
# Search Advertising: Numerical analysis


Model: demand function, consumer type, and profit


```
\ln[1] = \text{Demand}[\text{theta}_, p_, \text{pbar}_, \text{eta}_] := \text{Piecewise}[\{\{0, p > \text{pbar}\}\}, \text{theta} + p^{(-\text{eta})}]
                          InverseDemand[theta\_, q\_, eta\_] := Piecewise[\{\{0, theta > q\}\}, (q-theta) ^ (-1/eta)]
                          CdfTheta[theta_, gamma_] := Piecewise[{{0, theta < 0}, {1, theta > 1}}, theta^gamma]
                          PdfTheta[theta_, gamma_] = D[CdfTheta[theta, gamma], theta]
                          Profit[theta_, p_, pbar_, eta_] :=
                               \label{eq:piecewise} Piecewise[\{\{0\,,\ p>pbar\,\}\}\,,\ (p-0.1)\,*\,Demand[theta,\ p,\ pbar,\ eta]]
                          DerivativeProfit[theta_, p_, pbar_, eta_] = D[Profit[theta, p, pbar, eta], p]
                                                                                                                      theta < 0
                                   gamma theta^{-1+gamma} 0 < theta < 1
  Out[4]=
                                                                                                                      theta > 1
                             Indeterminate
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             p-pbar > 0
                                   \frac{\text{eta } \left(-0.1+p\right) \text{ theta}}{-} - \text{eta } \left(-0.1+p\right) \text{ } p^{-1-\text{eta}} \text{ } \left(1.+p^{\text{eta}} \text{ theta}\right) + p^{-\text{eta}} \text{ } \left(1.+p^{\text{eta}} \text{ theta}\right) \\ - \text{True } \left(-0.1+p\right) \text{ theta} \left(-0.1+p\right) \text{ } p^{-1-\text{eta}} \text{ } 
    |n/7|:= ptheta = 1.0; pp = 0.2; ppbar = 1.0; peta = 2.0; pgamma = 0.5;
                          Demand[ptheta, pp, ppbar, peta]
                          InverseDemand[ptheta, Demand[ptheta, pp, ppbar, peta], peta]
                          Profit[ptheta, pp, ppbar, peta]
                          CdfTheta[0.5, pgamma]
 Out[8]= 26.
  Out[9]= 0.2
Out[10]= 2.6
Out[11]= 0.707107
```

Remark: When eta increases, demand sensitivity increases => argmax of profit decreases... but max of profit increases (argmax closer to 0 in which demand goes to infinity)

```
Manipulate[Plot[Demand[0.3, ip, ppbar, ieta], {ip, 0, 1}], {ieta, 2, 5}]
Manipulate[Plot[Profit[0.3, ip, ppbar, ieta], {ip, 0, 1}], {ieta, 2, 5}]
Manipulate[Plot[CdfTheta[itheta, igamma], {itheta, 0, 1}], {igamma, 0.5, 1.5}]
```







