individual characters under categories. The activities with which they are occupied before experiencing *erôs* (such as gathering flowers, weaving a cricket-trap, and constructing a syrinx and playing on it, 1.10.2) are all identified as 'pastoral and childish games' (Ἀθύρματα... ποιμενικά καὶ παιδικά, 1.10.2; παίζόντων, 1.11.1) and provide a solid contrast with the seriousness (σπουδήν, 1.11.1) that Eros is about to introduce into their lives.¹⁶ This carefree playfulness, in other words, does not explore how *specifically* Daphnis and/or Chloe experience childhood in any particular or idiosyncratic way (for example, as opposed to other children). Rather, their behaviour is defined by their subsumption under (and at the same time makes them representatives of) two categories of people: shepherds and children. The point is, indeed, that such playful and carefree behaviour is played out against the serious advent of Eros. Philetas' introduction reiterates this contrast. He is introduced into the story, and the protagonists' lives, just when they are about to engage in pleasant activities (Τερπομένοις δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐφίσταται

¹³ See Winkler (1990b: 101–7, 1991: 16–17) on Eros' 'pastoral experiment'. On erotic education as a main theme in Longus, see Zeitlin (1990: 418, 435–44). On education in general (primarily through *mimesis*), see Herrmann (2007).

¹⁴ Chloe's first kiss, for example, is 'untutored and without skill' (ἀδίδακτον... καὶ ἄτεχνον, 1.17.1), Philetas' instruction is referred to as a 'nocturnal seminar' (νυκτερινὸν παιδευτήριον, 2.9.1), and Lycanion's practical instruction is an 'erotic tuition' (τῆς ἐρωτικῆς παιδαγωγίας, 3.19.1; see also πεπαίδευτο at 3.19.1 and ἐπαίδευσε at 3.19.2) of Daphnis, who, in turn, teaches sex to Chloe during their wedding night (Χλόη... ἔμαθεν, 4.40.3). Scarcella (1970: 50) briefly draws attention to the importance of the terms *paideuô* and *didaskô* in Longus.

¹⁵ See Mittelstadt (1971: 312), Levin (1977), Holzberg (2006: 126–7), and Stanzel (1991). The figure of Lycanion is read in a different way by Bretzigheimer (1988), who characterizes her (implausibly, I think) as an external threat to the relationship between Daphnis and Chloe.

¹⁶ On this contrast, see Winkler (1990b: 118–19, 1991: 24). This motif of playfulness resonates with the last word of the novel (παίγνια, 4.40.3), which again contrasts the earlier activity of the protagonists with the earnestness of real life which they enter at this point. See Winkler (1990b: 124, 1991: 28), Herrmann (2007: 223), and Morgan (2004a: 249).

πρεσβύτης, 2.3.1) which recall their earlier carefree pastimes.¹⁷ Again, their playfulness is contrasted (τότε δέ) with the seriousness that is to follow: the narrator makes it clear that the protagonists will be repaid by the gods for offerings made to the nymphs (2.2.6)—a repayment which will, of course, consist in (their knowledge of) their love for each other and, eventually, their marriage under the protection of Pan and the nymphs.

The episode is also illustrative of the artfulness with which the narrator adds flesh to the skeleton transition from pre-erotic to erotic youth. This transition and the emotional distress involved constitute well-known stock material in the novels¹⁸ but in Longus' novel, the protagonists' carefree playfulness, as well as its abrupt ending when Eros appears, is further documented by an ingenious play with the notion of *terpsis* ('pleasure').¹⁹ As well as the Philetas episode (τερπομένοις, 2.3.1), there are two other instances where *terpsis* is used to describe the protagonists' activities. In both instances, the term again refers to playful summer (τὸ θέρος, 1.28.1; θέρειοι, 3.24.1) pastimes such as Daphnis' narration of the Phatta myth to Chloe (1.27.1–4), swimming and bathing in springs (3.24.2), playing the pipes, singing, and picking flowers. The presence of noisy cicadas in both instances (ἀκρίδας ἀλούς... τέττιγας ἡχοῦντας, 3.24.2; ἀλῶν τεττίγων, 1.25.3) further aligns the two episodes. In both cases, the protagonists' pleasure is abruptly interrupted by the intrusions of external characters. In the first instance Pyrrhian pirates (Πυρραῖοι λησταί, 1.28.1) abduct Daphnis. The second episode precedes the introduction of Chloe's suitors (μνηστήρων πλῆθος, 3.25.1) into the narrative. Both types of intruders, then, are aligned, in retrospect, with Eros' spokesman Philetas, who equally abruptly puts an end to the protagonists' *terpsis* when teaching them the name of *erôs*. This depiction of *erôs* as an external force demolishing the children's carefree *terpsis* is highlighted by the narrator's explicit equation of *erôs* and piracy (τὸ Ἐρωτος ληστήριον, 1.32.4) immediately after Daphnis has been rescued from the Pyrrhian pirates.²⁰

The notion of *terpsis*, then, is instrumental in conceptualizing the initial, carefree playfulness of the protagonists as antithetical to the disrupting forces generated by the intrusion of Eros. But its importance for characterization

¹⁷ Their activities (such as leaping, whistling, singing, and playing with the sheep and goats; ἐσκίρτων, ἦδον, and ἐσύριττον, 2.2.6) verbally echo their previous pastimes (σκιρτώντας, ἦδον (1.9.2), and συρίζειν (1.10.2)). Furthermore, the famous Aristotelian (*Rh.* 3.4.3) comparison that highlights their playfulness by aligning them with dogs ('like dogs off the leash'; κύνες ἐκ δεσμῶν λυθέντες, 2.2.6) recalls their earlier imitation of birds, lambs, and bees (1.9.2).

¹⁸ See e.g. the instances of emotional distress in Chariton (1.1.7–8) and Xenophon of Ephesus (1.3) and Ninus' assessment of his own emotional condition ('Had I not become aware of Aphrodite, I might still have been rejoicing (μακάριος) in my impregnable strength. But now (νῦν δέ)...', A.II.25–7).

¹⁹ See, among others, Goldhill (1995: 6–7) on the 'pleasurable' (*terpnon*) in this novel in general.

²⁰ On this equation, see Turner (1960: 121).

goes further: it marks this intrusion as the starting point of a process of change and thereafter, circularly, resurfaces to mark the end of this process. This happens through its use in the three embedded myths of Phatta (1.27.1–4), Syrinx (2.34.1–3), and Echo (3.23.1–5). It is commonly accepted that these three myths are best read as a series featuring close thematic connections with the main story.²¹ Each of the stories is explicitly referred to as a *mythos* (μυθολογῶν, 1.27.1; μῦθον, 2.33.3; μυθολογεῖν τὸν μῦθον, 3.22.4) and features a *parthenos* as its most important character—like the main story, whose female protagonist, Chloe, is referred to by Pan as a *parthenos* about whom Eros wants to create a *mythos* (ἐξ ἧς Ἔρως μῦθον ποιῆσαι θέλει, 2.27.2). It is equally clear that the three female characters of these embedded myths are associated with each other and with Chloe by similarity: all are beautiful (*kalai*) and musical (*mousikai*), as is Chloe.²² And the notion of change is central to all three myths: each of the girls undergoes a painful metamorphosis as a result of male aggression and sexuality, but their music lives on beyond that. And in all three myths, the notion of *terpsis* marks the ultimate result of this metamorphosis: the wood dove or *phatta*, the flute or *syrinx*, and the echo are all described as generating *terpsis*,²³ which links the girls in the myths to what they become after their metamorphoses. Similarly, Chloe will be metamorphosized from an ignorant child into a married woman²⁴ and face the loss of virginity and childlike naivety. Her metamorphosis will also be a source of *terpsis*. First, she will metamorphose into a mature adult woman, who will, like the girls in the story, become what her name indicates, the giver of new life (that is, like Demeter, the goddess of harvest and vegetation whose

²¹ These myths have been discussed extensively in the secondary literature. For a discussion of the different strands in scholarship between 1950 and 1995, see Morgan (1997: 2238–41). On significant *contrasts* between the main story and the embedded myths, see Philippides (1980) and Bowie (2003b: 365–72, 2007: 349–52).

²² The associations are particularly clear in the first embedded narrative, which is addressed to Chloe and immediately aligns her with the main figure: ‘There once was a maiden, maiden’ (Ἦν παρθένος, παρθένε, 1.27.1). Moreover, both Chloe and the girl in the narrative are beautiful (καλή, 1.27.1) and tend animals (Chloe is a shepherd, the girl in the myth a cowherd; ἐνεμε, 1.27.1). Furthermore, the girl in the myth sits below a pine tree (καθίσασα ὑπὸ πίτυν, 1.27.2), like Chloe earlier in the story (ὑπὸ τῇ δρυὶ . . . πλησίον καθήμενη, 1.13.4). She wears a garland of pine (στεφανωσαμένη πίτυϊ, 1.27.2), like Chloe (πίτυος ἐστεφανοῦτο κλάδοις, 1.23.3; στεφάνω πίτυος, 1.24.1). The pine garland (*pitys*), furthermore, associates Chloe with the nymph Pitys, about whom the anonymous girl sings a song in the myth (1.27.2). Through the anonymous girl’s assimilation to Pitys, Chloe is also assimilated to this nymph, as is highlighted by the comparison of Chloe with a nymph when she is wearing the pine garland (1.24.1).

²³ See Pandiri (1985: 132). The idea that a *syrinx* generates *terpsis* surfaces particularly frequently in the novel: 2.21.2 (ἐτέρπετο), 2.29.3 (τερπόμεναι), 2.35.4 (τερπνότερον . . . Τερπνόν . . .), 2.36.1 (τερπόμενοι), and 4.26.3 (τερπνότερον). The echo generated by singing sailors is also a delight to hear (ἐγίνετο ἄκουσμα τερπνόν, 3.21.4). And the sound of the wood dove equally delights (Ἐτερψεν, 1.27.1) the protagonists, just as the girl in the myth delights the cows with her song (ἐτέρποντο αἱ βόες, 1.27.2).

²⁴ See Morgan (1994b: 69–70, 1997: 2241) and MacQueen (1990: 82–9). Kestner (1973: 167) defends a different reading.

cult name is Chloe²⁵). As such, she will offer sexual *terpsis* to Daphnis. Secondly, Chloe will also metamorphose from a girl into a *mythos* (the book that the reader is reading, that is). As such, Chloe (or the story about her) will equally offer *terpsis* to the reader, as is highlighted by the narrator's comment on his narrative as a 'delightful possession for all mankind' (κτῆμα . . . τερπνὸν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, pr. 3),²⁶ which programmatically aligns the *mythos* of Daphnis and Chloe with the results of the three metamorphoses in the embedded narratives: all four are sources of *terpsis*.

The interpretation of the three myths as *exempla* for Chloe's evolution corroborates and complicates the characterization of Eros as an intruder disturbing the carefree playfulness of the protagonists. Just as the three myths present the girls' metamorphoses as painful moments that will, ultimately, result in harmony, Eros' intrusion into the lives of the protagonists is the painful (eliminating *terpsis*, that is) event that marks the beginning of the psychological-emotional metamorphosis leading up to the harmony (and *terpsis*) of marriage. To the protagonists, Eros is what the male characters in the embedded myths are to Phatta, Syrx, and Echo: the painful end of a carefree life, but a necessary step towards harmony and happiness. This double role of Eros (first eliminating and then recreating *terpsis*) is mirrored by the two figures who act as the protagonists' instructors: whereas Philetas' introduction interrupts the *terpsis* of the protagonists, Lycaenion's introduction occurs when the protagonists find themselves at the other end of the emotional spectrum: Daphnis is *unhappy* (ἐκλαεν, 3.14.5) because his unfamiliarity with sexual technique prevents him from satisfying sexual desire (ἀπορηθείς). It is precisely this aspect that Lycaenion will teach him. She is complementary to Philetas not only in that she teaches the deeds of *erôs* (as opposed to his name), but also because she initiates the transition from a lack of *terpsis* to the ultimate fulfilment of *terpsis*, whereas Philetas marks the transition from initial *terpsis* to the lack thereof.

4.2 IGNORANCE

The protagonists' ignorance is directly attributed in a number of key episodes.²⁷ It is thematized in two episodes before the protagonists have learned Philetas' instructions. These mirror each other in that each depicts one of the

²⁵ See Ar. *Lys.* 825. Hunter (1983: 17) and van Es (2001: 107–8).

²⁶ The Thucydidean background has, of course, often been noted. On its possible functions, see Luginbill (2002).

²⁷ On the importance of ignorance in this novel in general, see e.g. M. Lausberg (1998–9: 32). See Repath (2011: 109–10) on the protagonists' erotic ignorance in particular.

protagonists seeing the other naked when bathing and neither understands what happens to him/her (οὐκ ᾔδει, 1.13.5; ἀγνοῶν, 1.32.4). These episodes construct a ring composition within the first book, framing the protagonists' transition from a pre-erotic stage to erotic awareness: the first time that Chloe sees Daphnis bathing naked is explicitly marked as the first appearance of love in her life (ἔρωτος ἀρχή, 1.13.5); the first time that Daphnis sees Chloe bathing naked concludes the first book (1.32.4). The two bathing scenes are further aligned by the fact that the narrator in both cases presents their ignorance as a manifestation of the same two important coordinates which, as we have seen, already defined their character in the pre-erotic stage of their lives: their young age and rustic upbringing (νέα κόρη καὶ ἐν ἀγροικίᾳ τεθραμμένη, 1.13.5; νέος καὶ ἄγροικος, 1.32.4), the latter of which may refer both to geographical provenance (the countryside as opposed to the city) and lack of cultural development. Again, then, the concern is with typification rather than individuation, with category rather than idiosyncrasy. At this point, ignorance is not adduced to highlight particularities that would set apart Daphnis or Chloe from other young rustics (although, as we will see, it becomes a tool to differentiate them vis-à-vis each other later in the novel). For the moment, it is part of how 'a Daphnis' and 'a Chloe' are impacted by the advent of Eros in their lives and can be expected to behave.

Throughout the first book, this ignorance is subtly communicated through the consistent use as a metonymical technique of characterization of the protagonists' focalization of their own emotions, their love for each other, and the physical beauty of their beloved. All these concepts are often represented exclusively as they themselves experience them (without narratorial interpretation, that is). As is well known, they catalogue the familiar range of erotic symptoms when in love²⁸—familiar to the reader, that is, but *unfamiliar* to the protagonists themselves. In their speeches, they systematically articulate these unfamiliar emotions by associating them with well-known *comparantia* taken from their immediate environment. They describe their love, for example, as a sickness (νοσῶ, 1.14.1; νόσου καινῆς, 1.18.2) and compare their pain to the sharpness of bee stings (κέντρου μελίττης πικρότερον, 1.18.1; μέλιτται, 1.14.2) and rose thorns (βάτοι, 1.14.2).²⁹ Of course, the image of love as an illness is a *topos* in novelistic literature, love poetry (going back to Sappho), and Theocritean poetry alike,³⁰ but at the level of the argument function it serves as a tool for the protagonists to come to terms with their own feelings, which are new and unknown to them.³¹ Similarly, Daphnis focalizes

²⁸ Goldhill (1995: 13).

²⁹ Bowie (2005*b*) discusses these (and other) metaphors in Longus but does not connect them to characterization.

³⁰ See, among others, Morgan (2004*a*: 6).

³¹ Bowie (2006: 35–6) touches upon some of these metaphors and comparisons and also reads them as instrumental for the protagonists in coming to terms with unknown phenomena.

his own heartache ‘as if gnawed by poison’ (ὥς ἐσθιομένην ὑπὸ φαρμάκων, 1.32.4), an image which he also uses in his own character text to describe Chloe’s kiss (φαρμάκων, 1.18.2). Moreover, he is sad (σκυθρωπός), ‘as if he had not been kissed but bitten’ (ὥσπερ οὐ φιληθεὶς ἀλλὰ δηχθείς, 1.17.2) and Chloe acts ‘more strangely than a cow that has been stung by a gadfly’ (Οὐδὲ βοὸς οἷστρω πηλεγείσης τοσαῦτα ἔργα, 1.13.6). In the latter example, the distinction between the argument function and key function is particularly highlighted by the ambiguity of the term *oistros*, which means ‘gadfly’ but is also a common metaphor for the sexual urge.³² This is a good example of Longus’ general tendency to generate an ironic tension between the protagonists’ innocence and ignorance on the one hand, and the reader’s predetermined inability to read with such innocence or ignorance.³³ In this instance, Chloe, at the level of the argument function, compares the origin of her sickness with a gadfly in order to come to terms with her unknown emotions, but at the level of the key function the reader can see the true sexual nature of the *oistros* affecting her.

In order to make sense of their own appreciation of their beloved’s physical beauty, they often identify external causes. Chloe, for example, thinks that the bathing (1.13.2–3, 1.13.5, 1.14.3) and the music of Daphnis’ *syrinx* (1.13.4) make him beautiful. Likewise, Daphnis focalizes his own emotional response to Chloe’s beauty as resulting from the bathing pool (1.32.4). Moreover, they again borrow *comparantia* from their immediate environment—especially at the beginning of the story, when they have just fallen in love with each other. Chloe, for example, compares Daphnis’ beauty with the beauty of flowers (τὰ ἄνθη, 1.14.2). Daphnis, for his part, compares the size of Chloe’s eyes to the eyes of a cow (βοός, 1.17.3), the colour of her face to goats’ milk (τοῦ τῶν αἰγῶν γάλακτος), the softness of her lips to roses (ρόδων, 1.18.1), and the sweetness of her mouth to honeycomb (κηρίων). All these *comparantia* are plants and animals familiar to the protagonists in their daily life. They illustrate how Daphnis and Chloe try to articulate the strange impact on them of the other’s beauty by assimilating it to familiar matters.

Part of their ignorance is removed in the Philetas and Lycaenion episodes. But whereas these episodes instruct the protagonists about the concept of *erôs* and sexual technique respectively, other aspects of erotic development are not covered. Again, their ignorance about these aspects is metonymically attributed through personal focalization. When the winter separates them from each other, for example, they experience this season as a sad one (λυπηράς, 3.4.2), whereas other people are happy with the seasonal interruption of work (ἔχαιρον, 3.4.1). Of course, the reader easily reads the protagonists’ sadness as an indication of the fact that they are *missing* each other, which is not made explicit in the

³² On this meaning of *oistros*, see Danek and Wallisch (1993: 50–1) and Morgan (2004a: 162).

³³ On this tendency in general, see Goldhill (1995: 8–14, 20–31). On innocence in the protagonists’ characterization, see also Haynes (2003: 65–6).

text because the protagonists themselves have no experience of this emotion and so cannot give it a name. The reader is merely given a series of ‘symptoms’: they are said to remember their enjoyment of the past season (ἐν μνήμῃ γενόμενοι . . . τερπνῶν, 3.4.2), to pass sleepless nights (νύκτας . . . ἀγρύπνους διήγον), and to regard winter as a ‘dead’ season waiting for rebirth (ἐκ θανάτου παλιγγενεσίαν). When they notice an object that reminds them of their previous happiness, it makes them ‘sad’ (Ἐλύπει . . . αὐτούς, 3.4.3).

This consistent adoption of the protagonists’ own focalization again reflects their restricted knowledge about their own feelings: since they have been together since the earliest days of their love (the narrator draws attention to their inseparability early in the story³⁴), they have not yet been confronted with any lengthy separation. Similarly, when Daphnis is kissed by a woman at a festival of Dionysus, Chloe’s reaction is again ‘sadness’ (ἐλύπησεν, 2.2.2). Immediately afterwards, Daphnis reacts identically (ἐλυπεῖτο) when he sees men calling to Chloe and dancing around her. This time, the reader interprets both reactions as indications of jealousy, but because the protagonists themselves do not know this phenomenon, its representation is again limited to the symptoms focalized by themselves. The same pattern underlies the representation of their sexual frustration when they try to put into practice Philetas’ third remedy for love of ‘lying down naked together’. Since they do not know that Philetas’ expression is a euphemism (εἰδότες . . . τῶν ἐντεῦθεν οὐδέν, 2.11.3), they are unable sexually to satisfy their mutual longing and part ‘with nothing gained from the loss of the better part of the day’ (μάτην τὸ πλείστον τῆς ἡμέρας δαπανήσαντες διελύθησαν). They contrast their disappointment with their positive evaluation of the first two remedies (kissing and embracing), which they regard as pleasures (τέρψεις, 2.11.1 and 3.20.2; both in personal focalization).³⁵ Since they do not know what sex is (let alone sexual frustration), they focalize their feelings of discomfort and unease as dislocated from the sexual level and see them as a result of their awareness that they have done nothing and wasted time.

Such consistent personal focalization without narratorial comment or interpretation recalls the narrative technique typical of *apheleia*, as discussed in Chapter 2. Traditionally, indeed, Longus’ style is characterized as an example of *apheleia* and *glykytês*.³⁶ In the episodes discussed, this ‘simple’ writing style

³⁴ 1.10.3 (‘You would have sooner seen the sheep and the goats parted from one another than Chloe and Daphnis’).

³⁵ When Chloe kisses Daphnis after his abduction by the Methymnians, the kiss is sweet as honey (μελιτώδες, 2.18). And when, during the winter, they think about the previous season, they remember ‘the joys (τερπνῶν) they had left behind, how they used to kiss, embrace, take their meals together’ (3.4.2).

³⁶ See McCulloh (1970: 59), Mittelstadt (1971: 327–8), and Hunter (1983: 84–98). See Wouters (1995: 83) on Longus’ style as an example of *saphêneia* and *apheleia*. On the highly similar characteristics of *apheleia* and *glykytês*, see Ch. 2 n. 29.

is consciously adopted to embody the ignorance or ‘simplicity’ of the protagonists. The narrator registers that they experience the longing induced by separation, jealousy, and sexual frustration but do not have the knowledge or the vocabulary to identify these emotions. This attribution of ‘simplicity’ to the protagonists is certainly no isolated case. Chloe’s simplicity is made explicit (τὸ ἀφελές, 2.39.2) when she asks Daphnis to swear not one but two oaths of fidelity (δεύτερον . . . ὅρκον). As noted in §2.1, attaching value to oaths is an indication of ‘simple’ character according to ancient rhetorical theory. Moreover, her speech contains some of the typical stylistic markers of aphelic discourse, such as anaphora (ἡράσθη μὲν Πίτυος, ἡράσθη δὲ Σύριγγος, 2.39.3), parataxis (καὶ φεύγει καὶ μίσει καὶ ἀπόκτεινον, 2.39.4), and apostrophe (ὦ Δάφνι, 2.39.2).³⁷ The argumentation adopted also echoes *apheleia*: both the comparison of herself to a wolf (ὥσπερ λύκον) and her request that Daphnis swear by the herd of goats and the goat that suckled him as a baby (2.39.4) can be read as instances of the tendency of aphelic discourse to draw inspiration from the animal kingdom when developing arguments.³⁸

A further indication of Chloe’s simplicity is that her ‘simple’ request for a second oath can be linked with the two typical coordinates that have been shown to define her character in earlier episodes and at the same time are singled out in ancient rhetorical treatises as markers of *apheleia*. The first such coordinate, the fact that Chloe is a young girl (ὡς κόρη, 2.39.2), is explicitly adduced by the narrator as an explanation for her simple behaviour and resonates with Hermogenes’ association of *apheleia* and ‘simple people without malice’ (ἀφελῶν καὶ ἀκάκων ἀνθρώπων) such as children (παιδῶν) and women (γυναικῶν).³⁹ The second coordinate, the fact that Chloe is also a *shepherdess*, is not explicitly linked to her request but is nevertheless abundantly thematized by the immediate narrative context, where the protagonists have just been shown driving their flocks home (2.38.1–2) and are occupied with typical shepherds’ activities well known from the bucolic tradition (such as pipe-playing; ἐσύριττον, 2.38.3). In any case, the fact that Chloe is a shepherdess makes her particularly suitable as a subject of aphelic discourse. Hermogenes makes it clear that *apheleia* is suitable for ‘unaffected’ (τῶν ἀπλάστων ἡθῶν) characters as found in Theocritus’ bucolic writings (τὰ Θεοκρίτου ἐν τοῖς βουκολικοῖς) among other genres,⁴⁰ and singles out

³⁷ On the stylistic characteristics of *apheleia*, see p. 119 (with further references).

³⁸ Hermog. *Id.* 325.21–3 Rabe (1913) (ἀφελεῖς ἐννοιοὶ καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων λαμβανόμεναι). In this respect, Daphnis’ rejection of Gnathon’s sexual advances because the animals do not do it like that (4.12.2) is an indication of his simple shepherdly character. On the irony involved, however, see Morgan (2004a: 231) and Goldhill (1995: 66).

³⁹ Hermog. *Id.* 323.12–15 Rabe (1913). The same rhetorician also refers to the speech of ‘women and youngsters in love’ (γυναῖκας λεγούσας καὶ νεανίσκους ἐρώντας) as an example of *apheleia* (*Id.* 324.1 Rabe (1913)).

⁴⁰ Hermog. *Id.* 322.13–17 Rabe (1913).

‘uncultivated peasants’ (γεωργῶν ἀγροίκων) as suitable incarnations of aphelic subject matter.⁴¹ Choricus of Gaza too, in an introductory comment to his *Ethopoeia of a shepherd*, makes it clear that the character appropriate to this figure is ‘pastoral and simple’ (ποιμενικόν τε καὶ ἀφελές τὸ ἦθος).⁴² Chloe’s simple speech, then, is in tune with her characterization as both a young girl and a shepherdess.

4.3 EMOTIONAL DOMINANCE

As I indicated in this chapter’s introductory paragraphs, scholars have observed that emotional dominance and control gradually shift from Chloe to Daphnis. In this section I will address a number of factors involved in shaping this evolution. These factors relate to interpersonal control and dominance, erotic maturity, receptiveness to physical beauty, and the protagonists’ awareness of what they themselves identify as problematic aspects of love and sex. Although Chloe’s (1.13.1–4) and Daphnis’ (1.17.2–18.2) initial love for each other is often depicted symmetrically,⁴³ the question of emotional dominance differentiates them from the outset. Chloe falls in love first, although she is younger. More importantly, the registration of significant behavioural patterns and motivations points to a marked difference in agency involved in each case: whereas Daphnis is completely unaware of Chloe’s feelings when she falls in love with him (bathing scene, 1.13), he himself falls in love with her *at her initiative* (that is, after being kissed by her, something which she has been desiring for a long time: *πάλαι ποθοῦσα φιλήσαι*, 1.17.1). Being in love herself, she *makes* Daphnis fall in love with her. Her controlling role in Daphnis’ erotic awakening is underlined when she asks him to take a bath the next day (1.13.5) and when they consider whether to ‘lie down naked together’, as advised by Philetas. Whereas their awareness of the problematic nature of this remedy is depicted symmetrically,⁴⁴ each of them has a different reason for not trying it:

⁴¹ Hermog. *Id.* 323.14 Rabe (1913). See also *Id.* 324.4 Rabe (1913) on peasants (γεωργῶν) and *apheleia*.

⁴² Chor. *Ἡθοποιία ποιμένος* 134 Boissonade. Rohde (1914³: 551 n. 2) singles out this *ethopoeia* as broadly reminiscent of Longus’ novel.

⁴³ The narrator explicitly addresses the symmetry in Daphnis’ and Chloe’s daily activities (they do everything together: *Ἐπραττον δὲ κοινῇ πάντα πλησίον ἀλλήλων νέμοντες . . . Θᾶπτον ἅν τις εἶδε τὰ ποιμνία καὶ τὰς αἰγας ἅπ’ ἀλλήλων μεμερισμένας ἢ Χλόην καὶ Δάφνην*, 1.10.1–3). Once they have fallen in love, the protagonists are affected by similar body language (they both blush: *ἐρυθρήματι*, 1.13.6; *ἐρυθρήματι*, 1.17.2) and are unable to continue their daily occupations (Chloe forgets to eat, cannot sleep, and is no longer interested in tending her flocks (1.13.6); Daphnis hardly eats, does not drink, equally neglects his flock, and does not play the syrinx any more). See Konstan (1994: 79–90) for other markers of ‘erotic symmetry’.

⁴⁴ They kiss and embrace each other (*ἐφίλησαν . . . περιέβαλον*, 2.9.1), but lying naked together seems too risky ‘not just for maids but for young goatherds as well (*οὐ μόνον παρθένων ἀλλὰ καὶ*

whereas Daphnis does not *dare* to mention it (μήτε...τολμώντος εἰπεῖν, 2.10.3), Chloe does not *want* to take the initiative (μήτε...βουλομένης κατάρχεσθαι). This difference suggests that, whereas Daphnis may *like* to lie naked with her, Chloe consciously *decides* not to take the lead. It is a result of her choice, then, that nothing happens.

Chloe's controlling role persists when Daphnis washes himself in the cave of the nymphs in front of her. Whereas in the previous bathing episode Daphnis goes with Chloe to the cave (ἐλθὼν ἅμα τῇ Χλόῃ, 1.13.1), Chloe now takes him to the cave herself (ἀγαγοῦσα...εἰσαγαγοῦσα, 1.32.1).⁴⁵ Moreover, she washes her own body in front of Daphnis for the first time (τότε πρῶτον, 1.32.1). Since in the first bathing scene Daphnis has undressed in front of her, Chloe knows from her own experience the impact of this act on the beholder and now consciously provokes such an impact on Daphnis. Her control is illustrated by Daphnis' comparison of himself (in personal focalization) with someone who is being chased (καθάπερ τινὸς διώκοντος αὐτόν, 1.32.4) and with the booty of the robbers who abducted him earlier (ἔτι παρὰ τοῖς λησταῖς μένειν).

Chloe's control over Daphnis' emotional evolution is mirrored by her control over his access to information about her sexuality. When Daphnis is abducted by pirates, Dorcon helps Chloe to rescue him. In exchange for this help, he asks her to kiss him (φίλησον, 1.29.3), which she does (φίλημα φιλῆσας, 1.30.1). When Chloe later reports to Daphnis her encounter with Dorcon, the kiss is the only detail that she hides from him, out of shame (Μόνον αἰδεσθείσα τὸ φίλημα οὐκ εἶπεν, 1.31.2). Although at this point, they have not yet been instructed by Philetas that kissing is one of the three remedies for love, they nevertheless both feel instinctively that kissing is a marker of erotic behaviour. Daphnis falls in love with Chloe after being kissed by her (1.17.1) and is disconcerted by its impact on him (1.18.1–2). Moreover, he metaphorically kisses (κατεφίλει) Chloe by moving his lips over a syrinx on which he teaches her to play (1.24.4). The omission of Dorcon's kiss from Chloe's report illustrates her ability to deal with the communication of her erotic awakening in a controlled manner. This episode brings to mind

νέων αἰδόλων). This is the only passage in the novel where the narrator explicitly addresses gender to highlight the *similarity* between the two protagonists (an explicit emphasis on gender usually highlights a *difference* between the protagonists, for example in 1.29.2, 2.39.2, 2.39.6, and 3.4.5). Moreover, the protagonists simultaneously utter soliloquies in which they think about the implications of Philetas' exposition for their own situation (2.8.2–5) and have the same dream in which they lie naked together (1.10.1) and to which they respond in an identical way (Ἐνθεώτεροι...ἐπειγόμενοι πρὸς τὰ φιλήματα καὶ ἰδόντες ἀλλήλους ἅμα μειδιάματι προσέδραμον, 2.10.2). Finally, they smile simultaneously, which is the only instance where body language is addressed to convey the *positive* influence of Eros on them.

⁴⁵ Morgan (2004a: 175) rightly points to the active verbs of which Chloe is the subject, and which are indices of her 'erotic initiative'.

Callirhoe's similar aptness in such controlled communication, as illustrated when she hides from Chaereas her letter of farewell to Dionysius. In Longus, such asymmetry is established at the very beginning of the story.

The gradual shift of emotional dominance from Chloe to Daphnis during the course of the novel goes hand in hand with a development in Daphnis' erotic maturity and receptiveness to female physical beauty. Again, this strand is fleshed out almost exclusively through metonymical characterization. Just like their ignorance, their erotic maturity is indicated by *when* the protagonists focalize each other's physical beauty.⁴⁶ Only when Chloe falls in love with Daphnis does she focalize his physical characteristics (his hair is black and thick, his body sun-tanned, etc.; 1.13.2) and only *then* for the first time does she find him beautiful (τότε πρῶτον αὐτῇ καλὸς ἐδόκει, 1.13.2). In comparison with other Greek novels, the protagonists' physical features appear at a late stage in the story, which indicates that Longus treats the awakening of love as a gradual process, unlike the other novelists' adoption of the love-at-first-sight *topos*.⁴⁷ Daphnis' physical features are communicated to the reader no earlier than when they become important for Chloe in the process of awakening sexuality. Similarly, Chloe's physical characteristics are only communicated to the reader when Daphnis falls in love with her and focalizes her beauty. The narrator makes it clear that '*then for the first time* (τότε πρῶτον) he noticed with wonder that her hair was golden, . . . as if now *for the first time* (ὥσπερ τότε πρῶτον) he had acquired eyes, and had been blind before' (1.17.3).

We first become aware of the evolution of Daphnis' journey towards erotic maturity when he sees Chloe washing her body for the first time (τότε πρῶτον, 1.32.1). However, the reader realizes that this moment does *not* coincide with the first time that he sees her *naked*. As Morgan (2003b: 182–3) astutely observes, this has occurred earlier in the story after Daphnis has fallen into a pit and Chloe takes off her breast band to assist Dorcon in pulling him out (1.12.4). The narrator makes it clear that from this day onwards (ἀπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας) Dorcon is in love with Chloe (ἐρωτικῶς . . . διετέθη, 1.15.1), which suggests that Dorcon, whose name means 'the watcher', falls in love with Chloe as soon as he sees her breasts. Daphnis must also have seen Chloe's breasts during this episode, but the sight has no impact on him. It is only when he sees her bathing that it *does* have an impact. This contrast between the two episodes is further underlined by the similarity in Dorcon's and Daphnis' reactions when struck by Chloe's beauty: like Dorcon, Daphnis is affected in his *psychē* by the sight of Chloe's naked body (τὴν ψυχὴν, 1.32.4; τὴν ψυχὴν, 1.15.1). Even if Daphnis is still too ignorant to understand his reaction, he has matured erotically since the first spring. This time, unlike then, he has become receptive to the erotic stimulus of a naked female body.

⁴⁶ See Scarcella (1983: 208), who merely hints at this point.

⁴⁷ See Goldhill (1995: 9) on Longus' variation on this *topos*.

This increasing receptiveness to female beauty is also underlined by his reaction to the kisses of women at a festival of Dionysus: whereas earlier Chloe's first kiss only makes him morose (*σκυθρωπός*, 1.17.2), these kisses *excite* him (*παρώξυνε*, 2.2.1). Again, this development is reflected in the *comparantia* adopted in his own character text: whereas he first compares the pain of being in love with a bee sting and poison (1.18.1–2), he later observes that Chloe's kiss stings the heart and 'drives him mad like new honey' (*ὥσπερ τὸ νέον μέλι μαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ*, 1.25.2). He also compares the effect of her kiss with the sweetness of her breath, which he likens to apples and pears (*τὰ μῆλα . . . αἱ ὄχναι*, 1.25.2). The appearance of *mania* and the images adopted by Daphnis as *comparantia* are more erotically charged than before.⁴⁸ Moreover, they occur at the beginning of summer, which is mentioned as adding to the erotic heat that they feel for each other (*Ἐξέκαε . . . αὐτούς*, 1.23.1). Daphnis' increased emotional intensity is also highlighted by his changed behaviour: whereas in spring he is ashamed to look at Chloe (*βλέπων . . . ἐρυθήματι ἐπίμπατο*, 1.17.2), he now 'gazes shamelessly at every inch of her' (*ἔβλεπεν ἀπλήστως οἷα μηδὲν αἰδούμενος*, 1.25.1). Moreover, when he sees her in a fawn-skin and pine-garland, he imagines himself to be looking at one of the nymphs (*μίαν ᾤετο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἄντρον Νυμφῶν ὄραν*, 1.24.1). Chloe has, of course, been repeatedly associated with nymphs throughout the story,⁴⁹ but in this instance for the first time the comparison occurs in Daphnis' own focalization. The erotic overtones of this comparison are clear not only from the immediate context (their eyes are said to be bewitched, 1.24.1), but also from the fact that Daphnis' focalization of Chloe as a nymph invites the reader to cast Daphnis in the role of Pan. This association is highlighted by the fact that the episode occurs at *noon* (*Τῆς . . . μεσημβρίας*, 1.24.1), which is traditionally the time of epiphanies, especially of Pan⁵⁰ (who reveals himself to Bryaxis at this time of day, 2.26.5).

Daphnis' increasing physical maturity is accompanied by an increase in emotional control over Chloe. This becomes clear when he first takes the initiative in trying to put into practice the third remedy suggested by Philetas ('lying down naked together'). He pulls her towards him, so that she comes to lie on her side (*Βιαιότερον . . . τοῦ Δάφνιδος ἐπισπασαμένου κλίνεται*, 2.11.2).⁵¹

⁴⁸ The apple, which is the most obviously erotic symbol in this context, actually appears a second time as a *comparans* in this episode, when the protagonists compare parts of each other's bodies with fruit (*μήλας*, 1.24.3). On the connection between honey and love, see Trzaskoma (2007: 355–7).

⁴⁹ Chloe's introduction assimilates her to the nymphs, in whose cave (*Νυμφῶν ἄντρον*, 1.4.1) she is found by Dryas. His name also underlines her connection to the nymphs (*dryades* (2.39.3 and 3.23.1) are oak nymphs; see Morgan 2004a: 153). Chloe's association with the nymphs is repeatedly re-activated throughout the novel (e.g. her flight to the nymphs' cave during the attack of the Methymnians, 2.20.3; her oath of fidelity by the nymphs and that of Daphnis by Pan, 2.39.1).

⁵⁰ See Epstein (2002: 32–3) and Morgan (2004a: 152).

⁵¹ See also Morgan (2004a: 185), who identifies this action of Daphnis as 'the first sign of 'normal' male dominance'.

They do not get any further at this point, but continue their search for *erôs* (ἔρωτα ζητοῦντες, 3.13.3) as soon as they are reunited in the spring, when Daphnis' growing control over Chloe continues. Because they are incited by the sexual behaviour of their goats and sheep (ἐξεκάνοντο . . . ἐτήκοντο), they consider the possibility that there is 'something more' (περιττότερόν τι) to Philetas' third remedy. It is Daphnis in particular who tries to explore this possibility (μάλιστα . . . ὁ Δάφνις): he swells (ὤργα, 3.13.4) in response to her kisses, becomes ruttish (ἐσκιτάλιζε) in response to her embraces, and is bolder than her and readier to try anything (ἐς πᾶν ἔργον περιεργότερος καὶ θρασύτερος). Moreover, he keeps insisting (ἤτει, 3.14.1) that she should please him in anything that he wants (χαρίσασθαί οἱ πᾶν ὅσον βούλεται). Daphnis employs the verb 'χαρίζομαι' in its most neutral meaning of 'doing something agreeable to someone', but at the level of the key function the reader is reminded of the specific sexual meaning of the word ('to please someone sexually'). More specifically, he proposes to do with her 'what the rams do to the ewes, and the billy-goats to the nanny-goats' (3.14.2) and, subsequently, stands up and embraces her from behind, 'mimicking the goats' (μιμούμενος τοὺς τράγους, 3.14.5). At this point, the consistently metonymical characterization is complemented by a marked metaphorical component, both intertextually and intratextually. First, the scene echoes Theocritus' *Idyll* 1, which equally addresses Daphnis' sexual frustration at the sight of copulating billy-goats;⁵² moreover, it also mirrors an episode that in the novel occurs exactly one year earlier in the narration. At the beginning of the first spring (Ἦρος . . . ἀρχή, 1.9.1), the *mimesis* of animals (μιμηταί, 1.9.2) is an indication of their childlike innocence and young age. Longus clearly places himself in a tradition going back to Aristotle (*Po.* 1448^b5–9), who regards *mimesis* as a source of pleasure. Now, one year later, the originally playful concept of *mimesis* has been appropriated to the sexual level.⁵³ And another crucial difference is that now it no longer results spontaneously from innocent playfulness but is rather a well-thought-out consequence of Daphnis' argumentation, drawing upon the information provided by Philetas about the three remedies for love. Although Chloe's verbal protests initially convince him not to do so (πείθεται, 3.14.5), he eventually embraces her from behind anyway. Verbal resistance, then, is futile at this stage of the narrative: Daphnis is in control.

These attempts on Daphnis' part highlight the fact that, for the first time, the protagonists are differentiated from each other with regard to their *ignorance about sexuality*. Like Chloe, Daphnis is unfamiliar with sex and with sexual satisfaction (he is surprised, for example, that rams behave serenely after the

⁵² Theoc. *Id.* 1.86–91, on which, see G. B. Miles (1977: 150).

⁵³ See Zeitlin (1990: 436–44) on *mimesis* as crucial in, among other things, the development of the protagonists.

deed), but the mere fact that he assumes that there is ‘the deed’ (τὸ ἔργον, 3.14.3) that must follow Philetas’ third remedy sharply distinguishes him from Chloe, who asks what more there could possibly be other than the remedies as suggested (τί πλέον, 3.14.2). Chloe does not realize that what the sheep and goats do is the ‘deed of Eros’ about which Philetas has told them. In her view, both the upright position of the copulating animals (ὀρθοὶ . . . ὀρθαί, 3.14.4) and their fleece (λασιώτεραι) are incompatible with Philetas’ advice to *lie* together while *naked* (συγκατακλιθῆναι καὶ ταῦτα γυμνήν). Daphnis, on the other hand, focalizes the sheep’s behaviour correctly as the deeds of love (τὰ ἔρωτος ἔργα, 3.14.5). Moreover, for the first time he articulates the insight that Philetas’ third remedy is something *transitive*, something that rams *do to* ewes (ποιοῦσι, 3.14.2). Up to that point, the euphemistically symmetrical description of sex by Philetas (κεῖσθαι, 2.8.5) prevented them from thinking of sex as a transitive activity. Chloe immediately takes up this notion in her own speech (‘the males *do it* . . . and the females *have it done to them*; δρώσιν . . . πάσχουσιν, 3.14.4) but does not realize it has anything to do with Philetas’ instructions.

And again, metonymical characterization is complemented by metaphorically generated semantic layers. The above-mentioned *mimesis* episode recalls not only the protagonists’ imitation of sheep and goats during the first spring, but also their imitation of Pan and Syrinx in dance (ὠρχήσαντο τὸν μῦθον, 2.37.1) after hearing this myth told by Lamon. As in the other two episodes, the technical term is explicitly mentioned (ἐμιμείτο, 2.37.1; μιμούμενος, 2.37.2). These three episodes can be read, then, as a series metaphorically informing the gradual evolution of the sexual awareness of the protagonists through significant contrasts and similarities. Whereas the first episode is set in a pre-sexual context, the third episode shows the protagonists aiming at something that the reader clearly recognizes as sexual intercourse. The second episode stands midway between these two, not only chronologically but also psychologically as far as the protagonists’ sexual awareness is concerned. The sexual element involved in their imitation of the myth of Pan and Syrinx is clear to the reader, but only partially acknowledged by Daphnis and Chloe themselves. Lamon’s narration of the myth has informed them that Pan feels love (τὸν ἔρωτα, 2.34.2) for Syrinx—a concept that they know since Philetas’ instruction. But like Philetas earlier (2.7.7), Lamon does not mention sex explicitly, but merely describes it as ‘what Pan wanted’ (ὃ τι ἐχρηζέ, 2.34.1).

The gradual reversal of emotional leadership is mirrored in Daphnis’ growing awareness of the potentially problematic nature of love. This is indicated by the attention he pays to the questions of faithfulness and unfaithfulness. These concepts occur in a number of instances before the protagonists themselves consciously address them. Again, it is Chloe who first focuses on

the potentially problematic nature of these.⁵⁴ And again, metonymical registration of behaviour, speech, and motivations takes the lion share of the construction. She kisses Dorcon (1.30.1) but does not tell Daphnis because she is ashamed. Furthermore, she gets jealous when Daphnis is kissed by a woman at a festival. Moreover, when both protagonists, as a proof of their love, swear that they will not live without the other (μὴ ζήσεσθαι, 2.39.1; καὶ θάνατον καὶ βίον, 2.39.2), she characterizes herself as 'faithful' to Daphnis (πιστή, 2.39.4) and objects to Daphnis' oath to Pan, whom she characterizes as an amorous god 'not to be trusted' (ἄπιστος, 2.39.2). She bases her judgement on Pan's erotic character as demonstrated by his love both for Pitys (ἡράσθη... Πίτυος, 2.39.3) and Syrinx (ἡράσθη... Σύριγγος) in the two myths that have been told to her up to that point. Consequently, she expresses the fear that Pan will not punish Daphnis even if he goes after more women 'than there are reeds in your syrinx' (πλείονας... γυναικας τῶν ἐν τῇ σύριγγι καλάμων, 2.39.3). By adopting this *comparans*, she assimilates the object of Daphnis' hypothetical sexual desire (women) to the object of Pan's actual sexual desire (S/syrinx). This is not the first passage in the novel where one of the protagonists associates Daphnis with Pan. Daphnis earlier compares himself to Pan (1.16.3) when rejecting Dorcon's comment that he has a goatish smell. However, whereas this comparison does not have any erotic connotations, the oath episode, for the first time, shows the association between Pan and Daphnis being situated on a sexual level *by one of the protagonists themselves*. To be sure, Daphnis' musical interpretation of Pan's behaviour earlier shows that he does conceptualize Pan's love as playing an important role *in the myth itself* (Daphnis pipes 'a plaintive tune like one in love (ὡς ἐρῶν), an amorous tune (ἐρωτικόν) like one paying court, a tune of recall like one seeking and not finding', 2.37.3), but he does not realize that this myth is paradigmatic of his and Chloe's own situation. In other words, he does not acknowledge the link between Pan and himself (or Chloe and the nymphs) on the basis of an erotic *tertium comparationis*, as Chloe does in her speech to Daphnis.

