



Building the Futuristic **Blockchain Ecosystem**

SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

PABLO

TOKEN OVERVIEW

Risk Findings

Severity	Found
● High	2
● Medium	2
● Low	0
● Informational	2

Centralization Risks

Owner Privileges	Description
● Can Owner Set Taxes >25% ?	Not Detected
● Owner needs to enable trading ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Disable Trades ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Mint ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Blacklist ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner set Max Wallet amount ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Set Max TX amount ?	Not Detected

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OVERVIEW

The Expelee team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analysed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the smart contract audit:

Audit Result	Passed with High risk
KYC Verification	-
Audit Date	25 June 2023

CONTRACT DETAILS

Token Name: Pablo Token

Symbol: PABLO

Network: Ethereum

Language: Solidity

Contract Address:

0xd8CB514834F3Af897A0b3Cdd7c9169Adea74A996

Total Supply: 99,000,000

Owner's Wallet:

0xAd7f334Cb8b2DA6Ec2E068EFd2D8775967e1D0d0

Deployer's Wallet:

0xAd7f334Cb8b2DA6Ec2E068EFd2D8775967e1D0d0

AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Audit Details

Our comprehensive audit report provides a full overview of the audited system's architecture, smart contract codebase, and details on any vulnerabilities found within the system.

Audit Goals

The audit goal is to ensure that the project is built to protect investors and users, preventing potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities after launch, that lead to scams and rugpulls.

Code Quality

Our analysis includes both automatic tests and manual code analysis for the following aspects:

- Exploits
- Back-doors
- Vulnerability
- Accuracy
- Readability

Tools

- DE
- Open Zeppelin
- Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code
- Compiler
- Hardhat

VULNERABILITY CHECKS

Design Logic	Passed
Compiler warnings	Passed
Private user data leaks	Passed
Timestamps dependence	Passed
Integer overflow and underflow	Passed
Race conditions & reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Possible delays in data delivery	Passed
Oracle calls	Passed
Front Running	Passed
DoS with Revert	Passed
DoS with block gas limit	Passed
Methods execution permissions	Passed
Economy model	Passed
Impact of the exchange rate on the logic	Passed
Malicious event log	Passed
Scoping and declarations	Passed
Uninitialized storage pointers	Passed
Arithmetic accuracy	Passed
Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Safe Zeppelin module	Passed

RISK CLASSIFICATION

When performing smart contract audits, our specialists look for known vulnerabilities as well as logical and access control issues within the code. The exploitation of these issues by malicious actors may cause serious financial damage to projects that failed to get an audit in time. We categorize these vulnerabilities by the following levels:

High Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

Medium Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.


Low Risk

Issues on this level are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed.

Informational

Issues on this level are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed.

INHERITANCE TREES



TESTNET VERSION

Adding Liquidity ✓

Tx:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x0085911dbc2f06f09bf68a28a082c97289ba965ab32ea204c5ea8847fc87f33b>

=====

Buying when excluded from fees ✓

Tx (0% tax):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x9d444d98c4fb29bbafea7078171c0562561d56dc341f186ddff2c933636913ab>

=====

Selling when excluded from fees ✓

Tx (0% tax):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa2beab434bc1c5865542b781ac4cab60bbe87d34ecf5fc2c675b70ce3659c21b>

=====

Transferring when excluded from fees ✓

Tx (0% tax):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x223c39cf7b059aff87fd3b11377258223b8042cfb06a87a8632bf40c0c82fb97>

=====

TESTNET VERSION

Buying ✓

Tx (0-10% tax):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x138a0ac6b9cd4cd2d837a6db78041be7f190ec8ed2b7c2d63982234e0d431fd6>

=====

Selling ✓

Tx (0-10% tax):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x7b71dfb5ae3b57d92558792f7a8ce5ed9f0e41beaf3856f1edbff4a8de07566d>

=====

Transferring ✓

Tx (0% tax):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x9f884aa7c33c59bba00a0d7dbe01eda97590fd5eb6c7ff7116ea109a2f8673f6>

