When Common Identities Decrease Trust: An Experimental Study of Partisan Women

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Abstract: *How does sharing a common gender identity affect the relationship between Democratic and Republican women? Social psychological work suggests that common ingroup identities unite competing factions. After closely examining the conditions upon which the common ingroup identity model depends, I argue that opposing partisans who share the superordinate identity of being a woman will not reduce their intergroup biases. Instead, I predict that raising the salience of their gender will increase cross-party biases. I support my hypotheses with a nationally representative survey of 3,000 adult women and two survey experiments, each with over 1,000 adult women. These findings have direct implications for how women evaluate one another in contentious political settings and, more broadly, for our understanding of when we can and cannot rely upon common identities to bridge the partisan divide.*

Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/I4KVD1.

Partisanship not only influences the way American voters evaluate politics and policies (Bullock et al. 2015; Nicholson 2012; Taber and Lodge 2006), but even affects our personal feelings toward one another (Carlin and Love 2013; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Yet, while partisanship is an influential group identity, there are other important identities that cut across partisanship and influence these attitudes. Gender is one common example. Although women are more likely to identify as Democrats, approximately 38% identify as Republicans. Among white women, partisanship evenly splits between Democrats (46%) and Republicans (47%). How does sharing this common gender identity affect the relationship between Democratic and Republican women? Social psychological findings suggest that shared identities should unite rival groups (Brewer 2001). The prevailing common ingroup identity model (CIIM) suggests that highly salient superordinate categories reduce intergroup bias (Gaertner et al. 1993), making shared group membership salient to competing rivals,

which in turn increases trust (Dovidio and Fiske 2012; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000).

In this study, I examine trust between competing partisans who share the common identity of being a woman. After examining the conditions upon which CIIM depends, I argue that under certain circumstances, women from opposing parties will *not* experience reduced intergroup biases, but will rather display tendencies toward *greater* bias against one another. CIIM requires that members of both rival groups conceive of the superordinate group membership in the same terms. I argue and empirically demonstrate that women from competing parties do not hold a common understanding of what it means to be a woman and, therefore, raising the salience of gender among women who are partisan rivals can *exacerbate* mistrust between them.

I test these hypotheses with a survey of 3,000 adult women and two survey experiments, each with over 1,000 adult women. I expect first that women from opposing parties hold distinct attitudes toward their gender

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identity. I further hypothesize that when a policy makes gender salient, women are more likely to penalize fellow women for identifying with the opposing party, as compared with the penalty they apply to men who identify with the opposing party. When policies do not make gender salient, I do not expect to find this gendered difference in how women treat opposing partisans. Across each study, I find strong support for my hypotheses.

High-profile women in politics have recently fueled speculation that women may cross the aisle to support a woman (e.g., Cook 2007; Hamby 2008)—yet women voters do not appear to do so, instead reliably voting for in-party men even when they run against women. My study has direct implications for how women evaluate one another in contentious political settings. I find that sharing a gender identity not only fails to unite women who are partisan rivals but, in fact, further highlights their rivalry. Even more broadly, this study advances our understanding for when we cannot rely upon common identities to bridge the partisan divide.

Theories on Shared Identities and Group Relations

The CIIM suggests that individuals will view outgroup members more favorably if they think of them as members of an ingroup (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Gaertner et al. 1993). Tajfel and Turner (1979; see also Tajfel et al. 1971) assigned children to competing groups and found that they discriminate against members of the outgroup while unduly rewarding fellow ingroup members. Once the researchers emphasized a common identity that united rival group members, social cohesion strengthened and, with it, so did preferences for the overarching group (see also Sherif et al. 1954/1961). This work suggests that rivals should form favorable impressions of one another if they "embrac[e] a larger group identity which subsumes their separate identities" (Nadler and Saguy 2004, 18). More recently, Levine and colleagues (2005) administered a face-to-face experiment on male soccer fans. The researchers employed a confederate to feign injury, and they manipulated whether the injured individual wore a jersey bearing the subject's preferred soccer team or the rival soccer team. They found that soccer fans were more likely to help a like-minded soccer fan in crisis. With a follow-up experiment, they reduced these biases by first encouraging all participants to think of soccer fans as a superordinate identity that bonds all league fans together.

