

Nicotine and Tobacco Product Sales after E-cigarette Flavor Restrictions

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Acknowledgments and Disclaimers


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
Agenda

- Background
- Research Questions
- Data
- Methods
- Findings
- Discussion, Limitations, & Implications



Percent of State Residents Covered by Flavored ENDS Sales Restrictions



US Tobacco Product Flavor Policies



Percent of State Residents Covered by Restrictions on:
Flavored Cigar Sales Menthol Cigarette Sales



GRADE Evaluation of Evidence on ENDS Flavor Policies' Effects

| Outcome | Quality of Evidence | Supporting Evidence |
|---|---------------------|--|
| Sale | | |
| Reduced sales of ENDS | Moderate | Ali (2022), Gammon (2021), Katchmar (2021), Liber (2021) [28–31] |
| Increased sales of combustible cigarettes | Low | Gammon (2021), Katchmar (2021), Liber (2021), Xu (2022) [28–30, 33] |
| Behaviour | | |
| Reduced consumption of any tobacco use | Low | Kingsley (2019, 2021), Olsen (2022), Yang (2022) [38–41] |
| Reduced ENDS consumption | Low | Hawkins (2021), Kingsley (2019), Liu (2022), Yang (2020) [35, 38, 39, 42] |
| Increased combustible cigarette consumption | Very Low | Friedman (2021), Hawkins (2021), Kingsley (2019), Liu (2022), Yang (2022) [34, 35, 38, 39, 42] |

Cadham CJ et al. (2022) *BMC Public Health*

Concern 1: Substitution towards more Lethal Products


- Myriad evidence links policies making ENDS more expensive or less accessible to increases in cigarette smoking
 - Adults: Saffer et al. 2020; Pesko, Courtemanche, & Maclean, 2020
 - Pregnant women: Abouk et al, 2019
 - Young adults: Friedman & Pesko 2022
 - Youth: Abouk et al 2022, Pesko & Warman, 2021, Friedman 2015; Pesko, Hughes, & Faisal, 2016; Dave, Feng, & Pesko, 2019
- Economic theory: consumption effects from reducing a product's appeal should be in the same direction as policies increasing its price, all else equal

Concern 2: Current Results' Generalizability


- Most prior studies:

- Assess flavor restrictions' effects in a single jurisdiction or state, or multiple temporary policies;
- Omit tests required for causal interpretation of quasi-experimental evidence
- Consider short follow up periods
- Ignore policy heterogeneity

ENDS Flavor Prohibition



ENDS Flavor Limitations




Research Question

What are ENDS flavor restrictions' effects on
ENDS and cigarette sales?

Data

Data: IRI retail sales data for 44 US states (Jan. 2018–March 2023) + newly compiled data on state & local tobacco flavor policies

Outcomes: ENDS sales/capita; Cigarette sales/capita



Data & Methods

Exposure: Proportion of state residents covered by ENDS flavor policies


Two-way fixed effects

$$Y_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Flv_{st} + \lambda \overrightarrow{X_{st}} + \gamma_s + \delta_t \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Flv_{st} + \beta_2 Flv_{s,t-13} + \lambda \overrightarrow{X_{st}} + \gamma_s + \delta_t \quad (2)$$

$\overrightarrow{X_{st}}$: Proportion covered by flavored cigar & menthol cigarette sales restrictions, flavor policy interim periods (between passage & effective dates for each flavor policy), other tobacco control policies (tax rates, T21, etc.), beer taxes, medical & recreational cannabis legalization, & environmental controls

Results: Continuous Flavor Policy Variable



Results: Binary Flavor Policy Variable

ENDS Volume Sales/Capita

Basic Covariate Specification

-0.353**

+ Tobacco Control Covariates

-0.358**

+ All Policy Covariates

-0.342**

+ Environmental Covariates

-0.333**

Short Run Effect Estimate All Covariates

-0.204*

Long Run Effect Estimate All Covariates

-0.509**

Cigarette Pack Sales/Capita

Basic Covariate Specification

0.157**

+ Tobacco Control Covariates

0.202**

+ All Policy Covariates

0.209**

+ Environmental Covariates

0.216**

Short Run Effect Estimate All Covariates

0.123


Long Run Effect Estimate All Covariates

0.345**


-1.5 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.5

State ENDS Flavor Restriction Coefficients & 95% Confidence Intervals


Results: Binary Exposure, de Chaisemartin & d'Haultfoeuille (DCDH, 2022)




ENDS Sales/Capita analysis using DCDH (2022)



Cigarette Sales/Capita analysis using DCDH (2022)




Results




ENDS Sales/Capita by Flavor, DCDH (2022)


Flavored ENDS




Tobacco or Unflavored ENDS




Results




Results by Consumer Base



Results: Prohibitions vs Limitations



Results: Prohibitions vs Limitations, Omitting MA & RI



Findings

- ENDS flavor policies →  ENDS &  Cigarette sales
 - + 15 cigarettes purchased for every 1 less 0.7mL ENDS pod sold
 - 70% of the long-run effect on cigarette sales stems from non-menthol cigarettes
 - ≈ 40% of the long-run effect on cigarette sales stems from youth-disproportionate brands
- Flavor Prohibitions vs. Limitations
 - Evidence does not suggest that ENDS flavor prohibitions are more effective at reducing ENDS sales than limitations
 - Only flavor prohibitions → statistically significant increases in sales of adult-disproportionate cigarette brands

Implications

Any public health benefit of reducing ENDS use by limiting or prohibiting flavors could lead to offsetting public health damage by increasing cigarette sales.

Limitations

- **Sales ≠ Consumption**. If flavor restrictions lead people to buy ENDS in unrestricted jurisdictions, flavor restrictions' effects on ENDS use will be smaller than estimated by sales data.
- **Blind Spots in Retail Scanner Data**: omits online sales, specialty shops, illicit markets. → sales changes may reflect shifts in sourcing, e.g., from convenience stores to vape shops

**IRI's data cover vast majority of cigarette sales →
These issues should not impact cigarette results.**

Policy Concerns & Options

1. FDA PMTA review has not authorized a single flavored or menthol ENDS product → de facto flavor prohibition?
 - Could evaluating whether each product independently is “appropriate for the protection of public health” yield a mix of products that make this market inappropriate for public health?

Alternative: Concrete Product Standards + Manufacturer Penalties for Youth Use + Point of Sale Retailer Regulation

Policy Concerns & Options

2. Misdirection: Is the focus on less lethal tobacco products impeding efforts to reduce combustible product use, the primary driver of tobacco-related disease?

- Critical Challenges:
 - Substantial equivalence allows introduction of new cigarettes that are quite different from predicate products sold pre-February 15, 2007
 - No manufacturer-specific penalties for disproportionate youth consumption
 - No ENDS user fees in FD&C Act → FDA is under-resourced

Questions/Comments?

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