

**IMPORTANT: Explain your answer briefly. Do not just write a short answer or fill the assembly code.**

1. [10pts] The following code fragment has a potential vulnerability.

```
void* copy_elements(void *ele_src[], int ele_cnt, size_t ele_size) {
    /*
     * Allocate buffer for ele_cnt objects, each of ele_size bytes
     * and copy from locations designated by ele_src
     */
    void *result = malloc(ele_cnt * ele_size);
    if (result == NULL)
        /* malloc failed */
        return NULL;
    void *next = result;
    int i;
    for (i = 0; i < ele_cnt; i++) {
        /* Copy object i to destination */
        memcpy(next, ele_src[i], ele_size);
        /* Move pointer to next memory region */
        next += ele_size;
    }
    return result;
}
```

- A. [4pts] Write possible values for ele\_cnt and ele\_size to crash the application/system. Explain the reason.

- B. [6pts] Write extra C codes to add before the malloc call to prevent the crash.

2. [10pts][floating point data representation]

- A. [4pts] Assume variables `x`, `f`, and `d` are of type `int`, `float`, and `double`, respectively. (Neither `f` nor `d` equals to +infinity, -infinity, or NaN). For each of the following expressions, either argue that it is always true or give a counterexample if it is not.

A-1) `x == (int) (double) x`

A-2) `f == -(-f)`

A-3) `1.0/2 == 1/2.0`

A-4) `d*d >= 0.0`

A-5) `(f+d) - f == d`

- B. [3pts] Write the rounded binary numbers for the following values. They should be rounded to nearest 1/4 (2 bits right of binary point, and must use “round-to-even” rule).

Explain the advantage of such “round-to-even” rule, compared to round-down or round-up.

10.00011               => \_\_\_\_\_

10.00110               => \_\_\_\_\_

10.11100               => \_\_\_\_\_

10.10100               => \_\_\_\_\_

- C. [3pts] Explain how a floating point compare instruction (fcmp) can be implemented for the IEEE fp format. How will it be different from the integer compare instruction (cmp)?

3. [5pts] In the following code fragment, argue whether b and c always have the same value or not.

```
typedef union {
    float f;
    unsigned u;
} bit_float_t

float bit2float (unsigned u) {
    bit_float_t arg;
    arg.u = u;
    return arg.f;
}

unsigned a = random();
float b = bit2float(a);
float c = (float) a;
```

4. [8pts] Answer the two questions for the following C function and the corresponding assembly code.

```
long rfun(unsigned long x) {

    if ( _____ )
        return _____;

    unsigned long nx = _____;
    long rv = rfun(nx);
    return _____;
}
```

```
rfun:
    pushq    %rbx
    moveq    %rdi, %rbx
    movl    $0, %eax
    testq   %rdi, %rdi
    je      .L2
    shrq    $2, %rdi
    call    rfun
    addq    %rbx, %rax
.L2:
    popq    %rbx
    ret
```

- A. [3pts] What value in the C code does rfun store in %rbx?

- B. [5pts] Fill in the missing expressions in the C code.

5. [7pts] The following two C code fragments show two different ways of supporting 2D data structures.

```
#define ZLEN 5
typedef int zip_dig[ZLEN];

#define PCOUNT 4
zip_dig pgh[PCOUNT] =
{{1, 5, 2, 0, 6},
 {1, 5, 2, 1, 3},
 {1, 5, 2, 1, 7},
 {1, 5, 2, 2, 1}};

int get_pgh_digit
(int index, int dig)
{
    return pgh[index][dig];
}
```

```
zip_dig cmu = { 1, 5, 2, 1, 3 };
zip_dig mit = { 0, 2, 1, 3, 9 };
zip_dig ucb = { 9, 4, 7, 2, 0 };

#define UCOUNT 3

int *univ[UCOUNT] = {mit, cmu,
ucb};

int get_univ_digit (size_t index,
size_t digit){

    return univ[index][digit];
}
```

A. [4pts] Complete the following assembly codes for the two access functions. (explain your answer)

```
1) _____
addl %rax, %rsi
movl 2) _____, %eax
ret
```

```
salq    $2, %rsi
addq    3) _____, %rsi
4) _____
ret
```

B. [3pts] Discuss the pros and cons of the two approaches.

6. Find the minimum number of operations to implement the given functions.

- Points will not be given if functions are implemented more than your minimum number of operations.
- You should justify your solution by implementing the functions.
- Assignment operator '=' is legal. But it will not be counted as an operator.

(1) addOK [5pts]

Description	Determine if can compute x+y without overflow
Examples	addOK(0x80000000,0x80000000) = 0 addOK(0x80000000,0x70000000) = 1
Legal Ops	! ~ & ^   + << >>

The minimum number of operations to implement this function is \_\_\_\_\_.

```
int addOK(int, int)
{
}
```

8. [10pts] Solve the following problems with the given assembly code.

