

RISK AND RESILIENCE BOOTCAMP





WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT



RISK RESPONSE PLANNING

This module is an overview on developing a high maturity risk response plan



MITIGATION PLANNING

- Mitigation planning
 - How an organization turns abstract risk analysis into concrete, executed change
 - Risk assessment describes what could go wrong
 - Risk response chooses how to treat it (avoid/mitigate/transfer/accept)
- The mitigation plan answers
 - “Exactly what will we do, by when, with which resources, and how will we know we’ve succeeded?”
- In mature environments
 - Mitigation plans are tightly integrated with
 - Risk registers, GRC workflows, project management, and operational metrics (KPIs/KRIs)
 - Poorly defined mitigation is one of the most common failure modes in risk program
 - Risks get “accepted by default” because mitigation is vague, under-resourced, or untracked

MITIGATION PLANNING

- A robust mitigation plan has four pillars
 - Resources
 - Timelines
 - Success criteria
 - Clear ownership

RESOURCE PLANNING

- Mitigation without adequate resources is performative
 - It exists only on paper
 - Resource planning ensures the organization has the resources to implement the plan
- Technical resources
 - These are the people who actually change things in systems
 - Engineers / Developers: apply code changes, refactor applications, improve error handling
 - Platform / Cloud Engineers: adjust infrastructure, implement auto-scaling, reconfigure IAM
 - Security Analysts / Engineers: implement new controls, tuning SIEM/SOAR rules, deploy EDR
 - Architects: redesign critical parts of the system (e.g., remove single points of failure, break monoliths, segment networks)

RESOURCE PLANNING

- Technical resources
 - Example
 - Mitigation: "Reduce lateral movement risk in internal network"
 - Technical Resources
 - Network engineer to implement segmentation
 - Security engineer to tune microsegmentation policy
 - Architect to define zero-trust design patterns

RESOURCE PLANNING

- Financial resources
 - Mitigation often requires spend, including
 - New tools (e.g., CSPM platform, PAM solution, backup system)
 - Additional cloud capacity or redundancy
 - External consultants or penetration testers
 - Training programs for staff
 - Risk teams must coordinate with Finance and leadership to secure budget
 - Expenditures often justified with evidence for
 - Risk-reduction value
 - Cost of inaction vs. cost of mitigation
 - Regulatory/penalty avoidance

RESOURCE PLANNING

- Human resources: owners and SMEs
 - Mitigation needs named people, not just roles
 - Risk Owner: accountable for risk closure and residual risk
 - Mitigation Owner / Project Lead: coordinates the actual remediation activities
 - Subject Matter Experts (SMEs): cryptography, identity, DB, cloud, etc.
 - High-maturity organizations track workload to ensure people tasked with mitigation actually have capacity, not just theoretical assignment

RESOURCE PLANNING

- Infrastructure resources
 - Mitigation often requires safe testing and rollout environments, including
 - Non-production environments that resemble production (staging, pre-prod)
 - Sandbox environments for testing patches, configuration changes, and failover
 - Extra cloud capacity for
 - Blue/green deployments
 - Rolling updates
 - DR testing
 - Parallel runs

RESOURCE PLANNING

- Infrastructure resources
 - Example:
 - Mitigation: "Implement real-time database replication across regions"
 - Required infrastructure
 - Additional DB nodes in second region
 - Replication network setup
 - Load balancer configuration
 - Without infrastructure planning, mitigation may raise new risks
 - For example: untested failover, performance degradation

TIMELINES

- Timelines transform mitigation
 - From “we should do this”
 - Into “we will do this by X, and we will measure progress along the way”
- Risk-based timelines
 - Not all risks are equal.
 - Timeline design must consider
 - Inherent risk level (likelihood × impact)
 - Exposure duration – how long the organization has been exposed
 - Risk velocity – how fast incidents could materialize
 - Compensating controls – can we “buy time” safely?
 - Critical, high-velocity risks require days, not months

TIMELINES

- Regulatory alignment
 - Certain timelines are effectively non-negotiable due to law or regulation
 - Patching deadlines for critical vulnerabilities in regulated industries
 - Time-bound remediation of audit findings
 - Contractual remediation SLAs with clients
 - Mitigation plans must explicitly reference these obligations and prioritize accordingly
 - Example
 - "Remediate high CVSS vulnerabilities within 30 days, critical within 7 days"
 - "Address audit-identified high-severity control deficiencies within 90 days"

