

An attempt to give the most abstract possible definition of a blockchain.

# 1 Blockchain

## 1.1 Lists and their validation

Given a set  $S$ , let  $\text{SET}(S)$  be the set of all sets of elements of  $S$ , and  $\text{FLIST}(S)$  be the set of all finite lists of elements of  $S$ . Given  $L \in \text{FLIST}(S)$ , we use notation  $\text{length}(L)$  to refer to the number of elements in  $L$ , notation  $L[i]$  to refer to the  $i$ -th element in  $L$ , where  $i \in \{1, \dots, \text{length}(L)\}$ , and notation  $L[i, j]$  to refer to the sublist  $[L[i], \dots, L[j]]$  of  $L$ , where  $i, j \in \{1, \dots, \text{length}(L)\}$  and  $i \leq j$ . Notice that  $\text{length}(L) = 0$  if and only if  $L$  is the empty list  $[]$ .

From now on, assume that  $\Sigma$  is a finite alphabet, and that  $\mathbf{B} \subseteq \Sigma^*$  is the set of all possible blocks.

**Definition 1.** A validation rule is a function  $V : \text{FLIST}(\mathbf{B}) \rightarrow \text{SET}(\mathbf{B})$

Intuitively,  $V$  is a function taking a finite list  $L$  of blocks as input, and returning the set of blocks that could be added to  $L$  to produce a valid blockchain.

A list  $G \in \text{FLIST}(\mathbf{B})$  is said to be a genesis list of  $V$  if  $\text{length}(G) \geq 1$ ,  $G[1] \in V([])$  and  $G[i+1] \in V(G[1, i])$ , for every  $i \in \{1, \dots, \text{length}(G) - 1\}$ . That is,  $G$  is a genesis list if  $G$  is a non-empty valid blockchain.

**Definition 2.** Let  $V$  be a validation rule and  $G$  be a genesis list. Then a list  $L \in \text{FLIST}(\mathbf{B})$  is valid with respect to  $(G, V)$  if:

1.  $\text{length}(G) \leq \text{length}(L)$  and  $G = L[1, \text{length}(G)]$ .
2.  $L[i+1] \in V(L[1, i])$ , for every  $i \in \{\text{length}(G), \dots, \text{length}(L) - 1\}$ .

The role of  $G$  in this definition is to provide the blocks to startup the system. Let  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$  be the set of valid lists with respect to  $(G, V)$ .

Two lists  $L_1, L_2 \in \text{FLIST}(\mathbf{B})$  are said to disagree in the last element if one of the following conditions holds: (1)  $\text{length}(L_1) = 0$  and  $\text{length}(L_2) > 0$ , (2)  $\text{length}(L_1) > 0$  and  $\text{length}(L_2) = 0$ , or (3)  $\text{length}(L_1) > 0$ ,  $\text{length}(L_2) > 0$  and  $L_1[\text{length}(L_1)] \neq L_2[\text{length}(L_2)]$ .

**Definition 3.** Let  $V$  be a validation rule and  $G$  be a genesis list of  $V$ . Then  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$  is safe if for every pair  $L_1, L_2 \in \text{FLIST}(\mathbf{B})$  that disagree in the last element, it holds that  $V(L_1) \cap V(L_2) = \emptyset$ .

## 1.2 Knowledge

Given a validation rule  $V$ , a genesis list  $G$  of  $V$  and a subset  $K$  of  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$ , there is a natural way to visualize  $K$  as a graph  $\mathcal{G}(K)$ . The set of nodes of  $\mathcal{G}(K)$  is the set of blocks occurring in the lists in  $K$ , and there is an edge from a block  $b_1$  to a block  $b_2$  if there exists a list  $L \in K$  such that  $b_1 = L[i]$  and  $b_2 = L[i+1]$ , where  $i \in \{1, \dots, \text{length}(L) - 1\}$ .

**Lemma 1.** Assume that  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$  is safe. Then for every subset  $K$  of  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$ , it holds that  $\mathcal{G}(K)$  is a tree rooted at  $G[1]$ .

**Juan: Related to the next comment, why do we need  $\mathcal{K}(G, V)$ ? this is just all non-empty finite subset  $K$  of  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$**

Thus, assuming that  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$  is safe, from now on we refer to every non-empty finite subset  $K$  of  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$  as a *knowledge tree* of  $(G, V)$ . Moreover, we define  $\mathcal{K}(G, V)$  as the set of all knowledge trees of  $(G, V)$ .

### 1.3 Block chain and protocols

**Definition 4.** A relation  $\preceq$  on  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$  is said to be a knowledge order over  $(G, V)$  if  $\preceq$  is a total preorder on  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$ , that is,  $\preceq$  is reflexive, transitive and total.

Moreover,  $P$  is said to be a blockchain protocol over  $(G, V)$  if  $P$  is a sequence  $\{\preceq_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$  such that each  $\preceq_i$  ( $i \in \mathbb{N}$ ) is a knowledge order over  $(G, V)$ .

**Marcelo:** Do we really need to use the notion of knowledge tree in the following definitions? If we say that  $K$  is a knowledge tree then we need to use  $\text{PATHS}(K)$  to refer to the paths in  $K$ . On the other hand, if we directly say that  $K \in \text{LOG}(G, V)$ , we can just refer to the elements of  $K$  (we do not a special notation for paths). Knowledge trees are a nice way to visualize the blocks of set  $K \in \text{LOG}(G, V)$ , but I think we should just mention them because of this (and we should not use them in the definitions). What do you think?

**Juan:** You mean  $K \subset \text{LOG}(G, V)$  right? I agree that here we do not need safeness nor finiteness to make this work, so we could just stick with  $\text{LOG}(G, V)$  instead of all knowledge trees

**Definition 5.** Let  $P = \{\preceq_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$  be a blockchain protocol over  $(G, V)$ ,  $K \subseteq \text{LOG}(G, V)$  and  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ . Then a maximal element of  $K$  with respect to  $\preceq_t$  is said to be a blockchain of  $K$  at time  $t$  with respect to the protocol  $P$ .

**Marcelo:** I stopped here. I am not totally convinced that we need to introduce the following notion of equivalence, this is something that we need to discuss.

### 1.4 Action, states, reward and game

**Definition 6.** Considering a set of player  $P$  we denote  $\mathcal{K}_P$  the set of function  $K_P : P \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$  mapping a knowledge tree to each player.

Intuitively  $\mathcal{K}_P$  represents the true knowledge of each player.

**Definition 7.** We call action  $a$  for player  $w \in P$  function  $a_w : \mathcal{K}_P \rightarrow \mathcal{K}_P$  such that:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall K_P \in \mathcal{K}_P, \forall u \in P, K_P(u) &\subseteq a_w(K_P)(u) \\ \forall K_P \in \mathcal{K}_P, \forall u \in P, a_w(K_P)(u) &\subseteq a_w(K_P)(w) \cup K_P(u) \end{aligned}$$

Let  $A_w$  be the set of action for player  $w$ .

An action of player  $w$  is represented by a modification of  $w$  knowledge and a round of communication.

**Definition 8.** Let  $P$  be a set of player,  $\mathcal{A} = A_{p_1} \times A_{p_1} \dots \times A_{p_{|P|}}$

**Definition 9.** We call reward for player  $w$  a function  $r_w : \mathcal{K}_P \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$

Intuitively  $\mathcal{K}_P$  represent the knowledge of each player assumed by  $w$

**Definition 10.** Let  $P$  be a set of player,  $\mathcal{R} = r_{p_1} \times r_{p_1} \dots \times r_{p_{|P|}}$

## 2 Etienne 's modification space

**Definition 11.** Considering a set of player  $P$ , a set of function  $\mathcal{K}_P$ , the set of action  $\mathcal{A}$ , the set of reward  $\mathcal{R}$ , and a function  $\mathcal{P} : \mathcal{K}_P \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{K}_P \rightarrow [0; 1]$  a transition probability ( $\mathcal{P}(K_P, A, K_P^1)$  is the probability of transitioning from  $K_P$  to an element of  $K_P^1$  after joint action  $A$ ). We define a infinite stochastic game  $\Gamma$  such that:

- $P$  is the set of player.
- $\mathcal{A}$  is the set of available action.
- $\mathcal{K}_P$  is the set of states.
- $\mathcal{R}$  the set of pay-off function.
- $\mathcal{P}$  is the transition probability function.

### Stationary Nash equilibrium, Reasonable knowledge

**Definition 12.** We call stationary strategy for a player  $w$  a function  $\sigma_w : \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_w$

**Definition 13.** Considering a game  $\Gamma$  and a stationary strategy vector  $\sigma$ , we define the  $n$ -reachability probability  $\mathcal{P}_n^\sigma : \mathcal{V} \rightarrow [0; 1]$  by induction such that :

$$\mathcal{P}_0^\sigma(v_0) = 1 \wedge \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, v \neq v_0 \implies \mathcal{P}_0^\sigma(v) = 0$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{n+1}^\sigma(v) = \sum_{v' \in \mathcal{V}} \mathcal{P}_n^\sigma(v') * T(v', \sigma(v'), v)$$

We say that  $v$  is  $\sigma$  reachable if exists  $n \in \mathcal{N}$  such that  $\mathcal{P}_n^\sigma(v) > 0$

**Definition 14.** We call  $\beta$  discounted reward of player  $w$  for a strategy vector  $\sigma$  and a game  $\Gamma$  the value

$$u_w(\sigma) = \sum_{n=0}^{+\infty} \beta^{n+1} * r_w(v, \sigma_w(v)) * T(v, \sigma(v), \sigma_w(v)) * \mathcal{P}_n^\sigma(v)$$

**Definition 15.** We say that  $\sigma$  a vector of stationary strategies is a  $\beta$  discounted stationary equilibrium of  $\Gamma$  iff :

$$\forall w \in P, \forall \sigma_w, u_w(\sigma) \geq u_w((\sigma_{\neg w}, \sigma_w))$$

**Definition 16.** We say that  $v$  is  $\alpha$  reasonable regarding a game  $\Gamma$  if exists a  $\beta$  discounted stationary equilibrium of  $\Gamma$  noted  $\sigma$  such that

$$\sum_{n=0}^{+\infty} \mathcal{P}_n^\sigma(v) \geq \alpha$$

**Etienne: Do not read after**

## 2.1 Equivalent games

In order to define equivalent game we just have to define equivalent knowledge regarding a game.

**Definition 17.** Let  $K = (N, E)$  and  $K' = (N', E')$  two knowledge we say that  $K$  and  $K'$  are  $\equiv$  equivalent regarding  $\Gamma = (P, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{K}_P, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{P})$  if :

$\equiv$  is an equivalent function over blocks

$$\forall L \in K, \exists L' \in K', \forall i \in \llbracket 1, |L| \rrbracket, L[i] \equiv L'[i]$$

$$\forall L' \in K', \exists L \in K, \forall i \in \llbracket 1, |L'| \rrbracket, L[i] \equiv L'[i]$$

$$\forall w \in P, \forall a_w \in \mathcal{A}_w, \forall K_P \in \mathcal{K}_P, K_P(w) = K, \forall p \neq w \in P, K'_P(p) = K_P(p) \wedge K'_P(w) = K' \implies r_w(K_P, a_w) =$$

$$\forall w \in P, \forall a_w \in \mathcal{A}_w, \forall K_P \in \mathcal{K}_P, K_P(w) = K, \forall p \neq w \in P, K'_P(p) = K_P(p) \wedge K'_P(w) = K' \implies \forall K_P^1 \in \mathcal{K}_P, \mathcal{P}(K_P, A, K,$$

We denote  $K^\equiv$  the set of knowledge equivalent to  $K$ .