=====

Internal swap (marketing wallet received BNB) ✓

Tx :

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x2ff773071dbb9fe17d07a0fdf8c51c943e57c4ec#tokentxns>

=====

FUNCTION DETAILS

Contract	Type	Bases			
L	**Function Name**	**Visibility**	**Mutability**	**Modifiers**	
IERC20 Interface					
L	totalSupply	External	!		NO !
L	balanceOf	External	!		NO !
L	transfer	External	!	●	NO !
L	allowance	External	!		NO !
L	approve	External	!	●	NO !
L	transferFrom	External	!	●	NO !
IERC20Metadata Interface IERC20					
L	name	External	!		NO !
L	symbol	External	!		NO !
L	decimals	External	!		NO !
Context Implementation					
L	_msgSender	Internal	🔒		
L	_msgData	Internal	🔒		
Ownable Implementation Context					
L	<Constructor>	Public	!	●	NO !
L	owner	Public	!		NO !
L	renounceOwnership	Public	!	●	onlyOwner
L	transferOwnership	Public	!	●	onlyOwner
ERC20 Implementation Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata					
L	<Constructor>	Public	!	●	NO !
L	name	Public	!		NO !
L	symbol	Public	!		NO !
L	decimals	Public	!		NO !
L	totalSupply	Public	!		NO !

FUNCTION DETAILS

```

| L | balanceOf | Public | ! | [NO ! | |
| L | transfer | Public | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | allowance | Public | ! | [NO ! |
| L | approve | Public | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | transferFrom | Public | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | decreaseAllowance | Public | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | _transfer | Internal | 🔒 | ● ||
| L | _mint | Internal | 🔒 | ● ||
| L | _burn | Internal | 🔒 | ● ||
| L | _approve | Internal | 🔒 | ● ||
| L | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | 🔒 | ● ||
| L | _afterTokenTransfer | Internal | 🔒 | ● ||
|||||
| **IUniswapV2Factory** | Interface | |||
| L | feeTo | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | feeToSetter | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | getPair | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | allPairs | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | allPairsLength | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | createPair | External | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | setFeeTo | External | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | setFeeToSetter | External | ! | ● [NO ! |
|||||
| **IUniswapV2Pair** | Interface | |||
| L | name | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | symbol | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | decimals | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | totalSupply | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | balanceOf | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | allowance | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | approve | External | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | transfer | External | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | transferFrom | External | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | DOMAIN_SEPARATOR | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | PERMIT_TYPEHASH | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | nonces | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | permit | External | ! | ● [NO ! |
| L | MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | factory | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | token0 | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | token1 | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | getReserves | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | price0CumulativeLast | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | price1CumulativeLast | External | ! | [NO ! |
| L | kLast | External | ! | [NO ! |

```

FUNCTION DETAILS

```

| L | mint | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | burn | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | swap | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | skim | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | sync | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | initialize | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
|||||
| **IUniswapV2Router01** | Interface | |||
| L | factory | External | ! | | NO | ! |
| L | WETH | External | ! | | NO | ! |
| L | addLiquidity | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | addLiquidityETH | External | ! | 🟢 | NO | ! |
| L | removeLiquidity | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | removeLiquidityETH | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | swapExactTokensForTokens | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | swapTokensForExactTokens | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | swapExactETHForTokens | External | ! | 🟢 | NO | ! |
| L | swapTokensForExactETH | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | swapExactTokensForETH | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | swapETHForExactTokens | External | ! | 🟢 | NO | ! |
| L | quote | External | ! | | NO | ! |
| L | getAmountOut | External | ! | | NO | ! |
| L | getAmountIn | External | ! | | NO | ! |
| L | getAmountsOut | External | ! | | NO | ! |
| L | getAmountsIn | External | ! | | NO | ! |
|||||
| **IUniswapV2Router02** | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 |||
| L | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
|
| L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
| L | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ! | 🟢 | NO | ! |
| L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ! | ● | NO | ! |
|||||
| **Pablo** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | ! | ● | ERC20 |
| L | <Receive Ether> | External | ! | 🟢 | NO | ! |
| L | startTrading | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | getRouterAddress | Public | ! | | NO | ! |
| L | claimStuckTokens | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | isContract | Internal | 🔒 | | |
| L | excludeFromFees | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromFees | Public | ! | | NO | ! |
| L | setFees | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |

```

FUNCTION DETAILS

```

| L | changeStakingpoolWallet | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner | |
| L | setSwapEnabled | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | setSwapTokensAtAmount | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | excludeFromWalletLimit | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromWalletLimit | Public | ! | [NO !] |
| L | excludeFromTxLimit | External | ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromTxLimit | Public | ! | [NO !] |
| L | _transfer | Internal | 🔒 | ● | ||
| L | swapAndLiquify | Private | 🔒 | ● | ||
| L | swapAndSendFee | Private | 🔒 | ● | ||
### Legend
| Symbol | Meaning |
|:-----|:-----|
| ● | Function can modify state |
| 🏠 | Function is payable |

```

MANUAL REVIEW

Severity Criteria

Expelee assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to methodology based on OWASP standards.

Vulnerabilities are divided into three primary risk categories:

High

Medium

Low

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

- Malicious input handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use

Overall Risk Severity				
Impact	HIGH	Medium	High	Critical
	MEDIUM	Low	Medium	High
	LOW	Note	Low	Medium
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
	Likelihood			

HIGH RISK FINDING

Category: Centralization

Subject: Trades must be enabled manually

Status: Open

Severity : High

Overview

Owner of the contract must call startTrading function in order for holders to be able to transfer/sell their tokens. If Owner refuse to enable trades for any reason, holders wont be able to transfer/sell their tokens and their assets will be locked in liquidity pool forever.

```
function startTrading() external onlyOwner {  
  require(!isTradingEnabled, "Trading already enabled");  
  swapEnabled = true;  
  isTradingEnabled = true;  
  startTradingAt = block.timestamp;  
}
```

Suggestion

To resolve this issue you can:

- Enable trades prior to presale: this ensures investors about safety of their assets
- Transfer ownreship of the contract to pinksale: this ensures that trades will be enabled eventually at right time
- Create a time lock feature: this ensures that trades will be enabled automatically after a fixed amount of time.

HIGH RISK FINDING

Category: Centralization

Subject: Liquidity pool is not excluded from walletLimit

Status: Open

Severity : High

Overview

At `_transfer` function, liquidity pool address is not excluded from `walletLimit`. If liquidity pool holds more than 2% of total supply, all sell transactions would be disabled.

```
if (!_isExcludedFromFees[from] && !_isExcludedFromFees[to] && !swapping)
{
    if (!isExcludedFromTxLimit(from) && !isExcludedFromTxLimit(to)) {
        require(
            amount <= (totalSupply() * txLimit) / denominator, "Amount transaction
cannot more than tx limit"
        );
    }
    if (!isExcludedFromWalletLimit(to)) {
        require(
            balanceOf(to) + amount <= (totalSupply() * walletLimit) / denominator,
            "Balance of to user cannot more than wallet limit"
        );
    }
}
```

Suggestion

Liquidity pool must be excluded from `walletLimit`.

HIGH RISK FINDING

```
if (!_isExcludedFromFees[from] && !_isExcludedFromFees[to] && !swapping)
{
    if (!isExcludedFromTxLimit(from) && !isExcludedFromTxLimit(to)) {
        require(
            amount <= (totalSupply() * txLimit) / denominator, "Amount transaction
cannot more than tx limit"
        );
    }
    if (!isExcludedFromWalletLimit(to) && to != liquidityPair) {
        require(
            balanceOf(to) + amount <= (totalSupply() * walletLimit) / denominator,
            "Balance of to user cannot more than wallet limit"
        );
    }
}
```

