

# Macroeconomics II: Course Summary

---

Erik Öberg (Uppsala University, UCLS)

May 15, 2023

# What have we covered?

- **Business-cycle frameworks:** *RBC*, *NK*
- **Frictional labor markets:** McCall, Burdett-Mortensen, DMP
- **Incomplete asset markets:** Consumption-savings dynamics in partial equilibrium, Aiyagari

- Apart from the RBC extensions, we have focused on the “vanilla” versions of these frameworks in isolation
- Today: attempt to summarize the course material, by means of showing how these frameworks can be put together and are used for quantitative research
- In particular, we will outline a business cycle model with sticky prices, incomplete asset markets and a frictional labor market: a **HANK-SAM Model**

- **Heterogeneous Agents New Keynesian** models: NK business cycle models with incomplete asset markets (and therefore household heterogeneity)
- Why interesting?
- Consider the vanilla RANK model:

$$\hat{i}_t = \phi\pi_t + \nu_t$$

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa \hat{y}_t$$

$$\hat{y}_t = -(\hat{i}_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + E_t \hat{y}_{t+1}$$

- What is the transmission mechanism of an MP shock?

- Extended representation of the vanilla RANK model:

$$\hat{i}_t = \phi \pi_t + \nu_t$$

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa \hat{y}_t$$

$$\hat{c}_t = -(\hat{i}_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + E_t \hat{c}_{t+1}$$

$$\hat{c}_t = \hat{y}_t$$

- What is the transmission mechanism of an MP shock to output?


Roughly:

1. Shock: nominal rate  $i_t$  up
2. Sticky prices: real rate  $\hat{i}_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}$  up
3. Intertemporal substitution: consumption  $c_t$  down
4. Market clearing: output  $y_t$  down

# HANK models: motivation

- Is intertemporal substitution really a reasonable theory of fluctuations in aggregate demand?
  - Macro evidence: no (see, e.g., Yogo, ReStat 2004; Canzoneri-Cumby-Dilba, JME 2007)
  - Micro evidence: Limited, but also no (see, e.g., Best-Cloyne-Ilzetski-Kleven, REStud 2020)
- Even though income, financial wealth and income risk might respond to monetary policy as well, this has close to no impact on the consumption decisions of well-insured households
  - Recall lecture 10: well-insured households behaves according to PIH
- This is counterintuitive and at odds with what we know from the micro data
- HANK models offer an alternative theory of aggregate demand

# HANK models: new transmission mechanisms



Taken from Ben Moll's website

# The Unemployment Risk Channel


- One channel that has attracted much attention:  
**Unemployment-risk channel (URC)**
  1. **Households:** Unemployment  $\uparrow$ 
    - $\Rightarrow$  precautionary saving  $\uparrow$
    - $\Rightarrow$  goods demand  $\downarrow$
  2. **Firms:** Goods demand  $\downarrow$ 
    - $\Rightarrow$  labor demand  $\downarrow$
    - $\Rightarrow$  unemployment  $\uparrow$
- Generates a multiplier
  1. *Inefficient* amplification & propagation
  2. May be mitigated with targeted fiscal policy
- To evaluate the implications of this channel, we need a HANK model with endogenous unemployment dynamics: **HANK-SAM models**



- **Ravn-Sterk (JME 2017; JEEA 2021), Rendahl-Riegler-Den Haan (JEEA 2019):** HANK-SAM interaction is a source of amplification
- **McKay-Reis (Ecmtra 2016; REStud 2021), Kekre (REStud forthc):** HANK-SAM interaction raises the value of automatic stabilizers (esp unempl. insurance)
- **Challe (AEJmacro 2020):** HANK-SAM interaction changes optimal monetary policy
- **Broer-Drue Dahl-Harmenberg-Öberg (no paper yet):** A unified framework to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different fiscal stabilization policies
- To illustrate some of these points, I will employ a (slightly simplified) version of the framework in BDHÖ


- **Households:**
  1. **Workers:** can be *employed* or *unemployed*
    - Employed: Earn fixed real wage  $W$ , pay labor income taxes
    - Unemployed: enjoy UI benefits
  2. **Capitalists:** collect all firm profits, do not work, risk neutral
- **Producers:**
  1. **Intermediate good producers**
    - Labor  $\Rightarrow$  intermediate goods
    - Frictional labor market, CRS matching function
    - Sluggish vacancy posting due to idiosyncratic stochastic entry cost
    - Separations due to idiosyncratic stochastic continuation cost
  2. **Wholesale producers**
    - Intermediate goods  $\Rightarrow$  differentiated goods
    - Monopolistic competition + Rotemberg price adjustment costs
  3. **Final producers**
    - Differentiated goods  $\Rightarrow$  final good
    - Perfect competition
- **Government:** Sets the nominal interest rate, collects taxes, issues debt

# Graphical model overview




- Consider an exogenous path of TFP  $\mathbf{z} = [z_0, z_1, \dots]$
- To a first-order approximation, the equilibrium is summarized by
  - A SAM-block response:**  $\mathbf{u} = M_{SAM}(\mathbf{p}^x + \mathbf{z})$   
 $\mathbf{u}$  is the path of unemployment *and* the labor-market flows

# Graphical model overview




- Consider an exogenous path of TFP  $\mathbf{z} = [z_0, z_1, \dots]$
- To a first-order approximation, the equilibrium is summarized by
  - A SAM-block response:**  $\mathbf{u} = M_{SAM}(\mathbf{p}^x + \mathbf{z})$   
 $\mathbf{u}$  is the path of unemployment *and* the labor-market flows
  - An HA-block response:**  $\mathbf{R}^{real} = M_{HA} \mathbf{u}$

# Graphical model overview



- Consider an exogenous path of TFP  $\mathbf{z} = [z_0, z_1, \dots]$
- To a first-order approximation, the equilibrium is summarized by
  - A SAM-block response:**  $\mathbf{u} = M_{SAM}(\mathbf{p}^x + \mathbf{z})$   
 $\mathbf{u}$  is the path of unemployment *and* the labor-market flows
  - An HA-block response:**  $\mathbf{R}^{real} = M_{HA} \mathbf{u}$
  - An NK-block response:**  $\mathbf{p}^x = M_{NK} \mathbf{R}^{real}$

# The multiplier process




- **Proposition:** Model solution is given by

$$\mathbf{u} = (\mathbf{I} - M_{\text{SAM}} M_{\text{NK}} M_{\text{HA}})^{-1} M_{\text{SAM}} \mathbf{z}$$


1.  $(\mathbf{I} - M_{\text{SAM}} M_{\text{NK}} M_{\text{HA}})^{-1}$  captures a repeated **demand-driven** multiplier process generating the equilibrium response to the shock
2. The direct (first-round) response  $\mathbf{u} = M_{\text{SAM}} \mathbf{z}$  is also the response with *flexible prices* (no demand-loop)

# The multiplier process: illustration


TFP,  $Z_t$




Unemployment Risk,  $URISK_t$



Intermediate goods price,  $P_t^x$



Unemployment,  $U_t$




# Equivalence of demand and supply shocks

- **Proposition:** The impulse responses for labor-market variables to a shock to TFP (supply) and to the discount factor of workers (demand) are equivalent up to a scaling factor.
- Interesting, because IRFs of labor market variables to TFP and MP shocks look very similar in the data (at odds with vanilla NK model!)



# Equivalence of shocks in the model: illustration




# Our calibration approach

- **Calibrate HA block** so consumption-saving of households match evidence on
  1. Fall in consumption in response to unemployment
  2. Fall in consumption in response to unemployment-benefit expiration
  3. Marginal propensity to consume (not targeted but in line with data)
- **Calibrate SAM block** so firing-hiring of firms match evidence on
  1. Relative timing of the peak for the separation rate and the trough for the job-finding rate
  2. Contribution of separation and the job-finding rate to unemployment dynamics

# Consumption effects of unemployment


- **Stylized fact #1:** Consumption ~20% lower for unemployed (Chodorow-Reich-Karabarbounis, 2016)
- **Stylized fact #2:** Drop at UI exhaustion of ~45% of income drop (Ganong-Noel, 2019)




Source: Ganong-Noel (2019)

# Separation rate leads job-finding rate

## Monetary policy shock



## Technology shock



Source: CPS 1967-2020; Romer-Romer MP shock; Fernald TFP shock.