It is Daphnis' winter visit to Chloe that thematizes Daphnis' growing awareness concerning the questions of faithfulness and unfaithfulness. When he asks Chloe to remember him (Μέμνησό μου, 3.10.3), thus implying that he considers the opposite to be possible, she reassures him by recalling her oath (ὥμοσα) and seems more confident about their relationship than Daphnis. She encourages him (Θάρρει, 3.10.4) and anticipates their reunion as soon as the snow has melted (εὐθύς, 3.10.3), whereas he, on the contrary, focuses on the vast amount of snow (πολλή, 3.10.4) and the length of time to wait indicated by this. For this reason, the apparently inappropriate passivity

⁵⁴ Compare e.g. *Metiochus and Parthenope*, where it seems to be Metiochus who raises the matter (λήσμων, pottery fragment O. Bodl. 2175, 4: 'Parthenope, are you forgetful of your Metiochus?').

implied by the narrator's description of her answer as an echo of Daphnis' words (*ἀντιφωνήσασα . . . καθάπερ ἡχώ*, 3.11.1) has puzzled scholars.⁵⁵ But in one respect, Chloe's response does, of course, echo Daphnis' earlier words. She answers Daphnis' request to remember him ('Remember me', *Μέμνησό μου*, 3.10.3) with an explicit affirmation that she will ('I remember you'; *Μνημονεύω*). This literal echo of Daphnis' concern highlights the fact that, this time, it is Daphnis who brings up the question of faithfulness, and *not* Chloe, as in their first dialogue about this subject. Now that the winter prevents them from being together, Daphnis is the first to communicate concern that the other might forget their oaths of fidelity. Whereas Chloe problematizes this question in the autumn, Daphnis takes up this role in the winter. Again, then, an intratextual metaphorical dimension is added to support a development suggested by the registration of behaviour.

Once Daphnis has been instructed in sexual practice by Lycaenion, another problematic aspect concerning *erôs* enters his worldview. He initially feels the urge (*ὥρμητο*, 3.19.1; *τῆς . . . ὀρμῆς*, 3.20.1) to do with Chloe what he has been taught but is frightened (*ἐδεδοίκει*, 3.20.2) by Lycaenion's warning that Chloe will scream and bleed when penetrated for the first time. Montiglio (2010: 47–8) observes that the conflict Daphnis experiences here is in line with his ignorance about any social codification of sexual desire: this conflict preserves 'the cultural constraints of natural inclinations by having Daphnis invest those constraints with a strong emotion, which wins over his initial enthusiasm and assures that he will play the required role: not, however, because he honors those constraints (this would be out of character), but because his fear agrees with them'. Daphnis' decision, it is true, can be read as an amoral variation of the generically topical concept of self-control as a social value. But this reworking does not necessarily mean that the conflict Daphnis experiences is situated *exclusively* between the two poles of initial urge and subsequent fear and that, consequently, there are no moral considerations involved at all. Daphnis, after all, carefully considers (*εἰς λογισμὸν ἄγων*, 3.20.1) Lycaenion's words and consciously decides (*Γινούς*, 3.20.2) *not* to have sex with Chloe because he does not want (*θέλων*, 3.20.1) her to scream and bleed. Moreover, he conceptualizes penetration as the infliction of a wound (*τραύματος*, 3.20.2) and therefore resolves not to go beyond kisses and embraces, which differ from penetration in *not* being dangerous (*ἀκίνδυνον*).

For Daphnis, then, there is a moral question involved: should he wound and endanger Chloe, whom he loves, in order to share with her his own knowledge about *erôs*? He consciously decides not to. Indeed, the motivations underlying his subsequent actions echo his reasoned deliberation as well as his fear. When

⁵⁵ See e.g. Morgan (2004a: 205), who observes that the image of an echo implies a 'passivity which the exchange does not in fact bear out, though C[hloe] is the more reticent; a new sign of development from natural equality towards socially approved gender-norms'.

the protagonists again lie naked together (γυμνοὶ συγκατεκλίθησαν, 3.24.2), Daphnis does not have sex with Chloe because ‘the thought of blood scares him’ (ἐτάραξε τὸ αἷμα, 3.24.3). In addition, he does not even allow (οὐκ ἐπέτρεπεν) Chloe to take off her clothes on a number of subsequent occasions because ‘he fears that one day his resolution might be overcome’ (δεδοικώς μὴ νικηθῇ τὸν λογισμόν ποτε). The term *logismos* picks up his reasoned deliberation just after his initiation (3.20.1). The notion of such deliberation being conquered by what the reader recognizes as passion brings to the fore the traditional conflict between reason and passion. In other words, Daphnis’ behaviour is informed by a rational decision which, however, he recognizes is vulnerable to passion. The conflict he experiences, then, is more complex than the simple opposition between initial urge and subsequent fear allows.

Daphnis’ decision results in the preservation of Chloe’s virginity until her marriage and thus respects, albeit inadvertently, the social codes underlying Longus’ universe—and operative in the other ‘late’ novels as well (e.g. Ach. Tat. 4.1.4, Hld. 1.25.4). In Longus, the desirability of this scenario is explicitly articulated by Chloe’s adoptive mother Nape, who proposes that Dryas give Chloe in marriage to one of her suitors in order to prevent her from ‘making a man of one of the shepherds’ (ἄνδρα ποιήσεταιί τινα τῶν ποιμένων, 3.25.2) for some apples or roses (ἐπὶ μήλοις ἢ ῥόδοις). The words ‘making a man’ in Nape’s speech echo Lycanion’s statement to Daphnis after his initiation that she has made him a man (ἄνδρα . . . πεποίηκα, 3.19.3). Moreover, the reference to apples in Nape’s speech will resurface when Daphnis gives a freshly picked apple to Chloe as a present—an image symbolizing her future defloration. ‘One of the shepherds’, referred to by Nape, then, will in the end be none other than Daphnis himself.

Daphnis’ initiation also invests him with an additional level of control in the sexual domain. At this point, his control over their relationship can be read as the intratextual counterpart of Chloe’s dominance after the Dorcon episode, when she was able to control Daphnis’ access to information about her sexuality. Now it is Daphnis who controls her access to information: he does not even tell her why he does not want them to lie naked together. She wonders (ἐθαύμαζε, 3.24.3) what the reason could be, but is too ashamed to ask (ἡδέϊτο πυνθάνεσθαι). The differentiation of the protagonists on the sexual level is interconnected with a similar differentiation on the social level. Just like Daphnis’ developing emotional dominance, this strand is mainly constructed with metonymical techniques throughout, often complemented with metaphorically generated meaning. Whereas the narrative on the whole is presented as the story of the instruction of the protagonists, the agency of instruction during the novel shifts from external figures such as Philetas and Lycanion to Daphnis himself. Daphnis teaches Chloe to play the syrinx (Ἐδίδασκεν, 1.24.4) and his narration of the Phatta myth is explicitly presented by the primary narrator as instruction of Chloe (διδάσκει αὐτήν, 1.27.1).

The narrator's reference to the content of the myth as 'the things that are being told' (τὰ θρυλούμενα, 1.27.1) suggests that Daphnis' superior knowledge is informed by a social component: Daphnis seems to have access to the stories that are being told in the worlds of adults. Chloe, on the other hand, has not. The Echo myth further foregrounds this difference in knowledge. Like the Syrinx myth, it is narrated by Daphnis to Chloe and presented as instruction (διδάξειε, 3.22.4). Like the other embedded myths in the novel, this myth is aetiological: Daphnis' narration explains the origin of echoes. Daphnis knows the phenomenon of echo (εἰδώς, 3.22.1), unlike Chloe, who then hears it for the first time (τότε πρῶτον, 3.22.2). The fact that Daphnis tells this myth to Chloe immediately after his initiation in sex by Lycaenion reflects his newly acquired position as possessor of special knowledge and experience.⁵⁶ But more importantly, whereas the Phatta myth is presented by the primary narrator as Daphnis' instruction, it is Daphnis *himself* who presents the Echo myth as an instance of the instruction of Chloe ('διδάξειε' occurs in Daphnis' focalization: he demands kisses as a fee for his instruction, 3.22.4). After his sexual initiation by Lycaenion, then, Daphnis for the first time identifies *himself* as Chloe's instructor.

Moreover, the Echo myth symbolizes Daphnis' own concerns in another way. Daphnis' superiority in knowledge about the phenomenon of the echo reflects his superior knowledge about sex. This is highlighted, first, by the fact that Chloe is eroticized in this episode. She is compared to a baby bird (ῶσπερ νεοττός ὄρνιθος, 3.20.3) as she snatches food from Daphnis' mouth, an image not only casting Daphnis as a parent,⁵⁷ thus reinforcing his role as an instructor, but also aligning Chloe with Eros, who is repeatedly described as a baby bird in the novel (πέρδικος νεοττός, 2.4.3; ἀηδόνης νεοττός, 2.6.1).⁵⁸ Secondly, there is the presence of the sexual element in the Echo myth, as opposed to its absence in the Phatta myth. The cause of Echo's metamorphosis is, at least partially, her attempt to remain a virgin. The myth is not only proleptic of the introduction of the question of marriage into the narrative a couple of paragraphs later (3.25.1): it can also be read as a symbol of Daphnis' own concerns with Chloe's virginity at this point in the frame narrative. More specifically, his fear (ἐδεδοίκει, 3.20.2) of Chloe's bleeding is reflected in his narration of the myth:⁵⁹ the suggestively violent terms in which Daphnis envisages Chloe's defloration (see pp. 224–5) are paralleled in the myth by the murder of Echo who is torn to pieces (διασπῶσιν, 3.23.3).⁶⁰ In his

⁵⁶ See e.g. Hunter (1997: 19).

⁵⁷ Morgan (2004a: 213).

⁵⁸ On birds as erotic symbols in Longus, see O'Connor (1991: 400) and Morgan (2004a: 180, 213).

⁵⁹ See also McCulloh (1970: 65–6).

⁶⁰ Moreover, they are echoed when Chloe is deflowered at the end of the novel: the people accompanying Daphnis and Chloe to their bedroom do not sing the traditional ὑμέναιος (οὐχ ὑμέναιον ᾄδοντες, 4.40.2), but 'began to sing with rough and uncouth voices, as if they were breaking up the ground with forks'.

ignorance, Daphnis conflates defloration with murder. The contrast with the Phatta myth is highly significant: in that myth, narrated by Daphnis to Chloe during the first summer, the cause of the girl's metamorphosis is her sadness at a boy's theft of eight cows. At this point in the frame narrative, neither of the protagonists knows anything about *erôs*, and the loss of their cattle was the worst that could happen to them in their otherwise carefree lives. Thus, in the two myths, the threat to the girls reflects the concerns of the protagonists and Daphnis respectively at that point in the frame narrative.

Social differentiation of the protagonists is further thematized, of course, once Daphnis has been recognized as the son of Dionysophanes and Cleariste (4.21.3). The reader is offered a prolepsis of this differentiation when Dionysophanes and Cleariste send Daphnis some food after his syrinx performance. Daphnis eats this together with Chloe, but only Daphnis is said to enjoy the urban cuisine (*ἦδετο γευόμενος ἀστικής ὀψαρτυσίας*, 4.15.4).⁶¹ This social 'shift' is also highlighted by the fact that he offers his pastoral possessions to the gods (4.26.2). Moreover, he puts on expensive (*πολυτελῆ*, 4.23.2) clothes, which evoke a contrast with an earlier episode in which Chloe puts on Daphnis' clothes (1.24.2). Unlike then, cross-dressing has now become completely impossible: she could never now wear Daphnis' expensive city clothes. The social inequality suddenly created between Daphnis and Chloe destabilizes, of course, one of the most important markers of symmetry between them so far: their similar rustic upbringing as shepherds' or goatherds' children. This opposition is neutralized after Chloe is recognized as being high-born. She too then offers pastoral possessions to the gods (4.32.3) and changes appearance as Cleariste dresses her (*ἐκόσμει*, 4.31.3) as her son's future wife. But even if some performative aspects of Daphnis' behaviour change because of his abrupt social promotion, at other points it becomes clear that a rustic background cannot simply be supplanted. When Dionysophanes, for example, mentions Daphnis' goats in a speech, Daphnis suddenly realizes that they have not yet been watered and wants to rush off to his herds (4.25.1). But since the point of Dionysophanes' speech is, precisely, that Daphnis, as his newly recognized son, will no longer work as a goatherd but will, instead, be given land, slaves, gold, and silver to the extent that he will rival kings, Daphnis' reaction indicates to everyone (*πάντες*, 4.25.2) that 'despite having become a master he was still a goatherd' (*δεσπότης γεγεννημένος ἔτι ἦν αἰπόλος*). His being a shepherd, one of the coordinates informing his character from the beginning of the novel onwards, is shown to persist through habituation despite the more recent social reconfiguration that makes such habituation superfluous. Just as Daphnis and Chloe will after their marriage remain in the countryside (instead of going to live in the city), this episode casts habituation and upbringing as

⁶¹ Morgan (2004a: 233) rightly contrasts this scene with 1.10.3, where the protagonists share the simple food of the countryside.

influences stronger than both *physis* and the performative aspects implied by social identity.

Of course, the protagonists' high-born origins are indicated to the reader from the beginning of the story by their recognition tokens and inform their adoptive parents' marriage negotiations. In the episodes preceding their recognition, Daphnis' 'real' origin is further thematized by a number of paradigms. When he meets Dionysophanes for the first time, for example, the narrator compares his physical appearance to that of Apollo while herding cattle in the service of Laomedon (*Ἀπόλλων Λαομέδοντι θητεύων ἐβουκόλησε*, 4.14.2). This divine paradigm is in tune with the many divine resonances surrounding the protagonists' characters.⁶² Included in the paradigm is the point that Daphnis' social status is only *apparently* inferior to that of Dionysophanes. Apollo, who was sent with Poseidon to Troy to work in the service of Laomedon, will turn out to have a higher status than Laomedon could have suspected. Similarly, shortly after this episode, Daphnis too will be revealed to be of higher status than Dionysophanes is aware of at the moment of their first encounter. Moreover, the circumstances in which Daphnis' and Apollo's true identities are revealed are also similar. Apollo manifests himself as a god to Laomedon by punishing him when he breaks his promise to pay Poseidon and him—that is, when he treats them as slaves. Similarly, Astylus' plan to take Daphnis to the city as a *παῖς* (a sexually and socially inferior person) for Gnathon is the immediate cause of Lamon's display of Daphnis' recognition tokens to Dionysophanes and Cleariste. Lamon himself draws attention to this fact when he condemns Astylus' intention to treat Daphnis as Gnathon's slave (*δοῦλον*), servant (*οἰκέτην*), and plaything (*παροίνημα*, 4.19.5).

The paradigms evoked by Gnathon to persuade Astylus to allow him to take Daphnis with him to the city function similarly. When Astylus asks mockingly whether Gnathon is not ashamed to fall in love with a goatherd, Gnathon replies by listing three examples of mythological herdsmen with whom even gods have fallen in love: 'Anchises was a cowherd, but Aphrodite

⁶² Their names, for example, underline their assimilation to the divine. The mythical tragic cowherd (see Schönberger 1960: 13, Hunter 1983: 16–17, 22–31, Morgan 2004a: 7 n. 13, and Wojaczek 1969) is the son of Hermes and a nymph (see Philippides 1978: 96–105 for a comparison with Longus' Daphnis). On his association with figures depicted as young dying consorts of goddesses associated with eroticism and love, see Anagnostou-Laoutides and Konstan (2008). On Chloe's name as a cult name of the goddess of harvest and vegetation, Demeter, see pp. 211–12. The fact that Daphnis and Chloe are foundlings suckled by animals also aligns them with many divine figures, such as Zeus, who was suckled by the goat Amalthea, and Dionysus. Regarding the latter, see Hunter (1983: 16–17), Blázquez (1987: 125), and Morgan (2004a: 152), with reference to Merkelbach (1988: 45). Finally, other characters in the novel also acknowledge divine strands in their identity. Lamon and Dryas believe that Daphnis and Chloe are under the protection of divine providence (*τῶν σωθέντων προνοία θεῶν*, 1.8.2). And Dryas regards the discovery of Chloe as divine (*Θεῖον . . . τόεῖρημα*, 1.6.1).

took him as her lover. Branchus grazed goats, but Apollo loved him. Gany-medes was a shepherd, but the lord of the universe carried him off' (4.17.6). Thus Gnathon tries to justify his choice of a goatherd like Daphnis by referring to the similar behaviour of three of the most important Olympic gods. In his list of herdsmen, Gnathon aims at generating an optimal rhetorical effect: his three *exempla* begin with the first three letters of the Greek alphabet (*ABI*)⁶³ and Daphnis' own name begins with the *fourth* (*Δ*). At the level of the key function, however, the contrast in status between the paradigms to which he assimilates himself on the one hand (gods) and those to which he assimilates Daphnis on the other (mortal men), reflects Gnathon's (incorrect, as the reader knows) assumption that Daphnis has a lower social status than himself. Unlike Gnathon himself, the reader clearly perceives the warning addressed to Gnathon by this series of paradigms: Daphnis is *not* the slave that Gnathon believes him to be.

Once Daphnis has been recognized as the son of Dionysophanes and Cleariste, his social differentiation from Chloe reaches its climax and, for a minute, even affects their emotional relationship. Daphnis is said to forget Chloe, albeit briefly (*Ἐξελάθετο . . . πρὸς ὀλίγον*, 4.23.2). The novelistic *topos* of erotic rivalry threatening the emotional exclusiveness of the protagonists' relationship is here relocated to the level of social differentiation. After this point, their social differentiation gradually decreases. This decrease neatly combines the metonymical and metaphorical techniques adopted so far to bring out the *increasing* differentiation. Well before Chloe's recognition, for example, Daphnis apologizes (*ἀπελογεῖτο*, 4.29.5) for his neglect and curses his own recognition (*ὦ πικρὰς ἀνευρέσεως*, 4.28.3) in a lament monologue (*ὠδύρετο*, 4.28.2). This monologue follows one by Chloe, who laments that Daphnis has forgotten her. In the novel as a whole, each protagonist utters only two lament monologues, which construct a ring composition. The first two monologues highlight the beginning of the protagonists' love for each other (first spring): they mark the moments when they have first fallen in love (1.14.1–4 and 1.18.1–2). The other pair, on the other hand, marks what the protagonists themselves consider to be the end of their love, albeit for a short time (last autumn). Chloe laments because she is convinced that Daphnis has forgotten her (*Ἐξελάθετο*, 4.27.1). Daphnis, for his part, laments because Chloe has been abducted (*ἀρπάσας*, 4.28.3) by Lampis and consequently expresses the fear that *he* will sleep with her (*<συγ>κοιμήσεται*). At the level of the key function, both pairs of lament monologues thematize the painfulness of transition (metamorphosis). When the protagonists fall in love, their lament monologues mark the sadness of their emotional metamorphosis from a pre-erotic to an erotic stage in their lives. It is a painful but inevitable

⁶³ Morgan (2004a: 235).

step, as the primary narrator highlights in his prologue ('no one has ever escaped love, nor ever shall', οὐδεὶς ἔρωτα ἔφυγεν ἢ φεύξεται, pr. 4). At the end of the novel, the protagonists' lament monologues mark the *social* metamorphosis of Daphnis. The two pairs of lament monologues, then, form each other's intratextual counterpart in thematizing the two single most important themes underlying the protagonists' characterization: that is, emotional and social development. Simultaneously, however, the latter pair of lamenting monologues spans the gap between the two protagonists at its widest point, when their sexual and social differentiation has reached its climax. It marks the most asymmetrical point in the entire novel.

4.4 RHETORICAL AND SOCIAL SKILLS

As is well known, Longus' novel thematizes the intimate connection between sex and the social conventions governing it. As Goldhill (1995: 5) points out, it ambiguously and ironically establishes a gap between the protagonists on the one hand, who innocently and ignorantly pelt each other with apples, and the reader on the other, who decodes such acts as the conventional behaviour of shepherds in love in bucolic poetry.⁶⁴ Such a split between the ignorance of characters and the sophistication of the reader rehearses similar discrepancies in bucolic poetry⁶⁵ and is thematized in the novel by the inexperience of the protagonists with the social codes of amatory communication. In Longus, direct, metonymical, and metaphorical characterization work together to construct this aspect. The figure of Dorcon serves as a foil. He is older than Daphnis and Chloe (he is said to have his beard just on his chin (ἀρτιγένειος, 1.15.1), whereas Daphnis is still beardless (ἀγένειος, 1.16.2)) and is said to *know* the name and deeds of love (εἰδὼς ἔρωτος καὶ τοῦνομα καὶ τὰ ἔργα, 1.15.1), which, of course, sets him apart from the protagonists. He decides to conquer Chloe 'with gifts or by force' (δώροις ἢ βίᾳ, 1.15.1) and puts into practice these two strategies consecutively.⁶⁶ In each instance, the narrator explicitly highlights the protagonists' *apeiria*. Dorcon's gifts, first of all, are said to be part of a 'lover's strategy' (τέχνης ἐραστοῦ, 1.15.3) with which Chloe is inexperienced (ἄπειρος). Her ignorance of the social codes governing courting in the world of adults is highlighted by the fact that she happily accepts the presents and passes them on to Daphnis, which makes her even

⁶⁴ See e.g. Theoc. *Id.* 5.88. On similar ambiguity, see Daude (1991: 211) and Konstan (1994: 79–80).

⁶⁵ See G. B. Miles (1977) on Theocritus' *Idylls*.

⁶⁶ He gives gifts in 1.15.2–3 (to Chloe) and in 1.19.1–3 (to her father, Dryas), and uses force in 1.20.1–21.5.

happier (μᾶλλον δὲ ἔχαιρεν). To be sure, Chloe *knows* that men are dangerous (she is said to be afraid of the rowdy shepherds in their vicinity; φόβω, 1.28.2),⁶⁷ but it is the social codification of male desire that is completely unknown to her. Furthermore, her naive acceptance of Dorcon's presents is contrasted with Dryas' reaction to being offered gifts. Rather than being happy with the presents, like Chloe (ἔχαιρε, 1.15.3), Dryas is *beguiled* (θελχθεῖς, 1.19.3). He does *not* accept the gifts because Chloe's high birth makes her a suitable bride for someone socially more elevated than Dorcon (κρείττονος . . . ἀξία νυμφίου).⁶⁸ Secondly, Daphnis and Chloe are inexperienced not only in the social codification of desire as performed by Dorcon, but also in the sexually motivated transgression of social codes. When Dorcon puts on a wolf's skin to abduct her (another *technê*, 1.20.1), it is again *apeiria* (1.21.4) that prevents them from correctly assessing his purpose. They think that he is merely playing 'a pastoral game' (ποιμενικὴν παιδιάν, 1.21.4), which echoes their own occupations at this stage of the narrative (ποιμενικά καὶ παιδικά, 1.10.2).

Another area that thematizes the social codification of desire throughout the novel and the protagonists' inexperience with it at the outset is speech, which is foregrounded as a tool for erotic communication from early on in the novel. Before being instructed by Philetas about the three remedies for love, Daphnis and Chloe themselves try talkativeness (*lalia*) as a remedy of their own. One of the symptoms of Chloe's love for Daphnis is that 'the name of Daphnis is on her lips all the time' (πολλὰ ἐλάλει Δάφνιν, 1.13.5). Daphnis, for his part, is said to be more talkative than crickets (τῶν ἀκρίδων λαλίστερος, 1.17.4) before he falls in love with Chloe, but afterwards is talkative *only* to Chloe. The verb denoting both Daphnis' and Chloe's speech, *laleô*, is also adopted by Longus to refer to the chirruping of crickets and cicadas (see, for example, 1.14.4, 1.25.3, 1.26.3 and 3.24.2). The connection resurfaces in particular with respect to Daphnis when he expresses the fear that the noise of the cicadas (ὦ λάλων τεττίγων, 1.25.3; λαλοῦντα, 1.26.3) may disturb Chloe in her sleep. The emphasis on Chloe as the recipient of the cicadas' noise again aligns them with Daphnis himself, who is said shortly before to be *lalos* only to Chloe.⁶⁹ Moreover, both the cicada and Daphnis are referred to as 'our good friend' by the narrator (*beltistos*; the only two attestations of this word in

⁶⁷ Winkler (1990b: 118, 1991: 24).

⁶⁸ Dryas' strategic behaviour resurfaces when his wife Nape suggests making a material profit (πολλὰ λαβόντες, 3.25.2) by giving Chloe in marriage to one of the suitors. He is, again, enchanted by the idea (ἐθέλητο τοῖς λεγομένοις, 3.25.3) when thinking about the wealth of the suitors' gifts, but ultimately does not agree because he finds Chloe's high-born origin incompatible with such rustic suitors (κρείττων . . . μνηστήρων γεωργῶν) and hopes that she will make them wealthy (εὐδαίμονας θήσει) once her real parents have been found.

⁶⁹ As Bowie (2005a: 80) notes, cicadas have traditionally served as figures for human beings since Homer.

Longus⁷⁰). In both cases, this denomination is closely associated with verbal activity: the cicada is called *beltistos* when taken out of Chloe's bosom while chirruping (μηδὲ . . . σιωπῶντα, 1.26.3), Daphnis after uttering a soliloquy on his love for Chloe that is explicitly characterized by the primary narrator as nonsense (ἀπελγήρει, 1.17.4). Through the association of the talkative cicada with Daphnis, then, the narrator takes a superior and mocking stance towards Daphnis' and Chloe's inability to communicate their love for each other in any way other than through speech. That words, however, can never be an adequate remedy for love, is highlighted by Philetas, who claims that nothing 'that can be uttered in a song' (οὐκ ἐν ᾠδαῖς λαλούμενον, 2.7.7) can be a remedy for Eros. The verbal echo (*laloumenon*) makes the message hard to miss: *lalia*, spontaneously practised by the protagonists once they have fallen in love, is no remedy.

But Daphnis soon appropriates social conventions for amatory behaviour and communication. This appropriation is especially thematized, once more through metaphorical characterization, in an episode that recalls and significantly departs from both the Dorcon episode and the verbal helplessness of the protagonists. When the protagonists are separated from each other during the winter, they search for a *technê* (τέχνην ἐξήτουν, 3.4.4) that would allow them to meet. Daphnis is more successful than Chloe: whereas she is 'terribly frustrated and helpless' (δεινῶς ἄπορος . . . καὶ ἀμήχανος), he invents a ruse to see her (σόφισμα, 3.4.5; τέχναις, 3.11.3). The narrator explains that Daphnis 'has time to spare and is cleverer than a girl' (σχολὴν ἄγων καὶ συνετώτερος κόρης, 3.4.5), which draws attention to the protagonists as representatives of social types and, more specifically, to the different social codes underlying their lives as they grow up. It also makes explicit in a social context the gender differentiation that, as we will see presently, is implicitly explored at the level of emotional dominance.⁷¹ Daphnis' liberty and free time are contrasted with Chloe's occupations in winter, when her mother is always with her (ἀεὶ . . . συνῆν) and teaches her how to card wool and turn a spindle (ἐρίᾳ τε ξαίνειν διδάσκουσα καὶ ἀτράκτους στρέφειν). Unlike Daphnis, Chloe is being prepared by her mother for her future role as a wife (γάμου μνημονεύουσα) and consequently does not have the time to think of *technai* to see her beloved. She is being restricted by social codes. The socially privileged position of Daphnis, on the other hand, gives him the opportunity to pursue personal desires.

In the Dorcon episode, which likewise presents Chloe as the ultimate goal of *technai*, the protagonists' inexperience is apparent, among other things, from their inability to recognize *erôs* in its socially coded form (Dorcon's gifts). In the winter episode, now, Daphnis himself considers ways to socially encode his

⁷⁰ Morgan (2004a: 171).

⁷¹ See Ory (1984) on the gender differentiation in this episode.

desire for Chloe. His speech is emblematic of this new ability. It surveys different excuses (*πρόφασιν*, 3.6.2) to present to Chloe's parents as explanations for his visit:

'I have come to get a light for the fire.' 'Why, weren't there neighbours just a stade away?' 'I have come to ask for bread.' 'But your bag is full of food.' 'I'm out of wine.' 'But you had the wine-vintage just the other day.' 'A wolf was after me.' 'Where are the wolf's footprints, then?' 'I want to see Chloe.' 'Who admits that to a girl's father and mother?' (3.6.3)

Daphnis is searching for 'what would be the most plausible thing to say' (*ὅ τι λεχθῆναι πιθανώτατον*, 3.6.2). *Pithanos*, as a well-known technical term from rhetorical theory, indicates that he is looking for the excuse that will be most convincing in approaching Chloe's parents. Since he does not dare to reveal the real reason for his visit, he needs a rhetorically convincing and socially acceptable way to gain access to her house and thus satisfy his desire to see her. Ultimately, he decides to abandon this rhetorical plan for a reason which is equally rhetorically informed: he concludes that none of the excuses he has considered is above suspicion (*ἀνύποπτον*, 3.6.4). Whereas in the Dorcon episode the protagonists do not even *recognize* love in its socially coded form, Daphnis himself now attempts rhetorically to code his amorous desire for Chloe in a socially acceptable form.⁷²

Daphnis' rhetorical abilities are further thematized in a number of speeches that transpose standard novelistic material to the bucolic story world of Longus' characters. Two such speeches are the beauty contest (*ὑπὲρ κάλλους ἔρις*, 1.15.4) between Daphnis and Dorcon and the 'judicial hearing' (*δικαιολογήσασθαι*, 2.14.4) of Daphnis and the Methymnians.⁷³ Both rework the novelistic *topos* of the courtroom scene and are heavily marked as rhetorically significant. In the beauty contest, for example, Chloe is appointed as judge of the contest (*ἐδίκασε*, 1.15.4) and her description of Daphnis' last words as an *enkôtion* will have alerted ancient readers to the epideictic rhetorical genre in general and the famous *progymnasma* of the same name in particular. The judicial hearing is even more replete with rhetorical markers: Philetas is appointed as judge (*δικαστήν*, 2.15.1) and the Methymnians' speech is cast as an accusation (*κατηγορήσαν*, 2.16.1), which makes, by definition, Daphnis' speech an *apologia*.

Both speeches of Daphnis are rhetorically ambiguous. On the one hand, their style is simple and characterized, just as that of Chloe's 'simple' speech, by easily recognizable markers of *apheleia*. The repetitive adoption of the

⁷² I prefer this view to Cusset's (2006: 235–6), who argues that in internal discourses like Daphnis' speech here 'le narrateur met en évidence l'incapacité de ses héros à agir et à se décider' (my italics).

⁷³ On the beauty contest, see also De Temmerman (2012d: 163–4).

conjunction 'but' (ἀλλά) as the opening word of consecutive sentences in Daphnis' *apologia*, for example, both refers to his opponents' accusations (Ἀλλ' ἀπέφαγον . . . Ἀλλὰ ἐσθῆς ἐνέκειτο . . . , 2.16.3) and introduces his own defence (Ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο ἡ ναῦς). Both the parataxis and the repetitiveness evoke rhetorical clumsiness and simplicity and are characteristics of aphelic discourse which, just as in Chloe's case, is used, unsurprisingly, to cast Daphnis' words as those of a shepherd and to highlight his rustic upbringing. This 'pastoral simplicity' of his speech is further contextualized by speeches from city dwellers. The speech (4.24.1–4) of one such city dweller, Dionysophanes (a Mytilenean), is clearly marked by longer sentences and much less syntactic repetition. It includes not only parataxis but also hypotaxis and parenthetical constructions, all of which makes it slightly less simple and monotonous than Daphnis' speeches. And while the stylistic differences between Daphnis' and Dionysophanes' speeches remain merely implicit, the judicial hearing with the Methymnians explores rhetorical simplicity explicitly as a marker of rurality. The Methymnians, whose urban origin is emphasized on their introduction,⁷⁴ opt for a rhetorical approach of *saphêneia* (clarity) and *syntomia* (brevity) (σαφή καὶ σύντομα, 2.15.1) precisely because the judge (Philetas) is, unlike themselves, an uneducated rustic (βουκόλον ἔχοντες δικαστήν). Moulding of discourse in function of one's addressee recalls well-known progymnasmatic guidelines.⁷⁵ And unsurprisingly, both *saphêneia* and *syntomia* are well-known rhetorical qualities which show some overlap with *apheleia*.⁷⁶ The Methymnians, then, in deliberately adopting a clear, concise and easy-to-follow style organize their rhetorical performance around a self-perceived contrast between their own urban sophistication and the rural simplicity of country-folk, particularly that of their judge and opponent.

On the other hand, notwithstanding their simplicity, Daphnis' speeches are both successful. In the incident with the Methymnians, Philetas swears by Pan and the nymphs that Daphnis is completely innocent (2.17.1). In the beauty contest, Chloe does not hesitate for a minute and declares Daphnis the winner (1.17.1). His victories point out that his rhetorical simplicity does not exclude cleverness and effectiveness. In the beauty contest in particular, his victory is the result of a clever refutation of the arguments put forward by Dorcon. The beauty contest has often been connected to the pastoral tradition, where it is a

⁷⁴ They are introduced as rich young men from the city of Methymna who go to the countryside to celebrate the vintage with a foreign holiday (ἐν ξενικῇ τέρψει) (2.12.1).

⁷⁵ See Theon *Prog.* 115.24 Sp. II and Nicol. *Prog.* 64.5 Felten.

⁷⁶ Stylistic 'purity' (καθαρότης), for example, is a characteristic of both *saphêneia* (Hermog. *Id.* 226.14–15 Rabe (1913) (Σαφήνειαν . . . ποιεῖ . . . καθαρότης), 227–34 Rabe (1913)) and *apheleia* (Hermog. *Id.* 322.5–6 Rabe (1913) (Ἐννοιαί . . . ἀφελείας . . . καθαραί)). On *apheleia* and *syntomia*, see e.g. D. H. Lys. 17.21–2 and *Dem.* 13.4–5.

topos,⁷⁷ but I think that it also offers a deliberate variation on a number of rhetorical conventions.⁷⁸ Dorcon's speech features some of the *topoi* of a *psogos* or *vituperatio* as prescribed by the *progymnasmata* authors. Daphnis' answer offers a refutation, or *anaskeuê*, of these *topoi*.⁷⁹ His rhetorical strategy consists in taking up the *topoi* addressed by Dorcon and adopting them as *tertia comparationis* which align him with divine paradigms. Dorcon emphasizes, for example, that he himself has been brought up by a (human) mother (μήτηρ, 1.16.1) whereas Daphnis has been fed by a beast (θηρίον) and suckled by a goat (αἰξ αὐτῷ γάλα δέδωκεν, 1.16.2). This recalls the progymnasmatic *topos* of (social) origin, or *tychê*.⁸⁰ Daphnis takes up this *topos* by aligning himself with Zeus, who was also suckled by a goat. Secondly, Dorcon's emphasis on the contrast between his own occupation as cowherd and that of Daphnis, who is only a goatherd, recalls the *topos* of *archê*, or official office. Daphnis, for his part, highlights his qualities as a goatherd (τράγους τῶν τούτου βοῶν μείζοντας, 1.16.3)⁸¹ and adapts the assimilation between himself and the goats to align himself with Pan.⁸² Dorcon also addresses the *topos* of physical beauty (1.16.1–2) in a number of comparisons geared towards contrasting Daphnis' physical appearance with his own. He calls himself 'bigger' (μείζων) than Daphnis and compares his own beard with corn (πυρρός ὡς θέρος μέλλον ἀμᾶσθαι). Daphnis, on the other hand, is small (μικρός) and does not even have a beard (ἀγένειος), which, in Dorcon's view, aligns him with women. Finally, he also contrasts the colour of his white skin (λευκός εἰμι ὡς

⁷⁷ See e.g. Theoc. *Id.* 5 and 8. See, among others, Mittelstadt (1970: 222–4) and Morgan (2004a: 164); the latter calls the beauty contest in Longus 'a complex prose reworking of conventional verse forms, combining continuous speech with amoebaean symmetry of motif and adapting the subject matter of a wooing-song like Theokr. 3'. On the other hand, such a contest might also have specifically novelistic resonances (see e.g. Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 94, 75a42–b2 on a contest of three lovers (ἔρις τριῶν ἐραστῶν) in Iamb. *Bab.*, where there is also a judgement (κρίσις ... κρίνων) and, possibly, a kiss for the winner (τοῦ φιληθέντος κρίσει νικήσαντος, 75b6–7).

⁷⁸ Danek and Wallisch (1993: 51–2) briefly touch upon a few rhetorical figures in Daphnis' speeches, such as parallelism and chiasmus. Bowie (2003b: 364) tantalizingly suggests that Daphnis' refutation of Dorcon's speech adds 'a streak of the mythologically learned sophist to our conception of Daphnis'. See also Edwards (1997) on lovers as sophists in Longus.

⁷⁹ The Greek equivalent of the *refutatio* is the *ἀνασκευή* (and not the *κατασκευή* (*confirmatio*), as G. Anderson 1984: 44 suggests). See Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 8.30–1 Sp. II, Aphth. *Prog.* 27.25–6 Sp. II, and Nicol. *Prog.* 29.7–35.4 Felten. Hock (1997b: 452) identifies Daphnis' speech as a comparison or *synkrisis*, which is unlikely in my view. Whereas, at the level of the key function, the combination of Dorcon's and Daphnis' speeches offers a *synkrisis* of both characters, Daphnis primarily rejects Dorcon's arguments. On similar use of *progymnasmata* in other novelistic contexts, see P. Parsons (2010: 48).

⁸⁰ See e.g. Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 12.22 Sp. II and Theon *Prog.* 78.25 Sp. II.

⁸¹ See Bowie (2009: 14) on this pastoral virtue.

⁸² Dorcon's speech features a third external *topos*, namely *πλοῦτος* (wealth) (see *πένης ὡς μηδὲ κύνα τρέφειν*), which is equally refuted by Daphnis (*ἀρκεῖ δέ μοι [ὁ] τυρὸς καὶ ἄρτος ὀβελίας καὶ οἶνος λευκός, ὅσα ἀγροίκων πλουσίων κτήματα*, 1.16.4), albeit not by way of assimilation to a paradigm.

γάλα) with Daphnis' dark tan (μέλας ὡς λύκος). In his reply, Daphnis singles out the details of his beardlessness and dark skin to compare himself with Dionysus and a hyacinth respectively.

In the beauty contest, then, character is thematized in more than one way. First, the presence itself of the well-known, and emphatically ethical rhetorical speech genres of *encomium* and *vituperatio* suffices to foreground character depiction.⁸³ But in Longus' bucolic story world, secondly, the standard *topoi* usually adopted to depict character in ancient rhetoric and contemporary literature alike⁸⁴ are systematically 'bucolicized' both in Dorcon's speech and Daphnis' adaptation of them in his self-presentation. This 'bucolicization' of progymnasmatic *topoi* shows that Daphnis moulds Dorcon's rhetorical abilities to his own advantage. Dorcon's rhetoric is emulated by Daphnis.

In both passages, the transposition of the novelistic *topos* of the courtroom scene to the bucolic story world serves to highlight Daphnis' role in rhetorically overcoming two generically important obstacles in novel literature: external (physical) aggression (Methymnians) and, even if Daphnis himself at this point in the narrative is not aware of the concept, erotic rivalry (Dorcon). His rhetorical success will culminate in another equally important novelistic domain: marriage. The introduction of the question of marriage into the lives of the protagonists immediately frames their social origins as a matter of central importance. Because of the delicate recognition tokens found with them at the beginning of the story, both Daphnis and Chloe are suspected by their own parents of being of high descent. Consequently, neither Lamon nor Dryas wants to betroth his foster-child to someone of a socially inferior background. Daphnis, now, is immediately aware of the importance of wealth and social status in his pursuit of a marriage to Chloe. It is an indication of his social maturity that he himself anticipates the problematic nature of Lamon's low social status (3.26.2). When the nymphs help him to find 3,000 gold coins and thus transform him into a socially acceptable candidate, he persuades Dryas and Nape to let him marry Chloe.

Like Daphnis' earlier speeches, this speech is characterized by a simple style that is successful and effective. The speech echoes previous speeches in containing some obvious markers of *apheleia*: the whole speech is one long concatenation of short, paratactically organized sentences with an abundant use of conjunctions. This time, Daphnis' favourite is not 'but', as in his *apologia* to the Methymnians, but rather 'and' (καί), which occurs no fewer than thirteen times in the few lines that this speech occupies. Daphnis' simple

⁸³ See e.g. Halliwell (1990: 45) on *encomium* and *vituperatio* as 'paradigmatic forms of ethical judgement' since Aristotle.

⁸⁴ See e.g. Frazier (1996: 126) on the *topoi* of city of origin, family ties, parents, and political function to depict character in Plutarch's *Lives*.

rhetorical approach is further highlighted if we compare it with a rather more sophisticated speech in the *Ninus* novel, where the eponymous hero also sets out to persuade the mother of his beloved on a marriage-related topic (A.I.38–IV.13). The situation is not identical, however, in that Ninus' speech is about setting an earlier date for a marriage that has already been agreed upon. Whereas Daphnis spends most of his speech listing his many qualities as a husband for Chloe, Ninus passes over this aspect in a preterition ('I am the man you know me to be, so I need not tiresomely proclaim it.', A.II.25–6) and instead dedicates much of his speech to matters that transcend the *hic et hunc*. He critiques, for example, Assyrian marriage customs in the form of a *nomos-physis* debate in A.II.27–III.12 and bases an appeal on the unpredictability of fortune in A.III.12–36.⁸⁵ And whereas Daphnis, according to the narrator, boldly broaches the subject of marriage (πάνν θρασύν . . . λόγον περὶ γάμου, 3.29.1) and, accordingly, emphatically uses an imperative in his very first sentence ('Give me Chloe for a wife', 3.29.2), Ninus gradually works round to justifying his intervention (A.III.36–IV.12).

Unsophisticated directness as used in his speech to Chloe's parents also marks Daphnis' behaviour elsewhere, where it is readily associated with his rustic background. After his sexual initiation by Lycaenion, for example, he is eager to show Chloe immediately what Lycaenion has taught him (3.19.1). The narrator makes it clear that Daphnis' impulsive reaction is an indication of the fact that he has 'the thoughts of a shepherd' (ποιμενικὴν γνώμην). It is paradoxical, then, that the rustic directness in his speech to Chloe's parents suggests not only haste, impatience, and excitement,⁸⁶ but also self-confidence and determination evoked by the thought that the money the nymphs have given him makes him the richest person in the world (ὡς πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλουσιώτατος, 3.29.1). He self-consciously places himself in a position of superiority over the other suitors (τῶν ἄλλων κρατῶν, 3.29.3), a self-presentation supported by a series of arguments. Again, this strategy draws upon the adoption of well-chosen self-fashioning revolving around a number of progymnasmatic *topoi*. As in his speech in the beauty contest, Daphnis highlights his qualities on a 'professional' level ('I can plough a field, and winnow against the wind. I am very good at cutting corn, pruning a vine, and planting trees', 3.29.2), which again echoes the progymnasmatic *topos* of the 'official profession' (*archê*). As an illustration, he offers an overview of successful practice (*πράξεις*) in a professional context (he has doubled the number of goats in his flock, raised fine big billy-goats, etc.; 3.29.2). He also addresses the progymnasmatic *topos* of origin. Since, at this point in the story, Daphnis is unaware of his noble descent, he only refers to his origin as an element that aligns him with Chloe (ἐθρεψεν αἰξὶ ὡς Χλόην οἷς, 3.29.3). He also thematizes the *topos*

⁸⁵ See Stephens and Winkler (1995: 56).

⁸⁶ See Morgan (2004a: 219).

of wealth, or *ploutos*, when he presents himself as financially superior to his opponents (3.29.4). The 3,000 gold coins, which he realizes, of course, to be the most powerful argument, are mentioned at the end, which is traditionally regarded as the best place for the strongest argument.⁸⁷ He goes on to contrast these coins with the (inferior) gifts of the other suitors. The success of this performance is indicated by the fact that Dryas and Nape immediately (*αὐτίκα*) promise to let him marry Chloe (3.30.1). Such success highlights Daphnis' increased social control over his environment. This is particularly clear in the conclusion to his speech, when he explicitly warns his interlocutors that no one must know about the gold coins, 'not even my father Lamon himself' (*Μόνον ἴστω τοῦτο μηδείς, μὴ Λάμων αὐτὸς οὐμὸς πατήρ*, 3.29.4).

