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%% This BibTeX bibliography file was created using BibDesk.
%% http://bibdesk.sourceforge.net/
%% Created for Brad Weslake at 2011-09-20 14:02:24 -0400
%% Saved with string encoding Unicode (UTF-8)
@article{smith_2008a,
Abstract = {Many have thought that symmetries of a Lagrangian explain the standard laws of energy, momentum, and angular momentum conservation in a rather straightforward way. In this paper, I argue that the explanation of conservation laws via symmetries of Lagrangians involves complications that have not been adequately noted in the philosophical literature and some of the physics literature on the subject. In fact, such complications show that the principles that are commonly appealed to to drive explanations of conservation laws are not generally correct without caveats. I hope here to give a clearer picture of the relationship between symmetries and conservation laws in Lagrangian mechanics via an examination of the bearing that results in the inverse problem in the calculus of variations have on this topic.},
Author = {Sheldon R. Smith},
Date-Added = {2011-09-19 18:55:25 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-19 18:55:25 -0400},
Journal = {Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics},
Keywords = {Symmetry; Physics; Explanation},
Month = 5,
Number = {2},
Pages = {325--345},
Title = {Symmetries and the Explanation of Conservation Laws in the Light of the Inverse Problem in Lagrangian Mechanics},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2007.12.001},
Volume = {39},
Year = {2008},
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@article{smith_2005,
Author = {Nicholas J. J. Smith},
Date-Added = {2011-09-19 18:41:02 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-19 18:43:18 -0400},
Journal = {The Monist},
Keywords = {Backwards Causation; Time Travel},
Month = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {388-395},
Title = {Why Would Time Travelers Try to Kill their Younger Selves?},
Volume = {88},
Year = {2005}}
@article{smith_2007b,
Abstract = {Many have found attractive views according to which the veracity of specific causal judgements is underwritten by general causal laws. This paper describes various variants of that view and explores complications that appear when one looks at a certain simple type of example from physics. To capture certain causal dependencies, physics is driven to look at equations which, I argue, are not causal laws. One place where physics is forced to look at such equations (and not the only place) is in its handling of Green's functions which reveal point-wise causal dependencies. Thus, I claim that there is no simple relationship between causal dependence and causal laws of the sort often pictured. Rather, this paper explores the complexity of the relationship in a certain well-understood case.
Introduction
The Causal Covering-Law Thesis
The Laws of String Motion
Green's Functions and Causation
Green's Functions and Boundary Conditions
The Green's Function as a Violation of the Wave Equation
The Green's Function and other Senses of `Causal Law': Temporal Propagation and Local Propagation
The Distributional Wave Equation
Why is not the Green's Function a `Causal Law'?
Conclusion
},
Author = {Smith, Sheldon R.},
Date-Added = {2011-09-19 18:36:24 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-20 14:02:19 -0400},
Journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Keywords = {Causation; Laws; Physics},
Month = 12,
Number = {4},
Pages = {659--688},
Title = {Causation and Its Relation to {`Causal} Laws'},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axm036},
Volume = {58},
Year = {2007},
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@book{zimmerman_2004,
Address = {Oxford},
Annote = {On file},
Author = {Dean W. Zimmerman},
Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Metaphysics},
Date-Added = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Editor = {Dean W. Zimmerman},
Keywords = {Metaphysics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Title = {Oxford Studies in Metaphysics},
Volume = {1},
Year = {2004},
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@incollection{hall_2004b,
Annote = {On file},
Author = {Ned Hall},
Crossref = {zimmerman_2004},
Date-Added = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Keywords = {Causation},
Pages = {255-299},
Title = {The Intrinsic Character of Causation},
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@proceedings{weingartner_1989,
Address = {Vienna},
Author = {Paul Weingartner and Gerhard Schurz},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of the Natural Sciences: Proceedings of the 13th International Wittgenstein Symposium},
Date-Added = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Editor = {Paul Weingartner and Gerhard Schurz},
Keywords = {Anthology},
Publisher = {Verlag H{\"o}lder-Pichter Tempsky},
Title = {Philosophy of the Natural Sciences: Proceedings of the 13th International Wittgenstein Symposium},
Year = {1989}}
@inproceedings{cartwright_1989a,
Author = {Nancy Cartwright},
Crossref = {weingartner_1989},
Date-Added = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Keywords = {Causation; Quantum Mechanics},
Pages = {120-127},
