

Risks from learned optimization in advanced machine learning systems

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We analyze the type of learned optimization that occurs when a learned model (such as a neural network) is itself an optimizer—a situation we refer to as mesa-optimization. We believe that the possibility of mesa-optimization raises two important questions for the safety and transparency of advanced machine learning systems. First, under what circumstances will learned models be optimizers? Second, when a learned model is an optimizer, what will its objective be, and how can it be aligned? In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of these two primary questions and provide an overview of topics for future research.

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1. INTRODUCTION

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