

Demand Forecasting II: Evidence-Based Methods and Checklists

J. Scott Armstrong¹

Kesten C. Green²

Working Paper 92-KCG-clean

May 30, 2017

This is an invited paper. Please send us your suggestions on experimental evidence that we have overlooked. In particular, the effect size estimates for some of our findings have surprised us, so we are especially interested to learn about experimental evidence that runs counter to our findings. Please send relevant comparative studies that you—or others—have done by June 10. We have a narrow window of opportunity for making revisions. Also let us know if you would like to be a reviewer.

¹ The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 747 Huntsman, Philadelphia, PA 19104, U.S.A. and Ehrenberg-Bass Institute, University of South Australia Business School: +1 610 622 6480 F: +1 215 898 2534 armstrong@wharton.upenn.edu

² School of Commerce and Ehrenberg-Bass Institute, University of South Australia Business School, University of South Australia, City West Campus, North Terrace, Adelaide, SA 5000, Australia, T: +61 8 8302 9097 F: +61 8 8302 0709 kesten.green@unisa.edu.au

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ABSTRACT

Problem: Decision makers in the public and private sectors would benefit from more accurate forecasts of demand for goods and services. Most forecasting practitioners are unaware of discoveries from experimental research over the past half-century that can be used to reduce errors dramatically, often by more than half. The objective of this paper is to improve demand forecasting practice by providing forecasting knowledge to forecasters and decision makers in a form that is easy for them to use.

Methods: This paper reviews forecasting research to identify which methods are useful for demand forecasting, and which are not, and develops checklists of evidence-based forecasting guidance for demand forecasters and their clients. The primary criterion for evaluating whether or not a method is useful was predictive validity, as assessed by evidence on the relative accuracy of *ex ante* forecasts.

Findings: This paper identifies and describes 17 evidence-based forecasting methods and eight that are not, and provides five evidence-based checklists for applying knowledge on forecasting to diverse demand forecasting problems by selecting and implementing the most suitable methods.

Originality: Three of the checklists are new—one listing evidence-based methods and the knowledge needed to apply them, one on assessing uncertainty, and one listing popular forecasting methods to avoid.

Usefulness: The checklists are low-cost tools that forecasters can use together with knowledge of all 17 useful forecasting methods. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that by using the checklists, forecasters will produce demand forecasts that are substantially more accurate than those provided by currently popular methods. The completed checklists provide assurance to clients and other interested parties that the resulting forecasts were derived using evidence-based procedures.

Key words: big data, calibration, competitor behavior, confidence, decision-making, government services, market share, market size, new product forecasting, prediction intervals, regulation, sales forecasting, uncertainty

Authors' notes: Work on this paper started in early 2005 in response to an invitation to provide a chapter for a book. In 2007, we withdrew the paper due to differences with the editor of the book over “content, level, and style.” We made the working paper available on the Internet from 2005 and updated it from time to time through to 2012. It had been cited 75 times by April 2017 according to Google Scholar. We decided to update the paper in early 2017, and added “II” to our title to recognize the substantial revision of the paper including the addition of recent developments in forecasting and the addition of five checklists. We estimate that most readers can read this paper in one hour.

1. We received no funding for the paper and have no commercial interests in any forecasting method.
2. We endeavored to conform with the Criteria for Science Checklist at GuidelinesforScience.com.

Acknowledgments: We thank Hal Arkes, Roy Batchelor, David Corkindale, Robert Fildes, Paul Goodwin, Andreas Graefe, Kostas Nikolopoulos, and Malcolm Wright for their reviews. We also thank those who made useful suggestions, including Phil Stern. Finally, we thank those who edited the paper for us: Esther Park, Maya Mudambi, and Scheherbano Rafay.

INTRODUCTION

Demand forecasting asks how much of a good or service would be bought, consumed, or otherwise experienced in the future given marketing actions, and industry and market conditions. Demand forecasting can involve forecasting the effects on demand of such changes as product design, price, advertising, or the actions of competitors and regulators. This paper is concerned with improving the accuracy of forecasts by making scientific knowledge on forecasting available to demand forecasters.

Accurate forecasts are important for businesses and other organizations in making plans to meet demand for their goods and services. The need for accurate demand forecasts is particularly important when the information provided by market prices is distorted or absent, as when governments have a large role in the provision of a good (e.g., medicines), or service (e.g., national park visits.)

Thanks to findings from experiments testing multiple reasonable hypotheses, demand forecasting has advanced rapidly since the 1930s. In the mid-1990s, 39 leading forecasting researchers and 123 expert reviewers were involved in identifying and collating scientific knowledge on forecasting. These findings were summarized as principles (condition-action statements). One-hundred-and-thirty-nine principles were formulated (Armstrong 2001b, pp. 679-732). In 2015, two papers further summarized forecasting knowledge in the form of two overarching principles: simplicity and conservatism (Green and Armstrong 2015, and Armstrong, Green, and Graefe 2015, respectively). The guidelines for demand forecasting described in this paper draw upon those evidence-based principles.

This paper is concerned with methods that have been shown to improve forecast accuracy relative to methods that are commonly used in practice. Absent a political motive that a preferred plan be adopted, accuracy is the most important criterion for most parties concerned with forecasts (Fildes and Goodwin 2007). Other criteria include forecast uncertainty, cost, and understandability. Yokum and Armstrong (1995) discuss the criteria for judging alternative forecasting methods, and show how researchers and practitioners ranked the criteria.

METHODS

We reviewed research findings and provided checklists to make this knowledge accessible to forecasters and researchers. The review involved searching for papers with evidence from experiments that compared the performance of alternative methods. We did this using the following procedures:

- 1) Searching the Internet, mostly using Google Scholar.
- 2) Contacting key researchers for assistance, which, according one study, is far more comprehensive than computer searches (Armstrong and Pagell, 2003).
- 3) Using references from key papers.
- 4) Putting working paper versions our paper online (e.g., ResearchGate) with requests for papers that might have been overlooked. In doing so, we emphasized the need for experimental evidence, especially evidence that would challenge the findings presented in this paper.
- 5) Asking reviewers to identify missing papers.
- 6) Sending the paper to relevant lists such as ELMAR in marketing.
- 7) Posting on relevant websites such as ForecastingPrinciples.com.

Given the enormous number of papers with promising titles, we screened papers by whether the “Abstracts” or “Conclusions” reported the findings and methods. If not, we stopped. If yes, we

checked whether the paper provided full disclosure. If yes, we then checked whether the findings were important. Of the papers with promising titles, only a small percentage passed these criteria.

The primary criterion for evaluating whether or not a method is useful was predictive validity, as assessed by evidence on the accuracy of *ex ante* forecasts from the method relative to those from current practice or to existing evidence-based alternative methods. These papers were used to develop checklists for use by demand forecasters, managers, clients, investors, funders, and citizens concerned about forecasts for public policy.

CHECKLISTS TO IMPLEMENT AND ASSESS FORECASTING METHODS

We summarize knowledge on how best to forecast in the form of checklists. Structured checklists are an effective way to make complex tasks easier, to avoid the need for memorizing, to provide relevant guidance on a just-in-time basis, and to inform others about the procedures you used.

Checklists are useful for applying evidence-based methods and principles, such as with flying an airplane or performing a medical operation. They can also inform decision-makers of the latest scientific findings.

Much research supports the value of using checklists (see, e.g., Hales and Pronovost 2006). One experiment assessed the effects of using a 19-item checklist for a hospital procedure. The before-and-after design compared the outcomes experienced by thousands of patients in hospitals in eight cities around the world. The checklist led to a reduction in deaths from 1.5% to 0.8% in the month after the operations, and in complications, from 11% to 7% (Haynes et al. 2009).

While the advances in forecasting knowledge over the past century have provided the opportunity for substantial improvements in accuracy, most practitioners do not make use of that knowledge. There are a number of reasons why that happens: practitioners (1) prefer to stick with their current forecasting procedures; (2) wish to provide support for a preferred outcome; (3) are unaware of evidence-based methods; or (4) are aware of the evidence-based methods, but they have not followed any procedure to ensure that they use them, and they have not been asked to do so. Practitioners who are not using evidence-based forecasting methods for reasons 3 or 4 will benefit from reading this paper and using the checklists provided.

Practitioners are unaware of evidence-based methods (reason number 3) because the usual way they learn about a subject—by reading a textbook—would not have made them aware. At the time that the original 139 forecasting principles were published, a review of 17 forecasting textbooks found that the typical textbook mentioned only 19% of the principles. At best, one textbook mentioned one-third of the principles (Cox and Loomis 2001).

Failure to comply with known evidence-based procedures (reason number 4) can be cured by requiring practitioners to complete a checklist. When clients specify the procedures they require, practitioners will try to comply, especially when they know that their processes will be audited.

This paper presents checklists to aid funders in asking forecasters to provide evidence-based forecasts, policy makers to assess whether forecasts can be trusted, and forecasters to ensure that they are following proper methods and could thus defend their procedures in court, if need be. They can also help clients to assess when forecasters follow proper procedures. When the forecasts are wildly incorrect—think of the forecasts made on and around the first Earth Day in 1970, such as the “Great 1980s Die-Off” of 4 billion people, including 65 million Americans (Perry 2017)—forecasters might be sued for failing to follow proper procedures in the same way that medical and engineering professionals can be sued for negligence.