These rhetorically significant passages, then, clearly display Daphnis controlling his environment in three of the most important novelistic domains: erotic rivalry (Dorcon), external aggression (Methymnians), and marriage (Chloe's parents). The fact that all this is presented in a highly 'bucolicized' way (including the simple, clumsy style of a shepherd and an adaptation of progymnasmatic *topoi* to bucolic subject matter) does not detract from Daphnis' rhetorical competence within such a universe. In this domain of social control, and in addition to the consistent metonymical depiction through speech, Daphnis' rhetorical agency is also constructed metaphorically by a conspicuous contrast with Chloe, who says hardly anything in the entire novel and is unique among Greek novel heroines for *only* speaking to the novel hero (2.39.2–4, 3.10.3–4, 3.14.2–4).⁸⁸ Lalanne (2006: 136–45) rightly observes that Longus emphasizes male dominance by subjecting Chloe to a gradual process of effacement while allowing Daphnis gradually to become more visible and important as an agent in the story. In my view, and as in Chariton's novel, the hero's characterization conspicuously foregrounds rhetoric as a quality central to the establishment of such male adulthood. Moreover, Longus' highly asymmetrical distribution of rhetorical qualities to the protagonists is more straightforwardly part of a strategy of establishing gender-differentiated dominance than in Chariton's novel (where, as we have seen, Callirhoe is not eclipsed altogether, like Chloe, but rather keeps the realm of private conversation as a territory of rhetorical effectiveness).

A third area in which the protagonists' social skills are explored is that documenting their behaviour during and after their preparations for the arrival of Dionysophanes, who is to confirm their marriage. Here, Daphnis' and Chloe's modes of social behaviour are characterized by a contrast similar to the rhetorical one. And again, metonymical and metaphorical characterization

⁸⁷ Quint. *Inst.* 3.6.10, for example, recommends this strategy.

⁸⁸ Even when she speaks to herself, two speeches are attributed to her and to Daphnis simultaneously (2.8.2–5 and 2.9.2). Her other self-addressed speeches are lament monologues (1.14.1–4 and 4.27.1–2).

are perfectly compatible. A first step in the preparations is looking after the goats as well as possible (4.4.2–4). Daphnis pays much attention to their care, at Lamon's suggestion (*Παρεκελεύετο . . . ὁ Λάμων*, 4.4.2), because he wants his master to be enthusiastic about the marriage (4.4.3). The eventual success of his diligence (*κηδεμονία*, 4.4.4) is anticipated by the primary narrator, who compares the flock of goats with the divine flock of Pan. The milking-pails and cheese-baskets (*σκαφίδων καινῶν καὶ γαυλῶν πολλῶν καὶ ταρσῶν μειζόνων*, 4.4.4) echo the objects that Odysseus finds in the Cyclops' cave (Hom. *Od.* 9.219–23).⁸⁹ Odysseus, who narrates this episode, emphasizes the abundance of the Cyclops' supply (*τυρῶν βρῖθον, στείνοντο . . . ναῖον δ' ὀρῶ ἄγγεα πάντα*) and the quality of the material (*τετυγμένα*). In Longus, the reference to the Cyclops' provision room proleptically indicates that Daphnis' efforts will be successful and that Dionysophanes, like Odysseus, will be impressed. In fact, this is not the only episode aligning Daphnis with Odysseus. The fact that Chloe, at the beginning of the story, falls in love after Daphnis' bathing scene (1.13.2) evokes the famous Homeric scenes where Odysseus is beautified (*κάλλει*, *Od.* 6.237; *κάλλος πολύ*, *Od.* 23.156) by Athena through bathing (*νίζετο*, *Od.* 6.224; *λοῦσεν*, *Od.* 23.154) before appearing before Nausicaa and Penelope respectively.⁹⁰ Odysseus, then, has been present as an implicit paradigm of Daphnis since the outset, and it is no coincidence that this cunning hero resurfaces now, when Daphnis' successful attempts to exert control over his social environment are thematized.

Such control is also emphasized by a contrast with Chloe, which reaffirms gender differentiation as a crucial marker of social behaviour. This marker is briefly hinted at as early as the first book, when Chloe, as a girl (*κόρη*), is afraid (*φόβῳ*) of arrogant shepherds (*τῶν ἀγερώχων ποιμένων*, 1.28.2) and for this reason brings out the sheep more slowly than Daphnis. When, in the last book, the question of social performance is foregrounded by the upcoming visit of Dionysophanes, similar instances of differentiation are explored in more detail. Although she is at first as diligent as Daphnis (she even neglects her own flocks to help him look after his, 4.4.5), the symmetry is soon broken. In the episodes leading up to Dionysophanes' visit, Chloe literally disappears from the scene. When Lamon discovers the destruction of Dionysophanes' garden, for example, there is no trace of her: only Daphnis and Myrtale are attracted by Lamon's laments (4.7.5). Initially, Chloe is absent because she is trying to keep her relationship with Daphnis hidden from Dionysophanes (*λανθανόντων*, 4.6.3), but during Dionysophanes' inspection of the flocks, she runs away into the forest 'because she was shy and frightened of such a crowd' (*ὄχλον τοσοῦτον αἰδεσθεῖσα καὶ φοβηθεῖσα*, 4.14.1). Daphnis is equally

⁸⁹ *ταρσοὶ . . . γαυλοὶ τε σκαφίδες τε* (Hom. *Od.* 9.219–23). See Hunter (1983: 63) and Morgan (2004a: 226).

⁹⁰ See Goldhill (1995: 10).

affected by shyness (as suggested by his body language when he appears before his master⁹¹) and fear (*ἀγωνιῶν*, 4.6.2; *φοβουμένων*, 4.6.3), but his performance at his first encounter with Dionysophanes highlights the difference between them: whereas *aidôs* and fear make Chloe flee as soon as the master appears, Daphnis presents gifts, despite his fear and shyness.

Daphnis' sense of initiative and strategic behaviour towards Eudromus, Astylus, Dionysophanes, and Cleariste is primarily moulded by two traditional motifs taken from the bucolic genre: the syrinx concert and gifts. When he meets Dionysophanes and Cleariste, he succeeds in making a good impression through his virtuoso syrinx performance (4.15.2–4). He fills his entire audience with admiration (*ἐθαύμαζον*, 4.15.4), especially Cleariste, who promises him rewards. Afterwards, Dionysophanes and Cleariste even share their lunch with him (4.15.4). At the level of the key function, Daphnis' syrinx performance aligns him with Philetas, who gives an equally virtuoso performance during the first autumn (2.35.3–4).⁹² But unlike Philetas, Daphnis sees his performance as part of a social strategy: after the performance, he is hopeful (*εὐελπίς*, 4.15.4) that he has *persuaded* (*πείσας*) his masters to agree to the marriage. The use of the word *peithô* clearly invests this performance with rhetorical dimensions: the syrinx performance is, like his speeches, aimed at *persuading* his listeners. Like rhetoric, it is a tool for Daphnis to establish control over his environment.

Offering gifts is also a recurrent motif in the bucolic tradition, where it embodies the unselfish values of the countryside.⁹³ In Longus, it becomes one of the techniques adopted by several characters in their attempts to conquer one of the protagonists sexually. Dorcon twice gives presents to Chloe (*δῶρα*, 1.15.2–3) and later approaches Dryas with gifts (*δῶρα πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα*, 1.19.2). Later, several suitors (*δῶρον ἔφερον*, 3.25.1; *μείζονα . . . δῶρα, . . . δῶρα*, 3.25.3) and Lampis (*δῶρα . . . πολλά*, 4.7.1) do the same. Lycaenion, finally, also uses a gift to seduce Daphnis (*δῶροισ*, 3.15.2). For Daphnis, gifts are strategic tools adopted in his endeavour to marry Chloe. Of course, they play a role in the protagonists' social interaction long before marriage becomes an issue. Chloe, for example, passes on to Daphnis the gifts that she has received from Dorcon (1.15.3), Lycaenion catches Daphnis that way (*δῶροισ . . . δῶρον ἔδωκε*, 3.15.2–3), and Daphnis, in turn, promises to give her presents (*δώσειν*, 3.18.2) if she instructs him in the *technê* of *erôs*. Moreover, Chloe wants to give Daphnis a syrinx as a present (*σύριγγα καινὴν . . . δῶρον*, 1.28.3). At a later point in the novel, when they know the name of *erôs*, they focalize this syrinx as a 'love gift' (*δῶρον ἐρωτικόν*, 3.4.3). When Daphnis has decided to ask Dryas

⁹¹ He says nothing (*εἶπεν οὐδέν*, 4.14.2) but blushes deeply (*ἐρυθρήματος πλησθείς*) and bows his head (*ἐνευσέ κάτω*).

⁹² See Cresci (1981: 2) and Morgan (2004a: 233).

⁹³ See e.g. Theoc. *Id.* 5.8, 6.43. See also Morgan (2004a: 163) and Cresci (1981: 3).

for his daughter's hand, gifts come to thematize the social conventions underlying marriage. Daphnis' inability to give presents, because of Lamon's modest social background, is remedied by the nymphs, who promise him 'gifts that will enchant Dryas' (δῶρα . . . ἃ θέλξει Δρύαντα, 3.27.2). The words 'δῶρα' and 'θέλξει' verbally echo Dorcon and other suitors' gifts to Dryas and their impact on him⁹⁴ and are emblematic of Daphnis' self-presentation, who, as the narrator points out, now starts counting himself among the suitors (εἶνα τῶν μνωμένων, 3.26.1). The nymphs, then, help Daphnis to deal with his desire for Chloe in a socially conventionalized way. Once Dryas and Nape have agreed to the marriage, Daphnis' master Dionysophanes has to be persuaded. Again, Daphnis tries to achieve this aim with gifts—for Dionysophanes (δῶρα, 4.14.2), his son Astylus (δῶρα, 4.10.3), and his messenger Eudromus (οὐκ ὀλίγα . . . ἔδωκεν, 4.6.1). All these gifts are, of course, geared towards making them look kindly on him and his request. Even before Dionysophanes arrives, Daphnis has put Eudromus 'in a friendly frame of mind' (φίλα φρονῶν, 4.6.2) which leads him to promise to put in a good word for Daphnis with his master (ἀγαθὸν τι εἶρεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην ἐπηγγέλλετο).⁹⁵

Whereas at the level of the argument function gifts are social and strategic tools for Daphnis, at the level of the key function this motif interacts with deeper layers of meaning in the novel. Once Dryas and Nape have consented to the marriage, Daphnis kisses Chloe openly 'as if she was his wife (already)' (ὥς γυναῖκα, 3.33.1). This moment, when Daphnis regards Chloe as his wife for the first time, is marked by a number of passages depicting marital life (Daphnis helps Chloe with some domestic occupations, the Theocritan echoes of which recall the image of conjugal life as presented by the Cyclops Polyphemus to the sea nymph Galatea)⁹⁶ and followed almost immediately by an episode where Daphnis picks an apple from the top of an apple tree and gives it to Chloe as a present (δῶρον, 3.34.1). As has been pointed out by others, this scene evokes an *epithalamium* by Sappho (fr. 105), about which Himerius observes that the *unpicked* apple symbolizes the bride's untouched virginity.⁹⁷ According to this imagery, then, Daphnis' picking of the apple anticipates his

⁹⁴ 1.19.1 (δῶρον), 3.25.1 (δῶρον), 1.19.3 (θελχθεῖς), and 3.25.3 (ἐθέλγετο).

⁹⁵ Daphnis' careful efforts to befriend Eudromus pay off repeatedly. When Lampis has destroyed Dionysophanes' garden (4.9.3), for example, it is Eudromus who promises to help them (αὐτὸς συμπράξειν ἐπηγγέλλετο) because he is 'benevolent towards Daphnis' (εὖνους ὦν τῷ Δάφνιδι). And when Astylus plans to take Daphnis to the city, Eudromus immediately informs Daphnis and Lamon (αὐτίκα καταλέγει πάντα, 4.18.1) because 'he likes Daphnis as a good young man' (4.18.1).

⁹⁶ Longus 3.33.2 (ἤμελγε μὲν εἰς γαυλοὺς τὸ γάλα, ἐνέπηγνυ δὲ ταρσοῖς τοὺς τυρούς, προσέβαλλε <δὲ> ταῖς μητράσι <τούς> ἄρνας καὶ τοὺς ἐρίφους). See Theoc. *Id.* 11.65–6: ποιμαίνειν δ' ἐθέλοις σὺν ἐμὴν ἅμα καὶ γάλ' ἀμέλγειν // καὶ τυρὸν πᾶσαι τάμισον δριμεῖαν ἐνείσα. Hunter (1983: 63) characterizes the words of Polyphemus in Theocritus as 'the picture of conjugal bliss'.

⁹⁷ Him. Or. 9.16. See Hunter (1983: 74–6) and Morgan (2004a: 221–2).

defloration of Chloe.⁹⁸ It is not merely a display of male courage and dominance,⁹⁹ but also an indication of *sexual* dominance. Previously, Daphnis has not dared to deflower Chloe for fear of the deflorator blood mentioned by Lycaenion (ἐδεδοίκει, 3.20.2), just as an apple picker before Daphnis is said to have been afraid (ἔδεισεν, 3.33.4) to climb the tree high enough to pick the apple. Thus, he deflowers her symbolically—and pays no attention to her when she tries to stop him (κωλυούσης, 3.34.1). Chloe, then, has no control over Daphnis' *real* actions (he climbs the tree nevertheless), or over his (future) sexual acts, represented metaphorically at this stage. As a woman, she is no longer in control of her own virginity. This is further highlighted by the word 'ἡμέλησε' in this episode, which provides a verbal echo of an earlier passage, where Daphnis is also said to neglect (Ἀμέλει, 3.24.3) Chloe precisely because he is afraid to deflower her.¹⁰⁰ His neglect of Chloe's protests about him picking the apple, then, underlines his control over her virginity, albeit symbolically: since Lycaenion's instruction, Daphnis has the knowledge to decide autonomously when Chloe is to be deflowered.

Chloe's lack of control over her own virginity is highlighted by her anger at Daphnis' neglect of her protest (ἀμεληθείσα ὀργισθείσα . . . ὀργισμένη, 3.34.1). This combination of anger and neglect recalls Daphnis' winter visit (the only other episode where her anger is addressed), when she feigns anger (ἐσκήπτετο . . . ὀργίζεσθαι, 3.8.2) because of Daphnis' purported readiness to return home without having seen her (ἐλθὼν ἔμελλεν ἀποτρέχειν οὐκ ἰδὼν). As in the episode with the apple, then, anger is cast as the result of being neglected. The fact that she only *pretends* to be angry in the first episode should be read as a subtle indication of her awareness that Daphnis has come to her place because of her, and not to catch birds, as he himself says (διηγείτο πῶς . . . ὄρμησε πρὸς ἄγραν, 3.8.1). This is confirmed by her own words after he says that he has come because of her: 'I know, Daphnis' (Οἶδα, Δάφνι, 3.10.3).¹⁰¹ In the apple episode, on the other hand, Chloe's anger is real, which recalls the embedded myth where Pan angrily (ὀργῇ, 2.34.3) cuts off the reed stems because he is *ignored* (ἀμελοῦσα, 2.37.1) by Syrinx. The causal connection between the neglect on the one hand and the manifestation of anger on

⁹⁸ The narrator highlights Chloe's assimilation to the apple by pointing out that the apple is still in the tree because the picker has neglected it (ἡμέλησε καθελεῖν, 3.33.4). The same term denotes Daphnis' neglect (ἡμέλησεν, 3.34.1) of Chloe, who tries to stop him from climbing the tree.

⁹⁹ See Morgan (1994b: 68): 'This looks very like an assertion of his dominance and manhood.'

¹⁰⁰ On the concept of neglect in Longus, see Bowie (2005b: 80–1).

¹⁰¹ This awareness contrasts Chloe with her adoptive parents, who believe Daphnis and praise his energy (ἐπῆνουν τὸ ἐνεργόν, 3.8.2). Bowie (2006: 33) observes that here for the first time the protagonists address themselves using their proper names and interprets it as an indication of increasing emotional proximity.

the other is identical in the two episodes (notwithstanding the gender role reversal): the embedded narrative results in the metamorphosis of Syrinx (the girl) into the instrument that Chloe gives to Daphnis as a 'love gift' (*δῶρον ἐρωτικόν*, 3.4.3; cf. 1.28.3). Like her syrinx, his apple is a *'δῶρον ἐρωτικόν'*. Daphnis' picking of the apple is, as a symbol of Chloe's defloration, the symbolic culmination of her metamorphosis from girl to woman. Given his fear of real (because bloody) defloration, symbolic defloration is, until their wedding night, his 'love gift' to her.

The apple episode also highlights the rhetorical abilities of Daphnis at this stage of the narrative. To make amends for having neglected her attempt to stop him from climbing the tree, he associates the apple with the one that Paris (*ἐκείνος . . . ποιμήν*, 3.34.3) gave to Aphrodite as a prize for her beauty and labels it as Chloe's trophy of victory (*ἀθλον . . . νικητήριον*, 3.34.2). By associating himself with Paris, he aligns Chloe not only with Aphrodite but also with Helen,¹⁰² another famous beneficiary of an apple from Paris. This association is further strengthened by the fact that Chloe, whom, as we have just been told, he now sees as his wife, gives him a kiss that is 'better than even a golden apple' (*κρείττον καὶ χρυσού μύλου φίλημα*, 3.34.3). In one single paragraph, then, Daphnis associates Chloe both with the goddess of love and with the most beautiful of women—a clear indication of the rhetorical abilities accompanying his *'ἐρωτικόν'* present.

Four interconnected episodes featuring gifts from one protagonist to the other, then, contribute to the construction of differentiation. The two passages where Chloe gives a present to Daphnis (Dorcon's present and the syrinx) occur at the beginning of the story. At this point, the protagonists are still ignorant about love. The reader interprets Chloe's presents as tokens of her love for Daphnis, but the protagonists themselves will focalize Chloe's syrinx for Daphnis as a 'love gift' only later, when they know what love is. When Daphnis gives presents (to Dryas and Nape, to Dionysophanes and his entourage, and to Chloe herself), on the other hand, the story is approaching its end. Daphnis has by then been instructed not only about the name of Eros, but also about his deeds. The three episodes where he gives presents indicate that not only has he acquired basic sexual technique, but also the ability to adapt himself to the socially conventionalized codes informing marriage—both in asking Chloe's hand from her father and in (symbolically) consummating the marriage. By the end of the second summer, from both technically sexual and social points of view, Daphnis is ready to marry Chloe.

¹⁰² See also Morgan (2004a: 222).

4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

A paradox concerning character in Longus' novel is that what is arguably the most psychological of ancient Greek novels contains almost no individual characterization. Part of this paradox results from the systematic subsumption of character under the two broad categories around which the entire psychology of the protagonists is built: their youth and rustic upbringing as shepherds. These categories are often addressed explicitly and metonymically supported through the registration of behavioural patterns. And even if the protagonists are increasingly differentiated from each other as the novel progresses, this differentiation is thematized around the single distinction between male and female, which again makes them representatives of their respective categories rather than individuals. Longus' novel explores many elements that are involved in the protagonists' psychological development from ignorant and innocent childhood to sexual and social maturity but they all shape the protagonists as emblematic of how such development takes place in young rustic boys and girls generally.

Nevertheless, although the psychological processes involved depict typical rather than individual character, they meticulously explore and interconnect a number of strands that all have their role to play in an evolution from childhood to mature adulthood. In this sense, Daphnis and Chloe are semantically very rich types. The most overt level of characterization deals mostly with their ignorance and inexperience, which first align them and then gradually (but not always symmetrically) disappear as they acquire psychological maturity. Both the presence of these features in the early stages and their gradual disappearance are documented, often subtly, by metonymical techniques (most notably through the protagonists' speeches and focalization of phenomena that are as yet unknown to them: their emotions, their love for each other, physical beauty, and, later, the feelings of longing, jealousy, and sexual frustration).

Even if gender differentiation is thematized overtly in a social context a number of times, important strands of such differentiation are constructed almost exclusively through indirect techniques of characterization. The depiction of the gradual shifting of emotional dominance from Chloe to Daphnis in the interconnected areas of sex and its social regulation, for example, is constructed through a combination of a number of metonymical and metaphorical techniques. Examples of the former are the registration of behavioural patterns, speeches, and focalization to construct the development of Daphnis' receptiveness to female beauty and the differentiation of their ignorance about sex. As far as the latter is concerned, not only are mythological paradigms important (for example, to highlight Daphnis' real origin and his resourceful preparation for Dionysophanes' visit) but so is intratextual patterning. Very often,

that is, aspects of character are addressed through significant differences between mirror scenes to be read as doublets and triplets subtly and artfully connected through verbal echoes or shared imagery (e.g. the *mimesis* episodes in the first, second, and third books documenting Daphnis' increasing emotional control over Chloe).

As in other novels, interpersonal control plays an important role in the context of the social interaction of the protagonists. The importance of rhetoric as an instrument in the establishment of such control is explored in the depiction of the development towards specifically *male* adulthood (Chloe says conspicuously little throughout the novel). On this level too, there is a marked evolution from ignorance (the Dorcon episode) to the appropriation of social codes and conventions (Daphnis' winter visit) and again metonymical and metaphorical characterization neatly converges. Daphnis becomes a successful public speaker in a series of bucolicized rhetorical scenes in three of the most important novelistic domains (erotic rivalry in the beauty contest, external aggression in the judicial hearing, and marriage in the proposal to Chloe's parents) and this ability is shown as concomitant with his acquisition of important insights about the value of performance (syrinx concert) and strategic skills (gifts) in social interaction. Like Chariton, Longus firmly identifies rhetorical and social skilfulness as crucial components of a development towards adulthood. And less ambiguously than Chariton he proclaims them to be essential markers of male adulthood. Longus too, then, like Chariton, advertises novelistic heroism as the depiction not simply of 'ideal' types but of psychologically realistic behaviour, involving the gradual learning of how to mould urges and desire in socially acceptable forms, the establishment of both emotional and social dominance, and the acquisition of rhetorical and strategic sensitivities.

Heliodorus

5.1 PARTIAL DEPICTIONS

Character portrayal fundamentally intersects with the particular way in which a story is narrated. It depends on the distribution throughout the story of information; on the question, that is, of *when* we are told what about whom. This simple truth pertains to every story, but Heliodorus develops it into an extremely complicated and ambiguous game of hermeneutic challenge.¹ As is commonly known, narrative structure and the organization of time are more complex in the *Aethiopica* than in any other extant ancient Greek novel. The first part of the story is presented anachronically.² The story famously begins *in medias res* and reveals preceding events through long (mostly actorial but occasionally narratorial) flashbacks in the subsequent books.³ This means that the narration of the *story* only gradually allows the reader to fill in the gaps and reconstruct the *history* of the narrative.⁴ It also, of course, affects any reading of character, since early stages in characters' lives are dealt with only at relatively late stages of the narration.

This narrative technique accommodates one of the *Aethiopica*'s major themes, which is the search for the heroine's true identity, homeland, and family.⁵ Towards the end of the first half of the novel, Chariclea is revealed to have been born in Ethiopia as the daughter of the royal couple. Almost

¹ Both hermeneutic complexity and ambiguity are characteristic of Heliodorus' narrative technique. See Morgan (1989a: 99) on Heliodorus' 'hermeneutic mode' of story-telling and Morgan (1989b) on the preservation of the reader's uncertainty as an important narratorial concern. On ambiguity in Heliodorus, see, among others, Winkler (1982: 114–37), Whitmarsh (2002a: 116–19), Chew (2007: 293), and Perkins (1999: 200–2).

² 'Anachrony' is the change of the chronological order of events. The term comes from Genette (1972: 78–89). See de Jong (2007: 3–8).

³ See Morgan (2007b: 484–96) and Futre Pinheiro (1987: 357–501, 1998: 3163–8).

⁴ For the common narratological distinction between *fabula*, or *history* (a chronologically ordered sequence of events that is abstracted from the *story*), and *story* (the presentation of these events), see my introduction p. 42.

⁵ See e.g. Lalanne (2006: 149–53). On the central importance of (elusive) identity in this novel, see Whitmarsh (1998, 1999) and Perkins (1999).

immediately after her birth, we are told, she was exposed because of her white skin (4.8.1–8), the explanation for which is that at the moment of conception, her mother happened to be looking at a painting in her bedroom that showed Andromeda white and naked, so that this image was imprinted on the unborn child (10.14.4–7).⁶ At this point in the story, earlier passages have already explained how Chariclea has come from Ethiopia to Delphi, where she lives as a priestess of Artemis. Subsequent episodes narrate her departure from Delphi and her journey to Ethiopia, which has been cryptically foreshadowed by an oracle (2.35.5) and a dream (4.14.2) to be her final destination.⁷ Heliodorus' novel, then, narrates the heroine's homecoming, or *nostos*.⁸ However, it subverts this central theme by staging not a classical return to Greece but a trenchant relocation of the heroes to the edges of the world instead.⁹ This relocation is made all the more poignant by the adoption of a macro-structure that picks out as a principal intertext the *Odyssey*, one of the hallmarks of Greek culture in general and the prototypical *nostos* story in particular. As well as the novel's beginning *in medias res* (which, like the *Odyssey*, depicts its protagonists on the shores of a distant country¹⁰), Calasiris' long homodiegetic narration in the house of his host in Chemmis (2.24.5–5.1.2 and 5.17.2–33.3) recalls Odysseus' narration at the court of the Phaeacians.¹¹ Both Odysseus' and Calasiris' narrations cover a couple of books and narrate events that lead up to the situation in which they are recounted. Moreover, they both end precisely in the middle of the overall narrative (the end of book 5 in Heliodorus; the end of book 12 in the *Odyssey*).¹²

The search for Chariclea's identity is firmly established in the opening scene, which is famously presented to the reader as a hermeneutic challenge.¹³ It depicts two people, who will later turn out to be the protagonists of the story,¹⁴ amidst newly slain bodies on a beach at the Heracleotic mouth of the

⁶ See Reeve (1989), Létoublon (1998), and Zeitlin (2013: 77–8) on the 'Andromeda effect', also known as the theory of maternal impression (Morgan 2008a: 433 n. 114 and Dilke 1980: 265–6).

⁷ The oracle refers to Ethiopia as 'the black land of the sun' (ἡελίου πρὸς χθόνα κυανέην, 2.35.5). The dream refers to it as 'one of the world's remotest extremities' (γῆς ἐπ' ἔσχατόν τι πέρας, 4.14.2), which echoes the famous Homeric depiction of the Ethiopians (ἔσχατοι ἀνδρῶν, *Od.* 1.23). See Hägg (2000: 198 n. 13) and Hilton (2001: 85).

⁸ See, among others, Konstan (1994: 90, 2004–5: 189).

⁹ This relocation is explored in Whitmarsh (1998, 1999) and S. D. Smith (2007b: 227–34).

¹⁰ Whitmarsh (1999: 21).

¹¹ See Futre Pinheiro (1991: 69–70).

¹² The Odyssean pattern underlying the overall structure of Heliodorus' novel has long been recognized. See Rohde (1914³: 474–6), Keyes (1922: 42–51), Hefti (1950: 98–103), and Wolff (1912: 157, 192). More recently, see Futre Pinheiro (1991: 69–70 n. 5) (with other references) and Whitmarsh (1998: 93 n. 2).

¹³ On this scene and the readerly questions evoked in it, see Bühler (1976: 180–1), Winkler (1982: 95–114, 2001), S. Bartsch (1989: 109–77), and Morgan (1989a: 103–4).

¹⁴ Their names are first mentioned only in 1.8.4. The primary narrator often withholds the names of characters until a later point in the narrative. An extreme example is Sisimithres, who is

Nile. The entire scene is focalized by a group of brigands who are ignorant of their identity and background and whose inability to infer the preceding events is repeatedly emphasized (οὐδὲ συνιέναι τὴν σκητὴν ἐδύναντο, 1.1.7; τὸ γεγονὸς ὃ τι ποτέ ἐστιν ἀποροῦντες, 1.1.8; τὰ ὄντα δὲ οὐπω ἐγίνωσκον, 1.2.6; ὑπ' ἀγροικίας εἵκαζον, 1.7.2).¹⁵ The mysteriousness of the girl's identity receives particular emphasis, as she is focalized by the brigands as 'a sight *even more* inexplicable' (θέαμα . . . ἀπορώτερον, 1.2.1) than the scene in its entirety. Like the brigands, the reader is puzzled as to who these characters are and how they ended up on this Egyptian beach.

Although the presence of the protagonists is ultimately explained only halfway through the novel (five books later, that is), there are plenty of clues in their introduction that allow the generically attuned reader to identify them as Greek novel protagonists, which, of course, given the fact that Chariclea will ultimately turn out to be not Greek but Ethiopian, sets up a profound ambiguity. The primary narrator communicates, first of all, that they are not Egyptians: Chariclea focalizes the colour of the brigands' skins as 'unusual' and black (ἄηθες, 1.2.8; μέλανας, 1.3.1), which is later echoed by the brigands' own focalization of her dress as 'strange' (ξένη, 1.3.6). Moreover, the brigands do not understand their language (1.3.2)¹⁶ and place them in the care of a young Greek 'so that they might have someone to talk to' (1.7.3). His company is welcomed enthusiastically by the protagonists when he identifies himself as 'a Greek like themselves' (καὶ αὐτὸς Ἕλληνα, 1.8.6).

Secondly, their introduction evokes topical idealizing characteristics that constitute some of the generic hallmarks of the depiction of novelistic heroes. To begin with, both characters are extremely beautiful. The brigands are struck by Theagenes' 'manly beauty' (ἀνδρείῳ τῷ κάλλει, 1.2.3), his shape and tallness (τὴν μορφὴν καὶ . . . τὸ μέγεθος, 1.3.6). Chariclea's indescribable beauty (ἀμήχανόν τι κάλλος, 1.2.1) typically leads some of them to conjecture that she is a goddess, a priestess (ἱέρειαν, 1.2.6; τὸ κάλλος . . . θεσπέσιον . . . τὴν ἱέρειαν, 1.7.2; ἱέρεια, 1.20.2), or even the living statue of a goddess (ἔμπνοον . . . τὸ ἄγαλμα, 1.7.2). Equally typically, they regard her physical beauty as an indication of high social descent, or *eugeneia* (εὐγενούς, 1.2.1).¹⁷ Beside these typical characteristics, the narrator also sets up the theme of love from the start. Chariclea is depicted next to Theagenes, who is lying at her feet and 'comes round from the verge of death as if from a deep

introduced into the story in 2.30.1 as an Ethiopian ambassador who gives Chariclea into the care of a Delphic priest, but whose name appears only in 10.4.2 shortly before Chariclea's recognition, in which he plays a crucial role.

¹⁵ See Morgan (1991: 86–90, 1994a: 107).

¹⁶ On the importance of linguistic diversity in Heliodorus (as opposed to the other novelists), see Shalev (2006: 183–91), Brioso Sánchez (2003: 331–42), Saïd (1992), Morgan (1982: 258–60), and Winkler (1982: 104–5).

¹⁷ On nobility as one of the topical characteristics of novelistic protagonists, see Baslez (1990).

sleep' (ὥσπερ ἐκ βαθέος ὕπνου τοῦ παρ' ὀλίγον θανάτου κατεφαίνεται, 1.2.3). This image recalls the iconography of the Egyptian goddess Isis tending the dead body of her husband Osiris.¹⁸ The brigands even liken her explicitly to this goddess (Ἰσιν, 1.2.6). The theme of love evoked by this alignment is further corroborated by Theagenes' apostrophe of Chariclea as 'my darling' (ὦ γλυκεῖα, 1.2.4) and an explicit narratorial comment (πόθος . . . καὶ ἔρως, 1.2.9).

Finally, the few words uttered by the protagonists in this episode clearly evoke a number of important stock motifs that generically mark the vicissitudes of a central novelistic love couple: separation (ἀποστατεῖν, 1.2.4), the intention to commit suicide if unable to be together, outrage concerning chastity (τῆς εἰς σωφροσύνην ὕβρεως, 1.3.1), and woes in general (τῶν περιστηκόντων ἀλγεῖνων). Furthermore, Chariclea's speech is emphatically cast as a lamenting monologue (θρήνους, 1.8.1; ἀνοιμώξασα, 1.8.2; ἐπιδακρύσασα, 1.8.2; θρηνεῖς, 1.8.4), another *topos* of the discourse of novelistic heroes. It lists a further string of what the reader easily identifies as stock novelistic motifs: separation from one's family (στέρησις τῶν οἰκείων), imprisonment by pirates (καταποντιστῶν ἄλωσις . . . ληστῶν . . . σύλληψις), innumerable dangers at sea (θαλασσῶν μυρίος κίνδυνος), and a future even more bitter than past events (πικρότερα τῶν ἐν πείρᾳ τὰ προσδοκώμενα) (1.8.2).

The introduction, then, firmly establishes the two newly introduced characters as Greek novel protagonists and draws attention to love as an important element defining their relationship. It further highlights their physical beauty, *eugeneia*, and some of the stock novelistic motifs that typically characterize novelistic heroes. The elaboration of these and other characteristics in the remainder of the novel is profoundly ambiguous. On the one hand, they are repeatedly echoed and confirmed by various characters throughout the novel.¹⁹ On the other hand, these echoes and confirmations are never straightforward. For example, a number of paradigms are adduced to underscore Chariclea's beauty in particular. Charicles compares her to 'a vigorous young plant' (καθάπερ ἔρνος τι τῶν εὐθαλῶν, 2.33.3) as she bursts rapidly into the flower of youth (εἰς ἀκμὴν . . . ἀνέδραμεν). This comparison evokes Odysseus' comparison of Nausicaa to a plant that has grown well (τοιόνδε θάλος, *Od.* 6.157; φοίνικος νέον ἔρνος ἀνερχόμενον, *Od.* 6.163).²⁰ In this episode, physical beauty is explicitly mentioned as the *tertium comparationis* (εἰδός τε μέγεθός τε φυὴν τ' ἄγχιστα εἴσκω, *Od.* 6.152). However, Charicles' comparison evokes not only

¹⁸ Morgan (2008a: 355 n. 3).

¹⁹ Both Charicles and Sisimithres, for example, comment that they experience Chariclea's physical beauty as divine (ἀμήχανόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον κάλλος, 2.30.6; θεῖον, 2.31.1) at first sight (even if at the time she was only seven years old and a newborn respectively). Calasiris also mentions the protagonists' physical beauty (τοῖς καλοῖς, 2.23.1), inner qualities (ἀγαθοῖς), and godlike nature (θεοῦς). On their beauty, see also 5.9.2 and 3.3.4. On their *eugeneia*, see 2.34.1, 5.29.1, 8.3.7, 8.9.4, and 8.17.2.

²⁰ See Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1994: 91 n. 1).

Nausicaa but also Achilles, as it echoes Thetis' description of this hero in the *Iliad* (ἀνέδραμεν ἔρπει ἵσος, 18.437).²¹ This paradigm of *male* physical beauty immediately destabilizes any reading of this or that paradigm as straightforward or unambiguous. I return below to the ambiguity underlying the use of paradigms in this novel. For now, it suffices to note that this example points to Heliodorus' tendency to make unstable even the most common generic characteristics of the novel protagonists as communicated in the opening scene.

This complication of the protagonists' characteristics is foregrounded by the narrative structure of the novel, which results in the partial nature of their initial depiction.²² Chariclea's identity in particular is documented by narratives embedded in Calasiris' story. Each of these covers an earlier stage in her life and thus takes the reader one step further back in time. Within the narrative that Calasiris tells to Cnemon, he cites an account told to him in Delphi by Charicles (2.29.3–33.7), who reveals that he brought Chariclea from Egypt when she was seven years old (ten years before the time of recounting in Chemmis, that is). His narrative, in turn, contains an account told to him by the Ethiopian ambassador Sisimithres in Egypt (2.31.1–5), which covers the earliest episode in Chariclea's life (from birth to 7 years). It narrates the girl's exposure after birth, Sisimithres' discovery of her, and his decision to take her to Egypt seven years later, where he eventually entrusts her to Charicles' care. The formal organization of these narratives as 'Chinese boxes' (Calasiris tells to Cnemon what Charicles tells to Calasiris what Sisimithres tells to Charicles about Chariclea) tantalizingly highlights the heuristic impossibility of any immediate straightforward and complete communication of Chariclea's character.²³ First, Calasiris, Charicles, and Sisimithres are all homodiegetic narrators, which means that they are, by definition, not omniscient but have only limited knowledge about the events narrated and the characters described. Sisimithres' account, which is our only source for the earliest stage of Chariclea's life, thematizes this heuristic limitation. He explicitly highlights the fact that he has to *infer* Chariclea's past from the recognition tokens he found with her ('It was her mother, *I imagine* (οἶμαι), who had had the foresight to provide the baby with these signs', 2.31.2).²⁴ Moreover, the partial nature of the information communicated by him is emphatically foregrounded when he promises to tell Charicles the next day 'in more detail and at greater length' (τὰ σαφέστερα δὲ καὶ ἀκριβέστερα, 2.31.5) what he knows about the child but then

²¹ Morgan (2008a: 406 n. 68).

²² This technique is obviously not restricted to the characterization of the protagonists. See e.g. Winkler (1982: 95) on 'incomplete cognition' as a basic principle underlying Heliodorus' narrative technique and Paulsen (1992: 217) on the partial initial depiction of Calasiris.

²³ Such an organization of narratives within narratives aligns Heliodorus' novel with Antonius Diogenes' *The Incredible Things beyond Thule*, where it was possibly used to similar effect. See Stephens and Winkler (1995: 114–16) on the narratological complexity of this novel.

²⁴ See Morgan (1982: 228) on 'οἶμαι' as a marker of uncertainty in other passages.

is unable to keep that promise. The reader's inability to access this information is echoed by Charicles' regret at not having learned (γινῶναι, 2.32.3) 'who she is, where she comes from, and who her mother and father are' (τὰ κατὰ τὴν κόρην τίς ἢ πόθεν ἢ τίνων), and by Cnemon's dismay at not having heard the entire story from Calasiris (ἀσχάλλω . . . οὐκ ἀκούσας). Simultaneously, however, Calasiris points out to him that this information is not irretrievably lost and promises to provide the missing pieces of the jigsaw in due course (Ἀκούσῃ), which he eventually does more than a book later (4.8.1–8).

The partial nature of Chariclea's initial depiction is particularly evident with respect to two of her most important characteristics, namely *phronêma* (pride, mental strength) and *sôphrosynê* (chastity). Neither characteristic is, of course, unusual for novelistic heroines. Chariton, for example, explicitly foregrounds Callirhoe's *phronêma* in an early passage thematizing her chastity (1.3.6). In Heliodorus, both are introduced in the opening scene of the novel (through a combination of direct attribution and metonymical documentation) and taken up, elaborated, and complicated in later chapters (providing an intratextual metaphorical aspect to their construction). First, *phronêma*. In the opening scene, the brigands are struck by the fact that Chariclea has 'an air of courage and nobility' (φρονήματος δὲ εὐγενοῦς ἔτι πνέουσα, 1.2.1), despite her great distress (τοῖς . . . παρούσι περιελγούσα). This inference is arguably based on their observation of the careful and undistracted attention she pays to Theagenes, who is lying wounded at her feet. The narrator makes it clear that she gazes steadily at him (περισκοπούσα, 1.2.2) and that her 'genuine affection and wholehearted love' (πόθος ἀκριβῆς καὶ ἔρως ἀκραιφνής, 1.2.9) cause her courage (τὸ φρόνημα καταναγκάζει) to focus entirely on him. This is the first in a series of instances where caring and loving attention in difficult circumstances is taken as an indication of Chariclea's courage. Later, a second group of brigands are equally struck by her *phronêma* (τοῦ φρονήματος, 1.3.6). Thyamis, too, regards the fact that she does not give up in the face of misfortunes (πρὸς τὰς παρούσας οὐ πέπτωκε συμφοράς, 1.20.1) as an indication of it (τὸ φρόνημα).

In all these instances, *phronêma* is inferred by other characters from Chariclea's ability to *display* mental strength in the face of misfortune. This ability in general and its performative character in particular are put into perspective by what is arguably a pivotal moment in the development of Chariclea's self-knowledge, namely her discovery of her true royal identity (4.11.4). She learns this from Calasiris' oral translation of a letter embroidered by her mother on a waistband immediately after her birth and exposed with her (4.8.1–8). This letter, then, takes us back to one of the earliest stages of the narrative's history.²⁵ It explicitly thematizes a set of characteristics (such as

²⁵ See Hilton (1998: 81–4) on this letter as a compressed version of the narrative, and Whitmarsh (1998: 119) on the letter as representing a brief and intimate 'countertext' of the (long and public) novel as a whole.

phronêma, *sôphrosynê*, *eugeneia*, and her resemblance to Andromeda) that are shown throughout the narrative to be crucial markers of Chariclea's identity. The letter, then, thematizes the connection between *phronêma* and *eugeneia* as established in the opening paragraphs of the novel: Persinna identifies herself as the queen of Ethiopia and encourages her daughter not to forget her noble descent (μεμνήσῃ τῆς εὐγενείας, 4.8.7) and to maintain the 'pride of a princess' (φρόνημα βασιλείον) in memory of her parents. The narrator highlights the impact of these words on Chariclea by observing a marked change in her behaviour. When Calasiris approaches her before reading the letter, Chariclea, who is alone (μόνην, 4.9.3), is in love with Theagenes. He observes that her mental strength (τῷ μὲν φρονήματι) is struggling to resist her passion (τὸ πάθος) but that she has been overcome by physical distress (τῷ σώματι δὲ πάντῃ πεπονημένην). As soon as she is informed about her origin and royal background (ἐγνώρισεν αὐτήν, 4.12.1), however, 'a pride more befitting her birth' is awakened in her (τὸ φρόνημα διανιστάσα πλέον τῷ γένει). This episode, then, juxtaposes initial succumbing *phronêma* with *phronêma* rekindled by the awareness of high social descent. The erotic context in which this contrast is staged invites the reader to reconsider Chariclea's performance of *phronêma* in the opening scene. Whereas love for Theagenes at first makes her succumb mentally, in the opening scene it is precisely this love (ἔρως, 1.2.9) that mentally forces her (καταναγκάζει) to behave in a way that the brigands, and the readers with them, interpret as an indication of courage. Only in the fourth book, then, is her display of *phronêma* in the opening episode put into perspective. Only then is the reader invited to infer that it is not simply a static quality but the result of a self-conscious change in her self-perception and self-presentation. In the opening scene, love no longer dominates Chariclea but has been subsumed by her self-awareness and desire to present herself in a manner befitting her high social rank.

Chastity, or *sôphrosynê*, the other important characteristic of Chariclea introduced in the opening scene, is similarly documented in retrospect when Chariclea discovers her own identity. Her introductory *ecphrasis* clearly evokes the traditional iconography of Artemis,²⁶ with whom she is explicitly compared by the brigands (Ἄρτεμιν, 1.2.6). This depiction resonates with her own emphasis on chastity in this episode (σωφροσύνην, 1.3.1; καθαρὰν . . . τὴν σωφροσύνην, 1.8.3) and its explicit acknowledgement by other characters (σώφρονα, 1.20.2; σωφροσύνης, 2.4.2). Like *phronêma*, *sôphrosynê* is a characteristic resolutely sponsored by Persinna in her letter. In it, Persinna encourages her daughter to honour chastity (τιμῶσα σωφροσύνην, 4.8.7), which she identifies as 'the sole mark of virtue in a woman' (ἡ δὲ μόνῃ γυναικείαν ἀρετὴν χαρακτηρίζει).²⁷ Again, the revelation of this advice constitutes a

²⁶ She has, for example, a quiver hanging from her shoulders (1.2.2). See also Hardie (1998: 34–5).

²⁷ See also M. J. Anderson (1997: 310–22).

pivotal moment in Chariclea's perception of her own identity in general, and *sôphrosynê* in particular. Before it, *sôphrosynê* informs Chariclea's behaviour in an extreme way. Charicles informs Calasiris that, as a priestess of Artemis (τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ζάκορον, 2.33.4), she renounces marriage altogether (ἀπηγόρευται... αὐτῇ γάμος) and is resolved to stay a virgin all her life (παρθευεῖν τὸν πάντα βίον διατείνεται).²⁸ Accordingly, she regards her love for Theagenes as shameful (ἐρυθριῶσα, 4.11.1; αἰσχύνην, 4.10.2; αἰσχρόν, 4.10.2). This reaction aligns her with Theagenes, who is also ashamed to talk about his love (αἰσχροτέρων, 4.10.2; ἐρυθριῶ... ἐσιώπησεν, 3.17.1). Furthermore, he too renounces marriage (γάμον, 3.17.4) and cultivates chastity in an equally extreme way. Just as in the case of Xenophon of Ephesus' hero Habrocomes, Theagenes' abstinence from sex (Ὁμιλίας... ἀπείρατος) and contempt for all women (διαπτύσαι πάσας) recall the tragic figure of Hippolytus, which further emphasizes the socially problematic and potentially destructive nature of his behaviour.²⁹ There is, however, one important difference between Heliodorus' two protagonists. Theagenes changes his view because, as he confesses himself, Chariclea's beauty (τὸ Χαρικλείας... κάλλος) makes him realize that he is not naturally proof against temptation (μὴ φύσει καρτερικός). Theagenes, therefore, like Habrocomes, may be read as an instantiation of the stereotype informing novelistic heroism: one is devoted to chastity until one falls into the hands of Eros.³⁰ His *physis* is presented as a stable entity but his own perception of it changes as a result of a specific circumstance (meeting Chariclea).

Chariclea, on the other hand, persists in emphatically casting her feelings as fundamentally clashing with her ideal of *sôphrosynê* after she has fallen in love with Theagenes. She states that she is caused even more pain by not having overcome her love at the outset (κρατῆσαι... τὴν ἀρχήν, 4.10.3) and having instead succumbed to passion (ἡττηθῆναι), which she considers an affront to virginity (λυμαιομένου... παρθενίας). Just like Theagenes' passion, Chariclea's adamancy is thematized in terms of *physis*. In her foster-father's view, her refusal to marry (his candidate) is a denial of her *physis* as a woman. He begs Calasiris to persuade her 'to acknowledge her own nature (γνωρίσαι τὴν ἐαυτῆς φύσιν, 2.33.6) and to realize that she is a woman (ὅτι γυνὴ γέγονεν εἰδέναι)'. But Calasiris, for his part, realizes that Chariclea's *physis* is fundamentally different from what her foster-father imagines. He explains to Theagenes that Chariclea, even if she is devoted to chastity, will eventually succumb to passion through his own plotting because 'art can bend even nature to its

²⁸ See also 3.9.1 (μισόλεκτρος καὶ ἀνέραστος). S. L. Maguire (2005: 76–163) gives (Christian as well as pagan) mythographical contextualization of Chariclea's virginity.

²⁹ Hippolytus as a paradigm of Theagenes resurfaces when Arsace is aligned with Phaedra (7.8.15). On this passage, see Cueva (1998: 109).

³⁰ As well as Xenophon's *Ephesiaca*, there is also *Metiochus and Parthenope*, where the hero also prays that Love may never touch him (II.68).

will' (τέχνη καὶ φύσιν οἶδε βιάζεσθαι, 3.17.5). To Calasiris, then, Chariclea's adamancy is *part* of her *physis* rather than its negation. And Calasiris' conceptualization of Chariclea's *physis* is also profoundly different from Theagenes' depiction of his own *physis*. Whereas Theagenes realizes that being proof against temptation is *not* part of his *physis*, Calasiris assumes that it is part of Chariclea's and that, therefore, it will need to be moulded by *technê* and external force (*bia*). Calasiris imagines Chariclea's *physis* itself to be unchangeably devoted to chastity but at the same time suggests that its impact upon her behaviour can and will be changed through his machinations.

Calasiris' view of Chariclea's *physis*, itself unchangeable but at the same time receptive of external influence as far as its impact on behaviour is concerned, recalls a common ancient distinction between *êthos* (the acquired and changeable element) and *physis* or 'nature' (the innate essence of a person, given or inherited at birth and, generally speaking, unchanging) as conceptualized in Plutarch's ethical treatise *On the delay of divine vengeance* (*De sera num.* 551d, 562b).³¹ Here, a person's *êthos* is presented as being related to his/her *physis*, but affected, moulded, and changed by the extent to which reason acts upon it through either education or habituation, either by circumstance or deliberate effort.³² Whereas, in other words, the notion of development is important (if not intrinsic) to the conception of *êthos*,³³ the innate tendencies may be developed, diminished, or concealed through education, but not fundamentally changed. It is true that Plutarch seems to allow for some flexibility as to how far behaviour can deviate from innate tendencies³⁴ and even seems to assume (in some *Lives*) that moral degeneration might result from, among other things, 'a change of nature' (μεταβολὴ φύσεως),³⁵ but in general, if actions contrary to *physis* (παρὰ φύσιν) occur, they need explanation.³⁶

It is such an explanation that the reader is offered regarding Chariclea's *physis*. Chariclea's renunciation of marriage puzzles the reader because in an

³¹ D. A. Russell (1966b: 144–7) and Lombardi (1997: 385). This distinction is no universal rule. See e.g. Fortenbaugh (1979) for a different view on the (Aristotelian) notion of *physis* in *EN* 1154^a32.

³² Duff (2003: 94–5, 2008b: 2), Swain (1989a: 62–4), and Dihle (1956: 63–4, 84–7). See Albini (1997) on the 'educational triad' in Plutarch (*physis*, *logos*, and *êthos*). For a more detailed summary of the primary texts and for further references, see Duff (1999: 72–8) and Gill (2006: 219–38).

³³ In *De sera num.* 551e, Plutarch makes it clear that *êthos* is also called *tropos*, because it is 'the changeable part (τὸ μεταβάλλον)'. See also Swain (1989a: 62).

³⁴ In *De sera num.* 551e–552d, for example, he explains apparent inconsistencies between *êthos* and *physis* not in terms of a radical inversion, but as instances of the need of great natures (αἱ μεγάλοι φύσεις) to adapt to changed circumstances. See Lombardi (1997: 387).

³⁵ Verdegem (2010: 120).

³⁶ D. A. Russell (1966a: 38, 1966b: 144–7). However, Gill (1983: 478–9) argues that Plutarch is not always consistent in following this distinction and that the meaning of *physis* is occasionally remarkably close to that of *êthos*. In these cases, Plutarch seems to accept that *physis* too may change (*Sull.* 30.6, *Sert.* 10.6, *Comp. Cim. Luc.* 1.4).

earlier passage, which deals with events *subsequent* to the Delphic episode, she explicitly mentions marriage as the ultimate aim of her relationship with Theagenes (γάμον, 1.25.4).³⁷ This apparent incongruity draws attention to the fact that some change might indeed have occurred in Chariclea's perception of her own *sôphrosynê*. It soon becomes clear that this change is also intertwined with her discovery of her own identity. It also becomes clear that Calasiris is responsible for instigating it, thus making good his own prediction. His revelation to Chariclea of this identity is part of a broader scheme directed at persuading her to elope with Theagenes and himself to Ethiopia.³⁸ After discovering her true identity in Persinna's letter (ἀνέγνω, 4.9.1), he at first withholds the discovery, takes up their earlier conversation (4.5.2–6.1), and begins to mould her perception of her own chastity in order to make her receptive to the idea of marriage,³⁹ which, in turn, will be instrumental in persuading her to elope. First, he plainly exposes her emotional distress as an indication of her love for Theagenes. He informs her that Theagenes reciprocates this love and adds that her foster-father has selected another husband for her—a prospect that she abhors. Secondly, he reassures her (Ἐπιρρωννύς, 4.10.4) that she is not the first or the only woman ever to have experienced love, but that it has been felt by many notable ladies (πολλαῖς . . . γυναιξὶ τῶν ἐπισήμων, 4.10.5) and many maidens who were otherwise paragons of *sôphrosynê* (πολλαῖς . . . παρθένοις τῶν τὰ ἄλλα σωφρόνων). Finally, he encourages her to 'consider how to make the best of your situation' (Ἐπισκόπει δὲ ὅπως ἄριστα διαθήσῃ τὰ παρόντα, 4.10.6) and presents marriage as a wise and virtuous option:

Never to have felt love's touch is a blessing (τὸ μὲν ἀπείρατον γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔρωτος εὐδαίμων), but once caught (τὸ δὲ ἄλόντα) it is wisest (σοφώτατον) to keep one's thoughts on paths of virtue (πρὸς τὸ σῶφρον). If you are willing to believe this, you may rid yourself of this slur of carnal desire (τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμίας αἰσχρὸν ὄνομα) and make your objective the lawful contract of wedlock (τὸ δὲ συναφείας ἔννομον συνάλλαγμα), so transforming your malady into matrimony (εἰς γάμον τρέβαι τὴν νόσον) (4.10.6).

Whereas Chariclea, then, first regards her own emotional disposition as shamefully incompatible with her ideal of *sôphrosynê*, Calasiris narrows the notion of shamefulness to sexual desire, and subsequently opposes it to marriage, which he characterizes as virtuous. It has been pointed out that the novel as a whole valorizes marriage as the *telos* of chaste love.⁴⁰ For my purpose, it is important to point out that Chariclea's initial view on marriage

³⁷ The connection between the two passages is mentioned in passing by Morgan (1989b: 302).

³⁸ On this mission and the manipulation involved, see pp. 287–9.

³⁹ Calasiris' intervention, then, is more significant than Keul-Deutscher's (1997: 347) qualification of it as 'advice' ('Ratschlag') suggests.

⁴⁰ Morgan (1998a: 72).

risks forestalling such a *telos*, and that it is Calasiris who moulds her mental disposition to make her accept marriage. He teaches her, that is, to reshape her desire for Theagenes according to the socially accepted norm and institution of marriage.⁴¹ The effectiveness of his intervention is clear from the fact that thenceforth Chariclea abandons her renunciation of marriage and, according to his guidelines, maintains a firm dichotomy between marriage and sex. She defines her initial desire for Theagenes (τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ σοὶ πόθον, 1.25.4) as a lack of *sôphrosynê* (μὴ σωφρονοῦσα) but repeatedly acknowledges marriage (γυναιῖκα ποιεῖσθαι, 4.18.5; ὡς ἀνδρὶ συνθεμένῃ, 1.25.4) as an indication of it (σωφρονῶν, 6.9.4). Indeed, her definition of marriage as the only ‘legitimate’ (ἐννομον, 1.25.4) erotic relationship between her and Theagenes verbally echoes Calasiris’ description (ἐννομον, 4.10.6).

Whereas at the level of the argument function Chariclea’s redefinition of *sôphrosynê* involves moral anxiety (which Gill, as we have seen, associates with ‘character’), at the level of the key function this episode offers an insight into, and understanding of, exactly *how* Chariclea comes to redefine a concept so crucial to her self-definition. Just as in Chariton’s novel, then, the heroine’s *sôphrosynê* forms the testing ground for a detailed exploration of notions that Gill associates with the concept of ‘personality’ rather than ‘character’. And just as in Chariton, what is at stake for the heroine is the compromising of her *sôphrosynê*. But whereas in Chariton the heroine’s (second) marriage precisely constitutes such a compromise, in Heliodorus Calasiris offers it as a way not to abandon but, on the contrary, to honour *sôphrosynê*. And whereas Callirhoe revises not the quality of *sôphrosynê* itself but rather its relative position in a hierarchy with *eugeneia* and *philostorgia*, Chariclea is shown to change her view of *sôphrosynê* itself. This important role played by Calasiris also rehearses a well-known novelistic motif that the road to adulthood is often paved with figures who act as teachers (like, for example, Lycaenion teaching Daphnis and Daphnis subsequently teaching Chloe in Longus’ novel, and Myrto acting as an instructor of her mistress in Antonius Diogenes’ novel according to Photius’ summary⁴²). Calasiris’ role is also contextualized more broadly by discussions of the importance of external influence in character building, such as Plutarch’s *On the delay of divine vengeance*. Plutarch makes it clear that a god does not expedite punishment for all people alike because he is aware of the fact that innate nobility of soul can break out into vice against its nature (παρὰ φύσιν) when corrupted by, among other things, bad company (ὑπὸ . . . ὁμιλίας φαύλης φθειρόμενον), but can be restored to its rightful condition upon receiving careful treatment (551d). In the *Lives* too, Plutarch thematizes (and distinguishes between) virtues native to a hero and virtues acquired through contact

⁴¹ See Goldhill (1995: 113) on marriage as the ‘key institution of normative sexual discourse and social practice’.

⁴² Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 166, 109a40–1 (διδασκάλῳ) and 109b2 (ἀναδιδασκούσῃ).

with a particular society or by the influence of contemporaries.⁴³ In Heliodorus' novel, the impact of Calasiris upon Chariclea's mental disposition thematizes this concern with external influence upon one's *physis*.

Chariclea's discovery of her own identity, then, implicitly communicates to the reader that the presence of *phronêma* and *sôphrosynê* in the opening scene is not to be read as a static quality merely instantiating the novelistic *topos* of the proud and chaste heroine but as the result of a *changed* self-perception in which a key role is played by Calasiris.⁴⁴ In the Delphi episode, both characteristics are present in the form of socially undeveloped and unworkable concepts. Moreover, both are problematic in Chariclea's efforts to come to terms with her love for Theagenes. Later, she consciously refines these concepts as part of her identity. Calasiris offers guidance which is both indirect (by showing her Persinna's letter, which initiates her rekindled awareness of *phronêma*) and direct (by actively changing her view on *sôphrosynê*) in order to mould both characteristics into a socially acceptable form. This leads to two observations that invite us to read Chariclea's character as a complex, multi-faceted concept. First, *phronêma* and *sôphrosynê* are presented as shapable and controllable qualities, either by oneself or by other characters. Chariclea self-consciously decides to adopt a pride more befitting her birth and Calasiris moulds her perception of *sôphrosynê*. From one particular moment in the narrative onwards, then, Chariclea *knows* what Persinna considers to be essential markers of her identity as a princess and consciously decides to conform to this ideal and shape her behaviour accordingly. Secondly, this decision implies that characteristics are not static but dynamic. *Phronêma* is clearly marked as a socially informed disposition sharpened by conscious engagement and self-awareness. *Sôphrosynê* changes from being a problematic rejection of love altogether to a learned conforming of it to institutional normativity.

Heliodorus' exploration of the teachable element of *sôphrosynê* harks back, first of all, to tragedies such as *Hippolytus*, which, as Gill (1990b: 92) observes, presents *sôphrosynê* in ways that relate to the question of whether this virtue depends on nature (*physis*) or on the kind of teaching and habituation that ensures conformity with the laws or conventions of society. Moreover, my reading of Chariclea's *phronêma* and *sôphrosynê* in general resonates with ancient theory on character from Plato and Aristotle onwards, where, as I discussed in the introduction, the *creation* of character before adulthood is conceptualized as a process allowing change, as it involves formation, education, and the influence of individuals such as parents and teachers. In addition, the attention paid to Chariclea's *physis* and the sponsoring of two of her main

⁴³ Swain (1992: 102), with reference to *Comp. Dio Brut.* 2.1, 4.1, *Comp. Pel. Marc.* 1.6, *Comp. Lyc. Num.* 2.2, and *Comp. Lys. Sull.* 1.4–6.

⁴⁴ More generally on the conception of identity in Heliodorus not as an innate essence but as the product of human culture, see Whitmarsh (2011: 125–8).

characteristics in Persinna's letter draw attention to yet another element thematized in Plutarch's treatise *On the delay of divine vengeance*: that of the persistence of *physis* across generations. As it happens, Plutarch imagines this aspect with an example that reminds us in quite a few details of the paradox of the colour of Chariclea's skin—although, to be sure, Plutarch's explanation of the details involved plays out very differently. Plutarch compares *physis* with *external* physical features such as skin colour, to conceptualize it as an inherited, or inheritable, element:

As the warts, birthmarks, and moles of the fathers disappear in the children to reappear later in the children of sons and daughters, and as a certain Greek woman, on bearing a black child and being charged with adultery, discovered that she was fourth in descent from an Ethiopian, . . . so too the first generations often conceal and submerge traits and passions of the soul, while later and in the persons of others the nature (ἡ φύσις) breaks out and restores the inherited bent for vice and virtue (ἀπέδωκε τὸ οἰκεῖον εἰς κακίαν καὶ ἀρετήν). (Plu. *De sera num.* 563ab; trans. de Lacy and Einarson, with slight alterations)

Plutarch's conceptualization of *physis* as persistent over generations (even if not observable in every single generation) complements that of the importance of parental influence even on pre-natal character as discussed in *De liberis educandis* (1d8–2a3), where it is argued that a father needs to be sober when conceiving.⁴⁵ Both these passages imagine *physis* as an inherited (or at least inheritable) essence. Both this conceptualization and the above-mentioned notion of the malleability of character through external influence resonate with the depiction of Chariclea's *phronêma* and *sôphrosynê*: in essence, these qualities are naturally present in Chariclea as part of her inherited royal *physis* but she handles them in a rudimentary, socially—and, indeed, generically—undeveloped and unworkable form that needs to be cultivated, controlled, and efficiently developed by self-awareness and teaching. When she discovers her own identity, then, the reader discovers, in retrospect, that her *phronêma* and *sôphrosynê*, firmly set up as they are in the opening scene, are not merely static, generically topical characteristics but the results of a change in mental outlook involving self-knowledge, self-esteem, and external influence.

5.2 SÔPHROSYNÊ AND RHETORIC

5.2.1 Chariclea and Thyamis

Both the shapable/controllable and the dynamic aspects of characterization are thematized by Chariclea's confrontation with Thyamis (1.19.1–26.6). As

⁴⁵ See Albini (1997: 59) for details.

the leader of the brigands who imprison her and Theagenes in the opening episode,⁴⁶ he acts as the first sexual predator in the story to cross Chariclea's path.⁴⁷ This episode features an intimate interconnection between *sôphrosynê* on the one hand and rhetorical ability on the other. As Pernot (1992: 45) observes, Chariclea adopts a defensive rhetoric aimed at remaining a virgin and safeguarding chastity.⁴⁸ I argue below that, like *phronêma* and *sôphrosynê*, this intertwining of *sôphrosynê* and rhetoric is retrospectively explored in later books as the result of a consciously adopted process of change. Again, the constellation of techniques used to construct such change constitutes a combination of direct attribution, metonymical documentation (this time, unsurprisingly, through speech), and metaphorically generated support through the use of mirror scenes that come later in the narration but deal with earlier episodes. But this time, metaphorical characterization involves not only this intratextual element but also broader play with mythological paradigms. And again, the change thus depicted is to a large extent informed by teaching and controlled imitation and adaptation.

Right from the start, the connection between chastity and rhetoric is underlined by two prominent paradigms of Chariclea. The *ecphrasis* aligning her with Artemis in the opening scene (1.2.2) is almost immediately followed by an evocation of Apollo. The laurel branch on her head (Δάφνη τήν κεφαλὴν ἔστεπτο, 1.2.2), the bow (τὸ τόξον), and the arrows (τῶν . . . βελῶν, 1.2.5) are, of course, traditional attributes of this god. Moreover, the rattling of these arrows in the quiver hanging from Chariclea's shoulders verbally echoes the depiction of Apollo when he angrily descends from the Olympus at the beginning of the *Iliad* (φαρέτρην τῶν ὤμων, Hld. 1.2.2; τόξ' ὤμοισιν . . . φαρέτρην, Il. 1.45; τῶν . . . βελῶν πῇ ἀθρόα κινήσει κλαγξάντων, 1.2.5; ἔκλαξαν, Il. 1.46; κινήθ' ἔντος, Il. 1.47; βέλος, Il. 1.51).⁴⁹ The association is further corroborated by the brigands' simultaneous characterization of Chariclea as 'more godlike' than before (θειότερον, 1.2.5).⁵⁰ At this point, the reader can only hypothesize that this paradigm draws attention to Chariclea's intelligence and resourcefulness, two characteristics traditionally associated with Apollo and amply demonstrated by the Thyamis episode a little later. This inference is, indeed, confirmed by later episodes, which I will discuss in due course. The simultaneous presence of Artemis and Apollo in the opening scene anticipates, of course, the importance of both

⁴⁶ Although the Thyamis episode follows the opening scene almost immediately, it is narrated almost twenty paragraphs later because of the insertion of Cnemon's embedded story (1.9–18).

⁴⁷ At the level of the *history*, however, Thyamis is preceded by other sexual predators, such as Alcmenes and Trachinus.

⁴⁸ On the connection between rhetoric and chastity, see also Brethes (2007b: 226–7).

⁴⁹ See, among others, Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1994: 5 n. 2) and Morgan (2008a: 354 n. 2).

⁵⁰ Another connection between Chariclea and Apollo is her name, which is first mentioned in 1.8.4. As already observed by the 10/11th-century Byzantine author Philip the Philosopher, the numeral value of the letters of this name adds up to 777. The number seven is closely associated with Apollo. See Dowden (1996: 270) and M. Jones (2004: 88–90).

gods throughout the novel.⁵¹ Chariclea spends ten years of her life as a priestess of Artemis in Delphi, the most important site for the cult of Apollo. This importance also in turn anticipates the final paragraph of the novel, where Chariclea becomes the priestess of Selene, who is, like Artemis, a moon goddess, and Theagenes becomes the priest of Helios, who is, like Apollo, a sun god.⁵²

The simultaneous presence of Apollo and Artemis in the opening scene is emblematic of the connection between chastity and rhetorical ruse thematized throughout the novel. This connection is especially highlighted in the Thyamis episode, which offers a brilliant demonstration of Chariclea's 'Artemisian' and 'Apollonian' characteristics. In this episode, Chariclea addresses a speech to Thyamis that answers his marriage proposal. It is the first demonstration in the story of rhetorical aptness as a tool for preserving chastity (*σωφρονεῖν . . . καθαρὰν*, 1.25.4).⁵³ The thematic importance of both paradigms throughout the episode is indicated by their remarkable presence in Chariclea's self-presentation.⁵⁴ Moreover, the overall contours of the episode, depicting a leader who has imprisoned a girl with whom he wants to share his bed, echo the opening episode of the *Iliad* (*Il.* 1.31; *Hld.* 1.19.7), first evoked by Chariclea's assimilation to Apollo in the novel's opening scene.⁵⁵

The rhetorical character of Chariclea's speech to Thyamis is clearly underlined by technical vocabulary: Theagenes, for example, calls it fine *dēmēgoria* (which is a technical term for deliberative oratory; 1.25.5) and her preceding reflections are referred to as *enthymēmata* (1.21.3), which since Aristotle had been recognized as techniques of persuasion (*pisteis*) based on deductive logic (e.g. *Rh.* 1.1.3). Moreover, Chariclea displays a highly developed rhetorical self-awareness: she explains to Theagenes that she has falsely described both of them as Ephesians (1.22.2–5) as a 'concealment' (*ἐπικαλύμματα*) of the truth, intended to make the listeners lose their way' (1.25.6). She also depicts her speech as 'a few opportune words uttered in need' (*λόγων ἐπικαίρων καὶ πρὸς τι χρεῖῳδες εἰρημένων*, 1.25.3), which not only draws attention to the traditional importance of circumstances or *kairoi* in rhetorically effective speech, but also dissociates her words from her true

⁵¹ Bargheer (1999: 114–18, 121–3) surveys their presence in the novel.

⁵² Chariclea's depiction in the Delphic procession in a carriage drawn by a pair of white cows (*συνναρίδος λευκῆς βοῶν*, 3.4.2) already echoes the traditional iconography of the moon goddess Selene (see *OCD*⁴ s.v. Selene). See Birchall (1996a: 33–8, 87) and Bargheer (1999: 104–7, 127–8) on the importance of moon (goddess) and sun (god) in this novel.

⁵³ On Chariclea's rhetorical skills, see Egger (1994a: 272), Couraud-Lalanne (1999: 168), Haynes (2003: 72), and Brethes (2007b: 223–56).

⁵⁴ She presents herself (correctly) as a priestess of Artemis and Theagenes (falsely) as her brother (*ἀδελφῷ τῷ ἐμῷ*, 1.21.3) and a priest of Apollo (1.22.2). Furthermore, she consents to the marriage but requests a postponement until she has laid aside her priesthood and insignia at an altar or shrine of Apollo (1.22.6).

⁵⁵ Numerous differences between Agamemnon's and Thyamis' behaviour emphasize the latter's noble character (unlike Agamemnon: *κακῶς*, *Il.* 1.25). See Dowden (1996: 277).

intentions. Thus the idea is established that rhetorical performance implies the construction of a split between words and intentions—an idea, as we will see, abundantly thematized in the novel.

The effectiveness of Chariclea's rhetorical performance is repeatedly emphasized. Theagenes, for example, characterizes her presentation of him as her brother as an exceedingly clever ruse (σοφὸν εἰς ὑπερβολήν, 1.25.6). The primary narrator, for his part, takes pains to present her speech as a rhetorical victory over Thyamis. Chariclea opens her speech with a statement that she feels compelled (ἀναγκάζομαι, 1.22.1) to answer Thyamis' marriage proposal because, by including her in the discussion, he has tried to obtain her hand 'by persuasion rather than by force' (πειθοῖ μάλλον ἢ βίᾳ). This *captatio* is verbally echoed by the narrator's depiction of the *effect* of her speech: because of her speech, Thyamis is *compelled* (κατηναγκασμένος, 1.23.2) to consent (πείθεσθαι) to her proposal to postpone the marriage, although he is abjectly unhappy at this prospect. The repeated emphasis on speech as a tool to compel through persuasion verbally echoes Gorgias' celebrated account of the power of speech, where he states that speech persuades the soul (λόγος γὰρ ψυχὴν ὁ πείσας, ἣν ἔπεισεν) and forces (ἡνάγκασε) it to consent (πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις, Gorg. *Hel.* 12). As I will demonstrate in due course, these qualities of speech are repeatedly acknowledged throughout the novel. For now, it suffices to point out that the intertextual resonance underlines the effectiveness of Chariclea's rhetorical intervention. Unlike Helen (and like Callirhoe; see §1.2), Chariclea is the subject rather than the object of rhetorical persuasion and, consequently, succeeds in defending her chastity instead of surrendering it. The reactions of other listeners also indicate the effectiveness of her speech: like Thyamis, they praise her (ἐπῆνουν . . . ἐπῆνει, 1.23.1), have no objection whatsoever, and urge Thyamis to do as she asks. Consequently, Thyamis reappoints Cnemon as their companion and no longer their warder (οὐ φρουρὸς . . . ἀλλὰ συνόμιλος, 1.24.1) and sees to it that they pass their days in conditions of greater comfort (ἀβροτέραν, 1.24.2) than before. Out of respect for Chariclea, he even invites Theagenes to share his table. The fact that he, indeed, focalizes her as Theagenes' sister (τῆς ἀδελφῆς) clearly points to the immediate effectiveness of her false identification. Her speech, then, makes a difference.

Chariclea's rhetorical effectiveness is further highlighted by the repeated occurrence of Odysseus.⁵⁶ Before her speech, she has her eyes fixed on the ground (τῇ γῇ τὸ βλέμμα προσερείσασα, 1.21.3), which is a rhetorical action commonly known since the *Iliad*, where Odysseus is said to gaze downwards when he is about to give a speech (κατὰ χθονὸς ὄμματα πῆξας, *Il.* 3.217).⁵⁷ In the Homeric episode, Odysseus' rhetorical skills are explicitly praised as unequalled among

⁵⁶ On Odysseus as a paradigm for Chariclea, see also Fusillo (1989: 31–2).

⁵⁷ See Pernot (1992: 49 n. 22), who also refers to Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.157–8 for the action of gazing downwards in rhetorical performance.

mortals (οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆι γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος, *Il.* 3.223). This alignment, then, highlights Chariclea's rhetorical skills as demonstrated by the subsequent speech. On the other hand, it also constructs ambiguity as to how to assess her character and rhetorical performance. The narrator makes it clear that her body language indicates that she *seems* (ἐώκει, 1.21.3) to be gathering her thoughts to say something. Taken at face value, this observation corroborates the alignment with her paradigm, as it highlights the mental activity underlying her speech. However, the elusiveness of her *real* reflections is highlighted by the special blush which appears on her face (πεφοίνικτο . . . πλέον ἢ σύνηθες)⁵⁸ and the fact that her eyes become more alive (τὸ βλέμμα κεκίνητο πρὸς τὸ γοργότερον). Both bodily signs suggest to the reader that there is more going on in her mind than the brigands, as observers, are able to infer. This point is intertextually marked by the above-mentioned Iliadic episode, where Antenor misinterprets Odysseus' body language. He infers from Odysseus' downward gaze that he is morose (ζάκοτον, *Il.* 3.220) and stupid (ἄφρονα, *Il.* 3.220), only to be made aware of his superior rhetorical skills as soon as he starts speaking.

The presence of Odysseus in this rhetorical passage of the novel evokes not only rhetorical versatility, trickery, deceptiveness, and cunning but also the notions of obscurity, ambiguity, changeability, devious self-presentation, and the difficulty of pinning down true identity that are traditionally associated with this figure from Homer onwards.⁵⁹ Such ambivalence creates the background against which Chariclea's first words should be read. She states that it would have been more fitting for Theagenes to address Thyamis, 'for I think that silence becomes a woman, and it is for a man to respond among men' (μᾶλλον . . . ὁ μὲν λόγος ἡρμοζεν ἀδελφῷ τῷ ἐμῷ Θεαγένει τούτῳ· πρέπειν γὰρ οἶμαι γυναικὶ μὲν σιγὴν ἀνδρὶ δὲ ἀπόκρισιν ἐν ἀνδράσιν, 1.21.3). These words create a tension with the newly established paradigm of Odysseus because it explicitly *denies* any rhetorical capacity on her part. But on the other hand, this denial is an unmistakable variation on the well-known rhetorical *topos* of the orator casting himself in a *captatio benevolentiae* as unaccustomed to public speaking.⁶⁰ Chariclea, that is, explicitly negates her rhetorical powers with a phrase recognized by the reader as highly rhetorical. Equally oxymoronic and ambiguous is the depiction of the impact of her speech on Thyamis, who is said to be enchanted by her words 'as by a Siren' (ὥσπερ τινὸς σειρήνος, 1.23.2). Here, then, Chariclea is explicitly aligned not with Odysseus but with one of his most famous, and deadly, enemies. On the other hand, the

⁵⁸ For another interpretation, see Lateiner (1998: 180–1), who claims that she 'uses her blush and silence with set purpose'.

⁵⁹ On the Homeric Odysseus as a profoundly ambiguous figure, see Worman (2002: 13, 44, 74–81, 89–107). On such ambiguity as part of the Greek literary tradition, see Marincola (2007) and Duff (1999: 172).

⁶⁰ On this trope, see p. 159.

reference to Thyamis' enchantment (κεκηλημένος) verbally echoes the famous effect of *Odysseus*' long narration on his Phaeacian audience (κηληθμῶ, Hom. *Od.* 13.2). This resonance again aligns Chariclea not with a Siren but with *Odysseus* himself.⁶¹

The ambiguity thus created is further complicated by the fact that Chariclea is associated not only with *Odysseus* and a Siren, but repeatedly also with Penelope. In the Thyamis episode, Penelope's presence is vaguely echoed by the overall importance of both chastity and resourcefulness in Chariclea's characterization.⁶² The former element resonates with one of the very few explicit evocations of Penelope, halfway through the novel, which connects her emphatically to the importance of (preserved) chastity *and* to Chariclea: Penelope occurs as a part of Calasiris' dream, in which *Odysseus* makes it clear that Penelope (τῆς ἐμῆς γαμετῆς, 5.22.3) sends greetings to Chariclea, 'since she esteems chastity (τὴν σωφροσύνην) above all things'.⁶³ The resourcefulness of Penelope is also echoed in Chariclea when she openly and unambiguously consents to marry Thyamis and asks for a postponement of the marriage (1.22.5). These techniques of feigned consent and requested postponement are, of course, not only favoured by novel heroines throughout the genre as a means of avoiding the violation of their chastity⁶⁴ but are also as old as Penelope in the *Odyssey* and evoke one of the many ambiguities associated with this figure ever since. The occasional ambivalence of Penelope's attitude towards the suitors (see §1.2) is brought to the fore in a particularly obvious way when Chariclea finds herself justifying her course of action to Theagenes, who believes that her consent to marry Thyamis is genuine. Just as in Chariton's novel, the paradigm of Penelope functions in an ambiguous way to thematize the thin line between the heroine's chastity and the devious and, for some, disconcerting versatility with which she defends it. And just as in Chariton's novel, the ambiguity is fleshed out by the hero, who raises serious doubts about the chastity and fidelity of the heroine.

Already in Chariclea's first rhetorical performance, then, the reader is alerted to two important strands underlying her representation. First, the Thyamis episode thematizes rhetorical skill, rationality, resourcefulness, and

⁶¹ Brethes (2007b: 233–9) also points to the simultaneous depiction in this episode of Chariclea as *Odysseus* and as a Siren. He does not mention the oxymoronic expression clearly foregrounding this ambiguity.

⁶² On Penelope as an example of intelligence and resourcefulness in Heliodorus, see Paulsen (1992: 45–6).

⁶³ The figure of Penelope is again evoked by the word *pikrogamos*, a Homeric term which exclusively refers to Penelope's suitors in the *Odyssey* (1.266, 4.346, 17.137) and to characters who want to marry Chariclea in Heliodorus (πικρόγαμος, 5.30.3; πικρογάμους, 7.28.5).

⁶⁴ Parthenope, for example, pretends to agree to have sex with the Persian king (if we use the Coptic Martyr Act of St Bartanuba to reconstruct the Greek original; Stephens and Winkler 1995: 76). And in Iamblichus' *Babyloniaca*, Sinonis pretends to reciprocate Setapus' love (ἀντερᾶν ὑποκρίνεται, Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 94, 76b33–4).

cunning (Apollo, Odysseus) as major characteristics and as tools for safeguarding chastity (Penelope, Artemis). Secondly, the episode draws attention to the elusiveness, indeterminacy, and ambiguity of Chariclea's character. This indeterminacy is emblematic of Chariclea's overall identity at this stage in the narrative, when the reader does not yet know who she is or where she comes from. Her alignment with Odysseus anticipates the reader's awareness that this story primarily tells her *nostos*, but it is instantly made unstable by her simultaneous alignment with the Sirens and with Penelope.

Like Chariclea's *phronêma* and *sôphrosynê* (see §5.1), the intertwining of rhetorical ability and *sôphrosynê* as thematized in the Thyamis episode is retrospectively documented and complicated in subsequent books. From the viewpoint of the history, Chariclea's earliest adoption of rhetoric occurs in the Delphic episode, where it is also staged as a tool to protect chastity. In this, Charicles complains that he tries to *persuade* (πείσαι, 2.33.5; πείσον, 2.33.6) her to renounce virginity by using 'soft words, promises, and reasoned arguments' (θεραπείων...ἐπαγγελλόμενος...λογισμούς, 2.33.5) but that she always counters his arguments by displaying (ἐπανατείνεται) experience in argumentation (τὴν ἐκ λόγων πολυπειρίαν). Charicles not only emphasizes Chariclea's rhetorical skills, but also foregrounds rhetoric as a teachable concept. He makes it clear that he taught her these skills himself (ἐδιδάξαμην) as a basis for choosing the best way of life.⁶⁵ This association between good rhetoric and good morality is a classic one;⁶⁶ according to Chariclea, this 'best way', is, of course, a life informed by *sôphrosynê* and in arguing this she clearly outdoes her own teacher. She is supreme in both.

The introduction of rhetoric as a teachable concept prepares the ground for the treatment of some specific aspects of Chariclea's rhetorical development. In general, her adoption of rhetoric as a tool for the protection of her chastity is shown to be a relative and fluid concept that evolves as a result of imitation. In particular her appreciation of the moral acceptability of rhetorical manipulation is shown to be the result of an imitative process. In the Thyamis episode, her rhetorical skilfulness is emphasized by Theagenes' inability to understand (συμβάλλειν οὔτε ἐδυνάμην, 1.26.1) why she openly and unambiguously

⁶⁵ In this episode, Chariclea's rhetorical ability is explicitly highlighted as an indication of *paideia*, which surfaces for the first time in her life. Before coming to Delphi, she has been brought up, as we learn from Sisimithres, by shepherds in the Ethiopian countryside, far from the city (εἰς ἀγρόν...πόρρω τῆς πόλεως...ποιμέσιν, 2.31.2). This environment stands in sharp contrast to the cultured setting of Delphi, where, as Charicles testifies, she learns Greek very quickly (τάχιστα, 2.33.3), spends time in the company of learned people (οὔτε...ἀπρόσμικτος...πρὸς τοὺς λογίους τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀλλὰ...τούτοις συνόμιλος, 2.33.7; οὐδὲ...πρὸς τὸ λόγιον γένος ἀπρόσμικτος, 3.19.3), and even shares their dwelling inside the temple precinct. Accordingly, Calasiris confirms that she has frequently asked him questions (ἐπύθετο, 2.35.3 ἠρώτησε, 3.6.2) about religious writings (λόγων ἱερῶν, 2.35.3) and 'human and divine matters' (θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων, 3.6.2).

⁶⁶ See e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 12.1.38.

consents to a marriage with Thyamis (γάμου... ὃν οὐ βούλομαι κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον ἀρνήσασθαι, 1.22.5). The reader, on the other hand, realizes that her request for postponement is, of course, one of the topical ruses adopted by novelistic heroines and a stratagem that she has already used before (5.26.3).⁶⁷ In her defence, Chariclea explains that her consent is a *lie* aimed at protecting them both (καθάπερ πάλαισμα τὸ πλάσμα, 1.26.5). She supports this explanation with maxims about the ineffectiveness of resistance, the usefulness of lying and the effectiveness of submissiveness and promises when confronted with passion:

Immovable resistance (μάχη... ἀντίτυπος, 1.26.3) only aggravates the force of irresistible passion ('Ορμήν... κρατούσης ἐπιθυμίας), whereas a meek answer and swift submission (λόγος... εἴκων καὶ πρὸς τὸ βούλημα συντρέχων) can curb the first eruption of desire and soothe away the pangs of lust with the sweet taste of a promise (τῆς ἐπαγγελίας) given. Lovers of a coarser grain (οἱ ἀγροικότερον ἐρῶντες)... consider a declaration of interest (τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν) as the first act of love: a promise (τῆς ἐπαγγελίας) makes them think they own you, and thenceforth, secure in the haven of their hopes (τῶν ἐλπίδων), they act with much more composure (πραότερον)... Sometimes even a lie can be good (Καλὸν γάρ ποτε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, 1.26.6), if it helps (ὠφελοῦν) those who speak it without harming those to whom it is spoken.

As the many maxims in Chariclea's speech indicate, she thus teaches Theagenes some basic premises underlying a successful rhetorical performance and the establishment of control over others.⁶⁸ This rhetorically self-conscious elaboration aligns her, once again, with Odysseus, who in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* similarly defends the usefulness of lying.⁶⁹ But it also stands in sharp contrast to the Delphic episode, where Chariclea's chastity is threatened for the first time in the narrative history.⁷⁰ When Charicles has selected Alcamenes as her future husband (4.7.9), Calasiris advises her to *pretend to agree* to the marriage (Πλάττεσθαι... ὡς ἐπινεύουσιν, 4.13.3; σύντρεχε τὰ πρὸς τὸν γάμον, 4.13.5), but Chariclea regards this solution as highly problematic. She makes it clear that 'it is hard, even repugnant' (Βαρὺ... αἰσχρόν, 4.13.4), even to promise (τὸ καὶ μέχρις ἐπαγγελίας) to prefer another to Theagenes. This objection echoes moral guidelines from Aristotle, who depicts shame as a result 'not only of doing, but also of saying repugnant things' (αἰσχύνονται... οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντες τὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγοντες, *Rh.* 2.6.21–2).⁷¹ As such, her words underline a moral consciousness which seems incompatible with Calasiris' rhetorical

⁶⁷ The two episodes are further connected by Chariclea's false presentation of Theagenes as her brother (ἀδελφῷ τῷ ἐμῷ, 1.21.3; ἀδελφὸν... τὸν ἐμόν, 5.26.3).

⁶⁸ See Pernot (1992: 44), who calls it 'une leçon sur le ψεῦδος'.

⁶⁹ See *S. Ph.* 108–9 (οὐκ αἰσχρόν... τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν; // οὐκ, εἰ τὸ σωθῆναί γε τὸ ψεῦδος φέρει). See Brethes (2007b: 243) and Pernot (1992: 44).

⁷⁰ Pernot (1992: 44) briefly points to this contrast.

⁷¹ On this point, see Brethes (2007b: 246).

advice to disconnect real intentions from communicative ones. This fundamental split between rhetorical contrivance and reality is highlighted by Chariclea's own words when she asks Calasiris what the purpose of the suggested deceit (τὸ πλάσμα, 4.13.4) is and how it will be prevented from being made reality (ἔργον). Moreover, this split connects this episode to the Thyamis episode, where she does use it and presents it to Theagenes as the key distinction between her *promise* to marry Thyamis and her true determination *not* to do so (1.26.3). It is in the Alcamenes episode, then, that Calasiris successfully plants in Chariclea the seed of rhetorical ruse as a means of remaining chaste. Despite moral objections, she clearly shows willingness to follow his advice and even gives him her word (Ὁμολόγει, 4.13.5) that she will do as he says.

Chariclea and Calasiris resemble each other in a number of ways. They are, for example, both characterized as 'wise'.⁷² Scholars have also aligned them for their common ability to exercise control over other people.⁷³ Against the background of such similarities, however, I want to draw attention to Calasiris' role as a model for imitation in the development of Chariclea's rhetorical abilities. As the Alcamenes episode indicates in retrospect, Chariclea's rhetorical awareness in her struggle to defend her chastity is initiated by Calasiris. He moulds not only her perception of her own *sôphrosynê* as such (as we have seen), but also her ability to defend it in sexually threatening environments. This is further demonstrated when her chastity is threatened by Trachinus, the next brigand to cross her path. In this case, she presents Theagenes as her brother (ἀδελφὸν . . . τὸν ἐμὸν, 5.26.3) and consents to Trachinus' marriage proposal. Both speech acts echo those of Calasiris when he is approached by Trachinus a little earlier. He also feigns consent and presents the two protagonists as his children (παῖδες εἰσὶ μοι δύο, 5.18.7).⁷⁴ In a narratorial remark to Cnemon, he is explicit that his 'fair promises' (χρησταῖς ἐπαγγελίαις, 5.20.1) simply aim at satisfying Trachinus temporarily, in order to avoid violence (βιάιόν τι). He also informs Cnemon that Chariclea's adoption of both ruses results from a combination of what he has taught her on the one hand (τῆς ἐμῆς ὑποθήκης, 5.26.2) and her own wisdom (σοφώτατον) and rhetorical ability 'to turn a situation to her own advantage' on the other (καιρὸν διαθέσθαι δραστήριος). Indeed, Chariclea also devises a number of ruses herself. First, her body language is instrumental:⁷⁵ she discards any downcast expression and forces

⁷² On Chariclea, see 3.4.1 (σοφή). On Calasiris, see 3.11.3 (σοφώτατε), 3.19.3, 4.7.1, 4.10.2, 4.16.9, and 6.15.4.

⁷³ See e.g. Chew (2007: 295) on their common rhetorical skilfulness. On Chariclea and Calasiris as both learning through wandering, see Montiglio (2005: 239).

⁷⁴ See Pernot (1992: 49 n. 17) for a different reading.

⁷⁵ Body language constructs a contrast between Chariclea and less chaste women like Demaenete and Arsace, who consciously use body language to communicate sexual desire rather than to protect their chastity (1.9.3, 7.2.2, 7.12.7).

herself to put on a more alluring expression (τὸ κατηφές ἐκ τῶν περιστηκότων τοῦ βλέμματος ἀπεσκευασμένη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐπαγωγότερον ἐκβιασμένη). She also softens up her suitor by characterizing his proposal as an indication of philanthropy (τὰ φιланθρωπότερα) and by feigning gratitude to the gods for their encounter (θεοῖς . . . χάρις).⁷⁶ Moreover, when begging for Theagenes' and Calasiris' lives, she falls to her knees and cries in supplication. The narrator explicitly underlines the effectiveness of these techniques: whereas her tears move Trachinus to pity (οἶκτον, 5.26.4), her eyes reduce him to abject slavery (πρὸς τὸ ὑπήκοον ἐδουλοῦτο), and he relents. Like the Thyamis episode, then, the Trachinus episode clearly highlights Chariclea's immediate rhetorical success.

In short, this episode invites the reader to revisit Chariclea's rhetorical performance in the Thyamis episode. Because of the location of the Thyamis episode at the beginning of the story, the reader initially regards her rhetorical success as a mere indication of natural rhetorical skilfulness. It is only after reading the Alcamenes and Trachinus episodes in Calasiris' embedded narrative that the reader realizes that this skilfulness is the product of an ongoing and dynamic process of negotiation and imitation. In the latter two episodes, Calasiris teaches Chariclea how to safeguard her chastity.⁷⁷ When the embedded narrative that recounts these two episodes has come full circle and brings the reader back to the opening scene at the Heracleotic mouth of the Nile (immediately after the Trachinus episode), Calasiris is no longer with Chariclea.⁷⁸ The reader realizes that by now Chariclea has internalized his teaching and is able to adopt independently the strategies that he has taught her, as the Thyamis episode shows. It is only at the end of the fifth book, then, that the reader finds out that the Thyamis episode actually narrates the very first instance where Chariclea and Theagenes are *separated* from Calasiris since their departure from Delphi. This episode therefore becomes a marker not merely of Chariclea's rhetorical skilfulness, but also of the aptness with which she can now face misfortunes *on her own*.

Charicles' and, thereafter, Calasiris' teaching of Chariclea echoes similar concerns with spiritual development presented through a relationship between pupil and teacher in other imperial narrative, for example in the *Pseudo-Clementines* and in philosophers' and statesmen's biographies.⁷⁹ The imitative aspect of Chariclea's learning process in particular resonates with the important role played by imitation in biographical depictions of character

⁷⁶ The originality of the latter technique is highlighted by Calasiris' *own* imitation of it a little later (ἐνεδεικνύμην τοῖς . . . θεοῖς χάριν, 5.28.2).

⁷⁷ This reading complements those of scholars who have repeatedly, and rightly, depicted Calasiris as guide and father figure to the protagonists. See, among others, Marcovaldi (1969: 15–17) and Konstan (2004–5: 189–90). Chariclea herself thematizes at length her own dependence (7.14.7–8).

⁷⁸ They are separated in 5.33.1–3.

⁷⁹ See e.g. Czachesz (2009) and Duff (2008b: 8–9).

formation or improvement and the connection made there (and elsewhere) between *êthos* and *ethos* ('habit').⁸⁰ Moreover, Heliodorus' thematization of such teaching in the realm of rhetorical skilfulness rehearses a well-known *topos* in the rhetorical tradition, where the teachability of rhetoric is of central importance from the legendary teacher-rhetorician Corax and, according to some traditions, his pupil Tisias onwards.⁸¹ The famous paradox of Tisias attempting rhetorically to outwit his teacher in order to escape payment but himself being countered by exactly the same argument⁸² brings to the fore the same theme of pupil outwitting teacher in sophistry that is taken up by Heliodorus in Charicles' complaint that Chariclea uses against him the very art that he has taught her (2.33.5).

This depiction of Chariclea as an imitator of Calasiris is given a new dimension after their reunion in Chemmis. When setting out in search of Theagenes, Chariclea recounts to Calasiris the 'various artifices' (*ἐπινοίαις*, 6.9.6) with which she managed to ward off Thyamis. Three such devices figure in the Thyamis episode: feigned consent to the marriage proposal (*γάμου* . . . *ὃν οὐ βούλομαι κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον ἀρνήσασθαι*, 1.22.5), feigned gratitude to the gods (*εὐπραγοῦντες ὅτι θεῶν τις εἰς χεῖρας τὰς ὑμετέρας ἤγαγε*, 1.22.5; *ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ κηδεμονίας ἄμοιρον*, 1.22.6), and the presentation of Theagenes as her brother (*ἀδελφῶ τῷ ἐμῷ*, 1.21.3). In fact, two of these techniques have been invented and demonstrated by Calasiris before.⁸³ But whereas to Cnemon Calasiris presents her rhetorical development as partially the result of his own teaching, in his conversation with Chariclea he focuses exclusively on her own achievements:

There would be no harm in *your* devising (*ἐπινοεῖς*) some ploy (*μηχανήν τινα*) to circumvent your fears. *You* seem to be adept at thinking of (*σοφιστεῦσαι*) clever ways to deflect and defer unwelcome advances (*τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων διαδύσεις τε καὶ ὑπερθέσεις*) (6.9.7, *my italics*).

As the rhetorical terminology indicates, Calasiris primarily compliments Chariclea on the *inventio*, or *heuresis* (*ἐπινοεῖς, μηχανήν, σοφιστεῦσαι*), that informs her performance. This compliment implies that she herself is responsible for *devising* these ruses. That this is not the case is highlighted by the fact that Chariclea doubts whether Calasiris is being serious or just poking fun at

⁸⁰ Duff (1999: 39) on Plutarch's *Lives*. Frazier (1996: 132–3) discusses the dynamics of imitation and emulation connected with admiration in the *Lives* of Coriolanus (15.5), Aristides (2.1), Agis (19.7), and Pelopidas (26.7).

⁸¹ Kennedy (1963: 58–61) gives sources and references.

⁸² Tisias argues that his failure to persuade his teacher to refuse payment would expose the latter's lessons as unsuccessful and therefore unworthy of payment. In response, Corax argues that *his* failure to persuade his pupil to pay would illustrate, precisely, the success of his lessons (as teacher would be shown outwitted by pupil) and therefore that they are worthy of payment. The paradox is attested in Anon. *Prolegomena* 4, 26.21–27.7 Rabe (1931).

⁸³ These are feigning consent (Alcamenes episode, 4.13.3–5) and presenting the protagonists as brother and sister (Trachinus episode, 5.18.7).

her (ἀλληθεύεις . . . ἢ παιδιάν με πεποίησαι, 6.10.1). On the other hand, she also ‘brightens a little’ (ἀνείθη . . . μικρόν) at his words and proposes they dress as beggars, a ruse (τέχνην) previously contrived by Theagenes. This reaction invites us to read Calasiris’ compliment as psychological support and as a way to boost Chariclea’s self-confidence. As a result, Chariclea for the first time in the entire narrative is encouraged to suggest a stratagem herself *in the presence of Calasiris* rather than merely following or imitating his advice. Whereas up to now, the relation between the two has been one of teacher and pupil, we here get a less polarized and less hierarchical relationship. Now that Chariclea has been able, thanks to Calasiris’ teaching, to deal with adversities on her own (the Thyamis episode), their relationship following their reunion takes on a new dimension. She now takes the initiative alongside him. This is further underlined by the rhetorical control she establishes over Cnemon. Attention has already been drawn in the first book to the caution with which she tends to deal with him. Although Cnemon has tended Theagenes’ wounds (1.8.7) and told his own story to her and Theagenes (1.9–18), she advises Theagenes to conceal (σιγητέον, 1.26.5) their true identity from him because ‘we have neither a long friendship nor a close connection to give us a firm guarantee of his reliability’. When reunited with Cnemon, she adopts subtle rhetoric to mask her lack of confidence. The narrator makes it clear that she does not regard him as a trustworthy (οὐδὲ ἀνύποπτον, 6.7.8) travelling companion, but since she suspects that he is in love with Nausicles’ daughter, she assures him that he is ‘under no obligation’ (ἀνάγκης) to stay with her and Calasiris. She encourages him to go back to Athens and emphasizes that she and Calasiris will fight on (μαχεσόμεθα, 6.7.9) until they reach the end of their wanderings—a comment that surely plays on Cnemon’s cowardice, which has been repeatedly displayed throughout the novel.⁸⁴ Again, then, Chariclea’s rhetorical resourcefulness is operative alongside that of Calasiris, but this time extending the teacher–pupil relationship established earlier in the story from mere imitation to devising and adopting rhetorical versatility independently.

5.2.2 Theagenes and Arsace

Chariclea builds up expertise and knowledge in rhetorical skilfulness, a development that can be read as one specific instantiation of an oft-noted broad correlation in her character between wandering and the acquisition of knowledge, itself rehearsing the Platonic metaphor of the journey of the soul

⁸⁴ See e.g. Paulsen (1992: 105–13), De Temmerman (2007b: 91–2).

and aligning her with Calasiris.⁸⁵ Chariclea's initiative in embarking on travels, for example, has been read in such terms and contrasted with Theagenes' behaviour, as well as that of other novelistic heroines, whose freedom to move is restricted and who, rather, are moved against their will.⁸⁶ Heliodorus explores the asymmetrical position in rhetorical skilfulness between heroine and hero after their arrival in Memphis, when Calasiris has died (7.11) and Chariclea, in turn, becomes for Theagenes a mentor in rhetorical ruse (7.9–8.13). This episode also thematizes rhetoric as a tool for the preservation of chastity—Theagenes' this time. And again, direct, metonymical, and intratextual metaphorical characterization converge in constructing this connection. In Memphis, the protagonists almost immediately become the object of manipulation by Cybele, who tries to persuade Theagenes to have sex with Arsace, her mistress and the wife of the Persian satrap Oroondates. Chariclea's new 'Calasirian' position is highlighted by Theagenes himself, who directly asks her advice (*Τί . . . χρὴ πράττειν*, 7.25.6) on what ruse to devise (*τίνα μηχανὴν ἐπινοεῖν*). His question literally echoes Chariclea's when she asked Calasiris how to avoid a marriage with Alcamenes (*τί χρὴ πράττειν*, 4.13.3). Whereas then Chariclea sought advice from Calasiris, Theagenes now seeks advice from Chariclea. Her position as a teacher is also highlighted by the implicit evocation of the Thyamis episode, which, as I argue, is meant to be read as the (or a) counterpart to the Arsace episode (7.9–8.13).⁸⁷ The connection between the two episodes in general and Chariclea's role as Theagenes' teacher of rhetoric in particular are both highlighted by the fact that Theagenes' response to Cybele is prepared by Chariclea, who advises him to 'remember your sister in whatever you say' (*Τῆς ἀδελφῆς . . . μέμνησο ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγῃς*, 7.12.7). This suggestion, which recalls a ruse originally conceived by Calasiris to safeguard Chariclea's chastity (5.18.7), invites Theagenes to put into practice the guidelines on the moral acceptability and usefulness of lying that she has taught him in the Thyamis episode (*Καλὸν . . . τὸ ψεύδος*, 1.26.6). His response also evokes Chariclea's rhetorical performance in the Thyamis episode: like her, he employs this ruse (*Ἀδελφοί*, 7.13.1; *ἀδελφὴν . . . τὴν ἐμήν*, 7.18.3; *Ἀδελφῆς . . . τῆς ἐμῆς*, 7.24.6) and engineers a false story about their background (he says they are searching for their parents, who have been abducted by pirates, 7.13.1). Moreover, following Chariclea's advice (*πρὸς τὴν Χαρίκλειαν ὑπὲρ τῆς θεραπευτικῆς ὑποκρίσεως*, 7.19.2), he also adopts a

⁸⁵ See Montiglio (2005: 239–40) on some key moments in the journey in the *Aethiopica* and their Platonic overtones (with reference to earlier scholarship). On rhetoric and knowledge generally, see Reinhardt (2007).

⁸⁶ John (2003: 194–9) and Montiglio (2005: 240–1).

⁸⁷ Morgan (1998a) demonstrates that a number of 'doublets' underlie Heliodorus' narrative architecture. In my view, the (implicit) evocation of the Thyamis episode in the Arsace episode, which he does not discuss, is another such doublet.

rhetoric of *feigning*.⁸⁸ Like Chariclea's speeches in the Thyamis and Trachinus episodes (1.24.1 and 5.26.4), his speech immediately results in benign reactions from their interlocutors.⁸⁹

The overall similarity between Chariclea's reaction in the Thyamis episode and Theagenes' in the Arsace episode draws attention to one fundamental difference between the two. The protagonists are aligned, of course, by their common attitude to Arsace's lust as immoral (*ἄτοπον*, 7.21.4; *τῶν ἄτοπωτέρων*, 7.19.8). However, they are set apart by their views on *how* Theagenes should avoid such immorality. Chariclea evokes the possibility that Theagenes might actually have sex with Arsace (*δρᾶσαι τὸ ἔργον*, 7.21.3) as a last resort to save them (*τὸ σῶζεσθαι*). Although she is explicit that she would not oppose this scenario (*οὐκ ἂν σφόδρα διενεχθεῖσα*), she is much more in favour of a rhetorically contrived solution, as she herself has repeatedly adopted. She is insistent that he should *not* verbally resist Arsace (*μὴ ἀντιβαίνειν*, 7.18.3) and repeatedly urges him to consent (*συντρέχειν*, 7.18.3; *μὴ ἀρνεῖσθαι*, 7.21.1; *κατανεύσας*, 7.25.6). Her advice conspicuously aligns her with Calasiris through the evocation of his guidelines at earlier stages of the story. This is done in two distinct ways. First, she casts her advice in rhetorically marked language, explicitly highlighting the powers of rhetoric in the face of erotic danger. She encourages Theagenes to 'give the impression' (*ἐνδεδείκνυσθαι*, 7.18.3) of doing just as Arsace wishes, to 'pretend' (*πλάττου*, 7.21.4) to agree, to make promises (*ἐπαγγελίαις*), and to 'win her over with hope' (*ἐφηδύνων ἐλπίδι*). Finally, she asks him not to 'allow this role (*τῆς μελέτης*) to become the first step towards shameful reality (*τὸ αἰσχρὸν τοῦ ἔργου*)', thus explicitly casting Theagenes' behaviour towards Arsace as a rhetorical performance (*meletê*) as distinct from his actual intentions. Again, then, the crucial split between performance (words) and intention is highlighted. This split and the vocabulary used echo not only the importance of promise-making in earlier episodes in general (*χρησταῖς ἐπαγγελίαις . . . ἐπηγγελόμην*, 5.20.1), but also, and particularly, Calasiris' advice to consent to Alcamenes' marriage proposal (*Πλάττεσθαι*, 4.13.3), and Chariclea's initial rejection of it (*αἰσχρὸν*, 4.13.4).

⁸⁸ When Cybele initially does not communicate Arsace's intentions explicitly (*Προδήλως . . . οὐκ ἐξέφαινε*, 7.19.7) but tries to make Theagenes understand them (*συνιέναι*) by hinting at them indirectly (*κύκλω*) and ambiguously (*δι' αἰνιγμάτων*), he feigns not to understand (*ὥς ἂν μὴδὲ συνιείς*, 7.19.8). Although the narrator makes it clear that she sees through his deceit (*στοχαζομένη . . . ὥς συνίησι*), he nevertheless forces (*ἀναγκάζεται*, 7.20.1) her to speak more clearly (*λευκότερον διαλεχθῆναι*) and to announce Arsace's love overtly (*ἀπαρακαλύπτως ἐξηγῶρεν*).

⁸⁹ Cybele is visibly delighted (*τῇ διαχύσει τοῦ προσώπου κατάδηλος . . . σφόδρα ὑπερησθεῖσα*, 7.14.1) that Chariclea, as Theagenes' sister, does not pose an obstacle or threat to Arsace's advances. Arsace, for her part, offers them delicious food (*πολυτέλειαν καὶ χλιδὴν ὑπεραίροντα*, 7.18.1) as a gift of welcome.

Secondly, her discourse is 'Calasirian' in its use of medical vocabulary and images concerning bodily malfunction. She presents Arsace's desire as hunger (τὴν ὄρεξιν, 7.21.4) to be fed (τρέφω) with promises and argues these will buy them some time which will 'cut away' (ὑπότμινε) immediate danger. Finally, she advises Theagenes to ease 'the tumour of Arsace's anger' (καταμαλάττων . . . τοῦ θυμοῦ τὸ φλεγμαῖνον) with fair words. Of course, lovesickness is a novelistic *topos*,⁹⁰ but its depiction in conspicuously medical terms in such a rhetorically marked context recalls Calasiris' self-presentation when dealing with Chariclea's love for Theagenes.⁹¹ Whereas she pretends to have a headache (τῆς κεφαλῆς ἄλγος διοχεῖν, 3.7.1), Calasiris (like the reader) knows that her love for Theagenes is the real reason for her distress. For him, then, her pretence creates an alignment between bodily malfunction ('headache') and love that is instrumental in rhetorical control. He extensively exploits this alignment as a means to establish such control, especially over Charicles, who himself regards his daughter's condition as a sickness from the start (μαλακία, 3.7.2) and is easily fooled into believing that she suffers from the evil eye (3.9). From this point onwards, Charicles consistently depicts Chariclea's condition as a sickness (νοσεῖν, 3.9.1; οὐχ ὑγιαίνουσα, 3.18.2) and asks Calasiris to cure her (διαλῦσαι, 3.9.1; τινα . . . ἴασιν . . . ἰάσασθαι, 3.18.3). Calasiris, in turn, echoes this discourse (πάσχουσιν, 3.9.1; ἐπισκεψόμενοι . . . ἀκριβέστερον, 3.18.4) and asks Charicles to present him to Chariclea as a close friend, 'so that she will respond with more confidence (θαρραλέωτερον, 3.18.4) to my physicking' (ἰώμενον). Charicles virtually repeats these words to Chariclea, encouraging her to have confidence (θάρσει, 3.19.3) and stressing Calasiris' ability to cure her (ἴασιν τινα . . . ἰᾶσθαι). Thus, Calasiris constructs the image of himself as a doctor even before confronting Chariclea directly, on which occasion he repeats this self-presentation (ἡ νόσος . . . ἰαθήναι, 4.5.4).

In the Arsace episode, then, both Chariclea's rhetorical advice and the medical discourse in which it is cast recall Calasiris' earlier rhetorical behaviour. This alignment fleshes out her new position as Theagenes' teacher, but also draws attention to a new aspect of her imitation of Calasiris. Not only does she put into practice his advice; she also adopts his style of self-presentation and language. In this way, her evolution from pupil to teacher of rhetoric is foregrounded. After initially rejecting Calasiris' advice regarding Alcamenes and adopting it to delude Trachinus and Thyamis, she now goes one step further and shows that she has sufficiently assimilated this advice to

⁹⁰ See e.g. Keul-Deutscher (1997: 344–7) on 'Liebesleidenschaft und Liebeskrankheit' in Heliodorus.

⁹¹ The medicalization of Chariclea's condition is emphatically thematized in the novel. See Robiano (2003), who points to traces in Hld. 4.7.3–7 of medical concepts from Erasistratus and Antiochus (as preserved in Galen's *In Hipp. progn. comment.* 1, 8, CMG V.9.2.218.14–219.5).

teach Theagenes, who is now as sceptical towards it as she was herself in the beginning.

Theagenes' learning process is more problematic than Chariclea's. Initially, he regards the idea of feigning consent to Arsace's proposal as morally unacceptable. He makes it clear that he cannot make up such *plasmata* (μηδὲ πλάσασθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα δύνασθαι, 7.21.5) because 'to speak immoral words is just as wrong as to commit immoral acts' (ποιεῖν γὰρ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ λέγειν ὁμοίως ἀπρεπές).⁹² This sweeping claim, of course not only rules out one of the main ruses of novelistic heroes (and heroines) for saving their threatened chastity, but it also recalls Chariclea's own refusal to feign consent in the Alcamenes episode (αἰσχρόν, 4.13.4; see pp. 265–6). The crucial difference between the two, however, is that, whereas Chariclea is pragmatic enough to follow Calasiris' advice despite her moral objections and later adopts it independently of him, Theagenes is initially adamant. In his very first confrontation with Cybele, he deliberately *dissociates* himself from Arsace in an attempt to persuade Cybele that he is not a suitable party to be introduced to her mistress: 'She [Arsace] is rich and happy; we are homeless, wretched strangers in a foreign land; do not impose our sorrows on her' (7.13.2). This dissociation stands in sharp contrast to Chariclea's deliberate *association* of herself with Thyamis in similar circumstances: when consenting to his marriage proposal, she presents herself not only as a prisoner happy to be thought worthy of her master's bed (εὐδαίμονα τύχην, 1.22.6) but also as a suitable wife for him. She presents such a marriage as an instance of divine providence (τῆς ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ κηδεμονίας) and highlights the fact that she is dedicated to the gods (θεοῖς ἀνακειμένην) and will appropriately become the wife of the son of a high priest (προφήτου παιδίω) who will soon be a high priest himself (μετ' ὀλίγον . . . προφήτῃ).

Theagenes, then, prefers to reject Arsace openly (ἀπογνῶναι, 7.21.5) rather than to dissimulate consent. He makes it clear that he chooses to endure possible suffering as a consequence (πάσχειν . . . φέρειν τὰ προσπίπτοντα), thus consciously presenting his own course of action as a workable alternative to Calasiris' and Chariclea's rhetoric of promise-making, which has always aimed at avoiding such immediate danger (for example in 5.20.1, where Calasiris makes clear this purpose). The imminence of such danger in the Arsace episode is suggested not only by Cybele's repeated warnings of Arsace's vengefulness (7.20.4 and 7.25.2) but also by the fact that Arsace's advances to Theagenes implicitly evoke those of Demaenete to Cnemon.⁹³ This evocation draws attention not only to Theagenes' active resistance (as opposed to Cnemon's passivity) but also to the importance of Cnemon's story

⁹² Again in 7.25.7 ('Don't speak like this', *Εὐφύμησον*). Brethes (2007b: 246–7) briefly discusses Theagenes' equation of reality and its verbal representation.

⁹³ Paulsen (1992: 68, 90–2) lists the similarities between the two episodes.

as a paradigm of the dangers resulting from immoderate female lust. Although Cnemon tells this story to both protagonists in the opening scene of the novel, it is Chariclea who seems to be more aware of such possible dangers in the Arsace episode: she explicitly warns Theagenes not to land *them both* (ήμᾱς) in great danger (μέγα κακόν, 7.21.5). Her advice perfectly foreshadows subsequent developments. When Theagenes, as he had previously said he would, bluntly rejects Arsace (Ἀπειπόντος . . . λαμπρῶς, 7.22.2) and thus rules out any hope of his compliance (παντοίως τὸ προσδοκᾶν ἀποφήσαντος), Cybele's son Achaemenes reveals to Arsace that Theagenes is in fact a prisoner of war, and therefore her slave (δοῦλος, 7.24.1). In addition, Arsace decides to give Chariclea in marriage to Achaemenes (7.24.4). This new situation is indeed perilous for both protagonists: it redefines Theagenes' social status so that he is placed in a defenceless position of unconditional obedience and it exposes Chariclea to yet another sexual predator.

Only when Theagenes is confronted with this new and doubly dangerous situation does he realize the appropriateness of Chariclea's approach. He confesses that they 'are done for' (Οἷχεται τὰ καθ' ήμᾱς, 7.25.3). The changed circumstances initiate a shift in his awareness of the importance of rhetorical effectiveness and, subsequently, in his rhetorical behaviour. He is aghast to hear that Chariclea is to be married to Achaemenes (ἐβέβλητο . . . ὡς ὑπὸ τρώσεως τῶν λόγων, 7.24.5) but nevertheless decides not to object this plan (ἐγνων . . . μὴ ὁμόσε χωρεῖν) but rather to sidestep it (ἐκκλίνει) like the attack of a wild animal (καθάπερ θηρίου τήν ὀρμήν). Moreover, he now reacts differently to Cybele's repeated threats. In two instances, Cybele threatens (ἀπειλὴν, 7.20.4) that refusal to comply with Arsace's demands will result in severe punishment for Theagenes (ἀμείλικτοι . . . καὶ βαρυμήνιδες . . . ἀμύνονται . . . κολάσαι, 7.20.4; δουλείαν . . . τήν ἐσχάτην καὶ ἀτιμοτάτην . . . κολάσεως, 7.25.2). In each instance, she also holds out the prospect of reward for cooperation (τιμῆσαι τὸν εὖνον, 7.20.4), either by promising freedom and a life of ease and plenty (ἐλευθερίας . . . μεθέξει καὶ ἀφθόνης ὡς ἐν εὐπορίᾳ βιώσεται, 7.25.2) or by depicting Arsace's wealth (πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν, 7.20.4) and power (δύναμιν). To each of these approaches, Theagenes' response is significantly different. Whereas on the first occasion, as we have seen, he responds with a blunt refusal (7.22.2), on the second he asks to be given time before answering (ὀλίγον ἐπιμείναι παρακαλέσας, 7.25.3), thus adopting one of the stock novelistic devices of protagonists whose chastity is threatened.

As soon as he has become aware of the importance of such rhetorical dissimulation, his behaviour is informed to a considerable extent by imitation of Chariclea's earlier rhetorical practice. He feigns gratitude to the gods for being Arsace's slave (θεοῖς χάρις, 7.24.5), requests permission to postpone his answer (7.25.3), and eventually consents to have sex with Arsace (ἑτοιμος, 7.26.2; Ἔσται καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ, 7.26.6). To Chariclea, he still defines this consent as immoral (τῶν ἀτόπων, 7.26.7), echoing in the process his earlier

description of Arsace's desire (τῶν ἀτοπωτέρων, 7.19.8), but this time he is able to feign such immorality. The crucial importance of Chariclea in this development is obvious. She has been advising him all along to consent and has herself employed all three of these techniques before. In fact, Theagenes' explanation of his verbal consent (τῆς ἐπαγγελίας, 7.26.7) as a device (ἐπινενόηται, 7.26.8) that should keep Arsace's desire (τῇ . . . ἐπιθυμίᾳ) waiting for a while (ὑπερθέσεως) literally echoes an earlier speech by Chariclea, where *she* explains to *him* her promise to marry Thyamis in exactly the same words (τούτων . . . ἐπηγγελμένων, 1.26.2; τῆς ἐπαγγελίας, 1.26.3; ἐπινοίαις, 1.26.4;⁹⁴ ἐπιθυμίας, 1.26.3; ὑπερεθέμην 1.26.4). Here as well, then, the implicit presence of the Thyamis episode shows that Chariclea has become for Theagenes the teacher of rhetorical dissimulation that Calasiris has been for her in earlier episodes. Just as Chariclea earlier imitates Calasiris' discourse, so Theagenes now imitates (or, in fact, verbally echoes) Chariclea's language. But this evocation of the Thyamis episode also draws attention to a change in Theagenes, since on that occasion he could not even understand Chariclea's ruse without explanation from her, whereas he has now acquired the mental flexibility to invent speech that does not correspond to his true intentions.

Thus Theagenes, like Chariclea earlier, does not merely imitate but also develops a ruse himself. He even highlights his own heuristic capacities in the construction of rhetorical discourse (εὐρέτις . . . ἐπιλογισμῶν, 7.25.7). His most important contribution is the deliberate communication to Arsace and Cybele of the fact that Chariclea is not his sister after all but his beloved and bride-to-be (μνηστὴν . . . τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ νύμφην καὶ . . . γαμετὴν, 7.26.4). This allows him plausibly to make his consent to have sex with Arsace conditional on her cancellation of the marriage between Chariclea and Achaemenes (7.26.3)—a condition she accepts (7.26.4, 7.26.6). As he explains to Chariclea, he deliberately arranges for Cybele to be present at this interview (7.26.9) so that Achaemenes will get to hear of this thwarting of his marriage plans. The underlying calculation is that Achaemenes will then throw the whole situation into confusion (7.26.8) and develop hostile designs against Arsace (ἐπιβουλεύσειν, 7.26.10), which, indeed, soon turns out to be the case (7.28.2–4 and 8.1.6).

Theagenes consciously makes a psychological analysis of Achaemenes' situation as the basis of this calculation. He explains to Chariclea that Achaemenes is a man born in slavery (δοῦλον . . . τὴν τύχην, 7.26.10) and therefore likely to hate his mistress anyway. He also points out that, in addition, Achaemenes is in love (ἐρώντα) and feels hard done by (ἀδικοῦμενον) because, in assigning Chariclea to him, Arsace has preferred Theagenes to himself (προτετιμῆσθαι). This analysis turns out to be completely correct when

⁹⁴ See also 6.9.6 (ἐπινοίαις) and 6.9.7 (ἐπινοεῖς) for other references to Chariclea's devices in this episode.

Achaemenes, indeed, complains to his mother that Arsace holds Theagenes ‘in greater esteem’ (προτετίμηται, 7.27.7; τιμᾶσθαι, 7.27.8).

Theagenes’ analysis allows him not only to predict Achaemenes’ reactions, but also to intervene actively in order to *influence* these reactions. When ordered to wait on Arsace’s table, for example, he refuses to accept Achaemenes as his teacher (Οὐδὲν . . . δέομαι διδασκάλων, 7.27.2) and casts himself in a position of social superiority over him.⁹⁵ Moreover, he makes it obvious he is not listening to a word he says and walks ‘beside him with his eyes fixed on the ground’ (οὐδὲ ἀκούοντι προσεοικῶς κάτω νέυσας ἀντιπαρῇει, 7.27.6). This body language recalls Theophrastus’ depiction of an arrogant man (ὁ . . . ὑπερήφανος, *Char.* 24), one of whose modes of behaviour is not to speak (μὴ λαλεῖν, *Char.* 24.8) to passers-by when walking in the street but ‘to keep his head down and look up only when it suits him’ (κάτω κεκυφώς, ὅταν δὲ αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ἄνω πάλιν).⁹⁶ When, after being treated so arrogantly and dismissively, Achaemenes observes Arsace’s admiration for Theagenes, his anger and jealousy are aroused (καὶ ὀργῆς ἅμα καὶ ζηλοτυπίας, 7.27.4). The narrator makes it clear that, together with his frustrated love (ἔρωτος καὶ ἀποτυχίας, 7.29.1), these emotions eventually motivate him to leave Memphis and inform Oroondates of Arsace’s envisaged infidelity. This, in turn, leads to the protagonists’ release from Arsace’s prison (8.13.5–14.1). Theagenes’ psychological warfare has proven very successful—he has Achaemenes exactly where he wants him.

This episode, then, foregrounds the change through which Theagenes has gone. Like Chariclea, he thematizes the importance of rhetoric as a tool in the preservation of chastity, though he embodies the problematic nature of such rhetorical control as morally objectionable but ultimately unavoidable more than she does.⁹⁷ The protagonists’ changing attitudes to rhetoric attest to the fact that their awareness of its importance is depicted not statically but as an amalgam of skills which involve moral considerations and have to be passed on by teaching and imitation. At the same time, such teaching has to be complemented by own input. In the end, Heliodorus’ novel thematizes the protagonists’ rhetorical growth: it addresses their evolution from rejecting

⁹⁵ He says that, whereas Achaemenes is forced (καταναγκάζει) by his social station as a slave (ἡ τύχη) to know how to pour wine at Arsace’s table, in his own case natural ability (ἡ φύσις) and the requirements of the moment (ὁ καιρὸς) tell him what is to be done (7.27.2). On this scene, see also p. 22.

⁹⁶ This depiction is added to earlier deliberately arrogant behaviour of Theagenes (such as his refusal to perform a *proskynêsis* in front of Arsace), which leads both Achaemenes and Arsace to characterize him as arrogant (ὑπερήφανος, 7.25.1; ὑπερήφανον, 7.25.2).

⁹⁷ My reading differs from Montiglio’s (2010: 50), who limits the presence of moral conflict in this novel to the figure of Hydaspes (and leaves this part of the novel out of her discussion altogether).

morally unacceptable courses of action to accommodating them in their strategies of self-defence.

5.3 SELF-PRESENTATION DECONSTRUCTED: THEAGENES REREAD

As I have shown, self-presentation, rhetorical performance, dissimulation, and the conscious construction of identity are recurrent tools for the protagonists for safeguarding their chastity. But in this novel, the importance of such tools is not limited to this thematic area. It accords with the role of performance in a more general sense. As scholars have observed, Heliodorus' presentation of a white Ethiopian heroine who passes most of her life as the quintessential Greek *pepaideumenê* in a quintessentially Greek place like Delphi defines identity more as the performance of a role than as a fixed essence determined by birth.⁹⁸ Indeed, the thrust of the novel as a whole is to defy any essentialist and fixed conceptualization of identity. Against this background, I hope to show, Heliodorus also explores both the construction of character and its deconstruction. Of course, the questions of what promotes or undermines stability and permanence of character are traditional themes in ancient literature and philosophy (see §0.3), but my emphasis on Heliodorus' conscious exploration of ambiguity through the simultaneous staging of construction and deconstruction also resonates with scholarly readings of the Second Sophistic as a 'postmodernist' culture, where literature is a self-conscious and ever versatile exploration of notions of instability, playfulness, and wittiness defying fixed meaning.⁹⁹

It has been pointed out that Heliodorus' novel thematizes body language as a tool in the construction of performance in the case of several minor characters.¹⁰⁰ However, less attention has been paid to the protagonists' adoption of this technique, even though, as in other novels, body language is a recurrent tool for them to hide emotions or intentions in a public context.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ See Perkins (1999: 197–201) and Whitmarsh (1998: 107–13, 122–4).

⁹⁹ On the Second Sophistic as a 'postmodernist' culture, see Whitmarsh (2005a: 9, 2011: 8), Nasrallah (2008: 533–65), and Praet (2011). On the ancient Greek novel in particular as such an 'unstable' genre defying essentialist moral readings, see Goldhill (1995).

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. Paulsen (1992: 139–41). See Liviabella Furiani (1996a: 307–8, 311–12, 322, 332–3) on dissimulation through body language.

¹⁰¹ In general the expression of emotions is limited to isolated settings, whose importance is often explicitly highlighted (*ἰδίᾳ καὶ παντὸς ἀπηλλαγμένοι*, 5.4.4; *χωρισθείσης καιρὸν ἢ μόνωσις*, 7.14.4; *μόνος*, 7.25.3). In addition, blushing is often depicted as a response to a public revelation of what is meant to remain hidden or private (*μόνην πρὸς μόνον*... *ἐρυθριᾶν*, 1.10.4; *ἡρυθρίων*... *θεωρόν*, 2.7.1; *ἐρυθριῶσα*... *κρύπτειν*, 4.10.4; *ἐρυθριῶσαν*... *λάθαι*, 5.34.2; *Ἐρυθρία*... *ἐν οἷς κατείληπτο ἐννοοῦσα*, 6.9.4).

Another similar technique instrumental in the public performance of character is physical disguise.¹⁰² What these two techniques have in common is that they not only explore the importance of conscious dissimulation but simultaneously thematize the ability to read and expose it. In terms of both body language and physical disguise, that is, construction and deconstruction of performance are simultaneously thematized. Moreover, the reader is invited to read them both as non-verbal instantiations of *rhetorical* activity, so the terminology adopted often calls to mind the rhetorical contrivances used elsewhere and evokes the split between emotions or intentions on the one hand and external display or performance on the other. As we have seen, such a split characterizes the protagonists' speeches as well.

Theagenes' self-presentation during a banquet in Delphi is a case in point. He visibly suffers from his lovestruck condition (he stares into space, sighs deeply, is gloomy, and seems to be lost in thought, 3.10.4), but is nevertheless careful to adopt (*μεταπλάττων*, 3.10.4) a more cheerful expression. Theagenes' conscious adoption of particular body language, then, is presented as a *plasma*, a term used throughout the novel to refer also to rhetorical dissimulation. Its use here aligns Theagenes' performance with, for example, Chariclea's rhetorical performance in the Thyamis episode (*τὸ πλάσμα*, 1.26.5). But, unlike the latter, Theagenes' *plasma* is immediately exposed as such: Calasiris, who narrates this episode, observes that Theagenes keeps up the *pretence* (*ἐνεδείκνυτο*, 3.10.4) of being in high spirits and *forces* himself (*ἐβιάζετο*) to be hospitable to his guests. Again, the presence of an element of violent force (*bia*) connects Theagenes' performance with performances where rhetorical persuasion is also presented as such a force (for example 10.33.4: *βιασθείσα*).¹⁰³ Calasiris makes it clear that Theagenes is unable to disguise his true condition to him (*ἡλίσκετο . . . πρὸς ἐμοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν ὅποι φέροιτο*, 3.10.4). The *uncontrolled* aspects of Theagenes' body language reveal his true disposition, which he attempts to hide by consciously moulding his body language.¹⁰⁴ This episode, then, like others,¹⁰⁵ explores not only the construction of performance, but also its deconstruction.

¹⁰² On disguise as a strategy of deceit in ancient fiction, see de Carlos Villamarín (1990: 248–9).

¹⁰³ See also 3.19.1, where Chariclea, sick with love for Theagenes, forces herself (*ἐβιάζετο*) to assume a normal countenance and way of speaking as soon as she realizes Calasiris' presence.

¹⁰⁴ On Theagenes' attempt to hide his feelings as an indication of *paideia*, see M. Jones (2012: 53–5). Liviabella Furiani (1996a: 300, 303–4) briefly touches upon the distinction between voluntary and involuntary body language. On blushing as an instance of involuntary body language, see Lateiner (1998: 163–89, esp. 163–9).

¹⁰⁵ Another example occurs in 7.17.1, where the protagonists feign normality of bearing and expression (which is again cast as bodily *plasma*; *πρὸς τὸ σύννητες σχῆμα καὶ βλέμμα διαπλάττειν*) to hide their grief from Cybele, but are unsuccessful (*οὐ μὴν ἔλαθον*). Similar examples are found in 8.13.3 (the protagonists' exposed dissimulation before Bagoas) and 2.12.5–13.4 (Thermouthis' exposed dissimulation before Theagenes).

Both the rhetorical overtones and the simultaneous presence of construction and deconstruction also inform the realm of physical disguise. Thus, Theagenes' plan that he and Chariclea should disguise themselves as beggars (ἐαυτοὺς μεταπλάσαντες, 2.19.1)¹⁰⁶ in order not to attract attention highlights the importance of identity construction and self-presentation as a survival skill. The narrator again presents this ruse as an instance of rhetorical self-fashioning when referring to Chariclea's adoption of it as a *plasma* (τὸ πλάσμα, 6.11.3) and a *hypokrisis* (τῆς ὑποκρίσεως, 6.12.1), which is, of course, a common denomination for a rhetorical performance or *actio*.¹⁰⁷ Chariclea herself is also rhetorically conscious of this instance of identity construction, as is shown by similar rhetorical terminology in her own speech (τέχνην, 6.10.1; πλαττώμεθα τὸ σχῆμα, 6.10.2).

The rhetorical overtones in this passage are further documented metaphorically by the fact that Theagenes' ruse, and Chariclea's adoption of it, evoke two *exempla*. The first of these is Apollo, evoked by the reappearance of Chariclea's bow and quiver, which she now takes off as part of this ruse (τὸ . . . τόξον καὶ τὴν φαρέτραν, 5.5.4).¹⁰⁸ This evocation by means of the bow and quiver is implicit in the opening scene (see p. 259), but this time Theagenes explicitly connects the bow with Apollo, referring to it as 'the special attribute of the god they serve'; θεοῦ τοῦ κρατούντος ὄπλον οἰκείωτάτον). As in the opening scene, the figure of Apollo marks resourcefulness. The connection between Apollo and this quality is further highlighted by the fact that another ruse in this episode evokes the same god: in order to communicate secretly and to keep track of each other if separated, they choose 'the Pythian' ('ὁ Πυθικός' for Theagenes, and 'ἡ Πυθιάς' for Chariclea; 5.5.1) as a code name (σύμβολα, 5.4.7), which is, of course, one of the traditional epithets of Apollo.

The second *exemplum* highlighting the rhetorical overtones in this passage is Odysseus, who, upon his return to Ithaca, is famously disguised as a beggar in a scene that emphatically thematizes his rhetorical qualities: he fabricates a long fiction about his past adventures (οὐδ' . . . ἀληθέα εἶπε, 13.254), and his cunning, stealthiness, craftiness, and 'softness of speech' are explicitly addressed by the narrator as well as Athena (πολυκερδέα, 13.255;

¹⁰⁶ Perkins (1999: 201) briefly touches upon this episode as an illustration of the performative aspect of identity.

¹⁰⁷ And not only for a theatrical performance, as noted by Paulsen (1992: 22).

¹⁰⁸ The narration of Theagenes' ruse is divided between two different passages (2.19 and 5.5). The fact that both passages deal with the same event is clearly indicated. The first episode takes place in a cave (τοῦ σπηλαίου, 2.18.1) at dawn (ἄμα ἡλίου, 2.19.3) immediately before Thermouthis and Cnemon leave and cross a nearby lake (τὴν λίμνην περαιωθέντες ἐχώρου). The narrator then relates their journey, which eventually leads Cnemon to Calasiris. Only after his long embedded narrative does the narrator return in a flashback to the protagonists, who have been left alone in the cave (Μόνοι . . . κατὰ τὸ σπήλαιον ὑπελείποντο, 5.4.4) after Cnemon's and Thermouthis' departure (τὴν λίμνην διέπλευσαν, 5.4.3) at dawn (ἑωρι).

κερδαλέος... ἐπίκλοπος... δόλοισι... ποικιλομήτα, δόλων ἄτ', 13.291–3; ἐπητής... ἀγχίνοος, 13.332). This epic scene is strongly connected with Heliodorus' episode of disguise. First, Chariclea's disguise consists of a number of attributes verbally echoing that of Odysseus (ῥάκεσιν... ῥυπώντος... πήραν, 6.11.3; ῥάκος... ῥυπόωντα... πήρην, *Od.* 13.434–7).¹⁰⁹ Secondly, both scenes occur at the beginning of the second half of the narrative, when the long homodiegetic narration (by Odysseus and Calasiris respectively) has ended and the overarching narrative has been resumed. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' disguise marks the beginning of his plan (μῆτιν, 13.386) to defeat the suitors and be reunited with his wife (both elements are anticipated repeatedly in this episode: 376–81, 383–91, 402–3). In the novel, similarly, the episode marks the beginning of Chariclea's quest for Theagenes (ἀναζητητέον... τὸν Θεαγένην, 6.9.5).

The analogy builds on earlier allusions, such as Theagenes' emphatic alignment with Odysseus when he presents as a future recognition token before they split up the scar on his knee that he got hunting boar (οὐλὴν... ἐπὶ τοῦ γόνατος ἐκ θήρας σὺς, 5.5.2), which recalls Euryclea's recognition of Odysseus by the same means (*Od.* 19.392–475).¹¹⁰ The epic model is picked up again at Chariclea and Theagenes' reunion, when Theagenes is unable to recognize Chariclea because of her disguise (ὄψιν... ῥυπῶσαν, 7.7.6), which echoes Penelope's inability to recognize Odysseus in beggars' clothes (*Od.* 23.94–5).¹¹¹ The paradigmatic character of the failure of the protagonists to recognize each other is highlighted by the irony lurking behind their explicit assumption that, when reunited, 'it would be enough (ἀρκεῖν) simply to lay eyes on one another (ὀφθῆναι), for all eternity would be too short a time to efface the tokens of recognition that love had engraved upon their hearts' (τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ ἐρωτικά γνωρίσματα, 5.5.2). Theagenes' subsequent inability to recognize Chariclea when they are, in fact, reunited destabilizes their assumption and brings out more poignantly the Odyssean intertext as a guiding principle.

Just as in the overtly rhetorical Thyamis episode, then, the evocation of Apollo as a paradigm of resourcefulness and inventiveness is accompanied by the evocation of Odysseus and Penelope. At first sight, all three seem to reinforce each other as paradigms of rationality, cunning, and intelligence. However, the deliberate and conscious identity construction as thematized in this episode is again dealt with in an ambiguous way. Theagenes' ruse, that is, is immediately deconstructed. Cnemon highlights the implausibility of physically beautiful people passing as beggars by ironically stating that their faces

¹⁰⁹ See also Paulsen (1992: 163).

¹¹⁰ Morgan (2008a: 449 n. 129).

¹¹¹ See also Paulsen (1992: 52). On disguise and recognition in the epic model, see Bierl (2004: 105–7).

are ‘hideously ugly’ (τῶν ὀφειῶν σφόδρα διεστραμμένως, 2.19.1) like those of beggars. He further remarks that beggars like them ‘would not ask for scraps but for swords and cauldrons’ (οὐκ ἀκόλους ἀλλ’ ἄοράς τε καὶ λέβητας αἰτῆσειν), which verbally recalls and inverts Melanthius’ description of Odysseus as ‘begging only for scraps, never for swords or cauldrons’ (αἰτίζων ἀκόλους, οὐκ ἄορας οὐδὲ λέβητας, *Od.* 17.222).¹¹² Whereas Theagenes’ ruse associates the protagonists with Odysseus, Cnemon explicitly dissociates them from this paradigm.

This example illustrates two important strands underlying character construction in Heliodorus. First, the attention repeatedly drawn to deconstruction as well as construction of self-presentation highlights the problematic nature of any conscious adoption or creation of a certain identity, as it is characterized by limits and restrictions. This observation fits into a wider background of authorial deconstruction of consciously constructed self-presentations of various characters.¹¹³ Secondly, it illustrates the fact that such conscious identity construction often adopts paradigms as a main technique. However, as Cnemon’s mocking remark indicates, such paradigms are not unambiguous in themselves and infuse identity construction with ambiguity. I take the second of these strands first.

One passage in Heliodorus explicitly addresses the hermeneutic ambiguity informing the use of *exempla*. When Chariclea is visibly suffering after falling in love with Theagenes, her father Charicles consults Calasiris about her behaviour.¹¹⁴ The latter says that Chariclea has been struck by the evil eye (ὀφθαλμὸν τινα βάσκανον, 3.7.2), an affliction attracted by extreme physical beauty.¹¹⁵ Since Charicles is sceptical at first, Calasiris adduces two parallels from the animal kingdom to support his point that eye contact is likely to transmit disease (3.7.4–8.2).¹¹⁶ As a result, Charicles is persuaded and compliments Calasiris for having solved the problem ‘in an extremely wise and convincing way’ (σοφώτατα καὶ πιστικώτατα, 3.9.1). This reaction clearly presents the *exempla* as inductive tools of persuasion, an important function of *exempla* in ancient rhetorical theory from Aristotle onwards.¹¹⁷ However, this passage also infuses their use with ambiguity. On the one hand, Calasiris inserts the examples in a gnomological elaboration that claims to convey

¹¹² Morgan (2008a: 391 n. 43).

¹¹³ Paulsen (1992: 85–141, 143–94, 195–200) convincingly argues that Cnemon, Calasiris, and Charicles self-consciously cast themselves in tragic overtones, but that this self-presentation is subsequently deconstructed by comic associations foregrounded by the author. See also Baumbach (1997, 2008: 174–8) on Calasiris’ ambivalent self-presentation.

¹¹⁴ This passage is also discussed in De Temmerman and Demoen (2011: 6–7).

¹¹⁵ See Yatromanolakis (1988). On the use of Plutarch’s account of the evil eye in this passage, see Dickie (1991).