TIMELINES

- Explicit milestones
 - Rather than a single end-date, mature plans define intermediate milestones, such as
 - Design complete by Week 2
 - Test environment implemented by Week 4
 - Pilot deployment completed by Week 6
 - Full production rollout by Week 8
 - Verification and closure by Week 10
 - Milestones allow
 - Progress tracking
 - Early detection of delays
 - Management visibility
 - This is where risk mitigation intersects with project management discipline

SUCCESS CRITERIA

- Define what “done” means
 - Whether risk has actually been reduced, not just “activities performed”
 - Good success criteria are
 - Specific: tied to a defined metric or state
 - Measurable: quantifiable with data
 - Auditable: evidence can be produced
 - Risk-linked: clearly reduce likelihood/impact

SUCCESS CRITERIA

- Example 1
 - “Reduce critical vulnerability count by 80% within 60 days”
 - *Metric.* # of critical vulnerabilities from scanner X
 - *Baseline.* 500 critical vulns today
 - *Target.* 100 or fewer in 60 days
 - *Risk Link.* Direct reduction of attack surface
 - *Auditability.* Before/after scan reports

SUCCESS CRITERIA

- Example 2
 - “Achieve 100% MFA enforcement on privileged accounts.”
 - *Metric.* % of privileged identities requiring MFA.
 - *Scope.* Admin accounts, root users, domain admins, cloud privileged roles.
 - *Target.* 100%. No exceptions unless formally approved and documented.
 - *Risk Link.* Reduces credential-based compromise risk.
 - *Auditability.* Identity provider logs, configuration evidence.

SUCCESS CRITERIA

- Example 3
 - “Reduce MTTR from 4 hours → 1 hour”
 - *Metric*: Mean Time to Recover (MTTR) for SEV-1 incidents
 - *Baseline*: 4 hours average over last quarter
 - *Target*: 1 hour in next quarter
 - Mitigation components
 - Automation (SOAR, scripts)
 - Better on-call coverage
 - Improved diagnostics and runbooks
 - *Risk Link*: Limits impact duration and financial loss.
 - *Auditability*: Incident logs & metric dashboards.

SUCCESS CRITERIA

- Example 4
 - “Zero backup integrity failures for 90 days”
 - *Metric.* # of failed restore tests or corrupt backups
 - *Baseline:* e.g., 5 integrity failures in past 90 days
 - *Target:* 0 failures in the next 90 days
 - Mitigation components
 - Better backup procedures
 - Verification scripts
 - Storage configuration fixes
 - *Risk Link:* Reduces data loss and recovery risk
 - *Auditability:* Backup reports and restore test logs

SUCCESS CRITERIA

- Why success criteria matter
 - Without solid success criteria
 - Mitigation degenerates into “activity theater”
 - Risk doesn’t actually change even though teams are busy
 - Leadership can’t tell if investments are reducing exposure
 - With clear criteria, risk and leadership can evaluate
 - Was the risk meaningfully reduced?
 - Did we hit deadlines?
 - Do we accept residual risk or plan further mitigation?

RESPONSIBLE PARTIES (RACI)

- If everyone is responsible, no one is responsible
 - Clear ownership is critical under pressure and for sustained follow-through
 - The RACI model in mitigation
 - Responsible (R) – Does the work
 - Accountable (A) – Ultimately answerable; approves completion
 - Consulted (C) – Provides expertise, must be engaged
 - Informed (I) – Kept updated; doesn't influence day-to-day actions

RESPONSIBLE PARTIES (RACI)

- Responsible
 - Ops engineer implementing failover
 - Security engineer deploying new EDR rules
 - Cloud engineer reconfiguring IAM or network
- Accountable
 - Product or system owner (e.g., Head of Payments Platform)
 - Ultimately “owns” the risk and signs off that mitigation is complete
- Consulted
 - Security team (control design and validation)
 - Risk and GRC (alignment with risk appetite and frameworks)
 - Legal and compliance (for regulatory considerations)
- Informed
 - Senior leadership (for major risk items)
 - Internal audit (for future assurance work)
 - Board-level committees (for strategic risks)

RESPONSIBLE PARTIES (RACI)

- Example: RACI for a Critical Vulnerability Mitigation
 - Risk: Critical remote code execution vulnerability in externally exposed web app
 - R – Responsible
 - App dev team (apply fix)
 - DevOps team (deploy patch)
 - A – Accountable
 - Application owner (business owner of that service)
 - C – Consulted
 - Security engineering (validate patch effectiveness)
 - Architecture team (ensure patch aligns with standards)
 - I – Informed
 - CISO, CIO
 - Risk committee