Given these findings, one could expect that common identities might increase trust across partisan rivals,

a concern that is particularly prevalent during times of increased social distance (Mason 2014) and affective polarization (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Yet the success of the CIIM relies in large part upon a particular assumption that, I argue, does not hold when we consider women in American politics.

Limits of the Common Ingroup Identity Model

The architects of the CIIM laid out particular requirements for their model of intergroup cooperation to succeed. Specifically, members of the competing subgroups must have the potential to conceive of themselves as a single, superordinate group rather than as two separate groups. Furthermore, members of each subgroup must share a common conception of what it means to be part of that superordinate group and, as such, must share "common, superordinate goals" (Brewer 1996, 291–303).

When rival groups do not share a common conception of the superordinate identity, the CIIM cannot hold. Dach-Gruschow and Hong (2006) find that identifying with the common identity of "American" failed to unite white and black Americans in the United States following Hurricane Katrina. The authors attributed the CIIM's failure to the fact that white and black Americans hold distinct conceptions of what it means to be American, and, therefore, they cannot unify around the common group identity. Rutchick and Eccleston (2010) take this a step further, arguing (as I will) that the failure for two subgroups to agree upon a commonly defined superordinate identity not only prevents the CIIM from succeeding but, in fact, can *increase* biases between the two rival subgroups. The authors explain that "when there is a perception that subgroups do not have a shared conception of the superordinate group, appeals to the common ingroup identity made by outgroup members are likely to backfire" (111). When a superordinate identity becomes salient, individuals consider distinctions in how each subgroup's members conceive of the superordinate identity. This exacerbates their distrust for one another. As Rutchick and Eccleston explain, "one must believe that the proposed superordinate group represents an identity that one truly shares" (2010, 110).

Given what we know about the limits of the CIIM, I expect that women from rival partisan camps cannot unify over their common gender identity for the simple reason that women from opposing parties hold distinct views of their gender identity. There is indeed a variety of ways to conceptualize what it means to identify as a woman or what a woman's role in society should be.

Attitudes toward gender roles generally are often conceptualized as either "traditional" (encapsulating a preference for men serving a role as a primary breadwinner and women taking a secondary role in the workplace) or as "egalitarian" (referring to men and women holding equal roles in the public and private spheres; Larsen and Long 1988). Existing work shows that more egalitarian views have become increasingly preferred over time,[1] and especially among women (Larsen and Long 1988), among younger Americans, and among individuals whose own mother was in the workplace (Donnelly et al. 2016).

Much of the work regarding attitudes toward the role of women in society tends to focus on distinctions between men and women. Burns et al. (2015), for example, note that despite significant overall movement toward more modern attitudes toward women, there remains a significant divide between men and women in "the extent to which they actually endorse equal roles" (126). Even among women, however, there is crucial variation in views toward gender. Burns et al. (2015) demonstrate a lack of cohesion among female respondents when it comes to views on women in the workplace and in positions of authority and on gender roles in the home. When it comes to attitudes toward feminism, a particularly effective measure for gauging gender consciousness (Cook 1989; Cook and Wilcox 1991; Huddy et al. 2015), there is again wide variation among women. Some women identify as feminists, others reject the term and its underlying principles, still others support its principles but reject the term (Taylor 1996), and even feminist activists hold disparate views of their feminist identities (Reger 2002). According to Burns et al. (2015), women as a whole have not developed as coherent a politicized group identity as have other subordinate groups—for example, as compared with African Americans, the working class, and the elderly (Aronson 2003, 904). Only half of women report believing that "what happens to women in this country will affect their own life" (Burns et al. 2015, 132).

Smith and Winter (2002) suggest that partisanship correlates with this variation, as they find a partisan divide in attitudes toward feminism and the women's movement, with Republicans holding more negative views among both male and female respondents. Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008) similarly demonstrate that liberals (as opposed to conservatives) implicitly favor feminism. I thus expect that a partisan divide over gender identity not only prevents women from opposing parties to unite when gender is made salient, but in fact increases mistrust

between them due to their divergent views on their gender identity. When politics are *not* explicitly relevant to women, however, the salience of gender will not increase, and women should not penalize one another for identifying with the partisan outgroup any more than they would penalize a man for doing so. In sum, my hypotheses are the following:

H1: Views on what it means to identify as a woman significantly differ across party lines. Women from opposing parties do not hold common views on their gender identity.

H2a: When gender is salient to politics, women will penalize women for identifying with the partisan outgroup significantly more than they will penalize men for identifying with the partisan outgroup. In other words, women's preference for in-party women versus out-party women is greater than their preference for in-party men versus out-party men.

H2b: When gender is not salient to politics, women will not favor in-party women over out-party women any more than they would favor in-party men over out-party men.

To carry out this study, I administered both a survey and two survey experiments. I will first describe the data, procedure, and results for the survey and then turn to the survey experiments.

Survey: Data and Procedure

The survey was administered by SurveyMonkey to an online panel of 3,607 women aged 18 and older April 18–24, 2017.[2] To confirm that Democratic and Republican women hold different views on their gender identity, I asked three questions. Scholars debate the merits of various items for measuring attitudes toward one's own gender identity group (e.g., Gurin 1985; Miller, Hildreth, and Simmons 1986; Sears and Huddy 1988), but evidence points toward feminist consciousness as a particularly effective item. Cook (1989, 78) demonstrates that a feminist consciousness scale better taps into group consciousness among women than do "closeness" measures and is strongly related to both group identification and support for collective action (Cook and Wilcox 1991). Huddy et al. (2015) show that the feminist consciousness measure is

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[1] Donnelly et al. (2016, 51) note a "brief and small decrease in egalitarian attitudes among adults over 40 in the early 2000s and, for 12th graders between the mid-1990s to the 2010s."

[2] Respondents are selected from nearly three million SurveyMonkey respondents. Data are weighted for age, race, sex, education, and geography using the American Community Survey. The modeled error estimate for this survey is plus or minus 1.5 percentage points. Sample demographics appear in Appendix A in the supporting information.

FIGURE 1 Responses to Survey Items among Democratic and Republican Women

the most powerful gender-related variable in predicting political attitudes in the 2012 American National Election Studies. I employ this same measure and ask respondents how well the term *feminist* describes them. I then asked them how well they think the term describes the typical Democratic woman and the typical Republican woman.

Survey: Results

The first question asked respondents how well the word *feminist* describes them. The response scale ranged from 1 (*Extremely well*) to 5 (*Not at all*). As illustrated in Figure 1, Democratic women feel significantly (p < .001) better represented by the term *feminist* (mean response: 2.47) than do Republican women (mean response: 3.80). This suggests a sharply divergent view across women from opposing parties regarding their gender identity.

I test the degree to which women perceive this cross-party distinction by asking them to rate how the typical Democratic woman and typical Republican woman might answer this question (responses denoted by diamonds and circles in Figure 1). Democratic women view a statistically significant gap (p < .001) between how Democratic women and Republican women typically view their gender identity: They estimate a mean response of 2.58 among Democratic women and a mean response of 3.5 among Republican women. Republican women also view a significantly (p < .001) large gap between the two partisan camps' perceptions of their gender identity, estimating a mean response of 2.35 among Democratic women and 3.5 among Republican women.