Exhibit 1: Forecasting Methods Application Checklist				
Name of forecasting problem: _____				
Forecaster: _____ Date: _____				
Method		Knowledge needed		Usable method
		Forecaster*	Respondent	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) (Number)
Judgmental methods				
1. Prediction markets	Survey/market design	Domain; Problem	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
2. Judgmental bootstrapping	Survey/experiment design	Domain; Causality	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
3. Multiplicative decomposition	Domain; Structural relationships	n/a	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
4. Intentions surveys	Survey design	Own plans/behavior	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
5. Expectations surveys	Survey design	Others' behavior	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
6. Expert surveys (Delphi, etc.)	Survey design	Domain	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
7. Simulated interaction	Survey/experiment design	Normal human responses	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
8. Structured analogies	Survey design	Analogous events	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
9. Experimentation	Experiment design	Normal human responses	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
10. Expert systems	Survey design	Domain	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
Quantitative methods (Judgmental inputs typically required)				
11. Extrapolation	Time series methods; Data	n/a	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
12. Rule-based forecasting	Causality; Time series methods	n/a	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
13. Regression models	Causality; Data	n/a	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
14. Segmentation	Causality; Data	n/a	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
15. Index models	Cumulative knowledge	n/a	<input type="checkbox"/>	[]
TOTALS (Count/Sum)			[]	[]
Obtain several forecasts from several methods when forecast reliability and accuracy is important				
16. Combined <i>within</i> methods			<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes
17. Combined <i>across</i> methods			<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes

*Forecasters must always know about the forecasting problem, which may require consulting with the forecast client and domain experts, and consulting the research literature.

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VALID FORECASTING METHODS: DESCRIPTIONS AND EVIDENCE

Exhibit 1 provides a listing of all 17 forecasting methods that have been found to have predictive validity. For each of the methods, the exhibit identifies the knowledge that is needed—in addition to knowledge of the method—to use the method for a given problem. The forecaster should be aware of evidence from prior experimental research that is relevant to the forecasting problem. For the great majority of forecasting problems, several of the methods listed in Exhibit 1 will be usable.

Practitioners typically use the method they are most familiar or the method that they believe to be the best for the problem at hand. Both are mistakes. Instead, forecasters should familiarize themselves with all of the valid forecasting methods and seek to use all that are feasible for the problem. Further, forecasters should obtain forecasts from several implementations of each method, and combine the forecasts. At a minimum, we suggest forecasters should obtain forecasts from two variations of each of three different methods in order to reduce the risk of extreme errors.

The predictive validity of a theory or a forecasting method is assessed by comparing the accuracy of forecasts from the method with forecasts from the currently used method, or from a simple plausible method, or from other evidence-based methods. For qualitative forecasts—such as whether a, b, or c will happen, or which of x or y would be better—accuracy is typically measured as some variation of percent correct. For quantitative forecasts, accuracy is assessed by the size of the forecast errors. Forecast errors are measures of the absolute difference between *ex ante* forecasts and what actually transpired. Much of the evidence on the forecasting methods described in this paper is, therefore, presented in the form of percentage error reductions attributable to using the method rather than the commonly used method, or some other benchmark method.

Evidence-based forecasting methods are described next. We start with judgmental methods, and follow with quantitative methods. The latter inevitably require some judgment.

Judgmental Methods

To be useful, understandable, unbiased and replicable, judgmental forecasting methods must be structured and fully disclosed. Contrary to common belief, being expert on a topic or problem is not sufficient to make accurate forecasts in complex situations.

Prediction markets (1)

Prediction markets—also known as betting markets, information markets, and futures markets—aim to attract experts who are motivated to use their knowledge to win money by making accurate predictions, thus being less likely to be biased. Markets have been long been used to make forecasts. For example, in the 1800s, they provided the primary way to forecast political elections (Graefe 2017). If you are wondering about the relevance to demand of forecasting the outcomes of U.S. presidential elections, consider that election results and the actions of the new incumbent can have important effects on markets.

Prediction markets are especially useful when knowledge is dispersed and many motivated participants are trading. In addition, they rapidly revise forecasts when new information becomes available.

The advent of software and the Internet means that prediction markets are practical for more forecasting problems. Forecasters using the prediction markets method will need to be familiar with designing online prediction markets, as well as with evidence-based survey design.

The accuracy of forecasts from prediction markets was tested across eight published comparisons in the field of business forecasting; Errors were 28% lower than those from no-change models, but 29% higher than those from combined judgmental forecasts (Graefe 2011). In another test, forecasts from prediction markets across the three months before each U.S. presidential election from 2004 to 2016 were, on average, less accurate than forecasts from the RealClearPolitics poll average, a survey of experts, and citizen forecasts (Graefe, 2017). We suspect that the small number of participants and the limit on each bet (\$500) harmed its effectiveness. Still, prediction markets contributed substantially to improving the accuracy of combined forecasts of voting for political candidates.

Judgmental Bootstrapping (2)

Judgmental bootstrapping was discovered in the early 1900s, when it was used to make forecasts of agricultural crops. The method uses regression analysis on the variables that experts use to make judgmental forecasts. The dependent variable is not the actual outcome, but rather the experts'

predictions of the outcome given the values of the causal variables. As a consequence, the method can be used when one has no actual data on the dependent variable.

The first step is to ask experts to identify causal variables based on their domain knowledge. Then ask them to make predictions for a set of hypothetical cases. For example, they could be asked to forecast the short-term effect of a promotion on demand given features such as price reduction, advertising, market share, and competitor response. By using hypothetical features for a variety of alternative promotions, the forecaster can ensure that the causal variables vary substantially and independently of one another. Regression analysis is then used to estimate the parameters of a model with which to make forecasts. In other words, judgmental bootstrapping is a method to develop a model of the experts' forecasting procedure.

Interestingly, the bootstrap model's forecasts are more accurate than those of the experts. It is like picking oneself up by the bootstraps. The result occurs because the model is more consistent than the expert in applying the rules. It addition the model does not get distracted by irrelevant features, nor does it get tired or irritable. Finally, the forecaster can ensure that the model excludes irrelevant variables.

Judgmental bootstrapping models are especially useful for complex forecasting problems for which data on the dependent variable—such as sales for a proposed product—are not available. Once developed, the bootstrapping model can provide forecasts at a low cost and make forecasts for different situations—e.g., by changing the features of a product.

Despite the discovery of the method and evidence on its usefulness, its early use seemed to have been confined to agricultural predictions. The method was rediscovered by social scientists in the 1960s. This paved the way for an evaluation of its value. A meta-analysis found that judgmental bootstrapping forecasts were more accurate than those from unaided judgments in 8 of 11 comparisons, with two tests finding no difference and one finding a small loss in accuracy. The typical error reduction was about 6%. The one failure occurred when the experts relied on an irrelevant variable that was not excluded from the bootstrap model (Armstrong 2001a.) A study that compared financial analysts' recommendations with recommendations from models of the analysts found that trades based on the models' recommendations were more profitable (Batchelor and Kwan 2007).

In the 1970s, in a chance meeting on an airplane, the first author sat next to Ed Snider, the owner of the Philadelphia Flyers hockey team. Might he be interested in judgmental bootstrapping? I asked him how he selected players. He told me that he visited the Dallas Cowboys football team to find out why they were so successful. The Cowboys, as it happened, were using judgmental bootstrapping, so that is what the Flyers were then using. He also said he asked his management team to use it, but they refused. He did, however, convince them to use both methods as a test. It took only one year for the team convert to judgmental bootstrapping. Snider said that the other hockey team owners knew what the Flyers were doing, but they preferred to continue using their unaided judgments.

In 1979, when the first author was visiting a friend, Paul Westhead, then coach of the Los Angeles Lakers basketball team, he suggested the use of judgmental bootstrapping. Westhead was interested, but was unable to convince the owner. In the 1990s, a method apparently similar to judgmental bootstrapping—regression analysis with variables selected by experts—was adopted by the general manager of Oakland Athletics baseball team. It met with fierce resistance from baseball scouts, the experts who historically used a wide variety of data along with their judgment. The improved forecasts from the regression models were so profitable, however, that today almost all professional sports teams use some version of this method. Those that do not, pay the price in their won-loss tally.

Despite the evidence, judgmental bootstrapping appears to be ignored by businesses, where the won-lost record is not clear-cut. It is also ignored by universities for their hiring decisions despite the

fact that one of the earliest validation tests showed that it provided a much more accurate and much less expensive way to decide who should be admitted to PhD programs (Dawes 1971),

Judgmental bootstrapping can also reduce bias in hiring employees, and in admitting students to universities, by insisting that the variables are only included if they have been shown to be relevant to performance. Orchestras have implemented this principle since the 1970s by holding auditions behind a screen. The approach produced a large increase in the proportion of women in orchestras between 1970 1996. (Goldin and Rouse 2000).

Multiplicative decomposition (3)

Multiplicative decomposition involves dividing a forecasting problem into multiplicative parts. For example, to forecast sales for a brand, a firm might separately forecast total market sales and market share, and then multiply those components. Decomposition makes sense when forecasting the parts individually is easier than forecasting the entire problem, when different methods are appropriate for forecasting each individual part, and when relevant data can be obtained for some parts of the problem.

Multiplicative decomposition is a general problem structuring method that should be used in conjunction with other evidence-based methods listed in Exhibit 1 for forecasting the component parts. For example, judgmental forecasts from multiplicative decomposition were generally more accurate than those obtained using a global approach (see MacGregor, 2001).

Intentions surveys (4)

Intentions surveys ask people how they *plan* to behave in specified situations. Data from intentions surveys can be used, for example, to predict how people would respond to major changes in the design of a product. A meta-analysis covering 47 comparisons with over 10,000 subjects, and a meta-analysis of ten meta-analyses with data from over 83,000 subjects each found a strong relationship between people's intentions and their behavior (Kim and Hunter 1993; Sheeran 2002).

Intentions surveys are especially useful when historical demand data are not available, such as for new products or in new markets. They are most likely to provide accurate forecasts when the forecast time horizon is short, and the behavior is familiar and important to the respondent, such as with durable goods. Plans are less likely to change when they are for the near future. (Morwitz 2001; Morwitz, Steckel, and Gupta 2007). Intentions surveys provide unbiased forecasts of demand, so adjustments for response bias are not needed (Wright and MacRae 2007).

To forecast demand using the intentions of potential consumers, prepare an accurate but brief description of the product (Armstrong and Overton 1977). Intentions should be obtained by using probability scales such as 0 = 'No chance, or almost no chance (1 in 100)' to 10 = 'Certain, or practically certain (99 in 100)' (Morwitz 2001). Evidence-based procedures for selecting samples, obtaining high response rates, compensating for non-response bias, and reducing response error are described in Dillman, Smyth, and Christian (2014).

