Verifying Semantic Conflict-Freedom in Three-Way Program Merges

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Abstract

Even though many programmers rely on 3-way merge tools to integrate changes from different branches, such tools can introduce subtle bugs in the integration process. This paper aims to mitigate this problem by defining a semantic notion of *conflict-freedom*, which ensures that the merged program does not introduce new unwanted behaviors. We also show how to verify this property using a novel, compositional algorithm that combines lightweight dependence analysis for shared program fragments and precise relational reasoning for the modifications. We evaluate our tool called SAFEMERGE on 52 real-world merge scenarios obtained from Github and compare the results against a textual merge tool. The experimental results demonstrate the benefits of our approach over syntactic conflict-freedom and indicate that SAFEMERGE is both precise and practical.

1 Introduction

Developers who edit different branches of a source code repository rely on 3-way merge tools (like git-merge or kdiff3) to automatically merge their changes. Since the vast majority of these tools are oblivious to program semantics and resolve conflicts using syntactic criteria, they may introduce bugs in the merge process. For example, many people speculate that Apple's infamous goto fail SSL bug was introduced due to an erroneous program merge [15, 28, 38].

To see how bugs may be introduced in the merge process, consider the simple *base program* shown in Figure 1 together with its two *variants* A and B. Here, both A and B modify the original program by incrementing variable x by 1. For instance, such a situation may arise in practice when two independent developers simultaneously fix the same bug in different locations of the original program. Since both variants effectively make the same change, the correct merge should be either A or B. However, running a 3-way merge tool (in this case, kdiff3) on these programs succeeds without any warnings and generates the incorrect merge shown on the right hand side of Figure 1. Since this program is clearly




Figure 1. Simple motivating example


different than what either developer intended, we see that a bug was introduced during the merge.

This paper takes a step towards eliminating bugs that arise due to 3-way program merges by automatically verifying semantic conflict-freedom, a notion inspired by earlier work on program integration [25, 43]. To motivate what we mean by semantic conflict-freedom, consider a base program P, two variants A, B, and a merge candidate M. Intuitively, semantic conflict freedom requires that, if variant A (resp. B) disagrees with P on the value of some program variable v, then the merge candidate M should agree with A (resp. B) on the value of v. In addition to ensuring that the merge candidate does not introduce new behavior that is not present in either of the variants, conflict freedom also ensures that variants A and B do not make changes that are semantically incompatible with each other.

The main contribution of this paper is a novel compositional verification algorithm, and its implementation in a tool called SafeMerge, for automatically proving semantic conflict-freedom. Our method is compositional in that it analyzes different modifications to the program in isolation and composes them to obtain an overall proof of semantic conflict-freedom. A key idea that allows compositionality is to model different versions of the program using edits applied to a shared program with holes. Specifically, the shared program captures common statements between the program versions, and holes represent discrepancies between them. The edits describe how to fill each hole in the shared program to obtain the corresponding statement in a variant. Given such a representation that is automatically generated by SAFE-Merge, our verification algorithm uses lightweight analysis to reason about shared program fragments but resorts to precise relational techniques to reason about modifications.

The overall workflow of our approach is illustrated schematically in Figure 2. Our method takes as input four related programs, namely the original program P, two variants A and B, and a merge candidate M, and represents them as edits

 $^{^1\}mathrm{The}$ example is inspired by the Apple SSL bug that resulted from duplicate goto statements.



applied to a shared program by running a "4-way diff" algorithm on the abstract syntax trees. The verifier leverages the result of the 4-way diff algorithm to identify which parts of the program to analyze more precisely. Specifically, our verification algorithm summarizes shared program fragments using uninterpreted functions of the form $x = f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ that encode dependencies between program variables. In contrast, the verifier reasons about edited program fragments in a more fine-grained way by constructing 4-way *product programs* that encode the simultaneous behavior of all four edits. Overall, this interplay between lightweight dependence analysis and product construction allows our technique to generate verification conditions whose complexity depends on the size and number of the edits.

To evaluate our technique, we collect over 50 real-world merge scenarios obtained by crawling Github commit histories and evaluate SafeMerge on these benchmarks. Our tool is able to verify the correctness of the merge candidate in 75% of the benchmarks and identifies eleven real violations of semantic conflict-freedom, some of which are not detected by textual merge tools. Our evaluation also demonstrates the scalability of our method and illustrates the advantages of performing compositional reasoning.

In all, this paper makes the following key contributions:

- We introduce the merge verification problem based on the notion of semantic conflict-freedom.
- We provide a compositional verification algorithm that combines precise relational reasoning about the edits with lightweight reasoning for unedited program fragments.
- We present a novel *n*-way product construction technique for precise relational verification.
- We describe an *n*-way AST diff algorithm and use it to represent program versions as edits applied to a shared program with holes.
- We implement our method in a tool called SAFEMERGE and evaluate our approach on real-world merge scenarios collected from Github repositories.

2 Overview

In this section, we give an overview of our approach with the aid of a merge example from the RxJava project 2 . Figure 3 shows the Base version (O) of the triggerActions method from the TestScheduler.java file. The two variants \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} and the merge \mathcal{M} perform the following modifications:

```
int time; int value;
void triggerActions(long targetTimeInNanos) {
    while(!queue.isEmpty()){
        TimedAction current = queue.peek();
        if(current.time > targetTimeInNanos){
            time = targetTimeInNanos;
            break;
        }
        time = current.time;
        queue.remove();
        current.action.call(current.scheduler, current.state);
}
```

Figure 3. Procedure from the base program in RxJava.

- Variant \mathcal{A} moves the statement time = targetTimeInNanos at line 6 to immediately after the while loop. This modification impacts the value of the variable time in \mathcal{A} with respect to the Base version.
- Variant \mathcal{B} guards the call current.action.call(...) at line 11 with a condition if(!current.isCancelled.get()) {...}. The call (at line 11) has a side effect on the variable called value (we omit the implementation of this procedure). This modification changes the effect on value with respect to the Base version.
- ullet The merge ${\cal M}$ incorporates both of these changes.

This example is interesting in that both variants modify code within a loop, and one of them (namely, \mathcal{B}) changes the control-flow by introducing a conditional. The loop in turn depends on the state of an unbounded collection queue, which is manipulated using methods such as queue.isEmpty and queue.remove. Furthermore, while triggerActions has no return value, it has implicit side-effects on variables time and value, and on the collection queue. Together, these features make it challenging to ensure that the merge $\mathcal M$ preserves changes from both variants and does not introduce any new behavior.

To verify semantic conflict-freedom, our techinque represents the changes formally using a list of *edits* over a shared program with *holes*. Figure 4 shows the shared program \hat{S} along with the corresponding edits Δ_O , $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$, $\Delta_{\mathcal{B}}$, $\Delta_{\mathcal{M}}$. A hole (denoted as <?HOLE?>) in \hat{S} is a placeholder for a statement. The shared program captures the statements that are common to all the four versions (O, \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{M}), and the holes in \hat{S} represent program fragments that differ between the program versions. An edit $\Delta_{\mathcal{P}}$ for program version \mathcal{P} represents a list of statements that will be substituted into the holes of the shared program to obtain \mathcal{P} .

Given this representation, we express *semantic conflict-freedom* as an assertion for each of the return variables (in this case, global variables modified by the triggerActions

²https://github.com/ReactiveX/RxJava/commit/1c47b0c.

Shared program with holes (S)void triggerActions(long targetTimeInNanos) { while (!queue.isEmpty()) { TimedAction current = queue.peek(); if (current.time > targetTimeInNanos) { <?HOLE?>: break: } time = current.time; queue.remove(); <?HOLE?>: } <?HOLE?>; Edit $O(\Delta_O)$ [time = targetTimeInNanos, current.action.call(...), skip] Edit $\mathcal{A}(\Delta_{\mathcal{A}})$ [skip, current.action.call(...), time = targetTimeInNanos] Edit $\mathcal{B}(\Delta_{\mathcal{B}})$ [time = targetTimeInNanos, if(!current.isCancelled.get()) { current.action.call(...);}, Edit $\mathcal{M}(\Delta_{\mathcal{M}})$ [skip, if(!current.isCancelled.get()) { current.action.call(...); }, program size, our technique generates mini-products by contime = targetTimeInNanos]

Figure 4. Shared program with holes and the edits.

method). Since the triggerActions method modifies time, value and queue, we add an assertion for each of these variables. For instance, we add the following assertion on the value of time at exit from the four versions:

```
(\mathsf{time}_{\mathcal{O}} = \mathsf{time}_{\mathcal{B}} = \mathsf{time}_{\mathcal{A}} = \mathsf{time}_{\mathcal{M}}) \vee
((\mathsf{time}_O \neq \mathsf{time}_{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow \mathsf{time}_{\mathcal{A}} = \mathsf{time}_{\mathcal{M}}) \land 
  (time_{\mathcal{O}} \neq time_{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow time_{\mathcal{B}} = time_{\mathcal{M}})
```

This assertion states that either (i) all four versions have identical side-effects on time, or (ii) if the side-effect on $time_{\mathcal{A}}$ (resp. $time_{\mathcal{B}}$) differs from $time_{\mathcal{O}}$, then $time_{\mathcal{M}}$ in the merge should have identical side-effect as time \mathcal{A} (resp. $time_{\mathcal{B}}$). We add similar assertions for value and queue.

To prove these assertions, our method assumes that all four versions start out in identical states and then generates a relational postcondition (RPC) ψ such that the merge is semantically conflict-free if ψ logically implies the added assertions. Our RPC generation engine reasons about modifications over the base program by differentiating between three kinds of statements:

Shared statements. We summarize the behavior of shared statements using straight-line code snippets of the form $y = f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ where f is an uninterpreted function. Essentially, such a statement indicates that the value of variable y is some (unknown) function of variables x_1, \ldots, x_n . These "summaries" are generated using lightweight dependence analysis and allow our method to perform abstract reasoning over unchanged program fragments.

```
\mathcal{P}_v
                                 := (\hat{S}, \Delta)
Program version
Edit
                           Δ
                                   := [] | \mathcal{S} :: \Delta
Stmt with hole
                                  := [\cdot] |A| \hat{S}_1; \hat{S}_2 | C? {\hat{S}_1} : {\hat{S}_2}
                                         while(C) {\hat{S}}
                           S
                                         A \mid S_1; S_2 \mid C ? \{S_1\} : \{S_2\}
Stmt
                                         while(C) \{S\}
Atom
                                         skip | x := e | x[e_1] := e_2
```

Figure 5. Representation of program versions. Here, :: denotes list concatanation, and *e* and *C* represent expressions and predicates respectively.

Holes. When our RPC generation engine encounters a hole in the shared program, it performs precise relational reasoning about different modifications by computing a 4-way product program of the edits. As is well-known in the relational verification literature [12, 13], a product program $P_1 \times P_2$ is semantically equivalent to P_1 ; P_2 but is constructed in a way that facilitates the verification task. However, because product construction can result in a significant blow-up in sidering each hole in isolation rather than constructing a full-fledged product of the four program versions.

Loops. Our RPC generation engine infers relational loop invariants for loops that contain edited program fragments. For instance, our method infers that (i) time_Q = time_B and $time_{\mathcal{A}} = time_{\mathcal{M}}$, (ii) $value_{\mathcal{O}} = value_{\mathcal{A}}$ and $value_{\mathcal{B}} =$ value M, and (iii) the state of collection queue is identical in all four versions for the shared loop from Figure 4.

Using these ideas, our method is able to automatically generate an RPC that implies semantic conflict-freedom of this example. Furthermore, the entire procedure is pushbutton, including the generation of edits, RPC computation, and relational loop invariant generation.