Title = {Quantum Causes: The Lesson of the Bell Inequalities}}
@inbook{fraassen_1989b,
Abstract = {According to Lewis's original account, the laws of nature in a given possible world are the principles of the best scientific theory of that world, where `best' denotes an optimal combination of strength and simplicity. This serves to provide content to a notion of physical necessity, but needed to be qualified with a restriction of such possible descriptions to languages whose predicates have a special status (in the simplest case, that of standing for `natural' classes of entities in that world). Lewis provides an anti-nominalist metaphysics, while staying as close as possible to the nominalist preferences that had characterized e.g. Quine's philosophical work. This Chapter argues that his account is at best deceptively successful, and solves the problem of inference at the cost of an inability to address the problem of identification.},
Crossref = {fraassen_1989},
Date-Added = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Pages = {40-64},
Title = {Ideal Science: David Lewis's Account of Laws},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.003.0003},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.003.0003}}
@book{fraassen_1989,
Abstract = {Laws and Symmetry has three main objectives. The first is to show the failure of philosophical accounts of laws of nature. The second is to undercut the epistemological principles at work in arguments for the reality of laws of nature. The third objective, nearest to my heart, is to be constructive as well, and to contribute to an epistemology and a philosophy of science antithetical to such metaphysical notions as laws of nature. Part One, in which the first objective is pursued, was the main subject of discussion in the symposium to follow. In this Synopsis, therefore, I shall concentrate on that.
In my view, as presented in Chapter 1, the concept of a law of nature is an anachronism, its proper life belonging to the 17th and 18th Centuries. Laws of nature played an important role in the philosophical-scientific thinking of Descartes and Newton, and functioned for them as a central clue to the structure of science. At the same time, two developments threatened the status of law. One was the empiricist critique of necessity and causality, notions closely allied to that of law. The other was that science was rapidly gaining autonomy not only from theology but from all of philosophy, and was exploiting concepts and methods foreign to metaphysics. Pre-eminent here is the birth of the symmetry argument. (Discussion of this subject is begun in Chapter 1 and continued in Chapters 10, 11 and 12.) Modern physics argues from symmetry and continuity -- not from universality or necessity, natural kinds or essences, contingency or accident. The concept of a law of nature is a vestigial concept in contemporary science.
Chapter 2 collects the cluster of criteria for what laws must be and do, which are honored in the literature to some degree or other. We can divide the criteria to be met by any philosophical account of laws roughly into major requirements and secondary ones. The major criteria concern what I call the problems of inference and identification. The accounts must show that there is a valid inference from what laws there are to what regularities there are in the world. The account must also identify the relevant aspects of the world that constitute or give rise to its laws, if any. Typically these two tasks lead to a dilemma. If laws of nature are identified in terms of some sort of necessity in nature which is simply postulated as fact, then there is no logical reason to think that the inference from lawlike necessity to actuality is valid. (Calling the postulated factor "necessity" or "necessitation" does not help.) If on the other hand the semantic account of law statements is so constructed that the inference in question is logically valid, then typically the truth-conditions of law statements involve something unidentifiable. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 argue that leading contemporary attempts (by David Lewis, David Armstrong, and a host of others) fail to slip between the horns of this dilemma. Nor do they meet secondary criteria, such as showing that what they make out to be laws of nature are the targets reached, or even aimed for, in scientific inquiry.
Both Quine and Rorty have, in their different ways, proclaimed the death of epistemology. I think they are right about mainstream traditional epistemology. There Induction has given way to Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the epistemology hospitable to realism, or to metaphysics in general. In my view, developed in Part Two, neither Induction nor IBE qualifies as a rational strategy for change of opinion. To that extent at least I endorse some of Quine's and Rorty's conclusions. But it also seems to me that the underground river of probabilism, slowly growing in force over three centuries, has burst forth above ground in the twentieth century and brought new hope for epistemology. In Part Two I argue that with the end of foundationalism, probabilism provides the framework for a new epistemology, which is also adequate for philosophy of science.