MEDIUM RISK FINDING

Category: Numerical

Subject: Numerical

Status: Open

Severity : Medium

Overview

At `_transfer` function, `walletLimit` and `txLimit` are expected to be a number in range 0-10_000, but this variables are initialized to a percentage of total supply at constructor.

```
constructor() ERC20("Pablo Token", "PABLO") {  
    //rest of the code..  
  
    // Set the wallet limit as 2% of the total supply of tokens  
    walletLimit = 2 * totalSupply() / 100;  
    // Set the transaction limit as 2% of the total supply of tokens  
    txLimit = 2 * totalSupply() / 100;  
}  
  
if (!_isExcludedFromFees[from] && !_isExcludedFromFees[to] && !swapping)  
{  
    if (!_isExcludedFromTxLimit(from) && !_isExcludedFromTxLimit(to)) {  
        require(  
            amount <= (totalSupply() * txLimit) / denominator, "Amount transaction  
cannot more than tx limit"  
        );  
    }  
    if (!_isExcludedFromWalletLimit(to)) {  
        require(  
            balanceOf(to) + amount <= (totalSupply() * walletLimit) / denominator,  
            "Balance of to user cannot more than wallet limit"  
        );  
    }  
}
```

MEDIUM RISK FINDING

Suggestion

walletLimit and txLimit should be a number between 0-10000, otherwise this limitations are disabled.

```
constructor() ERC20("Pablo Token", "PABLO") {  
    //rest of the code..  
  
    // Set the wallet limit as 2% of the total supply of tokens  
    walletLimit = 200;  
    // Set the transaction limit as 2% of the total supply of tokens  
    txLimit = 200;  
}
```

MEDIUM RISK FINDING

Category: Centralization

Subject: EOA receiving LP tokens

Status: Open

Severity : Medium

Overview

stakingpoolWallet is receiving LP tokens generated from auto-liquidity. This LP tokens can be used to remove a portion of tokens and BNB from the liquidity pool

```
uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: newBalance}(  
    address(this), otherHalf, 0, 0, stakingpoolWallet, block.timestamp  
);
```

Suggestion

There are multiple ways to resolve this issue:

- Burn new LP tokens
- Lock new LP tokens
- Distribute new LP tokens to token holders using a dividend tracker

INFORMATIONAL

Category: Logical

Subject: stakingpoolWallet receiving Wrapped BNB instead of BNB

Status: Open

Severity : Informational

Overview

stakingpoolWallet is receiving LP tokens generated from auto-liquidity. This LP tokens can be used to remove a portion of tokens and BNB from the liquidity pool

```
uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(  
    tokenAmount,  
    0, // accept any amount of ETH  
    path,  
    address(stakingpoolWallet),  
    block.timestamp  
);
```

Suggestion

In order to receive BNB use

“swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens” function
uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens

```
    tokenAmount,  
    0, // accept any amount of ETH  
    path,  
    address(stakingpoolWallet),  
    block.timestamp  
);
```


INFORMATIONAL

Category: Missing Logic

Subject: Fixed walletLimit and txLimit instead of BNB

Status: Open

Severity : Could be Low – High

Overview

walletLimit and txLimit variables are constant meaning that their value can not be changed later using a setter function.

Impact of this issue can be Low – High.

A High impact case could be when txLimit is so little proportional to liquidity pool size

Suggestion

It's highly recommended to create a setter function for updating txLimit and walletLimit depending on different market conditions

ABOUT EXPELEE

Expelee is a product-based aspirational Web3 start-up. Coping up with numerous solutions for blockchain security and constructing a Web3 ecosystem from deal making platform to developer hosting open platform, while also developing our own commercial and sustainable blockchain.

 www.expelee.com



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Building the Futuristic **Blockchain Ecosystem**

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All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment. Team provides no guarantess against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document.

Always do your own research and project yourselves from being scammed. The Expelee team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools.

Under no circumstances did Expelee receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website. Alway do your own research and protect yourselves from scams.

This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token. The Expelee team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.

The logo for Expelee, featuring the word "expelee" in a stylized font. The "ex" is in white, and "pelee" is in orange. The letters are bold and modern.

Building the Futuristic **Blockchain Ecosystem**