Levendusky and Malhotra (2016) note that Democrats and Republicans generally tend to hold exaggerated views of the degree to which they disagree on policy issues, a phenomenon they refer to as *false polarization.* Here, though, it appears that Democratic and Republican women actually hold remarkably accurate views on their sharply divergent attitudes toward feminist identity. This supports my first hypothesis: Women from opposing partisan camps do not share a common view of their "superordinate" identity of being a woman.

Survey Experiment: Data and Procedure

To test my second and third hypotheses, I employed a survey experiment, which I administered to a sample of 1,089 American women recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI) August 3–13, 2015.[3] I then replicated my survey experiment by readministering the same design to a sample of 1,760 American women recruited by Survey Sampling International March 23–26, 2017. I will discuss this replication study after I present my initial results.

This experimental approach offers the "twin advantages of randomization and control" (Chong and Druckman 2007, 637), ensuring that the study is internally valid (Campbell 1957; McDermott 2011).

[3]SSI recruits participants through a large opt-in sample. Panelists are randomly assigned to particular surveys. SSI samples are certified by a third-party auditor and meet external benchmarks for quality. Opt-in Internet panels appear to produce estimates as accurate as telephone surveys (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014). Sample demographics appear in Appendix B in the supporting information.

TABLE 1 Experimental Conditions

	Woman supports gender-salient issue	Man supports gender-salient issue	Woman supports non-gender-salient issue	Man supports non-gender-salient issue
Republican	*Condition 1*	*Condition 3*	*Condition 5*	*Condition 7*
Democrat	*Condition 2*	*Condition 4*	*Condition 6*	*Condition 8*

Survey experiments are particularly useful for studying the effect of gender on a host of political variables (see Dolan and Sanbonmatsu 2011). Sapiro (1981–1982) designed the seminal experiment of this nature when she asked respondents to read a fictional political speech that was attributed either to a female candidate (Joan Baker) or male candidate (John Baker) without any additional heuristics (e.g., party identity). Sapiro's was the first study to experimentally demonstrate that a candidate's gender influences respondents' evaluations of them (specifically in low-information settings). The study I designed and administered harkens back to this original experiment, with a few crucial differences. In what follows, I describe the design and procedure before turning to my results.

My study required eight conditions. In each one, participants evaluate either a woman (whom I named Linda Walsh) or a man (Lewis Walsh) from either party (Democratic or Republican) who supported one of two issues (gender-salient or non-gender-salient). Table 1 displays all eight conditions.

My hypotheses make the following predictions. First, when gender is salient, women will penalize out-party women relative to in-party women significantly more than they will penalize out-party men relative to in-party men. I test this hypothesis by comparing Conditions 1–4. The difference in how Republican women evaluate Condition 1 (in-party woman) versus Condition 2 (out-party woman) should be greater than the difference in how they evaluate Condition 3 (in-party man) versus Condition 4 (out-party man). I expect that this will hold among Democratic women as well: The difference in how Democratic women evaluate Condition 2 (in-party woman) versus Condition 1 (out-party woman) should be greater than the difference in how they evaluate Condition 4 (in-party man) versus Condition 3 (out-party man). The CIIM would predict that women penalize other women *less* harshly for identifying with the out-party than they penalize men, but I expect that the opposite is true: Women are, in fact, penalized *more* harshly by other women for identifying with the out-party.

My second hypothesis states that when gender is not salient, women do not penalize other women for identifying with the out-party any more than they would penalize

men for doing so. Conditions 5–8 allow me to test this hypothesis. I expect that the penalty Republican women apply to Condition 6 (out-party woman) relative to Condition 5 (in-party woman) should be no greater than the penalty they apply to Condition 8 (out-party man) relative to Condition 7 (in-party man). Similarly, the penalty that Democratic women apply to Condition 5 (out-party woman) relative to Condition 6 (in-party woman) should be no greater than the penalty they apply to Condition 7 (out-party man) relative to Condition 8 (in-party man).