¹¹⁶ One of these examples is explicitly presented as such: παραδείγματος (3.8.1).

¹¹⁷ See Demoen (1997: 129–31) on the *exemplum* as a type of proof (πίστις/probatio).

general truths about the infectious power of gazing. But he also makes it clear to Charicles that this theory also explains the origin of love (ἡ τῶν ἐρώτων γένεσις, 3.7.5). Accordingly, the reader recognizes Chariclea's behaviour as a topical novelistic representation of lovesickness.¹¹⁸ And indeed, in his first person narration, Calasiris makes it clear to Cnemon that Chariclea's behaviour is the result of lovesickness (τῷ ἔρωτι, 3.7.1). However, in his explanation addressed to Charicles, he discusses love only in general terms along with eye diseases and silently passes over Chariclea's case.¹¹⁹ Consequently, while tantalizingly providing Charicles with all the clues needed to diagnose his daughter's behaviour correctly, he leads him to believe that she has been afflicted with the evil eye rather than love.¹²⁰ Charicles' interpretation of the *exempla*, then, differs from that of the reader, so that this episode seems to highlight the hermeneutically ambiguous character of inductive logic in general and implicitly encourages the reader to approach critically any argumentation based on paradigms. Furthermore, Calasiris' comment that he adduces one of the *exempla* from 'holy books on animals' (βίβλοις ἱεραῖς ταῖς περὶ ζώων ἀνάγραφτον, 3.8.1) might be read as a metaliterary marker that makes this *exemplum* (and its ambiguity) emblematic of other *exempla* in the novels that draw upon literature in general.

The problematic character of argumentation based on paradigms and aimed at identity construction is highlighted in the case of Theagenes.¹²¹ As is commonly known, Theagenes is repeatedly cast as an epic hero throughout the novel.¹²² It is worth noting, however, that this role is, at least partially, constructed for Theagenes by *himself*. An example is Theagenes' encounter with Calasiris in Delphi, which is also his earliest appearance in the history of the narrative. Calasiris, who recounts this episode, makes it clear that, according to Charicles, Theagenes is the leader of the Aenianians and *prides himself* on being a descendant of Achilles (Ἀχιλλείδης . . . εἶναι σεμνύνεται, 2.34.4). The validity of this self-presentation is corroborated in a number of instances. Charicles, for example, confirms that Theagenes does indeed strike him as a truly worthy descendant of Achilles (ἀληθῶς ἔδοξε τοῖς Ἀχιλλείδαις ἐμπρέπειν), citing his beauty and size as proofs (τοιούτος ἐστι τὴν μορφήν καὶ τοσοῦτος ἰδεῖν τὸ μέγεθος).¹²³ Moreover,

¹¹⁸ See Létoublon (1993: 145–8) on the topical representation of lovesickness in the novels (and 146–7 on Chariclea in particular). See also Paulsen (1992: 173) on Calasiris' knowledge of Chariclea's condition.

¹¹⁹ Calasiris' ambivalent style of communication is also acknowledged by Paulsen (1992: 174).

¹²⁰ On Calasiris' deception of Charicles in this episode, see Goldhill (2001: 170–2). On Calasiris' characterization as a cunning and charlatanesque deceiver in general, see n. 138.

¹²¹ Part of this discussion of Theagenes has appeared in De Temmerman (2012d: 165–9).

¹²² See Paulsen (1992: 47–53).

¹²³ The combination of beauty and size is often said to characterize Theagenes. Charicles' words verbally echo Theagenes' introduction into the story, where the brigands focalize him identically (τοιούτος τὴν μορφήν καὶ τοσοῦτος τὸ μέγεθος, 1.3.6). His size and beauty are also highlighted by various other characters, such as an anonymous woman in Bessa (6.13.1) and an Ethiopian crowd (10.9.1).

the association seems to be echoed by his remarkable victory in a foot race a little later (4.3.3–4.1), which recalls Achilles' 'swift-footedness', an epithet abundantly present in the *Iliad* (πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς, *Il.* 1.58, 1.84, 1.148, etc.).¹²⁴ Not only does Theagenes claim that no one has ever defeated him in a foot race (ποοσί, 4.2.3),¹²⁵ but the narrator also compares him with Achilles as depicted by Homer during his battle with the Scamander (οἶον Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τὴν ἐπὶ Σκαμάνδρῳ μάχην ἀθλοῦντα παρίστησιν, 4.3.1). In this episode, Achilles' swift-footedness is, indeed, repeatedly mentioned (ποδάρκης, *Il.* 21.49; 21.149). Moreover, the narrator explicitly adduces the splendour of Theagenes' appearance as a *tertium comparationis* ('an august, magnificent sight', σεμνόν τι θέαμα καὶ περίβλεπτον), which echoes the equal attention drawn to Achilles' physical beauty in the Iliadic episode (καλὸς τε μέγας, *Il.* 21.108).¹²⁶ Finally, Achilles' legendary impulsiveness¹²⁷ may be recalled in the depiction of Theagenes' body language before the start of the race: he pants in his eagerness (ἀσθμαίνων) to begin and is so impatient that he can hardly wait for the starter's signal (ἄκων καὶ μόγισ ἀναμένων).

On the other hand, the evocation of Achilles' battle with the Scamander complicates Theagenes' self-presentation, as that incident shows Achilles' impulsiveness taken to dangerously uncontrolled extremes. It primarily depicts his raging fury and the insatiable bloodthirstiness with which he kills his enemies and thematizes the morally unacceptable and personally pernicious consequences of this behaviour. What is more, in another connection with the novelistic episode, it enacts these consequences through a *foot race*.¹²⁸ The river first verbally reproaches Achilles for committing terrible acts (*Il.* 21.214) and damming the water with corpses (*Il.* 21.218), but soon attacks him physically with giant waves (*Il.* 21.240). Achilles becomes filled with fear (δρείσας, *Il.* 21.248), jumps out of the river, and flees at great speed across the plain (ἐκ δύνης ἀνορούσας // ἤϊξεν πεδίοιο ποσὶ κραιπνοῖσι πέτεσθαι, *Il.* 21.246–7), with the river rushing after him (ὦρτο δ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ, *Il.* 21.248). Despite his fleetness of foot, which is repeatedly mentioned (ἀπόρουσεν, *Il.* 21.251; λαυφηρὸν ἐόντα,

¹²⁴ See also Paulsen (1992: 48). As M. Jones (2006: 551–2) points out, Theagenes' name, his connection with Achilles, and his depiction as an excellent runner all evoke a famous athlete of the 5th cent. bc who is said by Pausanias to have had 'the ambition . . . to rival Achilles by winning a prize for running' (6.11.4–5; trans. M. Jones). On the tendency to attribute heroic status to athletes in general, see C. P. Jones (2010: 38–41).

¹²⁵ Calasiris also refers to Theagenes' swift-footedness (ὀξὺς δραμεῖν, 4.6.5).

¹²⁶ In this respect, Theagenes' depiction in full armour (τὴν πανοπλίαν ἐνδύς, 4.3.1) may also recall Achilles' 'beautiful weapons' (τὰ τεύχεα καλά, *Il.* 21.317).

¹²⁷ On impulsiveness as a legendary characteristic of Achilles, see Birchall (1996a: 148).

¹²⁸ Most commentators do not know what to make of the comparison between Theagenes and Achilles fighting the Scamander. Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1960: 4 n. 2) call it 'arbitraire', which is echoed by Paulsen (1992: 48), according to whom there is no suitable *tertium comparationis*, except perhaps the overall splendour of the two heroes' appearance. Only Morgan (1998a: 75) seems to have noticed that this is the only Iliadic episode where Achilles makes use of his fleetness of foot by running away from a superior adversary.

Il. 21.264) and emphasized by comparison with an eagle, the flood always overtakes and disables him (*αἰεὶ Ἀχιλλῆα κιχήσατο κύμα ῥόοιο*, *Il.* 21.263; *ὑπὸ γούνατ' ἐδάμνα // . . . κονίην δ' ὑπέρεπτε ποδοῖν*, *Il.* 270–1). Only when Achilles receives help from the gods (*Il.* 21.285–97 and 357–60) is the river god forced to cease the attack and acknowledge defeat.

The prominence of Theagenes' claimed descent from Achilles aligns him with Alexander the Great, whose descent from the epic hero is a famous commonplace in ancient literary sources.¹²⁹ Diodorus Siculus aligns precisely the Iliadic episode of the Scamander chasing Achilles with Alexander's narrow escape from death in a shipwreck on confluent rivers and mentions that the latter's subsequent sacrifice to the gods reflects that 'he, like Achilles, had done battle with a river' (17.97.3). However, whereas the historiographical passage clearly parades the similarity between Alexander and Achilles, the narrator in Heliodorus illustrates Theagenes' victory by evoking an episode which implicitly features an important *difference* between Theagenes and his fleet-footed paradigm. Unlike Theagenes, Achilles *loses* the race against the river and has to beg the gods for help to avoid drowning (273–83). On an implicit level, the evoked episode is no longer an *exemplum e simili*, but an *exemplum e contrario*. At the level of the *Ernstbedeutung*,¹³⁰ moreover, this episode may be taken to function as an early indication that, like Achilles, Theagenes will one day become the victim of his own impulsiveness. I will return to this point but, for now, it suffices to note that the problematic undertones in the evoked Iliadic episode offer an illustration of how the association between Theagenes and Achilles is not only constructed but also *deconstructed*.

This instance of deconstruction is part of a wider problematization of Theagenes' self-association with Achilles, which begins as soon as Calasiris (and the reader) hears about it. First, Theagenes provides a genealogy of the Aenianians which casts them as possessing the noblest ancestry in the whole of Thessaly and as 'Hellenes in the truest sense of the word' (*Θετταλικῆς . . . μοίρας τὸ εὐγενέστατον καὶ ἀκριβῶς Ἑλληνικόν*, 2.34.2). As Whitmarsh (1998: 101–3) observes, however, this representation ironically deviates from the overall historical obscurity of the Aenianians, who were a minor political group mentioned only occasionally in classical literature and reduced to the merest footnote in Greek literature after that.¹³¹ It is tempting to interpret this incongruity as an indication of the possible

¹²⁹ D. S. 17.1.4, Plu. *Alex.* 2.1. See Mossman (1988: 83). On imperial reworkings of Homeric characterization, see G. Miles (2004) and Kim (2008).

¹³⁰ On the *Ernstbedeutung* of *exempla*, see p. 172.

¹³¹ See also Whitmarsh (2011: 125 n. 103) on their only appearance in Homer (*Il.* 2.749) and Strabo's emphasis on their obscurity (9.4.11, 9.5.22).

untrustworthiness of Theagenes, especially since this characteristic is traditionally attributed to Thessalians.¹³²

The deconstruction of Theagenes' self-presentation can also be supported by the observation that, in fact, other characters' perception of him is at times significantly different from his own. Calasiris, for example, initially doubts the plausibility of his Achillean descent: he is surprised (*θαυμάσαντος*, 2.34.5) that a man of the race of the Aenianians proclaims himself a son of Achilles, who has been known from Homer onwards to have come from Phthia. In response, Charicles lists the arguments that Theagenes himself adduces. This list, aiming as it does at substantiating Theagenes' claim, conspicuously draws attention to the fact that the alignment with Achilles is far from self-evident. It requires explanation, proof, and justification, as the technical rhetorical vocabulary in Charicles' exposition indicates (*διατεινόμενος*, 2.34.5; *τεκμήριον*, 2.34.7). This is further underlined by the fact that these arguments do *not* convince Calasiris: he laconically concludes that he does not want to challenge the Thessalians' claims, 'be they true or be they simply wishful thinking' (*ἢ χαρίζεσθαι ταῦτα ἢ καὶ ἐπαληθεύειν*, 2.34.8). It is only when Calasiris *sees* Theagenes with his own eyes that he admits that he really has 'something redolent of Achilles about him in his expression and dignity' (*Ἀχίλλειόν τι τῷ ὄντι πνέων καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνῳ τὸ βλέμμα καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ἀναφέρων*, 2.35.1). Accordingly, he makes it clear to Chariclea that Theagenes seems to be speaking the truth (*ἐπαληθεύειν ἔοικεν*, 4.5.5) when claiming Achillean descent. However, even this confirmation is immediately made problematic. First, Calasiris, like Charicles earlier, adduces size and beauty as *tertia comparationis* (*τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει*, 4.5.5), but, as Whitmarsh (1998: 103) observes, the *Aethiopica* as a whole exemplifies precisely the principle that one need not resemble one's ancestors. Secondly, Calasiris also *qualifies* the association of Theagenes with Achilles. He draws attention, that is, to some important *differences* between them. For one thing, Theagenes does *not* have the same arrogance as Achilles (*οὐχ ὑπέρφρων οὐδὲ ἀγήνωρ*); he has a sweetness that softens his pride (*τῆς διανοίας τὸν ὄγκον ἡδύτητι καταπραΰνων*). Calasiris' words echo Diomedes' characterization of Achilles as arrogant (*ἀγήνωρ*, *Il.* 9.699), and thus consciously present Achilles as an example *e contrario* rather than one *e simili*. Moreover, Calasiris' qualification of Theagenes as 'not arrogant' playfully recalls his first encounter with him, where Achilles as a paradigm is explicitly evoked (*Ἀχίλλειον*, 2.35.1) and characterized by body language that shows traces of arrogance:

He carried his head erect (*ὀρθὸς τὸν αὐχένα*), and had a mane of hair swept back from his forehead (*ἀπὸ τοῦ μετώπου τὴν κόμην πρὸς τὸ ὄρθιον ἀναχαιτίζων*); his

¹³² See Whitmarsh (1998: 103 n. 47) for references. On Theagenes as 'un pur Grec', on the other hand, see Létoublon (1992: 88–9).

nose proclaimed his courage by the defiant flaring of his nostrils (ἡ ῥὶς ἐν ἐπαγγελία θυμοῦ καὶ οἱ μυκτῆρες ἐλευθέρως τὸν ἀέρα εἰσπνέοντες); his eyes were not quite slate blue but more black tinged with blue, with a gaze that was haughty (σοβαρόν) and yet not unattractive (οὐκ ἀνέραστον), rather like the sea when its swelling billows subside, and a smooth calm begins to spread across its surface (οἶον θαλάσσης ἀπὸ κύματος εἰς γαλήνην ἄρτι λεαινομένης). (2.35.1)

This passage is crammed with details about Theagenes' physical appearance that in physiognomic treatises are associated with courage and *andreia*.¹³³ Indeed, Theagenes' body language as self-consciously indicating courage, defiance, and haughtiness (θυμοῦ, ἐλευθέρως, σοβαρόν) seems to contradict Calasiris' downplaying of his arrogance. However, read against the background of Diomedes' explicit characterization, this body language may suggest that, during his first encounter with Calasiris, Theagenes *tries* to behave like Achilles in order to corroborate his verbal claims to Achillean ancestry. The self-consciousness of this behaviour may again evoke the famous Achillean dimension of the figure of Alexander the Great, whose sacrifices for, and visit to, the tomb of, among others, Achilles may also be read as public acts affirming his lineage.¹³⁴ But in Theagenes' case, Calasiris' observation of the *difference* between Theagenes and his epic paradigm immediately undermines the credibility of his self-presentation. It highlights the simultaneous presence of both association and dissociation, of construction and deconstruction. This simultaneity is even more highlighted by the interplay between the paradigms of Achilles and Odysseus underlying the *ecphrasis* of Theagenes. On the one hand, the description corroborates the alignment of Theagenes and Achilles since it evokes Philostratus' descriptions of Achilles in the *Heroicus* (19.5) and the *Imagines* (2.2).¹³⁵ On the other hand, the description also contains intertextual elements connecting Theagenes not with Achilles but with Odysseus: the nose and nostrils as a physical feature indicating courage, for example, echo the depiction of Odysseus when he sees his father in Hades (*Od.* 24.318–19).¹³⁶ Theagenes' introduction into the narrative history, then, is marked by the simultaneous presence of both Achilles and Odysseus. This once again destabilizes Theagenes' self-presentation and exposes it as problematic: it is not absolute or linear, but leaves room for differences, incongruities, and significant divergences. The association of the two characters,

¹³³ M. Jones (2012: 120–1) gives the references. On the physiognomic importance of this passage, see also Evans (1969: 72 n. 51) and also Morgan (1998a: 67) on Theagenes' arrogance in particular (and Vogt 2006: 274 on the physiognomic depiction of arrogance).

¹³⁴ Mossman (1988: 83).

¹³⁵ See also Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1994: 95 n. 1) and Morgan (2008a: 408 n. 75).

¹³⁶ 'Then the heart (θυμός) of Odysseus was stirred, and up through his nostrils (ἀνὰ ῥίνας) shot a sharp strength (δριμύ μένος) as he beheld his dear father'. See also Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1994: 95 n. 2).

that is, is a relative and nuanced concept. It is clear that Theagenes' own self-presentation is not the whole story.

Just as with Chariton's Chaereas, scholars have taken Theagenes' association with Achilles to be a marker of idealism.¹³⁷ But as has already been touched upon in my discussion of the evocation of Achilles' battle with the Scamander, the novel also explores impulsiveness as one of the more problematic *tertia comparationis* of this association. Theagenes' impulsive behaviour is frequently emphasized, from his earliest appearance in the history of the narrative onwards. He is introduced to Calasiris by a messenger who explicitly highlights the impatience (πάλαι δι' ὄχλου, 2.34.1) with which he has been asking for a priest to perform a ceremony. This characteristic repeatedly resurfaces in the remainder of the story (λιπαρῶς ἐγκείμενος, 2.6.2; ἄκων καὶ μόγις ἀναμένων, 4.3.1; ὠδίνων, 10.31.3) and is particularly emphasized by Calasiris' description of Theagenes' love for Chariclea. Whereas Chariclea is repeatedly depicted at home, suffering from her emotions on her bed or a seat (ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνῆς, 3.7.1; ἐπὶ θώκου, 3.18.1) but not undertaking any action, Theagenes makes various attempts to approach her. As well as consulting Calasiris to seek his help (συνεργὸν . . . ληψόμενος, 3.16.2), he also makes direct attempts: he runs towards her at the Pythian tournament and deliberately (ἐξέπίτηδες, 4.4.2) falls into her arms, pretending (δῆθεν) to be unable to control his momentum, and even keeps watch at her house (4.6.3).

It is Theagenes' impulsiveness that Calasiris exploits in order to make him defenceless against his manipulation. As the reader knows well, from early in the Delphic episode onwards, Calasiris aims at manipulating both protagonists as part of his plan to take them from Delphi to Ethiopia, as was foretold by an oracle (2.35.5).¹³⁸ Theagenes' attempt to seek Calasiris' help (3.16.2) is emblematic of the power relations between them. Although he approaches Calasiris because he considers him instrumental in his plan to win over Chariclea,¹³⁹ Calasiris makes it clear that Theagenes' visit provides *him* with the perfect opportunity (καιρόν, 3.17.1) to establish control over the young man. Theagenes, indeed, is systematically depicted as an extremely naive victim

¹³⁷ This is one of the few points where I find myself in disagreement with M. Jones' (2012: 119–24) magisterial discussion. In her view, the paradigm of Achilles serves to highlight only Theagenes' *positive* qualities (p. 123: Theagenes 'is like Achilles, but better . . . Heliodorus seems to intend the reader to understand only the positive points of the comparison').

¹³⁸ See Sandy (1982b: 142–6), M. Jones (2004: 80–1), and Paulsen (1992: 172–84) on Calasiris as a manipulator and a cunning and charlatanesque deceiver. See Paulsen (1992: 178–83) on his manipulation of Theagenes and Chariclea in particular. On Calasiris as motor of (part of) the action, see Reardon (2001: 320–1).

¹³⁹ This is suggested by the fact that Theagenes is delighted (ἡδονῆς . . . ἐνεπλήσθη, 3.11.3) to find out that Calasiris is an Egyptian priest (because of the wisdom traditionally associated with Egypt and its inhabitants) and consequently takes pains to establish bonds of friendship. He drinks to their friendship (φιλίαν) and, when saying goodbye, embraces Calasiris 'with a warmth that belied the brevity of their acquaintance' (3.11.4).

of Calasiris' manipulation,¹⁴⁰ which is further underlined by Chariclea's much more sceptical attitude towards Calasiris.¹⁴¹ The idea, now, that it is his *impulsiveness* that makes him such an easy victim is particularly highlighted by his reaction to the news that Chariclea reciprocates his love. Characteristically, he immediately starts running to her house (ἄμα προέτρεχεν, 4.6.5). Calasiris stops him by grabbing his cloak (ἐπιλαβόμενος) and in jest refers to Theagenes' well-known talent for running (ὄξυς δραμεῖν). This reference to his victory in the foot race brings to the fore, once again, the figure of Achilles. However, whereas swift-footedness is the explicit *tertium comparationis* overtly adduced by Calasiris, the overall context unmistakably evokes Achilles' legendary impulsiveness. Calasiris explicitly exposes Theagenes' reaction as a lack of forethought and preparation (βουλῆς . . . διασκευῆς) and asserts that their undertaking is not one of plunder (ἄρπαγμα). This metaphorical depiction of Theagenes as a robber, of course, anticipates the protagonists' flight from Delphi a little later, which is engineered by Calasiris as a staged robbery,¹⁴² with Theagenes assigned the role of Chariclea's kidnapper. It is difficult, therefore, *not* to read Calasiris' words as a meta-comment on his own exploitation of Theagenes' impulsive behaviour. For the time being, his characterization of Theagenes' behaviour as something aligning him with a robber is no more than a metaphor, but soon his own plan will turn Theagenes into a *real* robber. As this episode points out, then, Theagenes shares with Achilles not only the characteristics of size, physical beauty, and speed, but he has also inherited his potentially dangerous impulsiveness, which is aptly exploited by Calasiris.

The consequences of Calasiris' exploitation of Theagenes' impulsiveness and his subsequent participation in the former's 'kidnapping' of Chariclea are notably far-reaching. Calasiris' staging of the flight from Delphi as a kidnapping leads Charicles and the other Delphians to curse Theagenes and his fellow-Thessalians as robbers (ἀναρπάζουσιν, 4.17.4; τὴν τῆς κόρης ἄρπαγὴν, 4.19.1) and criminals (τοὺς ἐξυβρικότας, 4.19.2; τῶν ἐξυβρισάντων, 4.19.7). And this is by no means the only consequence. In Delphi, the 'kidnapping'

¹⁴⁰ Examples are numerous. Calasiris makes Theagenes believe that supernatural powers allow him to divine that he is in love with Chariclea (he stages a 'theatrical piece of showmanship', makes 'meaningless calculations on my fingers, tossed my hair around, and pretended that the spirit was upon me', 3.17.1), which reduces him to a willing supplicant (3.17.3). Calasiris ensures even more dependence by contending that Chariclea is devoted to chastity (πρὸς ἔρωτα δύσμαχος, 3.17.5), and that 'all resources must be mobilized' (πάντα κινητέον) to win her over. In other words, he presents his own help as indispensable (ἐφ' ἡμᾶς . . . τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας . . . βιάζεσθαι, 3.17.5), although he knows that Chariclea is already in love with Theagenes (τῷ ἔρωτι, 3.7.1).

¹⁴¹ This contrast has often been noted. See, among others, Paulsen (1992: 180–2) and Brethes (2007b: 230).

¹⁴² Calasiris' role as the designer of the 'robbery' is repeatedly highlighted, for example in 4.17.2. Throughout the Delphi episode, the protagonists repeatedly acknowledge their dependence on Calasiris and promise to obey his instructions (τὰ δέοντα πείθεσθαι πράττειν . . . Ἐπηγγέλλετο ἅπαντα ποιήσειν ὡς ἂν ἐγὼ προστάττω, 3.17.5; πείθεσθαι καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἂν ὑφηγήσωμαι, 4.6.7; Τί . . . χρὴ ποιεῖν, 4.12.1; πειθομένη, 4.13.2; πείθομαι, τί χρὴ πράττειν, 4.13.3).

leads directly to the unanimous passing of a decree which reduces the public presence of holy acolytes, like Chariclea, in order to eliminate ‘for all time’ (τῶν ἐξῆς χρόνων, 4.21.1) the possibility of anyone ever committing such a crime again. This decree echoes the story of Echecrates, a Thessalian (like Theagenes!) who falls in love with a virgin pronouncing oracles at Delphi and rapes her.¹⁴³ As a result, the Delphians pass a law that in future not a virgin but an elderly woman dressed as a virgin should prophesy in the sanctuary. This story surely invites the reader to consider the historical impact of Theagenes’ behaviour. Clearly, he is bound to go down in Delphic history as an arch-criminal, a second Echecrates, for generations to come. Nor are the resonances of his criminal act restricted to Delphi. This becomes clear when at the end of the novel Charicles turns up in Meroe and even at that distance exposes Theagenes publicly as a robber (συλαγωγῆσας . . . ἀναρπάσας, 10.35.2; ἀποσυλῆσας, 10.36.3; Τὸν ἀποσυλῆσαντα, 10.36.5), an enemy, a violator, an offender, and a wretch (πολέμει . . . παλαμναῖε καὶ ἀλιτήριε, 10.35.1; ἀλάστορα, 10.36.4). The fact that Charicles’ appearance in Meroe acts as the closing part of the novel draws special attention to the fact that, even at this happy ending, Theagenes’ characterization is determined at least partially not by self-presentation but by a less than ideal image which circulates ‘out there’ beyond his own control and which has been imposed on him by the cunning of Calasiris.

5.4 MEROITIC PERFORMANCES

The closing episodes of the novel draw together the various strands of verbal rhetoric and its non-verbal instantiations (the latter of which I refer to hereafter as non-verbal rhetoric) explored in this chapter. What is more, they do so in a profoundly ambiguous way. In particular Chariclea’s conscious adoption of both in her self-performance is nowhere depicted more elaborately than in the episode of her arrival in Meroe and her parents’ subsequent recognition of her.¹⁴⁴

5.4.1 Non-verbal and verbal rhetoric

As an instance of non-verbal rhetoric, I begin with body language. From the first moment that Chariclea and Theagenes are brought before the king in Meroe to be sacrificed, the narrator draws special attention to their consciously

¹⁴³ The story is attested by D. S. 16.26.6. See also Hilton (1996: 192).

¹⁴⁴ See e.g. Whitmarsh (1998: 113–18), who describes Chariclea’s recognition as a ‘public performance of her genealogy’ (115).

adopted body language: Theagenes looks ‘less dejected’ (κατηφείς... ἐπ’ ἔλαττον, 10.7.3) than the other prisoners, and Chariclea’s countenance is radiant and smiling (φαιδρῶ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ μειδιῶντι). She stares so long and so hard at Persinna (συνεχές... καὶ ἀτενὲς εἰς τὴν Περσίνναν ἀφορώσα) that the queen suffers some distress (παθεῖν τι πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν). The impact of Chariclea’s body language on the queen is emphasized. She feels pity (ἐλεεινή, 10.7.4; ἡ ἀθλία, 10.7.5) because Chariclea reminds her of her own daughter, whom she judges to be more or less the same age. Her subsequent characterization of Chariclea recalls some of the qualities that she also addresses in the message on the waistband. She is struck, for example, by Chariclea’s noble expression (εὐγενὴς τὸ βλέμμα, 10.7.4) and the dignity with which she confronts her destiny (μεγαλόφρων πρὸς τὴν τύχην), which echoes the emphasis on *eugeneia* and *phronêma* in the message. Moreover, as soon as a chastity test has confirmed that Chariclea is a virgin, she praises her *sôphrosynê* (τῇ σωφροσύνῃ, 10.9.5), which again is one of the main concerns in her message. Persinna’s observation of all these characteristics arouses an emotion of grief in her more than it does in others (Πλέον... ἡνία) at the imminent sacrifice of the girl and she repeatedly asks Hydaspes to exempt her (10.7.5, 10.9.5). Chariclea’s body language, then, plays a crucial role in influencing Persinna’s emotional disposition as soon as they see each other.

It is suggested that Chariclea’s body language in this passage is part of her overall strategy to announce herself as Hydaspes’ and Persinna’s daughter. The rational choice in her body language is underlined by her explanation to Theagenes that maternal instinct (ἡ μητρῴα φύσις, 9.24.8) is an incontrovertible token of recognition (Ἀναντίρρητον γνώρισμα), which leads parents to feel affection (φιλόστοργον... πάθος) for their child the instant they set eyes on it (ἐκ πρώτης ἐντεύξεως).¹⁴⁵ When she subsequently decides publicly to announce herself as their daughter, her conscious use of her body is again highlighted. She explicitly acknowledges the crucial importance of this moment herself and produces from her pouch the robe that she used to wear as a priestess of Artemis in Delphi (τὸν ἐκ Δελφῶν ἱερὸν χιτῶνα, 10.9.3), which is ‘woven with gold thread and embroidered with rays’ (χρυσοῦφῃ... καὶ ἀκτίσι κατὰπαστον). She puts it on (ἐπεφέρετο), lets her hair fall free (τὴν... κόμην ἀνείσα), and runs forward like one possessed (οἶον κάτοχος).

The emphasis put on the conscious public exposure of her own beauty evokes a number of important associations. First, her beauty ‘blazes with a dazzling radiance’ (τῷ... κάλλει τότε πλέον ἐκλάμποντι καταστράπτουσα) and

¹⁴⁵ The validity of this assumption has already been proven by her first encounter with her father a little earlier, who is reported to be delighted (ᾗδετο, 9.1.3) at the sight of the young people (τῇ ὄψει τῶν νέων) and to feel ‘an instant attraction to his own flesh and blood (εὐμενὴς αὐτόθεν πρὸς τὰ ἴδια), as the prophetic intuition of his heart exerted its power over him’ (ὑπὸ [τοῦ] ματευτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς γνώμενος), although he did not know it himself (οὐκ εἰδώς).

causes a thrill of wonder (Θάμβος, 10.9.4) and astonishment (τοῦ θαύματος) in the crowd. Moreover, her appearance causes the crowd to pity her for her imminent sacrifice: the narrator makes it clear that they are sad (Ἐλύπει, 10.9.5) and would love to see her saved by some device (ἔκ τινος μηχανῆς). Chariclea, that is, establishes control over the crowd by merely appearing in front of them.¹⁴⁶ Such an open display of her beauty is contrasted with her habit (reminiscent of that of Chariton's Callirhoe) up to this point in the narrative of adopting a much more reticent body language in a potentially hostile environment¹⁴⁷—such as Meroe, with its imminent threat of human sacrifice. When, for example, she is bought as a slave by Nausicles and, after passing the night in isolation, led into a public space in his house, her body language is designed to hide herself from the outside world: she stands with her head bowed (κάτω νεύουσα, 5.11.1) and covers her eyes with a veil (τὸ πρόσωπον εἰς ὄφρὸν σκέπουσα). It is only when Nausicles assures her that there is nothing to be afraid of (θαρρεῖν παρακελευομένου) that she raises her head a little (μικρὸν ἀνένευσεν). Likewise, when taken captive by Thyamis, she stands 'inconspicuously' in the background (ὑπεσταλμένην, 1.28.1). On other occasions she often withdraws to private and hidden places to express her emotions.¹⁴⁸ At the moment of her self-declaration in Meroe, on the other hand, the introvert dynamic that has been informing her body language and behaviour is reversed; she now consciously displays her physical beauty.

Secondly, her deliberate display in this episode is given additional layers of meaning through intratextual metaphorical characterization: it clearly recalls other episodes in the novel where her dress is a clear marker of a conscious shift in self-presentation. It has been pointed out that the presence of this dress and its depiction verbally echo the opening scene (χρυσοῦφοῦς . . . τῆς ἐσθῆτος πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον ἀνταναγκάζουσας, 1.2.5) and the scene of the lovers' first encounter (χιτῶνα . . . ἀλουργὸν ποδήρη χρυσαῖς ἀκτίσι κατάπαστον ἡμφίεστο, 3.4.2).¹⁴⁹ Moreover, Chariclea puts on this Delphic robe (τὴν . . . ἐκ Δελφῶν ἱερὰν ἐσθῆτα ἡμφίεστο, 5.31.2) when confronting Pelorus in an episode immediately preceding the opening scene in the narrative history and aptly

¹⁴⁶ On beauty as an instrument of power in this novel, see Keul-Deutscher (1996: 325–9): 'die Macht der Schönheit'.

¹⁴⁷ See Morgan (1998a: 65–6) on the contrast between Chariclea's introverted way of dealing with her love and Arsace's much more dynamic and extrovert behaviour. On female introvert behaviour and silence in the novels, see M. J. Anderson (2009).

¹⁴⁸ When in love with Theagenes, for example, she is repeatedly depicted within the confines of her own lodgings (ἐπὶ τὴν . . . καταγωγὴν, 3.6.1; μόνην, 4.9.3). When he is missing, she leaves a public feast (χωρισθείσα μόνη, 6.8.3), withdraws to her favourite room (τὸ σύνθητες . . . δωμάτιον), and locks the doors securely to be sure that no one will disturb her (πρὸς οὐδενός . . . ὀχλείσθαι πιστεύουσα). Doody (2007: 38) touches upon the importance of isolation in this episode.

¹⁴⁹ Morgan (1998a: 71).

referred to as its ‘mirror scene’ by Dowden (1996: 277).¹⁵⁰ As in the opening scene and the Meroe episode, attention is drawn here to the interwoven golden thread flashing in the sun (*χρυσοῦφει στολῇ καταυγάζουσιν*). Calasiris, who narrates this episode to Cnemon, strongly suggests that she was instructed by him to wear this dress as part of his plan (*ἐννοίαν . . . φροντίσας*, 5.29.1) to thwart Trachinus’ marriage plans.¹⁵¹ He sends Pelorus to a ship where Chariclea is waiting for him and announces that he will ‘see Artemis herself’ (*αὐτὴν τὴν Ἀρτεμιν*, 5.31.1) in all her finery (*κεκόσμηται*). The reference to the goddess anticipates Chariclea’s appearance as focalized by Pelorus with her sacred Delphic robe—as she is also introduced to the reader in the opening scene of the novel (1.2.5)—as well as the demonstration of her archery skills in the battle resulting from Pelorus’ advances (5.32.3–4).

By the end of the fifth book, then, the reader realizes retrospectively that Chariclea’s Artemis-like appearance in the opening scene of the novel is the result of Calasiris’ stratagem. After five books, in which conscious self-presentation has been a major theme, Chariclea’s introduction to the reader in the opening sentences of the novel turns out to be the result of just such a conscious construction of identity. In this way, the end of the fifth book emphatically presents the figure of Chariclea, and her external appearance in particular, as the embodiment of ruse and conscious self-presentation. The laurel branch (*Δάφνη τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔσπετο*, 1.2.2), read in the opening scene as a mere attribute linking her with Apollo, now also comes to symbolize the victory in the battle whose results are depicted in the opening scene.¹⁵² The fact that this victory results from her use of the bow gives a new meaning to the alignment of this weapon, the laurel branch, and Apollo in the opening scene. Although her Delphic dress throughout the story aligns her with Artemis, whose priestess she is,¹⁵³ in the fifth book it also becomes a symbol of the conscious construction of identity and thus also evokes the characteristics of intelligence and resourcefulness hitherto associated with Apollo. The narrator takes pains to flesh out this connection by setting up an intertextual link between the Pelorus episode and the opening scene. Pelorus’ identification of Chariclea as his military reward (*τὸ γέρας*, 5.31.3) evokes the quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon over Bryseis, who is likewise referred to as *geras* in the opening episode of the *Iliad* (*τὸ . . . γέρας*, *Il.*

¹⁵⁰ Many verbal echoes connect the end of book 5 with the opening scene of the novel: indications concerning time (*ἡμέρας γενομένης*, 5.33.1; *Ἡμέρας ἄρτι διαγελώσης*, 1.1.1), Theagenes’ lifeless position at Chariclea’s feet (*ἴσα καὶ νεκρῷ προκείμενον*, 5.33.1; *προκείμενον . . . παρ’ ὀλίγον θανάτου*, 1.2.2–3), and Chariclea’s body language indicating that she is considering suicide (*βούλεσθαι . . . ἐπισφάττειν ἑαυτὴν ἐνδεκνυμένην*, 5.33.1; *δείξασα ἐπὶ τῶν γονάτων ξίφος*, 1.2.4).

¹⁵¹ He makes it clear, for example, that he explains to both protagonists what they have to do (5.30.1) and that they promise to do whatever he tells them (5.30.1).

¹⁵² Birchall (1996a: 85–6).

¹⁵³ See also Morgan (1998a: 71).

1.185).¹⁵⁴ The implicit presence of this Iliadic intertext, here at the end of the fifth book, aligns this episode with the opening scene of the novel, where it is first evoked by Chariclea's association with Apollo. Its reappearance brings to the fore the function of Apollo as a paradigm of the resourcefulness and intelligence underlying Chariclea's rhetorical self-presentation from the first book onwards. The connection between these characteristics and Chariclea's dress is further highlighted when she takes *off* this dress (μετημφίασεν ἐαυτήν, 5.5.4) as part of Theagenes' plan to disguise themselves as beggars (ἐαυτοὺς μεταπλάσαντες, 2.19.1)—another episode where we saw Apollo's presence highlighted (p. 279). She hides (λανθάνειν, 5.5.4) the dress, necklace, and laurel crown in a bag (from which she will produce them in Meroe; πηριδίῳ τινί, 5.5.4; ἐκ πηριδίου τινός, 10.9.3) and covers them with worthless stuff. Thus, as in the Pelorus episode, the dress again functions as an instrument in a deliberate change of public identity. By the end of book five, then, the dress has been firmly set up as embodying both Chariclea's Artemisian chastity and her Apollonian resourcefulness. Therefore, when she puts on the dress in the Meroe episode, the episodes evoked invite the reader to expect, once again, a manifestation of Artemisian and Apollonian characteristics, of chastity and (rhetorical) resourcefulness.

However, the Meroe episode has a final twist in store to be added to this imagery. Attention has been drawn to the fact that the scene of Chariclea's recognition is infused with profound ambiguity. As Morgan (1989*b*) aptly points out, in this episode the novelistic *topos* of the happy ending is treated with unparalleled indeterminacy. The reader is given clues to conjecture a happy ending but is simultaneously invited to consider the possibility that it may still go wrong until the very last page of the novel. To this effect, the narrator undermines readerly assumptions that draw upon common novelistic *topoi*. One of these is precisely the *topos* of chastity evoked when Chariclea undergoes the chastity test. The test will, indeed, prove her to be a virgin, but the novelistic *topos* of chastity is fundamentally perverted. On the one hand, the oracle in Delphi has suggested that the protagonists' chastity is a guarantee of a happy ending (τῇ περ ἀριστοβίων μέγ' ἀέθλιον ἐξάμονται, 2.35.5)—which, of course, meets the expectation of any generically attuned reader. On the other hand, such expectation is dashed when Hydaspes suddenly announces that, according to an Ethiopian custom, Chariclea will be sacrificed *only if* she is shown to be sexually pure (10.7.7).¹⁵⁵ At this point, then, the 'Artemisian' side of her character, highlighted since the first pages of the novel, turns out to be the main *obstacle* to a happy ending.

¹⁵⁴ On the Homeric resonances in this scene, see Paulsen (1992: 49).

¹⁵⁵ See Morgan (1989*b*: 302, 311) and Bretzigheimer (1999: 75).

Here, I argue that, parallel to such a deconstruction of the 'Artemisian' side of Chariclea's character, its 'Apollonian' side is similarly deconstructed in this episode. As foreshadowed by the appearance of her dress, her resourcefulness is amply demonstrated, as usual by a rhetorical performance. With this performance she aims at persuading Hydaspes and Persinna that, as their daughter, she is not a suitable victim for sacrifice in a ritual that traditionally requires foreign prisoners of war. However, the irony lies in the fact that, for once, such a performance will not suffice to avert danger. Morgan (1989b: 318) observes that in Chariclea's recognition 'the expected avenues of resolution are blocked' because Hydaspes refuses to accept the validity of Chariclea's arguments and her virgin modesty 'renders the otherwise formidable heroine incapable of making the confession that would save her lover's life'. This is correct as far as it goes, but I suggest that the reader is also invited to read these observations within a wider pattern that thematizes the neutralization of the power of rhetoric in this episode. One of the profound ironies in Chariclea's recognition scene is that the power of rhetoric, which she employs brilliantly to preserve her chastity throughout the novel, proves useless in her ultimate rhetorical challenge, namely convincing her father that she is who she is in order to avert the imminent sacrifice.

This irony is further enhanced by the fact that, in Chariclea's own view, the entire scene is pervaded by rhetorical significance. The possibility that rhetorical contrivance may *not* be the best course of action is suggested by Theagenes, who repeatedly encourages her to reveal straightforwardly her true identity to the king (9.24.3, 10.9.2). Theagenes, that is, argues for a neutralization of rhetorical power by equating words and reality. Such an equation has informed his course of action before, as we have seen, but what is especially important here is the marked contrast with Chariclea, who rejects his suggestion, arguing that the entire preceding story is a divinely contrived construction and emphasizing the need to await the right moment. She makes it clear that it would not be advantageous (*οὐ λυσιτελές*, 9.24.4) to reveal her identity *abruptly* (*εἰς ὁξὺν καιρόν*). In her view, the time is right only when Persinna and Sisimithres are present, as they are the only people who can testify to her true identity.

Her preference for a rhetorically contrived solution over a straightforward declaration of herself is clearly indicated by her rhetorically conscious elaboration of what she considers to be the importance of her two witnesses. She regards Sisimithres as a 'lawyer and collaborator' who can assist her recognition (*συνήγορόν τε καὶ συνεργόν... πρὸς τὸν ἀναγνωρισμόν*, 10.11.2). Her reference to Persinna as 'the key to the whole tangled web of complexity and recognition' (*ἐξ ἧς ἡ σύμπασα πλοκή τε καὶ ἀνεύρεσις*, 9.24.4) and 'the central figure of the story' (*τοῦ κεφαλαίου... τῆς ὅλης καθ' ἡμᾶς ὑποθέσεως*) is again pervaded by technical rhetorical vocabulary. First of all, the image of a story as a web (*πολυπλόκους... πλοκή*) firmly establishes the Aristotelian

image of ‘weaving’ (*plekô*) as a metaphor for an artfully contrived plot underlying a story (especially in tragedy).¹⁵⁶ Moreover, *kephalaion* is a common rhetorical term indicating a topic or heading in such stories. She also refers to her own story as a *hypothesis* (9.24.4), another conspicuously rhetorical term typically defining any discourse informed by a number of *circumstances* such as place, time, and character (as opposed to *thesis*, which lacks such circumstances), and therefore commonly used as a synonym for narrative.¹⁵⁷ Finally, the prominent place of the word *kataskeuê* in her statement that ‘great problems need great preparations’ (*μεγάλων . . . κατασκευῶν*, 9.24.3) draws attention to this word’s rhetorical resonances in designating any artistic treatment, elaboration, and even manipulation.

Her abundant emphasis on rhetorical significance is echoed in her actual speech to Hydaspes. She announces that she will adduce two types of evidence (*δύο τὰς μεγίστας ἀποδείξεις*, 10.12.4), which she further subdivides into documentary proof (*τὰς τε ἐγγράφους πίστεις*) and corroboration by witnesses (*τὰς ἐκ μαρτύρων βεβαιώσεις*). These are examples of what Aristotle calls ‘atechnical’ evidence (*πίστεις ἄτεχνοι*, *Rh.* 1.2.2). Moreover, her speech is also characterized by techniques aiming at aligning herself with her audience in general, and the king and queen in particular. Her opening words apostrophize the ‘gods and heroes who founded *our* race’ (*θεοί τε ἄλλοι καὶ ἥρωες γένους ἡμετέρου καθηγεμόνες*, 10.11.3) in general, and the Sun (*Ἥλιε*) in particular, to which she refers as the forefather of *her* ancestors (*γενεάρχῃ παρογόνων ἐμῶν*). This apostrophe not only takes into account the setting of the speech (with statues and pictures of these gods and heroes visibly displayed; *θεῶν . . . ἐγχωρίων ἀγάλματα καὶ ἡρώων εἰκόνες*, 10.6.3), but is primarily intended to align herself with the Ethiopian royal family, who, as the primary narrator explicitly mentions, regard these figures as their ancestors (*γενεάρχῃς ἐαυτῶν*). It also echoes the identification of the sun as her ancestor as she has read it in Persinna’s letter in Delphi (*ὁ γενεάρχῃς ἡμῶν Ἥλιος*, 4.8.2). Chariclea’s first words, then, anticipate not only her claim to be an Ethiopian (made explicit in 10.11.3, *ἐμὲ . . . ὕμεδαπὴν τε καὶ ἐγχώριον εὐρήσεις*) but also her self-presentation as being of royal blood (*γένους τοῦ βασιλείου τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐγγύτατα*, 10.12.1) and even Hydaspes’ and Persinna’s daughter (*θυγατέρα τὴν σὴν*).

Despite Chariclea’s resolutely conscious approach and the careful alignment of herself with her parents through their common ancestry, it will *not* be her speech that persuades Hydaspes. The irony is highlighted when, in an attempt to convince Theagenes of the importance of Persinna and Sisimithres’ presence, she depicts the scenario she judges likely to unfold if the truth about them were revealed too early (*προχείρως*, 9.24.6):

¹⁵⁶ Arist. *Po.* 1456^a9. See also LSJ.

