

# **Pentesting in SDN**

## **Owning the controllers**



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# **Who Am I?**

**Roberto Soares**

**Information Security Consultant**

**Conviso Application Security**

**@espreto**


- **Network (traditional)**
- **SDN Overview**
- **Threat Vectors**
- **Pentesting**
- **Defense**
- **Future**

# Traditionally...

- **Specific Vendors;**
- **Scalability;**
- **Complexity;**
- **Hardware Focus;**
- **Interoperability;**
- **etc...**



# Classical Model



- 1. Package sent to the switch.**
- 2. Switch looks in their polices.**
- 3. Switch forwards the packet to the server.**

# SDN (Software Defined Network)




# SDN: Architecture

## Data Plane & Control Plane



**“SDN isn’t a technology, it’s a architecture”.**

# SDN: Technical



- 1. Packet is sent to the switch.**
- 2. Packet header is extracted and sent to the controller.**
- 3. Controller (check) adds a new flow in the switch table.**
- 4. Switch forwards the packet to the server.**



# Vendors



“SDN is just a fad...”

# Controllers


- **Commercial**
  - HP VAN SDN
  - Juniper Contrail
  - Oracle SDN
  - Cisco XNC
  - Huawei POF
- **Open-Source**
  - Mininet
  - OpenDayLight
  - FloodLight
  - Juniper OpenContrail

# OpenFlow

- **Communication between the controller and the switch (logical/physical).**
- **Routing flow based.**
- **Secure channel for transmission.**
- **Allows for programming “Flows” (traffic type);**
- **Allows for switching different network layers to be combined;**
- **Not limited by the platform or be enforced by the protocols.**

**“SDN != OpenFlow”**

# OpenFlow (internal)



# **It's time for revision!**

## **DEMO 1**


**SDN overview with mininet**

**“Why set up your network if you can program it?”**




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# Threat Vectors



map.ipviking.com

# Vectors!



- ↔ Admins Management (SSH!?)
- ↔ Control Plane (OpenFlow)
- ↔ Data Plane (logical/physical connections)

# Attacks!

- 1. Fake/Hijacked traffic flows.**
- 2. Switch vulnerabilities.**
- 3. Vulnerabilities on Control Plane communications.**
- 4. Controller vulnerabilities.**
- 5. Untrusted apps/plugins on controller.**
- 6. Vulnerabilities on admin computer.**
- 7. Lack of resources for security analysis.**

**Specific to SDN**



# Attacks!

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# Pentesting...

- 1. Identify controllers.**
- 2. Enumerate configs.**
- 3. Owning the controller.**

# Default Ports

## Controllers:

**FloodLight/Mininet/Pox/POF/HP VAN port 6633.**

**Oracle SDN port 6522.**

## Management Interface:

**FloodLight port 8080.**

**OpenDayLight Web Interface port 8080.**

**HP VAN SDN & IBM SDN-VE port 8443.**

**Cisco XNC HTTP (8080) and HTTPS (8443).**

# It's time for revision!

## DEMO 2

`sdn_enum_controllers.rb`

<https://github.com/espreto>



# Authentication

## Default passwords:

**FloodLight = floodlight:<null>**

**OpenDayLight = admin:admin**

**HP VAN SDN = admin:skyline**

**Juniper Contrail = admin:contrail123**

**IBM SDN-VE = admin:admin**

**Cisco XNC = admin:admin**

# REST APIs

- **FloodLight port 8080**
  - (<http://localhost:8080/wm/core/controller/switchs/json>)
- **OpenDayLight port 80/8080**
  - (<http://localhost/rest/v1/model/controller-node>)
- **HP VAN SDN port 35357/8443**
  - (<https://localhost:8443/sdn/v2.0/auth>)
- **Juniper Contrail port 8081/8082**
  - (<http://localhost:8081/analytics/uves>)
- **IBM SDN-VE port 8443**
  - (<http://localhost:8443/one/nb/v2>)
- **Cisco XNC port 8080**
  - (<http://localhost:8080/controller/nb/v2/monitor>)



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# It's time for revision!

## DEMO 3

`sdn_enum_configs_api.rb`

<https://github.com/espreto>

# It's time for revision!

## DEMO 4

`sdn_hp_change_pass.rb`

<https://github.com/espreto>



# It's time for revision!

## DEMO 5

`sdn_hp_rce.rb`

<https://github.com/espreto>



# It's time for revision!


## DEMO 6

`sdn_contrail_read_file.rb`

<https://github.com/espreto>



# Real World...



# Try Hard

- **VLANs?**
- **IDS/IPS?**
- **NAC?**
- **Etc, etc, etc...**

**Look:**

**idle\_timeout, hard\_timeout, rtt values, etc.**



**“Packet Analysis is your best friend”.**

# Defense

- **Apply controls in CP and DP;**
- **Restrict access APIs;**
- **Audit internal malicious activity;**
- **Plugins/Applications that add levels of security;**
- **Hardening;**
- **Secure Development Lifecycle (SDLC);**
- **Specialized intrusion tests;**
- **Others...**

**“Security must not be optional”.**

# Future...

## ...of this research:

- **Coordination of CVEs with vendors; \o/**
- **Advanced research with SDN;**
- **Donations of Switches (OpenFlow supported); ☺**
- **Create a group to share information;**
- **And...**

**“Opportunities are usually disguised as hard work, so most people don’t recognize them”.**

**Ann Landers.**

# Questions?



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