Response error is often a large component of error. The problem is especially acute when the situation is new to the people responding to the survey, as when forecasting demand for a new product category; think mobile phones that fit easily in the pocket when they first became available. Intentions surveys are especially useful for forecasting demand for new products and for existing products in new markets because most other methods require historical data.

Expectations surveys (5)

Expectations surveys ask people how they *expect* themselves, or others, to behave. Expectations differ from intentions because people know that unintended events might interfere, and are subject to wishful thinking. For example, if you were asked whether you intend to catch the bus to work tomorrow, you might say, “yes”. However, because you realize that doing so is less convenient than driving and that you sometimes miss your intended bus, your expectation might be that there is only an 80% chance that you will go by bus. As with intentions surveys, forecasters should follow best practice survey design, and should use probability scales to elicit expectations.

Following the U. S. government’s prohibition of prediction markets for political elections, expectation surveys were introduced for the 1932 presidential election (Hayes, 1936). A representative sample of potential voters was asked how they expected *others* might vote, known as a “citizen forecasts.” These citizen expectation surveys have predicted the winners of the U.S. Presidential elections from 1932 to 2012 on 89% of the 217 surveys (Graefe 2014).

Further evidence was obtained from the PollyVote project. Over the 100 days before the election, the citizens’ expectations forecast errors for the seven U.S. Presidential elections from 1992 through 2016 averaged 1.2% compared to the combined polls of likely voters’ (voter intentions) average error of 2.6%; an error reduction of 54% (Graefe, Armstrong, Jones, and Cuzán 2017). Citizen forecasts are cheaper than the election polls, because the respondents are answering for many other people, so the samples can be smaller. We expect that the costs of the few citizen surveys would be a small fraction of one percent of the cost of the many election polls that are used.

Expectations surveys are often used to obtain information from experts. For example, asking sales managers about sales expectations for a new model of a computer. Such surveys have been routinely used for estimating various components of the economy, such as for short-term trends in the building industry.

Expert surveys (6)

Use written questions and instructions for the interviewers to ensure that’s each expert is questioned in the same way, thereby avoiding interviewers’ biases. Word the question in more than one way in order to compensate for possible biases in wording, and average across the answers. Pre-test each question to ensure that the experts understand what is being asked. Additional advice on the design for expert surveys is provided in Armstrong (1985, pp.108-116).

Obtain forecasts from at least five experts. For important forecasts, use up to 20 experts (Hogarth 1978). That advice was followed in forecasting the popular vote in the seven U. S. presidential elections up to and including 2016. Fifteen or so experts were asked for their expectations on the popular vote in several surveys over the last 96 days prior to each election. The average error of the expert survey forecasts was, at 1.6%, substantially less than the average error of the forecasts from poll aggregators, at 2.6% (Graefe, Armstrong, Jones, and Cuzán 2017, and personal correspondence with Graefe).

Delphi is an extension of the above survey approach whereby the survey is given in two or more rounds with anonymous summaries of the forecasts and reasons provided as feedback after each round. Repeat the process until forecasts change little between rounds—two or three rounds are usually sufficient. Use the median or mode of the experts’ final-round forecasts as the Delphi forecast. Software for the procedure is available at ForecastingPrinciples.com.

Delphi forecasts were more accurate than forecasts made in traditional meetings in five studies comparing the two approaches, about the same in two, and were less accurate in one. Delphi was more accurate than surveys of expert opinion for 12 of 16 studies, with two ties and two cases in which

Delphi was less accurate. Among these 24 comparisons, Delphi improved accuracy in 71% and harmed it in 12% (Rowe and Wright 2001.)

Delphi is attractive to managers because it is easy to understand, and the record of the experts' reasoning can be informative. Delphi is relatively cheap because the experts do not need to meet. It has an advantage over prediction markets in that reasons are provided for the forecasts (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe 2007). Delphi is likely to be most useful when relevant information is distributed among the experts (Jones, Armstrong, and Cuzán 2007).

Simulated interaction (role playing) (7)

Simulated interaction is a form of role-playing that can be used to forecast decisions by people who are interacting. For example, a manager might want to know how best to secure an exclusive distribution arrangement with a major supplier, how customers would respond to changes in the design of a product, or how a union would respond to a contract offer by a company.

Simulated interactions can be conducted by using naïve subjects to play the roles. Describe the main protagonists' roles, prepare a brief description of the situation, and list possible decisions. Participants adopt one of the roles, then read the situation description. The role-players are asked to engage in realistic interactions with the other role players, staying in their roles until they reach a decision. The simulations typically last less than an hour.

Relative to the method usually used for such situations—unaided expert judgment—simulated interaction reduced forecast errors on average by 57% for eight conflict situations (Green 2005). The conflicts used in the research that were most relevant to the problem of demand forecasting include union-management disputes, an attempt at the hostile takeover of a corporation, and a supply channel negotiation.

If the simulated interaction method seems onerous, you might think that following the common advice to put yourself in the other person's shoes would help you to predict decisions. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said that if he had done this during the Vietnam War, he would have made better decisions.³ A test of "role thinking," however, found no improvement in the accuracy of the forecasts relative to unaided judgment. Apparently, it is too difficult to think through the interactions of parties with divergent roles in a complex situation; active role-playing between parties is necessary to represent such situations with sufficient realism (Green and Armstrong 2011).

Structured analogies (8)

The structured analogies method involves asking ten or so experts in a given field to suggest situations that were similar to that for which a forecast is required (the target situation). The experts are given a description of the situation and are asked to describe analogous situations, rate their similarity to the target situation, and to match the outcomes of their analogies with possible outcomes of the target situation. An administrator takes the target situation outcome implied by each expert's top-rated analogy, and calculates the modal outcome as the structured analogies forecast (Green and Armstrong, 2007). The method should not be confused with the common use of analogies to justify an outcome that is preferred by the forecaster or client.

Structured analogies were 41% more accurate than unaided judgment in forecasting decisions in eight real conflicts. These were the same situations as were used for research on the simulated interaction method described above, for which the error reduction was 57% (Green and Armstrong 2007).

³ From the 2003 documentary film, "Fog of War".

A procedure akin to structured analogies was used to forecast box office revenue for 19 unreleased movies. Raters identified analogous movies from a database and rated them for similarity. The revenue forecasts from the analogies were adjusted for advertising expenditure, and if the movie was a sequel. Errors from the structured analogies forecasts were less than half those of forecasts from simple and complex regression models (Lovallo, Clarke and Camerer 2012).

Responses to government incentives to promote laptop purchases among university students, and to a program offering certification on Internet safety to parents of high-school students were forecast by structured analogies. The error of the structured analogies forecasts was 8% lower than the error of forecasts from unaided judgment (Nikolopoulos, et al. 2015). Across the ten comparative tests from the three studies described above, the error reduction from using structured analogies averages about 40%.

Experimentation (9)

Experimentation is widely used, and is the most realistic method to determine which variables have an important effect on the thing being forecast. Experiments can be used to examine how people respond to factors such as changes in the design or marketing of a product. For example, how would people respond to changes in a firm's automatic answering systems used for telephone inquiries? Trials could be conducted in some regions, but not others, in order to estimate the effects. Alternatively, experimental subjects might be exposed to different answering systems in a laboratory setting.

Laboratory experiments allow greater control than field experiments, and the testing of conditions in a controlled lab setting is usually easier and cheaper, and avoids revealing sensitive information. A lab experiment might involve testing consumers' relative preferences by presenting a product in different packaging and recording their purchases in a mock retail environment. A field experiment might involve, using the different package in different geographical on a number of test markets that are representative. An analysis of experiments in the field of organizational behavior found that laboratory and field experiments yielded similar findings (Locke 1986).

Expert systems (10)

Expert systems involve asking experts to describe their step-by-step process for making forecasts. The procedure should be explicitly defined and unambiguous, such that it could be implemented as software. Use empirical estimates of relationships from econometric studies and experiments when available in order to help ensure that the rules are valid. The expert system should result in a procedure that is simple, clear, and complete.

Expert system forecasts were more accurate than forecasts from unaided judgment in a review of 15 comparisons (Collopy, Adya and Armstrong 2001). Two of the studies—on gas, and on mail order catalogue sales—involved forecasting demand; in these studies, the expert systems errors were 10% and 5% smaller than those from unaided judgment.

Quantitative Methods

Quantitative methods require numerical data on or related to what is being forecast. However, these methods can also draw upon judgmental methods, such as decomposition. As well as numeric data, quantitative methods require structured judgmental inputs.

Extrapolation (11)

Extrapolation methods use historical data only on the variable to be forecast. They are especially useful when little is known about the factors affecting the forecasted variable, or the causal variables are not expected to change much, or the causal factors cannot be forecast with much accuracy. Extrapolations are cost effective when many forecasts are needed, such as for production and inventory planning for many product lines.

Perhaps the most widely used extrapolation method, with the possible exception of the no-change model, is exponential smoothing. Exponential smoothing is a moving average of time-series data in which recent data are weighted more heavily. Exponential smoothing is easy to understand, inexpensive, and relatively accurate. For a review of exponential smoothing, see Gardner (2006).

Damping a time-series trend toward the long-term historical trend or toward no trend often improves forecast accuracy. The greater the uncertainty about the situation, the greater the need for such damping. A review of ten experimental comparisons found that, on average, damping the trend toward zero reduced forecast error by almost 5% (Armstrong 2006). In addition, damping reduced the risk of large errors.

When extrapolating data of less than annual frequency, remove the effects of seasonal influences first. In forecasts over an 18-month horizon for 68 monthly economic series, seasonal adjustment reduced forecast errors by 23% (Makridakis, *et al.* 1984, Table 14).

Given the inevitable uncertainty involved in estimating seasonal factors, they too should be damped. Miller and Williams (2003, 2004) provide procedures for damping seasonal factors. Their software for calculating damped seasonal adjustment factors is available at forecastingprinciples.com. When they applied damping to the 1,428 monthly time series from the M3-Competition, forecast accuracy improved for 68% of the series.