C code
void phase(char *input) { int i; int numbers[6]; read_six_numbers(input, numbers); for(i = 1; i < 6; i++) { if ( [ ] ) explode_bomb(); } }

Assembly
Dump of assembler code for function phase:
0x000055555555522a <+0>: push %rbp 0x000055555555522b <+1>: push %rbx 0x000055555555522c <+2>: sub \$0x28,%rsp 0x0000555555555230 <+6>: mov %fs:0x28,%rax 0x0000555555555239 <+15>: mov %rax,0x18(%rsp) 0x000055555555523e <+20>: xor %eax,%eax 0x0000555555555240 <+22>: mov %rsp,%rbp 0x0000555555555243 <+25>: mov %rsp,%rsi 0x0000555555555246 <+28>: callq 0x555555555820 <read_six_numbers> 0x000055555555524b <+33>: mov %rsp,%rbx 0x000055555555524e <+36>: add \$0x14,%rbp 0x0000555555555252 <+40>: jmp 0x55555555525d <phase+51> 0x0000555555555254 <+42>: add \$0x4,%rbx 0x0000555555555258 <+46>: cmp %rbp,%rbx 0x000055555555525b <+49>: je 0x55555555526f <phase+69> 0x000055555555525d <+51>: mov (%rbx),%eax 0x000055555555525f <+53>: lea 0x2(%rax,%rax,2),%eax 0x0000555555555263 <+57>: cmp %eax,0x4(%rbx) 0x0000555555555266 <+60>: je 0x555555555254 <phase+42> 0x0000555555555268 <+62>: callq 0x5555555557fa <explode_bomb> 0x000055555555526d <+67>: jmp 0x555555555254 <phase+42> 0x000055555555526f <+69>: mov 0x18(%rsp),%rax 0x0000555555555274 <+74>: xor %fs:0x28,%rax 0x000055555555527d <+83>: jne 0x555555555286 <phase+92> 0x000055555555527f <+85>: add \$0x28,%rsp 0x0000555555555283 <+89>: pop %rbx 0x0000555555555284 <+90>: pop %rbp 0x0000555555555285 <+91>: retq 0x0000555555555286 <+92>: callq 0x555555554ed8 End of assembler dump.

A. Fill the C statement in the blank, based on the corresponding assembly codes. [5pts]

B. What is the solution if the first number of the solution is “1”? [5pts]

10. [7pts] Solve the following problems with the given C code and assembly code

**C code**

```
long mul(long *p,long val)
{
    long x=*p;
    long y=x*val;
    *p=y;
    return x;
}
long call_mul(long x)
{
    long v1=10;
    long v2=mul(&v1,300);
    return x+v2;
}
```

**Assembly**

```
mul:
    movq (%rdi), %rax
    imul %rax, %rsi
    movq %rsi, (%rdi)
    ret
call_mul:
    subq $16, %rsp
    movq $1000, 8(%rsp)
    
    
call mul ←
    addq 8(%rsp), %rax
    addq $16, %rsp
    ret
```

A. [3pts] Fill the assembly code in the blank(Assembly) [3pts]

B. [4pts] Assume that the program starts with the call\_mul function. Draw the stack frame when the program **finishes executing “call mul” instructions.**



**Initial Stack Structure**

11. [13pts] Answer the questions related to the following C and assembly codes.

```
/* Get string from stdin */
char *gets(char *dest)
{
    int c = getchar();
    char *p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

```
void call_echo()
{
    echo();
}
void echo()
{
    char buf[8];
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

```
00000000004006cf <echo>:
4006cf: 48 83 ec 18      sub    $0x18,%rsp
4006d3: 48 89 e7      mov    %rsp,%rdi
4006d6: e8 a5 ff ff ff  callq  400680 <gets>
4006db: 48 89 e7      mov    %rsp,%rdi
4006de: e8 3d fe ff ff  callq  400520 <puts@plt>
4006e3: 48 83 c4 18      add    $0x18,%rsp
4006e7: c3              retq

00000000004006e8 <call_echo>:
4006e8: 48 83 ec 08      sub    $0x8,%rsp
4006ec: b8 00 00 00 00      mov    $0x0,%eax
4006f1: e8 d9 ff ff ff  callq  4006cf <echo>
4006f6: 48 83 c4 08      add    $0x8,%rsp
4006fa: c3              retq
```

- A. [2pts] Find an input for “gets” to change the return address set by “call <echo>” instruction in the stack to 0x0 (8B).
- B. [2pts] Describe how an attacker can execute a short sequence of instructions in the example by exploiting the vulnerability.
- C. [2pts] Explain how the stack address randomization can thwart the attack?
- D. [3pts] Explain how return-oriented programming (ROP) works and how it can allow the attacker to bypass the non-executable permission setting on the stack and to execute a sequence of instructions the attacker wants to run?
- E. [4pts] Fill the blanks in the following assembly code which adds the stack canary protection.

```
00000000004006cf <echo>:  
40072f: sub    $0x18,%rsp  
400733: mov    %fs:0x28,%rax  
40073c: mov    %rax,0x8(%rsp)  
400741: xor    %eax,%eax  
400743: mov    %rsp,%rdi  
400746: callq  4006e0 <gets>  
40074b: mov    %rsp,%rdi  
40074e: callq  400570 <puts@plt>  
400753: _____  
400758: _____  
400761: je     400768 <echo+0x39>  
400763: callq  400580 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>  
400768: add    $0x18,%rsp  
40076c: retq
```