The gender-salient issue I employed was the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the first act that President Obama signed into law upon his inauguration. The substance of the law focuses on reducing inequality against women and therefore contains an explicit appeal to women. The non-gender-salient issue I employed in the experiment was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known colloquially as the Iran deal, which focused on Iran's capacity to produce nuclear weapons and imposed restrictions on both its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and its centrifuges for a fixed period of time. The Iran deal neither specifically primes women nor makes gender salient. Respondents read an article that described one of the scenarios listed in Table 2.

I provided the information in a simulated news article embedded in the survey. All eight articles appear in Appendix C in the supporting information. After reading the article, respondents rated the degree to which they *trust* the character about whom they read (Lewis Walsh or Linda Walsh) when it comes to the issue discussed in the article (either equal pay or the Iran deal). Trust is commonly used to measure intergroup cooperation (e.g., Gaertner and Dovidio 2000, 74) and is a "crucial component" of how people navigate their social relationships (Tropp 2008, 93; see also Fiske 2003). Recent research points to growing distrust between Democrats and Republicans as evidence of political polarization (e.g., Carlin and Love 2013; Iyengar and Westwood 2015) and demonstrates that Democrats and Republicans exhibit higher ingroup trust and lower trust for the political outgroup. Although scholars do not agree on a precise definition of trust, Levi and Stoker (2000) present a "minimal consensus" about its meaning. Trust is relational and

TABLE 2 Description of Conditions

Condition	Scenario
1	Linda Walsh identifies with the Republican Party and supports the Fair Pay Act.
2	Linda Walsh identifies with the Democratic Party and supports the Fair Pay Act.
3	Lewis Walsh identifies with the Republican Party and supports the Fair Pay Act.
4	Lewis Walsh identifies with the Democratic Party and supports the Fair Pay Act.
5	Linda Walsh identifies with the Republican Party and supports the Iran deal.
6	Linda Walsh identifies with the Democratic Party and supports the Iran deal.
7	Lewis Walsh identifies with the Republican Party and supports the Iran deal.
8	Lewis Walsh identifies with the Democratic Party and supports the Iran deal.

is bestowed upon specific individuals over specific domains. Interpersonal trust is variously conceived as necessary for robust democratic institutions (Gibson 1992; Inglehart 1977; Sullivan and Transue 1999, 627), as a key factor in promoting healthy societies (Mutz 2009, 440), as important for peaceful transitions of power (Sullivan and Transue 1999, 641), and as conducive to cooperation among citizens (Carlin and Love 2013, 44). More broadly, trust (or lack thereof) is used (e.g., by Hetherington and Rudolph 2015) to demonstrate that Americans are more polarized in their feelings toward opposing partisans than they are in their policy preferences. By isolating the degree to which female respondents trust a man or woman from the in-party or out-party regarding a gender-salient issue and a non-gender-salient issue, I am able to test my hypothesis regarding the influence of a common gender on affect between partisans. All question wording appears in Appendix D in the supporting information.

Survey Experiment: Results

The CIIM assumes that two competing subgroups hold compatible views of what it means to identify with the common superordinate identity group. In the absence of this common understanding, the groups will not unite under their umbrella identity; rather, as my second hypothesis states, intergroup biases will increase. I thus expect that when gender is salient to politics, women will penalize other women for identifying with the opposing party significantly more than they will penalize out-party men relative to in-party men. To maximize both the clarity of my results and the nuances in my findings, I present my results in two ways: first, in a series of graphs depicting the mean reported trust in each condition. Then I report and illustrate the results of a triple interaction that focuses on my three key independent variables of interest: the gender of the character in the vignette, the character's partisanship, and the issue that the character supports.