Damping by averaging seasonality factors across analogous situations also helps. In one study, combining seasonal factors from, for example, snow blowers and snow shovels, reduced the average forecast error by about 20% (Bunn and Vassilopoulos 1999). In another study, pooling monthly seasonal factors for crime rates for six precincts in a city increased forecast accuracy by 7% compared to using seasonal factors that were estimated individually for each precinct (Gorr, Olschlager, and Thompson 2003).

Another approach is to use multiplicative decomposition by making forecasts of the market size and market share, then multiplying the two to get a sales forecast. We were unable to find estimates of the effects of this approach on demand forecast accuracy. Nevertheless, given the power of decomposition in related areas, we expect that the approach would be effective.

Still another approach is to decompose a time-series by forecasting the starting level and trend separately, and then add them—a procedure called “nowcasting”. Three comparative studies found that, on average, forecast errors for *short-range* forecasts were reduced by 37% (Tessier and Armstrong, 2015). The percentage error reduction would likely decrease as the forecast horizon lengthened.

Multiplicative decomposition can also be used to incorporate causal knowledge into extrapolation forecasts. For example, when forecasting a time-series, it often happens that the series is affected by causal forces—growth, decay, opposing, regressing, supporting, or unknown—that are affecting trends in different ways. In such a case, decompose the time-series by causal forces that have different directional effects, extrapolate each component, and then recombine. Doing so is likely to improve accuracy under two conditions: (1) domain knowledge can be used to structure the problem so that causal forces differ for two or more of the component series, and (2) it is possible to obtain relatively accurate forecasts for each component. For example, to forecast motor vehicle deaths,

forecast the number of miles driven—a series that would be expected to grow—and the death rate per million passenger miles—a series that would be expected to decrease due to better roads and safer cars—then multiply to get total deaths.

When tested on five time-series that clearly met the two conditions, decomposition by causal forces reduced *ex ante* forecast errors by two-thirds. For the four series that partially met the conditions, decomposition by causal forces reduced error by one-half (Armstrong, Collopy and Yokum 2005). There was no gain, or loss, when the conditions did not apply.

Rule-based forecasting (12)

As with the other methods discussed below, rule-based forecasting (RBF) allows the use of causal knowledge in structured ways. To implement RBF, first identify the features of the series. There are 28 series features—including the causal forces mentioned in the preceding section—and factors such as the length of the forecast horizon, the amount of data available, and the existence of outliers (Armstrong, Adya and Collopy 2001). These features are identified by inspection, statistical analysis, and domain knowledge. There are 99 rules for combining the forecasts.

For one-year-ahead *ex ante* forecasts of 90 annual series from the M-Competition (available from <http://www.forecastingprinciples.com/index.php/researchers-page>), the median absolute percentage error for RBF forecasts were 13% smaller than those from equally weighted combined forecasts. For six-year ahead *ex ante* forecasts, the RBF forecast errors were 42% smaller; presumably due to the increasing importance of causal effects over longer horizons. RBF forecasts were also more accurate than equally weighted combinations of forecasts in situations involving strong trends, low uncertainty, stability, and good domain expertise. In cases where the conditions were not met, the RBF forecasts had little or no accuracy advantage over combined forecasts (Collopy and Armstrong 1992).

The contrary series rule is especially important. It states that when the expected direction of a time-series and the recent trend of the series are contrary to one another, set the forecasted trend to zero. The rule yielded substantial improvements in extrapolating time-series data from five data sets, especially for longer-term (6-year-ahead) forecasts for which the error reduction exceeded 40% (Armstrong and Collopy 1993). The error reduction was achieved despite the fact that the coding for “expected direction” was done by the authors of that paper, who were not experts on the product categories.

Regression analysis (13)

Regression analysis can be useful for estimating the strength of relationships between the variable to be forecast and one or more *known* causal variables. Thus, regression analysis can be helpful in assessing the effects of various policies.

In some situations, causal factors are obvious from logical relationships. In general, however, causal relationships are uncertain, and that is particularly the case with complex forecasting problems. If there are questions as to the validity of a proposed causal factor and its directional effect, one should consult published experimental research; especially meta-analyses of experimental findings. For example, a meta-analysis of studies estimating price elasticities of demand—the percentage change in unit sales resulting from a one-percent price increase—for 1,851 products from 81 studies, found an average price elasticity across studies of -2.62, with a range from -0.25 to -9.5 (Bijmolt, Heerde and Pieters, 2005, Table 1). Another meta-analysis—including elasticity estimates for 367 branded products—reported a mean value of -2.5 (Tellis 2009).

The conditions for the relationship must be understood. For example, high prices might have positive effects for some people who purchase “credence goods”—goods whose quality cannot be

assessed objectively such as very expensive watches and university tuition—to convince oneself (and others) that the product is the best quality.

Do not go beyond obvious relationships and experimental evidence when searching for causal variables. Those cautions are especially important when forecasters have access to large databases with many variables that show high correlations. Spurious correlations are often viewed as causal relationships, and lead to problems by suggesting useless research or incorrect policies. One field that suffers from this is health care, as described by Kabat (2008).

Regression is likely to be useful in situations in which three or fewer causal variables have important effects, and effect sizes can be estimated from many reliable observations in which the causal variables varied independently of one another (Armstrong 2012).

Principles for developing regression models include the following:

1. use prior knowledge, logic based on known relationships, and experimental studies, not statistical fit, for selecting variables and for specifying the directions of their effects;
2. discard a variable if the estimated relationship conflicts with prior evidence on the direction of the relationship;
3. discard a variables if it cannot be forecast or controlled;
4. use a small number of variables, preferably no more than three (not counting variables used to take account of known effects, such as using population to transforming data to per capita sales, or a price index to adjust for currency inflation);
5. damp the coefficients toward zero to adjust for excluded sources of error;
6. use a simple functional form;
7. avoid simultaneous equations; and
8. use large sample sizes.

Regression is not well suited for estimating relationships from non-experimental data: the statistical procedures used by regression analysis are confused by intercorrelations among causal variables in the model. Unfortunately, this improper use of regression analysis has been increasing. For example, statistical analyses of “big data” often violates the first five of the above eight principles for developing regression models. Big data often diverts researchers away from searching for experimental findings on causal factors. Ziliak and McCloskey’s (2004) review of empirical papers published in the *American Economic Review* found that in the 1980s, 32% of the studies ($N= 182$) had relied exclusively on statistical significance for inclusion in their models. The situation was worse in the 1990s, as 74% did so ($N=137$).

Regression analysis is conservative in that it reduces the size of the coefficients to adjust for random measurement error in the variables. However, it overlooks other sources of error such as the omission of important causal variables, inclusion of irrelevant variables, and errors in predicting the causal variables. Thus, the coefficients used in the forecasting model should be damped toward zero. This tends to improve out-of-sample forecast accuracy, particularly when one has small samples and many variables. In addition, intercorrelations among the causal variables make it difficult to determine weights for the causal variable. As this situation is common for many prediction problems, unit weight models frequently yield more accurate *ex ante* forecasts than models with coefficients estimated by regression analysis. One study compared forecasts from nine established U.S. election-forecasting models with forecasts from the same models with unit weights. Across the ten elections from 1976 to 2012, the use of unit weights for the predictors reduced the *ex ante* forecast error of each of the original regression models. On average the error reduction was 4% (Graefe 2015)

Segmentation (14)

Segmentation involves breaking a problem into independent parts, using knowledge and data to make a forecast about each part, and then adding the forecasts of the parts. For example, to forecast air travel demand in ten years' time, the Port of New York Authority in 1955 broke down airline travelers into 290 segments, including 130 business traveler and 160 personal traveler segments. The personal travelers were split by age, occupation, income, and education, and the business travellers by occupation, then industry, then income. Data on each segment was obtained from the census and from a survey on travel behavior. To derive the forecast, the official projected population for 1965 was allocated among the segments and the number of travelers and trip frequency were extrapolated using 1935 as the starting year with zero travelers. The forecast of 90 million trips was only 3% different from the 1965 figure (Armstrong 1985).

To forecast using segmentation, identify important causal variables that can be used to define the segments, and their priorities. Determine cut-points for each variable such that the stronger the relationship with the dependent variable, the greater the non-linearity in the relationship, and the more data that are available, the more cut-points needed. Forecast the population of each segment and the behavior of the population within each segment then combine the population and behavior forecasts for each segment, and sum the segments.

Segmentation has advantages over regression analysis for situations where variables are intercorrelated, the effects of variables on demand are non-linear, prior causal knowledge is good, and the sample sizes on each of the segments are large. Some of these conditions occurred in a study on predicting demand at gas stations that used data on 2,717 stations to develop a regression model and a segmentation model. The models including such variables as type of outlet, type of area, traffic volumes, length of street frontage, presence or not of a canopy, and whether or not the station was open 24 hours a day. The predictive validity of the two methods were then tested using a holdout sample of 3,000 stations. The error of the regression model was 58%, while that of the segmentation model was 41% (Armstrong and Andress 1970).

Index models (15)

Some forecasting problems are characterized by good knowledge of many causal variables. Consider for example, predicting which players will do well in football, who would make the best company executive, what a country should do to improve its economic growth, whether a new product will be successful. When there are many important causal variables, regression is not a valid way to identify the magnitudes (coefficients) of the causal relationships.

Fortunately, Benjamin Franklin proposed a sensible solution that we refer to as the "Index Model". He described his method in a letter in response to a letter from his friend Joseph Priestley, who had described to Franklin a "vexing decision" that he was struggling to make. The method is sometimes referred to as experience tables elsewhere. Index models require good prior knowledge about the direction of the effects of the variables (Graefe and Armstrong, 2011). Use prior experimental evidence or domain knowledge to identify predictor variables and to assess each variable's directional influence on the outcome. Better yet, draw upon meta-analyses of experimental studies. If prior knowledge on a variable's effect is ambiguous or is not obvious to all, or is contrary to experimental findings, do not include the variable in the model.

