

# **Network Incident Report**

Telephone: 202-406-5850 FAX: 202-406-9233 e-mail: ecb@secretservice.gov		
Subject: ☐ Site under attack ☐ Incident investigation in progress ☐ Incident closed		
What assistance do you require:  ☐ Immediate call ☐ None needed at this time ☐ Follow-up on all affected sites ☐ Contact the "hacking" site(s)		
Site involved (name & acronym):		
POC for incident:  • Name / Title		
Alternate POC for incident:  • Name / Title  • Organization  • E-mail • 7 x 24 contact information		
Type of Incident:  ✓ Malicious code: virus, Trojan horse, worm  ☐ Probes/scans (non-malicious data gatheringrecurring, massive, unusual)  ☐ Attack (successful/unsuccessful intrusions including scanning with attack packets)  ☐ Denial-of-service event  ☐ High embarrassment factor  ☐ Deemed significant by site		
Date and time incident occurred (specify time zone): 1:57 PM PST 8/15/22		
A summary of what happened:  Pegasus spyware installed on iPhone 12 and has likely been active for some time now		
Type of service, information, or project compromised (please provide specifics):  Sensitive unclassified such as privacy, proprietary, or source selection  Personal information information - Calls, SMSs, audio and video feeds from phone  Other unclassified  Other unclassified		
Damage done:  • Numbers of systems affected 1  • Nature of loss, if any  • System downtime  • Cost of incident:   unknown □ none □ <\$10K □ \$10K - \$50K □ >\$50K		
Name other sites contacted Law Enforcement Philadelphia Police Department Other:		

### **Details for Malicious Code** Apparent source: ☐ Diskette, CD, etc. ☐ E-mail attachment Software download Primary system or network involved: IP addresses or sub-net addresses OS version(s) iOS 14.6 NOS version(s) Other Other affected systems or networks (IPs and OSs): Type of malicious code (include name if known): ☐ Virus Trojan horse Pegasus Spyware for iOS ☐ Worm Joke program Other ☐ Copy sent to Amnesty International Tech Citizens Lab (University of Toronto) Method of Operation (for new malicious code): Details: ☐ Type: macro, boot, memory resident, "bh" payload process remotely ran, polymorphic, self encrypting, stealth after which spyware obtained root Payload permissions on the iPhone and Software infected disabled Apple crash reporting ☐ Files erased, modified, deleted, encrypted software as well as installed its own (any special significance to these files) surveillance software ☐ Self propagating via e-mail □ Detectable changes Other features How detected: Ran Mobile Verification Toolkit (Amnesty International) and checked against Pegasus IOC's Remediation (what was done to return Details: the system(s) to trusted operation): After backing up data victim wanted ☐ Anti-virus product gotten, updated, or installed externally, reflashed iOS 14.6 to for automatic operation

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Additional comments:

□ New policy instituted on attachments□ Firewall or routers or e-mail servers updated

to detect and scan attachments

**iPhone** 

## **Details for Probes and Scans** Apparent source: IP address \_\_\_ Host name Location of attacking host: □ Domestic ☐ Foreign ☐ Insider Primary system(s) / network(s) involved: IP addresses or sub-net addresses \_\_\_\_\_\_ OS version(s) NOS version(s) Other affected systems or networks (IPs and OSs): Method of Operation: Details: ☐ Ports probed/scanned ☐ Order of ports or IP addresses scanned ☐ Probing tool ☐ Anything that makes this probe unique How detected: Details: ☐ Another site ☐ Incident response team □ Log files □ Packet sniffer ☐ Intrusion detection system ☐ Anomalous behavior ☐ User Log file excerpts: Additional comments:

### **Details for Unauthorized Access**

Details for Official for Ized Access		
Apparent source: • IP address 217.70.184.38		
• Host name urlpush[.]net		
• Location of attacking host: France		
Domestic	<del></del>	
✓ Foreign		
☐ Insider		
Primary system(s) involved:  • IP addresses or sub-net addresses		
• OS version(s) iOS 14.6		
• NOS version(s)		
Other affected systems or networks (IPs and O	5s):	
Avenue of attack:	Details:	
☐ Sniffed/guessed/cracked password	Used network injection to redirect user	
☐ Trusted host access	to malicious website, then used zero-	
Vulnerability exploited	click zero-day vulnerabilities to install a	
Hacker tool used	toolkit that gets root access and installs	
☐ Utility or port targeted	3	
☐ Social engineering	the surveillance payloads	
Level of access gained-root/administrator, user		
Root permissions are obtained by the 'bh' process		
Troot permissions are obtained by the bir	p100033	
Method of operation of the attack	Details:	
(more detailed description of what was done):	Pegasus spyware was used to	
☐ Port(s) or protocol(s) attacked	perform this attack. Within Pegasus	
Attack tool(s) used, if known	is a toolkit likely named BridgeHead	
Installed hacker tools such as rootkit,	which runs as the process bh. This	
sniffers, 10phtcrack, zap	toolkit gains root access, disables	
Site(s) hacker used to download tools	apple crash reporting, and installs	
Where hacker tools were installed	additional spyware onto the iPhone	
<ul><li>Established a service such as IRC</li></ul>	additional spyware onto the it none	
Looked around at who is logged on	VA/abaita baalaan nadina ata dariatina ta	
Trojanned, listed, examined, deleted,	Website hacker redirected victim to	
modified, created, or copied files	in order to run exploit:	
✓ Left a backdoor	https://gnyjv1xltx.info8fvhgl3.urlpush	
☐ Names of accounts created and	[.]net:30875/zrnv5revj	
passwords used  Left unusual or unauthorized processes	<u>-</u>	
running	Pegasus spyware examined almost	
☐ Launched attacks on other systems or sites	all communications on the victims	
☐ Other	iPhone, and left backdoors for future	
	access.	

Details for Unauthorized Access (continued)		
How detected:  ☐ Another site ☐ Incident response team ☑ Log files ☐ Packet sniffer/intrusion detection software ☐ Intrusion detection software ☐ Anomalous behavior ☐ User ☐ Alarm tripped ☐ TCP Wrappers ☐ TRIPWIRED ☑ Other	Details: The Mobile Verification Toolkit, especially made to detect Spyware like Pegasus, read analysis of records from iOS backups and filesystem dumps and logs and found Pegasus spyware IOCs on victims iPhone	
Log file excerpts:  The malicious website containing the exploit used to deploy Pegasus spyware, urlpush[.]net, was found in the Twitter app's WebKit local storage, as well as IndexedDB folders on the iPhone.  This suggests that the victim opened the Twitter app and viewed a link within the Twitter app that opened up a local Safari page, which was redirected using network injection with a rouge cell tower or dedicated wireless equipment		
Remediation (what was done to return the system(s) to trusted operation):  Patches applied Scanners run Security software installed: Unneeded services and applications removed OS reloaded Restored from backup Application moved to another system Memory or disk space increased Moved behind a filtering router or firewall Hidden files detected and removed Trojan software detected and removed Left unchanged to monitor hacker	Details:  Because Pegasus likely doesn't run with full persistence anymore, reflashing the iOS on the iPhone should remove all traces of Pegasus spyware.  Victim was notified of network injection attacks and how to best avoid them when being personally targeted	
Additional comments:  Leaving the device unchanged to monitor the hacker was discussed, however Pegasus prevents other applications from jailbreaking the iPhone which could have been an ideal way to monitor the hacker. Additionally, the victim's "handler" using the Pegasus spyware may notice the lack of legitimate business communications from the victims phone and become suspicious		

## **Details for Denial-of-Service Incident** Apparent source: • IP address · Location of host: □ Domestic ☐ Foreign ☐ Insider Primary system(s) involved: IP addresses or sub-net address • OS version(s) NOS version(s) \_\_\_\_\_\_ Other affected systems or networks (IPs and OSs): Method of Operation: Details: ☐ Tool used ☐ Packet flood ☐ Malicious packet ☐ IP Spoofing ☐ Ports attacked ☐ Anything that makes this event unique Remediation Details: (what was done to protect the system(s)): ☐ Application moved to another system ☐ Memory or disk space increased ☐ Shadow server installed ☐ Moved behind a filtering router or firewall ☐ Other Log file excerpts: Additional comments: