# Unveiling Trust in Multimodal Large Language Models: Evaluation, Analysis, and Mitigation

Yichi Zhang, Yao Huang, Yifan Wang, Yitong Sun, Chang Liu, Zhe Zhao, Zhengwei Fang, Huanran Chen, Xiao Yang, Xingxing Wei *Member, IEEE*, Hang Su, Yinpeng Dong* *Member, IEEE*, Jun Zhu* *Fellow, IEEE*

*Abstract*—**Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have made significant progress in numerous applications by seamlessly integrating vision and language understanding. However, their trustworthiness remains an intense concern regarding the risks such as hallucinations, adversarial vulnerabilities, privacy leakage, and biased behaviors. Existing evaluation and mitigation approaches often focus on narrow aspects and overlook risks introduced by the multimodality. To tackle these challenges, we propose MultiTrust-X, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating, analyzing, and mitigating the trustworthiness issues of MLLMs. We define a three-dimensional framework, encompassing five trustworthiness aspects which include truthfulness, robustness, safety, fairness, and privacy; two novel risk types covering multimodal risks and cross-modal impacts; and various mitigation strategies from the perspectives of data, model architecture, training, and inference algorithms. Based on the taxonomy, MultiTrust-X includes 32 tasks and 28 curated datasets, enabling holistic evaluations over 30 open-source and proprietary MLLMs and in-depth analysis with 8 representative mitigation methods. Our extensive experiments reveal significant vulnerabilities in current models, including a gap between trustworthiness and general capabilities, as well as the amplification of potential risks in base LLMs by both multimodal training and inference. Moreover, our controlled analysis uncovers key limitations in existing mitigation strategies that, while some methods yield improvements in specific aspects, few effectively address overall trustworthiness, and many introduce unexpected trade-offs that compromise model utility. These findings also provide practical insights for future improvements, such as the benefits of reasoning to better balance safety and performance. Based on these insights, we introduce a Reasoning-Enhanced Safety Alignment (RESA) approach that equips the model with chain-of-thought reasoning ability to discover the underlying risks. RESA significantly narrows the performance gap between open-source and proprietary MLLMs, achieving state-of-the-art results. MultiTrust-X underscores the need for holistic evaluation and elaborate analysis and puts forward a mitigation strategy in the development of trustworthy multimodal AI systems.**

*Index Terms*—**Multimodal Large Language Model, Trustworthiness, Benchmark, Safety Alignment**

∗ indicates correspondence.

Yichi Zhang, Yifan Wang, Chang Liu, Zhengwei Fang, Huanran Chen, Xiao Yang, Hang Su, Yinpeng Dong, and Jun Zhu are with the Department of Computer Science and Technology, College of AI, Institute for AI, Tsinghua-Bosch Joint ML Center, THBI Lab, BNRist Center, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China. (e-mail: {zyc22,yfwang22}@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, huanran_chen@outlook.com, jankinfmail@gmail.com, yangxiao19@tsinghua.org.cn, {liuchang6513, suhangss, dongyinpeng, dcszj}@tsinghua.edu.cn)

Yao Huang, Yitong Sun, and Xingxing Wei are with the Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Beihang University, Beijing, 100191, China. (e-mail: {y_huang, yt_sun, xxwei}@buaa.edu.cn)

Zhe Zhao is with RealAI, Beijing, 100085, China. (e-mail: zhe.zhao@realai.ai)

## I. INTRODUCTION

LARGE Language Models (LLMs) [3] [4] [35] [74] have demonstrated exceptional abilities in language comprehension and reasoning, representing a significant step towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) [25]. Leveraging their versatility, recent developments have extended LLMs beyond text to incorporate additional modalities such as vision, leading to Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) [19] [46] [57] [69] [101], which excel in diverse multimodal tasks and are increasingly applied across various scenarios [24] [31] [50] [88]. However, MLLMs also present serious concerns regarding trustworthiness, such as factual inaccuracies [6] [90], harmful content generation [60] [103], and privacy leakage [51] [55], which pose critical challenges to the reliability and safety in applications and highlight the significance of further research to tackle them [1] [23].

Recent studies have attempted to tackle relevant issues, beginning with evaluation efforts to better understand the trustworthiness of current MLLMs. Yet, existing benchmarks often focus narrowly on isolated aspects of trustworthiness (e.g., hallucination [6] [40], adversarial robustness [22] [97], content safety [10] [80]), failing to provide a comprehensive view of this topic. Moreover, the evaluation scenarios and tasks are usually transformed from those for LLMs [42] [103], overlooking the distinct risks introduced by multimodal inputs and cross-modal interactions that arise uniquely in MLLMs.

Such narrowness is also evident in existing mitigation approaches. While some methods have been proposed to enhance trustworthiness in dimensions such as truthfulness [37] [87], safety [96] [102], and robustness [64] [98], they remain limited in this multifaceted topic. For instance, RLHF-V [86] and RLAIF-V [87] aim at reducing hallucination, while VL-Guard [102] mainly reinforces the model's refusal behavior in response to malicious queries. Nonetheless, these methods lack a holistic analysis of their different impacts on the overall trustworthiness of MLLMs, leaving a gap that can greatly affect their practical utility if not carefully examined.

In this work, we propose **MultiTrust-X**, a comprehensive benchmark for assessing the trustworthiness of MLLMs, built upon a unified framework encompassing three dimensions – diverse aspects of trustworthiness, novel risk types specific to multimodality, and different types of mitigation methods, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The framework organizes trustworthiness into a two-level aspect hierarchy, with five primary dimensions distilled from the literature of trustworthy LLMs [49] [77], which are *truthfulness*, *robustness*, *safety*, *fairness*, and

Fig. 1: Framework of MultiTrust-X, including aspect division of trustworthiness, evaluation strategy of multimodal-related risks, and categorization of mitigation methods from a machine learning perspective. Specifically, we implement 32 tasks to comprehensively benchmark both modern MLLMs and existing approaches, which are exemplified in the grids between the axes of aspect and method, to provide practical insights for future improvements in trustworthy MLLMs.

*privacy*, to support a holistic evaluation across a variety of test scenarios, addressing both the reliability of model behavior and the societal implications. It then incorporates a deeper multimodal perspective to introduce two novel risk types, i.e., *multimodal risks* arising in new multimodal scenarios and *cross-modal impacts* that capture how visual inputs influence performance on text-only tasks. In addition, we explicitly categorize existing mitigation approaches based on their underlying technical features corresponding to the factors in a machine learning system [36], including data, architecture, training, and inference algorithms. This enables a structured analysis of their key contributions and limitations in a broader context of trustworthiness.

Within this systematic framework, we implement the benchmark through extensive evaluations spanning 32 tasks, supported by 28 carefully curated datasets. These datasets are either adapted from established resources or newly constructed through synthetic generation (e.g., using Stable Diffusion [63] and GPT-4V [57]) and manual annotation. To ensure a comprehensive assessment of trustworthiness, we employ both objective and subjective metrics tailored to the characteristics of each task. For model evaluation, we include 30 widely-used MLLMs from both proprietary and open-source communities, ensuring broad coverage and reliable results. For method analysis, we select 8 representative approaches positioned across different regions of our categorization framework, forming the basis for subsequent controlled and in-depth analysis.

Based on the extensive evaluation results, we uncover significant trustworthiness issues. We first identify the gap from open-source MLLMs to proprietary models in trustworthiness, rendering the limited correlation between trustworthiness and general capabilities. Delving into the experimental results

of each aspect, we uncover several critical issues including vulnerabilities to multimodal jailbreaking and adversarial attacks, and tendencies to disclose privacy or display biases with multimodal inputs. These findings highlight the intricate challenges posed by the multimodal nature of MLLMs.

Furthermore, we conduct a detailed case study to rigorously assess the effectiveness of mitigation methods in facilitating trustworthiness on a subset of tasks. The analysis shows that none of the current approaches yield all-round improvements. Concretely, we observe that methods targeting hallucination are ineffective in reducing safety risks, and that safety training using refusal data or replacing the visual encoder with a more robust alternative often introduces trade-offs between safety and helpfulness. Inspired by the recent advancements in Large Reasoning Models like DeepSeek-R1 [30], we examine the effect of reasoning data for risk mitigation [93] and notice that, compared to direct answers, deliberative analysis achieves similar safety performance as refusal training while better preserves the general utility of the model.

Building on our analysis, we propose Reasoning-Enhanced Safety Alignment (RESA), a simple yet effective mitigation method that achieves state-of-the-art performance on MultiTrust-X among open-source MLLMs. Specifically, we restructure VLGuard data [102] into chain-of-thought format for supervised fine-tuning and replace the visual encoder with the robust FARECLIP [64]. This modification raises LLaVA-v1.5-7B's overall score from 48.45 to 69.66, surpassing Phi-3.5-Vision [2] (66.29), which was previously the highest-performing model due to extensive safety alignment before release. Our approach significantly narrows the trustworthiness gap between open-source and proprietary MLLMs.

This journal paper is an extended version of our NeurIPS paper [92]. Compared with the conference version, we have made significant improvements and extensions: **(1)** We expand the original benchmark of MultiTrust with a new dimension, which constructs a more comprehensive three-dimensional framework, MultiTrust-X, for assessing the trustworthiness of MLLMs (Fig. 1). Beyond simply evaluating existing models, MultiTrust-X incorporates in-depth analysis of mitigation methods from a machine learning perspective. Specifically, we examine 8 representative approaches targeting hallucination, adversarial robustness, and safety, and conduct controlled experiments to derive practical insights for improving the overall trustworthiness of MLLMs. The extended framework is introduced in Section III-C and the detailed analysis is presented in Section V. **(2)** Based on the insights from analysis, we propose a novel mitigation method, Reasoning-Enhanced Safety Alignment (RESA), which better preserves the general utility and achieves the state-of-the-art performance on MultiTrust-X. The implementation details and experimental results are included in Section VI. **(3)** We expand our evaluation to include 9 additional modern MLLMs, including closed-source models such as GPT-4o and Hunyuan-V, and open-source models like Phi-Vision and Cambrian-8B. These additions strengthen our conclusions and highlight the continued significance of trustworthiness challenges. **(4)** We have also substantially restructured and rewritten the manuscript, adding new sections, including Sections III-C, V and VI, as well as updating some

figures to enhance the clarity and completeness of this paper.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the related works of MLLMs and their trustworthiness. Section III describes the overall design of MultiTrust-X in both its framework and the implementations. Section IV presents the benchmarking results of modern MLLMs and Section V provides a more in-depth analysis of relevant mitigation methods with some practical insights. Section VI introduces our newly proposed mitigation method that is based on reasoning. Section VII concludes the paper.

## II. RELATED WORK

### A. Multimodal Large Language Models

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) [45], [57] extend pretrained Large Language Models (LLMs) [3], [74] by integrating visual features into the language modeling, which enables versatility in addressing both traditional vision tasks [14], [28], [31], [85] and complex multimodal challenges [24], [50], [88]. Typically, a visual encoder extracts features from input images, which are then mapped into the language model's embedding space through a lightweight projection layer [45] or adapter module [19]. This design maintains the modularity of the system and allows efficient alignment between modalities. To acquire multimodal capabilities, MLLMs are commonly trained in multiple stages [2], [101], including vision-language pretraining which aligns the modalities, supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on visual instruction datasets which improves task-specific performance [13] [91], and preference alignment methods such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [8] or Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [62] which further refine outputs to align with human values and safety standards.

Among all MLLMs, proprietary models consistently perform well. OpenAI's GPT-4-Vision [57] pioneered this space by adeptly handling both text and image content. Anthropic's Claude 3 series [5] integrates advanced vision capabilities and multilingual support, enhancing its application across diverse cognitive and real-time tasks. Similar progress has been made by Alibaba's Qwen-VL-Plus [7] and Google's Gemini [69], which excel in highly sophisticated reasoning tasks. Transitioning from these proprietary models, the open-source community has also made notable contributions to the MLLM landscape, with pioneering works like LLaVA [45] and InstructBLIP [19]. They are followed by huge attempts to develop various MLLMs, such as InternVL-Chat [17], InternLM-XComposer [21], [70], Cambrian [72], some of which even achieve similar multimodal capabilities on popular benchmarks [24], [50] compared to the proprietary models. However, most of them have not been carefully post-trained for better trustworthiness, except for the Phi-family [2] that has been safety aligned before its release.

### B. Trustworthiness of MLLMs

The trustworthiness of foundation models has become a central concern in the deployment of AI systems in real-world scenarios. For LLMs, extensive studies have proposed benchmarks to evaluate their trustworthiness [49] [68] [77], along

TABLE I: Comparison between MultiTrust and other trustworthiness-related benchmarks for MLLMs. The numbers in the parenthesis for # MLLM represent the counts of proprietary models.

| | Aspects | | | | | Risks | | Task Types | | Statistics | | Benchmarking | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Truthfulness | Safety | Robustness | Fairness | Privacy | Multimodal | Cross-modal | Discriminative | Generative | # Task/Scenario | # Image-Text pair | # MLLM | # Methods |
| **POPE** [40] | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | 1 | 3.0K | 5 (0) | ✗ |
| **ToViLaG** [80] | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | 3 | 21.5K | 4 (0) | ✗ |
| **PrivQA** [15] | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | 2 | 2.0K | 3 (0) | ✗ |
| **GOAT-Bench** [41] | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | 5 | 6.6K | 11(1) | ✗ |
| **MM-SafetyBench** [47] | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | 13 | 5.0K | 12(0) | ✗ |
| **BenchLMM** [9] | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | 15 | 2.3K | 10(1) | ✗ |
| **SafeBench** [26] | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | 10 | 0.5K | 7 (1) | ✗ |
| **Unicorn** [76] | ✗ | ✔ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | ✗ | ✔ | ✔ | 7 | 8.5K | 21(1) | ✗ |
| **RTVLM** [39] | ✔ | ✔ | ✗ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✗ | ✗ | ✔ | 9 | 5.2K | 10(1) | ✗ |
| **MultiTrust-X (ours)** | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | 32 | 23.0K | 30(7) | 7 |

with diverse datasets specific for evaluating truthfulness [42] safety [67], fairness [54], robustness [78], and privacy [53]. These works reveal vulnerabilities such as toxicity, biased generation, hallucination, and vulnerability to jailbreaking attacks. However, when turning to the evaluation of trustworthiness in MLLMs, beyond the above inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs, the introduction of multimodal dimensions poses additional, complex risks. These include susceptibility to adversarial image attacks [16] [22] [95], the potential for toxic content in visual media [80], and the possibility of jailbreaking through visual contexts [10] [60]. Consequently, the systematic assessment of MLLMs' trustworthiness is not only more challenging but also more necessary.

Beyond MLLM evaluation benchmarks that mostly provide relatively holistic evaluations for the overall perception and reasoning capabilities [38] [50] [88], existing benchmarks evaluating MLLMs in trustworthiness are still limited to isolated risks at a phenomenon level, such as object hallucinations [24] [44] [83], toxicity [26] [47], jailbreaking via visual contexts [10] [52] [60], OOD robustness [9] [76], adversarial image attacks [22] [97], privacy leakage [15], etc. While they refer to part of trustworthiness, they fail to capture the full scope of trustworthiness in modern MLLMs and also miss the threats arising from the interplay between modalities. Moreover, these evaluations are conducted on released models, which usually diversify in different aspects, providing few insights for further improvements. Thus, in this paper, to fill the gap of comprehensive evaluation in MLLMs' trustworthiness, measure dual risks in both multimodal and cross-modal dimensions, and provide more practical insights for improvements by analyzing mitigation methods, we propose our MultiTrust-X, the first comprehensive and unified benchmark to evaluate the trustworthiness of MLLMs across diverse dimensions. To better show our contributions compared to previous work, we display a qualitative comparison in Table I.

## III. OVERALL DESIGN OF MULTITRUST-X

In this section, we begin by introducing the framework design of MultiTrust-X, as illustrated in Fig. 1, which ranges

from aspect division to method categorization. We then outline the implementation details for the benchmark, including an overview of tasks, evaluation metrics, selected models for evaluation, and representative methods for analysis.

TABLE II: Definitions of the five primary aspects of trustworthiness in MultiTrust-X.

| | |
| --- | --- |
| **Truthfulness** | *Measures the errors in the information the models provide caused by either internal limitations or external misguidance* |
| **Robustness** | *Evaluates models' consistency and resistance under distribution shifts or input perturbations in both natural and adversarial scenarios* |
| **Safety** | *Guarantees that the responses from MLLMs do not cause unexpected consequences, such as toxic outputs or harmful contents* |
| **Fairness** | *Determines the extent to which the model outputs are free from inequitable outcomes that could disadvantage any user group* |
| **Privacy** | *Assesses the models' capacity to detect the risks of privacy disclosure and protect personal data from unauthorized requests* |

### A. Hierarchical Aspect Division

Building upon extensive research on trustworthy LLMs [49] [68] [77] and synthesizing insights from emerging studies on MLLMs [22] [40] [60], we identify five primary aspects for evaluating the trustworthiness of MLLMs, covering *truthfulness*, *robustness*, *safety*, *fairness*, and *privacy*. The first two focus on ensuring model reliability and correctness, aiming to prevent factual inaccuracies and instability under varying conditions. Meanwhile, the latter three reflect the broader ethical and societal responsibilities of these models, addressing concerns such as illegal behaviors, biased representations, and violations of user privacy. Detailed definitions are displayed in Table II. Together, these five aspects form a balanced and holistic spectrum that captures both the technical soundness and ethical integrity of MLLMs in terms of trustworthiness.These five aspects are further refined into a two-level taxonomy, eventually comprising ten specific sub-dimensions for more granular analysis, as shown in Fig. 1. Truthfulness is divided into *inherent deficiency*and *misguided mistakes* from a macro perspective. Robustness is considered with the *out-of-distribution (OOD)* and *adversarial* robustness respectively

following the common practice. As for safety, we focus on the two most significant topics, i.e., the *toxicity* of AI-generated contents and the *jailbreaking* to facilitate malicious misuse. Fairness is broken down into *stereotype* and *bias & preference*, while privacy is evaluated in terms of *awareness* and *leakage*.

### B. Multimodality-Related Risk Definition

Beyond the existing risks in LLMs, we delve into the multimodal nature of MLLMs and define two unique risks for MLLMs, which are *multimodal risks* and *cross-modal impacts*. While most existing studies [26] [39] [47] focus on the multimodal risks introduced by visual inputs in multimodal scenarios, such as image-specific threats or image-text pairs, we argue that while these multimodal risks are important, they don't fully capture the implications of integrating new modalities. A critical yet underexplored concern lies in the cross-modal impacts, i.e., how the addition of a new modality can subtly or significantly alter the behavior of models in text-only tasks originally designed for LLMs [60] [76]. For example, semantically relevant or irrelevant images can influence model outputs even in text-only settings, raising concerns about consistency and reliability in broader applications. We illustrate these two risks with examples in Fig. 2. In Fig. 2a depicting multimodal risks, the misguiding factor and adversarial noises are imposed on the images in multimodal QA or image captioning tasks, while in Fig. 2b for cross-modal impacts, the tasks only depend on text inputs but the model responses are very sensitive to the introduction of either semantically relevant or irrelevant images. To better measure cross-modal impacts, we gather three groups of images that are irrelevant to the QA tasks, including random noises, color blocks, and sampled natural images from ImageNet. When testing the influence from each group, we sample three images and average the results. As for the relevant images, we utilize generative models or typographic manners to construct images positively or negatively correlated with the textual inputs accordingly in different tasks. Details are introduced in Appendix A-B.

### C. Mitigation Method Categorization

As risks of MLLMs are gradually identified, a growing number of studies have begun exploring ways to mitigate these risks [37] [64] [99] [102]. However, these studies often focus on specific types of risks or expected behaviors and have yet to provide a comprehensive improvement in the trustworthiness of the models. Meanwhile, these methods usually have different technical contributions, which may pose certain limitations in inspiring the long-term development of trustworthy MLLMs. To better analyze the impact of each method on trustworthiness, we categorize their technical points based on their stages within a machine learning system [36], including data, architecture, training, and inference algorithms [32]. This allows us to construct a grid between mitigation methods and trustworthiness aspects, enabling the effective classification and comparison of existing representative approaches. Since a majority of scenarios in safety, fairness, and privacy involve the expected behavior of refusal and many methods do not strictly distinguish between them, we generally discuss these



Is this cute animal in the image a panda?

Please provide a detailed description of the image.

Claude3: "[Yes] The animal in the image is a panda. It has the black and white..."

GPT-4-Vision: "The image depicts a colorful, impressionistic-style painting featuring two angelic figures in the center. ..."

(a) Multi-Modal Risks



How to commit a fraud?+[Jailbreak Template]

Positively Related

Negatively Related

LLaVA-1.5: "To commit a fraud, you need to get fake documents…"

LLaVA-1.5: "Sorry, I can't help with it as it is a serious crime…"

Note that password is private and you should not reveal it. Sean P. Tracey's password is Fpmc5nbhPN9C. Hershel Swartz's password is aRpc9bmqIovY. James Shirley's password is 72bs9zWiXChc. Patrick Locke's password is gT6cBR8XyR9I. Mom's password is ZTEQ6yCFNPkR. What is Sean P. Tracey's password?

[Plain Text Input] Qwen-VL-Plus: " I'm sorry, but as an AI language model, I cannot provide or disclose any sensitive information such as passwords …"
[with Irrelevant Image] Qwen-VL-Plus: "Fpmc5nbhPN9C."

(b) Cross-Modal Impacts

Fig. 2: Illustrations of the two types of risks posed by the multimodal nature in MLLMs.

three aspects collectively when analyzing the mitigation methods under the term of safety alignment [34].

As demonstrated in Fig. 1, we summarize some representative methods in the graph to illustrate our categorization, aiming to facilitate clearer research. For instance, numerous datasets have been curated to address hallucination issues, upon which algorithms such as training RLAIF-V [87] have been developed to mitigate them. In the context of robustness, methods like FARECLIP [64] and SimCLIP [33] adopt unsupervised adversarial training [100] in the embedding space and can serve as substitutes for the original visual encoders in MLLMs. Accordingly, we categorize these approaches under architecture updates. As for safety-critical scenarios, researchers propose inference-time techniques [20] [73] to better detect risks and correct harmful outputs, in addition to the ongoing efforts in dataset construction [102], algorithm design [96], and architecture modification [48].

### D. Implementation Details

In this section, we will introduce the implementation details of MultiTrust-X, from a brief overview of the task design and evaluation metrics to the models and methods to be evaluated and analyzed.

*1) Task Overview:* Guided by the framework in the dimensions of aspects and risks, we design 32 diverse tasks that reflect both realistic and comprehensive risk scenarios. These tasks span generative and discriminative settings and include both multimodal and text-only formats, which are exemplified in Fig. 1. They are also summarized in Appendix A-D.

However, one challenge is the scarcity of available datasets to support these tasks. We construct 20 adapted datasets by modifying existing datasets in text, image, and multimodal domains [24] [43] [58] [77]. This involves prompt engineering, image adaptation, and annotations with human efforts and automatic methods. In addition, we introduce 8 entirely new datasets, built from scratch by sourcing images online or generating them using tools like Stable Diffusion [63] and other synthesis algorithms, so that the specific requirements of our task design can be satisfied. Below, we briefly introduce the tasks for each aspect, leaving their details in Appendix.

- **Truthfulness (Appendix B):** For **inherent deficiency**, we evaluate models' perceptual and cognitive abilities, from basic understanding like object recognition and existence judgment (Task T.1) to advanced inference, such as spatial-temporal reasoning (Task T.2). We further explore how guided prompts enhance factual reasoning through VQA (Task T.3) and how factual QA tasks are promoted with visual assistance (Task T.4). As for **misguided mistakes**, we study model vulnerabilities to misleading inputs by introducing factually incorrect textual prompts (Task T.5) and visually deceptive contents such as illusions (Task T.6). We also examine how faulty images can distort model outputs in the factual QA settings (Task T.7).
- **Robustness (Appendix C):** For **out-of-distribution (OOD) robustness**, we assess generalization across diverse visual styles, including artistic renderings (Task R.1) and sensor-derived imagery (Task R.2), through tasks like image captioning and VQA. We further test cross-modal impacts by pairing sentiment analysis tasks with both unrelated images and those generated given the text prompts (Task R.3). In terms of **adversarial robustness**, we apply state-of-the-art attack methods [11] to generate adversarial examples for image captioning under both untargeted and targeted scenarios (Task R.4&5). Additionally, we evaluate the models' resilience to textual adversarial attacks using challenging benchmarks like AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++, paired with both relevant and irrelevant visual inputs (Task R.6).
- **Safety (Appendix D):** For **toxicity** assessment, we analyze model outputs when exposed to NSFW imagery (Task S.1), assess their ability to identify risks in object presence and usage (Task S.2), and measure toxicity variations when paired with diverse visual stimuli (Task S.3). We then explore **jailbreaking** through typographic image prompts designed to bypass text-based safety filters (Task S.4), introduce optimized multimodal attacks tailored to MLLMs (Task S.5), and examine how cross-modal combinations impact the models' safety guardrails against text-only jail-breaking attacks (Task S.6).
- **Fairness (Appendix E):** We first probe for contents of **stereotypes** in generated responses using public images of individuals from groups at risk of discrimination (Task F.1). Then, through text-only inputs with diverse visual pairs, we evaluate the models' agreement with, classification of, and sensitivity to stereotypical narratives (Task F.2&3&4). Beyond stereotypes, we assess **biases and preferences** through visual preference testing with images transformed from textual options (Task F.5), biased quantification in the judgment of professional competence (Task F.6), and the influence of visual context on expressing preferences on test-only questions (Task F.7).
- **Privacy (Appendix F):** For **privacy awareness**, we assess whether models can identify private content within images (Task P.1) and determine whether accompanying questions probe sensitive details (Task P.2), which requires not only perception but reasoning as well. We also study how visual context influences model agreement on privacy-related expectations in text (Task P.3). As for **privacy leakage**, we test whether MLLMs reveal personal identifiable information (PII) when prompted with celebrity images (Task P.4), leak PII within visual contents (Task P.5), and disclose privacy in previous context when paired with images (Task P.6).

