



Security Assessment



Item 9 Internal Report

February 2026

Prepared for ether.fi

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This document is intended for **internal** use only.

Initial Commit Hash	Final Commit Hash
e24c1c2	54150cc

Informational Issues

I-01. Inaccurate Natspec documentation for `redeemFraxToUsdc` regarding error handling

Description: The `redeemFraxToUsdc` function in `SettlementDispatcherV2` includes Natspec documentation stating that it throws an `InvalidValue` error. However, the function body does not contain a check that would revert with this specific error (e.g., checking if the amount is zero). It only checks for configuration presence, balance sufficiency, and return amount sufficiency.

Recommendation: Update the Natspec documentation to accurately reflect the errors thrown by the function, or implement the missing check for zero amount if it was intended.

Customer's response: Fixed in commit [54150cc](#)

Fix Review: Fixed

I-02. Lack of output asset verification in Frax configuration

Description: The `setFraxConfig` function allows an admin to configure a Frax custodian address, and `redeemFraxToUsdc` utilizes this custodian to redeem Frax tokens. However, the system does not verify that the configured custodian actually outputs USDC. Since `redeemFraxToUsdc` implies a specific output asset (USDC) by its name and intended logic, a misconfiguration could lead to unexpected behavior if the custodian returns a different asset.

Recommendation: In `setFraxConfig`, verify that the configured custodian's output asset is USDC, or document that this validation is admin's responsibility.



Customer's response: Fixed in commit [54150cc](#)

Fix Review: Fixed

I-03. Discrepancy in validation between quoteAsyncFraxRedeem and redeemFraxAsync

Description: The `quoteAsyncFraxRedeem` function provides fee quotes for asynchronous Frax redemptions but lacks input validation present in the execution function `redeemFraxAsync`. Specifically, it does not check if the amount is non-zero or if it meets the `DUST_THRESHOLD` requirement (multiples of 1e12). This can lead to the function returning valid quotes for amounts that would inevitably revert when attempting the actual redemption.

Recommendation: Align the input validation in `quoteAsyncFraxRedeem` with `redeemFraxAsync` by adding checks for zero amounts and dust thresholds.

Customer's response: Acknowledged – *"This is fine. Doesn't add any additional risk as the `redeemFraxAsync` function will revert when necessary"*

Fix Review: Acknowledged

I-04. Missing pausable check in redeemFraxAsync

Description: The `bridge` function in `SettlementDispatcherV2` is protected by the `whenNotPaused` modifier, allowing the protocol to halt bridging operations in emergencies. However, `redeemFraxAsync`, which performs a similar cross-chain bridging operation for Frax, lacks this modifier. This inconsistency means that even if the contract is paused, Frax bridging operations could still be executed.

Recommendation: Add the `whenNotPaused` modifier to the `redeemFraxAsync` function to ensure consistent pause functionality across all bridging operations.

Customer's response: Fixed in commit [54150cc](#)



Fix Review: Fixed

I-05. Potential zero output in `redeemFraxToUsdc` for small amounts

Description: The `redeemFraxToUsdc` function facilitates the conversion of FraxUSD (18 decimals) to USDC (6 decimals). Due to the decimal precision loss during conversion in `RemoteCustodianUsdcScroll` (dividing by `1e12`), input amounts smaller than `1e12` wei will result in 0 USDC output. While the function has a `minReceive` check, passing `minReceive` as 0 would allow the transaction to succeed while burning non-0 FraxUSD for 0 USDC.

Recommendation: Enforce a minimum input amount of `1e12` inside `redeemFraxToUsdc` to prevent caller from accidentally redeeming amounts that result in zero output.

Customer's response: Fixed in commit [54150cc](#)

Fix Review: Fixed

I-06. Typo in `IFraxCustodian` interface parameter name

Description: There is a typo in the `IFraxCustodian` interface definition where the parameter `receiver` is misspelled as `reciever`. While this does not affect the contract's functionality or compilation (as Solidity uses types for function selectors), correcting it improves code readability and professionalism.

Recommendation: Correct the spelling of `reciever` to `receiver` in the `IFraxCustodian` interface.

Customer's response: Fixed in commit [54150cc](#)

Fix Review: Fixed



I-07. Inability to disable Midas redemption vaults

Description: The `setMidasRedemptionVault` function in `SettlementDispatcherV2` enforces a check that prevents setting the `redemptionVault` address to `address(0)`. This restriction makes it impossible to disable or remove a configured Midas redemption vault once it has been set, potentially locking a configuration even if a vault is deprecated.

Recommendation: Remove the check ensuring `redemptionVault != address(0)` to allow administrators to disable vaults by setting them to the zero address.

Customer's response: Acknowledged

Fix Review: Acknowledged

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