



# Security Assessment



# Ether-Fi – Berachain Native Minting Contracts

January 2025

Prepared for EtherFi

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# Project Summary

## Project Scope

Project Name	Repository (link)	Latest Commit Hash	Platform
EtherFi smart contracts	<a href="https://github.com/etherfi-protocol/weETH-cross-chain">etherfi-protocol/weETH-cross-chain</a>	Audit start: <a href="#">9154247f</a> Latest fix review: <a href="#">d5820774</a>	EVM

## Project Overview

This document describes the manual code review of [PR 40](#).

The work was a 1 day-effort undertaken from **24/01/2025** to **27/01/2025**.

The following contract list is included in our scope:

1. NativeMinting/L2SyncPoolContracts/HydraSyncPoolETHUpgradeable.sol
2. NativeMinting/ReceiverContracts/L1HydraReceiverETHUpgradeable.sol

During the manual audit, the Certora team discovered bugs in the Solidity smart contracts code, as listed on the following page.

## Findings Summary

The table below summarizes the findings of the review, including type and severity details.

Severity	Discovered	Confirmed	Fixed
Critical	-	-	-
High	-	-	-
Medium	-	-	-
Low	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

## Severity Matrix

Impact	High	Medium	High	Critical
	Medium	Low	Medium	High
	Low	Low	Low	Medium
		Low	Medium	High
		Likelihood		

## Low Severity Issues

### L-01 The excessive fee isn't refunded back

Severity: <b>Low</b>	Impact: <b>Medium</b>	Likelihood: <b>Low</b>
Files: HydraSyncPoolETHUpgradeable.sol	Status: Fixed	

#### Description:

`refundAddress` is `address(0x0)` in `stargate.sendToken()`

The excessive tokens will be lost:

```
File: HydraSyncPoolETHUpgradeable.sol
159:      (MessagingReceipt memory _msgReceipt, OFTRceipt memory
oftReceipt,) = stargate.sendToken{ value: hydraFee.nativeFee }(sendParam,
hydraFee, address(0x0));
```

**ether.fi's response:** The exact amount should always be supplied, but I can just add the sender for best practice: [PR 43](#)

**Certora's response:** Be aware that if `msg.sender` is a contract that lacks a receive function then this will revert.

**ether.fi's response:** This is automatically called by an EOA in our backend.

## Informational Severity Issues

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### I-01. The returns parameter and the return statement are using different values

This is more about code confusion as the final return statement is correct and is what will be returned.

```
File: HydraSyncPoolETHUpgradeable.sol
147:      ) internal virtual override returns (MessagingReceipt memory
msgReceipt) {
...
160:      msgReceipt = _msgReceipt;
...
166:      return receipt;
```

**ether.fi's response:** msgReceipt = \_msgReceipt; is an unnecessary line of code and will be removed. See [PR 42](#)

## I-02. Frontrunnable initializers

The initializations are frontrunnable:

```
File: DeployMockNativeMintingL1.s.sol
32:         address receiver = address(new
TransparentUpgradeableProxy(receiverImpl, delegate, ""));
33:
34:
L1HydraReceiverETHUpgradeable(payable(receiver)).initialize(address(mockPool),
lzEndpoint, deployer);
```

and

```
File: DeployMockNativeMintingL2.s.sol
42:         HydraSyncPoolETHUpgradeable poolProxy =
HydraSyncPoolETHUpgradeable(address(new TransparentUpgradeableProxy(poolImpl,
deployer, "")));
43:
44:         poolProxy.initialize(address(rateProvider), address(0x0),
address(token), l1Eid, stargateOFTETH, l1Receiver, deployer);
```

Consider a deployment with a payload (passing a data field instead of "" will trigger `upgradeToAndCall()` which can atomically initialize the contracts)

**ether.fi's response:** These are just the scripts to deploy and test on testnet and will not be used to deploy these contracts to production. Aware of the possible front run issue and we always use an encoded deployment payload for our production scripts

# Disclaimer

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Certora also provides services such as auditing, formal verification projects, and incident response.