

**Building the Futuristic Blockchain Ecosystem** 

## SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

Miraverse



### **TOKEN OVERVIEW**

#### **Risk Findings**

Severity	Found	
High	2	
Medium	2	
<ul><li>Low</li></ul>	0	
Informational	1	

#### **Centralization Risks**

Owner Privileges	Description	
Can Owner Set Taxes >25%?	Not Detected	
Owner needs to enable trading?	Not Detected	
Can Owner Disable Trades ?	Not Detected	
Can Owner Mint?	Not Detected	
Can Owner Blacklist?	Not Detected	
Can Owner set Max Wallet amount ?	Not Detected	
Can Owner Set Max TX amount?	Not Detected	



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# **OVERVIEW**

The Expelee team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analysed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the smart contract audit:

Audit Result	Passed With High Risk
KYC Verification	-
Audit Date	7 Aug 2023



## **CONTRACT DETAILS**

Token Name: Miraverse

Symbol: Mira

**Network: BSC** 

Language: Solidity

**Contract Address:** 

0x64293C84fC32f2A9B054fDA255cFE2F5fqe64316

Total Supply: 1,000,000,000

**Owner's Wallet:** 

0x66a95C92392d3eC3425648Cce52Ea6120e104Dbb

Deployer's Wallet:

0x66a95C92392d3eC3425648Cce52Ea6120e104Dbb

Testnet.

https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x7a2698DC1aCB8c8 FC3E606D6347F1EE07091243A



# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

#### **Audit Details**

Our comprehensive audit report provides a full overview of the audited system's architecture, smart contract codebase, and details on any vulnerabilities found within the system.

#### **Audit Goals**

The audit goal is to ensure that the project is built to protect investors and users, preventing potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities after launch, that lead to scams and rugpulls.

#### **Code Quality**

Our analysis includes both automatic tests and manual code analysis for the following aspects:

- Exploits
- Back-doors
- Vulnerability
- Accuracy
- Readability

#### **Tools**

- DE
- Open Zeppelin
- Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code
- Compiler
- Hardhat



# VULNERABILITY CHECKS

Design Logic	Passed
Compiler warnings	Passed
Private user data leaks	Passed
Timestamps dependence	Passed
Integer overflow and underflow	Passed
Race conditions & reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Possible delays in data delivery	Passed
Oracle calls	Passed
Front Running	Passed
DoS with Revert	Passed
DoS with block gas limit	Passed
Methods execution permissions	Passed
Economy model	Passed
Impact of the exchange rate on the logic	Passed
Malicious event log	Passed
Scoping and declarations	Passed
Uninitialized storage pointers	Passed
Arithmetic accuracy	Passed
Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Safe Zepplin module	Passed



# RISK CLASSIFICATION

When performing smart contract audits, our specialists look for known vulnerabilities as well as logical and acces control issues within the code. The exploitation of these issues by malicious actors may cause serious financial damage to projects that failed to get an audit in time. We categorize these vulnerabilities by the following levels:

#### **High Risk**

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

#### **Medium Risk**

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

#### **Low Risk**


Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.

#### **Informational**

Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.



### **INHERITANCE TREES**





### **FUNCTION DETAILS**

```
Contract
                        Bases
     **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers**
**IUniswapV2Router01** | Interface | ||
L | factory | External | | | NO |
| WETH | External | | NO | |
L | addLiquidity | External | | | NO | |
| addLiquidityETH | External | | III | NO | |
| removeLiquidity | External | | | NO |
| removeLiquidityETH | External | | | NO |
removeLiquidityWithPermit | External | | | NO |
| removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External | | | NO | |
| swapExactTokensForTokens | External
L | swapTokensForExactTokens | External | | | NO | |
| swapExactETHForTokens | External
| swapTokensForExactETH | External
| swapExactTokensForETH | External | | | NO |
| swapETHForExactTokens | External | | III | NO |
| quote | External | | NO | |
| getAmountOut | External | | NO |
getAmountIn | External | | NO | |
L | getAmountsOut | External | | NO | |
L | getAmountsIn | External | | NO | |
**IUniswapV2Router02** | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 |||
removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | NO |
| swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | NO | |
swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | III | NO |
**IUniswapV2Pair** | Interface | |||
I name | External | | NO | |
| symbol | External | | NO |
| decimals | External | | NO |
L | totalSupply | External | | NO |
| balanceOf | External | | NO |
L | allowance | External | | NO |
```