Index scores are the sum of the values across the variables, which might be coded as 1 or 0 (favorable or unfavorable). The alternative with a higher index score is likely to turn out better, or is more likely to occur. Where sufficient historical data are available, one can then obtain quantitative forecasts by regressing index values against the variable of interest, such as sales.

The disadvantage of the index model is that it is time-consuming to search the literature for relevant experimental studies of the causal variables. The advantage is that one can include all important variables, no matter how many there are.

Index models have been successfully tested for forecasting the outcomes of U.S. presidential elections based on biographical information about candidates' (Armstrong and Graefe 2011) and voters' perceptions of candidates' ability to handle the issues (Graefe and Armstrong 2013).

Another test assessed the predictions from an index model of the relative effectiveness of the advertising in 96 pairs of advertisements. There were 195 variables that were potentially relevant, so regression was not feasible. Guessing would result in 50% correct predictions. Judgment by novices was little better than guessing at 54%, expert judges made 55% correct correction, and copy testing yielded 57%. By contrast, the index method was correct for 75% of the pairs of advertisements (Armstrong, Du, Green and Graefe 2016.)

Index models with unit weights have been found to be more accurate than regression models with optimal weights estimated from historical data. Graefe and Armstrong (2013) identified 13 empirical studies that included comparisons of the two methods for forecasting problems in the domains of applied psychology, biology, economics, elections, health, and personnel selection. In 3 of the studies, the index model forecasts were found to be slightly less accurate, but for 77% of the studies (13), index model forecasts were more accurate.

Drawing once again on the U. S. presidential elections study above by Graefe (2015), an index model that used equal-weights for all of the 27 variables used by econometric forecasters in their individual models yielded an *ex ante* forecast error that was 29% lower than the error of the most accurate of the ten original regression models.

COMBINING FORECASTS

As noted earlier, forecasters continue to be concerned with finding the "best" forecasting method and model. That is unfortunate. When possible—and it is almost always possible—forecasters should use more than one method for forecasting, and combine the forecasts.

The basic rules for combining across methods are 1) to use all valid evidence-based methods—and no other methods; 2) Seek diverse data and procedures; 3) specify the weights and reasons for them before combining the forecasts; 4) use equal weights for the components, unless strong evidence is available that some methods provide more accurate forecasts than others; 5) once specified prior to any analysis, the weights should not be changed (Graefe, Armstrong, Jones, and Cuzán 2014; Graefe 2015); and 6) use many components. For important forecasts, we suggest using at least five components.

Combining forecasts from an evidence-based method *guarantees* that the resulting forecast will not be the worst forecast, and that it will perform at least as well as the typical component forecast. In addition, the absolute error of the combined forecast will be smaller than the average of the component forecast errors when any of the components bracket the true value. Finally, combining can be more accurate than the most accurate component—and this often occurs. Interestingly, the above facts are counter-intuitive. For example, when graduate business subjects were asked to make forecasts, and were given an opportunity to use a combined forecast, or to select what they believed to be the most accurate method, most picked what they thought would be the most accurate forecast (Larrick and Soll 2006). This plays out in real life. When New York City received two different forecast of an impending snow storm recently, they

debated which forecast was best. The wound up making the wrong pick. The combined forecast would have saved much money.

Combining within a method (16)

Combining forecasts from variations of a single method or from independent forecasters using the same method helps to compensate for errors in the data, mistakes, and small sample sizes in any of the component forecasts. In other words, combining within a single method is likely to be useful primarily in improving the reliability of forecasts.

Given that a particular method might tend to produce forecasts that are biased in some way—because the method cannot use all kinds of knowledge and data, or because of the way knowledge and data are used by the method—combining within a method cannot be relied upon to reduce bias. In practical terms, that means that the chance that combining within a single method will bracket the actual outcome is modest.

Our analysis of combining within method included 19 comparisons of combinations of forecasts from a single method with the typical individual forecasts. The average error reduction was 13%, with a range from 3 to 24% (Armstrong 2001c).

Combining across methods (17)

Combining forecasts from diverse methods is likely to improve validity by tending to cancel out the biases inherent in the different methods.

As a consequence of the effects of bracketing, knowing which method is best cannot offer the guarantees offered by combining. Thus, when there are two or more evidence-based methods, the method of combining forecasts should always be used. Combining forecasts is a superior forecasting strategy even if you could be certain that you know the best method for a given forecasting problem, which, in practice, you never do.

The accuracy gains from combining forecasts from diverse models and methods are likely to be large. For example, combining the forecasts of two economists whose theories were most different reduced the errors of real GDP forecasts by 23%, whereas combining the forecasts of two economists with the most similar theories reduced errors by 11%. The results were even more dramatic when analyzed by diversity of technique: 21% error reduction compared to 2% for the forecasts from similar techniques (Table 2, Batchelor and Dua 1995.)

We have been unable to identify studies that have specifically investigated the effect of combining combinations of forecasts from different evidence-based methods. Moreover, the procedure appears not to be used much in practice. Nevertheless, we consider the principle of combining forecasts within (method 16) *and then* across (method 17) evidence-based methods is likely to provide substantial reductions in forecast errors relative to those from single forecasts, and from combined forecasts from a single method.

The Armstrong (2001c) meta-analysis of combining mentioned in relation to combining forecasts within methods, above, provided some evidence on combining forecasts across methods from five studies involving combinations of one forecast from each of two different methods and two studies involving combinations of one forecast from each of three different methods. The respective error reductions were 9.9% and 10.8%. For the studies that involved combining more than one forecast from at least one of two or three different methods—combining within and across methods on a modest scale—the error reductions were greater, at 10.9% (n=3) and 23.5% (n=1), respectively.

The Armstrong, Morwitz and Kumar (2000) study described in the evidence on intentions surveys, above, also provides some evidence on combinations of combined forecast. The study found that combinations of time series' extrapolations and intentions forecasts reduced errors by one-third, compared to extrapolation forecasts alone.

Forecasts from the PollyVote U.S. election-forecasting project (PollyVote.com) provide the best data we are aware of for assessing the value of combining forecasts, especially combining combined forecasts across different forecasting methods. One finding is that for two of the four elections for which the PollyVote method was used to provide *ex ante* forecasts (2004 and 2012), the combined forecast was more accurate than the *best* of the component method combination forecasts. Another is that for forecasts made 100 days prior to each of the last seven U.S. Presidential elections, the PollyVote combination of combined forecasts of the popular vote missed the actual outcome by an average of only one percentage point. We are expecting to be able to report on the findings of further analysis of the PollyVote data relevant to combining combinations of forecasts in time for the publication of this paper.

GOLDEN RULE OF FORECASTING: BE CONSERVATIVE

Even if you use all on the above advice, you cannot be certain that your forecasts will be accurate due to inadequate knowledge and natural variations in behavior and the market. Thus, it is important to observe the Golden Rule of Forecasting.

The short form of the Golden Rule of Forecasting is to *be conservative*. The long form is to be conservative by adhering to cumulative knowledge about the situation and about forecasting methods. A conservative forecast is consistent with cumulative knowledge about the present and the past. To be conservative, forecasters must seek out and use all knowledge relevant to the problem, including knowledge of valid forecasting methods (Armstrong, Green, and Graefe, 2015). The Golden Rule of Forecasting applies to all forecasting problems.

The Golden Rule of Forecasting is like the traditional Golden Rule, an ethical principle, that could be rephrased as “forecast unto others as you would have them forecast unto you.” The rule is especially useful when objectivity must be demonstrated, as in legal disputes and public policy making (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2015).

Exhibit 2 is a revised version of Armstrong, Green, and Graefe’s Table 1 (2015, p.1718). It includes 28 guidelines logically deduced from the Golden Rule. Our literature search found evidence on the effects of 19 of the guidelines. On average the use of a typical guideline reduced forecast error by 28%. Stated another way, the *violation of a guideline increased forecast error by 39% on average*.

We have changed the Golden Rule Checklist item on adjusting forecasts (guideline 6 in Exhibit 2) to, “Avoid adjusting forecasts.” Why? Adjusting forecasts risks introducing bias. Bias is particularly likely to occur when forecasters or clients might be subject to political pressures or to other incentives to produce a given forecast. And bias is common. For example, a survey of nine divisions within a British multinational firm found that 64% of the 45 respondents agreed that, “forecasts are frequently politically modified” (Fildes and Hastings 1994). In another study, 29 Israeli political surveys were classified according to the independence of the pollster from low to high as “in-house,” “commissioned,” or “self-supporting.” The results showed a consistent pattern: the greater the pollsters’ independence, the more accurate were their predictions. For example, 71% of the most independent polls had a relatively high level of accuracy, whereas 60% of the most dependent polls had a relatively low level of accuracy (Table 4, Shamir 1986).

In addition, if one follows the primary advice in this paper to use a number of valid methods, it would be hard for experts to understand what is missing and how to adjust for that. Finally, we are unable to find any evidence that adjustments would reduce forecast errors *relative to the errors of forecasts derived in ways that were consistent with the guidance in the checklists presented in Exhibits 1 and 2 above*. Research on adjusting forecasts from statistical models that do not combine forecasts found that, even then, adjustments typically increase errors (e.g., Belvedere and Goodwin 2017, Fildes et al. 2009) or, at best, have mixed results (e.g., Franses 2014; Lin, Goodwin, and Song 2014).

Interestingly, early research in psychology had examined the effects of subjective adjustments to forecasts. The broad conclusion was that subjective adjustments reduce forecast accuracy. Meehl (1954) used this as the basis for his primary rule for recruiting employees: *If you are choosing which candidate to hire, make your decision prior to meeting the person*. He illustrated adjustments with an example: “You’re in the supermarket checkout lane, piling up your purchases. You don’t say, ‘This looks like \$178.50 worth to me’; you do the calculations. And once the calculations are done, you don’t say, ‘In my opinion, the groceries were a bit cheaper, so let’s reduce it by \$8.00.’ You use the calculated total.” Meehl based his conclusion, on decades of research. Research since then continues to support Meehl’s law (see Grove, et al. 2000). Those who hire people, such as top executives, continue to violate this law, with sports being a major exception (teams do not like to lose).

