## **Access Control**

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- Authentication
  - Who is the user?

- Authorization
  - What the user can do?

# Terminology

- Access Control Policies:
  - High level guidelines that determine how accesses are controlled and determined

- Mechanisms:
  - Low level SW/HW functions that implement a policy

# Terminology

### • Subject:

 Active entities (i.e. process) initiate actions or operations on objects. They can be object as well

### Object:

Target of the subject's operations (i.e.files)

### Access rights:


Read, write, execute, append, own....

# Terminology

- Reference Monitor:
  - has the goal to enforce the policy. It mediates all requested operations by subjects on objects

policies need to be specified and enforced

## **Access Control Model**



### **Access Control Matrix**

Representation of the access control policy

	file1	file2	file3	file4
John	Read Write Own		R W O	
Alice	R	R W O	W	R
Bob	R W	R		R W O

## **Access Control List**

### Stores matrix by columns

```
file1 → John,rwo;Alice,r;Bob,rw
```

file2 → Alice,rwo;Bob,r

file3 → John,rwo; Alice, w

file4 →Alice,r;Bob,rwo

## ACL

### <u>Pros</u>

- Easy access review with respect to an object
- Easy revocation of accesses to an object

#### Cons

- Difficult to determine all rights of a subject
- Not very efficient if there is a high turn over of users
- Difficult to revoke all access rights of a subject
- Difficult to delegate access rights

# Capabilities

Stores matrix by columns

```
John → file1,rwo;file3,rwo
```

Alice  $\rightarrow$  file1,r;file2,rwo;file3,w,file4,r

Bob  $\rightarrow$  file1,rw;file2,r;file4,rwo

# Capabilities

### **Pros**

- Easy access review with respect to a subject
- Possible to delegate access rights to an object

#### Cons

- Difficult to determine all subjects who can access a particular object
- Difficult to revoke access rights to an object

# Groups

- ACL can became very large
- A group is a collection of subjects
- Each group is characterized by a set of access rights
- All subjects member of a group have the access rights of that group.

### Es. Unix

```
drwxr-x--- crispo staff 1024 May 02 11:09 folder1 -rwxrwxr-x crispo staff 200192 June 24 17:21 file1
```

## Access Control Policies

- Discretionary
- Mandatory

# Discretionary Policies

Subject issues an access request to an object

- If the subject is authorized to do that
  - He is listed in the ACL of the object with the requested access right
  - He has a capability that list the object with the requested access right
- Access is granted

# Discretionary Policies

 If the authorization is present the request is served otherwise is rejected

- Advantages
  - Flexibility (e.g. commercial policies)

- Disadvantages
  - Information flow

# Mandatory Policies

 A security label is assigned to each subject and each object

Object's label reflect its security sensitivity

 Subject's label (clearance) is the trustworthiness of the subject not to disclose information he reads

# Mandatory Policies

Hierarchical ordered set (i.e., military and government)




# Mandatory Policies

 Subject issues an access request to an object. Access is granted on the basis of the following two rules:


Bell-La Padula model

- Read down
  - A subject's clearance must dominate the security level of the object being read
- Write up
  - A subject's clearance must be dominated by the security level of the object being written

- Prevent unauthorized information flow
- The model trusts users but not programs



Compartments refine labels to provide finer granularity



TS.nuclear > S.crypto

iff

 $TS \ge S$  and nuclear  $\supseteq$  crypto

 $X.S_1 > Y.S_2$  iff X>Y and  $S_1 \supseteq S_2$ 

- Advantages
  - High assurance
  - High value to confidentiality


- Disadvantages
  - Not very flexible
  - Many commercial policies value integrity more than confidentiality

## Covert Channel

Timing channel

Storage channel

# Multiple Access Control Policies



- Intersection applies
- Care to avoid conflicts