The remainder of the book (Chapters 8-13) is devoted to contributions to the semantic approach in philosophy of science, to support my call to leave metaphysics behind. The semantic approach does not require an anti-realist or anti-metaphysical stance. In fact it is also followed by philosophers with very different philosophical positions from my own. But that is just the point: this collaboration in philosophy of science is possible because the approach is in itself neutral, and does not presuppose metaphysical views. I will leave the details aside, since the present symposium concentrates on Part One, which was meant to be the destructive prelude to this constructive effort in philosophy of science.},
Address = {Oxford},
Author = {Bas C. van Fraassen},
Booktitle = {Laws and Symmetry},
Date-Added = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-18 18:10:55 -0400},
Keywords = {Laws; Lewis},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Title = {Laws and Symmetry},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.001.0001},
Year = {1989},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.001.0001}}
@book{collins_hall_paul_book_2004,
Address = {Cambridge MA},
Author = {John Collins and Ned Hall and L. A. Paul},
Booktitle = {Counterfactuals and Causation},
Date-Added = {2011-09-17 14:28:38 -0400},
Date-Modified = {2011-09-17 14:28:38 -0400},
Editor = {John Collins and Ned Hall and L. A. Paul},
Keywords = {Causation; Counterfactuals},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Title = {Causation and Counterfactuals},
Year = {2004},
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@unpublished{livengood_2011,
Author = {Jonathan Livengood},
Date-Added = {2011-08-29 19:58:08 +1000},
Date-Modified = {2011-08-29 20:02:47 +1000},
Keywords = {Causation},
Note = {\emph{No\^{u}s}},
Title = {Actual Causation and Simple Voting Scenarios},
Url = {http://www.pitt.edu/~jml47/actual_causation.pdf},
Year = {forthcoming},
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@article{mcdermott_2002,
Author = {Michael McDermott},
Date-Added = {2011-08-29 15:50:17 +1000},
Date-Modified = {2011-08-29 15:50:17 +1000},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Keywords = {Causation; Counterfactuals},
Month = 2,
Number = {2},
Pages = {84--101},
Reply-To = {lewis_2000},
Title = {Causation: Influence versus Sufficiency},
Volume = {99},
Year = {2002},
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@article{mcdermott_1995,
Abstract = {I propose an amendment of Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation, designed to overcome some difficulties concerning redundant causation.
},
Author = {Michael McDermott},
Date-Added = {2011-08-29 15:31:54 +1000},
Date-Modified = {2011-08-29 15:31:54 +1000},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Keywords = {Causation; Counterfactuals; Lewis; Preemption},
Number = {4},
Pages = {523-544},
Title = {Redundant Causation},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.4.52},
Volume = {46},
Year = {1995},
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@book{breese_2001,
Address = {San Francisco},
Author = {Jack Breese and Daphne Koller},
Booktitle = {Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference},
Date-Added = {2011-08-26 13:06:13 +1000},
Date-Modified = {2011-08-27 00:35:25 +1000},
Editor = {Jack Breese and Daphne Koller},
Keywords = {Artificial Intelligence; Anthology; anthology},
Publisher = {Morgan Kaufmann},
Title = {Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference},
Year = {2001}}
@incollection{halpern_2001,
Author = {Joseph Y. Halpern and Judea Pearl},
Crossref = {breese_2001},
Date-Added = {2011-08-26 13:05:59 +1000},
Date-Modified = {2011-08-26 13:06:34 +1000},
Keywords = {Artificial Intelligence; Anthology; Causation},
Pages = {194--202},
Title = {Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes},
Url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0011012v2},
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@book{woodward_2003,
Address = {New York},
Author = {James Woodward},
Booktitle = {Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation},
Date-Added = {2011-08-26 12:56:20 +1000},
Date-Modified = {2011-08-26 12:56:20 +1000},
Keywords = {Causation; Explanation; Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Reviewed-By = {weslake_2006,menzies_2006,hiddleston_2005,strevens_2007b},
Title = {Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation},
Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195155270.001.0001},
Year = {2003},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195155270.001.0001}}
@article{hitchcock_2001b,
Annote = {As \textcite{hitchcock_2001b} notes, a causal model ``should not contain variables whose values correspond to possibilities that we consider to be too remote'' (p. 287). I propose that the notion of an intervention, if cashed out in terms of actual experimental possibilities, supplies the needed restriction.},
Author = {Christopher Hitchcock},
Date-Added = {2011-08-26 12:55:52 +1000},
Date-Modified = {2011-08-26 12:55:52 +1000},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Keywords = {Causation},
Month = {6},
Number = {6},
Pages = {273-299},
Title = {The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs},
Volume = {98},
Year = {2001},
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