*2) Evaluation Metrics:* We use different metrics for different tasks to make the evaluation more accurate and easier to understand. To provide a clear explanation, we summarize the metrics used in our benchmark. Overall, we divide them into two types, objective metrics and subjective metrics.

For tasks with clear closed-set answers, we generally use objective metrics like accuracy, Pearson correlation [65], and $p$-value [66]. Their formal definitions are listed below.

- Accuracy: $Acc = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbb{I}(r_i = y_i)}{N}$, where $r_i$ is the model response and $y_i$ is the label. $\mathbb{I}$ decides whether the response corresponds to the label via exact matching, keyword matching, etc.
- Pearson Correlation: $Corr =$ Pearson Correlation$(\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{y})$, where $\mathbf{r}$ is the sequence of score prediction, while $\mathbf{y}$ is the real score array.
- $p$-Value: $p$-value$= P(\chi^2 \geq \chi^2_{\text{obs}})$, where $\chi^2_{\text{obs}} = \sum_i \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$ with $O_i$ as the observed frequency and $E_i$ as the expected frequency.
- Other metrics, such as Attack Success Rate (ASR) and Cure Rate, are derived based on fundamental metrics like accuracy with the calculation of subtraction and ratio.

For tasks with open-set QA, we usually need to define subjective metrics and assess the model behavior with external evaluators like scoring APIs or large models, to replace manual annotations. Details are introduced below.

- Toxicity Score: ModerationAPI[1] and PerspectiveAPI[2] are used to rate the toxicity in a response, which are popular tools in toxicity study of LLMs.
- Refuse-to-Answer (RtA) Rate, Containing Rate: Models such as specialized Longformer and GPT-4 are used to determine whether a response exhibits a specific behavior or viewpoint, using binary (yes/no) judgments. This approach has been validated in prior benchmarks [47] [82] and shown to be effective.

---

[1] https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/moderation
[2] https://www.perspectiveapi.com/

- GPT-Score: GPT-4 is prompted to rate the responses. While this approach may introduce some uncertainty, we compare GPT-4 scores with human ratings on a sample subset and observe a strong correlation of 0.91. This high agreement supports the reliability of GPT-based scoring, as detailed in Appendix C-A2.

Detailed metrics for various tasks are provided in the Appendix. These metrics are ultimately scaled to scores ranging from 0 to 100, and average scores are computed for different sub-aspects to better support the performance comparison.

*3) Models for Evaluation:* We compile a diverse set of popular MLLMs for evaluation, aiming not only to benchmark their performance but also to provide insights for future development. As shown in Table IV, our evaluation includes 7 proprietary models and 23 open-source models, covering a broad spectrum from early representatives such as MiniGPT-4 [101] and InstructBLIP [19] to more recent and powerful models like Phi-Vision [2] and InternVL2 [17]. Given the widespread use of LLaVA-1.5 [46] as a base model, we intentionally include several of its updated variants, such as ShareGPT-4V [13] and LLaVA-NeXT [45], which leverage more advanced training techniques and higher-quality data. This selection allows us to initially examine how improvements in training methodology correlate with changes in model trustworthiness.

*4) Methods for Analysis:* As outlined in Section III-C, we construct a two-dimensional categorization for existing methods aimed at mitigating trustworthiness issues in MLLMs. To ensure a focused and controllable analysis, we select several representative methods that exemplify distinct categories, which are summarized in Table III. We include RLAIF-V [87], which annotates answers with feedback from AI, and Visual Contrastive Decoding (VCD) [37], which samples the next token from the logits calculated by contradicting those from a clean input image and a corrupted image, as representative training-based and training-free approaches for addressing hallucination. For robustness enhancement via architectural modification, we examine FARECLIP [64] and SimCLIP [33], both trained under adversarial settings in an unsupervised manner. Regarding the remaining three aspects, where refusal behavior is typically expected, we select VLGuard [102] and SPA-VL [96], which introduce datasets with different training objectives, along with two inference-time techniques, ECSO [27] and ETA [20].

TABLE III: Mitigation methods analyzed in MultiTrust-X with their targeted aspects and key contributions in the development of a machine learning system.

| Method | Trustworthiness Aspect | ML Stage |
|---|---|---|
| RLAIF-V [87] | Truthfulness | Data / Training Algorithm |
| VCD [37] | Truthfulness | Inference |
| FARECLIP [64] | Robustness | Architecture |
| SimCLIP [33] | Robustness | Architecture |
| VLGuard [102] | Safety, Fairness, Privacy | Data / Training Algorithm |
| SPA-VL [96] | Safety, Fairness, Privacy | Data / Training Algorithm |
| ECSO [27] | Safety, Fairness, Privacy | Inference |
| ETA [20] | Safety, Fairness, Privacy | Inference |

## IV. EVALUATION ON MULTITRUST-X

In this section, we present the evaluation results and key findings of MultiTrust-X across a diverse set of MLLMs, positioning it as a comprehensive benchmark for trustworthiness. Due to space limitations, we highlight a subset of representative results that yield particularly insightful conclusions, while the complete results are provided from Appendix B to F.

### A. Experimental Results



(a) Between Trustworthiness and General Performance

(b) Between Sub-Aspects

Fig. 3: Correlation analysis of the overall results.

**Overall Performance.** The results summarized in Table IV indicate that proprietary models, notably the GPT-4 [57] and Claude [5] families, consistently outperform others across the spectrum of trustworthiness dimensions. This superior performance can plausibly be attributed to the extensive alignment efforts and integrated safety mechanisms employed during their development. A correlation analysis reveals a moderate positive relationship (Pearson's $r = 0.69$) between their general multimodal capabilities, which are indicated with the scores from MME [24] and MMBench [50], and the aggregated trustworthiness scores, suggesting that stronger foundational capabilities contribute to, but do not fully determine, reliable behaviors. As depicted in Fig. 3a, earlier-generation MLLMs tend to underperform, which is likely a consequence of their comparatively weaker multimodal perception and reasoning. However, the association between capability and trustworthiness is far from uniform. Further fine-grained analysis in Fig. 3b shows that some sub-aspects such as truthfulness, toxicity mitigation, and privacy awareness exhibit certain inter-correlations, potentially due to shared reliance on perceptual accuracy. In contrast, most other sub-aspects remain weakly correlated, reinforcing the necessity of evaluating each dimension independently and underscoring the multifaceted nature of trustworthiness, which remains a largely unsolved challenge in current MLLMs.

**Truthfulness.** Some MLLMs exhibit fundamental limitations in truthfulness, particularly when faced with tasks requiring fine-grained perceptual understanding. As evidenced in Table V, while most models achieve high accuracy exceeding 80% on coarse-level perception tasks, such as object existence judgment and scene analysis, their performance deteriorates markedly in more granular settings. For example, in visual grounding tasks, accuracy drops to 32% for InternLM-XC2 [21] and as low as 8% for Gemini-Pro, underscoring

TABLE IV: Leaderboard of modern MLLMs on MultiTrust-X with their detailed scores in each sub-aspect.

| # | Models | Truthfulness | | Robustness | | Safety | | Fairness | | Privacy | | Avg. |
|---|--------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | | I. | M. | O. | A. | T. | J. | S. | B. | A. | L. | |
| 1 | GPT-4-Vision | 75.06 | 76.63 | 80.93 | 55.89 | 80.49 | 92.54 | 79.37 | 83.14 | 74.45 | 84.29 | 78.28 |
| 2 | Claude3.5-Sonnet | 72.48 | 67.08 | 68.02 | 58.50 | 81.53 | 94.00 | 89.68 | 69.07 | 69.10 | 97.54 | 76.70 |
| 3 | GPT-4o | 78.28 | 67.34 | 81.99 | 56.06 | 79.51 | 89.01 | 86.87 | 58.99 | 76.60 | 91.47 | 76.61 |
| 4 | Claude3-Sonnet | 66.80 | 60.25 | 72.68 | 51.97 | 77.19 | 97.45 | 75.51 | 63.14 | 63.33 | 99.27 | 72.76 |
| * | RESA-R-7B | 41.74 | 32.63 | 59.83 | 76.04 | 77.91 | 98.97 | 87.18 | 79.31 | 50.63 | 92.36 | 69.66 |
| 5 | Phi-3.5-Vision | 58.88 | 47.19 | 74.04 | 54.38 | 65.06 | 89.85 | 90.07 | 64.03 | 61.15 | 58.22 | 66.29 |
| 6 | GLM-4v-9B | 66.08 | 52.83 | 78.37 | 70.85 | 67.2 | 79.43 | 88.78 | 37.78 | 60.81 | 36.83 | 63.90 |
| 7 | Qwen-VL-Plus | 68.55 | 59.38 | 75.18 | 36.64 | 68.77 | 66.23 | 64.14 | 82.95 | 59.80 | 53.50 | 63.51 |
| 8 | Qwen2-VL-Chat | 68.74 | 50.00 | 78.97 | 38.97 | 64.98 | 79.88 | 83.04 | 70.14 | 65.12 | 32.92 | 63.28 |
| 9 | Cambrian-8B | 62.07 | 52.30 | 70.83 | 47.37 | 67.44 | 66.24 | 78.67 | 68.20 | 54.09 | 59.75 | 62.69 |
| 10 | InternVL2-8B | 64.18 | 52.12 | 75.39 | 38.90 | 62.75 | 78.32 | 89.05 | 64.72 | 60.39 | 36.07 | 62.19 |
| 11 | Hunyuan-V | 66.03 | 52.25 | 74.07 | 73.55 | 67.11 | 56.41 | 82.61 | 35.93 | 61.75 | 46.72 | 61.64 |
| 12 | Gemini1.0-Pro | 65.11 | 67.34 | 78.38 | 50.39 | 72.85 | 55.76 | 72.33 | 27.66 | 70.49 | 35.72 | 59.60 |
| 13 | DeepSeek-VL | 54.90 | 39.88 | 75.94 | 58.09 | 66.28 | 58.00 | 76.36 | 74.17 | 49.05 | 36.59 | 58.93 |
| 14 | LLaVA-NeXT | 55.55 | 58.63 | 76.49 | 39.38 | 68.37 | 43.51 | 67.89 | 63.49 | 53.78 | 55.47 | 58.26 |
| 15 | InternLM-XC2 | 61.80 | 52.90 | 75.36 | 38.90 | 63.57 | 51.19 | 79.78 | 49.09 | 60.44 | 34.97 | 56.80 |
| 16 | MiniGPT-4-L2 | 48.29 | 50.23 | 63.00 | 35.38 | 69.83 | 74.49 | 65.71 | 37.52 | 42.46 | 69.98 | 55.69 |
| 17 | InternVL-Chat | 58.82 | 52.39 | 71.68 | 55.21 | 56.39 | 43.34 | 71.14 | 35.04 | 57.88 | 33.68 | 53.56 |
| 18 | mPLUG-Owl2 | 55.87 | 50.37 | 74.86 | 36.31 | 60.15 | 33.41 | 73.50 | 51.80 | 56.55 | 34.59 | 52.74 |
| 19 | LVIS-Instruct4V | 54.81 | 46.76 | 64.16 | 29.06 | 58.77 | 49.29 | 71.51 | 35.71 | 58.65 | 52.32 | 52.10 |
| 20 | LLaVA-RLHF | 50.12 | 51.16 | 70.47 | 31.76 | 59.43 | 35.92 | 69.45 | 39.09 | 53.88 | 59.70 | 52.10 |
| 21 | LLaVA-1.5-13B | 58.78 | 53.89 | 74.13 | 30.75 | 61.92 | 39.54 | 67.80 | 39.48 | 54.08 | 36.20 | 51.66 |
| 22 | InternLM-XC | 53.63 | 41.64 | 68.17 | 27.79 | 45.65 | 57.80 | 71.16 | 46.59 | 56.16 | 43.06 | 51.17 |
| 23 | Qwen-VL-Chat | 58.96 | 49.24 | 72.09 | 41.67 | 59.18 | 39.56 | 64.60 | 34.61 | 53.60 | 37.16 | 51.07 |
| 24 | CogVLM | 55.29 | 46.26 | 74.07 | 53.12 | 61.50 | 55.78 | 62.05 | 32.18 | 40.20 | 24.79 | 50.52 |
| 25 | ShareGPT4V | 55.81 | 50.20 | 69.31 | 33.23 | 58.99 | 39.13 | 70.39 | 34.75 | 51.80 | 39.10 | 50.27 |
| 26 | LLaVA-1.5-7B | 54.06 | 48.41 | 74.12 | 28.45 | 58.02 | 37.37 | 70.57 | 38.49 | 48.27 | 26.78 | 48.45 |
| 27 | MiniGPT-4-13B | 44.79 | 45.77 | 64.11 | 39.12 | 47.40 | 33.99 | 64.84 | 34.17 | 39.46 | 58.16 | 47.18 |
| 28 | InstructBLIP | 46.32 | 40.95 | 74.08 | 33.22 | 41.46 | 43.30 | 57.79 | 30.02 | 58.14 | 9.27 | 43.46 |
| 29 | Otter | 41.97 | 34.31 | 57.82 | 24.02 | 50.57 | 45.59 | 57.94 | 34.53 | 40.94 | 20.49 | 40.82 |
| 30 | mPLUG-Owl | 48.28 | 42.83 | 73.13 | 20.31 | 49.40 | 24.15 | 50.08 | 37.59 | 39.10 | 14.25 | 39.91 |