HIGH-QUALITY MITIGATION PLAN

- Example
- Risk: Elevated credential theft risk due to lack of MFA on privileged accounts.
 - Strategy: Mitigate via enforcing MFA and reducing unnecessary privileged accounts.
 - Resources:
 - Technical: IAM engineer, security engineer, directory services specialist
 - Financial: Budget for MFA token licensing
 - Infrastructure: Directory sync testing environment
 - Timeline:
 - Design & pilot: 2 weeks
 - Rollout to admins: 4 weeks
 - Rollout to service accounts where possible: 6 weeks
 - Success Criteria:
 - 100% of human privileged accounts protected by MFA within 6 weeks
 - 0 unprotected privileged logins detected in SIEM over 30-day verification period
 - RACI:
 - R: IAM engineer & security engineer
 - A: Head of Infrastructure
 - C: CISO, Security Architect
 - I: CIO, Internal Audit

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FALLBACK / CONTINGENCY PLANS

- Mitigation plans are designed to reduce risk by addressing root causes
 - But in real-world systems, especially complex, distributed, and tightly coupled ones, mitigation may
 - Take longer than expected
 - Only partially succeed
 - Be blocked by external constraints (vendors, regulations, dependencies)
 - Introduce new or unforeseen side effects
 - Fallback and contingency plans provide the safety net when mitigation is insufficient or too slow.
 - Core components of resilience engineering
 - They ensure that critical services continue to operate, perhaps in degraded form, even when normal controls or mitigation paths are compromised

FALLBACK / CONTINGENCY PLANS

- Operational workarounds and alternate pathways
 - Fallback plans are tactical
 - Short to medium term responses
 - Allow the organization to maintain some level of service despite failures in primary systems or processes
 - Assumes that
 - The primary path is temporarily unavailable or unreliable
 - Full root-cause resolution will take time
 - The organization must continue operating in the meantime
 - Fallbacks are deliberately designed into architectures and processes

FALLBACK / CONTINGENCY PLANS

- Failover to backup systems
 - Failover mechanisms reroute workloads from a failing primary system to a secondary one
 - Examples
 - Database failover from primary region to a hot standby in another region
 - Switching from primary message queue cluster to a backup cluster
 - Moving traffic from one data center to a mirrored facility
 - Design considerations
 - Data consistency: Is the backup RPO acceptable (e.g., 5 minutes of data loss)?
 - Performance: Can the backup handle full production load?
 - Automation: Is failover automatic (health checks, DNS failover) or manual (runbook-driven)?
 - Failover is often a planned fallback, tested through BC/DR exercises

FALLBACK / CONTINGENCY PLANS

- Switch from automated to manual processing
 - When automated systems fail or become unreliable
 - Manual processes can serve as temporary bridges
 - Examples
 - Manual approval of high-value transactions when rule engines or fraud systems are offline
 - Customer service agents manually entering orders when front-end portals fail
 - Operations teams manually running batch jobs that normally run via scheduler
- Risks and constraints
 - Human capacity limits (cannot scale indefinitely)
 - Higher error rates
 - Extended processing times
- Fallback planning must define how long manual mode is sustainable and what throughput is realistic

FALLBACK / CONTINGENCY PLANS

- Reroute traffic to alternate regions
 - In cloud and distributed systems, fallback often involves redirecting traffic
 - Examples
 - Routing users in Region A to Region B during an outage
 - Using global load balancers to steer traffic away from failing zones
 - Redirecting authentication to a secondary identity cluster
 - Challenges
 - Data residency/privacy constraints (e.g., cross-border data flow)
 - Latency increases affecting user experience
 - Capacity planning in alternate regions
 - Fallback here is often tightly coupled with multi-region architecture and BC/DR strategies

CONTINGENCY PLAN

- Fallback plans are more operational and tactical
- Contingency plans are strategic, high-level plans
 - For dealing with severe, persistent, or systemic failures when
 - Primary and backup options are compromised
 - External dependencies fail dramatically (e.g., vendor outage, cloud provider failure)
 - Safety, legal, or regulatory concerns override normal operations
- Contingency plans often involve major shifts in how or where operations are conducted

CONTINGENCY PLAN

- Activate alternative suppliers or vendors
 - If a critical third-party becomes unavailable or unreliable
 - Contingency may involve shifting to alternatives
 - Examples
 - Switching payment processor due to an extended outage
 - Moving from a compromised cloud security provider to another vendor
 - Activating a backup logistics company in a supply chain disruptio.
- Prerequisites
 - Pre-negotiated contracts or frameworks
 - Tested integration path
 - Risk assessments of alternative providers
- This ties directly into third-party risk management and vendor resilience