Representation of Program Versions

In this section, we describe our representation of program versions as edits applied to a shared program with holes. As shown in Figure 5, a program version \mathcal{P}_v is a pair $(\hat{\mathcal{S}}, \Delta)$ where \hat{S} is a statement with *holes* (i.e., missing statements) and an edit Δ is a list of statements (without holes). Given a program version $\mathcal{P}_{v} = (\hat{\mathcal{S}}, \Delta)$, we can obtain a full program $\mathcal{P} = \hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta]$ by applying the edit Δ to $\hat{\mathcal{S}}$ according to the ApplyEdit procedure of Figure 6. Effectively, ApplyEdit traverses the AST in depth-first order and replaces each hole with the next statement in the edit. Given *n* related programs $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$, we assume the existence of a *diff* procedure that generates a shared program \hat{S} as well as n edits $\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n$ such that $\forall i \in [1, n]$. ApplyEdit $(\hat{S}, \Delta_i) = \mathcal{P}_i$. Since this diff procedure is orthogonal to our verification algorithm, we defer the discussion of our *diff* procedure until Section 6.

Since the language from Figure 5 uses standard imperative language constructs (including arrays), we assume an operational semantics described using judgments of the form

```
ApplyEdit(\hat{S}, \Delta) = S where(S, []) = Apply(\hat{S}, \Delta)
Apply :: (\hat{S}, \Delta) \rightarrow (S, \Delta')
Apply([\cdot], S :: \Delta)
                                                           (\mathcal{S}, \Delta)
Apply(A, \Delta)
                                                           (A, \Delta)
                                                   = let (S_1, \Delta_1) = Apply(\hat{S}_1, \Delta) in
Apply(\hat{S}_1; \hat{S}_2, \Delta)
                                                            let (S_2, \Delta_2) = \text{Apply}(\hat{S}_2, \Delta_1) in
                                                            ((\mathcal{S}_1;\mathcal{S}_2),\Delta_2)
\mathsf{Apply}(C ? \{\hat{\mathcal{S}}_1\} : \{\hat{\mathcal{S}}_2\}, \Delta) = \mathsf{let}(\mathcal{S}_1, \Delta_1) = \mathsf{Apply}(\hat{\mathcal{S}}_1, \Delta) \mathsf{in}
                                                            let (S_2, \Delta_2) = \text{Apply}(\hat{S}_2, \Delta_1) in
                                                            (C ? \{S_1\} : \{S_2\}, \Delta_2)
Apply(while(C) {\hat{S}}, \Delta)
                                                    = let (S, \Delta') = Apply(\hat{S}, \Delta) in
                                                            (while(C) {S}, \Delta')
```

Figure 6. Application of edit Δ to program with holes \hat{S}

 $\sigma \vdash S \Downarrow \sigma'$, where σ is a *valuation* that specifies the values of free variables in S. Specifically, a valuation is a mapping from (variable, index) pairs to their corresponding values. The meaning of this judgment is that evaluating S under σ yields a new valuation σ' . In the rest of this paper, we also assume the existence of a special array called *out* that serves as the return value of the program. Any behavior that the programmer considers relevant (e.g., side effects or writing to the console) can be captured by storing the relevant values into this *out* array.

4 Semantic Conflict Freedom

In this section, we first introduce *syntactic* conflict-freedom, which corresponds to the criterion used by many existing merge tools. We then explain why it falls short and formally describe the more robust notion of *semantic* conflict-freedom.

Definition 4.1. (Syntactic conflict freedom) Suppose that we are given four program versions $O = (\hat{S}, \Delta_O)$, $\mathcal{A} = (\hat{S}, \Delta_{\mathcal{A}})$, $\mathcal{B} = (\hat{S}, \Delta_{\mathcal{B}})$, $\mathcal{M} = (\hat{S}, \Delta_{\mathcal{M}})$ representing the base program, the two variants, and the merge candidate respectively. We say that the merge candidate \mathcal{M} is *syntactically conflict free* if the following conditions are satisfied for all $i \in [0, n)$, where n denotes the number of holes in \hat{S} :

```
1. If \Delta_O[i] \neq \Delta_{\mathcal{R}}[i], then \Delta_{\mathcal{M}}[i] = \Delta_{\mathcal{R}}[i]
2. If \Delta_O[i] \neq \Delta_{\mathcal{B}}[i], then \Delta_{\mathcal{M}}[i] = \Delta_{\mathcal{B}}[i]
3. Otherwise, \Delta_O[i] = \Delta_{\mathcal{R}}[i] = \Delta_{\mathcal{B}}[i] = \Delta_{\mathcal{M}}[i]
```

Intuitively, the above definition states that the candidate merge \mathcal{M} makes the same syntactic change as variant \mathcal{A} (resp. \mathcal{B}) whenever \mathcal{A} (resp. \mathcal{B}) differs from \mathcal{O} . While this definition may seem intuitively sensible, it does not accurately capture what it means for a merge candidate to be correct. In particular, some incorrect merges may be conflict-free according to the above definition, while some correct merges may be rejected.

Example 4.2. Consider $\hat{S} = [\cdot]; [\cdot]; out[0] := x$ and the edits $\Delta_O = [\text{skip, skip}], \Delta_{\mathcal{A}} = [x := x + 1, \text{skip}], \Delta_{\mathcal{B}} = [\text{skip,} x := x + 1], \text{ and } \mathcal{M} = [x := x + 1; x := x + 1]. Observe that$

applying these edits to \hat{S} yields the same programs given in Figure 1. These programs are conflict-free according to the syntactic criterion given in Definition 4.1, but the merge is clearly incorrect (both variants increment x by 1, but the merge candidate ends up incrementing x by 2).

The above example illustrates that a syntactic notion of conflict freedom is not suitable for ruling out incorrect merges. Similarly, Definition 4.1 can also result in the rejection of perfectly valid merge candidates.

Example 4.3. Consider the base program x > 0? $\{y := 1\}$: $\{y := 0\}$; out[0] := y. Suppose this program has a bug that is caused by using the wrong predicate, so one variant fixes the bug by swapping the then and else branches, and the other variant changes the predicate from x > 0 to $x \le 0$. Clearly, choosing either variant as the merge would be acceptable because they are semantically equivalent. However, there is no merge candidate that can satisfy Definition 4.1 because the shared program is $[\cdot]$; out[0] := y and the two variants fill the hole in syntactically conflicting ways.

Based on the shortcomings of syntactic conflict freedom, we instead propose the following *semantic* variant:

Definition 4.4. (**Semantic conflict freedom**) Suppose that we are given four program versions O, \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} , \mathcal{M} representing the base program, its two variants, and the merge candidate respectively. We say that \mathcal{M} is *semantically conflict-free*, if for all valuations σ such that:

```
\sigma \vdash O \Downarrow \sigma_O \quad \sigma \vdash \mathcal{A} \Downarrow \sigma_{\mathcal{A}} \quad \sigma \vdash \mathcal{B} \Downarrow \sigma_{\mathcal{B}} \quad \sigma \vdash \mathcal{M} \Downarrow \sigma_{\mathcal{M}} the following conditions hold for all i: <sup>3</sup>
```

- 1. If $\sigma_O[(out, i)] \neq \sigma_{\mathcal{A}}[(out, i)]$, then $\sigma_M[(out, i)] = \sigma_{\mathcal{A}}[(out, i)]$
- 2. If $\sigma_O[(out, i)] \neq \sigma_B[(out, i)]$, then $\sigma_M[(out, i)] = \sigma_B[(out, i)]$
- 3. Otherwise, $\sigma_O[(out, i)] = \sigma_{\mathcal{A}}[(out, i)] = \sigma_{\mathcal{B}}[(out, i)] = \sigma_{\mathcal{M}}[(out, i)]$

In contrast to syntactic conflict freedom, Definition 4.4 requires agreement between the *values* that are returned by the program. Specifically, it says that, if the *i*'th value returned by variant *A* (resp. *B*) differs from the *i*'th value returned by base, then the *i*'th return value of the merge should agree with *A* (resp. *B*). According to this definition, the merge candidate from Example 4.2 is *not* conflict-free because it returns 2 whereas both variants return 1. Furthermore, for Example 4.3, we can find a merge candidate (e.g., one of the variants) that satisfies semantic conflict freedom.

5 Verifying Semantic Conflict Freedom

We now turn our attention to the verification algorithm for proving semantic conflict-freedom. The high-level structure of the verification algorithm is quite simple and is shown in Algorithm 1. It takes as input a shared program (with holes) \hat{S} , an edit Δ_1 for the base program, edits Δ_2 , Δ_3 for the variants, and an edit Δ_4 for the merge candidate. Conceptually, the algorithm consists of three steps:

³We assume that out[i] is a special value ⊥ if (out, i) ∉ dom(σ)

Algorithm 1 Algorithm for verifying conflict freedom

1: **procedure** Verify(
$$\hat{S}$$
, Δ_1 , Δ_2 , Δ_3 , Δ_4)

2: **assume** $vars(\{\hat{S}[\Delta_1], \dots, \hat{S}[\Delta_4]\}) = V$

3: $\varphi := (V_1 = V_2 \wedge V_1 = V_3 \wedge V_1 = V_4)$

4: $\psi := \text{RelationalPost}(\hat{S}, \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_3, \Delta_4, \varphi)$

5: $\chi_1 := \forall i. (out_1[i] \neq out_2[i] \Rightarrow out_2[i] = out_4[i])$

6: $\chi_2 := \forall i. (out_1[i] \neq out_3[i] \Rightarrow out_3[i] = out_4[i])$

7: $\chi_2 := \forall i. (out_1[i] = out_2[i] = out_3[i] = out_4[i])$

8: **return** $\psi \models (\chi_1 \wedge \chi_2) \vee \chi_3$

Precondition. Algorithm 1 starts by generating a pre-condition φ (line 3) stating that all variables initially have the same value. ⁴ Note that V_1 denotes the variables in the base program, V_2 , V_3 denote variables in the variants, and V_4 refers to variables in the merge candidate. We use the notation $V_i = V_j$ as short-hand for $\forall v \in V$. $v_i = v_j$.

RPC computation. The next step of the algorithm is to compute a relational post-condition ψ of φ with respect to the four program versions (line 4). Such a relational post-condition ψ states relationships between variables V_1, V_2, V_3 , and V_4 and has the property that it is also post-condition of the program $(\hat{S}[\Delta_1])[V_1/V]; \ldots; (\hat{S}[\Delta_4])[V_4/V]$. We will explain the RelationalPost procedure in detail shortly.

Checking conflict freedom. The last step of the algorithm checks whether the relational post-condition ψ logically implies semantic conflict freedom (line 8). Specifically, observe that the constraint $(\chi_1 \wedge \chi_2) \vee \chi_3$ encodes precisely the three conditions from Definition 4.4, so the program is conflict-free if ψ implies $(\chi_1 \wedge \chi_2) \vee \chi_3$.

5.1 Computing Relational Postconditions

Since the core part of the verification algorithm is the computation of RPCs, we now describe the RelationalPost procedure. As mentioned in Section 1, the key idea is to analyze edits in a precise way by constructing product programs, but perform lightweight reasoning for shared program parts using dependence analysis.