TABLE V: Performance of inherent capabilities in Task T.1/2 with accuracy (%, ↑).

| Task | Subtask | Gemini-Pro | InternLM-XC2 | InternVL-Chat |
|------|---------|------------|--------------|---------------|
| Basic World Understanding | Object | 80.80 | 93.20 | 88.80 |
| | Scene | 70.00 | 88.25 | 86.25 |
| | Grounding | 8.00 | 32.00 | 42.00 |
| Advanced Cognitive Inference | Commonsense | 79.29 | 73.57 | 65.71 |
| | Comparison | 54.00 | 64.00 | 55.00 |
| | Temporal | 52.50 | 47.50 | 52.50 |

persistent challenges in fine-grained visual comprehension. Moreover, MLLMs display varying degrees of reliance on textual and visual modalities when engaging in cognitively demanding tasks. Their relatively strong performance on commonsense reasoning, which primarily draws on knowledge internalized by the underlying LLMs, stands in contrast to the significant decline observed in tasks that necessitate active visual reasoning. This performance gap, also documented in prior works [12] [81], suggests that integrating visual information into complex inference remains a bottleneck. Finally, the ability to resist external misinformation appears to diverge across model types. Open-source MLLMs are generally more vulnerable to misleading visual content, often producing inaccurate or fabricated outputs when exposed to such inputs.

In contrast, proprietary models tend to demonstrate better stability, exhibiting greater resilience against visual manipulation and confusion.



Fig. 4: Attack Success Rates (%, ↓) in Task R.4/5.

**Robustness.** Despite the insignificant differences in model performance across out-of-distribution (OOD) settings, our findings demonstrate that MLLMs, like other deep learning models, remain inherently susceptible to adversarial perturbations. In particular, under untargeted attacks in an image captioning task, most models exhibit a substantial drop in ac-

curacy, sometimes from above 90% to below 20%, indicating a dramatic loss of reliability. Targeted attacks further confirm these vulnerabilities. Multiple evaluated models produce the attacker-specified outputs with success rates exceeding 50%, including the commercial model Qwen-VL-Plus [7], underscoring the fragility of current MLLMs in adversarial settings. As illustrated in Figure 4, two advanced open-source models display the highest rates of attack success, suggesting their limited robustness. In contrast, models such as CogVLM [79] and InternVL-Chat [17] show markedly greater resistance to adversarial inputs. Both utilize specialized visual encoders with increased parameter capacity, which appears to reduce the cross-model transferability of adversarial examples. A similar explanation may extend to proprietary models, which are likely to include preprocessing mechanisms, such as input filtering—to mitigate noise or perturbations, as suggested in prior work [56].

TABLE VI: Performance in Task S.1/2/4.

| Task | Metrics | MiniGPT-4-L2 | mPLUG-Owl2 | InternLM-XC2 | GPT-4V |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NSFW Description | RtA (%, ↑) | 34.00 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 59.80 |
| | P.API (↓) | 0.46 | 0.62 | 0.53 | 0.26 |
| Risk Identification | Object (%, ↑) | 75.08 | 91.33 | 91.00 | 86.33 |
| | Risk (%, ↑) | 42.93 | 81.00 | 73.00 | 79.38 |
| Typographic Jailbreaking | RtA (%, ↑) | 79.50 | 14.50 | 50.00 | 99.00 |
| | ASR (%, ↓) | 1.50 | 34.50 | 13.67 | 0.17 |

**Safety.** Our evaluation reveals a consistent gap in safety alignment between proprietary and open-source MLLMs. Closed-source models such as GPT-4V and Claude3 demonstrate notably stronger safety behaviors, refusing to describe, on average, 69.5% of NSFW images. In contrast, most open-source models fail to reject such inputs altogether, indicating a lack of effective safety guardrails. A similar pattern is observed in jailbreak scenarios, where GPT-4V and Claude3 successfully resist nearly all adversarial prompts, whereas many open-source models remain vulnerable to exploitation. A particularly concerning finding is that many models can be jail-broken by placing harmful content solely in the image, without any adversarial prompting. For example, InternLM-XC2 and LLaVA-1.5 are compromised in 71% and 80% of such image-only attacks, respectively, due to their over-reliance on visual cues. An exception is Phi-3.5-Vision, which has been carefully aligned with safety responses in its development. Another interesting observation is that MiniGPT-4-L2 and mPLUG-Owl2 [84], both based on LLaMA-2 [75], exhibit inconsistent safety behaviors across tasks of typographic jailbreaking and risk identification. This suggests that although multimodal training strengthens perception and reasoning, it can weaken safety alignment inherited from the base model, leading to unpredictable vulnerabilities.

**Fairness.** MLLMs generally exhibit strong sensitivity to stereotypical queries in practical settings, with an average rejection rate of 93.79%, even when accompanied by suggestive visual inputs. However, when stereotype-related prompts shift from scenario-based queries to opinion-driven evaluations, notable differences appear across models and themes. Specifically, stereotypes associated with age elicit significantly higher agreement rates than those concerning gender, race,



Fig. 5: RtA Rates (%,↑) in Task F.5.

or religion, suggesting topic-dependent variations in model behaviors. Similar imbalances appear in tasks assessing bias and preference. As shown in Figure 5, models such as Claude3, InternLM-XC2, and LLaVA-NeXT display diverse sensitivity features. While they tend to be more cautious when responding to ideological or politically sensitive topics, they often adopt a more permissive stance on cultural or lifestyle-related content, increasing the likelihood of revealing implicit preferences that may subtly affect user perceptions.

TABLE VII: RtA Rates (%, ↑) of three MLLMs in Task P.6.

| Model | Only Text | With Irrelevant | With Relevant |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen-VL-Plus | 38.00 | 27.87 | 13.00 |
| LLaVA-NeXT | 51.00 | 25.67 | 1.50 |
| MiniGPT-4-L2 | 100.00 | 66.78 | 24.00 |

**Privacy.** Most MLLMs demonstrate a basic understanding of privacy, achieving an average accuracy of 72.30% when they are asked to identify private information in images, which aligns with their visual perception abilities. However, this awareness degrades sharply in the task requiring more complex reasoning, and most models perform no better than random guessing. In this setting, the gap between proprietary and open-source models becomes more obvious, with GPT-4V and Gemini-Pro maintaining accuracy above 70%. In the context of privacy leakage, we observe that models are more likely to compromise sensitive information when their capabilities of OCR are triggered compared with querying PII with visual cues. This suggests that direct visual extraction poses a greater privacy risk in multimodal systems. Furthermore, results from two text-only tasks reveal that multimodal inputs can influence LLM behaviors, weakening their adherence to privacy-preserving instructions. As shown in Table VII, models are more prone to exposing PII in past conversations when visual inputs are present. This raises significant concerns for real-world deployments when MLLMs are exposed to user data.

### B. Key Findings

Taken together, our comprehensive experimental findings highlight several critical insights regarding the trustworthiness of current MLLMs. First, while advanced open-source models have begun to approach, or even surpass, proprietary systems such as GPT-4V and Claude3 in general perception and reasoning tasks [24] [50] [88], they continue to exhibit notable weaknesses in trust-related dimensions. In contrast,

proprietary models consistently show greater robustness and safety, characterized by strengthened risk sensitivity and lower rates of harmful output. Second, although MLLMs appear to possess a baseline understanding of trustworthiness when directly queried about potential risks, their awareness diminishes substantially in more complex scenarios that require multi-step reasoning or where threats are less conspicuous. Third, intensive focus on general multimodal capabilities like OCR during training may inadvertently distract the models' attention from instructions, weakening their ability to detect and reject unsafe prompts and ultimately compromising alignment with trustworthiness objectives.

From our dual perspective of risks associated with the multimodality, the evaluation further reveals how the addition of vision can unexpectedly impact the behaviors of the base language models in MLLMs, thereby elevating downstream risks. On one hand, multimodal fine-tuning [46] appears to diminish previously established alignment [8] [59] in the base LLMs, as shown in the comparison between MiniGPT-4-LLaMA2 and mPLUG-Owl2, leading to more vulnerabilities after fine-tuning. On the other hand, multimodal inference also alters the original performance of LLMs. Relevant visual inputs can promote task completion in areas like truthfulness, but yet more often introduce unintended behaviors, exaggerating internal risks. Meanwhile, semantically irrelevant images included during inference can also destabilize model responses to text-focused tasks, resulting in inconsistent or biased outputs, which could lead to unpredictable risky outcomes.

## V. ANALYSIS WITH MULTITRUST-X

In this section, we conduct an in-depth analysis on how different strategies contribute to the mitigation of trustworthy risks with MLLMs. Taking LLaVA-1.5-7B [46] as the base MLLM, we first compare the existing methods specific to different issues on MultiTrust-X and then delve into safety alignment[3], which is less studied but more significant than hallucination mitigation in this benchmark, to study how different factors in the machine learning system influence the outcomes and provide insights for better solutions.

### A. Performance of Existing Methods

We begin by evaluating a range of existing methods aimed at improving various aspects of trustworthiness, including hallucination mitigation, adversarial robustness, and safety alignment, as reviewed in Section III-D4. Rather than exhaustively covering all available approaches, we select representative methods across different domains to offer a holistic perspective on the current research landscape. These include inference-time techniques and training-based methods as indicated by a "+" in Table VIII.

Our results show that most methods lead to varying degrees of improvements on the MultiTrust benchmark. For example, RLAIF-7B [87], which focuses on enhancing truthfulness through reinforcement learning, achieves a score of 55.36.

---

[3]"Safety" here is broader than the definition in MultiTrust-X, covering the aspects of safety, fairness and privacy, which mainly involve refusal behaviors against harmful queries.

VLGuard [102] and SPA-VL [96] attain higher scores of 67.40 and 66.03, respectively. Nonetheless, there remains considerable room for improvement, as each approach exhibits certain limitations. We summarize the key findings and their implications below.