¹⁵⁷ See H. Lausberg (1998: §§1135.2, 1137.1, 398).

then we run a risk of unwittingly annoying (παροξύναντες) our hearer and becoming the objects of his justifiable anger (ὀργήν), for he [Hydaspes] might well think it wicked claptrap (χλεύην . . . καὶ ὕβριν) for a couple of prisoners marked out for slavery (αἰχμάλωτοι καὶ δουλεύειν ἀποκεκληρωμένοι) to concoct some incredible fiction (πεπλασμένοι καὶ ἀπίθανοι) and impose themselves on the king as his own children like a *deus ex machina* (καθάπερ ἐκ μηχανῆς).

These words predict the exact effect of her speech on Hydaspes *despite* the fact that it is given in Persinna and Sisimithres' presence. When she tries to persuade him that she is his daughter, his reaction literally echoes her worst-case scenario: he indeed regards her words as indications of hubris (ὕβρις, 10.10.3) and 'wicked claptrap' (χλεύην . . . καὶ ὕβριν, 10.12.2). Furthermore, he repeatedly describes her speech as fiction (πλάσματα, 10.10.4; πλάττεσθαι, 10.12.1; πλάσμασι, 10.12.2) and even her self-presentation as his daughter with the same theatrical metaphor that she uses a little earlier ('like a *deus ex machina*', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς . . . οἶον ἐκ μηχανῆς). Finally, despite Chariclea's explicit concern about not annoying her listener, his abrupt dismissal of her words even gives way to anger (ἀγανακτῶν).

Chariclea's announcement of the recognition tokens and witnesses has some impact on Hydaspes, but ultimately does not suffice to convince him. When she shows not only the waistband (10.13.1) but also the necklaces (10.14.2), the narrator makes it clear that they arouse only 'a feeling of unease' in Hydaspes (ἀδημονῶν . . . ἐφαίνετο, 10.14.3).¹⁵⁸ Even the pantarbe, which she emphatically identifies as his own ring (σὸν . . . ἴδιον ὃδε ὁ δακτύλιος), does not convince him. He recognizes it (ἔγνώρισεν) but, rather than accepting it as a proof of her true identity, entertains the possibility that she has merely found it. This doubt will only be removed by the picture of Andromeda, to which I will return in due course. For the moment, the point is that Chariclea's speech does not result in the same rhetorical success as her earlier speeches in the story, despite all the rhetorical sophistication which pervades it. Moreover, once Hydaspes *is* persuaded that she is his daughter, he explicitly states that this revelation will not save her from being sacrificed.

The clear tension between the rhetorical care in Chariclea's speech and its unsuccessful outcome is further highlighted by the intertextual prominence in this episode of Phoenix's famous speech to Achilles in the ninth book of the *Iliad*, where, as part of a delegation, he tries to persuade him to set aside his wrath and return to the army as an active warrior. The clearest pointer to this

¹⁵⁸ By contrast, the impact of the waistband on Persinna and Sisimithres is overwhelming. She is struck dumb with amazement (ἀχανής τε καὶ αὖτος, 10.13.1) and seized with a fit of palpitations (τρόμῳ τε καὶ παλμῷ). She sweats (ἰδρώτι), as she is simultaneously delighted (χαίρουσα) and perplexed (ἀμυχανοῦσα) at the return of her lost daughter. Sisimithres is equally astonished (ἐκπεπληγμένος, 10.13.3) and expresses countless shifting emotions (μυρίας τροπὰς τῆς διανοίας).

intertext occurs in Hydaspes' speech to the Ethiopian people, where he adduces arguments in favour of sacrificing his daughter, although the primary narrator makes it clear that his real intention is precisely the opposite: he prays to the gods that his speech, whose rhetoric he has contrived to ensure its ineffectiveness, will fail to carry its point (τὴν ἐπιτυχίαν τῶν ἐνηδρευμένων τῇ δημηγορίᾳ λόγων ἀπευχόμενος, 10.17.1). As Morgan (2006: 57–61) points out, this ambiguity makes Hydaspes' speech an example of a *logos eschêmatismenos*, a rhetorical trope which we have also observed to be part of the rhetorical toolkit of Chariton's Chaereas and which intends the opposite of what it says. Ancient rhetorical theory recognizes this trope as operative in Phoenix's speech.¹⁵⁹ Thus Hydaspes' rhetorical skilfulness is associated with that of Phoenix in an instance that conflates such skilfulness with paternal concerns and therefore echoes similar concerns in the Iliadic episode.¹⁶⁰

But this is not the first time that the famous Iliadic episode is alluded to in this novelistic passage. Immediately before his speech, Hydaspes discourages Chariclea from pleading for her life by almost literally citing a passage from Achilles' response to Phoenix: 'Do not confuse my heart with sorrow' (μή μοι σύγχει τὸν θυμὸν ὀδυρομένη, 10.16.9; μή μοι σύγχει θυμὸν ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχέων, *Il.* 9.612).¹⁶¹ This citation, then, aligns Phoenix (as Achilles' addressee), not with Hydaspes but with Hydaspes' addressee Chariclea. This alignment is taken up by Chariclea's rhetorical approach, which is, I argue, much like that of Phoenix. Among the three speaking members of the delegation in the *Iliad*, Phoenix gives not only the longest but also the rhetorically most subtle speech. Before his speech, Odysseus tries to persuade Achilles by elaborating at length on the numerous gifts that Agamemnon promises him (*Il.* 9.264–98). Achilles, for his part, unambiguously rejects this offer and makes it clear that he does not want any of them (9.378). Whereas Ajax, the third and last speaker of the embassy, also draws repeated attention to the gifts (9.632, 634–5 and 638–9), Phoenix is more careful to support his request with other arguments. Apart from using the trope of *logos eschêmatismenos*, he also adduces two stories, the first of which highlights his strong bond with Achilles since the latter's childhood and deals with his own escape from his father as a child (9.447–95). This story shares motifs with the main plot of the *Iliad*¹⁶² and has been read as an example of what Achilles must not do.¹⁶³ Similarly, the other story adduces Meleager (9.529–605) as a model of deterrence for Achilles.¹⁶⁴ Phoenix's use of the Meleager story is emblematic of the

¹⁵⁹ Morgan (2006: 60–1 nn. 31, 33) gives references.

¹⁶⁰ On Phoenix' father role in this Iliadic episode, see Held (1987).

¹⁶¹ Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1991: 98 n. 1) and Morgan (2008a: 571 n. 243) note the allusion.

¹⁶² Rosner (1976: 314–27). ¹⁶³ See Scodel (1982).

¹⁶⁴ See Rosner (1976: 316, 322–7). Establishing a model of imitation or deterrence is a widely established function of *exempla*: see Demoen (1997: 130 nn. 16–17).

ambivalence in his speech as a whole between rhetorical contrivance and unsuccessful outcome. This story, popular in antiquity because of its role as a paradigm, was understood by ancient critics to be infused with ambiguity in its Iliadic context.¹⁶⁵ Although Phoenix emphatically acknowledges the connection between the Meleager story and the situation at hand¹⁶⁶ and aims at encouraging Achilles *not* to behave like Meleager (as Phoenix makes explicit at the end of his speech: 9.600–5), the reader is invited to consider notable *similarities*. Meleager, like Achilles, withdraws from battle in anger (Phoenix repeatedly identifies Meleager's disposition as *cholos* (χόλος, 9.553; κεχολωμένος, 9.566), which is exactly how he refers to Achilles' wrath as well (χόλος, 9.436; κεχολώσθαι, 9.523)), is begged by the most prominent people (ἀρίστους, 9.575; see also ἀρίστους, 9.520) to abandon his stance, but only accedes to their requests when the enemy is already at the gate, so that in the end he does not receive the promised gifts. The paradigm of Meleager, then, ambiguously symbolizes both Phoenix's self-consciously skilful rhetoric and also its failure. As we have seen, Chariclea adopts a comparable rhetorical awareness. The crucial similarity between Phoenix and Chariclea is that, despite such rhetorical contrivance and sophistication, both speeches are ultimately unsuccessful. Just as Phoenix cannot persuade Achilles to give up his wrath, so Chariclea cannot convince her father that she is his daughter and, therefore, needs to be spared. It is precisely this similarity that is highlighted by the Iliadic quotation in Hydaspes' speech, which cites the very words with which Achilles exposes Phoenix' *eschêmatismenos* discourse.¹⁶⁷ Rhetorical skilfulness, then, does not help Phoenix or Chariclea.

The limits of rhetoric are thematized even more clearly in Chariclea's second speech, which aims, after her own recognition, at preventing her father from sacrificing Theagenes (νεανίαν ἄλλον ἐπιζητεῖν, 10.19.2; περισώζε τὸν ἄνδρα, 10.29.3). Again, the rationality of her approach and the consciously contrived character of her performance are highlighted. The primary narrator makes it clear that she *almost* (μικροῦ, 10.19.1) wails aloud when informed about Hydaspes' decision to sacrifice Theagenes, but with some difficulty (μόγισ) considers what it would be politic to do (τὸ συμφέρον τιθεμένη), forces herself to subdue the frenzy of her emotions to the exigencies of her situation (πρὸς τὸ ἐκμανέν τοῦ πάθους διὰ τὸ χρειώδες ἐγκαρτερῆσαι βιασαμένη), and works *stealthily* towards her goal (ὑφείρπε τὸν σκοπόν). This approach is again

¹⁶⁵ See Nünlist (2009: 262–3) on both the awareness among ancient critics of the paradigmatic value of this story (Ps.-Hdn. *Fig.* 104.14–16 Sp. III, for example, illustrates the concept of *paradeigma* with Phoenix's Meleager story) and of its ambiguity.

¹⁶⁶ He announces the story as one which also (οὕτω, 9.524) deals with famous heroes (τῶν πρόσθεν . . . κλέα ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων, 9.524–5) and one that he has long remembered (μέμνημαι . . . ἐγὼ πάλαι, 9.527) and will now recount to his audience as an example (ὕμιν ἐρέω, 9.528).

¹⁶⁷ See Morgan (2006: 61).

unsuccessful. First, she is misunderstood by her parents. Hydaspes interprets her efforts as mere philanthropy (τῆς φιλανθρωπίας, 10.20.1) and, a little later, makes it clear that he does not understand (οὐ συνίημι, 10.21.1) her sudden request to be allowed to kill Theagenes herself. Persinna, for her part, sees Chariclea's sympathy for Theagenes as an indication of pity (καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ οἰκτείρω, 10.29.3) and mere infatuation (πρόφασιν . . . ἐρωτικὴν, 10.29.4).

Secondly, this episode often depicts Chariclea as the *object* rather than the subject of rhetorical control. Since both interlocutors make it clear that Theagenes cannot be saved (τὸ δυνατόν οὐκ ἔστι, 10.21.2; Οὐ δυνατόν, 10.29.4), she is *forced* (κατηνάγκαζεν, 10.22.1) by the urgency of the situation to speak more clearly (λέγειν . . . φανερώτερον, 10.22.1; ἐξαγόρευε, 10.29.4; σαφέστερα . . . ἐξαγορεύειν, 10.33.4), and, thus, to abandon the stealthy rhetorical discourse that she envisages. Persinna subtly controls her by reassuring her (παρηγορούσης, 10.33.4) that Theagenes may still be saved (Εἰκὸς σωθῆναι). This contradicts her earlier statement that it is impossible to do so,¹⁶⁸ but the narrator makes it clear that it again *forces* (βιασθεῖσα) Chariclea to understand that the situation does not allow any postponement (τὸν καιρὸν οὐκ ἐνδιδόντα ὑπέρθεσιν). She can do nothing, that is, but proceed straight to the heart of the tale (πρὸς τὰ καιριώτερα τῶν διηγημάτων). The technique of postponement, then, which Chariclea first uses in Delphi in order not to communicate her love for Theagenes to Calasiris (4.6.1) and since then has repeatedly adopted to control various sexual predators (1.22.6 and 5.26.3), has now lost its efficacy. Moreover, Persinna also cleverly plays on Chariclea's concern with *sôphrosynê* by suggesting that she suffers from an improper passion unworthy of her virginity (παρθενία μὴ πρέπον, 10.29.4). Since Chariclea has always regarded *sôphrosynê* as a principle virtue, this suggestion upsets her and is another factor that forces (ἀναγκάζομαι, 10.29.5) her to make an explicit and undisguised declaration (πρὸς γυμνὴν δὲ λοιπὸν καὶ ἀπαρακάλυπτον χωρεῖν τὴν ἐμαυτῆς κατηγορίαν)—which indeed she does (ἐξαγορευσάσης, 10.38.2), albeit with difficulty (μόλις). Again, then, the neutralization of Chariclea's rhetorical power is foregrounded. Only the representation of plain fact (as opposed to the rhetorically contrived *plasma* that she has frequently adopted in the novel) can save Theagenes at this point. Chariclea's rhetorical ability, then, seems to have reached its limits, a fact highlighted all the more by an evocation of Chariclea's first rhetorical performance in the story. Again, the (metonymically relevant) depiction of her speech patterns is complemented by intratextually generated metaphorical characterization: the repeated emphasis on her being forced (κατηνάγκαζεν,

¹⁶⁸ This contradiction parallels a similar and equally rhetorical contradiction in Hydaspes' speech, where he first says to the Ethiopians that he cannot but obey the law of their ancestors, which forces him to sacrifice his daughter (10.16.5), but eventually leaves the decision of whether or not to sacrifice her to the audience (10.16.6).

10.22.1; ἀναγκάζομαι, 10.29.5; βιασθεῖσα, 10.33.4) to speak plainly presents a sharp contrast with the Thyamis episode, where she is emphatically foregrounded not as the object but as the *subject* of such rhetorical force. As we have seen, she is initially forced by Thyamis to speak, but eventually manages to force *him* to agree with her request for postponement. In Meroe, there is neither such an inversion nor such a postponement.

The neutralization of Chariclea's rhetorical power at the end of the story echoes a similar neutralization of Callirhoe's social control as she is put on display by Chaereas (see §1.4.2). But unlike Chariton, Heliodorus does not thematize such a disempowerment in terms of gender specificity: a similar neutralization of rhetorical impact underlies Theagenes' integration into Ethiopian society. It is marked by two episodes of *aristeia*: he spectacularly captures a runaway bull (10.28.4–29.2 and 10.30.1–5) and defeats an Ethiopian giant in single combat (10.31.3–32.3).¹⁶⁹ As scholars have observed, these episodes raise Theagenes to truly heroic stature.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, the Meroe episode emphatically thematizes a number of markers of Theagenes' masculinity, but it does so, once again, ambiguously. Of course, Theagenes' two heroic deeds in themselves are important markers of male courage. His pursuit on horseback of the runaway bull may well echo his Thessalian origin¹⁷¹ and is presented by the primary narrator as 'the product of his own innate courage (οἷκοθεν ἀνδρείῳ τῷ λήματι, 10.28.4) or the inspiration of some god or other'. Moreover, this episode again demonstrates his excellent horse-riding skills, which are praised elsewhere as indications of *andreia* (ἀνδρείας, 3.3.8).¹⁷² His victory over the giant evokes and simultaneously forms part of a series of other instances throughout the novel where physical strength, especially in a martial context, is solidly associated with male courage. When taken prisoner, for example, Theagenes is judged 'manly' (ἀνδρείας, 5.26.4) and therefore suited to be a brigand in Trachinus' band. A little later, when he cuts off Pelorus' arm in combat, his manly courage is both explicitly identified by Chariclea and the narrator (Ἀνδρίζου . . . θάρσος, 5.32.5) and implicitly highlighted by an alignment with the Homeric hero Eurypylus, who cuts off Hypsenor's arm (τὸν ὦμον παραξέσας τὴν χεῖρα, 5.32.6; ἔλασ' ὦμον // . . . ἀπὸ δ' ἔξεσε χεῖρα, *Il.* 5.80–1).¹⁷³ Finally, Thyamis even asks Theagenes to become the commander

¹⁶⁹ Paulsen (1992: 48–59) reads these episodes as part of a series of four, which also include the foot race in Delphi and the battle on the shores of the Nile. On Theagenes' race in Delphi and his wrestling match in Ethiopia, see also Morgan (1998a: 72–7).

¹⁷⁰ Morgan (1989b: 317). On the bull fight as a marker of Theagenes' heroism, see also C. P. Jones (2010: 73–4) and M. Jones (2012: 152–3).

¹⁷¹ C. P. Jones (2010: 74).

¹⁷² See Lalanne (2006: 175–6) on Theagenes' *andreia* and its construction through sporting contests.

¹⁷³ Rattenbury, Lumb, and Maillon (1960: 81 n. 4) and Morgan (2008a: 471 n. 152) identify the intertext. The further correspondence between Pelorus' subsequent flight (φυγῆν, 5.32.6) and the fact that Hypsenor is also fleeing when his arm is cut off (φεύγοντα, *Il.* 5.80) invites the reader

of the people of Bessa on their march against Memphis in case of his own death (7.5.5).

Next to such emphatic attention paid to the male performance of courage, it is striking that the novel as a whole is framed between two explicit acknowledgements of *rhetorical* performance as an indication of masculinity. Both at the beginning and at the end, Chariclea foregrounds rhetoric as a marker of masculinity. When taken prisoner by Thyamis after the opening scene, she comments that ‘it would have been more fitting for my brother Theagenes here to speak, for I think that silence becomes a woman, and it is for a man to respond among men’ (1.21.3). I have already dealt with the ambiguity and elusiveness of this utterance (p. 262), but what matters here is that Chariclea again emphasizes speech as a marker of masculinity in the Meroe episode when she says to Hydaspes that it would be better if not she but Theagenes told him who he really is, ‘for he is a man and can explain himself with less shame and embarrassment than I could as a woman’ (ἀνὴρ τε γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐμοῦ τε τῆς γυναικὸς εὐθαρσέστερον ἐξαγορεύειν οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσεται, 10.18.2). Despite these two cases of explicit emphasis on rhetoric as a marker of masculinity, however, Theagenes’ masculinity is, as we have just seen, largely thematized in *other* areas.

One such area, besides martial performance, is the preservation of chastity. In one passage, such preservation is even equated with a *rejection* of rhetoric. When Theagenes, even under torture, rejects Arsace’s advances utterly and unambiguously (παντάπασι καὶ ἀπαρακαλύπτως τὰ πρὸς με ἀπαγορεύων, 8.5.6), he is said by the narrator to be ‘more of a man than ever’ (πλέον ἀνὴρ τότε καὶ πλέον ἀπεμάχετο πρὸς τὰς πείρας, 8.6.4). As I have shown, this blunt rejection is meticulously constructed by the narrator as a rejection of the rhetorical split between words and true intentions which Chariclea repeatedly urges him to adopt. The equation between his words and emotions is highlighted by Cybele, who says to Arsace that ‘Chariclea’s name is forever on his lips, and he seems to derive comfort and healing merely from speaking it’ (8.6.8). Here, together with Theagenes’ *sôphrosynê*, it is the *rejection* of rhetoric rather than its adoption that is presented as an indication of his masculinity, which must have struck any *pepaideumenos* reader as a contradiction in terms almost by definition.

The absence of rhetorical ability as a marker of Theagenes’ masculinity in the rest of the novel is compensated for in the Meroe episode, which *does* thematize rhetorical ability, albeit indirectly. Here, Theagenes’ interventions are depicted not merely as physical but also as non-verbally rhetorical by several means. First, the *performative* aspects of his two important heroic deeds are highlighted. He strangles the bull to make it fall ‘just as it passes

to surmise that Theagenes actually kills Pelorus, even though the narrator makes it clear that he does not know what happened next (οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, 5.33.1).

the place where Hydaspes is sitting' (10.30.3), and once the bull has been defeated, he waves and beams at Hydaspes and the crowd (*συνεχὲς ἐπισείων . . . ἰλαρὸν ἀπέβλεπε*, 10.30.5). Similarly, Theagenes' body language in preparation for his duel (he sprinkles dust over his shoulders and forearms, plants his feet firmly on the ground, flexes his knees, hunches his shoulders and the broad of his back, lowers his head a little, and tenses every muscle in his body) recalls episodes where body language marks preparation for a *rhetorical* intervention.¹⁷⁴ The body language of the Ethiopian is also depicted with vocabulary which further presents the fight as a rhetorical rather than a physical confrontation. He shakes his head 'ironically' (*εἰρωνικοῖς τοῖς νεύμασιν*, 10.31.4) to make clear his low estimation of his opponent (*ἐκφραυλίζειν*).

Secondly, the depiction of power relations during the duel recalls earlier rhetorical contests in the story. Theagenes, for example, *forces* his opponent to surrender (*βιασάμενος . . . κατηνάγκασε*, 10.32.2), which echoes the presence of force as characteristic of rhetorical victories from the Thyamis episode onwards (see §5.2.1). Moreover, he *feigns* (*ἐσκήπτετο*, 10.31.6) to be worse affected by a blow than in fact he is, and when the Ethiopian delivers another blow, he *pretends* (*ἐσχηματίζετο*) to nearly fall on his face, thereby echoing the importance of feigning and ruse in earlier overtly rhetorical episodes. Finally, the primary narrator elaborates on Theagenes' rationality, as opposed to the mere brute force of his opponent, by using conspicuously rhetorical and technical vocabulary. Theagenes is not only said to be a master in the *art* of combat (*τέχνην*, 10.31.5) generally, but also adopts *sophistic* skill against the giant's brute force (*ἐμπειρία . . . τὴν ἄγροικον ἰσχὺν κατασοφίσασθαι*). Moreover, once he has experienced (*ἀπόπειραν . . . λαβών*) the power of his opponent, he resolves not to confront him directly (*μὴ ὁμόσε χωρεῖν*) in his bestial fury (*θηριωδῶς τραχυνόμενον*). This representation evokes two important strands underlying Theagenes' wrestling match. First, the emphasis put on his rationality highlights the heroic dimensions of his behaviour by harking back to famous epic wrestlers who display similarly rational skills: in a famous Iliadic wrestling match, Odysseus throws Telamonian Ajax to the ground by using 'guile' (*δόλου*, *Il.* 23.725) and in a boxing match against King Amycus of Bebrycia, Apollonius Rhodius' Polydeuces eschews brute force in favour of cleverly feinting and parrying (*Arg.* 2.19–97, esp. 2.94–7).¹⁷⁵ Secondly, the conflation of verbal and physical rhetoric broadly echoes other depictions of physical training (*gymnastikê*) as an intellectually prestigious art requiring skills that are also central to rhetorical expertise.¹⁷⁶ In the novel, this dimension is further highlighted by the sharp contrast between the rationality underlying Theagenes'

¹⁷⁴ For example, Chariclea's body language in preparation for her speeches to Thyamis (1.21.3) and Trachinus (5.26.2).

¹⁷⁵ On the latter episode, see Levin (1971: 23).

¹⁷⁶ The most famous example is Philostratus' *Gymnasticus*, on which, see König (2009: 252).

physical performance and the depiction of his opponent as a beast. Such 'beastification' in itself recalls mythical wrestling matches between Greeks and monstrous others (for example Heracles v. the half-giant Antaeus)¹⁷⁷ and, together with Theagenes' stealthy approach, echoes a number of other passages in the novel. In his fight with the bull,¹⁷⁸ for example, Theagenes adopts a similar approach to control a real rather than a metaphorical beast. The presentation of stealth opposed to animality also evokes the Arsace episode, where, in a more explicitly rhetorical context, he also decides not to make a frontal (verbal) attack (*μὴ ὁμόσε χωρεῖν*, 7.24.5) but to sidestep (*ἐκκλίνειν*) Arsace's attack which is 'like that of a wild animal' (*καθάπερ θηρίου*) (see p. 274). As the evocation of this episode suggests, verbal and physical rhetoric are conflated in the Meroe episode through the common imagery of reason against brute, bestial impulse. Moreover, Theagenes' awareness of the necessity of *not* confronting such bestial force in any direct way is contrasted with the few passages where characters *do* use a direct approach unmediated by rationality. Significantly, these characters are barbarians.¹⁷⁹

The emphasis put on the rationality of Theagenes' approach signals a conspicuous shift from earlier parts of the story, where, on the contrary, it is his impatience and impulsiveness which are thematized. In this respect, it is significant that in the Meroe episode the paradigm of Achilles has been replaced by the (implicit but) repeated paradigm of Odysseus, whom the reader has by now come to identify as an important paradigm of rhetorical ruse in this novel. The duel with the Ethiopian giant recalls, as has been pointed out by others, a tradition of confrontations between Greek cunning intelligence and barbarian brute force which ultimately goes back to Odysseus' encounter with Polyphemus.¹⁸⁰ On the other hand, the Ethiopian giant himself is also aligned with Odysseus: he is said to glare and grin at Theagenes (*ἐνορώων ἐμειδία τε σεσηρός*, 10.31.4), which is exactly the same body language as Odysseus adopts in Calasiris' dream (*σεσηρός . . . μειδιάσας*, 5.22.2). The duel, then, foregrounds the question of who will turn out to be not the strongest but the most cunning. Which of the two will be the real Odysseus?

¹⁷⁷ Whitmarsh (2011: 123).

¹⁷⁸ Morgan (1998a: 73–4) discusses the various connections aligning the pursuit of the bull with the duel. The rationality of Theagenes' approach in this instance is also indicated by the fact that he only slowly sidesteps (*πεφυλαγμένως ἐκκλίνων*, 10.28.6) the bull's charges in order to accustom it to the sight of him (*εἰς συνήθειαν . . . ἐνεβίβασεν*, 10.29.1).

¹⁷⁹ In the case of Cybele, who, in order to facilitate Arsace's advances to Theagenes, decides to take the most direct route (*ὁμόσε χωρεῖν*, 8.6.7) and poison Chariclea, this decision has deadly consequences because she accidentally drinks Chariclea's potion. There is also Thermouthis, who, as a barbarian and a brigand at that, is driven by the powerful emotions of sexual frustration, rage, and anger (*θυμοῦ ληστρικοῦ καὶ βαρβαρικῆς ὀργῆς . . . ἐρωτικὴν ἀποτυχίαν*, 2.12.5) to confront the alleged murderers of his beloved directly.

¹⁸⁰ Morgan (1998a: 62).

Theagenes' two interventions, then, offer a conflation of rhetorical and physical spheres and depict combat as an intrinsically rhetorical skill involving deception and dissimulation. In this episode, Theagenes' depiction as a (novelistic) hero is documented not only by the two spectacular feats themselves, but also by the way in which he performs them: he displays, that is, a rhetoric of physical rather than verbal strength. Moreover, his physical strength is informed by the adoption of rationality rather than by emotional impulse. The control of emotional impulses and the attention drawn to Odysseus throughout the duel with the Ethiopian giant evoke Theagenes' earliest appearance in the history of the narrative. As we have seen, his introduction to Calasiris in Delphi recalls both Achilles (explicitly) and Odysseus (implicitly). Initially, it is primarily the paradigm of Achilles that seems to inform the frequent depiction of Theagenes' impatience and impulsiveness. By the end of the novel, however, Achilles seems to have given way to Odysseus. Like Chariton's Chaereas, Theagenes is a novel hero who changes from being impulsive and, therefore, vulnerable, to being self-controlled, rational, and a controller of others.

5.4.2 Andromeda

The profound irony of Heliodorus' novel is that neither Chariclea's consciously contrived verbal rhetoric nor Theagenes' performance of physical rhetoric is ultimately helpful in their integration into Ethiopian society. Heliodorus combines a relocation of the traditional *nostos* to the edge of the world with a profound reversal of generic conventions: for a moment, traditional markers of novelistic heroism do not seem to work in the Ethiopian society where the protagonists have ended up. Theagenes' heroism is presented as potentially instrumental in securing his life and Chariclea is made more hopeful by Theagenes' victory (10.33.4), but her hopes are dashed when he is returned to the altar.¹⁸¹ It is notable that as a result of this victory, Hydaspes jumps up from his throne and says that he *wants* to, but unfortunately cannot, save Theagenes (βουλομένω . . . οὐ δυνατόν, 10.32.4), a reaction which echoes that of Persinna to Chariclea's consciously performed body language a little earlier (10.7.5 and 10.9.5), which invites a parallel reading of the two performances.

Chariclea is likewise unable to achieve her goal by rhetorical contrivance. Her speech does not convince Hydaspes that she is his daughter. His ultimate objection to her claim is the fact that she is white, unlike him and Persinna (10.14.3). Sisimithres counters this argument. He first testifies that the girl whom he rescued seventeen years earlier was indeed white (Λευκήν, 10.14.4)

¹⁸¹ See also Morgan (1989b: 317).

and adduces her age, physical appearance, and beauty as arguments corroborating the claim that this is the same girl standing before them now. But then he goes on to paraphrase Persinna's own explanation of Chariclea's white colour, as he (like the reader, 4.8.5) knows it from her message on the waistband. However, it is only when the image of Andromeda that Persinna beheld during the conception of her daughter seventeen years earlier is set up next to Chariclea that Hydaspes' disbelief, because of the exact likeness (τὸ ἀπηκριβωμένον τῆς ὁμοιότητος, 10.15.1), begins to waver (οὐκέτι . . . ἀπιστεῖν ἔχειν). Thus it is not her rhetorical performance which is the clinching factor in the recognition of Chariclea but the visual image of Andromeda. This visual effect is compounded by Chariclea's revelation of a black birthmark on her upper left arm (10.15.2), which is recognized by Sisimithres. Only then is Hydaspes convinced (ἐπειθeto, 10.16.2) and only after that does he explicitly acknowledge the recognition tokens and Sisimithres' testimony (τά τε γνωρίσματα ἐμήνυσσε καὶ ὁ σοφὸς Σισιμίθρης ἐμαρτύρησε, 10.18.1) as arguments that have persuaded him (ἀνέδειξεν). The Meroe episode, then, seems to subordinate the power of purely verbal rhetorical persuasion to the power of *evidentia* through a *visual* image.

The fact that the ultimate catalyst of Chariclea's recognition is a visual resemblance recalls a well-known tradition concerning the role of appearance as a tool of (rhetorical) persuasion. Emblematic of this tradition is the famous anecdote about the beautiful courtesan Phryne, who is acquitted in court not because of Hyperides' admirable defence but because she takes off her tunic and shows her magnificent body to the jury. Quintilian (*Inst.* 2.15.9) adduces this anecdote to point out that rhetoric entails not simply persuasion *through speech* but also involves non-verbal means of persuasion. Like Phryne, Chariclea is saved *not* through strictly verbal rhetoric, but by the persuasive power of an image. This notion, in turn, fits into, and attests to, the broader importance of the sense of sight in Heliodorus' novel. Attention has often been drawn to the abundance of visual elements in the novel's language,¹⁸² themes,¹⁸³ and theatrical imagery.¹⁸⁴ Some of these visual elements have also been shown to create a subtle dialogue with elements stressing the importance of the auditory rather than the visual mode of perception.¹⁸⁵ It is against the background of this interplay that the narrative, after ten books, deconstructs

¹⁸² See e.g. Bühler (1976: 177–85) and Suárez de la Torre (2004: 210–25).

¹⁸³ See e.g. Pulquério Futre (1981–2: 107–8) on the *ecphrasis* of the amethyst (5.14), which thematizes the importance of the visual in narrative, and Hardie (1998: 37–8) on the *ecphrasis* of Chariclea's waistband (3.4). See also Futre Pinheiro (2001: 128–9) on word and image in Heliodorus among others, and Whitmarsh (2002a: 117–18) on the fundamental interconnection of visual elements (such as *ecphrases* and statues) with Heliodorus' narrative.

¹⁸⁴ Niemke (1889: 1–11), Walden (1894: 1–43), Marino (1990), Woronoff (1991), and Paulsen (1992: 21–41).

¹⁸⁵ Liviabella Furiani (2003: 425–39).

the importance of strictly verbal rhetoric to privilege the importance of the visual as ultimate proof.¹⁸⁶ The story has come full circle: whereas a visual image shapes Chariclea's conception, and therefore the verbal representation of her story as the reader has read it in the novel,¹⁸⁷ the closing scene of the novel, conversely, transforms words into image and reaffirms the importance of the visual with which it all started.

Chariclea's recognition also inverts the dissociation between (fictional) representation and reality, which is, as we have seen, consistently thematized from the Thyamis episode onwards as fundamental to rhetorical performance. Together with the neutralization of rhetoric in this episode, then, this dissociation is now replaced by an *association* between the real Chariclea and the representation of Andromeda on the painting, whom she resembles perfectly (10.15.1).¹⁸⁸ This ultimate fusion of representation and reality is the culmination of a broader exploration throughout the novel of the interconnection between fact and fiction. At the beginning of the novel, for example, Chariclea identifies herself as a priestess of Artemis, and Theagenes as a priest of Apollo (1.22.2), a paradigm clearly in line with her false presentation of Theagenes as her brother (1.21.3). The reader, who at this point has been given clues to infer that they are lovers (see pp. 248–9), initially interprets this presentation as a fiction, especially since Chariclea herself makes clear to Theagenes its falseness (τὸ πλάσμα, 1.26.5). Later, however, part of the fiction becomes reality: as it turns out, Chariclea is indeed a priestess of Artemis in Delphi and Theagenes states clearly to Chariclea that they serve the god Apollo (5.5.4).¹⁸⁹ Moreover, at the end of the story they become the priest and priestess of the sun god and moon goddess respectively. Apollo's role starts as a fiction in a consciously contrived self-presentation but ends up being reality within the story world. Fiction and reality are fundamentally conflated. A similar conflation occurs in the Meroe episode immediately before Chariclea's recognition, when Hydaspes characterizes the speech in which she reveals herself to be his daughter as *plasmata* (πλάσματα, 10.10.4; πλάττεσθαι, 10.12.1; πλάσμασι, 10.12.2). Of course, this speech refers to what the reader recognizes as her *real* past adventures and her *real* Ethiopian identity.¹⁹⁰ Again, *plasmata* are

¹⁸⁶ The tension between word and image is a theme that Heliodorus has in common with other Second Sophistic literature, most notably perhaps with Philostratus' *Imagines*, on which, see Newby (2009).

¹⁸⁷ See Billault (1981b: 68) for this juxtaposition of Chariclea's conception with the conception of the story as a whole.

¹⁸⁸ On the portrait of Andromeda as fusing art and reality, see Zeitlin (2013: 77–81). And on such fusion in the depiction of an ivory stain on Chariclea's arm, see Whitmarsh (1998: 112).

¹⁸⁹ On the connections between Chariclea's *plasmata* and the story of Heliodorus as a whole, see Brethes (2007b: 247–51).

¹⁹⁰ On Hydaspes' characterization of Chariclea's story as fiction, see also Paulsen (1992: 77).

not false but real.¹⁹¹ This association between falsity and reality is provided with an ultimate layer of ambiguity when, in the last line of the novel, the narrator identifies himself as ‘Heliodorus, a descendant of the sun god’ (τῶν ἀφ’ Ἡλίου γένος... Ἡλίοδωρος, 10.41.4), thereby aligning himself with Chariclea, who is also said to have the sun god as her ancestor (ὁ γενεάρχης ἡμῶν Ἥλιος, 4.8.2).¹⁹² Just as within the story the ‘real’ Chariclea conflates with the visual representation on the painting, now the ‘real’ Heliodorus conflates with his fictional heroine verbally represented in the story.

The shifting representation of reality and fiction also informs the ambiguity of Andromeda as a paradigm for Chariclea. On the one hand, Heliodorus’ story rehearses a number of motifs standard in Greek myth in general (foreign princess meets Greek hero, falls in love instantly, and is prepared to risk anything for him, even betraying her (foster-)father¹⁹³) and is comparable in myriad ways with the myth of Andromeda in particular.¹⁹⁴ Most obviously, Andromeda herself is traditionally regarded as an ancestor of the Ethiopians—a tradition explicitly acknowledged in the novel (4.8.3, 10.6.3). There are also many other similarities between her and Chariclea. Like all of Chariclea’s important characteristics (*phronêma*, *sôphrosynê*, *eugeneia*; see §5.1), the figure of Andromeda is already present as a paradigm of Chariclea in Persinna’s letter (4.8.5), which points to the fundamental importance of this figure for Chariclea’s identity. Like Chariclea, Andromeda is the white¹⁹⁵ daughter of an Ethiopian king.¹⁹⁶ Like Chariclea, she is selected for sacrifice to the gods by her father.¹⁹⁷ Like Chariclea, she is ultimately saved. In both stories, moreover, the Ethiopian king receives prominent guests afterwards (Ov. *Met.* 4.763–4; Hld. 10.22.5). Perseus’ love for Andromeda, aroused at their first encounter (see Ov. *Met.* 4.675; Lucian, *DMar.* 14.3.8), aligns this hero with Theagenes, who

¹⁹¹ There are many more examples. Cnemon’s remark that he can see Chariclea and Theagenes through Calasiris’ description ‘as if they were here’ (3.4.7) again blurs the boundary between fiction and reality. See also Hunter (1998: 47) on the aetiology of usual Delphic practices as resulting from events within the fiction. See Whitmarsh (2002a) on the elusiveness of representation and reality in *ecphrases* in Heliodorus.

¹⁹² On this association between the primary narrator and his heroine, see also Perkins (1999: 202) and Morgan (2005: 317–18).

¹⁹³ See e.g. Shapiro (1991: 126–7) on Medea and Jason and Ariadne and Theseus.

¹⁹⁴ See Billault (1981b, 1991: 220) and, with less detail, Laplace (1992: 215) on Heliodorus’ treatment of this myth, and Morales (2004: 174–9) on a pictorial representation of it in Ach. Tat. 3.6.3–7.9. For a brief summary of the myth, see also Whitmarsh (1999: 20–1).

¹⁹⁵ According to most traditions, that is. See e.g. Philostr. *Im.* 1.29.3 (λευκή). See Dilke (1980: 266–7).

¹⁹⁶ The most extended versions of the myth of Perseus (including his love for Andromeda) are recorded by Apollod. *Bibliotheca* 2.4.1–5, Ov. *Met.* 4.607–5.249, and the scholia on A. R. (4.1091 and 4.1515a in Wendel 1974: 305–6 and 319–21). See Whitmarsh (2011: 116 n. 48) for a number of other ancient versions.

¹⁹⁷ Whereas Hydaspes makes it clear that the dedicatees of the sacrifice of the protagonists are ‘the gods of our homeland’ (θεοὶς τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις, 9.1.4), Andromeda’s sacrifice to a sea monster, likewise, ultimately aims at appeasing Poseidon.

similarly falls in love with Chariclea at first sight (3.5.4). The association is strengthened by the fact that, according to some traditions, Perseus, like Theagenes, takes part in a sports competition in Greece (Apollod. *Bibliotheca* 2.4.4). In both stories, moreover, Chariclea and Andromeda are first betrothed (σοὶ . . . νύμφην, 10.24.1; ἐγγεγνημένος Apollod. *Bibliotheca* 2.4.3) to a relative by their fathers,¹⁹⁸ but in both cases eventually given in marriage to their lovers (Ov. *Met.* 4.704, 4.735–8). Andromeda and Perseus' marriage feast, finally, ends in a bloody battle when Phineus appears (Ov. *Met.* 5.8–9), which recalls the epic battle over Chariclea between Pelorus' and Trachinus' forces on the shores of the Nile.

On the other hand, significant differences between Heliodorus' story and the myth show that Chariclea's story is not entirely like Andromeda's after all. Whereas Cepheus is forced, according to Apollodorus, by the Ethiopians to sacrifice his daughter (τοῦτο ἀναγκασθεὶς ὁ Κηφεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰθιοπῶν, Apollod. *Bibliotheca* 2.4.3), in the *Aethiopica*, the Ethiopians beg Hydaspes to save his daughter from being sacrificed (10.17.1). And, of course, Chariclea and Theagenes, unlike Andromeda and Perseus, are in Ethiopia to stay. Heliodorus' story ends with Chariclea's long-expected *nostos*, when she and Theagenes integrate into Ethiopian society as priests of the moon and sun gods.¹⁹⁹ Perseus, on the other hand, takes Andromeda to Greece after their marriage (ἄπεισιν αὐτὴν ἄγων, Lucian, *Dom.* 22.3; ἀπάξει αὐτὴν εἰς Ἄργος, Lucian, *DMar.* 14.3.18), which draws attention to the fundamental reversals at work in Heliodorus' novel at the levels of both gender and geography. This novel explicitly casts its heroine as a second Andromeda, but in fact it is a story about a man following a woman from Greece to the edges of the world, rather than a woman following a man from the edges of the world to Greece. In this respect, Chariclea's story is very much *unlike* Andromeda's.

This ambiguity resonates well with the observation that the depiction of Chariclea's black birthmark as instrumental in her recognition aligns her not with Andromeda but with Odysseus, whose thigh bears a scar enabling Euryclea to recognize him (*Od.* 19.388–475).²⁰⁰ This evocation of one of the hallmarks of Greekness as a paradigm of Chariclea immediately destabilizes her characterization as a princess of Ethiopia, a land explicitly placed on the margins of the world in the opening lines of the *Odyssey* (1.23). Moreover, the depiction presents Chariclea's birthmark as a stain (μαίανων, 10.15.2) on her otherwise perfect resemblance to Andromeda.²⁰¹ Even at the moment of this ultimate recognition, then, the assimilation is not complete, but leaves room

¹⁹⁸ Andromeda is betrothed to Phineus, Cepheus' brother, and Chariclea to Meroebus, the son of Hydaspes' brother.

¹⁹⁹ See Fusillo (1997: 221) and Morgan (1989b: 320) on the consciously contrived absence of any open-endedness in this novel.

²⁰⁰ This allusion has been identified by Fusillo (1989: 31) and Whitmarsh (1998: 111–12).

²⁰¹ Létoublon (1992: 94).

for difference and nuance. Whereas, then, Andromeda is adduced to identify Chariclea, at last, as a real Ethiopian at the level of the argument function, the paradigm of Odysseus, one of the most important *Greek* heroes, is evoked at the level of the key function and underlies the moment of her recognition as an Ethiopian. Thus, even the most fundamental assimilation of a character to a paradigm is infused with ambiguity precisely in an area that constitutes a traditionally fundamental *topos* of the genre (and one deviously reworked, as we have seen, in Achilles Tatius too): macro-social background. Chariclea is both Greek and Ethiopian.

5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Scholars have rightly drawn attention to the fact that moral characterization is one of the central strands in Heliodorus' novel.²⁰² Indeed, the 'good' love of the protagonists is clearly counterpointed not only by Athenian but also by Persian corrupt erotic behaviour as exemplified by figures such as Demaenete and Arsace.²⁰³ As a result, scholars have been tempted to read the *Aethiopica* as one of the most idealized novels in the extant corpus and to focus primarily on the depiction of the protagonists as idealized character types on the one hand²⁰⁴ and of Ethiopia as an idealized utopia on the other.²⁰⁵ However, they have also drawn attention to less than ideal aspects of Heliodorus' story world: Morgan (1989*b*), for example, points out that the narrator plays on the reader's fears that the happy ending as a *topos* informing the idealized novelistic universe may be perverted in this novel. As regards the construction of Ethiopia in particular, idealistic readings have been convincingly nuanced. Whitmarsh (1999: 22) notes that Ethiopia cannot simply be read as utopian because it is also the site of culturally inferior phenomena (such as the ignorant wrestler, who is defeated by Theagenes' Greek cunning, 10.31.5) and the definitely barbaric practice of human sacrifice. Morgan (2005) comes to similar conclusions through an examination of the semiotic systems activated by Ethiopia.

²⁰² See Dowden (1996) on the Platonic distinction between heavenly and pandemic love (267–9) and bad characters who conspicuously suffer the fate they deserve (275–8). See M. Jones (2004) on an assessment of characters according to their possession of heavenly or pandemic wisdom respectively.

²⁰³ See Morgan (1989*a*) on Cnemon's story as the depiction of a moral universe inferior to that represented by the protagonists. See also Keul-Deutscher (1997: 353–8) on Demaenete, Thisbe, Arsace, Cybele, and Achaemenes as 'Gegenfiguren' representing qualities opposed to those embodied by the protagonists.

²⁰⁴ See e.g. Hani (1978) on Chariclea as the incarnation of moral idealism.

²⁰⁵ See e.g. Szepessy (1957: 244–7), Hägg (2000: 214–15), and Dilke (1980: 269). I did not find Rogier (1982) particularly helpful.