Our RPC generation engine is described in Figure 7 using judgments $\vec{\Delta}$, $\varphi \vdash \hat{S} : \varphi', \vec{\Delta'}$. Here, φ is a precondition relating variables in different program versions, and $\vec{\Delta}$ is a vector of n edits applied to a shared base program \hat{S} . The meaning of this judgment is that the following Hoare triple is valid:

$$\{\varphi\} \hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_1][V_1/V]; \dots; \hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_n][V_n/V] \{\varphi'\}$$

In other words, φ' is a sound relational post-condition of the four program versions with respect to precondition φ . Since the edits in $\vec{\Delta}$ may contain more statements than there

(1)
$$\frac{\mathcal{S} = \mathsf{head}(\Delta_1)[V_1/V] \circledast \ldots \circledast \mathsf{head}(\Delta_4)[V_4/V]}{\vec{\Delta}, \varphi \vdash [\cdot] : \mathit{post}(\mathcal{S}, \varphi), [\mathsf{tail}(\Delta_1), \ldots, \mathsf{tail}(\Delta_4)]}$$

(2)
$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Modifies}(\mathcal{S}) = \{y_1, \dots, y_n\} \\ & \vec{x_i} = \text{Dependencies}(\mathcal{S}, y_i) \\ & \mathcal{S}_i = (y_i := F_i(\vec{x_i}))[V_1/V]; \dots; (y_i := F_i(\vec{x_i}))[V_4/V] \\ & \vec{\Delta}, \varphi \vdash \mathcal{S} : post(\mathcal{S}_1; \dots; \mathcal{S}_n, \varphi), \vec{\Delta} \end{aligned}$$

(3)
$$\frac{\vec{\Delta}, \varphi \vdash \hat{\mathcal{S}}_1 : \varphi', \vec{\Delta}' \quad \vec{\Delta}', \varphi' \vdash \hat{\mathcal{S}}_2 : \varphi'', \vec{\Delta}''}{\vec{\Delta}, \varphi \vdash \hat{\mathcal{S}}_1 : \hat{\mathcal{S}}_2 : \varphi'', \vec{\Delta}''}$$

(4)
$$\begin{aligned}
\varphi &\models \bigwedge_{i,j} C[V_i/V] \leftrightarrow C[V_j/V] \\
\vec{\Delta}, \varphi &\land C[V_1/V] \vdash \hat{S}_1 : \varphi', \vec{\Delta}' \\
\vec{\Delta}', \varphi &\land \neg C[V_1/V] \vdash \hat{S}_2 : \varphi'', \vec{\Delta}'' \\
\vec{\lambda}, \varphi &\vdash C ? \{\hat{S}_1\} : \{\hat{S}_2\} : \varphi' \lor \varphi'', \vec{\Delta}''
\end{aligned}$$

(5)
$$\frac{\varphi \models I \quad \vec{\Delta}, I \land \bigwedge_{i} C[V_{i}/V] \vdash \hat{S} : I', \vec{\Delta}' \quad I' \models I}{I \models \bigwedge_{i,j} C[V_{i}/V] \leftrightarrow C[V_{j}/V]}$$
$$\vec{\Delta}, \varphi \vdash \text{while}(C) \quad \hat{S} : I \land \bigwedge_{i} \neg C[V_{i}/V], \vec{\Delta}'$$

$$(6) \qquad \frac{\mathcal{S} = (\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_1])[V_1/V] \circledast \dots \circledast (\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_4])[V_4/V]}{\Delta_i = (\Delta_i^1 :: \Delta_i^2) \ (|\Delta_i^1| = \mathsf{numHoles}(\hat{\mathcal{S}}))}{\vec{\Delta}, \varphi \vdash \hat{\mathcal{S}} : post(\mathcal{S}, \varphi), [\Delta_1^2, \dots, \Delta_4^2]}$$

Figure 7. RPC inference

are holes in \hat{S} , we use $\vec{\Delta}'$ to denote the remaining edits that were not "used" while analyzing \hat{S} .

Let us now consider the rules in Figure 7 in more detail. The first rule corresponds to the case where we encounter a hole in the shared program and need to analyze the edits. In this case, we construct a "mini" product program S that describes the simultaneous execution of the edits. As we will see in Section 5.2, an *n*-way product program $S_1 \circledast \ldots \circledast S_n$ is semantically equivalent to the sequential composition S_1, \ldots, S_n but has the advantage of being easier to analyze. Given such a "mini product" S, our RPC generation engine computes the post-condition of S in the standard way using a *post* function, where $post(S, \varphi)$ yields a sound postcondition of φ with respect to S. Since S may contain loops in the general case, the computation of post may require loop invariant generation. As we discuss in Section 5.2, the key advantage of constructing a product program is to facilitate loop invariant generation using standard techniques.

Rule (2) corresponds to the case where we encounter a program fragment S without holes. Since S has not been modified by any of the variants, we analyze S in a lightweight way using dependence analysis. Specifically, for each variable y_i that is modified by S, we compute the set of variables x_1, \ldots, x_k that it depends on. We then "summarize" the behavior of S using statements of the form $y_i = F_i(x_1, \ldots, x_k)$ where F_i is a fresh uninterpreted function symbol. Hence, rather than analyzing the entire code fragment S (which

⁴Observe that this precondition also applies to local variables, not just arguments, and allows our technique to handle cases in which one of the variants introduces a new variable.

could potentially be very large), we analyze its behavior in a lightweight way by modeling it as straight-line code over uninterpreted functions. ⁵

Rule (3) for sequencing is similar to its corresponding proof rule in standard Hoare logic: Given a statement \hat{S}_1 ; \hat{S}_2 , we first compute the relational post-condition φ' of \hat{S}_1 and then use φ' as the precondition for \hat{S}_2 . Since \hat{S}_1 and \hat{S}_2 may contain edits nested inside them, this proof rule combines reasoning about \hat{S}_1 and \hat{S}_2 in a precise, yet lightweight way, without constructing a 4-way product for the entire program.

Rule (4) allows us to analyze conditionals C? $\{\hat{S}_1\}$: $\{\hat{S}_2\}$ in a modular way whenever possible. As in the sequencing case, we would like to analyze \hat{S}_1 and \hat{S}_2 in isolation and then combine the results. Unfortunately, such compositional reasoning is only possible if all program versions take the same path. For instance, consider the shared program $[\cdot]$; x > 0? $\{y := 1\}$: $\{y := 2\}$ and two versions A, B given by the edits [x := y] and [x := z]. Since A could take the then branch while B takes the else branch (or vice versa), we need to reason about all possible combinations of paths. Hence, the first premise of this rule checks whether each $C[V_i/V]$ can be proven to be equivalent to all other $C[V_i/V]$'s under precondition φ . If this is the case, all program versions take the same path, so we can reason compositionally. Otherwise, our analysis falls back upon the conservative, but non-modular, proof rule (6) that we will explain shortly.

Rule (5) uses *inductive relational invariants* for loops that have been edited in different ways by each program variant. Specifically, the first premise of this rule states that the relational invariant I is implied by the loop pre-condition, and the next two premises enforce that I is preserved by the loop body (i.e., I is inductive). Thus, assuming that all loops execute the same number of times (checked by line 2 of rule 5), we can conclude that $I \land \land_i \neg C[V_i/V]$ holds after the loop. Note that rule (5) does not describe how to compute such relational loop invariants; it simply asserts that I is inductive. As we describe in Section 7, our implementation uses standard techniques based on conjunctive predicate abstraction to infer such relational loop invariants.

Rule (6) allows us to fall back upon non-modular reasoning when it is not sound to analyze edits in a compositional way. Given a statement $\hat{\mathcal{S}}$ with holes, rule (6) constructs the product program $(\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_1])[V_1/V] \circledast \ldots \circledast (\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_4])[V_4/V]$ and computes its post-condition in the standard way. While rule (6) is a generalization of rule (1), it is only used in cases where compositional reasoning is unsound, as product construction can cause a blow up in program size.

Theorem 5.1. (Soundness of relational post-condition)⁶ Let \hat{S} be a shared program with holes and $\vec{\Delta}$ be the edits

such that $|\Delta_i| = \text{numHoles}(\hat{S})$. Let φ' be the result of calling RelationalPost $(\hat{S}, \vec{\Delta}, \varphi)$ (i.e., $\vec{\Delta}, \varphi \vdash \hat{S} : \varphi'$, [] according to Figure 7). Then, the following Hoare triple is valid:

$$\{\varphi\}\ (\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_1])[V_1/V];\ldots;(\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_n])[V_n/V]\ \{\varphi'\}$$

5.2 Construction of Product Programs

In this section, we describe our method for constructing *n*-way product programs. While there are several strategies for generating 2-way product programs in the literature (e.g., [12, 13]), our method differs from these approaches in that it uses similarity metrics to guide product construction and also generalizes these techniques to *n*-way products. The use of similarity metrics allows our method to generate more verification-friendly product programs while obviating the need for performing backtracking search over non-deterministic product construction rules.

Before we describe our product construction technique, we first give a simple example to illustrate how product construction facilitates relational verification:

Example 5.2. Consider the following programs S_1 and S_2 :

$$S_1: i_1 := 0$$
; while $(i_1 < n_1) \{i_1 := i_1 * x_1\}$
 $S_2: i_2 := 0$; while $(i_2 < n_2) \{i_2 := i_2 * x_2\}$

and the precondition $n_1 = n_2 \wedge x_1 = x_2$. It is easy to see that i_1 and i_2 will have the same value after executing S_1 and S_2 . Now, consider analyzing the program S_1 ; S_2 . While a static analyzer can *in principle* infer this post-condition by coming up with a precise loop invariant that captures the exact symbolic value of i_1 and i_2 during each iteration, this is clearly a very difficult task. To see why product programs are useful, now consider the following program S:

- (1) $i_1 := 0; i_2 := 0;$
- (2) while $(i_1 < n_1 \land i_2 < n_2) \{i_1 := i_1 * x_1; i_2 := i_2 * x_2; \}$
- (3) $(i_1 < n_1)$?{while $(i_1 < n_1)$ { $i_1 := i_1 * x_1$ }} : { $(i_2 < n_2)$?{while $(i_2 < n_2)$ { $i_2 := i_2 * x_2$ }} : {skip}}

Here, S is equivalent to S_1 ; S_2 because it executes both loops in lockstep until one of them terminates and then executes the remainder of the other loop. While this code may look complicated, it is much easier to statically reason about S than S_1 ; S_2 . In particular, since $i_1 = i_2 \wedge x_1 = x_2 \wedge n_1 = n_2$ is an inductive invariant of the first loop in S, we can easily prove that line (3) is dead code and that $i_1 = i_2$ is a valid post-condition of S. As this example illustrates, product programs can make relational verification easier by executing loops from different programs in lockstep.

Our *n*-way product construction method is presented in Figure 8 using inference rules that derive judgments of the form $\vdash S_1 \circledast \ldots \circledast S_n \leadsto S$ where programs S_1, \ldots, S_n do not share any variables (i.e., each S_i refers to variables V_i such that $V_i \cap V_j = \emptyset$ for $i \neq j$). The generated product S is semantically equivalent to S_1, \ldots, S_n but is constructed in a way that makes S easier to be statically analyzed. Similar

⁵There are rare cases in which this abstraction would lead to imprecision. Section 7 describes how our implementation handles such cases.

⁶ Proofs of all theorems are available in the Appendix.

$$(1) \qquad \frac{\vdash \mathcal{S}_{1} \circledast \mathsf{P}^{\circledast} \rightsquigarrow \mathcal{S}}{\vdash A; \mathcal{S}_{1} \circledast \mathsf{P}^{\circledast} \rightsquigarrow A; \mathcal{S}}$$

$$(2) \qquad \frac{\vdash \mathcal{S}_{t}; \mathcal{S}_{1} \circledast \mathsf{P}^{\circledast} \leadsto \mathcal{S}' \quad \vdash \mathcal{S}_{e}; \mathcal{S}_{1} \circledast \mathsf{P}^{\circledast} \leadsto \mathcal{S}''}{\vdash (C? \{\mathcal{S}_{t}\} : \{\mathcal{S}_{e}\}); \mathcal{S}_{1} \circledast \mathsf{P}^{\circledast} \leadsto (C? \{\mathcal{S}'\} : \{\mathcal{S}''\})}$$

$$(3) \frac{\exists \mathcal{S}_{i} \in P. \, \mathcal{S}_{i}[0] \neq \text{while}(C_{i}) \, \{\mathcal{S}_{B_{i}}\}}{\vdash \mathcal{S}_{i} \otimes (P \setminus \mathcal{S}_{i})^{\otimes} \otimes (\text{while}(C_{1}) \, \{\mathcal{S}_{B_{1}}\}); \mathcal{S}_{1} \leadsto \mathcal{S}} \\ \vdash (\text{while}(C_{1}) \, \{\mathcal{S}_{B_{1}}\}); \mathcal{S}_{1} \otimes P^{\otimes} \leadsto \mathcal{S}}$$

$$\forall S_{i} \in P. \ S_{i}[0] = \text{while}(C_{i}) \{S_{B_{i}}\}$$

$$\exists H \subseteq P. \ \forall L \subseteq P. \ sim(H) \ge sim(L)$$

$$\vdash (H[0])^{\circledast} \rightsquigarrow S' \vdash (H[1...])^{\circledast} \circledast (P \setminus H)^{\circledast} \rightsquigarrow S''$$

$$P^{\circledast} \rightsquigarrow S'; S''$$

$$(4)$$

$$F S_{B_1} \otimes S_{B_2} \rightsquigarrow S$$

$$W := \text{while}(C_1 \wedge C_2) \{S\}$$

$$R := C_1 ? \{\text{while}(C_1) \{S_{B_1}\}\} : \{(C_2 ? \{\text{while}(C_2) \{S_{B_2}\}\} : \{\text{skip}\})\}$$

$$\vdash W; R \circledast P^{\circledast} \rightsquigarrow S'$$

$$\vdash (\text{while}(C_1) \{S_{B_1}\}) \otimes (\text{while}(C_2) \{S_{B_2}\}) \otimes P^{\circledast} \rightsquigarrow S'$$

Figure 8. Product construction. The base case is the trivial rule $\vdash S \leadsto S$, and we assume that every program ends in a *skip* and that $skip \otimes P^{\otimes}$ is the same as P^{\otimes} .

to prior relational verification techniques, the key idea is to synchronize loops from different program versions as much as possible. However, our method differs from existing techniques in that it uses similarity metrics to guide product construction and generalizes them to *n*-way products.

Notation. Before discussing Figure 8, we first introduce some useful notation: We abbreviate $S_1 \otimes \ldots \otimes S_n$ using the notation P^{\otimes} , and we write P to denote the list (S_1, \ldots, S_n) . Also, given a statement S, we write S[i] to denote the i'th element in the sequence (i.e., S[0] denotes the first element).

Similarity metric. As mentioned earlier, our algorithm uses similarity metrics between different program fragments to guide product construction. Thus, our algorithm is parameterized by a function $sim: \mathcal{S}^* \to \mathbb{R}^+_0$ that returns a positive real number representing similarity between different statements. While the precise definition of sim is orthogonal to our product construction algorithm, our implementation uses Levensthein distance as the similarity metric.

Product construction algorithm. We are now ready to explain the product construction rules shown in Figure 8. Rule (1) is quite simple and deals with the case where the first program starts with an atomic statement A. Since we can always compute a precise post-condition for atomic statements, it is not necessary to "synchronize" A with any of the statements from other programs. Therefore, we first compute the product program $S_1 \circledast P^{\circledast}$, i.e. $S_1 \circledast S_2 \circledast \ldots \circledast S_n$, and then sequentially compose it with A.

Rule (2) considers the case where the first program starts with a conditional C? $\{S_t\}$: $\{S_e\}$. In general, S_t and S_e may contain loops; therefore, there may be an opportunity to

synchronize any loops within S_t and S_e with loops from $P = S_2, \ldots, S_n$. Therefore, we construct the product program as $C ? \{S'\} : \{S''\}$ where S' (resp. S'') is the product of the then (resp. else) branch with P^{\circledast} .

Because the main point of product construction is to generate a verification-friendly program by executing loops in lock-step, all of the remaining rules deal with loops. Specifically, rule (3) considers the case where the first program starts with a loop but there is some program S_i in $P = (S_2, \ldots, S_n)$ that does not start with a loop. In this case, we want to "get rid of" program S_i by using rules (1) and (2); thus, we move S_i to the beginning and construct the product program S for $S_i \circledast (P \setminus S_i)^\circledast \circledast \text{while}(C_1) \{S_{B_1}\}; S_1$.

Before we continue to the other rules, we make two important observations about rule (3). First, this rule exploits the commutativity and associativity of the \circledast operator 8 ; however, it uses these properties in a restricted form by applying them only where they are useful. Second, after exhaustively applying rules (1), (2), and (3) on some P_0^{\circledast} , note that we will end up with a new P_1^{\circledast} where *all* programs in P_1 are guaranteed to start with a loop.

Rule (4) considers the case where all programs start with a loop and utilizes the similarity metric sim to identify which loops to synchronize. In particular, let H be the subset of the programs in P that are "most similar" according to our similarity metric. Since all programs in H start with a loop, we first construct the product program S' of these loops. We then construct the product program S'' for the remaining programs $P \setminus H$ and the remaining parts of the programs in H.

The final rule (5) defines what it means to "execute loops in lockstep as much as possible". Given two programs that start with loops while (C_1) { S_1 } and while (C_2) { S_2 }, we first construct the product $S_1 \otimes S_2$ and generate the synchronized loop as while $(C_1 \wedge C_2)$ { $S_1 \otimes S_2$ }. Since these loops may not execute the same number of times, we still need to generate the "continuation" R, which executes any remaining iterations of one of the loops. Thus, W; R in rule (5) is semantically equivalent to while (C_1) { S_1 }; while (C_2) { S_2 }. Now, since there may be further synchronization opportunities between W; R and the remaining programs S_3, \ldots, S_n , we obtain the final product program by computing W; $R \otimes S_3 \otimes \ldots \otimes S_n$.

Example 5.3. Consider again the programs S_1 and S_2 from Example 5.2. We can use rules (1) and (5) from Figure 8 to compute the product program for $S_1 \otimes S_2$. The resulting product is exactly the program S shown in Example 5.2.

Since rules (4) or (5) are both applicable when all programs start with a loop, our product construction algorithm first applies rule (4) and then uses rule (5) when constructing the

⁷Observe that our handling of if statements can cause a blow-up in program size, since we essentially embed the continuation S_1 inside the then and else branches. However, because our product construction applies to small program fragments, we have not found it to be a problem in practice.

⁸Recall that different programs do not share variables

Algorithm 2 n-way AST differencing algorithm

```
1: procedure NDIFF(S_1, \ldots, S_n)
             \hat{S} \leftarrow S_1; \quad \vec{\Delta} \leftarrow []; \quad i \leftarrow 2;
 2:
             while i \le n do
 3:
                   (\hat{\mathcal{S}}, \vec{\Delta}) \leftarrow \mathsf{GenEdit}(\hat{\mathcal{S}}, \mathcal{S}_i, \vec{\Delta})
 4:
             return (\hat{S}, \vec{\Delta})
      procedure GenEdit(\hat{S}, S, \Delta_1, ..., \Delta_k)
            (\hat{S}', \Delta, \hat{\Delta}) := \text{Diff2}(S, \hat{S})
 7:
             for i in [1, k] do
 8:
                   \Delta_i' := \operatorname{Compose}(\hat{\Delta}, \Delta_i)
 9:
            return (\hat{S}', \Delta'_1, \ldots, \Delta'_k, \Delta)
10:
     procedure Compose(\hat{\Delta}, \Delta)
             if \hat{\Delta} = [] then return []
12:
             else if head(\hat{\Delta}) = [\cdot] then
13:
                   return head(\Delta) :: Compose(tail(\hat{\Delta}), tail(\Delta))
14:
             else return head(\hat{\Delta}) :: Compose(tail(\hat{\Delta}), \Delta)
15:
```

product for $(H[0])^{\circledast}$ in rule (4). Thus, our method ensures that loops that are most similar to each other are executed in lockstep, which in turn greatly facilitates verification.

Theorem 5.4. (Soundness of product) Let $S_1, ..., S_n$ be statements with disjoint variables, and let $\vdash S_1 \circledast ... \circledast S_n \leadsto S$ according to Figure 8. Then, for all valuations σ , we have $\sigma \vdash S_1; ...; S_n \Downarrow \sigma'$ iff $\sigma \vdash S \Downarrow \sigma'$.

6 Edit Generation

The verification algorithm we described in Section 5 requires all program versions to be represented as edits applied to a shared program with holes. This representation is very important because it allows our verification algorithm to reason about modifications to different program parts in a compositional way. In this section, we describe an *n*-way AST differencing algorithm that can be used to generate the desired program representation.

Our *n*-way diff algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2. Procedure NDIFF takes as input *n* programs S_1, \ldots, S_n and returns a pair $(\hat{S}, \vec{\Delta})$ where \hat{S} is a shared program with holes and $\vec{\Delta}$ is a list of edits such that $\hat{S}[\Delta_i] = S_i$. The loop inside the NDIFF procedure maintains the key invariant $\forall j. \ 1 \leq j < i \Rightarrow \hat{S}[\Delta_j] = S_j$. Thus, upon termination, NDIFF guarantees that $\hat{S}[\Delta_i] = S_i$ for all $i \in [1, n]$.

The bulk of the work of the NDIFF procedure is performed by the auxiliary GenEdit function, which uses a 2-way AST differencing algorithm to extend the diff from k to k+1 programs. Specifically, GenEdit takes as input a new program S as well as the diff of the first k programs, where the diff is represented as a shared program \hat{S} with holes as well as edits $\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_k$. The key idea underlying GenEdit is to use a standard 2-way AST diff algorithm to compute the diff

between \hat{S} and the new program S and then use the result to update the existing edits $\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_k$.

In more detail, the Diff2 procedure used in GenEdit yields the 2-way diff of \hat{S} and S as a triple $(\hat{S}', \Delta, \hat{\Delta})$ such that $\hat{S}'[\Delta] = S$ and $\hat{S}'[\hat{\Delta}] = \hat{S}$. The core insight underlying GenEdit is to use $\hat{\Delta}$ to update the existing edits $\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_k$ for the first k programs. Specifically, we use a procedure Compose to combine each existing edit Δ_i with the output $\hat{\Delta}$ of 2Diff. The Compose procedure is defined recursively and inspects the first element of $\hat{\Delta}$ in each recursive call. If the first element is a hole, we preserve the existing edit; otherwise, we use the edit from $\hat{\Delta}$. Thus, if Compose($\hat{\Delta}, \Delta_i$) yields Δ_i' , we have $\hat{S}'[\Delta_i'] = \hat{S}[\Delta_i]$. In other words, the Compose procedure allows us to update the diff of the first k programs to generate a sound diff of k+1 programs.

Theorem 6.1. (Soundness of NDiff) Let $NDiff(S_1, ..., S_n)$ be $(\hat{S}, \vec{\Delta})$. Then we have $\hat{\Delta}[\Delta_i] = S_i$ for all $i \in [1, n]$.

7 Implementation

We implemented the techniques proposed in this paper in a tool called SafeMerge for checking semantic conflictfreedom of Java programs. SafeMerge is written in Haskell and uses the Z3 SMT solver [16]. In what follows, we describe relational invariant generation, our handling of various aspects of the Java language and other implementation choices.

Relational invariant generation. The RPC computation engine from Section 5.1 requires an inductive loop invariant relating variables from the four program versions. Our implementation automatically infers relational loop invariants using the Houdini framework for (monomial) predicate abstraction [20]. Specifically, we consider predicate templates of the form $x_i = x_j$ relating values of the same variable from different program versions, and compute the strongest conjunct that satisfies the conditions of rule (5) of Figure 7.

Modeling the heap and collections. As standard in prior verification literature [21], we model each field f in the program as follows: We introduce a map f from object identifiers to values and model reads and writes to the map using the select and update functions in the theory of arrays. Similarly, our implementation models collections, such as ArrayList and Queue, using arrays. Specifically, we use an array to represent the contents of the collection and use scalar variables to model the size of the collection as well as the current position of an iterator over the collection [17].

Side effects of a method. Our formalization uses an out array to model all relevant side effects of a method. Since real Java programs do not contain such a construct, our implementation checks semantic conflict freedom on the

⁹Existing 2-way AST diff algorithms can be adapted to produce diffs in this form. We provide our Diff2 implementation under supplementary materials.

method's return value, the final state of the receiver object as well as any field modified in the method.

Analysis of shared statements. Recall that our technique abstracts away shared program statements using uninterpreted functions (rule (2) from Figure 7). However, because unconditional use of such abstraction can result in false positives, our implementation checks for certain conditions before applying rule (2) from Figure 7. Specifically, given precondition ϕ and variables V accessed by shared statement S, our implementation applies rule (2) only when ϕ implies semantic conflict freedom on all variables in set V; otherwise, our implementation falls back on product construction (i.e., rule (6) from Figure 7). While this check fails rarely in practice, it is nonetheless useful for avoiding false positives.

7.1 Limitations

Our current prototype implementation has a few limitations:

Analysis scope. Because SAFEMERGE only analyzes the class file associated with the modified procedure, it may suffer from both false positives and negatives. In particular, our analysis results are only sound under the assumption that the external callees from other classes have *not* been modified.

Changes to method signature. SafeMerge currently does not support renamed methods or methods with parameter reordering, introduction, or deletion. However, our tool does not place any requirements on the mapping of local variables. Similarly, new fields can be introduced or deleted in different variants — we assume they are present in all four versions and that they start out in an arbitrary but equal state.

Concurrency, termination, and exceptions. Neither our formalism nor our prototype implementation support sound reasoning in the presence of concurrency. Our soundness claims also rely on the assumption that none of the variants introduce non-terminating behavior. Finally, although exceptions can be conceptually desugared in our formalism, our implementation does not handle exceptional control flow.

8 Experimental Evaluation

To assess the usefulness of the proposed method, we perform a series of three experiments. In our first experiment, we use SAFEMERGE to verify semantic conflict-freedom of merges collected from Github commit histories. In our second experiment, we run SAFEMERGE on erroneous merge candidates generated by kdiff3 [2], a widely-used textual merge tool. Finally, in our third experiment, we assess the scalability of our method and the importance of various design choices. All experiments are performed on Quad-core Intel Xeon CPU with 2.4 GHz and 8 GB memory.

8.1 Evaluation on Merge Candidates from Github

To perform our first experiment, we implemented a crawler that examines git merge commit histories and extracts interesting methods that have the potential to violate conflict freedom. Specifically, our crawler considers a merge scenario to be relevant if (a) a method is modified by *both* variants in different ways, (b) this method involves externally visible side effects ¹⁰, (c) the merge candidate is different from either of the variants, and (d) the code does not involve features that are not handled by our prototype.

To perform this experiment, we run our crawler on nine popular Java applications, namely Elasticsearch [18], libGDX [4], iosched [1], kotlin [3], MPAndroidChart [5], okhttp [6], retrofit [7], RxJava [8] and the Spring Boot framework [9]. Out of 1998 merge instances where a Java source file is modified in both variants, 235 cases involve modifications to the same method where the merge differs from Base, A and B. After filtering methods with no side-effects or containing unhandled features, we obtain a total of 52 benchmarks and evaluate SAFEMERGE on all of them. ¹¹

Main results. The results of our evaluation are presented in Table 1. For each benchmark, Table 1 shows the abbreviated name of the application it is taken from (column "App"), the number of lines of code in the merge candidate ("LOC"), the running time of SAFEMERGE in seconds ("Time"), and the results produced by SAFEMERGE and kdiff3. Specifically, for SAFEMERGE, a checkmark (✓) indicates that it was able to verify semantic conflict-freedom, whereas ✗ means that it produced a warning. In the case of kdiff3, a checkmark indicates the absence of *syntactic* conflicts.

As we can see from Table 1, SafeMerge is able to verify semantic conflict-freedom for 39 of the 52 benchmarks and reports a warning for the remaining 13. We manually inspected these thirteen benchmarks and found eleven instances of an actual semantic conflict (i.e., the merge candidate is indeed incorrect with respect to Definition 4.4). The remaining two warnings are false positives caused by imprecision in the dependence analysis and modeling of collections. In all, these results indicate that SafeMerge is quite precise, with a false positive rate around 15%. Furthermore, this experiment also corroborates that SafeMerge is practical, taking an average of 0.5 second to verify each benchmark.

Next, Table 2 compares the results produced by SAFE-MERGE and kdiff3 on the 52 benchmarks used in our evaluation. This comparison is very relevant because the merge candidate in these benchmarks matches exactly the merge produced by kdiff3 whenever it does not report a textual conflict. As shown in Table 2, 33 benchmarks are classified as conflict-free by both SAFEMERGE and kdiff3, meaning that SAFEMERGE can verify the correctness of the textual merge generated by kdiff3 in these cases. For instance, the merge with ID 41 in Table 1 corresponds precisely to the example from RxJava present in Section 2 (Figure 3). Perhaps more interestingly, we find five benchmarks for which kdiff3

 $^{^{10}}$ Our crawler considers a method to have side-effects if it its return value is not void or if it makes an assignment to a field.

¹¹All benchmarks can be found under supplementary materials.

ID	App	LOC	Time (s)	Result	Result	ID	App	LOC	Time (s)	Result	Result
				(SafeMerge)	(kdiff3)					(SafeMerge)	(kdiff3)
1	ESearch	18	0.05	✓	Х	27	libgdx	30	0.12	✓	✓
2	ESearch	25	0.07	✓	✓	28	libgdx	32	0.21	✓	✓
3	ESearch	101	0.20	✓	✓	29	libgdx	71	0.16	✓	✓
4	ESearch	63	0.49	✓	✓	30	MPAndroid	47	0.44	×	✓
5	ESearch	90	4.45	✓	✓	31	MPAndroid	66	0.17	✓	✓
6	ESearch	136	4.07	✓	✓	32	MPAndroid	109	0.16	✓	✓
7	ESearch	15	2.09	✓	✓	33	MPAndroid	44	0.10	✓	✓
8	ESearch	30	0.11	X	×	34	MPAndroid	62	0.16	✓	✓
9	ESearch	25	0.09	X	×	35	MPAndroid	43	0.11	✓	X
10	ESearch	21	0.15	X	×	36	MPAndroid	35	0.23	X	X
11	iosched	63	0.19	✓	1	37	MPAndroid	37	0.39	X	X
12	iosched	64	0.07	✓	✓	38	okhttp	28	0.10	X	✓
13	kotlin	96	0.16	X	✓	39	retrofit	66	1.67	✓	✓
14	kotlin	54	0.57	✓	✓	40	retrofit	78	1.76	✓	✓
15	kotlin	53	0.48	✓	✓	41	RxJava	28	0.20	✓	✓
16	kotlin	53	0.11	✓	✓	42	spring	107	0.12	✓	✓
17	kotlin	104	0.49	✓	✓	43	spring	77	0.23	X	X
18	kotlin	86	0.31	✓	✓	44	spring	82	0.15	✓	✓
19	kotlin	127	4.19	✓	×	45	spring	81	0.21	✓	✓
20	kotlin	56	0.62	✓	✓	46	spring	44	0.15	✓	X
21	kotlin	11	0.06	✓	1	47	spring	37	0.30	✓	X
22	kotlin	77	0.18	✓	✓	48	spring	42	0.07	✓	/ /
23	kotlin	11	0.06	✓	✓	49	spring	36	0.06	✓	/
24	kotlin	38	0.15	✓	✓	50	spring	64	0.20	X	/
25	kotlin	67	0.33	✓	×	51	spring	13	0.09	X	X
26	kotlin	7	0.19	X	Х	52	spring	20	0.05	X	✓

Table 1. Summary of experimental results.

SafeMerge	kdiff3	Count	Implication
√	✓	33	Verified textual merge
1	×	6	Verified manual merge
×	✓	5	Fail to verify textual merge
X	X	8	Fail to verify manual merge

Table 2. Summary of differences between SAFEMERGE and kdiff3. "Count" denotes the number of instances in Table 1.

generates a textual merge that is semantically incorrect according to SAFEMERGE. Among these five instances, two correspond (with IDs 13, 30) to the false positives discussed earlier, leaving us with three benchmarks where the merge generated by kdiff3 violates Definition 4.4 and should be further investigated by the developers.

As we can see from Table 2, there are fourteen benchmarks that are syntactically conflicting according to kdiff3 and were likely resolved manually by a developer. Among these, SafeMerge can verify the correctness of the merge candidate for six instances (spread over four different applications), thereby confirming the existence of real-world scenarios where syntactic conflict-freedom results in false positives. Finally, there are eight cases where the manual merge cannot be verified SafeMerge. While these examples indeed violate semantic conflict-freedom, they do not necessarily correspond to bugs (e.g., a developer might have intentionally discarded changes made by another developer).

For example, in the merge with ID 36 from Table 1, both variants A and B weaken a predicate in two different ways by adding two and one additional disjuncts respectively ¹². However, the merge M only picks the weaker predicate from A, thereby effectively discarding some of the changes from variant B.

8.2 Evaluation on Erroneous Merge Candidates

In our second experiment, we explore whether SafeMerge is able to pinpoint erroneous merges generated by kdiff3. To perform this experiment, we consider base program with ID = 25 from Table 1 and generate variants by performing various kinds of mutations to the base program. Specifically, we design pairs of mutations that cause kdiff3 to generate buggy merge candidates.

The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 3, where the column labeled "Description" summarizes the nature of the mutation. For each pair of variants that are semantically conflict-free, the version named -kdiff3 shows the incorrect merge generated by kdiff3, where as the one labeled -manual shows the correct merge that we generated manually. For benchmarks that are semantically conflicting,

¹²Merge commit https://github.com/PhilJay/MPAndroidChart/commit/ 9531ba69895cd64fce48038ffd8df2543eeea1d2

Name	Description	Time (s)	Result
B1-kdiff3	Patch gets duplicated in merge	0.36	Х
B1-manual	Correct version of above	0.38	✓
B2-kdiff3	Semantically same, syntactically different patches	0.42	Х
B2-manual	Correct version of above	0.33	✓
B3-kdiff3	Inconsistent changes in assignment (conflict)	0.34	Х
B4-kdiff3	Interference between refactoring and insertion (conflict)	0.31	X
B5-kdiff3	Interference between insertion and deletion (conflict)	0.30	X
B6-kdiff3	One patch supercedes the other	0.32	X
B6-manual	Correct version of above	0.29	✓
B7-kdiff3	Inconsistent patches due to off-by-one error (conflict)	0.29	Х

Table 3. Results of our evaluation on merges generated by kdiff3.




Figure 9. Lines of code vs. running time.

we only provide results for the incorrect merge generated by kdiff3 since a correct merge simply does not exist.

The results from Table 3 complement those from Section 8.1 and provide further evidence that a widely-used merge tool like kdiff3 can generate erroneous merges and that these buggy merges can be detected by our proposed technique. This experiment also demonstrates that SAFEMERGE can verify conflict-freedom in the manually constructed correct merges.

8.3 Evaluation of Scalability and Design Choices

To assess the scalability of the proposed technique, we performed a third experiment in which we compare the running time of SafeMerge against the number of lines of code and number of edits. To perform this experiment, we start with an existing benchmark from the SafeMerge test suite and increase the number of lines of code using loop unrolling. We also vary the number of edits by injecting a modification in the loop body. This way, the number of holes in the shared program increases with each loop unrolling.

