



Building the Futuristic **Blockchain Ecosystem**

# SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

Oggy Floki

# TOKEN OVERVIEW

## Risk Findings

Severity	Found
● High	0
● Medium	0
● Low	0
● Informational	0

## Centralization Risks

Owner Privileges	Description
● Can Owner Set Taxes >25% ?	Not Detected
● Owner needs to enable trading ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Disable Trades ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Mint ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Blacklist ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner set Max Wallet amount ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Set Max TX amount ?	Not Detected

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# OVERVIEW

The Expelee team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analysed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the smart contract audit:

<b>Audit Result</b>	<b>Passed</b>
<b>KYC Verification</b>	-
<b>Audit Date</b>	<b>14 November 2023</b>

# CONTRACT DETAILS

**Token Address:** --

**Name:** Oggy Floki

**Symbol:** \$OGF

**Decimals:** 18

**Network:** Binance smart chain

**Token Type:** ERC20

**Owner:** --

**Deployer:** --

**Token Supply:** 4696900000000000

**Checksum:** b391b4a737a5cdfd0edf7de92a1b2764

## Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the Binance smart chain Testnet, which can be found at the following address:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x1c4E97890b81d9d11d74EaCe15F3F122f0f77b15#code>

# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

## Audit Details

Our comprehensive audit report provides a full overview of the audited system's architecture, smart contract codebase, and details on any vulnerabilities found within the system.

## Audit Goals

The audit goal is to ensure that the project is built to protect investors and users, preventing potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities after launch, that lead to scams and rugpulls.

## Code Quality

Our analysis includes both automatic tests and manual code analysis for the following aspects:

- Exploits
- Back-doors
- Vulnerability
- Accuracy
- Readability

## Tools

- DE
- Open Zeppelin
- Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code
- Compiler
- Hardhat

# VULNERABILITY CHECKS

Design Logic	Passed
Compiler warnings	Passed
Private user data leaks	Passed
Timestamps dependence	Passed
Integer overflow and underflow	Passed
Race conditions & reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Possible delays in data delivery	Passed
Oracle calls	Passed
Front Running	Passed
DoS with Revert	Passed
DoS with block gas limit	Passed
Methods execution permissions	Passed
Economy model	Passed
Impact of the exchange rate on the logic	Passed
Malicious event log	Passed
Scoping and declarations	Passed
Uninitialized storage pointers	Passed
Arithmetic accuracy	Passed
Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Safe Zepplin module	Passed

# RISK CLASSIFICATION

When performing smart contract audits, our specialists look for known vulnerabilities as well as logical and access control issues within the code. The exploitation of these issues by malicious actors may cause serious financial damage to projects that failed to get an audit in time. We categorize these vulnerabilities by the following levels:

## High Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

## Medium Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

## Low Risk

Issues on this level are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed.

## Informational

Issues on this level are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed.



# STATIC ANALYSIS

```

INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- _mint(liquidityWallet,((_supply * liquidityPercent) / 100) * 10 ** 9) (OggyFloki.sol#848)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- _mint(presaleWallet,((_supply * presalePercent) / 100) * 10 ** 9) (OggyFloki.sol#849)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- _mint(burnWallet,((_supply * burnPercent) / 100) * 10 ** 9) (OggyFloki.sol#850)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- _mint(cexListingWallet,((_supply * cexListingPercent) / 100) * 10 ** 9) (OggyFloki.sol#851)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply
INFO:Detectors:
Contract locking ether found:
  Contract OggyFlokiToken (OggyFloki.sol#789-1029) has payable functions:
    - OggyFlokiToken.receive() (OggyFloki.sol#1026)
  But does not have a function to withdraw the ether
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#contracts-that-lock-ether
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.swapTokens(uint256,address,address) (OggyFloki.sol#989-1013) ignores return value by router.swapExactTokensForTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (OggyFloki.sol#1001-1007)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.transfer(address,uint256).owner (OggyFloki.sol#937) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (OggyFloki.sol#184-186) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address,address[])_liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#834) lacks a zero-check on :
- liquidityWallet = _liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#840)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address,address[])_presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#835) lacks a zero-check on :
- presaleWallet = _presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#841)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address,address[])_burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#836) lacks a zero-check on :
- burnWallet = _burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#842)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address,address[])_cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#837) lacks a zero-check on :
- cexListingWallet = _cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#843)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:Detectors:

```

```

INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address,address[])_liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#834) lacks a zero-check on :
- liquidityWallet = _liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#840)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address,address[])_presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#835) lacks a zero-check on :
- presaleWallet = _presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#841)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address,address[])_burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#836) lacks a zero-check on :
- burnWallet = _burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#842)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address,address[])_cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#837) lacks a zero-check on :
- cexListingWallet = _cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#843)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in OggyFlokiToken.swapTokens(uint256,address,address) (OggyFloki.sol#989-1013):
  External calls:
  - router.swapExactTokensForTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (OggyFloki.sol#1001-1007)
  State variables written after the call(s):
  - super._transfer(msg.sender,_to,tokenAmount) (OggyFloki.sol#1010)
    - _balances[from] = fromBalance - amount (OggyFloki.sol#568)
    - _balances[to] += amount (OggyFloki.sol#571)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in OggyFlokiToken.swapTokens(uint256,address,address) (OggyFloki.sol#989-1013):
  External calls:
  - router.swapExactTokensForTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (OggyFloki.sol#1001-1007)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
  - Swapped(_token,tokenAmount,_to) (OggyFloki.sol#1012)
  - Transfer(from,to,amount) (OggyFloki.sol#574)
    - super._transfer(msg.sender,_to,tokenAmount) (OggyFloki.sol#1010)
Reentrancy in OggyFlokiToken.withdrawBEP20(address,uint256) (OggyFloki.sol#1015-1023):
  External calls:
  - IERC20(_token).transfer(owner(),amount) (OggyFloki.sol#1020)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
  - WithdrawnBEP20(_token,amount) (OggyFloki.sol#1022)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
INFO:Detectors:
Different versions of Solidity are used:
- Version used: ['0.8.19', '^0.8.0', '^0.8.19']
- 0.8.19 (OggyFloki.sol#747)
- ^0.8.0 (OggyFloki.sol#12)
- ^0.8.0 (OggyFloki.sol#39)

```

# STATIC ANALYSIS

```
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) uses literals with too many digits:
- _supply = 4696900000000000 (OggyFloki.sol#845)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) uses literals with too many digits:
- maxSwapAmount = 100000 * 10 ** 9 (OggyFloki.sol#855)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
INFO:Detectors:
Loop condition i < investors.length (OggyFloki.sol#967) should use cached array length instead of referencing 'length' member of the storage array.
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#cache-array-length
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken._busd (OggyFloki.sol#826) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken._usdt (OggyFloki.sol#827) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.burnPercent (OggyFloki.sol#814) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.cexListingPercent (OggyFloki.sol#815) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.liquidityPercent (OggyFloki.sol#812) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.presalePercent (OggyFloki.sol#813) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.uniswapV2Pair (OggyFloki.sol#825) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken._busdpair (OggyFloki.sol#828) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken._usdtpair (OggyFloki.sol#829) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#801) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#802) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#799) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#800) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.router (OggyFloki.sol#824) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
INFO:Slither:OggyFloki.sol analyzed (10 contracts with 93 detectors), 56 result(s) found
```

# TESTNET VERSION

## 1- Set Max Swap Amount (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa4103487b63ce1f0f614ff21e570fca5e1bdabdd79534a8031c2386529fc2be3>

## 2- Set Max Wallet Amount (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x490582e2a11a88d7865bf7efe756befe3522ad059198ddfb951e391cc813e051>

## 3- Burn (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc5f4cc3931ec10ecb35f28b3ef63cbcebd7418ed1c9506b6b97058abb8f6d162>

## 4- Approve (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc256e5d327066da579e294110ed5c5859106609be5edc04047282b53b2e1c17e>

## 5- Transfer Ownership (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xd3bb053f8ad3ca54eb396ce257e8b7ce079b04988ace86bf0a1bc7aaba8a81c3>

# MANUAL REVIEW

## Severity Criteria

Expelee assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to methodology based on OWASP standards.

Vulnerabilities are divided into three primary risk categories:

High

Medium

Low

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

- Malicious input handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use

Overall Risk Severity				
Impact	HIGH	Medium	High	Critical
	MEDIUM	Low	Medium	High
	LOW	Note	Low	Medium
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
	Likelihood			

# ABOUT EXPELEE

Expelee is a product-based aspirational Web3 start-up. Coping up with numerous solutions for blockchain security and constructing a Web3 ecosystem from deal making platform to developer hosting open platform, while also developing our own commercial and sustainable blockchain.

 [www.expelee.com](http://www.expelee.com)

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# expelee

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Under no circumstances did Expelee receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website. Alway do your own research and protect yourselves from scams.

This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token. The Expelee team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.

The logo for 'expelee' is displayed in a stylized font. The 'ex' is in white, and 'pelee' is in orange. The 'e' after 'ex' is white, and the 'ee' is orange. The logo is centered on a dark blue background with faint, abstract geometric shapes.

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