Marguerita ten Houten Notes on Data Project As of 022519

## PLAN FOR ANALYSES

- Variable animation on Dim.1 and Dim.2
- Plot of network distance parameter(s) vs. time
- Summarize roll call votes in a low-dimensional space without overly smoothing, but still sensitive to sharp changes (bursts)
- Network plot: edge = (distance of how strongly voted together), 1/voting percentage; node = congressman
  - <a href="https://briatte.github.io/ggnet/#example-4-french-mps-on-twitter">https://briatte.github.io/ggnet/#example-4-french-mps-on-twitter</a>
- Use tween for smooth transitions between congressmen (animation)

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## **BACKGROUND**

An elected representative is pulled in two directions — to represent the people who elected him and to stand with his colleagues in the House. He represents multiple constituencies.

Representation by the people, for the people, lies at the core of our governmental establishment and so, one would hope, that the responsiveness of our elected officials comes from constituent preferences.

- "If politics is about 'who gets what, when, and how,' then the politics of representative democracy is about 'who supports whom, when, and how and how much.' And, 'what do various constituencies get in return for their support?"" (Fenno 1977, 915).
- "Members lost electoral support from increasing the extent to which they voted with the extreme of their party" (Canes-Wrone *et al.* 2002).
- "Across American legislatures, elected representatives do not converge to the median voter in their constituency... At any point in time, legislators' representation of constituents varies systematically based on the party elected to office, holding the district's underlying preferences constant" (Fowler and Hall 2015, 358).
- "Divergent and persistent representation at the district level means that there will be long stretches of time in which the median member of the legislature is consistently to the left or right of the median voter across all districts (or the median voter in the median district)" (Fowler and Hall 2015, 367).

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## LITERATURE

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