To evaluate the benefits of the various design choices that we adopt in this paper, we also compare SAFEMERGE with two variants of itself. In one variant, namely *Product*, we model the shared program using a single hole, so each edit corresponds to one of the program versions. Essentially, this




Figure 10. Number of holes (edits) vs. running time. Lines of code varies between 50 and 800.

method computes the product of the four program versions using the rules from Figure 8 and allows us to assess the benefits of representing program versions as edits applied to a shared program. In another variant called *No dependence*, we do not abstract away shared program fragments using uninterpreted functions and analyze them by constructing a 4-way product. However, we still combine reasoning from different product programs in a compositional way.

Figure 9 compares the running time of SAFEMERGE against these two variants as we vary the number of lines of code but *not* the number of edits. Observe that the y-axis is shown in log scale. As we can see from this plot, SAFEMERGE scales quite well and analyzes each benchmark in under a second. In contrast, the running time of *Product* grows exponentially in the lines of code. As expected, the *No dependence* variant is better than *Product* but significantly worse than SAFEMERGE.

Next, Figure 10 compares the running time of SafeMerge against *Product* and *No dependence* as we vary *both* the number of lines of code and the number of edits. Specifically, a benchmark containing n holes contains 25n lines of code, and the y-axis shows the running time of each variant in log scale. As expected, SafeMerge is more sensitive to the number holes than it is to the number of lines of code because it abstracts away shared program fragments. However,

SAFEMERGE still significantly outperforms both *Product* and *No Dependence*. In particular, for a program with 32 edits and 800 lines of code, SAFEMERGE can verify semantic conflict freedom in approximately 10 seconds, while *No Dependence* takes approximately 100 seconds and *Product* times out.

In summary, this experiment shows that SAFEMERGE scales well as we vary the lines of code and that its running time is still feasible when program variants perform over 30 modifications to the base program in this example. This experiments also corroborates the practical importance of representing program versions as edits applied to a shared program as well as the advantage of abstracting away shared program fragments using uninterpreted functions.

9 Related Work

In this section, we compare our technique with prior work on program merging and relational verification.

Structure-aware merge. Most algorithms for program merging are textual in nature, hardly ever formally described [29], and without semantic guarantees. To improve on this situation, previous work has proposed structured and semistructured merge techniques to better resolve merge conflicts. For example, FSTMerge [11] uses syntactic structure to resolve conflicts between AST nodes that can be reordered (such as method definitions), but it falls back on unstructured textual merge for other kinds of nodes. Follow-up work on JDime [10, 33] improves the poor performance of structure-based merging by using textual-based mode (fast) as long as no conflicts are detected, but switches to structure-based mode in the presence of conflicts. However, none of these techniques guarantee semantic conflict freedom.

Semantics-aware merge. Our work is inspired by earlier work on program integration, which originated with the HPR algorithm [25] for checking non-interference and generating valid merges. The HPR algorithm was later refined by the work of Yang et al. [43], which is one of the first attempts to incorporate semantics for merge generation. In that context, the notion of conflict-freedom is parameterized by a classification of nodes of the variants as unchanged such that the backward slices of unchanged nodes in the two variants are equivalent modulo a semantic correspondence. Thus, their classification algorithm is parameterized by a semantic congruence relation. Our approach tackles the slightly different merge verification (rather then merge generation) problem, but improves on these prior techniques in several dimensions: First, we do not require annotations to map statements across the different versions — this information is computed automatically using our edit generation algorithm (Sec 6). Second, we show how to formulate conflict freedom directly with verification conditions and assertion checking. Finally, our approach performs precise, compositional reasoning about edits by combining lightweight dependence analysis with relational reasoning using product programs.

Relational verification. Verification of conflict freedom is related to a line of work on relational program logics [14, 39, 42] and product programs [12, 13, 44]. For instance, Benton's Relational Hoare Logic (RHL) [14] allows proving equivalence between a pair of structurally similar programs. Sousa and Dillig generalize Benton's work by developing Cartesian Hoare Logic, which is used for proving k-safety of programs [39]. Barthe et al. propose another technique for relational verification using product programs [12, 13] and apply their technique to relational properties, such as equivalence and 2-safety [40]. In this work, we build on the notion of product programs used in prior work [12, 13, 44]. However, rather than constructing a monolithic product of the four program version, we construct mini-products for each edit. Furthermore, our proposed product construction algorithm differs from prior techniques in that it uses similarity metrics to guide synchronization and generalizes to n-way products.

Cross-version program analysis. There has been renewed interest in program analysis techniques for answering questions about program differences across versions [32]. Prior work on comparing closely related programs versions include regression verification that checks semantic equivalence using uninterpreted function abstraction of equivalent callees [19, 22, 30], mutual summaries [23, 41], relational invariant inference to prove differential properties [31] and verification modulo versions [34]. Other approaches include static analysis for abstract differencing [27, 35], symbolic execution for verifying assertion-equivalence [37] and differential symbolic execution to summarize differences [36]. Our work is perhaps closest to differential assertion checking [31] in the use of product programs and invariant inference. However, we do not require an assertion and verify a more complex property involving four different programs. We note that bugs arising from 3-way merges could potentially also be uncovered using multi-version testing [26].

10 Conclusion and Future Work

We have proposed a notion of *semantic conflict freedom* for 3-way merges and described a verification algorithm for proving this property. Our verification algorithm analyzes the edited parts of the program in a precise way using product programs, but leverages lightweight dependence analysis to reason about program fragments that are shared between all program versions. Our evaluation shows that the proposed approach can verify semantic conflict-freedom for many real-world benchmarks and identify issues in problematic merges that are generated by textual 3-way merge tools.

We view this work as a first step towards precise, semantics-aware *merge synthesis*. In future work, we plan to explore synthesis techniques that can automatically generate correct-by-construction 3-way program merges. Since correct merge

candidates should obey semantic conflict freedom, the verification algorithm proposed in this paper is necessarily a key ingredient of such semantics-aware merge synthesis tools.

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$$\frac{\sigma \vdash e \Downarrow c \quad \sigma' = \sigma[(x,0) \mapsto c]}{\sigma \vdash skip \Downarrow \sigma}$$

$$\frac{\sigma \vdash e \Downarrow c \quad \sigma' = \sigma[(x,0) \mapsto c]}{\sigma \vdash x := e \Downarrow \sigma'}$$

$$\frac{\sigma \vdash e \Downarrow c \quad \sigma' = \sigma[(x,0) \mapsto c]}{\sigma \vdash x := e \Downarrow \sigma'}$$

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$$\frac{\sigma \vdash x := e \Downarrow \sigma'}{\sigma \vdash x := e \Downarrow \sigma'}$$

$$\frac{\sigma[(x,0)] = c}{\sigma \vdash out(x) \Downarrow \sigma}$$

$$\frac{\sigma \vdash C \Downarrow true}{\sigma \vdash S_1 \Downarrow \sigma_1}$$

$$\frac{\sigma \vdash C \Downarrow false}{\sigma \vdash C ? \{S_1\} : \{S_2\} \Downarrow \sigma_2}$$

$$\frac{\sigma \vdash C \Downarrow true}{\sigma \vdash C ? \{S_1\} : \{S_2\} \Downarrow \sigma_2}$$

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Figure 11. Operational semantics

Appendix A: Operational Semantics

Figure 11 shows the operational semantics of the language from Figure 5. Recall that σ maps (variable, index) pairs to values, and we view scalar variables as arrays with a single valid index at 0. Since the semantics of expressions is completely standard, we do not show them here. However, one important point worth noting is the semantics of expressions involving array reads:

$$\begin{array}{c} \sigma \vdash e \Downarrow c \\ \underline{(a,c) \in dom(\sigma)} \\ \overline{\sigma \vdash a[e] \Downarrow \sigma[(a,c)]} \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{c} \sigma \vdash e \Downarrow c \\ \underline{(a,c) \notin dom(\sigma)} \\ \overline{\sigma \vdash a[e] \Downarrow \bot} \end{array}$$

In other words, reads from locations that have not been initialized yield a special constant \perp .

Appendix B: Soundness of Product

Here, we provide a proof of Theorem 5.4. The proof is by structural induction over the product construction rules given in Figure 8. Since the two directions of the proof are completely symmetric, we only prove one direction. Note that the base case is trivial because $\vdash S \rightsquigarrow S$.

Rule 1. Suppose $\sigma \vdash A \Downarrow \sigma'$ and $\sigma' \vdash S_1; S_2; \ldots; S_n \Downarrow \sigma''$. By the premise of the proof rule and the inductive hypothesis, we have $\sigma' \vdash S \Downarrow \sigma''$. Thus, $\sigma \vdash A; S \Downarrow \sigma''$.

Rule 2. Suppose $\sigma \vdash (C ? \{S_t\} : \{S_e\}); S_1; S_2; \ldots; S_n \Downarrow \sigma''$. Without loss of generality, suppose $\sigma \vdash C \Downarrow true$, and suppose $\sigma \vdash S_t; S_1 \Downarrow \sigma'$, so $\sigma' \vdash S_2; \ldots; S_n \Downarrow \sigma''$. By the first premise of the proof rule and the inductive hypothesis, we have $\sigma \vdash S' \Downarrow \sigma''$. Hence, $\sigma \vdash C ? \{S'\} : \{S''\} \Downarrow \sigma''$.

Rule 3. Let $S_x = \text{while}(C_1) \{S_{B_1}\}; S_1$. Suppose we have $\sigma \vdash S_x; S_2; \ldots; S_n \Downarrow \sigma'$. Suppose there is exists S_i that satisfies first premise of the proof rule. Observe that $S_1; S_2; \ldots; S_n$; is semantically equivalent to $S_n; S_2; \ldots; S_{n-1}; S_1$; as long as S_1, S_n , do not share variables between them and also with $S_2 \ldots S_{n-1}$. Since S_x and S_i have no shared variables between them and with any other program S_j different than S_x and S_i , we have

$$\sigma \vdash S_i; S_2; \ldots; S_{i-1}; S_{i+1}; \ldots S_n; \text{while}(C_1) \{S_{B_1}\}; S_1 \Downarrow \sigma'$$

Then, by the premise of the proof rule and the inductive hypothesis, we have $\sigma \vdash S \Downarrow \sigma'$.

Rule 4. Suppose we have $\sigma \vdash S_1; S_2; \ldots; S_n \Downarrow \sigma''$ where each S_i is of the form while $(C_i) \{S_{B_i}\}; S_i'$. By the same reason as in Rule 3. we can move any loop in each S_i to the beginning as they don't share any variable with any other S_j . That is, considering $H = S_1; \ldots; S_o$ be the set of programs satisfying the second premise we have

$$\sigma \vdash \text{while}(C_1) \{S_{B_1}\}; \dots \text{while}(C_o) \{S_{B_o}\} \Downarrow \sigma'$$

and considering S_{o+1} ; ... Sn a sequence of the original programs excluding the ones in H we have

$$\sigma' \vdash S'_1; \dots S'_o; S_{o+1}; \dots Sn \Downarrow \sigma''$$

Then, by the last premises of the proof rule and the inductive hypothesis, we have that $\sigma \vdash \mathcal{S}'; \mathcal{S}'' \Downarrow \sigma''$.

Rule 5. Suppose we have

$$\sigma \vdash \text{while}(C_1) \{S_1\}; \text{while}(C_2) \{S_2\}; S_3; \dots; S_n \downarrow \sigma'$$

Let W' be the loop while $(C_1 \wedge C_2)$ $\{S_1; S_2\}$. Since C_1, C_2 and S_1, S_2 have disjoint sets of variables, the program fragment while (C_1) $\{S_1\}$; while (C_2) $\{S_2\}$ is semantically equivalent to W'; R (where R comes from the third line of the proof rule). Hence, we have $\sigma \vdash W'; R; S_3; \ldots; S_n \Downarrow \sigma'$. By the first premise of the proof rule and the inductive hypothesis, if $\sigma_0 \vdash S_1; S_2 \Downarrow \sigma_1$ for any σ_0, σ_1 , then $\sigma_0 \vdash S \Downarrow \sigma_1$. Thus, $\sigma \vdash W' \Downarrow \sigma^*$ implies $\sigma \vdash W \Downarrow \sigma^*$, which in turn implies $\sigma \vdash W; R; S_3; \ldots; S_n \Downarrow \sigma'$. By the last premise of the proof rule and the inductive hypothesis, we know $\sigma \vdash S' : \sigma'$; hence, the property holds.