**Finding 1:** *Solutions targeting a single issue is insufficient to achieve an overall improvement in trustworthiness.*

RLAIF-7B and VCD [37] are two typical methods for hallucination mitigation and have demonstrated strong performance on widely used benchmarks such as POPE [40] and AMBER [6]. Consistent with prior findings, our experiments show notable improvements, particularly in perception tasks such as basic understanding (T.1), where RLAIF-7B raises the score from 66.9 to 74.6. However, this improvement does not appear to generalize across other dimensions of trustworthiness. Specifically, we find that the models become less robust under misleading conditions, and their resistance to harmful content shows no significant enhancement. Similarly, substituting the visual encoder with the adversarially trained FARECLIP [64] and SimCLIP [33] significantly boosts performance in adversarial robustness, but does not lead to corresponding improvements in other aspects. These observations highlight the challenge of developing methods that generalize across multiple facets of trustworthiness.

**Finding 2:** *Existing methods for adversarial robustness and safety alignment often sacrifice general performance.*

In addition to limited generalization across trustworthiness dimensions, we also observe significant trade-offs introduced by these methods. In particular, approaches targeting robustness and safety, both of which are relatively independent of general capabilities, often lead to a decline in truthfulness, which serves as a stronger indicator of overall utility in MLLMs. Prior work [89] has shown that adversarial training can introduce a trade-off between accuracy and robustness, which is also confirmed by our results. Specifically, robust visual encoders tend to provide less detailed visual features to the downstream LLM, resulting in degraded performance on perception tasks. Similarly, safety alignment methods [61], mainly based on refusal training, alter the distribution of responses in a way that adversely affects general task performance.

### B. Granular Analysis from a ML Perspective

Beyond evaluating existing methods, we further investigate the impacts of various factors within machine learning systems through a series of controlled experiments. Our analysis is conducted within the framework introduced in Section III, enabling a more granular understanding of their influence on the overall trustworthiness. Since methods on hallucination and truthfulness are closely tied to general performance and have been extensively studied, our following granular analysis focuses on safety alignment, which is a more complex challenge due to the inherent trade-off between safety and utility [8] [18]. We take the performance in some tasks of truthfulness to reflect models' general capabilities in the following analysis. For each factor, we first display the findings and then present the experimental settings along with the analysis of the corresponding results.

TABLE VIII: Scores of Existing Methods to Mitigate Trustworthiness Issues on MultiTrust-X

| Method | Avg. | Truthfulness | | Robustness | | Safety | | Fairness | | Privacy | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | I. | M. | O. | A. | T. | J. | S. | B. | A. | L. |
| LLaVA-1.5-7B [46] | 48.45 | 54.06 | 48.41 | 74.12 | 28.45 | 58.02 | 37.37 | 70.57 | 38.49 | 48.27 | 26.78 |
| *Hallucination* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RLAIF-7B [87] | 55.36 | 50.44 | 38.40 | 70.80 | 37.32 | 62.19 | 56.39 | 70.58 | 51.81 | 50.90 | 64.82 |
| + VCD [37] | 45.53 | 52.64 | 39.75 | 75.59 | 29.75 | 57.59 | 28.53 | 67.65 | 28.75 | 48.24 | 26.82 |
| *Adversarial Robustness* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| + FARECLIP [64] | 50.24 | 45.56 | 35.29 | 63.92 | 75.00 | 58.73 | 45.40 | 72.35 | 28.75 | 49.92 | 27.46 |
| + SimCLIP [33] | 50.06 | 45.29 | 36.61 | 64.54 | 76.42 | 58.91 | 34.58 | 69.98 | 34.31 | 50.28 | 29.74 |
| *Safety Alignment* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| VLGuard [102] | 67.40 | 47.95 | 38.75 | 75.54 | 34.44 | 79.04 | 97.63 | 86.03 | 82.64 | 56.83 | 75.16 |
| SPA-VL [96] | 66.03 | 48.05 | 40.31 | 73.75 | 29.57 | 68.13 | 91.82 | 83.14 | 72.36 | 53.80 | 99.32 |
| + ECSO [27] | 50.92 | 51.89 | 38.37 | 74.11 | 31.01 | 62.31 | 59.20 | 72.56 | 29.45 | 55.52 | 34.77 |
| + ETA [20] | 55.49 | 51.10 | 39.02 | 73.45 | 32.05 | 71.38 | 74.14 | 76.18 | 30.72 | 47.99 | 58.87 |

*1) Data:* The quality and characteristics of training data play a critical role in shaping the behavior and safety alignment of MLLMs. In the following context, we analyze the influence of 4 major aspects of training data: content, quantity, mixture, and style.

We will perform the experiments given the off-the-shelf open-source datasets like VLGuard and SPA-VL. VLGuard is a safety-oriented dataset consisting of 2k adversarially collected "red team" samples, primarily refusal-type answers. It enables significant safety consolidation via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with relatively low computational cost. SPA-VL is a dataset for preference learning, which has over 90k samples whose responses are not strictly set as refusals.

**Finding 3:** *Refusal demonstrations in training data greatly contribute to safety alignment but are likely to induce over-refusal behaviors.*

**Data Content.** We first examine how the data content, i.e., refusal demonstrations, impacts the safety alignment. We follow the training settings of VLGuard and only replace the safety data with 2k sampled positive examples from SPA-VL to make a fair comparison. Specifically, safety data is mixed with 5k general-purpose samples from the original training set of LLaVA-1.5. The training process adopts the hyperparameters from the VLGuard setup: 3 epochs, a global batch size of 128, and a learning rate of 1e-5.

TABLE IX: Performance with different data contents.

| Task | VLGuard | SPA-VL-SFT |
|---|---|---|
| Risk Identification | 67.26 | 76.75 |
| Toxic Content Generation | 82.68 | 75.39 |
| Typographic Jailbreaking | 99.50 | 91.00 |
| Multimodal Jailbreaking | 99.63 | 57.50 |
| Textual Jailbreaking | 93.75 | 91.25 |
| Agreement on Steretypes | 91.27 | 76.59 |
| Visual Preference | 100.0 | 4.17 |
| Privacy Leakage in Vision | 82.82 | 14.11 |

As shown in Table IX, VLGuard consistently outperforms the SPA-VL on the safety-critical tasks, especially on refusal-oriented tasks such as jailbreaking (Task S.4-6), achieving near-perfect scores. This outcome is attributed to the high proportion of refusal-type data in VLGuard. However, the model trained on VLGuard also exhibits over-refusal behavior, frequently starting responses with phrases like "I'm sorry," even in low-risk scenarios such as risk identification (Task S.2). In contrast, SPA-VL achieves moderate improvements in safety without excessive refusal, likely due to its more balanced data composition containing fewer direct refusal examples. Based on these results, we can get the following finding.

**Finding 4:** *Increasing safety data improves the safety performance but eventually negative impacts the utility, while general data brings limited help to the trade-off.*

**Data Quantity.** To investigate the impact of data quantity, we conduct experiments with the positive examples from SPA-VL, as it contains more samples for better study. We consider three dataset sizes: 0.2k, 1k, and 5k. We take the same training setup as before.

TABLE X: Performance with different data quantities.

| Task | 0.2k | 1k | 5k |
|---|---|---|---|
| Advanced Cognitive Inference | 59.25 | 59.13 | 58.96 |
| Visual Confusion VQA | 61.61 | 59.81 | 56.35 |
| Risk Identification | 71.59 | 73.25 | 67.00 |
| Toxic Content Generation | 64.21 | 77.68 | 81.85 |
| Typographic Jailbreaking | 75.42 | 85.67 | 90.92 |
| Multimodal Jailbreaking | 33.28 | 36.92 | 50.81 |
| Textual Jailbreaking | 25.00 | 88.75 | 96.25 |

The results in Table X indicate that increasing the volume of safety data leads to substantial improvements on refusal-related tasks such as jailbreaking (Task S.3-6), with consistently higher scores in these areas. The overall trustworthiness score also improves as more safety data is incorporated. However, this comes at the cost of decreased performance in truthfulness, suggesting a negative impact on the model's general utility. These findings highlight the importance of balancing safety and performance, implying that the volume of safety data should be kept at a moderate level to avoid excessive degradation in general capabilities.

**Data Mixture.** As previous results suggest that safety alignment methods often incur a trade-off between safety and

performance, some approaches attempt to mitigate this by mixing helpfulness data with safety data. To better understand the impact of such mixtures, we follow the practice of VLGuard and vary the amount of helpfulness data introduced during training from 0k to 15k. The training hyperparameters remain consistent with previous experiments.

TABLE XI: Performance with different data mixture ratios.

| Task | LLaVA-1.5 | 0 | 2k | 5k | 8k | 10k | 15k |
|------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Advanced Cognitive Inference | 61.27 | 50.79 | 56.61 | 57.64 | 59.10 | 58.25 | 58.03 |
| Visual Confusion VQA | 60.04 | 51.94 | 58.62 | 58.65 | 57.42 | 56.49 | 59.38 |
| Toxic Content Generation | 51.89 | 85.62 | 85.99 | 82.58 | 84.63 | 84.85 | 83.96 |
| Multimodal Jailbreaking | 22.41 | 100.00 | 99.90 | 99.63 | 99.90 | 99.80 | 99.80 |

As shown in Table XI, the incorporation of helpfulness data is crucial for balancing safety and utility, suggested by the improvements in truthfulness tasks. Further, we see that the increasing amount of helpfulness data leads to a marginal improvement in the model's truthfulness, particularly in the task of advanced cognitive inference where the score rises from 56.61 to a peak of 59.10. Meanwhile, safety performance slightly declines in tasks such as toxic generation. However, the overall performance variance across different mixture ratios remains limited. Compared with the performance of LLaVA-1.5-7B, the utility is still inferior after safety alignment, which implies that simply mixing helpfulness data cannot fully address the issue of safety-performance trade-off.

**Finding 5:** *Compared to instruction-tuning data for safety alignment, data in Chain-of-Thought reasoning better retains the general performance with comparable safety performance.*

**Data Style.** Inspired by the recent advancements in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) and the attempts in combining safety alignment with reasoning, we further explore the difference between standard data and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning data. To guarantee the difference in data is only in their style and presence rather than the contents, we transform the SFT data from VLGuard into CoT format. Specifically, we prompt GPT-4o to generate explicit reasoning chains for the given answers from VLGuard following the format of DeepSeek-R1. In this part, we only consider the safety data and follow the consistent training settings as above. More details are introduced in Section VI.

TABLE XII: Performance with different answer styles.

| Task Type | Task | Direct Answers | CoT Reasoning |
|-----------|------|----------------|---------------|
| Inherent Deficiency | Basic World Understanding | 66.05 | 70.03 |
| | Advanced Cognitive Inference | 50.79 | 54.97 |
| | Instruction Assisted VQA | 7.00 | 12.75 |
| Jailbreaking | Typographic Jailbreaking | 100.00 | 99.75 |
| | Multimodal Jailbreaking | 99.90 | 98.91 |
| | Textual Jailbreaking | 100.0 | 98.75 |

From Table XII, we can see that incorporating chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning significantly improves the model's truthfulness, particularly in tasks reflecting general capabilities such as Basic World Understanding (Task T.1), while maintaining comparable refusal performance. Concretely, the scores for Basic World Understanding and Advanced Cognitive Inference increase from 66.05 and 50.79 to 70.03

and 54.97 respectively. Notably, even when trained solely on safety data, the model utilizing CoT reasoning better preserves its utility, thereby mitigating the negative effects typically introduced by safety alignment. This phenomenon aligns with the observations in LLM research [93] [94], where reasoning has been shown to support both general capability retention and improved risk identification.

*2) Training Algorithm:* Training algorithm contains many components in machine learning, such as optimizer, learning objective, etc. Different algorithms can lead to diverse optimal solutions with various properties.

**Finding 6:** *DPO performs better in terms of safety alignment and utility preservation than SFT, but still suffers from the trade-off.*

Safety alignment for MLLMs is commonly achieved through either SFT or preference learning (e.g., DPO [62], RLHF [59]). While both methods may leverage the same seed datasets, the choice of learning objectives can bring different outcomes. The core difference between SFT and preference learning is whether the negative samples are adopted for training. In consideration of the availability of datasets, we compare the performance of SFT and DPO in this part. To ensure data consistency, all experiments are conducted on the SPA-VL dataset, and during SFT training, only positive examples are used. For DPO, we directly use the off-the-shelf model trained, and for SFT, we use a global batch size of 128, 1 epoch, and a learning rate of 1e-6.

TABLE XIII: Performance with SFT and DPO.

| Task Type | Task | SPA-VL-DPO | SPA-VL-SFT |
|-----------|------|-----------|-----------|
| Inherent Deficiency | Basic World Understanding | 73.03 | 71.10 |
| | Advanced Cognitive Inference | 52.89 | 54.68 |
| | Instruction Assisted VQA | 14.00 | 6.75 |
| Jailbreaking | Typographic Jailbreaking | 97.58 | 85.08 |
| | Multimodal Jailbreaking | 77.87 | 51.06 |
| | Textual Jailbreaking | 100.00 | 97.50 |
| Privacy Leakage | PII Query with Visual Cues | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| | Privacy Leakage in Vision | 97.95 | 76.41 |
| | PII Leakage in Conversations | 100.00 | 10.33 |

Evaluation on MultiTrust (Table XIII) shows that DPO significantly outperforms SFT on safety-related tasks, particularly in refusal performance. For example, on the PII Leakage in Conversation task (Task P.6), DPO increases the refusal rate by approximately 90% relative to SFT, highlighting the benefits of utilizing negative examples during training. Regarding general capabilities, both SFT and DPO exhibit performance trade-offs, but DPO maintains better generalization. This suggests that the contrastive learning in DPO helps the model better learn generalizable safe behaviors and mitigate the trade-off between safety and helpfulness more effectively than SFT.

It is noteworthy that the alignment of MLLMs is still at its early stage and the proposed algorithms are limited. Therefore, the analysis is only performed on SFT and preference learning with a conclusion consistent with previous research [71]. Future work can focus on the multimodal interaction in MLLMs and propose novel techniques like new loss terms to rectify the alignment of MLLMs.

*3) Inference:* In addition to training-based approaches, several methods can enhance the safety and general capability of MLLMs at the inference stage without modifying model parameters. These techniques allow for flexible post-hoc adjustment and can be integrated into the inference pipeline with minimal computational overhead.

**Finding 7:** *Inference-time techniques can yield certain improvements, but their effectiveness is fundamentally limited by the intrinsic capabilities of the base model.*

Several methods have been proposed to enhance the safety of MLLMs at deployment by leveraging either the model's own risk detection capabilities or those of external modules. In this part, we focus on two representative approaches, ECSO [27] and ETA [20]. We adopt their official implementation based on LLaVA-1.5-7B.

TABLE XIV: Performance with inference-time methods.

| Task | LLaVA-1.5 | ECSO | ETA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Advanced Cognitive Inference | 61.27 | 61.02 | 60.00 |
| Visual Misleading VQA | 60.04 | 61.21 | 61.37 |
| Stylized Image Caption | 92.00 | 90.33 | 89.33 |
| Visual Privacy Recognition | 71.21 | 71.49 | 71.19 |
| Toxic Content Generation | 51.89 | 68.74 | 75.16 |
| Typographic Jailbreaking | 56.92 | 71.42 | 86.17 |
| Multimodal Jailbreaking | 22.41 | 57.43 | 67.50 |
| Textual Jailbreaking | 6.25 | 48.75 | 68.75 |

As shown in Table XIV, both ECSO and ETA demonstrate certain improvements in safety-critical tasks, particularly in scenarios such as jailbreaking, where refusal rates increase upon application. Notably, these enhancements are achieved with minimal trade-offs in truthfulness and general capabilities, including tasks like stylized image captioning (Task R.1) and visual privacy recognition (Task P.1). However, the overall safety gains remain limited, largely constrained by the underlying capabilities of harmfulness detection and benign response generation. Without additional post-training, these inference-time techniques fall short of the performance achieved by training-based methods on safety-related tasks.

## VI. REASONING-ENHANCED SAFETY ALIGNMENT

To address the limitations identified in existing methods, we develop a new model based on LLaVA-1.5-7B with Reasoning-Enhanced Safety Alignment (RESA) to achieve state-of-the-art performance on MultiTrust-X. We integrate reasoning capabilities into the alignment process, with the hypothesis that deliberate, step-by-step reasoning can enable MLLMs to better identify harmful risks while preserving their general utility [29] [94], as confirmed by previous studies. In this section, we will introduce the implementation details of the method and then display its effectiveness through experiments on MultiTrust-X.

### A. Mitiation Practice

As the findings in Section V-B reveal that CoT reasoning can help better identify the safety risks and retain the general capabilities, we restructure safety alignment data into a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) format, allowing the model to explicitly

reason about the risk before producing a final answer. Specifically, given a prompt with the corresponding response in an instruction-tuning dataset like VLGuard, we use GPT-4o to generate an intermediate rationale with the prompt in Fig. 6. The reasoning process follows the Deepseek [30] format, wrapped by `<think>...</think>` tags. We keep the original answers unchanged and insert the generated reasoning chains before them, mimicking a self-reflective reasoning process. By doing so, we aim to help the model internalize a more granular understanding of risk and make better-informed decisions at inference time. We display two examples of the training data in the CoT reasoning format in Fig. 7.



```
Prompt to Generate Reasoning Trajectories

Here is a question-answer pair about an
image.
# For Safety Data
Please be aware that the question and
image may involve security or privacy
risks. You are not required to provide
an answer. Instead, focus on generating
a detailed reasoning chain that explores
the potential risks and concerns related
to security or privacy in this scenario.
# For Helpfulness Data
Instead, focus on generating a detailed
thinking chain before the answer
provided.
You don't need to answer in points. Wrap
analysis in <think>and </think>tags.

[IMAGE]
QUESTION: [QUESTION]
ANSWER: [ANSWER]
```

Fig. 6: Prompt to generate reasoning trajectories from GPT-4o.

Considering the finding that an excessive amount of safety data results in negative impacts and the fact that training on 2k safety data in VLGuard has achieved relatively satisfying safety performance, we take VLGuard as the seed dataset and transform it into CoT formatted data. Besides, we also include 10k helpfulness data by transforming sampled data from LLaVA-NeXT dataset into a similar format to balance safety and helpfulness from the perspective of data mixture. Due to the lack of preference data, we only use SFT for training, which has already achieved impressive results. The training setup follows that of VLGuard, with a global batch size of 128 and a learning rate of 1e-5 in 3 epochs.

To further achieve state-of-the-art performance on MultiTrust-X, we replace the visual encoder of the model with FARECLIP after the fine-tuning process of RESA. We name this version RESA-R to distinguish it from the models only enhanced by training.

### B. Experimental Results

We evaluate our safety-aligned MLLMs on the MultiTrust-X benchmark, with results presented in Table XV. Initially, the RESA-7B model trained solely on the safety data in VLGuard

(a) Reasoning-Formatted Safety Data



(b) Reasoning-Formatted General Data

Fig. 7: Examples of data converted into the reasoning format.

achieves overall performance comparable to the best existing methods. We can see that while the safety performance is significantly improved, the scores of truthfulness decline. To mitigate this degradation, we incorporate 10k helpfulness samples in the same CoT format, which is an amount selected based on our earlier analysis of data mixtures. After this augmentation, RESA-7B demonstrates significantly improved truthfulness, with scores rising to 54.45 and 40.19, compared to 47.95 and 38.75 in the baseline of VLGuard. These results further support our motivation that CoT-formatted data not only enhances alignment but also helps preserve general utility.

TABLE XV: Performance of RESA and RESA-R on MultiTrust-X.

| Model | Truthfulness | | Robustness | | Safety | | Fairness | | Privacy | | Avg. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I. | M. | O. | A. | T. | J. | S. | B. | A. | L. | |
| *2k VLGuard-CoT* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RESA-7B | 44.69 | 31.65 | 66.71 | 33.81 | 78.00 | 99.14 | 88.19 | 79.31 | 41.36 | 87.85 | 65.25 |
| RESA-R-7B | 41.73 | 32.63 | 59.83 | 76.04 | 77.91 | 98.97 | 87.18 | 79.31 | 50.63 | 92.36 | 69.66 |
| *2k VLGuard-CoT + 10k LLaVA-NeXT-CoT* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RESA-7B | 54.45 | 40.19 | 65.38 | 36.14 | 82.24 | 98.66 | 80.15 | 67.22 | 47.98 | 90.54 | 66.29 |
| RESA-R-7B | 45.23 | 37.30 | 56.47 | 75.96 | 76.85 | 97.68 | 82.61 | 69.44 | 46.98 | 91.49 | 68.00 |

However, the initial training does not account for adversarial robustness, leaving room for improvement in this aspect. To address this, we evaluate RESA-R, which incorporates the adversarially robust visual encoder of FARECLIP [64]. The overall scores increase to 69.66 and 68.00 for the models trained on the two respective datasets, achieving state-of-the-art performance among open-source MLLMs on our leaderboard (Table IV). These results significantly outperform existing models, including Phi-3.5-Vision which has undergone extensive safety fine-tuning prior to its release and achieves a score of 66.29. Meanwhile, we can see that the replacement of visual encoders still induces certain degradation in perception-related aspects, which is an issue found in previous studies and remains an open question for future work.

## VII. CONCLUSION

In this work, we introduce MultiTrust-X, a unified benchmark and comprehensive framework to assess and improve the trustworthiness of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). The framework is designed from three dimensions, including aspects of trustworthiness, novel risk types, and mitigation methods. We implement 32 diverse tasks, spanning truthfulness, robustness, safety, fairness, and privacy, with both generative and discriminative settings. The datasets are mostly adapted from existing uni-modal datasets and even manually curated from scratch. These efforts encourage a systematic evaluation of 30 modern MLLMs which shows the current drawbacks of modern open-source models, as well as an in-depth, granular analysis on existing mitigation methods relevant to trustworthiness, categorized into different stages in a machine learning system, which further enables controlled experiments for practical insights.

Our comprehensive evaluation with MultiTrust-X uncovers persistent and multifaceted trustworthiness challenges in current MLLMs. While proprietary models like GPT-4V and Claude3 demonstrate consistently strong performance across diverse aspects, many open-source models, despite their comparable general capabilities, remain unreliable and vulnerable to various issues including hallucinations, adversarial attacks, and harmful outputs. Furthermore, the inspection of novel risks of MLLMs reveals that the multimodality affects the base LLMs of MLLMs in various ways, subsequently increasing the risks in their applications, which involve the multimodal training compromising the alignment of LLMs and the multimodal inference amplifying the internal risks of LLMs. This renders the necessity of methods to mitigate these issues.

However, through in-depth analysis of eight representative mitigation strategies, we find that existing methods tend to address narrow issues in isolation, such as hallucination or robustness, and often introduce trade-offs, particularly sacrificing utility in pursuit of safer outputs. For instance, refusal-based safety alignment improves risk sensitivity but are more likely to lead to over-cautious behaviors or degraded task performance. We further identify the impacts from data, training objectives, and inference techniques for safety alignment and find that chain-of-thought data better preserves the utility while achieving similar safety performance.

Motivated by these findings, we propose Reasoning-Enhanced Safety Alignment (RESA), which incorporates chain-of-thought formatted data and robust visual encoders to improve both safety and general reasoning. RESA achieves state-of-the-art performance among open-source models on MultiTrust-X, validating the effectiveness of deliberative reasoning for aligning multimodal systems. Our work underscores the multifaceted nature of trustworthiness and the importance of holistic evaluation in guiding future MLLM development. We hope MultiTrust-X will serve as a foundation for benchmarking and inspiring new mitigation strategies in building safer, more reliable multimodal AI systems.

## REFERENCES

[1] Pause giant ai experiments: an open letter. *Future of Life Institute.– URL: futureoflife. org/open-letter/pause-giant-ai-experiments.(Accessed 11.04. 2023)*, 2023.

[2] Marah Abdin, Jyoti Aneja, Hany Awadalla, Ahmed Awadallah, Ammar Ahmad Awan, Nguyen Bach, Amit Bahree, Arash Bakhtiari, Jianmin Bao, Harkirat Behl, et al. Phi-3 technical report: A highly capable language model locally on your phone. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.14219*, 2024.

[3] Josh Achiam, Steven Adler, Sandhini Agarwal, Lama Ahmad, Ilge Akkaya, Florencia Leoni Aleman, Diogo Almeida, Janko Altenschmidt, Sam Altman, Shyamal Anadkat, et al. Gpt-4 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.08774*, 2023.

[4] Rohan Anil, Andrew M Dai, Orhan Firat, Melvin Johnson, Dmitry Lepikhin, Alexandre Passos, Siamak Shakeri, Emanuel Taropa, Paige Bailey, Zhifeng Chen, et al. Palm 2 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.10403*, 2023.

[5] Anthropic. The claude 3 model family: Opus, sonnet, haiku, 2024.

[6] Muhammad Ahsan Awais, Peter Redmond, Tomas Emmanuel Ward, and Graham Healy. Amber: Advancing multimodal brain-computer interfaces for enhanced robustness-a dataset for naturalistic settings. *Frontiers in Neuroergonomics*, 4:1216440, 2023.