I begin with examining how Republican women respondents rate the trustworthiness of the fictionalized character who supports equal pay for women, an issue that makes gender salient (Figure 2). When the character in the vignette is a woman, she is viewed as significantly less trustworthy when she identifies with the out-party (i.e., the Democratic party; M = 3.60, SE = 0.73) than when she identifies with the in-party (i.e., the Republican party; M = 5.03, SE = 0.57). The male character, however, is not penalized for identifying with the out-party; his trustworthiness as an in-party Republican (M = 4.18, SE = 0.60) is not significantly different from his trustworthiness as an out-party Democrat (M = 4.08, SE = 0.70). The downward slope from in-party women to out-party women is significantly more negative than the slope from in-party men to out-party men (p < .05). This indicates that when a policy issues raises the salience of gender, sharing a common gender identity with the out-party *decreases* trust for out-party women among Republican women far more so than it does for out-party men.

I find the same pattern among Democratic women (see Figure 3). As they evaluate in-party Democrats versus out-party Republicans who share their common gender identity, the out-party women are severely penalized. Democratic women, meanwhile, do not penalize Republican men compared with Democratic men. Again, the downward slope from in-party women to out-party women is significantly more negative than the slope from in-party men to out-party men (p < .05).

In the preceding two conditions, the issue in each vignette raised the salience of gender and, as I argue, motivated women to consider distinctions in how out-party women view their common gender, thus increasing bias. This theory suggests that when a policy issue does *not* make gender salient, women will not penalize women for identifying with the out-party more than they will penalize men for the same behavior. I now turn to Figure 4 as I describe these results.

FIGURE 2 Perceived Trustworthiness of Equal Pay Supporters among Republican Women

Note: Dark circles display the mean level of perceived trust among Republican women for women who are Republicans (on the left) and for women who are Democrats (on the right). Lighter circles illustrate the mean level of perceived trust among Republican women for men who are Republicans (on the left) and for men who are Democrats (on the right). The 95% confidence intervals are denoted by vertical lines around each mean.

On the left panel of Figure 4, I illustrate mean perceived trust among Republican women. When the character in the vignette supports the Iran deal, Republican women do not penalize women for identifying with the out-party any more than they penalize men for doing so. The right panel of Figure 4 shows identical results for Democratic women. Out-party women are no longer penalized when gender is not salient.

With a regression model, I can specify the effect of each of these variables alone and in concert with one another. I employ the following model:[4]

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Trust} = {} & \beta\text{Woman} \\
& + \beta\text{Outparty} \\
& + \beta\text{GenderSalientIssue} \\
& + \beta\text{Woman} \times \beta\text{Outparty} \\
& + \beta\text{Woman} \times \beta\text{GenderSalientIssue} \\
& + \beta\text{Outparty} \times \beta\text{GenderSalientIssue} \\
& + \beta\text{Woman} \times \beta\text{Outparty} \times \beta\text{GenderSalientIssue}
\end{aligned}
$$

[4]Variables are coded as such: Woman (0 = Lewis Walsh, 1 = Linda Walsh), Out-party (0 = character in vignette and respondent are both Democrats, or are both Republicans; 1 = character in vignette is Democrat and respondent is Republican, or vice versa), Gender-salient issue (0 = issue in vignette does not address gender, 1 = issue does address gender).

The model regresses the respondent's perceived trust on the character's party, the character's gender, and the nature of the issue that the character supports, as well as interactions between each of these variables as a pair and an interaction among all three. In Figure 5, I plot the resulting coefficients.

The baseline against which each coefficient in this model is compared is an in-party man who supports the Iran deal. The first coefficient represents the gender of the character in the vignette ("woman"). The nonsignificance of this coefficient (p = .23) indicates that women do not trust an in-party woman any more than they trust an in-party man who supports the Iran deal. This demonstrates that the CIIM does not appear to hold in the case of partisans who share the common identity of being a woman.

The "out-party" coefficient illustrates the significant negative effect of an out-party man, rather than an in-party man, who supports the Iran deal on perceived trustworthiness (p < .001). Respondents are less likely to trust men from the other party (as opposed to their own party) when they support the Iran deal. This is exactly what we would expect, given in-party biases: Out-partisans are viewed as less trustworthy than are in-partisans.