### **FUNCTION DETAILS**

```
| approve | External | | | NO |
 L | transfer | External | | | NO | |
 transferFrom | External | | NO | |
 L | DOMAIN SEPARATOR | External | | | NO | |
 L PERMIT TYPEHASH | External | NO | |
 I nonces | External | | NO
 | permit | External | | | NO | |
 | MINIMUM LIQUIDITY | External | | | NO | |
 L | factory | External | | | NO |
 token0 | External | | NO | |
 L token | External | NO | |
 L | getReserves | External | NO
 | price0CumulativeLast | External | | NO | |
 | price1CumulativeLast | External | NO | |
 | kLast | External | | NO |
 L|mint|External | | | NO |
 | burn | External | | | NO |
 swap | External | | | NO | |
 L|skim|External | | | NO |
 L|sync|External | | | NO | |
 | initialize | External | | | NO | |
**IUniswapV2Factory** | Interface | |||
 L|feeTo|External | | NO | |
 l feeToSetter | External | NO | |
 getPair | External | | NO | |
 allPairs | External | | NO | |
 | allPairsLength | External | NO | |
 L | createPair | External | | | NO | |
 | setFeeTo | External | | | NO | |
 | setFeeToSetter | External | | | NO | |
 INIT CODE PAIR HASH | External | | NO | |
**IGemAntiBot** | Interface | |||
 | setTokenOwner | External | | | NO | |
 onPreTransferCheck | External | | | NO | |
**IUniswapV2Caller** | Interface | |||
 | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | | NO | |
| **IFee** | Interface | |||
 L payFee | External | NO | |
**StandardTokenWithAntibot** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable ||
 └ | <Constructor> | Public | | ■ | ERC20 |
 L | decimals | Public | | NO | |
```



### **FUNCTION DETAILS**

```
L | setUsingAntiBot | External | | | onlyOwner |
 L | updateUniswapV2Pair | External | | | onlyOwner |
 L | updateUniswapV2Router | Public | | | onlyOwner |
 | updateMaxWallet | External | | | | onlyOwner |
 | updateMaxTransactionAmount | External | | | onlyOwner |
 └ | updateLiquidityFee | External | | ● | onlyOwner |
 | updateMarketingFee | External | | | onlyOwner |
 | updateMarketingWallet | External | | | onlyOwner |
 | updateMinAmountToTakeFee | External | | | onlyOwner |
 L | setAutomatedMarketMakerPair | Public | | • | onlyOwner |
 💄 setAutomatedMarketMakerPair | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | |
 | excludeFromFee | External | | | onlyOwner |
 | excludeFromMaxTransactionAmount | External | | | onlyOwner |
 | transfer | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |
 L | takeFee | Private 🔐 | 🌑 | lockTheSwap |
 L | swapTokensForBaseToken | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | |
 L | addLiquidity | Private 🔐 | 🔴 | |
 | withdrawETH | External | | | onlyOwner |
 L | withdrawToken | External | |  onlyOwner |
 ### Legend
 Symbol | Meaning |
        Function can modify state
       | Function is payable |
```



### **TESTNET VERSION**

Adding Liquidity  Tx: https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x6d7d08e8b8703988eecf1056b05f6a93d672f4316dbb73f86493a9401054dcf2
Buying when excluded from fees  Tx (0% tax):  https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x092b26afa4c273fffce6477b658d113153cadf78cf99
c9e912bae8e593bf1ed5  ===================================
569cfce5487a4a571463b  ===================================
https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x88968cb22e8fa545f72675f61b59794b68850dac0ce960580ea2cf87c91a589

Buying

Tx (0-20% tax):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc3a0d499870f207fb9dcea05ff7bc480bea8b067e2 0a233868c733712cb201cf



### **TESTNET VERSION**

Selling V Tx (0-20% tax):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xf25d050a5209363e281fb49ef10e8555408f0873c3 3502216fbb0be62219084f

Transferring < Tx (0% tax):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x251f9245f57e3fd216fd5379a81dcea5aa3d9a96eb0 a9e68c37ce72a276cdb97

Internal swap (auto-liquidity + ETH sent to marketing wallet)



https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xf25d050a5209363e281fb49ef10e8555408f0873c3 3502216fbb0be62219084f



### **MANUAL REVIEW**

#### **Severity Criteria**

Expelee assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to methodology based on OWASP standarts.