The argument in favor of adjustments is that it may be needed when the forecasting method has not included all important knowledge and information, such as a key variable. If, however, forecasters follow the Exhibit 1 “Forecasting Methods Application Checklist” and the Exhibit 2 “Golden Rule of Forecasting Checklist” guidance—in particular on decomposition (guideline 1.1.2), including all important variables (4.3), and combining forecasts (2.5, 3.5, 4.4, 5)—there should be no important information that is not taken into account in the resulting forecast. And therefore, no need for adjustments.

Take the problem of how to forecast sales of a product that is subject to periodic promotions: a problem that is typically dealt with by judgmentally adjusting a statistical forecast of demand (see, e.g., Fildes and Goodwin 2007). The need for adjustment could be avoided by decomposing the problem into one of forecasting the level, trend, and effect of promotions separately. Trapero, Pedregal, Fildes, and Kourentzes (2013) provides support for that approach, finding an average reduction of mean absolute errors of about one-third compared to adjusted forecasts.

Expert and non-expert raters can complete the Golden Rule of Forecasting Checklist in less than an hour the first time they use it, and in less time after becoming familiar with it. Forecasters must fully disclose their methods and clearly explain them (Guideline 1.3). To help ensure the reliability of the checklist ratings, ask at least three people, each working independently, to do the ratings.

Exhibit 2: Golden Rule of Forecasting--Checklist II

Guideline	<u>Comparisons*</u>			
	<u>N</u>	<u>Error reduction</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
1. Problem formulation				
1.1 Use all important knowledge and information by...				
1.1.1 <input type="checkbox"/> selecting evidence-based methods validated for the situation	7	3	18	
1.1.2 <input type="checkbox"/> decomposing to best use knowledge, information, judgment	17	9	35	
1.2 Avoid bias by...				
1.2.1 <input type="checkbox"/> concealing the purpose of the forecast	—			
1.2.2 <input type="checkbox"/> specifying multiple hypotheses and methods	—			
1.2.3 <input type="checkbox"/> obtaining signed ethics statements before and after forecasting	—			
1.3 <input type="checkbox"/> Provide full disclosure for independent audits, replications, extensions	1			
2. Judgmental methods				
2.1 <input type="checkbox"/> Avoid unaided judgment	2	1	45	
2.2 <input type="checkbox"/> Use alternative wording and pretest questions	—			
2.3 <input type="checkbox"/> Ask judges to write reasons against the forecasts	2	1	8	
2.4 <input type="checkbox"/> Use judgmental bootstrapping	11	1	6	
2.5 <input type="checkbox"/> Use structured analogies	3	3	57	
2.6 <input type="checkbox"/> Combine independent forecasts from diverse judges	18	10	15	
3. Extrapolation methods				
3.1 <input type="checkbox"/> Use the longest time-series of valid and relevant data	—			
3.2 <input type="checkbox"/> Decompose by causal forces	1	1	64	
3.3 Modify trends to incorporate more knowledge if the...				
3.3.1 <input type="checkbox"/> series is variable or unstable	8	8	12	
3.3.2 <input type="checkbox"/> historical trend conflicts with causal forces	1	1	31	
3.3.3 <input type="checkbox"/> forecast horizon is longer than the historical series	1	1	43	
3.3.4 <input type="checkbox"/> short and long-term trend directions are inconsistent	—			
3.4 Modify seasonal factors to reflect uncertainty if...				
3.4.1 <input type="checkbox"/> estimates vary substantially across years	2	2	4	
3.4.2 <input type="checkbox"/> few years of data are available	3	2	15	
3.4.3 <input type="checkbox"/> causal knowledge about seasonality is weak	—			
3.5 <input type="checkbox"/> Combine forecasts from diverse alternative extrapolation methods	1	1	16	
4. Causal methods				
4.1 <input type="checkbox"/> Use prior knowledge to specify variables, relationships, and effects	1	1	32	
4.2 <input type="checkbox"/> Modify effect estimates to reflect uncertainty	1	1	5	
4.3 <input type="checkbox"/> Use all important variables	5	4	45	
4.4 <input type="checkbox"/> Combine forecasts from diverse causal models	5	5	22	
5. <input type="checkbox"/> Combine combinations of forecasts from diverse methods	16	15	18	
6. <input type="checkbox"/> Avoid adjusting forecasts	—			
Totals and Unweighted Average by Guideline 1 to 6	106	70	28	

* N: Number of papers with findings on effect direction.

n: Number of papers with findings on effect size. %: Average effect size (geometric mean)

SIMPLICITY IN FORECASTING: OCCAM'S RAZOR

Forecasters should use simple methods—no more complex than is needed for accuracy and usefulness. That is based on the Occam's razor, which was proposed earlier by Aristotle. The principle has been generally accepted for centuries.

But do forecasters believe in Occam's razor? When 21 of the world's leading experts in econometric forecasting were asked whether more complex econometric methods yield more accurate forecasts than simple methods; 72% replied that they did. In that survey, "complexity" was defined as an index reflecting the methods used to develop the forecasting model: (1) the use of coefficients other than 0 or 1; (2) the number of variables; (3) the functional relationship; (4) the number of equations; and (5) whether the equations involve simultaneity (Armstrong 1978).

A series of tests across different kinds of forecasting problems—such as forecasting of high school dropout rates—found that simple heuristics were routinely at least as accurate as complex forecasting methods, and often more accurate (Gigerenzer, Todd et al. 1999). In a recent paper, we (Green and Armstrong 2015), proposed a new operational definition of simplicity, one that could be used by any client. It consisted of a 4-item checklist to rate simplicity in forecasting as the *ease of understanding by a potential client*. Exhibit 3 provides an abridged version of the checklist provided on ForecastingPrinciples.com. Thus, for example, it would help to use plain and simple language, only adding mathematical symbols and equations if they are needed for clarity or precision. The checklist was created before any analysis was done and it was not changed as a result of testing.

Exhibit 3: "Simple Forecasting" Checklist

Are the descriptions of the following aspects of the forecasting process sufficiently uncomplicated as to be easily understood by decision makers?	Simplicity rating (0...10)
1. method	<input type="text"/>
2. representation of cumulative knowledge	<input type="text"/>
3. relationships in models	<input type="text"/>
4. relationships among models, forecasts, and decisions	<input type="text"/>
Simple Forecasting Average (out of 10)	<input type="text"/>

We found 32 published papers that allowed for a comparison of the accuracy of forecasts from simple methods with those from complex methods. Four of those papers tested judgmental methods, 17 tested extrapolative methods, 8 tested causal methods, and 3 tested forecast combining methods. The findings were consistent across the methods with a range from 24% to 28%. On average across each comparison, the more complex methods had *ex ante* forecast errors that were 27% higher than the simpler methods. The finding was surprising because the papers the authors analyzed appeared to be proposing the more complex methods in the expectation that they would be more accurate.

ASSESSING FORECAST UNCERTAINTY

The uncertainty of a forecast plays a role in how one would use it. For example, if demand for automobiles is forecast to increase by 20% next year, firms might consider hiring more employees and investing in more machinery, but if the uncertainty over the forecast is such that a decline in demand is

possible, they might not. Exhibit 4 presents a checklist for assessing of uncertainty. We discuss the items in the checklist, below.

Exhibit 4: Assessing Forecast Uncertainty Checklist

<input type="checkbox"/> 1	Avoid tests of statistical significance
<input type="checkbox"/> 2	Avoid assessing uncertainty on the basis of statistical fit with historical data
<input type="checkbox"/> 3	Estimate prediction intervals or likelihoods using <i>ex ante</i> forecasts for the situation
<input type="checkbox"/> 4	Estimate prediction intervals or likelihoods using <i>ex ante</i> forecasts for analogous situations
<input type="checkbox"/> 5	Obtain judgmental estimates of uncertainty from people familiar with the situation

Avoid tests of statistical significance

Estimating uncertainty by using statistical significance is not possible. Any attempt to do so will confuse readers and lead to poor decision-making. There is an extensive literature extending over more than half a century on the issue. McShane and Gal (2015) provides a short review, and an experiment finding that subjects who were provided with prediction intervals made decisions that were more rational than those of subjects who received only statistical significance test results.

Another study found that even when the findings of two studies were presented only as confidence intervals, more than a quarter (26) of the 96 responses from psychology academics involved interpreting the findings in terms of statistical significance. Of that 26, all by 2 (8%) failed to recognize the two studies had “broadly consistent” results that “don’t conflict”. In contrast, 79% of the 61 responses that interpreted the findings in terms of the confidence intervals provided recognized that the studies both supported a positive finding (Coulson, Healey, Fidler and Cumming, 2010).

Avoid assessing uncertainty on the basis of statistical fit with historical data

In a study using data consisting of 31 observations on 30 variables, stepwise regression was used with a rule that only variables with a *t* statistic greater than 2.0 would be included in the model. The final regression had eight variables and an R^2 (adjusted for degrees of freedom) of 0.85; in other words, the statistical fit was good. The data, however, were from Rand’s book of random numbers (Armstrong 1970). A number of studies have used real world data to show that fit does not provide evidence on out of sample predictive validity (e.g., Pant and Starbuck 1990). Also ignore other statistical significance measures, such as *t*, *p*, and *F* (Soyer and Hogarth 2012).

Estimate prediction intervals and likelihoods using *ex ante* forecasts for the situation and for analogous situations

Uncertainty is most accurately represented using empirical prediction intervals based on *ex ante* forecast errors from the same or analogous forecasting situations (Chatfield 2001). Simulate the actual forecasting procedure as closely as possible using available data as efficiently as possible, and use the distribution of the errors of the resulting *ex ante* forecasts to assess uncertainty. For new situations, such as new product forecasts, assess uncertainty using the accuracy of forecasts for analogous situations.

Obtain judgmental estimates of uncertainty from people familiar with the situation

One common judgmental approach is to ask experts to express their confidence in their own judgmental forecasts. In obtaining such forecasts, use a diverse group of experts with relevant knowledge and experience. In addition, in assessing the uncertainty of their forecasts, ask them to include all sources of uncertainty and to assess their effects to the extent possible. Ask experts to write a list of all the reasons why their forecasts might be wrong. Doing so will help to moderate overconfidence (Arkes, 2001).

Experts are typically overconfident about the accuracy of their forecasts. An analysis of judgmental confidence intervals for economic forecasts from 22 economists over 11 years found the actual values fell outside the range of their 95% individual confidence intervals about 43 percent of the time (McNees 1992). A 10-year panel study of experts expectations that provided more than 13,300 stock market return probability distributions found that the actual market returns were within the executives 80% confidence intervals only 36% of the time (Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey 2013).

To improve the calibration of forecasters' estimates of uncertainty, ensure that they receive timely, accurate and well summarized information on what actually happened, along with reasons why their forecasts were right or wrong. Weather forecasters use such procedures and their forecasts are well-calibrated for a few days ahead. When they say that there is a 40% chance of rain, on average over a large sample of forecasts, rain falls 40% of the time.

Estimates of the standard error of survey research, such as are provided for election polls, are typically overconfident. That is to be expected, as such estimates are based only on the uncertainty due to sampling error; they ignore response error and non-response error. These error sources are typically at least as large as the sampling error. For example, in election forecasting, the empirically estimated confidence intervals tend to be about twice as large as those reported by election forecasters (Buchanan, 1986).

When uncertainty is high—such as with forecasting demand for new products—response error is also likely to be high due to survey respondents' uncertainty about how they would make their decision (see Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Response error is likely to be the primary source of error for new products.

Non-response error leads to large errors because the people who are most interested in the topic of the survey are much more likely to respond. This error can be reduced to some extent by the “extrapolation-across-waves” method (Armstrong and Overton 1977). Still, forecasters should consider this problem in their assessment of uncertainty.

Quantitative estimates

Traditional statistical confidence intervals estimated from historical data also tend to be too narrow. One study showed that the percentage of actual values that fell outside the 95% confidence intervals for extrapolation forecasts was often greater than 50% (Makridakis, Hibon, Lusk, and Belhadjali 1987). The reason is likely to be that causal variables led to changes during the validation period.

Overconfidence arising from estimates based on the historical fit of the data to a regression model is compounded when analysts use the traditional statistics provided with regression programs. This leads them to overfit the model. The standard error of the regression is of no value to forecasters as a measure of the prediction interval (Soyer and Hogarth 2012).

As with analyses of judgmental forecasts, regression models ignore key areas of uncertainty such as the omission of key variables, the difficulty in controlling or forecasting the causal variables,

inability to make accurate forecasts of the causal variables, and the difficulty of weighting the causal variables when there are intercorrelations among the causal variable. These problems are magnified when analysts strive for a close fit, and even more so when data mining techniques strive for a close fit. Such efforts reduce the likelihood the prediction intervals contain the true value. Thus, at the same time that data mining harms forecasting accuracy, it misleads clients by reporting a high level of confidence.

One way to address the problem of biases and multiple sources of error is to use a variety of different forecasting methods in the expectation that the sources of bias will vary across methods. We were unable to find any testing of this proposal in the literature. However, initial small sample tests in the PollyVote project suggest that prediction intervals based on using the standard deviation of forecasts provided by six different forecasting methods were well calibrated. This seems sensible, but must be considered as speculative at this time.

Forecast errors in time series are often asymmetric, and the lack of symmetry makes estimating prediction intervals difficult. Asymmetry of errors is likely to occur when the forecasting model uses an additive trend. The most sensible procedure to deal with the problem of asymmetry is to transform the forecast and actual values to logarithms, calculate the prediction intervals using differences in the logged values, and present the results in actual values (Armstrong and Collopy 2001). The log-log transformation also makes models much easier to understand, because the coefficients represent elasticities.

Loss functions can also be asymmetric. For example, the losses due to a forecast that is too low by 50 units may differ from the losses if a forecast is too high by 50 units. But asymmetric errors are a problem for the planner, not the forecaster; the planner must assess the damages due to forecasts where the supply is too high versus those where it is too low.

A METHOD DESERVING OF FURTHER TESTING: QUANTITATIVE ANALOGIES

When there are multiple similar situations for which there are quantitative data that is relevant to the target situation, forecasting using the method of quantitative analogies is feasible. For example, to forecast the effect of the launch of a generic drug on sales of an established drug, one could use the percentage change in the sales of similar established drug brands that had previously been exposed to such competition.

The quantitative analogies method requires that the procedure for searching for analogies is specified before beginning the search. The forecaster must then locate experts who are able to identify similar historical events about which there is relevant quantitative data—typically time series—and rate their similarity to the current problem situation.

The quantitative analogies procedure has been used by many companies. The method is consistent with Occam's razor and the Golden Rule of Forecasting, and has intuitive appeal. To date, however, there is little direct evidence on the predictive validity of quantitative analogies compared to forecasts from evidence-based alternatives.

One study used data on the five closest analogies to forecast sales of each of 20 target products reduced error by 8% on average compared to forecasts from regression analysis (last line of Table 2, Goodwin, Dyussekeneva, and Meeran 2013). Another study is Wright and Stern's (2015) comparison of the average of analogous product sales growth trends with forecasts from the exponential-gamma sales growth model. When 13 weeks of sales data were used for calibration, their quantitative analogies method reduced the mean absolute percentage error of forecasts of sales of new pharmaceuticals by 43%. Additional improvements in accuracy might be possible by using several experts to rate analogies

for similarity and to then use only the top-rated ones for forecasting, as with the structured analogies method.

METHODS LACKING PREDICTIVE VALIDITY

Those involved with demand forecasting will notice that some commonly used methods were not discussed above. This is because we were unable to find evidence that they improve accuracy relative to validated alternatives. Popular methods lacking evidence on predictive validity are listed in Exhibit 5.

Some of these methods have been tested against validated methods and have been found to be less accurate. That is the case, for example, with the Box-Jenkins method: studies of comparative accuracy have found that Box-Jenkins did poorly relative to simpler and more comprehensible alternatives (e.g. Makridakis, *et al.*, 1984). The Box-Jenkins method is difficult for reasonably intelligent human beings to understand, thus violating Occam's razor.

Unaided judgment

Experts' judgment is convenient for many demand forecasting tasks, such as forecasting sales for new products, design changes, pricing, advertising, competitor behavior, or government regulations. Experts' unaided judgments can provide useful forecasts, but only for similar, well understood, situations where they receive accurate and well-summarized feedback and where change is unlikely. Such conditions rarely apply to complex problems.

Research examining the accuracy of experts' judgmental forecasts dates back to the early 1900s. Those findings led to the Seer-Sucker Theory (Armstrong 1980): "No matter how much evidence exists that seers do not exist, suckers will pay for the existence of seers." The Seer-Sucker Theory has held up well over the years; in particular, a 20-year comparative evaluation study provided support (Tetlock 2005). Examples abound. Consider, for example, that many people invest in hedge funds despite the evidence that the returns from the expert stock pickers' portfolios—especially after commissions and management fees are deducted—are inferior to those from a portfolio that mimics the stock market (Malkiel 2016).

Given the evidence to date, efforts to find better experts would be an inefficient use of resources. It would also slow the progress of scientific forecasting by keeping alive the belief that experts' unaided judgments are useful. As we have shown above, experts are vital when their expertise is used in structured ways.

Focus groups

A popular method used to forecast customers' behavior, such as demand for a proposed TV series. However, there is no evidence to support the use of this approach for demand forecasting. Furthermore, the approach violates forecasting principles. First, the participants are seldom representative of the population of interest. Second, samples are small, usually less than ten. Third, in practice, questions for the participants are typically poorly structured and untested. Fourth, the responses of participants are influenced by the expressed opinions of others in the group, and by the way the moderator poses the questions. Fifth, subjectivity and bias are difficult to avoid when summarizing the responses of focus group participants. Focus groups have been used as a way to support a preferred policy by claiming that everyone had their say on the matter.

Exhibit 5:
Checklist of Methods to Avoid:
Popular methods that lack predictive validity* and ignore principles

Avoided	Method	Ignored	Occam's Razor	Golden Rule
	Judgmental			
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unaided judgment			✓
<input type="checkbox"/>	Focus groups			✓
<input type="checkbox"/>	Game theory	✓	✓	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Scenarios			✓
	Quantitative			
<input type="checkbox"/>	Box-Jenkins / ARIMA	✓	✓	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Conjoint analysis			✓
<input type="checkbox"/>	Neural networks	✓	✓	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Data mining / Big data analytics	✓	✓	

*Method has failed tests of *ex ante* forecasting accuracy relative to naïve, commonly used, and previously validated methods, or evidence of success in fair tests is not available.

Game theory

Game theory involves thinking about the goals of various actors in a situation where there are conflicts over decisions. It involves thinking about the incentives that motivate parties and deducing the decisions they will make. The method sounds like a plausible way to forecast the decisions people will make, such as in negotiations among market participants and regulators, and in conflict situations. Authors of textbooks and research papers recommend game theory to make forecasts about outcomes of conflicts, such as how competitors would respond to a price reduction by our firm, or to an advertising campaign that compares our firm's products to those of competitors. Our May 2017 Google Scholar search using "game theory," "accuracy," and "forecast" or "predict," yielded 45,000 "results."

We have been unable to find evidence to support the claim that game theory provides useful forecasts. In the only tests of forecast validity to date, game theory experts' forecasts of the decisions that would be made in eight real conflict situations were no more accurate than students' unaided judgment forecasts (Green 2002 and 2005). Avoid game theory until such time as there is research that identifies conditions under which it is valid.

Scenarios

Scenarios are stories about the future in which the outcomes are described in detail and written in the past tense. This might be expected to help people think through the likelihood of an event. However, addition of details to the story leads people to *inflate* the likelihood of the event, which violates the simple logic that A plus B cannot be more likely to occur than A. In short, the expectation is that forecasts would be seriously biased (see Gregory and Duran 2001.)