FIGURE 3 Perceived Trustworthiness of Equal Pay Supporters among Democratic Women


Note: Dark circles display the mean level of perceived trust among Democratic women for women who are Democrats (on the left) and for women who are Republicans (on the right). Lighter circles illustrate the mean level of perceived trust among Democratic women for men who are Democrats (on the left) and for men who are Republicans (on the right). The 95% confidence intervals are denoted by vertical lines around each mean.

FIGURE 4 Perceived Trustworthiness of Iran Deal Supporters among Republican and Democratic Women

Note: Dark circles display the mean level of perceived trust among women for women, and lighter circles display the mean level of perceived trust among women for men. The 95% confidence intervals are denoted by vertical lines around each mean.

FIGURE 5 Coefficients Included in the
Triple-Interaction Model

FIGURE 6 Replication Data: Coefficients
Included in the Triple-Interaction
Model

The third variable, "gender-salient issue," demonstrates that respondents are significantly ($p < .01$) more likely to trust in-party men who support a gender-salient issue (the Fair Pay Act), as compared with in-party men who support the Iran deal.

The interaction between "woman" and "gender-salient issue" shows a marginal benefit of being a woman from the in-party who supports a gender-salient issue ($p = .08$), as opposed to a man who does the same. Women evaluate in-party women slightly more positively than they evaluate in-party men when the issue raises the salience of gender.

The interaction between "out-party" and "gender-salient issue" demonstrates that men from the out-party who support the gender-salient issue are perceived as more trustworthy than are men from the out-party who support the non-gendered issue ($p = .007$).

The final variable—the three-way interaction—is the key variable in this analysis; it demonstrates that the penalty women apply to opposition partisans when they support gender-salient issues is significantly ($p < .01$) more negative when the opposition partisans are also women. Not only does the common ingroup identity

fail to unite women from opposing parties when gender is salient, but it in fact drives them *further apart*. The salience of gender effectively increases their outgroup biases against women from the opposing party. This backlash effect is evident only against fellow women from the opposing party when gender is salient.[5]

Replication Study

The preceding study compares one gender-salient issue with one non-gendered issue. I administered the study to one sample at one point in time. To check robustness,

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[5]My survey experiment did not include questions regarding attitudes toward feminism to avoid priming feminist identity in non-gender-salient conditions. I conducted additional tests to investigate whether there are heterogeneous effects based on respondents' attitudes toward feminism. These results appear in Appendix E of the supporting information.

I readministered this study on a different adult population at a different point in time (2 years later). This time, I included the same two issues I had previously employed, and I also added two more recent policy issues that are associated with the new president. The first, Donald Trump's Inspiring the Next Space Pioneers, Innovators, Researchers, and Explorers (INSPIRE) Women Act, is a gender-salient bill aimed at encouraging women to enter careers in science, technology, engineeering, and math (STEM). The second, Donald Trump's Executive Order 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States," is a non-gender-salient order that temporarily bans travel to the United States from six Muslim-majority nations. I coded the equal pay and STEM conditions as "gender-salient" and the Iran deal and travel ban conditions as "non-gendered." I then ran the identical regression that I used in the first study.

The results, which I provide in detail in Appendix F-i of the supporting information, are nearly identical in terms of both the direction and significance of every coefficient.[6] Figure 6 illustrates the results from the regression model. Across this new sample and across new issues, the penalty that women apply to opposition partisans when they support gender-salient issues is significantly more negative when the opposition partisans are also women.