Unlike the depiction of Heliodorus' Ethiopia, the characterization of his protagonists has almost never been the site of such deconstruction of idealistic readings.²⁰⁶ Even Paulsen (1992: 42–7), who offers an admirably subtle discussion of the ambiguous characterization of many minor characters in Heliodorus, argues that the protagonists are depicted in an unproblematic and unambiguous way,²⁰⁷ claiming that their social and ethical depiction and their association with (mainly epic) paradigms have primarily an idealizing function.²⁰⁸ In this chapter, I have proposed a different reading of Theagenes' and Chariclea's characterization. First, I have pointed out that Chariclea's *phronêma* and *sôphrosynê* are presented in Heliodorus not merely as topical entities but as concepts consciously shaped and controlled either by herself (*phronêma*) or by Calasiris (*sôphrosynê*). Moreover, the structure of the narrative with its many analepses accommodates a pattern of gradual documentation of characteristics which are directly attributed (but only partially developed) early on in the narrative. Mostly, such gradual documentation is shaped by metonymical characterization (notably through the registration of behavioural patterns and speech) and at the same time involves a marked metaphorical component, building on both intratextual and intertextual associations. It is not only Chariclea's *history* that is gradually reconstructed by the reader when reading the story; her characteristics too are more fully fleshed out in retrospect. This is true, for example, for some of the most important hallmarks of novelistic heroism: her *eugeneia*, for example, is made explicit in the opening episode, but we do not learn until the fourth book just how *eugenês* Chariclea, as the daughter of the Ethiopian royal couple, *really* is. Similarly, her *phronêma* is clearly marked as a socially informed disposition sharpened by conscious engagement and self-awareness. And *sôphrosynê* is shown to evolve from a problematic complete rejection of love to a learned conforming of it to institutional normativity. These characteristics, then, are explicitly introduced in the opening scene but later indirectly shown *not* to be merely static, generically topical characteristics but rather the results of a mental change involving self-knowledge, self-esteem, and external influence.

The connection between Chariclea's rhetorical qualities and the preservation of her chastity, which has been occasionally discussed by others,²⁰⁹ is also presented as the result of such a change. Here, it is intrinsically connected with

²⁰⁶ Only Pernot (1992: 46) briefly suggests that idealizing readings of Chariclea as a character type are inadequate. Her rhetorical qualities lead him to conclude that she is not only beautiful, courageous, and chaste, but also a manipulative and deceptive public speaker; and that, therefore, the assessment of novel protagonists as stylized figures does not adequately capture the figure of Chariclea.

²⁰⁷ See e.g. Paulsen (1992: 216).

²⁰⁸ See Paulsen (1992: 53, 215) on epic models as methods for depicting the protagonists' social and ethical elevation; and (1992: 82) on the alleged lack of originality in the characterization of Heliodorus' protagonists.

²⁰⁹ Such as Pernot (1992) and Brethes (2007b).

the importance of teaching and imitation on the one hand and individual creative contributions on the other, as is shown by both Chariclea's and Theagenes' rhetorical abilities, especially Chariclea's, which are thematized as subject to evolution: whereas at first she is taught by Calasiris, she assimilates his guidelines well enough to follow them in his absence (the Thyamis episode) and, after their reunion, takes the initiative together with him. After his death, the depiction of her rhetorical abilities as partially resulting from his teaching is complemented by the depiction of her subsequent relationship with Theagenes, where she is no longer the object but the subject of such teaching. The parallelism is highlighted by their initial resistance to rhetorical contrivance on moral grounds and by the fact that imitation in both cases also consists of adopting one's teacher's mode of discourse. As her and Theagenes' depiction shows, rhetorical awareness is not a static but a dynamic concept, an amalgam of skills which have to be morally considered and which even evolve from rejection to their assimilation in strategies of self-preservation and self-defence. The entire process, again, is not directly addressed by the narrator, but explored at the levels of metonymical (through registration of speech, actions, and reactions) and metaphorical characterization (through intratextually shaping the relevant episodes into a complex web of mirror scenes as well as through the suggestive use of paradigms such as Artemis, Apollo, and Odysseus). Here, my reading resonates with those of scholars who have observed some aspects of evolution in other domains of character representation in Heliodorus' novel. Lalanne (2006: 149–53), for example, draws attention to Chariclea's gradual acquisition of social status (from priestess to princess) through several trials. And Fusillo (1989: 217–18) makes it clear that Heliodorus' protagonists are unique in the ancient novelistic corpus in that the changing environments in which they act (Delphi, Egypt, Ethiopia) mirror a gradually growing awareness of the divine fate of which they are the instruments and which culminates in their becoming priests of Helios and Selene.

In my reading of rhetorical abilities as indicative of change, rhetoric is also conceived of as something that is passed on from teacher to pupil by imitation and as something to be cultivated through practice. In this respect, rhetorical skill is aligned with *phronêma* and *sôphrosynê*, which are constructed as naturally present in Chariclea (*physis*) but in need of cultivation, control, and development through self-awareness and teaching. Like Chariton's Chaereas, then, Heliodorus' Chariclea explores the notion of character revelation, and, like Chariton, Heliodorus foregrounds rhetorical skill as one of the most fundamental qualities to be developed in the process. But given the intricate narrative structure, he thematizes these issues in a more gradual, intricate, and subtle way. The importance of rhetoric is also thematized in the characterization of Heliodorus' hero, but there it is made even more deviously ambiguous, as it is exported to areas of non-verbal rhetoric. And in any case, the ultimate importance of both Chariclea's and Theagenes'

rhetorical skilfulness is not straightforward. It does not lead to any celebration of this quality (as in Chaereas' final speech) which is made problematic in the final book, when they end up in a society where it does not seem to work in any straightforward way, needing to be complemented by yet another kind of rhetoric (visual proof). Heliodorus foregrounds rhetoric as a multifaceted area through which he explores the performative aspects of character, its shapability, controllability, and capacity to accommodate evolution. Much of Chariclea's and Theagenes' character is about self-presentation, and much of such performance is shown to be artificial, consciously learned (mainly from Calasiris and, in Theagenes' case, also from Chariclea), and culturally determined rather than inborn. Together with his emphasis on psychological growth and the socially informed perfection of qualities, all these themes indicate that the depiction of his protagonists goes well beyond any stereotypical representation of character types.

My second main point deals with the inherent elusiveness and ambiguity of Heliodorus' construction of his protagonists, which makes virtually impossible any unproblematic and straightforward reading of them as character types. I have identified self-presentation as a main site in which such ambiguity is explored and have drawn attention to the importance once more of an interplay of metonymical and metaphorical techniques of characterization. These techniques are body language, physical disguise, and paradigms, but this time they are used as tools of conscious identity construction by the protagonists themselves. Moreover, they function as concepts that, at the level of the key function, make problematic such identity construction. Unlike others, who read the association of the protagonists with paradigms as a narratorial instrument of their idealization, I have read it, on the contrary, as a character's tool of self-presentation which is simultaneously infused with ambiguity at the level of the key function. Theagenes' self-presentation as 'Achillean' in particular is an area in which such ambiguity and deconstruction are extensively thematized by Heliodorus, not only by an interplay of intertextual markers of association and dissociation, but also by the fact that (although he, like Chaereas, is shown to change from initial Achillean impulsiveness to Odyssean, reasoned cunning) a very problematic image of this hero is constructed by other characters and circulates outside his own control.

The Meroe episode offers a culmination of the strands of ambiguity, self-presentation, and deconstruction thematized throughout the novel. It deconstructs both the Artemisian and Apollonian sides of Chariclea's character as they have been thematized since the opening scene and undermines the efficacy of both verbal and non-verbal rhetoric as tools of self-presentation after it has been developed as one of the major themes of the story. The rhetorical split between *plasma* and reality adopted by the protagonists throughout the novel is now replaced by a visual association between reality and representation, as Andromeda's painting is foregrounded as the decisive

factor in the recognition of Chariclea. However, even this ultimate paradigm of Chariclea is treated with ambiguity and inconclusiveness. As such, Chariclea's recognition is emblematic of the protagonists' character depiction in general. It undermines any notion of character as a fixed and stable entity. Instead, it explores character as a fluid simultaneity of association and dissociation, of construction and deconstruction. It is the stage for conflicting self-presentation and characterization and thematizes the ultimately problematic nature of character as intrinsically unstable and elusive.

Conclusion

In his study on characterization in Émile Zola's *Les Rougon-Macquart*, Hamon (1983: 19) comments that character is 'traceable everywhere and nowhere' ('localisable partout et nulle part'). As my book suggests, some novelists seem to have built some of their most important characters around this very notion of conceptual elusiveness and vagueness of 'character'. As a rule, of course, construction of character cannot be separated from that of other narrative aspects such as plot, time, and action, and regularly spills over into them. Nevertheless, I have attempted in this book to make character more tangible. In any case, this book has not (and could never have) become an exhaustive study of characterization in the Greek novel. My approach, centring on narrative techniques of characterization, is one of many. By grounding these techniques not only in modern (structuralist) narratology but also in ancient rhetoric I have challenged the idea, advanced by some, that characterization and rhetoric exist *next to* (or even *despite*) each other, as if they were two separate phenomena. In my view, the attribution of characteristics to characters in narrative *is* an intrinsically rhetorical process; the narrative techniques used are never neutral but based on the rhetorical tropes of metonymy and metaphor. As such, they raise questions about the directness, overttness, and straightforwardness of a narrator's communication of character. Moreover, they are used not only by (primary) narrators in the novels but also by characters themselves as tools for self-presentation and performance (the examples of Chaereas, Chariclea, Theagenes, and, of course, Clitophon readily come to mind) and/or for the depiction of other characters (for example Clitophon's depiction of Leucippe).

In some cases, the construction of character is shaped by techniques that are consistently used to flesh out one particular characteristic. Callirhoe's body language, for example, has been shown to function as a semiotic tool to mark an evolution from defenceless innocence to manipulative experience; a comparable change in Chaereas is more firmly located in the realm of rhetorical abilities and marked by a consistent registration of significant speeches. In virtually all the novels, the *introductions* of the protagonists are highly significant *loci* of characterization. Longus' narrator, for example, makes clear the

protagonists' true identity as early as their introductions; and the introduction of Clitophon as well as Chariclea and Theagenes offers clues that allow the generically attuned reader to identify them as Greek novel protagonists but at the same time provide reasons to question such identity. The importance of introductory contexts for characterization invites comparison with biographical narrative, where Plutarch, it has been repeatedly observed, often opens a *Life* with a fairly crude and overt depiction of character which he then progressively redefines by a process of complementing, refining, and adding subtleties.¹ To be sure, such direct, often blunt, characterization at a character's introduction also occurs in the novels (e.g. Clitophon's characterization of Callisthenes). But in the case of the protagonists, things seem to be more complex. On the one hand, novelistic narrators, like Plutarch, introduce their protagonists (at least, in the earlier novels) with a fairly standard set of topics, such as micro-social backgrounds (*eugeneia* or membership of local elite families), educated-intellectual membership (*pepaideumenoi*), and physical beauty (typically accompanying social as well as moral elevation and itself emphasized by metaphors and comparisons).² On the other hand, they also seem to take a road that is, in some sense, the opposite to that chosen in biography: rather than presenting character overtly and emphatically in the introduction (and refining it later), they use the introductions to implicitly plant seeds of what will later be contextualized and turn out to be important characteristics.³ What we find in the novels is not so much 'progressive redefinition' (which Pelling (1988a: 269 = 2002a: 293–4) observes in biography) as 'progressive actualization'. This is primarily true for male protagonists, most obviously for Chaereas and Clitophon, and to a lesser extent for Habrocomes and Daphnis. In Heliodorus, this dynamic is complicated in the depiction of Chariclea's character, where anachronical narration systematically establishes a pattern of retrospective documentation. In the case of Theagenes, it is not so much his introduction into the story that plants such seeds, but rather his earliest appearance chronologically: his introduction to Calasiris.

I have analysed the interplay of techniques of characterization in order to test three interdependent questions about Greek novel protagonists that have been addressed in varying detail in modern-day scholarship: to what extent are they depicted as character types or as individuals, as ideal or more lifelike figures, and as static or dynamic? On the one hand, as we all know, the protagonists incarnate moral and cultural qualities such as *eugeneia*, *paideia*,

¹ Pelling (1988a: 268–71 = 2002a: 293–4, 1988b: 12–13, 25, 42–3, 1990a: 228–30 = 2002a: 310–12). Taken up by Duff (1999: 177–8, 2003: 110, 2005).

² On such topics in particular in introductory contexts in Plutarch, see Duff (2008a).

³ Similar to Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles*, in the introduction of which he 'implicitly reveals character-traits of the subject that will be developed later' (Duff 2008a: 159).

and *sôphrosynê*, which are usually presented explicitly and distinguish them from most of their non-Greek (barbarian) antagonists and enemies, and consequently invite readings in terms of static and ideal character types. Such topical and stereotypical depiction also seems to underlie characterization in some of the fragments.⁴ But the extant novels are not homogeneous in the ways they deal with some of these topical elements. Recent scholarship has detected an evolution of increasing elusiveness and lack of straightforwardness in the representation of identity from the earlier to the later novels.⁵ This development is also suggested by the topical markers used to anchor protagonists in their social backgrounds. The *topos* of *macro-social* descent, for example, is fundamentally perverted in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus. In the former, Clitophon's Phoenician origin is part of an overall inversion of novelistic conventions and highlights his interest in sex and his unreliability as a narrator; in the latter, the use of an *Ethiopian* heroine radically confuses centre and periphery in the realm of cultural identity and underlines the importance of the *performance* of such identity. The *topos* of *micro-social* descent too is fundamentally reworked in later novels: whereas it is merely a given in Chariton and Xenophon, Longus and Heliodorus present it as the final destination to be ultimately discovered after a process of searching. And the *educated-intellectual* area to which novelistic protagonists usually belong (*pepaideumenoi*), finally, is similarly revised by Longus, who relocates topical *paideia* to the erotic level and treats this latter as a socially informed evolving concept rather than merely given.

But the bulk of this book has been dedicated to showing that characterization in individual novels is more complex than merely topical depiction. For one thing, the oft-mentioned symmetry between the protagonists is challenged by some novels as early as their introductions, where protagonists are often individuated vis-à-vis each other. The most asymmetrical introduction of protagonists may well be found in Xenophon, although it is precisely this novel which is frequently adduced as the prototype of the novelistic representation of symmetry. Asymmetry is also constructed in the introduction to Chariton's novel and becomes a central concern in Achilles Tatius, where it is inherent in the narrative technique of homodiegetic narration. In Longus, the very notions of symmetry and asymmetry are shown to be shifting concepts (while the protagonists are introduced symmetrically, they are gradually differentiated from the first spring onwards).

Secondly, overtly topical characterization is virtually always problematized in one way or another, which at once raises questions about the allegedly ideal nature of the protagonists' characters. If scholars doubt the idealistic qualities of the Greek novel, they mostly adduce *minor* characters or one or two

⁴ See e.g. López Martínez (1998) on Ninus' *paideia* in the eponymous novel.

⁵ Whitmarsh (2011: 25–135, esp. 69–71).

significant incidents (such as Chaereas' assault on Callirhoe) as illustrations of realistic character depiction, but in this book I have attempted to relocate this issue to the centre of the genre: I suggest that in all five extant novels the characterization of protagonists is partially but significantly shaped by psychologically realistic rather than ideal concerns. Sometimes so-called 'ideal' characteristics are ironized by the fact that they are limited to the perception of one particular character, whereas other indications may evoke ambiguity or flag their deconstruction. The tension between Theagenes' self-proclaimed Achillean descent and its deconstruction by the narrator is an example of such ironic treatment of topical material. More often, the thematically central concept of *sôphrosynê* is subjected to similar irony. Clitophon's *sôphrosynê*, for example, is explicitly addressed *only* by himself. Likewise, in Xenophon, Habrocomes' self-characterization as *sôphrôn* is made problematic by other characters, and most notably the heroine, who use other names to refer to the same bundle of characteristics. And Chariton's Chaereas, for his part, characterizes his own wife as *sôphrôn* only unwittingly, which fits in with his generally problematic perception of Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê*. Even on the (most overt) level of direct characterization, then, characterization does not seem to be *just* a matter of (idealizing) typification.

The mere fact that some of the most important characteristics of Greek novel protagonists are attributed so explicitly raises the question of whether such attribution is underscored, complicated, qualified, emphasized, or undermined through *indirect* characterization or through (either explicit or implicit) attribution of *other* characteristics. It has rightly been observed that characterization in narrative texts contemporary with the Greek novels is often a matter of implication, subtlety, and allusion rather than (or at least in addition to) explicit depiction.⁶ The novels themselves are no exception. Unsurprisingly perhaps, most of the indirect documentation takes place at the level of metonymical characterization, mostly through speech and action. In this respect, the novels can again be compared with biography, where, as Pelling (2002b: 324–5) observes, character is shaped not by Gill's (tragic) notion of the 'self in dialogue' but rather by behavioural patterns that are operative in everyday life as well ('unreflecting moments and responses' rather than 'great moments'). To some extent, this is true for the novels as well, even if both Chariton's and Achilles Tatius' narrators draw upon the concept of the self in dialogue at least once (the former to flesh out Callirhoe's excruciating abortion dilemma, the latter to unwittingly expose his own perception of *sôphrosynê* as perverted).

⁶ See e.g. Zadorojnyi (2006: 264) on indirect characterization in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, and Nünlist (2009: 225–37) on the importance of allusions, hints, and hidden meanings in some of the scholiasts' readings of ancient literature.

Of course, the characters' behavioural patterns are also documented by a range of other metonymical techniques whose prominence varies considerably from novel to novel. *Emotions*, for example, are most evident in the construction of the protagonists' characters in Achilles Tatius and Longus. Clitophon's rationalizing stance towards his own and others' emotions characterizes the protagonist and points to fictionalization underlying his narration. Longus also characterizes his protagonists through their perception of emotions: by systematically restricting descriptions of emotions to their own focalization, the narrator highlights their ignorance. The *comparantia* adduced (again in their focalization) to capture the feelings of love, erotic longing, and jealousy further flesh out this characteristic. Permanent *physical characteristics* of the protagonists, for their part, are rarely accorded any importance.⁷ When physical details are given, they often help to characterize the focalizing character: Clitophon's attention to Leucippe's physical features fits into his broader characterization as someone interested in women and sex, and Daphnis' and Chloe's attention to each other's physical characteristics marks the beginning of their love. Variable physical features are more important than permanent ones: Callirhoe is characterized by (unintentional) blushing, while Chariclea and Theagenes are characterized by the conscious *performance* of body language; and Clitophon, for his part, is characterized by his perception of Leucippe's body language.

But behavioural patterns grounding the characters in everyday life (and making them recognizable as fictional *analoga* of human beings) constitute only one side of characterization. In all the novels, character is also constructed metaphorically and this dimension draws attention not to their mimetic qualities but rather to their nature as *literary* constructs. A first type of metaphorical characterization, present in all five extant novels, is *intratextual*. The use of a number of scenes (usually doublets or triplets) whose juxtaposition reveals significant similarities and differences is an important technique throughout the genre. While it is used to good effect already in Chariton's novel (for example in the Plangon and Artaxates episodes), it is in Achilles Tatius and, especially, Longus and Heliodorus that intratextual patterning becomes an omnipresent technique of characterization that is not just of occasional but of fundamental importance.

Secondly, *intertextually* generated metaphorical characterization is no less important. Lalanne (2006: 127) makes it clear that Odysseus is the only epic hero who plays a really important role in the novels, but I have suggested that metaphorical characterization in almost all the novels associates protagonists with a much wider range of (mainly epic, historiographical, and mythological) paradigms. The only exception is Xenophon's novel, where metaphorical

⁷ This absence has been widely discussed by scholars, starting with Rohde (1914³: 150–6), who connects it with ancient sculpture. See also Dubel (2001) and Hunter (1994: 1073).

characterization is very limited. As I have argued, this lack fits into a wider pattern in which comparisons and metaphors more generally are absent and which may be explained as a characteristic of *apheleia*. This feature aligns the novels with contemporary narrative, where metaphor is also a common technique for defining and conveying character.⁸ In the novels, mythological and literary paradigms contribute to a more nuanced appreciation of characterization and often act as devices infusing characters with ambiguity. Such ambiguity is generated partly by shifting associations and self-associations, which document and/or emphasize diverging strands of character. Callirhoe, for example, is aligned with Helen, but also with Penelope; Chariclea is compared to Odysseus, but also to Penelope and the Sirens; Clitophon is associated with some of the most renowned mythological seducers of women, but also with Odysseus, whose *sôphrosynê* is ambiguous but who, ultimately, is happily reunited with his wife.

The ambiguity is also generated by paradigms which at times question, undermine, deconstruct, and destabilize various (often central) characteristics by raising disconcerting questions and thus burdening the protagonists with problematic associations.⁹ (Chaereas' and Theagenes' associations with Achilles ostensibly emphasize their physical beauty and noble descent respectively, but in fact anticipate uncontrollable impetuosity; the paradigms of Ariadne and Theseus/Dionysus, Semele and Zeus, and Thetis and Peleus consistently highlight Chaereas' problematic perception of his own wife's *sôphrosynê*). I believe, then, that paradigms in the novels are evocative of too much ambiguity to make likely the more restrictive readings suggested by others, who see myth in the novels as selectively chosen to illustrate one particular aspect (and often nothing else).¹⁰ As I have shown, paradigms are often evoked through dynamics of both association and (often simultaneous) dissociation. Various diverging strands of (and often irreconcilable tensions between) different accounts¹¹ evoked make one-to-one equations between characters and paradigms problematic; they rather suggest that characters can never be wholly like their paradigms (Callirhoe is not entirely like Penelope, but neither is she entirely like Helen; Theagenes is not entirely like Achilles or Odysseus; and Chariclea is presented as almost identical to Andromeda but at the same time is not at all like her).

It is not just that direct, metonymical, and metaphorical techniques of characterization work ambiguously in their own right. It is also that the

⁸ See e.g. Duff (2003: 111–12) on Plutarch.

⁹ See Öhrman (2008) on a similarly destabilizing function of paradigms in Roman elegy, where they make problematic similarly central themes such as faithfulness.

¹⁰ See e.g. Hirschberger (2001: 170–2) and Cueva (2004: 24–5, 33).

¹¹ The evocation of the story of Ariadne in Chariton is emblematic: of the four passages that explicitly evoke it (1.6.3, 3.3.5, 4.1.8, 8.1.2), two *associate* it with, while the two others specifically *distinguish* it from, Callirhoe's story (see also Whitmarsh 2005b: 119–20). On intertextuality as a distancing device in Longus, see also Bowie (2003b, 2007).

interaction between them is often no less ambiguous and problematic. And it is this kind of interaction that is relevant to our question of how to read, for example, instances of typification and individuation. While some techniques may construct topical strands of novel protagonists, other techniques suggest divergent readings or provide individuating accents. And again, the five extant novels are not homogeneous in this respect. Broadly speaking, their protagonists can be located along a sliding scale from more typified to more individuated: while Daphnis and Chloe occupy positions closer to the typification end of this continuum, Theagenes, Habrocomes, and Anthia are provided with rather more individuating detail—but less than Chaereas, Clitophon, Callirhoe, Chariclea, and Leucippe, the last of whom is provided with few individual details but is nevertheless (and paradoxically) individuated to the point that questions are raised about whether or not she actually *is* the novel heroine that Clitophon wants her to be. A language of subtlety, then, seems more appropriate than one of contrast to describe typification and individuation in the novels.¹²

But even so, individuation cannot simply be equated with the kind of idiosyncrasy that we are used to in modern literature. Even in the most individuated protagonists, there are (often obvious) similarities to others that make them fall into categories underlying notions of novelistic heroism. In this respect, this book has confirmed what had already been observed by others: that character individuation *is* more limited than that with which readers of modern novels are comfortable. In this respect, the novels are similar to other narrative literature from the imperial period. In biography, most notably, character individuation has been imagined as standing somewhere between the depiction of a wholly unified character or mere stereotype on the one hand and the mix of divergent, irreconcilable, and often inconsistent character traits of modern biography on the other. Plutarch in his *Lives*, for example, has been shown to work with an ‘integrated’ conception of character in which characterization is not so much a matter of interweaving divergent and often irreconcilable predispositions¹³ but rather of depicting qualities that tend to converge into some sort of logically explicable relation with one another, a consistent bundle of characteristics which fit closely together.¹⁴ Pelling (1990a: 238–9) observes that even with Plutarch’s most individual figures, we can still naturally talk about what may happen to ‘*a sort of person like Antony*’ (his italics). The same is true for even the more individuated protagonists in the novels, who still fit a recognizable human type: even if Chaereas, for example, is set apart from other novel heroes by uncontrolled anger and violent jealousy at the beginning of the novel, these strands

¹² Frazier (1996: 140) points to similarly subtle depiction in Plutarch’s *Lives*.

¹³ On such predispositions and *modern* biography, see also Dihle (1956: 76–81).

¹⁴ Pelling (1988a: 262 = 2002a: 287, 1990a: 235–44).

ultimately serve to flesh out, by contrast, an acquisition of self-control that is also thematized as a marker of novelistic heroism in the depiction of Xenophon's Habrocomes, Longus' Daphnis, and Heliodorus' Theagenes.

At the same time, my readings suggest that such an 'integrated' depiction of novelistic heroes and heroines may be semantically richer than scholars have observed. In particular, I argue that recurrent concerns with self-control are complemented by an awareness of the necessity of establishing and maintaining control over *others* as intrinsic to attaining adulthood. Rhetoric in particular is singled out as an important tool for achieving such control, not only in male characters in public contexts (Chaereas, Daphnis), but also in female characters such as Callirhoe and Chariclea, who use rhetorical skills in one-to-one conversations to protect their chastity. These skills are best read not as strands individuating Callirhoe and Chariclea, but as qualities to be acquired in order to become representative and semantically full novel heroines. (Clitophon's and Clinias' clearly marked concern with undigested rhetorical *form* offers a significant variation on this theme of rhetorical maturity.) But they do raise questions, once again, about the purportedly ideal nature of the novel protagonists: most of the novels foreground the evolving ability to control others as an essential part of their characters, and show that such ability comes with psychologically realistic qualities such as ability and readiness to distort the truth or to manipulate and/or control social environments. This is very much the case in Chariton (Callirhoe and Chaereas), Heliodorus (Chariclea and Theagenes), Longus (who thematizes strategies for taking the initiative and acquiring dominance on a sexual level and relocates them to a social level), and, albeit documented in a less detailed and less rich manner, Xenophon (Habrocomes' gradual acquisition of rational self-defence). It may be significant that it is precisely in Clitophon's characterization that these concerns are *not* thematized; this lack in itself may be yet another reason to question the extent to which he really *is* a novel hero, especially since in Leucippe's characterization they *are* thematized, particularly in the Ephesian episode, where they are part of a broader depiction arguably aimed at evoking a number of typical markers of novelistic heroines (and consistently echoing Chariton's Callirhoe to this effect).

The themes of power and powerlessness are, of course, presented in a very obvious way throughout the entire genre by the fact that the protagonists are typically tossed all over the Mediterranean by divine forces, pirates, and other enemies. Consequently, these notions are not alien to scholarship on the novel. The well-known opposition between the heroes' weak passivity and the heroines' active resourcefulness,¹⁵ for example, centres on them. Different interpretations of this opposition explain it either as a conscious literary

¹⁵ On this opposition, see Reardon (1991: 81–2), Konstan (1994: 15–26), Haynes (2003: 81–2), and Alvares (1995: 395; with reference to other secondary literature).

construction promoting an ideology of reciprocity and symmetry,¹⁶ as a reflection of contemporary society (it is taken to suggest a female readership¹⁷ or to mirror the increasing freedom and visibility of women¹⁸), or as a sign of Greek cultural integrity and superiority under Roman imperial rule.¹⁹ I hope to have offered ammunition for blurring at least to some extent the traditional rigid opposition between male passivity and female activity.²⁰ In my view, the representation of Greek novel protagonists is more ambivalent than this distinction suggests. Egger (1994a: 272–4, 1994b: 39), for her part, suggests that heroines are powerful exclusively in erotic and emotional realms, whereas *factual* power resides with their male counterparts; but in my view, some of the novels clearly thematize female control and power *outside* the erotic realm by depicting heroines who, in the course of the narrative, learn to exert precisely such ‘factual’ control over their social environments through the use of rhetoric (Callirhoe, Chariclea, and, in a more limited way, Leucippe). Haynes (2001: 83, 2003: 50–1) similarly corrects Egger’s view by observing that some heroines are also able to manipulate situations on a social level²¹ but her focus on female control leads her to leave *male* control altogether underexposed: she argues that the rhetorical competence of male protagonists is an area of ‘ideological marginality to the genre’ (2003: 88). However, we have seen that it is operative in the characterization of heroes as well as heroines, whose social, rhetorical, and intellectual resources mark their ability to overcome misfortunes. And in some novels, such as Longus’ *Daphnis and Chloe* and (what we have left of) *Ninus*, it is even thematized as an *exclusively* male province.

To be sure, the ability to establish control over others is a traditional marker of heroism from Homer onwards and the combined interest in this as well as self-control picks up a long tradition that singles out both abilities as civic qualities enhancing self-presentation and performance.²² Related questions about the acceptability of manipulation, lying, and deceit, which are explored in the novels as well, sometimes generate moral ambiguity (as in the case of Chaereas) but can also be valued more positively (for example Chariclea’s ‘Penelopean’ devices to save chastity), thereby taking up the old positive evaluation of falsehood and lying present in Homer, Hesiod, and epinician poetry.²³ Other *novelistic* literature also thematizes the importance of

¹⁶ Konstan (1994: 30–6). ¹⁷ Holzberg (1995: 33–5).

¹⁸ Egger (1988) and Johne (2003). ¹⁹ Haynes (2001: 74, 80–8, 2003: 13–14, 44–80).

²⁰ Occasionally, to be sure, this distinction has already been blurred to some extent. See also e.g. Schmeling (2003b: 425), who characterizes even the heroines as passive.

²¹ See also Kaimio (1995: 130–2). On the (ambiguous) relation between beauty and power, see Liviabella Furiani (1996b: 122–3).

²² See e.g. D. A. Miller (2000: 188–241) and Papadodima (2011) on control and self-presentation, and Roisman (2003: 128–9) on both types of control in the Attic orators.

²³ See e.g. Pratt (1993: 55–129) on problematizations of the assumption that telling the truth is good and lying is bad in these texts. See also Gleason (2001) on the depiction of power and control, which often involves the realms of deceit and manipulation, in Josephus.

interpersonal forms of power. Control and manipulation are very prominent, of course, in the Latin novels.²⁴ Early Christian novelistic biographies known as the *Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles* also explore a holy man's power to control a situation with prophecy and miracle, his impact on individuals or the whole community, and his often high-handed, superior behaviour towards enemies or authority.²⁵

The concern with controlling one's social environment invests character in the novels with a specific 'participant' strand (to use Gill's term): following scholars who have already observed that protagonists interact in various ways with their communities,²⁶ I would add that their investment with (rhetorical) control over others is yet another novelistic instantiation of how character is embedded in social and interpersonal factors. It highlights in particular their often problematic and challenged position and the ways in which they attempt (sometimes successfully) to navigate their social environments. As such the novels again are in conformity with much of Second Sophistic literature, in which the prominent presence of power and control has famously been connected to the socio-political context of the Roman empire in which this literature was written and read.²⁷

At the same time, however, this strand in the novels may also document a concept that in Gill's view is less readily compatible with (the participant strand of) 'character' and more with 'personality': the rhetorical skills of novelistic heroes and heroines flesh out their rational abilities that invite *understanding* rather than moral assessment of the ways in which they act in the narratives.²⁸ Of course, as I have observed, the moral strand of character is clearly present in all the novels. The mere fact that most of the main characteristics are well-known *virtues* such as *sôphrosynê* and *phronêma* is itself a strong indication. But the detailed way in (and extent to) which characteristics are shown in action often goes beyond moral assessment. Callirhoe's second marriage, for example, is *explained* as the result of her defencelessness against the kind of skilful manipulation that she will subsequently acquire throughout the rest of the story. Likewise, Anthia's and Chariclea's machinations allow understanding of how, in varying circumstances, they time and again manage to save their chastity. And Chaereas' harnessing of the power of rhetoric explains how he enters the Egyptian army, climbs its hierarchical ladder, and, finally, maintains his leading position (for example, when mutiny is

²⁴ W. S. Smith (1994). ²⁵ G. Anderson (1993: 184).

²⁶ Such as Whitmarsh (2011: 32, 41, 140). See, more generally, Bassi (2003) on the importance of one's interdependence with society and *polis* in the construction of manliness.

²⁷ See Swain (1996), Schmitz (1997), and, specifically on heroes in Plutarch interwoven with society, Frazier (1996: 101–24). On the novel as a product of the Greek elite under Rome, see Lalanne (2006: 32–3).

²⁸ On the importance of rational abilities in contexts of persuasion, van der Mije (2011) is interesting (but locates such abilities with addressees rather than with speakers).

explicitly presented as an alternative to his rhetorical and manipulative intervention). These concerns have more to do with understanding than with moral assessment and, therefore, challenge Gill's distinction between ancient concerns with character and modern ones with personality.²⁹ Characterization in the novels explores both.

Another conclusion of this book fits in with these observations and at the same time documents one other dimension of the protagonists' concern with establishing control over their lives and social environments. This conclusion is that protagonists are depicted not so much as static but rather as changing in various ways. In the cases of Callirhoe, Chaereas, Habrocomes, Daphnis, Chariclea, and Theagenes change (in some cases more gradual than in others) concerns various facets of an ability to successfully position themselves in their environments and deal with external threats through rational skills. And again, it is worth floating the idea that the absence of these notions of change in Clitophon and Leucippe may work as an argument *ex silentio* inviting us to wonder to what extent they *are* to be read as real novel heroes. The direction of such rational growth explored by the other novels can again be compared with that in other genres. In the biographers, for example, *paideia* is one of the distinctive guiding forces behind character development in general and developing rational abilities in particular.³⁰ In the novels, *paideia* is of course invariably and emphatically present in protagonists and occasionally connected with changed behaviour (e.g. Chaereas' behavioural shift). A recurrent, specific aspect presenting *paideia* as an ongoing process is the connection between rational development and interaction with teachers or mentor figures, who appear not only in the famous cases of Daphnis and Chloe, but also in Heliodorus (Calasiris for Chariclea, and Chariclea for Theagenes), Achilles Tatius (Clinias), Chariton (Polycharmus, Mithridates), and, in a more limited way, Xenophon (Aegialeus). On the other hand, development is also explored as a result of the experience of misfortunes, trials, and difficulties along the way (Callirhoe arms herself against manipulation after having been victimized by it; Habrocomes fine-tunes rational methods of resisting sexual predators so that he avoids the risk of being tortured). Here again, comparison with other genres is instructive. In biography, character development and change in many cases primarily (and, according to some, exclusively³¹) documents *moral* behaviour in the face of (undeserved) misfortunes (as exemplified in Plu. *Sert.* 10.4–7):³² both improvement (e.g. Plu. *Comp. Cim. Luc.* 1.4, *De sera*

²⁹ See Pelling (1989: 230–1, 2002b: 321–2) for similar observations on character and personality in Plutarch's *Lives*.

³⁰ See Swain (1989a, 1990) and Frazier (1996: 78–80) on Plutarch's *Lives*. See Duff (1999: 75) on *paideia* and reason in Plutarch's *On Moral Virtue*.

³¹ See e.g. Frazier (1996: 89): 'le seul changement que les Anciens aient envisagé est en effet d'ordre moral'.

³² Verdegem (2010: 120).

num. 551c–552d) and, more often, degeneration of adult character (e.g. Polyb. 7.13 on Philip V, Plu. *Sol.* 7.1–2, *Sull.* 30.4).³³ Comedy too explores the notion that, although individuals do not usually change in their moral character, misfortunes corrupt it (e.g. Men. *Mon.* 313) (as do bad habits and certain effects of society, such as bad company and wealth).³⁴ The novels, on the other hand, convey a more constructive message about character change: the confrontation of characters (mainly protagonists) with misfortune is of course one of the hallmarks of the genre, but misfortunes are ultimately conducive not to negative developments but rather to the development of rational abilities that allow them to arm themselves against threats.³⁵

My reading of the novels' concern with the rational rather than moral development of the protagonists—or, in other words, with *understanding* changed 'personality' rather than assessing 'character'—is in tune with recent scholarship on these texts. Most notably, Lalanne (2006) argues that the heroes' and heroines' many ordeals and adventures function as training for their roles as socially accepted citizens and wives respectively. For male characters, this *paideia* is primarily directed towards the acquisition of a number of basic qualities such as moderation, perseverance, and magnanimity, which are emblematic of the virtues of a civilized Greek male adult.³⁶ She argues, accordingly, that masculinity is construed as being the result of a learning process ('l'objet d'un apprentissage') and explored as a social construction (204). I would add that such a learning process also implies the acquisition of the (often rhetorical) tools for navigating the web of social interaction.³⁷ For female protagonists too, Lalanne emphasizes learning processes that affect characterization but ultimately sees such evolutions directed to an awareness of female conformism to the woman's role in (a male-dominated) society (2006: 129–53). Leucippe, for example, 'learns to remain silent' (149). Here, my readings occasionally differ from Lalanne's, as they draw more attention to the fact that the characterization of female protagonists too, despite its conformism to gender roles, more often than not thematizes their participation in, and negotiation of, empowering forms of social control (Callirhoe, Anthia, Chariclea, and, to a lesser degree, Leucippe).

³³ Frazier (1996: 90–2), Gill (1983: 478–80, 2006: 416) and Duff (2008b: 2 n. 7).

³⁴ Traill (2008: 83–5).

³⁵ See also Konstan (1994: 46) on the impact of misfortunes guiding the protagonists from initial attraction to attachment marked by 'faith and steadfastness in the face of adversity'. Whitmarsh (2011: 155), for his part, observes an evolution not towards a growing ability to arm themselves, but rather towards a growing acceptance of divine benevolence.

³⁶ See also Bakhtin (1981: 106) on the Greek novel as a 'novel of ordeal' (*Prüfungsroman*) and the 'shaping force of the idea of trial'.

³⁷ See also Webb (2007: 534), who briefly touches upon the link between rhetoric and masculinity in one of Chaereas' speeches in Chariton's novel (8.7.9–8.11).

Whitmarsh (2011: 70, 100–7, 254–5) also emphasizes that the novels explore profound questions about the nature of identity ('to what extent does experience change the individual?', 255) and that individuals can reshape themselves in the light of their experiences (107). He suggests that the relative importance of conservative and transformative strands is itself subject to evolution in that the later novels develop the transformative vector more than the earlier ones. Achilles Tatius' and Longus' shared interest in the metamorphosis theme, for example, is said to reflect 'the newer conceptions of character change embedded in the works of biographers' (107). Whitmarsh is certainly right that the later novels radically revise the use of what I have called macro- and micro-social backgrounds.³⁸ However, several aspects lying closer to the notion of character/personality than to that of identity do not always seem to confirm a real boundary between the earlier and later novels. This much is also suggested by M. Jones (2012: 16), who has recently observed that important ideological aspects underlying novelistic constructions of *andreia* and *paideia* show no real diachronic rupture in the genre. Similarly, the protagonists' developing sense of a rational capacity to control their environment does not change in any drastic way from Chariton to Heliodorus. Chariton and Xenophon clearly reflect a concern with this kind of change (documenting growing social control in the cases of Callirhoe, Chaereas, and, in a more limited way, Habrocomes), although it is true that in these early novels such change is dealt with in a more straightforward manner of unidirectional progression than in, say, Heliodorus, where it is refracted by the narrative structure.

But there are more elements that bridge the commonly accepted gap between so-called 'pre-sophistic' and 'sophistic' novels. One of the features uniting all these texts is not only their above-mentioned 'integrated' conception of character, but also their exploration of the *limits* of this conception. In a number of cases in the genre, a dynamic interplay between direct and indirect forms of characterization blurs, undermines, deconstructs, or questions important characteristics. Contradictions, oppositions, paradox, and simultaneous instances of both construction and deconstruction often result in ambiguous and complex depictions.³⁹ Such ambiguous depictions repeatedly destabilize strictly ideal readings and address psychologically more realistic strands of character. Theagenes' self-proclaimed descent from Achilles, Callirhoe's *sôphrosynê*, Clitophon's self-presentation, and that of Leucippe as *sôphrôn*, for example, are all destabilized by various metonymical and

³⁸ While, for example, Chariton's and Xenophon's protagonists reintegrate into their societies at the end of their stories, 'Daphnis and Chloe choose to live a pastoral life even after they have been reunited with their urban parents' (Whitmarsh 2011: 216).

³⁹ On the notions of 'complexity' and 'openness' of character in modern literary theory, see e.g. Hochman (1985: 123–5, 138–40).

metaphorical techniques. And while actions are usually adduced to corroborate such characteristics, ‘one-off’ acts repeatedly infuse *sôphrosynê* with ambiguity in the cases of Callirhoe, Clitophon, and Leucippe. This tendency is played upon most by Chariton (e.g. Callirhoe’s *sôphrosynê*) and Heliodorus (e.g. Theagenes’ self-presentation as Achilles), although, again, this complexity is given an additional twist in Heliodorus by being enshrined in a notably labyrinthine narrative structure. In fact, a number of more precise similarities between characterization in Chariton and in Heliodorus make it worth floating the idea that the former may have been an important source of inspiration for the latter. As in Chariton’s novel, the paradigm of Penelope in Heliodorus’ functions ambiguously to thematize the thin line between the heroine’s chastity and the devious and, for some, disconcerting versatility with which she defends it. And as in Chariton’s novel, this ambiguity is fleshed out by the hero in particular, who raises profound doubts about the chastity and fidelity of the heroine. Chariclea’s reticent body language is reminiscent of that of Callirhoe and, like Callirhoe, Chariclea is contrasted with Helen in being the subject rather than the object of rhetorical persuasion. And Theagenes, like Chaereas, changes from being impulsive and, therefore, vulnerable, to self-controlled, rational, and controlling others. Whether these similarities are to be read as indications of direct influence or of generic, common notions about novelistic heroism does not matter too much. They suggest, as do most of the areas of characterization that this book has addressed, that differences between ‘pre-sophistic’ and ‘sophistic’ novelistic characterization are perhaps more a matter of degree than of kind—a conclusion that fits in very well with (and echoes) Hock’s (1997b: 450) on rhetorical differences between the two novel groups.

Ambiguity, to be sure, challenges one of the main premises of Aristotle’s conception of stable character in the *Poetics* (namely that a character ought to be consistent—*τὸ ὁμαλόν*—or consistently inconsistent—*ὁμαλῶς ἀνώμαλον*)⁴⁰ but also feeds into a well-known fascination with (often morally) unstable, complex, and paradoxical characters in the literary tradition. Of course, complex characters play pivotal roles in epic and tragedy,⁴¹ but the importance of moral complexity has also been observed in comedy⁴² and is, more famously, prominent in historiography, where great virtues and great vices coexist and evil is accompanied by remarkable mental or physical abilities.⁴³

⁴⁰ *Po.* 1454^a26–8. See, among others, Nünlist (2009: 249–52) and de Carvalho (1988).

⁴¹ See, among others, Katz (1991) on Penelope in the *Odyssey*, Williams (1996) on Aeëtes in Apollonius’ *Argonautica*, and Gill (2006: 421–61) on Senecan tragedy and Virgil’s *Aeneid*.

⁴² Traill (2008: 3–10, 79–129, 177–244).

⁴³ See Pitcher (2007: 106) on Roman historiography and in particular on Sallust’s Catiline (*Cat.* 5.1–5), Livy’s Hannibal (21.4.9), Appian’s Mithridates (*Mith.* 546–50), and Tacitus’ Sejanus (*Ann.* 4.1). See also Gillison (2003) on Tacitus’ Agrippina and Wiedemann (1979) on Catilina in the *Historia Augusta*.

In biography too, and in Plutarch in particular, it is often not at all clear how the reader is meant to judge protagonists.⁴⁴ Plutarch states explicitly that human nature is never wholly good (*Cim.* 2.4–5), destabilizes moral certainties, and even in the only pair of *Lives* explicitly said to be an example of vice (*Demetrius–Antony*) does not seem to portray character wholly negatively.⁴⁵ Other *Lives*, such as those of Lysander, Agesilaus, Lucullus, Flamininus, Philopoemen, and (especially) Alcibiades and Alexander repeatedly present ambivalent and complex characters, often inconsistent and volatile, and neither perfect nor wholly bad nor reducible to a shift from good to bad nor vice versa.⁴⁶ In specific cases (e.g. Clitophon, Leucippe, and the early Chaereas) the novels too seem to question at least to some degree the moral standards of protagonists rather than to foreground them bluntly as givens.

More often than not, characterization in the novels is a multiform, ambiguous, and complex matter. Broadly speaking, the most ‘overt’ level of characterization thematizes most visibly, but often misleadingly, traditional topical characteristics such as *eugeneia*, physical beauty, and *sôphrosynê*. On more covert levels of characterization, however, the novels are more concerned with the deconstruction of such depictions and with the insertion of question marks next to the alleged perfection of the protagonists. As this book shows, the oldest European novels explore the construction of literary characters in a much less straightforward and more active, richer, and more colourful way than is commonly accepted. Clearly, these protagonists do not simply accord with stereotypes, but, on the contrary, explore a diverse set of themes that repeatedly invite the reader to consider what it means to be a novel hero(ine).

⁴⁴ Duff (1999: 55, 63–5).

⁴⁵ Pelling (1980: 138, 1988b: 10–18) and Duff (1999: 55–6, 283–4).

⁴⁶ See Shipley (1997: 30, 269), Tröster (2008), J. J. Walsh (1992: 218–21), Duff (1999: 134), and Whitmarsh (2002b).

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