#### First order condition (Privacy)

```
In[13]:= FirstOrderCondition[p_, pbar_, eta_, gamma_] := Integrate[
          DerivativeProfit[theta, p, pbar, eta] * PdfTheta[theta, gamma] , {theta, 0, 1}]
       FullSimplify[FirstOrderCondition[p, pbar, eta, gamma]]
             \texttt{0.1}\,\texttt{p}^{-1.-1.\,\text{eta}}\,\left(\texttt{eta}+\texttt{eta}\,\texttt{gamma}+\texttt{10.}\,\texttt{p}-\texttt{10.}\,\texttt{eta}\,\texttt{p}+\texttt{10.}\,\texttt{gamma}\,\texttt{p}-\texttt{10.}\,\texttt{eta}\,\texttt{gamma}\,\texttt{p}+\texttt{10.}\,\texttt{gamma}\,\texttt{p}^{\texttt{1.+eta}}\right)
                                                                                               Re[gamma] > 0.
           \left.\rule{0mm}{2.5ex}\right| Integrate \left[\rule{0mm}{0.5ex}0.1\,\text{gamma}\,\text{p}^{-1.-1.\,\text{eta}}\right. theta ^{-1.+\text{gamma}}
                                                                                               True
                                                                                                                    p-1.pbar \le
            (eta + 10. p - 10. eta p + 10. p^{1.+eta} theta), \{theta, 0., 1.\},
             Assumptions \rightarrow p - 1. pbar \le 0. && Re[gamma] \le 0.
                                                                                                                     True
In[15]:= pp = 0.2; ppbar = 1.0; peta = 2.0; pgamma = 0.5;
       FirstOrderCondition[pp, ppbar, peta, pgamma]
Out[16]= 0.333333
Results: Profit, CS, Welfare (Privacy)
In[17]:= ExpectedTheta[gamma_] := Integrate[theta * D[CdfTheta[theta, gamma], theta], {theta, 0, 1}]
        ExpectedProfit[p_, pbar_, eta_, gamma_] :=
         Integrate[Profit[theta, p, pbar, eta] * D[CdfTheta[theta, gamma], theta], {theta, 0, 1}]
        ExpectedConsumerSurplus[theta_, qstar_, eta_] :=
         {\tt Integrate[InverseDemand[theta, q, eta], \{q, 0, qstar\}]}
       FullSimplify[ExpectedProfit[p, pbar, eta, gamma]]
             0.1 p^{-1.eta} (-1.+10.p) (1.+gamma+gamma p^{eta})
                                                                                               Re[gamma] > 0.
            Integrate [0.1 \text{ gamma p}^{-1. \text{ eta}} (-1. + 10. \text{ p})]
                                                                                                True
                                                                                                                    p-1.pbar \le
Out[20]=
              theta^{-1.+gamma} (1. + p^{eta} theta), {theta, 0., 1.},
             Assumptions \rightarrow p - 1. pbar \leq 0. && Re[gamma] \leq 0.
                                                                                                                     True
In[21]:= pp = 0.2; ppbar = 1.0; peta = 2.0; pgamma = 0.5;
       ExpectedProfit[pp, ppbar, peta, pgamma] ==
         Profit[ExpectedTheta[pgamma], pp, ppbar, peta]
       ExpectedConsumerSurplus[ExpectedTheta[pgamma],
         Demand[ExpectedTheta[pgamma], pp, ppbar, peta], peta]
Out[22]= True
Out[23]= 10.
Computation of equilibria: Tests (Privacy)
In[24]:= ppbar = 1.0; peta = 2.0; pgamma = 0.5;
        Quiet[NSolve[FirstOrderCondition[p, ppbar, peta, pgamma] == 0, p]]
\text{Out}[25] = \left\{ \left\{ p \to 1. - 1. \; \text{UnitStep}^{(-1)} \left[0.\right] \right\}, \; \left\{ p \to -1.82451 \right\}, \; \left\{ p \to 0.202779 \right\}, \; \left\{ p \to 1.62174 \right\} \right\}
Solving for various gamma (higher gamma: higher density of consumers towards gamma value 1 and thus higher profit)
ln[26]:= Quiet[For[igamma = 0.5, igamma \leq 1.5, igamma += 0.5,
                       arsol = NSolve[FirstOrderCondition[p, ppbar, peta, igamma] == 0, p];
                       sol = Select[p /. arsol, \# \ge 0 \&\& \# \le 1 \&][[1]];
                       Print[{sol, ExpectedProfit[sol, ppbar, peta, igamma]}]]]
```

```
{0.202779, 2.53379}
{0.204261, 2.55104}
{0.205183, 2.56151}
```

Solving for various eta (higher eta: higher demand sensitivity incudes lower prices, but profit increases)