Appendix C: Proof of Soundness of Relational Post-conditions

The proof is by structural induction on \hat{S} .

Case 1. $\hat{S} = [\cdot]$, and the edits are S_1, \ldots, S_4 . In this case, Figure 7 constructs the relational post-condition by first computing the product program S as $S_1[V_1/V] \circledast \ldots \circledast S[V_4/4]$ and then computing the standard post-condition of S. By Theorem 5.4, we have $\sigma \vdash S \Downarrow \sigma'$ iff $\sigma \vdash S_1[V_1/V] \circledast \ldots \circledast S[V_4/4] \Downarrow \sigma'$. Furthermore, by the correctness of *post* operator, we know that $\{\varphi\}S\{\varphi'\}$ is a valid Hoare triple. This

implies $\{\varphi\}\mathcal{S}_1[V_1/V]; \dots; \mathcal{S}_4[V_4/V]\{\varphi'\}$ is also a valid Hoare triple.

Case 2. $\hat{S} = S$ (i.e., \hat{S} does not contain holes). By the second rule in Figure 7, we know that $\{\varphi\}S_1;\ldots;S_n\{\varphi'\}$ is a valid Hoare triple. Now, consider any valuation σ satisfying φ . By the correctness of the Hoare triple, if $\sigma \vdash S_1;\ldots;S_n \Downarrow \sigma'$, we know that σ' also satisfies φ' . Now, recall that $S_1;\ldots;S_n$ contains uninterpreted functions, and we assume that $F(\vec{x})$ can return any value, as long as it returns something consistent for the same input values. Let Σ represent the set of all valuations σ_i such that $\sigma \vdash S_1;\ldots;S_n \Downarrow \sigma_i$. By the correctness of the Hoare triple, we know that any $\sigma_i \in \Sigma$ satisfies φ' . Assuming the correctness of the mod and dependence analysis, for any valuation σ such that $\sigma \vdash S[V_1/V];\ldots;S[V_4/V] \Downarrow \sigma'$, we know that $\sigma' \in \Sigma$. Since all valuations in Σ satisfy φ' , this implies σ' also satisfies φ' . Thus, $\{\varphi\}S[V_1/V];\ldots;S[V_4/V]\{\varphi'\}$ is also a valid Hoare triple.

Case 3. $\hat{S} = \hat{S}_1; \hat{S}_2$. Let $\vec{\Delta}_A$ denote the prefix of $\vec{\Delta}$ that is used for filling holes in \hat{S}_1 , and $\vec{\Delta}_B$ denote the prefix of $\vec{\Delta}_1$ that is used for filling holes in \hat{S}_2 . By the premise of the third rule and inductive hypothesis, we have

$$\{\varphi\}(\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A1}])[V_1/V]);\ldots;(\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A4}])[V_4/V])\{\varphi_1\}$$

as well as

$$\{\varphi_1\}(\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B1}])[V_1/V];\ldots;(\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B4}])[V_4/V])\{\varphi_2\}$$

Using these and the standard Hoare rule for composition, we can conclude:

$$\{\varphi\}$$
 $(\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A1}])[V_1/V]); \dots; (\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A4}])[V_4/V]);$
 $(\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B1}])[V_1/V]); \dots; (\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B4}])[V_4/V]) \quad \{\varphi_2\}$

Since we can commute statements over different variables, this implies:

$$\{\varphi\}$$
 $(\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A1}]; \hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B1}])[V_1/V]); \dots;$
 $(\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A4}]; \hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B4}])[V_4/V])$ $\{\varphi_2\}$

Next, using the fact that $\hat{S}[\Delta_i] = (\hat{S}_1; \hat{S}_2)[\Delta_i] = \hat{S}_1[\Delta_{Ai}]; \hat{S}_2[\Delta_{Bi}]$, we can conclude:

$$\{\varphi\}(\hat{S}[\Delta_1])[V_1/V]); \dots; (\hat{S}[\Delta_4])[V_4/V])\{\varphi_2\}$$

Case 4. $\hat{S} = C$? $\{\hat{S}_1\}$: $\{\hat{S}_2\}$. Let $\vec{\Delta}_A$, $\vec{\Delta}_B$ denote the prefixes of $\vec{\Delta}$, $\vec{\Delta}_1$ that is used for filling holes in \hat{S}_1 and \hat{S}_2 respectively. Also, let C_i denote $C[V_i/V]$. By the first premise of rule 4 from Figure 7 and the inductive hypothesis, we have:

$$\{\varphi \wedge C_1\}\ (\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A1}])[V_1/V]);\ldots;(\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A4}])[V_4/V])\ \{\varphi_1\}$$

Now, using the second premise and the inductive hypothesis, we also have:

$$\{\varphi \wedge \neg C_1\}\ (\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B1}])[V_1/V];\ldots;(\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B4}])[V_4/V])\ \{\varphi_2\}$$

Using these two facts and the standard Hoare logic rule for if statements, we get:

$$\{\varphi\} \quad C_1?(\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A1}])[V_1/V]); \dots; (\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A4}])[V_4/V]):$$

$$(\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B1}])[V_1/V]); \dots; (\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B4}])[V_4/V]) \qquad \{\varphi_1\}$$

Now, since φ logically entails $\bigwedge_{i,j} C_i \leftrightarrow C_j$, the statement above is equivalent to:

$$C_1$$
 ? $\{(\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A1}])[V_1/V]\}$: $\{(\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B1}])[V_1/V]\}$; ... C_4 ? $\{(\hat{S}_1[\Delta_{A4}])[V_4/V]\}$: $\{(\hat{S}_2[\Delta_{B4}])[V_4/V]\}$;

Next, using the fact that $\hat{S}[\Delta_i] = (C ? {\hat{S}_1} : {\hat{S}_2})[\Delta_i] = C ? {\hat{S}_1}[\Delta_{Ai}] : {\hat{S}_2}[\vec{\Delta}_{Bi}]$, we can conclude:

$$\{\varphi\}$$
 $((C_1?\{\hat{S}_1\}:\{\hat{S}_2\})[\Delta_1])[V_1/V];\dots;$
 $((C_4?\{\hat{S}_1\}:\{\hat{S}_2\}))[\Delta_4])[V_4/V]$ $\{\varphi'\}$

Case 5. \hat{S} = while(C) { \hat{S} }. As in case (4), let C_i denote $C[V_i/V]$. From the premise of rule (5) of Figure 7 and the inductive hypothesis, we know:

$$\{I\}\ (\hat{S}[\Delta_1])[V_1/V];\dots(\hat{S}[\Delta_4])[V_4/V]\ \{I\}$$

Since we also have $\varphi \models \mathcal{I}$ from the premise, this implies:

$$\{\varphi\} \text{ while}(C_1) \{(\hat{S}[\Delta_1])[V_1/V]; \dots (\hat{S}[\Delta_4])[V_4/V]\} \{I \land \neg C_1\}$$

Next, since we can commute statements over different variables and I implies $\bigwedge_{ij} C[V_i/V] \leftrightarrow C[V_j/V]$, we can conclude:

$$\{\varphi\}$$
 while (C_1) $\{(\hat{S}[\Delta_1])[V_1/V]\}; \dots;$ while (C_4) $\{(\hat{S}[\Delta_4])[V_4/V]\}$ $\{I \land \neg C_1\}$

Finally, because the loop while (C_i) $\{\hat{S}[\Delta_i]\}$ is the same as $(\text{while}(C_i) \{\hat{S}\})[\Delta_i]$, we have:

$$\{\varphi\}$$
 (while (C_1) $\{\hat{S}[V_1/V]\})[\Delta_1]; \dots;$
(while (C_4) $\{\hat{S}[V_4/V]\})[\Delta_4]$ $\{I \land \neg C_1\}$

Case 6. First, assuming the soundness of the standard *post* operator, we have $\{\varphi\}S\{post(S,\varphi)\}$. Using the premise of the proof rule and Theorem 5.4, we obtain:

$$\{\varphi\}$$
 $(\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_1^1])[V_1/V]; \dots (\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_4^1])[V_4/V]$ $\{post(\mathcal{S}, \varphi)\}$

Since Δ_i^1 is the prefix of Δ_i that contains as many holes as \hat{S} , we also know $\hat{S}[\Delta_i^1] = \hat{S}[\Delta_i]$. Thus, we get:

$$\{\varphi\}\ (\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_1])[V_1/V];\dots(\hat{\mathcal{S}}[\Delta_4])[V_4/V]\ \{post(\mathcal{S},\varphi)\}$$

Appendix D: Soundness of n-way Diff Algorithm

Theorem 6.1 follows directly from the following two lemmas:

Lemma 10.1. *If* $|\Delta| = \text{numHoles}(\hat{\Delta})$, then Compose ensures the following post-conditions:

- $|\Delta'| = |\hat{\Delta}|$
- For any \hat{S} s.t. numHoles(\hat{S}) = $|\hat{\Delta}|$, $(\hat{S}[\hat{\Delta}])[\Delta] = \hat{S}[\Delta']$

Proof. Consider the two postconditions of Compose. For the branch $\hat{\Delta} = [\]$, it is easy to see that $\Delta' = \hat{\Delta} = [\]$ and thus $|\Delta'| = |\hat{\Delta}|$. For any \hat{S} with 0 holes, applying any edits gets back \hat{S} , satisfying the second postcondition.

For the branch head($\hat{\Delta}$) = $[\cdot]$, we know numHoles(tail($\hat{\Delta}$)) = numHoles($\hat{\Delta}$) – 1 = $|\text{tail}(\Delta)|$ (given the precondition), which satisfies the precondition of Compose at line 14. The first postcondition of the recursive call to Compose implies that size of the return value ($|\Delta'|$) equals $|\text{head}(\Delta)| + |\text{tail}(\hat{\Delta})| =$ $1+|\hat{\Delta}|-1=|\hat{\Delta}|$. Now consider a \hat{S} such that numHoles(\hat{S}) = $|\hat{\Delta}|$. Let Δ'' be the return from the recursive call to Compose. Then $\hat{S}[\Delta'] = \hat{S}[\text{head}(\Delta) :: \Delta''] = (\hat{S}[\text{head}(\Delta)])[\Delta'']$ (by definition of applying an edit). Since numHoles($\hat{S}[head(\Delta)]$) = numHoles(\hat{S})-1 = $|\text{tail}(\hat{\Delta})|$, we know that $(\hat{S}[\text{head}(\Delta)])[\Delta'']$ = $((\hat{S}[\text{head}(\Delta)])[\text{tail}(\hat{\Delta})])[\text{tail}(\Delta)]$ (from the second postcondition of the recursive call). Since head($\hat{\Delta}$) = [·] in this branch, $(\hat{S}[\text{head}(\Delta)])[\text{tail}(\hat{\Delta})] = (\hat{S}[[\cdot] :: \text{tail}(\hat{\Delta})])[\text{head}(\Delta)] = (\hat{S}[\hat{\Delta}])[\text{head}(\Delta)].$ This follows from the fact that applying head(Δ) to the first hole in \hat{S} followed by applying tail($\hat{\Delta}$) is identical to applying a hole in the first hole in \hat{S} followed by applying tail($\hat{\Delta}$), followed by applying head(Δ) which applies it to the first hole in \hat{S} . Further, $((\hat{S}[\hat{\Delta}])[\text{head}(\Delta)])[\text{tail}(\Delta)] = (\hat{S}[\hat{\Delta}])[\Delta]$ by the rule of applying edits, which proves this postcondition.