Discussion and Conclusion

Growing distrust between Democrats and Republicans may lead social identity theorists to look toward cross-cutting ingroup identities as an avenue for bipartisan cooperation. The rise of women to positions of political power brings with it the potential for gender to bridge the gap between Democrats and Republicans—a potential that, I argue, cannot be realized given Democratic and Republican women's sharply contrasting views of what it means to identify as a woman. Several examples of women's reluctance to cross the aisle to support other women are evident in American politics. In presidential elections, women on the ticket have failed to inspire female voters to "cross over"; there is no substantial evidence that Hillary Clinton in 2008, Sarah Palin in 2008, or Hillary Clinton in 2016 achieved support from women in the opposing party. When it comes to gender consciousness and politics, women from opposing parties continue to maintain politically polarized viewpoints: For example, 87% of Democratic women and only 23% of Republican

women held a positive view of the 2017 Women's March in Washington.[7]

Research in political science demonstrates numerous challenges for women in the political arena. For example, female candidates are disproportionately punished for sponsoring negative ads (Krupnikov and Bauer 2014), and voters rate female politicians as possessing fewer positive feminine traits as compared with female professionals generally, yet they also are viewed as possessing fewer positive masculine traits than male politicians (Schneider and Bos 2014). A study of 10,000 newspaper articles concluded that female candidates garner substantially more coverage surrounding personal traits and far less regarding actual policy issues (Dunaway et al. 2013). Given all of this, it is perhaps no wonder that women are significantly more "election-averse" than are men (Kanthak and Woon 2014). Two elements appear to be at play when women evaluate men and women from the opposing party: First, the common Ingroup Identity Model does not unify women, as the classic social psychological work suggests it might. Second, it also appears as though out-party men may be receiving a boost in perceived trustworthiness for speaking out in favor of women's rights. The degree to which individuals reward out-groups (in this case, men) for supporting an in-group (in this case, women) merits further inquiry and surely plays a role in the phenomenon I observe.

When it comes to implications for political elites, my findings suggest that when women discuss women's issues, they receive no added reward from in-party women and, in fact, are penalized by out-party women. When men do the same, though, they appear to gain perceived trustworthiness from women in the opposing party. This could suggest that a party working to attract women from the other party would be best off with a male spokesperson discussing women's rights, though it raises the question of when this might lead to backlash among women. As parties weigh strategic trade-offs between appealing to distinct audiences (e.g., general election audiences vs. party activists), the effectiveness of this strategy could vary. To draw firmer conclusions regarding candidate preference, it would be useful to test my theories in elite settings.

In this study, I only examine women. I believe that my theory applies to any subgroups that do not hold compatible views of their superordinate identity, but additional work can test this theory in new contexts. I compare gendered issues in the domestic arena (i.e., equal pay

[6]The supporting information contains sample demographics (Appendix F-ii), stimuli (Appendix F-iii), and question wording (Appendix F-iv) for the replication study.

[7]Poll conducted by the *Washington Post*. See https://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2017/02/01/National-Politics/Polling/question_18499.xml?uuid=S_cl9uh1EeaQPZsR7X2NKg#.

and women's opportunities in STEM fields) with non-gendered issues in the foreign policy arena. Applying these theories to different policy domains might shed more light on how and when gender becomes salient to citizens. In addition, women in my study do not physically interact with women from the opposing party, but they rather simply read about them in a news article. Although Deschamps and Brown (1983) and Brown and Wade (1987) do not find that physical interaction is necessary to increase positive evaluations of outgroup members, Gaertner et al. (1999) do find that physical contact improves intergroup cooperation. Similarly, Klar (2014) finds that Democrats and Republicans who meet in small groups tend to moderate their biases against one another's viewpoints. Incorporating an element of physical interaction would be useful for understanding the limits of intergroup cooperation in American politics. My study demonstrates that shared identities should not be taken for granted as an automatic route to bipartisanship and should remind both scholars and political elites that oversimplifying identity politics may lead to unexpected outcomes.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

Appendix A: Demographics of Survey Sample
Appendix B: Demographics of Survey Experiment Sample
Appendix C: Experimental Stimuli

Appendix D: Question Wording from Survey Experiment
Appendix E: Additional Tests
Appendix F-i: Results from Replication Study
Appendix F-ii: Demographics of Replication Study Sample
Appendix F-iii: All experimental stimuli in Replication Study
Appendix F-iv: All question wording in Replication Study