CONTINGENCY PLAN

- Transition operations to a disaster recovery (DR) site
 - When primary environments are severely compromised, contingency may involve full DR activation
 - Examples
 - Moving core banking systems to a DR data center after a catastrophic event
 - Running all workloads from an alternate region for an extended period
 - Operating in DR mode after a ransomware event while restoring primary systems
 - Key issues
 - DR environments must be kept in sync (data, config, security posture)
 - Staff must be trained to operate from DR sites
 - Operating for extended periods in DR may incur substantial costs
 - This is where BC/DR and contingency strategy fully overlap

CONTINGENCY PLAN

- Switch authentication to offline mode
 - In identity crises (e.g., IdP outage, SSO failures, compromised SSO integration) may require some sort of contingency plan for authentication
 - Examples
 - Temporarily allow cached or local authentication with strict constraints
 - Use one-time codes or alternate identity verification channels (e.g., helpdesk-initiated)
 - Limit access to only those who can authenticate via a secondary method
- Risk trade-off
 - Security risk increases (less robust authentication)
 - Operational risk decreases (users can log in)
 - Contingency decisions here must be risk-informed and time-bound

CONTINGENCY PLAN

- Execute emergency “Stop” procedures for unsafe conditions
 - Sometimes, the safest action is to halt operations
 - Examples
 - Stopping trading due to severe pricing or risk system malfunction
 - Pausing critical industrial processes in energy or manufacturing when safety systems are degraded
 - Halting high-value or high-risk transaction types (e.g., international wires) until controls are restored
 - This is akin to a “kill switch” and must be
 - Pre-authorized at the right level of leadership
 - Clearly documented and rehearsed
 - Supported by clear criteria and communication plans
 - In many regulated or safety-critical environments, failing to stop unsafe operations is more serious than temporary downtime

TRIGGERS

- Mark when fallbacks and contingencies activate
 - Fallbacks and contingencies must not depend on arbitrary judgment alone
 - Triggering conditions should be predefined, risk-based, and operationally clear
 - Many incidents start with attempts at standard mitigation
 - Fallbacks/contingencies kick in when
 - Mitigation is taking longer than RTO permits
 - There is no clear ETA for resolution
 - Complex root-cause analysis is ongoing and cannot be rushed
- Example
 - Mitigation for an authentication bug is estimated at 6 hours; RTO is 1 hour
 - Trigger fallback (reduced functionality or alternate auth), while mitigation continues in parallel

TRIGGERS

- KRIs indicate escalating instability
 - KRIs can act as early-warning triggers for fallback/contingency
 - Rising error rates in a core service beyond dynamic thresholds
 - Increasing “near misses” in transaction processing
 - Accelerating capacity saturation and queuing delays
 - Example
 - KRI: Payment failure rate > 5% and rising
 - Trigger fallback: temporarily route payment traffic to alternate payment provider or degrade non-critical functions

TRIGGERS

- RTO/RPO thresholds are at risk
 - When the time since incident onset approaches RTO
 - Potential data loss is approaching RPO
 - Fallback and contingency must activate to avoid breach of resilience commitments
 - Example
 - RTO = 2 hours for core banking services
 - After 90 minutes of failed mitigation, risk team triggers contingency DR site activation or reduced functionality mode
 - Here, timeliness is non-negotiable

TRIGGERS

- Customer-facing SLAs are compromised
 - SLAs (latency, uptime, transaction success) often define
 - Contractual obligations
 - Financial penalties
 - Reputational risk thresholds
 - Triggered when live metrics show SLA breaches or imminent breaches
 - Example
 - Latency for core API > 2s for more than 10 minutes
 - Uptime < 99.9% for the current period
 - Fallback might
 - Disable secondary features
 - Increase rate-limiting on non-critical clients
 - Trigger traffic rerouting to reduce load

SAFETY NETS

- High-resilience organizations treat fallback and contingency planning as dynamic
 - Plans are updated after major incidents and Post-Incident Reviews
 - New attack vectors or failure modes result in new fallback/contingency patterns
 - Automation increasingly orchestrates fallback activation (e.g., automatic failover, circuit breakers, traffic shifting)
 - Exercises include forced activation of fallback/contingency to validate feasibility and human readiness

BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY

- Business continuity and disaster recovery (BC/DR)
 - Ensures critical services and business functions can withstand, adapt to, and recover from disruptive events
 - Including technical failures, cyberattacks, third-party outages, physical incidents, or large-scale crises
 - Business Continuity (BC): Keeps business processes running, even if in degraded mode.
 - Disaster Recovery (DR): Restores technology systems to a trusted, operational state.
 - BC focuses on what the business must be able to do
 - DR focuses on what the technology must be able to provide to support BC

ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS

- Self-monitoring: continuous telemetry and anomaly detection
 - Systems continuously emit and analyze telemetry such as
 - Latency, error rates, queue depth
 - Authentication patterns
 - Resource usage, saturation metrics
 - Configuration and policy drift
 - Self-monitoring means
 - Metrics and logs are first-class citizens
 - Anomaly detection (statistical and ML-based) is built-in
 - Signals are correlated across services and layers

ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS

- Self-healing: automated remediation routines
 - Self-healing means automated correction of certain classes of faults
 - Restarting crashed processes or containers.
 - Redeploying from a golden image when configuration drift is detected.
 - Replacing unhealthy nodes automatically.
 - Revoking tokens or disabling accounts detected as compromised.
 - Self-healing reduces MTTR without waiting for human intervention

ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS

- Self-adjusting: auto-scaling, rebalancing, failover
 - Self-adjusting systems
 - Scale horizontally under load (add more instances/pods)
 - Rebalance traffic to healthy nodes or regions
 - Shed non-critical load when under stress (graceful degradation)
 - Adjust concurrency limits and rate limits dynamically
 - Examples
 - Auto-scaling groups in cloud environments that increase capacity in response to CPU or response-time signals
 - Service meshes that reroute traffic around failing instances
 - These behaviors reduce the likelihood that a surge or partial failure escalates into a full outage

ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS

- Machine-assisted reasoning
 - AI/ML-assisted threat classification
 - Adaptive systems leverage AI/ML to
 - Classify alerts based on historical data and context
 - Score risk levels for events or entities (e.g., user risk scores)
 - Identify subtle patterns of attack (low-and-slow or multi-stage threats)
 - Suggest likely root causes and recommended actions
 - These capabilities augment human teams, particularly during high-volume or complex events

ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION

- Cross-functional collaboration
 - Adaptive organizations break silos between
 - Security
 - Operations / SRE
 - Development
 - Risk and GRC
 - Legal and Compliance
 - Business owners
 - Response involves multi-disciplinary teams working from a shared situational picture, not separated by rigid boundaries

ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION

- Rapid, evidence-based decision-making
 - Decisions are
 - Data-informed (based on KPIs, KRIs, telemetry, threat intel)
 - Time-bounded (decisions made in minutes, not days)
 - Guided by pre-agreed frameworks (risk appetite, playbook criteria)
 - Adaptive organizations invest in
 - Clear decision rights
 - Predefined thresholds
 - Real-time dashboards

ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION

- Flattened communication channels
 - During high-severity events
 - Hierarchical communication slows response
 - Adaptive organizations empower direct, lateral communication across teams
 - This may involve
 - Dedicated incident channels
 - Real-time incident “war rooms”
 - Clear but lightweight approval chains

ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION

- Dynamic allocation of staff and expertise
 - Adaptive response requires
 - Quickly pulling in experts from across the org
 - Reprioritizing non-critical work to free key people
 - Using on-call rotations and swarm models effectively
 - Organizations may maintain
 - Incident commander rosters
 - Domain expert lists (e.g., IAM, payments, data)
 - Surge capacity plans for major incidents

ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION

- Continuous learning from incidents
 - Every incident (and near miss) becomes input into
 - Updated playbooks
 - Better KRIs and KPIs
 - Architecture improvements
 - Training and simulations
 - Move from repeating the same failures to building resilience through learning

EXAMPLES OF ADAPTIVE RESPONSE

- Auto-isolation of compromised endpoints
 - Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool detects suspicious behavior
 - For example: ransomware-like encryption
 - Automatically isolates the endpoint from the network
 - Triggers SOAR workflows: ticket creation, alerting, forensic snapshot
- Risk impact
 - Limits lateral movement
 - Containment is immediate, reducing blast radius

EXAMPLES OF ADAPTIVE RESPONSE

- Automated throttling of suspicious network activity
 - Anomaly detection identifies spikes in traffic from certain IPs or geos, or unusual query patterns
 - System automatically throttles or blocks traffic according to predefined policies
 - Security and Ops teams are alerted to validate and tune behavior
- Risk impact
 - Reduces DDoS or data-exfiltration impact
 - Protects critical services while investigation proceeds

EXAMPLES OF ADAPTIVE RESPONSE

- Continuous reprioritization of risk remediation
 - Based on real-time KRIs
 - KRI dashboards highlight rising exposures (e.g., vulnerability clusters, failed controls, near misses)
 - Risk teams continuously adjust remediation queues and priorities
 - Automated workflows reassign tasks, adjust due dates, and notify owners
- Risk impact
 - Ensures mitigation efforts target the most critical and time-sensitive risks, not just what is “on the plan”

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Q&A AND OPEN DISCUSSION