### ■ Stylized Fact #3:

*Separation rate leads job-finding rate by 9-16 months*


- Also true for *uncertainty shocks* (Oh-Picco, 2020)

# Separation rate explains substantial share of unemployment

## Monetary policy shock



## TFP shock



Source: CPS 1967-2020; Romer-Romer MP shock; Fernald TFP shock.

### ■ Stylized Fact #4:

*Separations account for 40-60 percent of unemployment response*

- Also true for *uncertainty shocks* (Oh-Picco, 2020)

# To explain separation rate response, our model has elastic job destruction

- **Job value:**

$$V_t^j = P_t^x Z_t - W + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ (1 - \delta_{t+1})(V_{t+1}^j - \mu_{t+1}) \right]$$

- TFP:  $Z_t$
- Real output price:  $P_t^x$
- Wage:  $W$
- Separation rate:  $\delta_t$
- Continuation cost:  $\mu_t$
- **Firms draw continuation cost**  $\chi_t \sim G$ : mixture of point-mass and Pareto
- **Implied separation rate:**

$$\delta_t = \delta_{ss} \left( \frac{V_t^j}{V_{ss}^j} \right)^{-\psi}$$

- **Exogenous separation limit:**  $\psi \rightarrow 0$

# To explain job-finding rate response, our model has inelastic job creation

- **Vacancy value:**



$$V_t^v = -\kappa + \lambda_t^v V_t^j + (1 - \lambda_t^v) \beta \mathbb{E}_t [V_{t+1}^v]$$

- Vacancy posting cost:  $\kappa$
  - Job-filling rate:  $\lambda_t^v$
- **Firms draw entry cost**  $c \sim H$ : exponential distribution
- **Implied entry**

$$l_t = l_{ss} \left( \frac{V_t^v}{V_{ss}^v} \right)^{\frac{1}{\xi}}$$

- **Free entry model:**  $\xi \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $V_{ss}^v \rightarrow 0$   
(Only  $\xi \rightarrow \infty$ : Fixed homogenous entry cost)

# Demand externality matters only with active URC




- **Baseline with incomplete markets:** substantial amplification with sticky prices
- **With complete markets:** only aggregate income path matters; sticky prices make little difference




# Substantial amplification due to elastic firing and inelastic hiring

## Unemployment




## Unemployment gap (com. mkts)




- **Standard HANK-SAM** (exo. sep., free entry):
  1. Much smaller unemployment response

# Interaction of elastic firing and inelastic hiring

## Unemployment



## Unemployment gap (com. mkts)



1. **Endogenous separations** always amplifies
2. **Sluggish entry** *only amplifies with endogenous separations*
  - With limited entry response, newly separated *deplete the current vacancy stock*
  - $\Rightarrow$  Higher separation rate causes lower job-finding rate

- **Ravn-Sterk (JME 2017; JEEA 2021), Rendahl-Riegler-Den Haan (JEEA 2019):** HANK-SAM interaction is a source of amplification
  - These models typically features a large demand-driven multiplier
- **McKay-Reis (Ecmtra 2016; REStud 2021), Kekre (REStud forthc):** HANK-SAM interaction raises the value of automatic stabilizers (esp unempl. insurance)
  - The demand-driven multiplier stems from limited insurance to unemployment risk
- **Challe (AEJmacro 2020):** HANK-SAM interaction changes optimal monetary policy
  - The demand-driven multiplier changes the trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output

- **Broer-Druedahl-Harmenberg-Öberg (no paper yet):** A unified framework to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different fiscal stabilization policies
  - Commonly used labor-market policies (e.g. retention policies, hiring subsidies) may be very effective macroeconomic stabilization tools
  - Whether labor-market policies are preferable over UI (and other fiscal policies) depend very much on the elasticity of job creation and job destruction
  - We need more micro-level evidence on these elasticities