#### Order statistics (Disclosure)

```
In[28]:=
                                    {\tt PdfOrderStat[x\_,\,k\_,\,n\_,\,\,gamma\_] := \,\,(n\,!\,)\,\,/\,\,(\,(k\,-\,1)\,\,!\,\,\star\,\,(n\,-\,k)\,\,!\,)\,\,\star}
                                                   \texttt{CdfOrderStat}[y\_, k\_, n\_, \texttt{gamma}] = \texttt{Integrate}[\texttt{PdfOrderStat}[x, k, n, \texttt{gamma}], \{x, 0, y\}] 
                                                   n ! \left(1 - \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ 1 & x > 1 \\ x^{gamma} & True \end{array} \right)^{-k+n} \left( \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ 1 & x > 1 \\ x^{gamma} & True \end{array} \right)^{-1+k} \left( \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ gamma \ x^{-1+gamma} & 0 < x < 1 \\ 0 & x > 1 \\ Indeterminate & True \end{array} \right) \right) \right) \left( \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right) \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \right\} \left( \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right) \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \left\{ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & x < 0 \\ -1 + k \end{array} \right\} \right\} \left\{ \left
 In[30]:=
In[31]:=
                                    pk = 3; pn = 4; pgamma = 0.5;
                                   Print[{Integrate[PdfOrderStat[x, pk, pn, pgamma], {x, 0, 0.5}],
                                                  CdfOrderStat[0.5, pk, pn, pgamma]}]
                                    Print[{Integrate[PdfOrderStat[x, pk - 1, pn, pgamma], {x, 0, 0.5}],
                                                  CdfOrderStat[0.5, pk - 1, pn, pgamma]}]
{0.664214, 0.664214}
\{0.921573, 0.921573\}
In[34]:= pk = 1; pn = 1;
                                    Print[{CdfTheta[0.4, pgamma], CdfOrderStat[0.4, pk, pn, pgamma]}]
                                    \label{eq:print} $$\Pr[CdfOrderStat[0.4, pk+1, pn+1, pgamma], CdfOrderStat[0.4, pk, pn+1, pgamma]]$$ $$
{0.632456, 0.632456}
{0.4, 0.864911}
```

Reading (General: Proba that the kth highest draw among n is below y)

With gamma as 0.5 and only one draw, the probability to draw a theta lower than 0.4 is c. 0.63.

With the same gamma and two draws: the proba that the highest of both (the 2nd of 2) is below 0.4 is 0.4 (<0.63) and the proba that the lowest (the 1st of 2) is below 0.4 is c. 0.86.

### First order condition (Disclosure)

In[37]:= FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[p\_, pbar\_, eta\_, gamma\_, k\_, n\_] := Integrate[DerivativeProfit[theta, p, pbar, eta] \* PdfTheta[theta, gamma] \* CdfOrderStat[theta, k, n, gamma], {theta, 0, 1}] FullSimplify[FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[p, pbar, eta, gamma, k, n]]

$$\text{Out}[38] = \int_{0}^{1} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} n \: ! \: \left( 1 - \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 0 & x < 0 \\ 1 & x > 1 \\ x^{\text{gamma}} & \text{True} \end{array} \right)^{-k+n} \left( \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 0 & x < 0 \\ 1 & x > 1 \\ x^{\text{gamma}} & \text{True} \end{array} \right)^{-1+k} \left( \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Indeterminate} & x = 0 \mid \mid x = 1 \\ \text{gamma} \, x^{-1+\text{gamma}} & 0 < x < 1 \\ 0 & \text{True} \end{array} \right) \right\} \right\} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 0 & \text{gamma} \left[ 1 - k + n \right] \end{array} \right\} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 0 & \text{p > pbar} \\ p^{-1-\text{eta}} \; \left( \text{eta} \; (0.1-1.\,p) + 1.\,p \right) + \text{theta} \; \text{True} \end{array} \right\} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Indeterminate} & \text{theta} = 0 \mid \mid \text{theta} = 1 \\ \text{gamma} \; \text{theta}^{-1+\text{gamma}} \; 0 < \text{theta} < 1 \\ 0 & \text{True} \end{array} \right\} \right\} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{dtheta} \\ \text{dtheta} \end{array} \right\} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{dtheta} \\$$