For the branch head($\hat{\Delta}$) \neq [·], we know numHoles(tail($\hat{\Delta}$)) = numHoles($\hat{\Delta}$). This along with the precondition of Compose establishes the preconditon to the call to Compose at line 15. Let Δ'' denote the return of the recursive call to Compose. The recursive call ensures that $|\Delta''| = |\text{tail}(\hat{\Delta})| = |\hat{\Delta}| - 1$. Thus $|\Delta'| = |\text{head}(\hat{\Delta}) :: \Delta''| = |\hat{\Delta}|$, which establishes the first postcondition. Now consider a \hat{S} such that numHoles(\hat{S}) = $|\hat{\Delta}|$. Then $\hat{S}[\Delta'] = \hat{S}[\text{head}(\hat{\Delta}) :: \Delta''] = (\hat{S}[\text{head}(\hat{\Delta})])[\Delta'']$. Since numHoles($\hat{S}[\text{head}(\hat{\Delta})]$) = numHoles(\hat{S})-1 = $|\text{tail}(\hat{\Delta})|$, we know that $(\hat{S}[\text{head}(\hat{\Delta})])[\Delta''] = ((\hat{S}[\text{head}(\hat{\Delta})])[\text{tail}(\hat{\Delta})])[\Delta]$ (from the second postcondition of the recursive call), which simplifies to $(\hat{S}[\text{head}(\hat{\Delta}) :: \text{tail}(\hat{\Delta})])[\Delta] = (\hat{S}[\hat{\Delta})])[\Delta]$ by the property of applying an edit.

Lemma 10.2. If $|\Delta_i| = \text{numHoles}(\hat{S})$ for all $i \in [1, ..., k]$ and 2Diff satisfies the contract provided in Algorithm 3, then GenEdit ensures the following post-conditions:

• $|\Delta'_i| = \text{numHoles}(\hat{S}')$ for $i \in [1, ..., k+1]$ • $\hat{S}'[\Delta'_{k+1}] = S$ and $\hat{S}'[\Delta'_i] = \hat{S}[\Delta_i]$ for $i \in [1, ..., k]$

Proof. First, the precondition $|\Delta_i| = \text{numHoles}(\hat{\Delta})$ of Compose in line 9 is satisfied from the precondition $|\Delta_i| = \text{numHoles}(\hat{S})$ of GenEdit and the second postcondition numHoles $(\hat{\Delta}) = \text{numHoles}(\hat{S})$ of Diff2.

Now, consider the postcondition $|\Delta_i'| = \text{numHoles}(\hat{S}')$ for $i \in [1, ..., k+1]$. From the first postcondition of Diff2 at line 7, we know that $\text{numHoles}(\hat{S}') = |\hat{\Delta}|$. For any $i \in$

 $[1, \ldots, k]$, the first postcondition of Compose at line 9 implies $|\hat{\Delta}| = |\Delta'_i|$. Together, they imply that numHoles(\hat{S}') = $|\Delta'_i|$.

The postcondition $\hat{S}'[\Delta'_{k+1}] = \hat{S}$ follows directly from the third postcondition of Diff2 at line 7 and line ??. Now consider Δ'_i for $i \in [1, \ldots, k]$. We know from the postcondition of Diff2 that numHoles($\hat{S}') = |\hat{\Delta}|$. Therefore, from the postcondition of Compose at line ?? (where we substitute \hat{S}' for the bound variable \hat{S}), we know that $(\hat{S}'[\hat{\Delta}])[\Delta_i] = \hat{S}'[\Delta'_i]$. From the postcondition of Diff2 at line 7, we know $\hat{S}'[\hat{\Delta}] = \hat{S}$. Together, they imply $\hat{S}[\Delta_i] = \hat{S}'[\Delta'_i]$.

Appendix E: Example of 4-way diff

We illustrate the 4-way *diff* using a simple example:

According to Algorithm 2, we start out with the shared program $\hat{S} = O$ and $\Delta_O = [$].

Now consider the first call to GenEdit(\hat{S} , A, Δ_O). After invoking Diff2(A, \hat{S}) at line 7, it returns the tuple (\hat{S}' , Δ , $\hat{\Delta}$) where $\hat{S}' \doteq c$? {[·]} : {y := 2}; [·], $\Delta \doteq [x := 2, \text{skip}]$ and $\hat{\Delta} \doteq [x := 1, z := 3]$. The reader can verify that $\hat{S}'[\hat{\Delta}] = A$ and $\hat{S}'[\hat{\Delta}] = \hat{S} = O$. Next, consider the call to Compose($\hat{\Delta}$, Δ_1) where $\Delta_1 = [$]. The call executes the branch in line ?? twice (since $\hat{\Delta}$ does not contain any holes) and returns Δ' as $\hat{\Delta}$. Therefore, the call to GenEdit returns the tuple (\hat{S}' , [x := 1, z := 3], [x := 2, skip]), which constitutes \hat{S} , Δ_O , $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$ for the next call to GenEdit.

The next call to GenEdit(\hat{S} , B, Δ_O , $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$) calls Diff2(B, c? {[·]} : {y := 2}; [·]) and returns (\hat{S}' , Δ , $\hat{\Delta}$), where $\hat{S}' \doteq c$? {[·]} : {[·]}; [·] and $\Delta \doteq [x := 1, y := 2, z := 3]$ (which becomes $\Delta_{\mathcal{B}}$) and $\hat{\Delta} \doteq [[\cdot], y := 2, [\cdot]]$. The reader can verify that $\hat{S}'[\hat{\Delta}] = B$ and $\hat{S}'[\hat{\Delta}] = \hat{S}$. The loop at line 8 updates Δ_O and $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$ — we only describe the latter. The return of Compose($\hat{\Delta}$, $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$) updates $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$ to [x := 2, y := 2, skip] by walking the first argument and replacing [·] with corresponding entry from $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$. Similarly, the Δ_O is updated by Compose($\hat{\Delta}$, Δ_O) to [x := 1, y := 2, z := 3].

The final call to GenEdit(\hat{S} , M, Δ_O , $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$, $\Delta_{\mathcal{B}}$) returns the tuple (\hat{S} , Δ_O , $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$, $\Delta_{\mathcal{B}}$, Δ_M), where \hat{S} , Δ_O , $\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}$, $\Delta_{\mathcal{B}}$ remain unchanged (since \hat{S} already contains holes at all the changed locations), and Δ_M is assigned [x := 2, y := 3, skip]. The reader can verify that $\hat{S}[\Delta_O] = O$, $\hat{S}[\Delta_{\mathcal{A}}] = A$, $\hat{S}[\Delta_{\mathcal{B}}] = B$, $\hat{S}[\Delta_M] = M$.

Appendix F: An abstract implementation of Diff2

Algorithm 3 describes Diff2 algorithm for computing the 2-way diff. It takes as input a program S and a program with holes \hat{S} and returns the shared program with holes

Algorithm 3 Algorithm for 2-way AST Diff

```
1: procedure Diff2(S, \hat{S})
            Input: A program S and a shared program \hat{S}
 2:
            Output: Shared program \hat{S}' and edits \Delta, \hat{\Delta}
 3:
            Ensures: |\Delta| = |\hat{\Delta}| = \text{numHoles}(\hat{S}')
 4:
            Ensures: numHoles(\hat{\Delta}) = numHoles(\hat{S})
 5:
            Ensures: \hat{S}'[\Delta] = S, \hat{S}'[\hat{\Delta}] = \hat{S}
 6:
            if \hat{S} = [\cdot] then return ([\cdot], [S], [\hat{S}])
 7:
            else if \hat{S} = S then return (S, [], [])
 8:
            else if * then return Diff2(S; skip, \tilde{S})
      Non-deterministic skip introduction
            else if * then return Diff2(skip; S, \hat{S})
10:
     Non-deterministic skip introduction
            else if * then return Diff2(S, \hat{S}; skip)
11:
     Non-deterministic skip introduction
            else if * then return Diff2(S, skip; \hat{S})
12:
      Non-deterministic skip introduction
            else if S = S_1; S_2 and \hat{S} = \hat{S}_1; \hat{S}_2 then
13:
                  (\hat{\mathcal{S}}'_1, \Delta_1, \hat{\Delta}_1) := \text{Diff2}(\mathcal{S}_1, \hat{\mathcal{S}}_1)
14:
                  (\hat{\mathcal{S}}_2', \Delta_2, \hat{\Delta}_2) := \mathsf{Diff2}(\mathcal{S}_2, \hat{\mathcal{S}}_2)
15:
                  return (\hat{\mathcal{S}}'_1; \hat{\mathcal{S}}'_2, \Delta_1 :: \Delta_2, \hat{\Delta}_1 :: \hat{\Delta}_2)
16:
            else if S = C ? \{S_1\} : \{S_2\} \text{ and } \hat{S} = C' ? \{\hat{S}_1\} :
17:
      \{\hat{\mathcal{S}}_2\} and C = C' then
                  (\hat{\mathcal{S}}'_1, \Delta_1, \hat{\Delta}_1) := \text{Diff2}(\mathcal{S}_1, \hat{\mathcal{S}}_1)
18:
                  (\hat{\mathcal{S}}_2', \Delta_2, \hat{\Delta}_2) := \text{Diff2}(\mathcal{S}_2, \hat{\mathcal{S}}_2)
19:
                  return (C ? \{\hat{\mathcal{S}}_1'\} : \{\hat{\mathcal{S}}_2'\}, \Delta_1 :: \Delta_2, \hat{\Delta}_1 :: \hat{\Delta}_2)
20:
            else if S = \text{while}(C) \{S_1\} and \hat{S} = \text{while}(C') \{\hat{S}_1\}
21:
      and C = C' then
                  (\hat{\mathcal{S}}'_1, \Delta_1, \hat{\Delta}_1) := \text{Diff2}(\mathcal{S}_1, \hat{\mathcal{S}}_1)
22:
                  return (while(C) {\hat{S}'_1}, \Delta_1, \hat{\Delta}_1)
23:
24:
                  return ([·], [S], [\hat{S}])
25:
```

 \hat{S}' and edits Δ and $\hat{\Delta}$, such that $\hat{S}'[\Delta] = S$ and $\hat{S}'[\hat{\Delta}] = \hat{S}$. Since \hat{S} may contain holes, the edit $\hat{\Delta}$ may contain holes. The algorithm recursively descends down the structure of the two programs and tries to identify the common program and generate respective edits for the differences. We use nondeterministic conditional to abstract from actual heuristics to match parts of the two ASTs. For example, when matching S with \hat{S}_1 ; \hat{S}_2 , a heuristic may decide to match S with \hat{S}_1 and create a shared program $[\cdot]$; $[\cdot]$ and edits $\Delta = [S, skip]$, $\hat{\Delta} = [\hat{S}_1, \hat{S}_2]$; it may also choose to match S with \hat{S}_2 and create a shared program $[\cdot]$; $[\cdot]$ and edits $\Delta = [\text{skip}, S], [\hat{S}_1, \hat{S}_2]$. The decision is often based on algorithms based on variants of longest-common-subsequence [24]. However, these decisions only help maximize the size of the shared program, and do not affect the soundness of the edit generation. Lines 9 to 12 allow us to model all such heuristics by nondeterministically inserting skip statemnets before or after a statement. Line 24 ensures that the diff procedure can always return by constructing the trivial shared program [·] and S and \hat{S} as the respective edits. Line 7 checks if \hat{S} is a hole, then the shared program is a hole [.] and the two edits contain S and \hat{S} respectively. Line 8 is the case when S equals \hat{S} . We use = to denote the syntactic equality of the two syntax trees. The remaining rules are standard and recurse down the AST structure and match the subtrees.