Our Google Scholar search for "scenarios", "accuracy," and "forecast" or "predict" in May 2017 yielded 740,000 results. However, we have been unable to find any validation studies to support its value for improving accuracy. A review of research findings was unable to find any comparative studies to support the use of scenarios as a way to forecast what will happen. Scenarios also violate the Golden Rule, especially because they ignore prior knowledge.

Conjoint analysis

Conjoint analysis can be used to examine how demand varies as important features of a product are varied. Potential customers are asked to make selections from a set of offers. For example, various features of a laptop computer such as price, weight, dimensions, and screen size could be varied substantially while ensuring that the variations in features do not correlate with one another. The potential customers' choices can be analyzed by regressing them against the product features.

Conjoint analysis is based on sound principles, such as using experimental design and soliciting intentions independently from a representative sample of potential customers, so there is reason to expect the method to be useful. It is also used by practitioners. Our Google Scholar search for “conjoint analysis”, “accuracy,” and “forecast” or “predict” in May 2017 yielded over 10,000 results. However, we have been unable to find tests comparing the *ex-ante* accuracy of conjoint-analysis forecasts with those from other reasonable methods. Wittink and Bergestuen (2001) also failed to find such evidence. Despite the lack of sufficient testing for conjoint analysis, we believe that this method offers promise and urge that its predictive validity be tested against other methods such as experts’ judgmental forecasts—the most common practice—and judgmental bootstrapping.

Neural networks

Neural networks is a method designed to identify patterns in time-series and to use them to make forecasts. Studies on neural nets have been popular with researchers, and we found nearly 400,000 results in our May 2017 Google Scholar search for “neural networks”, “accuracy”, and “predict”, “forecast.” Little evidence on comparative forecast accuracy has been published. Perhaps the fairest and largest comparison, however, was the M3-Competition with 3,003 varied time series. In that study, neural net forecasts were 3.4% less accurate than damped trend-forecasts and 4.2% less accurate than combined extrapolations (Makridakis and Hibon 2000). The poor results are not surprising, given that neural nets ignore prior knowledge and violate Occam’s razor.

Data mining / big data analytics

Although data mining began in the 1960s with step-wise regression, we have been unable to find experimental evidence that looking for statistical patterns in data has improved *ex ante* forecast accuracy. In addition, data mining does not employ any of the 28 guidelines in the Golden Rule. An extensive review and reanalysis of fifty real-world data sets also found no evidence that data mining is useful (Keogh and Kasetty 2003). Finally, as noted above, data mining techniques by whatever name are expected to provide unrealistic overconfidence (narrow prediction intervals).

DISCUSSION

“The greatest deception men suffer is from their own opinions.” — Leonardo da Vinci

Have the substantial improvements in knowledge on forecasting over the past half century led to more accurate forecasts in government and business? The short answer is no. Instead, forecast accuracy appears to have declined over the period. Evidence of the lack of improvement in forecasting practice and forecast accuracy, includes:

- A review of forecasting for population, economics, energy, transportation, and technology led to the conclusion that forecasting was not becoming more accurate over time Ascher (1978).

- In a review research on agriculture forecasting, Allen (1994) was unable to find evidence that forecasting practice in economics had improved over time. He then compared the accuracy of forecasts in agricultural economics from 12 studies (22 series) before 1985 and 11 studies after 1985, finding only trivial differences in accuracy.
- Based on her review of 25 years of population forecasting research, Booth (2006) found no evidence that the accuracy of population forecasts has improved over time.
- McCarthy, Davis, Golicic and Mentzer (2006) replicated two surveys on sales forecast accuracy conducted 20 years earlier, they concluded that accuracy had fallen.
- Detailed analyses of European demographic forecasts for 14 European countries concluded that accuracy improved little or not at all from the late-1970s ([Keilman 2008](#)).

However, accuracy in some areas of forecasting appears to be improving. These include weather—up to a few days out—political elections, crime, medicine, and engineering. They have done so by adopting better forecasting procedures.

Given the evidence on their superior accuracy, why is the adoption of methods that provide more accurate forecasts so slow? For example, the benefits of combining forecasts were described in the scholarly literature more than a century ago, yet the method is seldom used.

Certainly, neglect of knowledge about the improved methods has been a barrier. Much forecasting is done by statisticians, yet a review of statistical journals found that they tend to ignore research that examines the relative advantages of different forecasting methods (Fildes and Makridakis 1995). There is no excuse for this. Relevant information on forecasting methods is published in leading journals and is summarized at [ForecastingPrinciples.com](#), a free website.

We believe that the most common reason forecasters avoid a scientific approach to forecasting is because the decision-makers have already made a decision and are only interested in information to support that opinion. Forecasters who follow evidence-based guidelines could not be confident that their forecasts would support the clients' preferences.

Another—and perhaps sometimes related—reason that scientific knowledge on forecasting is often overlooked, is the low priority given to it by senior managers. Forecasters and the forecasting function are given low status, and forecasters typically have had little training in forecasting methods according to surveys of forecasting practitioners. For example, a survey of 81 responses from sales forecasters in electronics industry firms in Scotland found that 71% had no specific training in forecasting (Watson 1996). An earlier survey by Fildes and Hastings (1994) found 85% of forecasters lacked specific training.

Forecasting for public policy is particularly prone to the problem of decision makers who are seeking support for a decision they have already made, rather than the most accurate and relevant forecasts to guide their decision making. For example, in 1994, the first author of this paper was asked by a U.S. federal government agency to evaluate the predictions made to support the proposed adoption of “Hillary Care”. The predictions violated the Golden Rule of Forecasting by ignoring cumulative knowledge in the form of economic principles and evidence-based forecasting methods, and so the predictions amounted to nothing more than opinions. In another example, the first author was asked by a federal government agency in 2006 to join an independent panel to evaluate the “Long Run Health Care Cost Growth for the U. S. 75-year

projection of the National Health expenditure as a percent of GDP.” To the distress of some panel members, the clients eventually used political guidelines rather than scientific guidelines for preparing the forecasts.

Forecasters ignore Occam’s razor by turning to ever more complex methods. They violate the Golden Rule in an effort to satisfy the clients’ need for support for their preferred policies. Clients are happy to have complex support for their policies. In this way societies still love the “rain dance.” The expected results are increased confusion and costs, higher confidence, and inaccurate forecasts.

Finally, the primary problem for this unfortunate state of affairs is that almost no one asks forecasters to provide scientific forecasts.

A Solution

We believe that these trends could be reversed for those who desire accurate demand forecasts. It is an old solution and it works. Clients must tell forecasters that, as part of their contract, they must adhere to the guidelines for scientific forecasting. They could do this by providing the five checklists in this paper to the forecasters and asking that they submit completed checklists as the project develops. They would also be informed that the requirements would be audited to ensure compliance and that payment would be withheld for a failure to comply.

Those who produce forecasts that have unfortunate consequences might be sued if it can be shown that their forecasting procedures were faulty, much like the legal proceedings against medical doctors and engineers. This would apply to those who produce forecasts for public policy.

According to Tashman and Hoover (2001), many commercial forecast providers refuse to have their products reviewed. The simplest way to address this is to ask the providers what methods they use and whether they have explicit procedures for implementing the guidelines in Exhibits 2 and 3 in this paper. If concerns arise over confidentiality, the audit procedure could be conducted by an independent financial auditor. Interestingly, all of the validated methods that we discuss in this paper, except for exponential smoothing (attributed to Robert G. Brown, a consultant, who fully disclosed his method), were conceived of and developed in universities.

Forecasters who go beyond the evidence-based methods available in this paper should provide evidence of predictive validity by independent testing. For an example of independent testing, consider the “Focus Forecasting”, a popular software package advertised for the accuracy of its production and inventory control forecasts. Comparisons of Focus Forecasting vs. damped-trend simple exponential smoothing using five time-series of cookware demand in a production planning application found that the average errors of the smoothing forecasts were smaller, regardless of the forecast horizon or error measure used. The researchers conducted a follow up study making similar comparisons using 91 time-series from the M-Competition that led to the same conclusion (Gardner and Anderson 1997; and Gardner, Anderson-Fletcher and Wicks 2001).

Our experience is that when we have required use of a checklist and made payment dependent of doing so, *everyone who has accepted the task has done so effectively*. This included a task involving 195 checklist items involved in assessing whether print advertisements were persuasive that was carried out by people recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.

CONCLUSIONS

Research over the past century has developed many new forecasting methods and principles. In addition, it has revealed which forecasting methods help under given conditions, the most effective way to use each method, and the expected effects on *ex ante* forecast accuracy. With the exception of heavily traded financial markets, the accuracy of forecasts for most situations can be substantially improved by using simple and conservative, evidence-based forecasting methods.

We also know which methods offer little promise, and which methods harm accuracy. In particular, the “big data” movement has overlooked evidence-based methods that make the best use of available data and led forecasters to ignore prior knowledge relevant to the situation they are concerned with and to ignore the evidence-based forecasting methods we describe in this paper.

Despite much effort to help practitioners by providing understandable forecasting principles and techniques, and by making them freely available at ForecastingPrinciples.com, most firms, consultants, and software developers ignore the evidence-based methods and turn to new methods that have not been shown to improve upon current practice or persist with commonly used methods that violate forecasting principles. Sometimes these practices help forecasters to provide forecasts that support a policy favored by a client. Sometimes the failure to follow evidence-based best practice is due to ignorance of the evidence-based forecasting methods and principles. The net effect has been that, in practice, forecasting is less accurate and less intelligible than it was half a century ago.

To improve forecasting in practice, employers and clients of forecasters must require, as part of the contract, that forecasters use the five checklists for evidence-based forecasting in this paper, or improved versions. Compliance should then be assessed by having clients use these simple checklists.

Checklists are useless unless they are used. Ask and it shall be done.

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Key: * = contacted ** = findings confirmed by authors (applies only to substantive findings)

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