Vulnerabilities are dividend into three primary risk categroies:

High

Medium

Low

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

- Malicious input handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use

Overall Risk Severity							
Impact	HIGH	Medium	High	Critical			
	MEDIUM	Low	Medium	High			
	LOW	Note	Low	Medium			
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH			
	Likelihood						



#### updating uniswapV2 router

Category: Logical / centralization

**Status: Open** 

**Impact: High** 

**Overview:** 

Owner is able to update mainRouter which is used for performing internal swap (auto liquidity and swapping fees into BNB). Setting mainRouter to a malicious contract could potentially disable internal swaps which in result affects sell transactions.

```
function updateUniswapV2Router(address
newAddress) public onlyOwner {
    require(
        newAddress != address(mainRouter),
        "The router already has that address"
    );
    emit UpdateUniswapV2Router(newAddress,
address(mainRouter));
    mainRouter = IUniswapV2RouterO2(newAddress);
_approve(address(this), address(mainRouter), MAX);
```



```
if (baseTokenForPair != mainRouter.WETH()) {
IERC20(baseTokenForPair).approve(address(mainRoute
r), MAX);
}
address _mainPair =
IUniswapV2Factory(mainRouter.factory()).createPair(
address(this),
baseTokenForPair
);
mainPair = _mainPair;
_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(mainPair, true);
}
```

#### **Suggestion:**

Its suggested to keep mainRouter immutable or disable updateUniswapV2Pair function after adding liquidity.



#### MaxTransaction amount not checked for liquidity pool

Category: Logical / centralization

**Status: Open** 

**Impact: High** 

**Overview:** 

Below condition in \_transfer function is not checking whether to is the pair address or not, in a sell condition, "to" is equal to pair address. If balance of liquidity pair is more than maxWallet and pair is not excluded form MaxTransactionAmount, this condition could cause sell transactions to revert

```
if (!isExcludedFromMaxTransactionAmount[to]) {
    require(
        balanceOf(to) < maxWallet,
        "ERC20: exceeds max wallet limit"
    );
}</pre>
```



```
Suggestion:

check if "to" is not equal to pair address

if (!isExcludedFromMaxTransactionAmount[to] &&
!automatedMarketMakerPairs[to]
) {
  require(
  balanceOf(to) < maxWallet,
  "ERC20: exceeds max wallet limit"
);
}
```

up to 20% fee

**Category: Centralization** 

**Status: Open** 

**Impact: Medium** 

**Overview:** 

Owner is able to update buy/sell fees within 0-20 percent. The upper bound might be considered a high amount of tax for investors.



```
sellLiquidityFee,
buyLiquidityFee
);
sellLiquidityFee = _sellLiquidityFee;
buyLiquidityFee = _buyLiquidityFee;
}
```

#### **Suggestion:**

Its suggested to declare a more reasonable upper bound for fees. This upper bound is suggested to be 10% according to pinksale safu criteria



Invalid condition for updating maximum buy/sell/transfer

**Category: Logical** 

**Status: Open** 

**Impact: Medium** 

**Overview:** 

require statement of updateMaxTransactionAmount function is indicating that new maximum transaction amount should be less than 0.1% of total supply, but the condition is not considering dividing total supply by 1000.

```
function updateMaxTransactionAmount(
    uint256 _maxTransactionAmount
) external onlyOwner {
    require(
    _maxTransactionAmount >= totalSupply(),
"maxTransactionAmount >= total supply / 1000"
    );
    emit UpdateMaxTransactionAmount(
    _maxTransactionAmount,
    maxTransactionAmount
    );
    maxTransactionAmount = _maxTransactionAmount;
}
```



#### **Suggestion:**

```
change require statement to match error message:
    require(
    _maxTransactionAmount >= totalSupply() / 1000,
"maxTransactionAmount >= total supply / 1000"
);
```



#### INFORMATIONAL FINDING

#### Maximum wallet and buy/sell/transfer

**Category: Centralization** 

**Status: Open** 

**Impact: Informational** 

**Overview:** 

Owner is able to set maximum wallet and buy/sell/transfer. This limits have a lower bound of 0.1% of total supply.

```
function updateMaxWallet(uint256 _maxWallet) external
onlyOwner {
    require(
        _maxWallet >= totalSupply() / 1000,
        "maxWallet >= total supply / 1000"
    );
    emit UpdateMaxWallet(_maxWallet, maxWallet);
    maxWallet = _maxWallet;
}

function updateMaxTransactionAmount(
    uint256 _maxTransactionAmount
) external onlyOwner {
    require(
    _maxTransactionAmount >= totalSupply(),
```



#### INFORMATIONAL FINDING

```
"maxTransactionAmount >= total supply / 1000"
);
emit UpdateMaxTransactionAmount(
   _maxTransactionAmount,
maxTransactionAmount
);
maxTransactionAmount = _maxTransactionAmount;
}
```



### **ABOUT EXPELEE**

Expelee is a product-based aspirational Web3 start-up.
Coping up with numerous solutions for blockchain security and constructing a Web3 ecosystem from deal making platform to developer hosting open platform, while also developing our own commercial and sustainable blockchain.

#### www.expelee.com

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