#### Results: Profit, CS, Welfare (Disclosure)

 $\ln[39] := \texttt{ExpectedThetaOrder[k\_, n\_, gamma\_]} = \texttt{Integrate[x*PdfOrderStat[x, k, n, gamma], \{x, 0, 1\}]}$ ExpectedProfitOrder[p\_, pbar\_, eta\_, k\_, n\_, gamma\_] = Integrate[Profit[x, p, pbar, eta] \* PdfOrderStat[x, k, n, gamma], {x, 0, 1}]

 $\ln[41]$ := pk = 2; pn = 3; pgamma = 0.5; pp = 0.2; ppbar = 1.0; peta = 2.0; ExpectedThetaOrder[pk, pn, pgamma] ExpectedProfitOrder[pp, ppbar, peta, pk, pn, pgamma] == Profit[ExpectedThetaOrder[pk, pn, pgamma], pp, ppbar, peta]

Out[42]= 0.3

Out[43]= True

#### Computation of equilibria: Tests (Disclosure)

```
\ln[44]:= pp = 0.2; ppbar = 1.0; peta = 2.0; pgamma = 0.5; pk = 4; pn = 9;
      FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[pp, ppbar, peta, pgamma, pk, pn]
      FindRoot[FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[p, ppbar, peta, pgamma, pn, pn] == 0, {p, 0.1}]
      FindRoot[FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[p, ppbar, peta, pgamma, pk, pn] == 0, {p, 0.1}]
Out[45] = 0.30303
Out[46]= \{p \rightarrow 0.207439\}
Out[47]= \{p \rightarrow 0.204307\}
Solving for various gamma (higher gamma: higher density of consumers towards gamma value 1 and thus higher profit):
ln[48]:= Quiet[For[igamma = 0.5, igamma \leq 1.5, igamma += 0.5,
                  sol = p /. FindRoot[
            FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[p, ppbar, peta, igamma, pk, pn] == 0, {p, 0.1}];
                  Print[{sol, ExpectedProfit[sol, ppbar, peta, igamma]}]]]
{0.204307, 2.53366}
\{0.205957, 2.55089\}
{0.206775, 2.56138}
Solving for various eta (higher eta: higher demand sensitivity... price decreases due to higher sensitivity)
ln[49]:= Quiet[For[ieta = 2.0, ieta \leq 3.0, ieta += 0.5,
                  sol = p /. FindRoot[
            FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[p, ppbar, ieta, pgamma, pk, pn] == 0, {p, 0.1}];
                  Print[{sol, ExpectedProfit[sol, ppbar, ieta, pgamma]}]]]
{0.204307, 2.53366}
{0.167312, 5.90105}
{0.150128, 14.8315}
Solving for various k, n
ln[50]:= pgamma = 0.5; peta = 2.0; ppbar = 1.0; pn = 10; ark = {10, 9, 8, 2, 1};
      FindRoot[FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[p, ppbar, peta, pgamma, 10, 10] == 0, {p, 0.1}]
      arpstardisclo =
       Table[p /. FindRoot[FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[p, ppbar, peta, pgamma, k, pn] == 0,
           {p, 0.1}], {k, ark}]
      arprofitdisclo = Table[ExpectedProfitOrder[arpstardisclo[[i]], ppbar,
          peta, ark[[i]], pn, pgamma], {i, Range[Dimensions[ark][[1]]]}]
Out[51]= \{p \rightarrow 0.207567\}
Out[52]= \{0.207567, 0.206866, 0.206221, 0.203379, 0.203059\}
Out[53]= \{2.58632, 2.57011, 2.55566, 2.50401, 2.50099\}
```

As the number of auctionned slots increases, proft/bid decreases... Disclosure is first profitable (with small k) then privacy is best.

#### Output for privacy

```
ln[54] = dim = Apply[Times, Dimensions[Table[0, {igamma, 0.5, 1.5, 0.5}, {ieta, 2.0, 3.0, 0.5}]]];
      arparam = Range[dim];
      arresult = Range[dim];
      arprofit = Range[dim];
      arcsurplus = Range[dim];
      count = 0;
      Quiet[Do[{count = count + 1,
          arsol = NSolve[FirstOrderCondition[p, ppbar, ieta, igamma] == 0, p],
          sol = Select[p /. arsol, \# \ge 0 \&\& \# \le 1 \&],
          arresult[[count]] = sol[[1]],
          arparam[[count]] = {igamma, ieta},
          arprofit[[count]] = ExpectedProfit[arresult[[count]], ppbar, ieta, igamma],
          etheta = ExpectedTheta[igamma],
          eqstar = Demand[etheta, sol[[1]], ppbar, ieta],
          arcsurplus[[count]] = ExpectedConsumerSurplus[etheta, eqstar, ieta]},
         {igamma, 0.5, 1.5, 0.5}, {ieta, 2.0, 3.0, 0.5}]]
In[61]:= Partition[arparam, Sqrt[dim]]
      Partition[arresult, Sqrt[dim]]
      Partition[arprofit, Sqrt[dim]]
      Partition[arcsurplus, Sqrt[dim]]
      Partition[arresult, Sqrt[dim]]
Out[61] = \{ \{ \{0.5, 2.\}, \{0.5, 2.5\}, \{0.5, 3.\} \}, 
       \{\{1., 2.\}, \{1., 2.5\}, \{1., 3.\}\}, \{\{1.5, 2.\}, \{1.5, 2.5\}, \{1.5, 3.\}\}\}
Out[62]= \{\{0.202779, 0.16709, 0.150085\},
        \{0.204261, 0.167305, 0.150127\}, \{0.205183, 0.167435, 0.150152\}\}
\mathsf{Out}_{[63]} = \{\{2.53379, 5.90107, 14.8315\}, \{2.55104, 5.91227, 14.8398\}, \{2.56151, 5.919, 14.8449\}\}
\mathsf{Out}_{[64]} = \{ \{ 9.86294, 24.4018, 66.5916 \}, \{ 9.79139, 24.3548, 66.5539 \}, \{ 9.7474, 24.3265, 66.5313 \} \}
Out[65] = \{ \{ 0.202779, 0.16709, 0.150085 \}, \}
        \{0.204261, 0.167305, 0.150127\}, \{0.205183, 0.167435, 0.150152\}\}
```

Within row: increase in eta i.e. demand price sensitivity decreases optimal price but increases profit (and consumer surplus, which is ok if price decreases)

Between rows: increase in gamma i.e. shift of weight in customer valuations towards higher valuations increases price and profit (decreases consumer surplus)

## Output for disclosure

```
ln[66]:= pgamma = 0.5;
     peta = 2.0;
     ppbar = 1.0;
     pn = 10;
     ark = \{10, 9, 8, 2, 1\};
     dimark = Dimensions[ark][[1]];
     arresultdisclo = Range[dimark];
     arprofitdisclo = Range[dimark];
     arcsurplusdisclo = Range[dimark];
     count = 0;
```

```
In[76]:= Quiet[Do[{count = count + 1,
         arsol = FindRoot[
            FirstOrderConditionDisclosure[p, ppbar, peta, pgamma, i, pn] == 0, {p, 0.1}],
         sol = Select[p/.arsol, \# \ge 0 \&\& \# \le 1 \&],
         arresultdisclo[[count]] = sol[[1]],
         arprofitdisclo[[count]] =
          ExpectedProfitOrder[sol[[1]], ppbar, peta, i, pn, pgamma],
         etheta = ExpectedThetaOrder[i, pn, pgamma],
         eqstar = Demand[etheta, sol[[1]], ppbar, peta],
         arcsurplusdisclo[[count]] = ExpectedConsumerSurplus[etheta, eqstar, peta]},
        {i, ark}]]
In[77]:= ark
      arresultdisclo
      arprofitdisclo
      arcsurplusdisclo
Out[77]= \{10, 9, 8, 2, 1\}
Out[78] = \{0.207567, 0.206866, 0.206221, 0.203379, 0.203059\}
Out[79]= \{2.58632, 2.57011, 2.55566, 2.50401, 2.50099\}
Out[80]= \{9.63544, 9.66807, 9.69831, 9.83384, 9.84934\}
```