

## Dark Pool Evolved

Trustless Randomness (VRF) using EIP-2537 (Precompile for BLS12-381)

### Problem: MEV in Dark Pools

- Dark Pool as Private DEX
  - Challenge: transaction ordering affected fairness
- MEV (Miner Extractable Value)
  - Miners reorder or censor transaction to gain benefits



**Need for Random Ordering** 

## VRF (Verifiable Random Function)

- Tranditional Random
  - Off-chain: oracles
    - Need trust assumption
  - On-chain: generate & proof
    - Gas too high (without precompile)

### May 7, 2025, Pectra (Prague) Upgrade

#### Better user experience:

- EIP-7702 Set EOA account code
- EIP-7691 Blob throughput increase
- EIP-7623 Increase calldata cost
- EIP-7840 Add blob schedule to EL config files

#### Better staking experience

- EIP-7251 Increase the MAX\_EFFECTIVE\_BALANCE
- EIP-7002 Execution layer triggerable exits

EIP-2537

eral purpose execution layer requests

ly validator deposits on chain


#### Protocol efficiency and security improvements:


- EIP-2537 Precompile for BLS12-381 curve operations
- EIP-2935 Save historical block hashes in state
- EIP-7549 Move committee index outside Attestation

#### **EIP-2537 Precompile for BLS12-381 curve operations**


Operation	EIP-1108 Gas (BN254)	EIP-2537 Gas (BLS12-381)
G1 Addition	150	375
G1 Multiplication	6,000	12,000
Pairing Check	34,000 × k + 45,000	32,600 × k + 37,700
G1 MSM	_	Dynamic
G2 Addition	_	600
G2 Multiplication	_	22,500
G2 MSM	_	Dynamic
Fp → G1 Mapping	_	5,500
Fp2 → G2 Mapping	_	23,800
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Enable on-chain VRF





## **Epoch-based Ordering**



## DEMO

# Prover (Typescript)

• Input: sk, pk, in

where sk is the private key used to generate the signature and randomness output, and in is the input.

1. Compute

$$preout = sk \cdot H_{\mathbb{G}}(in)$$

where  $H_{\mathbf{G}}$  is the hash-to-curve operation and H is a general hash function.

- 2. Select a random scalar  $r_1 \in \mathbb{F}_p$ .
- 3. Compute

$$R = r_1 \cdot G$$

$$R_m = r_1 \cdot H_{\mathbb{G}}(in)$$

4. Compute

$$c = H_p(in, pk, preout, R, R_m)$$

where  $H_p$  is a hash mapped into the finite field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ .

5. Compute

$$s_1 = r_1 + c \cdot sk$$

• Output:  $c, s_1, preout$ 

# Verifier (Solidity)

1. Compute

$$R = s_1 \cdot G - c \cdot pk$$

$$R_m = s_1 \cdot H_{\mathbb{G}}(in) - c \cdot preout$$

2. Verify

$$c \overset{?}{=} H_p(in, pk, preout, R, R_m)$$

3. If the equality holds, compute

$$out = H(preout, in)$$

and output out; otherwise, output false.

### Proof of Work