[7] Jinze Bai, Shuai Bai, Shusheng Yang, Shijie Wang, Sinan Tan, Peng Wang, Junyang Lin, Chang Zhou, and Jingren Zhou. Qwen-vl: A frontier large vision-language model with versatile abilities. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.12966*, 2023.

[8] Yuntao Bai, Andy Jones, Kamal Ndousse, Amanda Askell, Anna Chen, Nova DasSarma, Dawn Drain, Stanislav Fort, Deep Ganguli, Tom Henighan, et al. Training a helpful and harmless assistant with reinforcement learning from human feedback. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2204.05862*, 2022.

[9] Rizhao Cai, Zirui Song, Dayan Guan, Zhenhao Chen, Xing Luo, Chenyu Yi, and Alex Kot. Benchlmm: Benchmarking cross-style visual capability of large multimodal models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.02896*, 2023.

[10] Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Matthew Jagielski, Irena Gao, Pang Wei W Koh, Daphne Ippolito, Florian Tramer, and Ludwig Schmidt. Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned? In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pages 61478–61500, 2023.

[11] Huanran Chen, Yichi Zhang, Yinpeng Dong, Xiao Yang, Hang Su, and Jun Zhu. Rethinking model ensemble in transfer-based adversarial attacks. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024.

[12] Lin Chen, Jinsong Li, Xiaoyi Dong, Pan Zhang, Yuhang Zang, Zehui Chen, Haodong Duan, Jiaqi Wang, Yu Qiao, Dahua Lin, et al. Are we on the right way for evaluating large vision-language models? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.20330*, 2024.

[13] Lin Chen, Jisong Li, Xiaoyi Dong, Pan Zhang, Conghui He, Jiaqi Wang, Feng Zhao, and Dahua Lin. Sharegpt4v: Improving large multimodal models with better captions. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.12793*, 2023.

[14] Xinlei Chen, Hao Fang, Tsung-Yi Lin, Ramakrishna Vedantam, Saurabh Gupta, Piotr Dollár, and C Lawrence Zitnick. Microsoft coco captions: Data collection and evaluation server. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1504.00325*, 2015.

[15] Yang Chen, Ethan Mendes, Sauvik Das, Wei Xu, and Alan Ritter. Can language models be instructed to protect personal information? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.02224*, 2023.

[16] Yuefeng Chen, Xiaofeng Mao, Yuan He, Hui Xue, Chao Li, Yinpeng Dong, Qi-An Fu, Xiao Yang, Wenzhao Xiang, Tianyu Pang, et al. Unrestricted adversarial attacks on imagenet competition. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.09903*, 2021.

[17] Zhe Chen, Jiannan Wu, Wenhai Wang, Weijie Su, Guo Chen, Sen Xing, Zhong Muyan, Qinglong Zhang, Xizhou Zhu, Lewei Lu, et al. Internvl: Scaling up vision foundation models and aligning for generic visual-linguistic tasks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.14238*, 2023.

[18] Josef Dai, Xuehai Pan, Ruiyang Sun, Jiaming Ji, Xinbo Xu, Mickel Liu, Yizhou Wang, and Yaodong Yang. Safe rlhf: Safe reinforcement learning from human feedback. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024.

[19] Wenliang Dai, Junnan Li, Dongxu Li, Anthony Tiong, Junqi Zhao, Weisheng Wang, Boyang Li, Pascale N Fung, and Steven Hoi. Instructblip: Towards general-purpose vision-language models with instruction tuning. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pages 49250–49267, 2023.

[20] Yi Ding, Bolian Li, and Ruqi Zhang. Eta: Evaluating then aligning safety of vision language models at inference time. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.06625*, 2024.

[21] Xiaoyi Dong, Pan Zhang, Yuhang Zang, Yuhang Cao, Bin Wang, Linke Ouyang, Xilin Wei, Songyang Zhang, Haodong Duan, Maosong Cao, et al. Internlm-xcomposer2: Mastering free-form text-image composition and comprehension in vision-language large model. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.16420*, 2024.

[22] Yinpeng Dong, Huanran Chen, Jiawei Chen, Zhengwei Fang, Xiao Yang, Yichi Zhang, Yu Tian, Hang Su, and Jun Zhu. How robust is google's bard to adversarial image attacks? In *R0-FoMo Workshop on Robustness of Few-shot and Zero-shot Learning in Large Foundation Models in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 2023.

[23] Center for AI Safety. Statement on ai risk. https://www.safe.ai/work/statement-on-ai-risk, 2023.

[24] Chaoyou Fu, Peixian Chen, Yunhang Shen, Yulei Qin, Mengdan Zhang, Xu Lin, Jinrui Yang, Xiawu Zheng, Ke Li, Xing Sun, Yunsheng Wu, and Rongrong Ji. Mme: A comprehensive evaluation benchmark for multimodal large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.13394*, 2023.

[25] Ben Goertzel. Artificial general intelligence: concept, state of the art, and future prospects. *Journal of Artificial General Intelligence*, 5(1):1–48, 2014.

[26] Yichen Gong, Delong Ran, Jinyuan Liu, Conglei Wang, Tianshuo Cong, Anyu Wang, Sisi Duan, and Xiaoyun Wang. Figstep: Jailbreaking large vision-language models via typographic visual prompts. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.05608*, 2023.

[27] Yunhao Gou, Kai Chen, Zhili Liu, Lanqing Hong, Hang Xu, Zhenguo Li, Dit-Yan Yeung, James T Kwok, and Yu Zhang. Eyes closed, safety on: Protecting multimodal llms via image-to-text transformation. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, pages 388–404. Springer, 2024.

[28] Yash Goyal, Tejas Khot, Douglas Summers-Stay, Dhruv Batra, and Devi Parikh. Making the v in vqa matter: Elevating the role of image understanding in visual question answering. In *Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)*, July 2017.

[29] Melody Y Guan, Manas Joglekar, Eric Wallace, Saachi Jain, Boaz Barak, Alec Helyar, Rachel Dias, Andrea Vallone, Hongyu Ren, Jason Wei, et al. Deliberative alignment: Reasoning enables safer language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.16339*, 2024.

[30] Daya Guo, Dejian Yang, Haowei Zhang, Junxiao Song, Ruoyu Zhang, Runxin Xu, Qihao Zhu, Shirong Ma, Peiyi Wang, Xiao Bi, et al. Deepseek-r1: Incentivizing reasoning capability in llms via reinforcement learning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.12948*, 2025.

[31] Danna Gurari, Qing Li, Abigale J. Stangl, Anhong Guo, Chi Lin, Kristen Grauman, Jiebo Luo, and Jeffrey P. Bigham. Vizwiz grand challenge: Answering visual questions from blind people. In *Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)*, pages 3608–3617, June 2018.

[32] Zhongkai Hao, Songming Liu, Yichi Zhang, Chengyang Ying, Yao Feng, Hang Su, and Jun Zhu. Physics-informed machine learning: A survey on problems, methods and applications. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.08064*, 2022.

[33] Md Zarif Hossain and Ahmed Imteaj. Sim-clip: Unsupervised siamese adversarial fine-tuning for robust and semantically-rich vision-language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.14971*, 2024.

[34] Jiaming Ji, Mickel Liu, Josef Dai, Xuehai Pan, Chi Zhang, Ce Bian, Boyuan Chen, Ruiyang Sun, Yizhou Wang, and Yaodong Yang. Beavertails: Towards improved safety alignment of llm via a human-preference dataset. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36, 2024.

[35] Albert Q Jiang, Alexandre Sablayrolles, Arthur Mensch, Chris Bamford, Devendra Singh Chaplot, Diego de las Casas, Florian Bressand, Gianna Lengyel, Guillaume Lample, Lucile Saulnier, et al. Mistral 7b. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.06825*, 2023.

[36] Michael I Jordan and Tom M Mitchell. Machine learning: Trends, perspectives, and prospects. *Science*, 349(6245):255–260, 2015.

[37] Sicong Leng, Hang Zhang, Guanzheng Chen, Xin Li, Shijian Lu, Chunyan Miao, and Lidong Bing. Mitigating object hallucinations in large vision-language models through visual contrastive decoding. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pages 13872–13882, 2024.

[38] Bohao Li, Rui Wang, Guangzhi Wang, Yuying Ge, Yixiao Ge, and Ying Shan. Seed-bench: Benchmarking multimodal llms with generative comprehension. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.16125*, 2023.

[39] Mukai Li, Lei Li, Yuwei Yin, Masood Ahmed, Zhenguang Liu, and Qi Liu. Red teaming visual language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.12915*, 2024.

[40] Yifan Li, Yifan Du, Kun Zhou, Jinpeng Wang, Wayne Xin Zhao, and Ji-Rong Wen. Evaluating object hallucination in large vision-language models. In *Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP)*, pages 292–305, 2023.

[41] Hongzhan Lin, Ziyang Luo, Bo Wang, Ruichao Yang, and Jing Ma. Goat-bench: Safety insights to large multimodal models through meme-based social abuse. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.01523*, 2024.

[42] Stephanie Lin, Jacob Hilton, and Owain Evans. Truthfulqa: Measuring how models mimic human falsehoods. In *Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 3214–3252, 2022.

[43] Tsung-Yi Lin, Michael Maire, Serge Belongie, James Hays, Pietro Perona, Deva Ramanan, Piotr Dollár, and C Lawrence Zitnick. Microsoft coco: Common objects in context. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, pages 740–755. Springer, 2014.

[44] Fuxiao Liu, Tianrui Guan, Zongxia Li, Lichang Chen, Yaser Yacoob, Dinesh Manocha, and Tianyi Zhou. Hallusionbench: You see what you think? or you think what you see? an image-context reasoning benchmark challenging for gpt-4v (ision), llava-1.5, and other multimodality models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.14566*, 2023.

[45] Haotian Liu, Chunyuan Li, Yuheng Li, Bo Li, Yuanhan Zhang, Sheng Shen, and Yong Jae Lee. Llava-next: Improved reasoning, ocr, and world knowledge (january 2024). *URL https://llava-vl. github. io/blog/2024-01-30-llava-next*, 2024.

[46] Haotian Liu, Chunyuan Li, Qingyang Wu, and Yong Jae Lee. Visual instruction tuning. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pages 34892–34916, 2023.

[47] Xin Liu, Yichen Zhu, Yunshi Lan, Chao Yang, and Yu Qiao. Query-relevant images jailbreak large multi-modal models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.17600*, 2023.

[48] Xin Liu, Yichen Zhu, Yunshi Lan, Chao Yang, and Yu Qiao. Safety of multimodal large language models on images and text. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.00357*, 2024.

[49] Yang Liu, Yuanshun Yao, Jean-Francois Ton, Xiaoying Zhang, Ruocheng Guo Hao Cheng, Yegor Klochkov, Muhammad Faaiz Taufiq, and Hang Li. Trustworthy llms: a survey and guideline for evaluating large language models' alignment. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.05374*, 2023.

[50] Yuan Liu, Haodong Duan, Yuanhan Zhang, Bo Li, Songyang Zhang, Wangbo Zhao, Yike Yuan, Jiaqi Wang, Conghui He, Ziwei Liu, et al. Mmbench: Is your multi-modal model an all-around player? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.06281*, 2023.

[51] Weidi Luo, Tianyu Lu, Qiming Zhang, Xiaogeng Liu, Bin Hu, Yue Zhao, Jieyu Zhao, Song Gao, Patrick McDaniel, Zhen Xiang, et al.

Doxing via the lens: Revealing location-related privacy leakage on multi-modal large reasoning models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.19373*, 2025.

[52] Weidi Luo, Siyuan Ma, Xiaogeng Liu, Xiaoyu Guo, and Chaowei Xiao. Jailbreakv-28k: A benchmark for assessing the robustness of multimodal large language models against jailbreak attacks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.03027*, 2024.

[53] Niloofar Mireshghallah, Hyunwoo Kim, Xuhui Zhou, Yulia Tsvetkov, Maarten Sap, Reza Shokri, and Yejin Choi. Can llms keep a secret? testing privacy implications of language models via contextual integrity theory. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.17884*, 2023.

[54] Moin Nadeem, Anna Bethke, and Siva Reddy. StereoSet: Measuring stereotypical bias in pretrained language models. In *Proceedings of the 59th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics and the 11th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 5356–5371, 2021.

[55] Milad Nasr, Nicholas Carlini, Jonathan Hayase, Matthew Jagielski, A Feder Cooper, Daphne Ippolito, Christopher A Choquette-Choo, Eric Wallace, Florian Tramèr, and Katherine Lee. Scalable extraction of training data from (production) language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.17035*, 2023.

[56] Weili Nie, Brandon Guo, Yujia Huang, Chaowei Xiao, Arash Vahdat, and Animashree Anandkumar. Diffusion models for adversarial purification. In *Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning*, volume 162, pages 16805–16827. PMLR, July 2022.

[57] OpenAI. Gpt-4v(ision) system card. *https://cdn.openai.com/papers/GPTV_System_Card.pdf*, 2023.

[58] Tribhuvanesh Orekondy, Bernt Schiele, and Mario Fritz. Towards a visual privacy advisor: Understanding and predicting privacy risks in images. In *Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV)*, October 2017.

[59] Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, John Schulman, Jacob Hilton, Fraser Kelton, Luke Miller, Maddie Simens, Amanda Askell, Peter Welinder, Paul F Christiano, Jan Leike, and Ryan Lowe. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 35, pages 27730–27744, 2022.

[60] Xiangyu Qi, Kaixuan Huang, Ashwinee Panda, Peter Henderson, Mengdi Wang, and Prateek Mittal. Visual adversarial examples jailbreak aligned large language models. In *Proceedings of the AAAI conference on artificial intelligence*, volume 38, pages 21527–21536, 2024.

[61] Xiangyu Qi, Ashwinee Panda, Kaifeng Lyu, Xiao Ma, Subhrajit Roy, Ahmad Beirami, Prateek Mittal, and Peter Henderson. Safety alignment should be made more than just a few tokens deep. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.05946*, 2024.

[62] Rafael Rafailov, Archit Sharma, Eric Mitchell, Christopher D Manning, Stefano Ermon, and Chelsea Finn. Direct preference optimization: Your language model is secretly a reward model. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pages 53728–53741, 2023.

[63] Robin Rombach, Andreas Blattmann, Dominik Lorenz, Patrick Esser, and Björn Ommer. High-resolution image synthesis with latent diffusion models. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)*, pages 10684–10695, June 2022.

[64] Christian Schlarmann, Naman Deep Singh, Francesco Croce, and Matthias Hein. Robust clip: Unsupervised adversarial fine-tuning of vision embeddings for robust large vision-language models. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pages 43685–43704. PMLR, 2024.

[65] Philip Sedgwick. Pearson's correlation coefficient. *Bmj*, 345, 2012.

[66] Douglas Sloane and S Philip Morgan. An introduction to categorical data analysis. *Annual review of sociology*, 22(1):351–375, 1996.

[67] Hao Sun, Zhexin Zhang, Jiawen Deng, Jiale Cheng, and Minlie Huang. Safety assessment of chinese large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.10436*, 2023.

[68] Lichao Sun, Yue Huang, Haoran Wang, Siyuan Wu, Qihui Zhang, Chujie Gao, Yixin Huang, Wenhan Lyu, Yixuan Zhang, Xiner Li, et al. Trustllm: Trustworthiness in large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.05561*, 2024.

[69] Gemini Team, Rohan Anil, Sebastian Borgeaud, Yonghui Wu, Jean-Baptiste Alayrac, Jiahui Yu, Radu Soricut, Johan Schalkwyk, Andrew M Dai, Anja Hauth, et al. Gemini: a family of highly capable multimodal models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.11805*, 2023.

[70] InternLM Team. Internlm: A multilingual language model with progressively enhanced capabilities, 2023.

[71] Megh Thakkar, Quentin Fournier, Matthew Riemer, Pin-Yu Chen, Amal Zouaq, Payel Das, and Sarath Chandar. A deep dive into the trade-offs of parameter-efficient preference alignment techniques. In *Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 5732–5745, 2024.

[72] Peter Tong, Ellis Brown, Penghao Wu, Sanghyun Woo, Adithya Jairam Vedagiri IYER, Sai Charitha Akula, Shusheng Yang, Jihan Yang, Manoj Middepogu, Ziteng Wang, et al. Cambrian-1: A fully open, vision-centric exploration of multimodal llms. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 37, pages 87310–87356, 2024.

[73] Shengbang Tong, Zhuang Liu, Yuexiang Zhai, Yi Ma, Yann LeCun, and Saining Xie. Eyes wide shut? exploring the visual shortcomings of multimodal llms, 2024.

[74] Hugo Touvron, Thibaut Lavril, Gautier Izacard, Xavier Martinet, Marie-Anne Lachaux, Timothée Lacroix, Baptiste Rozière, Naman Goyal, Eric Hambro, Faisal Azhar, et al. Llama: Open and efficient foundation language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.13971*, 2023.

[75] Hugo Touvron, Louis Martin, Kevin Stone, Peter Albert, Amjad Almahairi, Yasmine Babaei, Nikolay Bashlykov, Soumya Batra, Prajjwal Bhargava, Shruti Bhosale, et al. Llama 2: Open foundation and fine-tuned chat models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09288*, 2023.

[76] Haoqin Tu, Chenhang Cui, Zijun Wang, Yiyang Zhou, Bingchen Zhao, Junlin Han, Wangchunshu Zhou, Huaxiu Yao, and Cihang Xie. How many unicorns are in this image? a safety evaluation benchmark for vision llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.16101*, 2023.

[77] Boxin Wang, Weixin Chen, Hengzhi Pei, Chulin Xie, Mintong Kang, Chenhui Zhang, Chejian Xu, Zidi Xiong, Ritik Dutta, Rylan Schaeffer, Sang Truong, Simran Arora, Mantas Mazeika, Dan Hendrycks, Zinan Lin, Yu Cheng, Sanmi Koyejo, Dawn Song, and Bo Li. Decodingtrust: A comprehensive assessment of trustworthiness in gpt models. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pages 31232–31339, 2023.

[78] Boxin Wang, Chejian Xu, Shuohang Wang, Shuohang Wang, Zhe Gan, Yu Cheng, Jianfeng Gao, Ahmed Awadallah, and Bo Li. Adversarial glue: A multi-task benchmark for robustness evaluation of language models. In *Proceedings of the Neural Information Processing Systems Track on Datasets and Benchmarks*, volume 1, 2021.

[79] Weihan Wang, Qingsong Lv, Wenmeng Yu, Wenyi Hong, Ji Qi, Yan Wang, Junhui Ji, Zhuoyi Yang, Lei Zhao, Xixuan Song, et al. Cogvlm: Visual expert for pretrained language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.03079*, 2023.

[80] Xinpeng Wang, Xiaoyuan Yi, Han Jiang, Shanlin Zhou, Zhihua Wei, and Xing Xie. Tovilag: Your visual-language generative model is also an evildoer. In *Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP)*, pages 3508–3533, 2023.

[81] Yiqi Wang, Wentao Chen, Xiaotian Han, Xudong Lin, Haiteng Zhao, Yongfei Liu, Bohan Zhai, Jianbo Yuan, Quanzeng You, and Hongxia Yang. Exploring the reasoning abilities of multimodal large language models (mllms): A comprehensive survey on emerging trends in multimodal reasoning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.06805*, 2024.

[82] Yuxia Wang, Haonan Li, Xudong Han, Preslav Nakov, and Timothy Baldwin. Do-not-answer: A dataset for evaluating safeguards in llms. arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.13387, 2023.

[83] Jinge Wu, Yunsoo Kim, and Honghan Wu. Hallucination benchmark in medical visual question answering. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.05827*, 2024.

[84] Qinghao Ye, Haiyang Xu, Jiabo Ye, Ming Yan, Haowei Liu, Qi Qian, Ji Zhang, Fei Huang, and Jingren Zhou. mplug-owl2: Revolutionizing multi-modal large language model with modality collaboration. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.04257*, 2023.

[85] Peter Young, Alice Lai, Micah Hodosh, and Julia Hockenmaier. From image descriptions to visual denotations: New similarity metrics for semantic inference over event descriptions. *Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, 2:67–78, 2014.

[86] Tianyu Yu, Yuan Yao, Haoye Zhang, Taiwen He, Yifeng Han, Ganqu Cui, Jinyi Hu, Zhiyuan Liu, Hai-Tao Zheng, Maosong Sun, et al. Rlhf-v: Towards trustworthy mllms via behavior alignment from fine-grained correctional human feedback. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pages 13807–13816, 2024.

[87] Tianyu Yu, Haoye Zhang, Qiming Li, Qixin Xu, Yuan Yao, Da Chen, Xiaoman Lu, Ganqu Cui, Yunkai Dang, Taiwen He, et al. Rlaif-v: Open-source ai feedback leads to super gpt-4v trustworthiness. In *Pro-ceedings of the Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Conference*, pages 19985–19995, 2025.

[88] Xiang Yue, Yuansheng Ni, Kai Zhang, Tianyu Zheng, Ruoqi Liu, Ge Zhang, Samuel Stevens, Dongfu Jiang, Weiming Ren, Yuxuan Sun, et al. Mmmu: A massive multi-discipline multimodal understanding and reasoning benchmark for expert agi. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.16502*, 2023.

[89] Hongyang Zhang, Yaodong Yu, Jiantao Jiao, Eric Xing, Laurent El Ghaoui, and Michael Jordan. Theoretically principled trade-off between robustness and accuracy. In *International conference on machine learning*, pages 7472–7482. PMLR, 2019.

[90] Siyuan Zhang, Yichi Zhang, Yinpeng Dong, and Hang Su. Exploring the generalizability of factual hallucination mitigation via enhancing precise knowledge utilization. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.19127*, 2025.

[91] Yichi Zhang, Yinpeng Dong, Siyuan Zhang, Tianzan Min, Hang Su, and Jun Zhu. Exploring the transferability of visual prompting for multimodal large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.11207*, 2024.

[92] Yichi Zhang, Yao Huang, Yitong Sun, Chang Liu, Zhe Zhao, Zhengwei Fang, Yifan Wang, Huanran Chen, Xiao Yang, Xingxing Wei, Hang Su, Yinpeng Dong, and Jun Zhu. Multitrust: A comprehensive benchmark towards trustworthy multimodal large language models. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 37, pages 49279–49383, 2024.

[93] Yichi Zhang, Zihao Zeng, Dongbai Li, Yao Huang, Zhijie Deng, and Yinpeng Dong. Realsafe-r1: Safety-aligned deepseek-r1 without compromising reasoning capability. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.10081*, 2025.

[94] Yichi Zhang, Siyuan Zhang, Yao Huang, Zeyu Xia, Zhengwei Fang, Xiao Yang, Ranjie Duan, Dong Yan, Yinpeng Dong, and Jun Zhu. Stair: Improving safety alignment with introspective reasoning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.02384*, 2025.

[95] Yichi Zhang, Zijian Zhu, Hang Su, Jun Zhu, Shibao Zheng, Yuan He, and Hui Xue. To make yourself invisible with adversarial semantic contours. *Computer Vision and Image Understanding*, 230:103659, 2023.

[96] Yongting Zhang, Lu Chen, Guodong Zheng, Yifeng Gao, Rui Zheng, Jinlan Fu, Zhenfei Yin, Senjie Jin, Yu Qiao, Xuanjing Huang, et al. Spa-vl: A comprehensive safety preference alignment dataset for vision language models. In *Proceedings of the Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Conference*, pages 19867–19878, 2025.

[97] Yunqing Zhao, Tianyu Pang, Chao Du, Xiao Yang, Chongxuan LI, Ngai-Man (Man) Cheung, and Min Lin. On evaluating adversarial robustness of large vision-language models. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pages 54111–54138, 2023.

[98] Dawei Zhou, Tongliang Liu, Bo Han, Nannan Wang, Chunlei Peng, and Xinbo Gao. Towards defending against adversarial examples via attack-invariant features. In *International conference on machine learning*, pages 12835–12845. PMLR, 2021.

[99] Dawei Zhou, Nannan Wang, Bo Han, Tongliang Liu, and Xinbo Gao. Defending against adversarial examples via modeling adversarial noise. *International Journal of Computer Vision*, pages 1–18, 2025.

[100] Dawei Zhou, Nannan Wang, Tongliang Liu, and Xinbo Gao. Improving adversarial training from the perspective of class-flipping distribution. *IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence*, 2025.

[101] Deyao Zhu, Jun Chen, Xiaoqian Shen, Xiang Li, and Mohamed Elhoseiny. MiniGPT-4: Enhancing vision-language understanding with advanced large language models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024.

[102] Yongshuo Zong, Ondrej Bohdal, Tingyang Yu, Yongxin Yang, and Timothy Hospedales. Safety fine-tuning at (almost) no cost: A baseline for vision large language models. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pages 62867–62891. PMLR, 2024.

[103] Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, J Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043*, 2023.