



Building the Futuristic **Blockchain** Ecosystem

# SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

CateCoin

# TOKEN OVERVIEW

## Risk Findings

Severity	Found
● High	0
● Medium	1
● Low	1
● Informational	2

## Centralization Risks

Owner Privileges	Description
● Can Owner Set Taxes >25% ?	Not Detected
● Owner needs to enable trading ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Disable Trades ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Mint ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Blacklist ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner set Max Wallet amount ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Set Max TX amount ?	Not Detected

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# OVERVIEW

The Expelee team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analysed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the smart contract audit:

<b>Audit Result</b>	<b>Passed</b>
<b>KYC Verification</b>	-
<b>Audit Date</b>	<b>08 April 2024</b>

# CONTRACT DETAILS

**Token Address:** 0x1689D1fd1dCcd01D46E1FD06C1CE3D21F4982EB3

**Name:** CateCoin

**Symbol:** CATE

**Decimals:** 18

**Network:** BscScan

**Token Type:** BEP-20

**Owner:** Renounced

**Deployer:** 0xaA0E4e2276B94572030650167d4744FACc1bb9BC

**Token Supply:** 21,000,000,000,000

**Checksum:** Ac6659e84744e0102ab19c1d1e78a321

**Testnet:**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xd5377c1e2d8302bf1c1d12e9d271a53099f741ad#code>

# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

## Audit Details

Our comprehensive audit report provides a full overview of the audited system's architecture, smart contract codebase, and details on any vulnerabilities found within the system.

## Audit Goals

The audit goal is to ensure that the project is built to protect investors and users, preventing potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities after launch, that lead to scams and rugpulls.

## Code Quality

Our analysis includes both automatic tests and manual code analysis for the following aspects:

- Exploits
- Back-doors
- Vulnerability
- Accuracy
- Readability

## Tools

- DE
- Open Zeppelin
- Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code
- Compiler
- Hardhat

# VULNERABILITY CHECKS

Design Logic	Passed
Compiler warnings	Passed
Private user data leaks	Passed
Timestamps dependence	Passed
Integer overflow and underflow	Passed
Race conditions & reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Possible delays in data delivery	Passed
Oracle calls	Passed
Front Running	Passed
DoS with Revert	Passed
DoS with block gas limit	Passed
Methods execution permissions	Passed
Economy model	Passed
Impact of the exchange rate on the logic	Passed
Malicious event log	Passed
Scoping and declarations	Passed
Uninitialized storage pointers	Passed
Arithmetic accuracy	Passed
Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Safe Zeppelin module	Passed

# RISK CLASSIFICATION

When performing smart contract audits, our specialists look for known vulnerabilities as well as logical and access control issues within the code. The exploitation of these issues by malicious actors may cause serious financial damage to projects that failed to get an audit in time. We categorize these vulnerabilities by the following levels:

## High Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

## Medium Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

## Low Risk


Issues on this level are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed.

## Informational

Issues on this level are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed.



# INHERITANCE TREE



# STATIC ANALYSIS

**INFO:Detectors:**  
 CateCoin.handleTax(address,address,uint256) (CateCoin.sol#593-633) ignores return value by taxWallets[charity].call{value: charityETH}() (CateCoin.sol#617)  
 CateCoin.handleTax(address,address,uint256) (CateCoin.sol#593-633) ignores return value by taxWallets[charity].call{value: ethGained - (liquidityETH + charityETH)}() (CateCoin.sol#620)  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unchecked-low-level-calls>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 CateCoin.handleTax(address,address,uint256) tax (CateCoin.sol#589) is a local variable never initialized  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 CateCoin.handleTax(address,address,uint256) (CateCoin.sol#593-633) ignores return value by uniswapV2Router02.swapExactTokensForETH(toSell,0,sellPath,address(this),block.timestamp) (CateCoin.sol#585-591)  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 CateCoin.setPayable(address) payableWallet (CateCoin.sol#536) lacks a zero-check on :  
 - Router = payableWallet (CateCoin.sol#537)  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
**Reentrancy in CateCoin.handleTax(address,address,uint256) (CateCoin.sol#593-633):**  
 External calls:  
 - \_transfer(from,address(this),tax) (CateCoin.sol#566)  
 - uniswapV2Router02.swapExactTokensForETH(toSell,0,sellPath,address(this),block.timestamp) (CateCoin.sol#585-591)  
 - (amountToken,amountETH,liquidity) = uniswapV2Router02.addLiquidityETH{value: liquidityETH}(address(this),liquidityToken,0,0,taxWallets[liquidity],block.timestamp) (CateCoin.sol#602-609)  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: charityETH}() (CateCoin.sol#617)  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: ethGained - (liquidityETH + charityETH)}() (CateCoin.sol#620)  
 External calls sending eth:  
 - \_transfer(from,address(this),tax) (CateCoin.sol#566)  
 - (amountToken,amountETH,liquidity) = uniswapV2Router02.addLiquidityETH{value: liquidityETH}(address(this),liquidityToken,0,0,taxWallets[liquidity],block.timestamp) (CateCoin.sol#602-609)  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: charityETH}() (CateCoin.sol#617)  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: ethGained - (liquidityETH + charityETH)}() (CateCoin.sol#620)  
 State variables written after the call(s):  
 - \_approve(address(this),address(uniswapV2Router02),toSell) (CateCoin.sol#583)  
 - \_allowances[owner][spender] = amount (CateCoin.sol#286)  
**Reentrancy in CateCoin.handleTax(address,address,uint256) (CateCoin.sol#593-633):**  
 External calls:  
 - \_transfer(from,address(this),tax) (CateCoin.sol#566)  
 - uniswapV2Router02.swapExactTokensForETH(toSell,0,sellPath,address(this),block.timestamp) (CateCoin.sol#585-591)  
 - (amountToken,amountETH,liquidity) = uniswapV2Router02.addLiquidityETH{value: liquidityETH}(address(this),liquidityToken,0,0,taxWallets[liquidity],block.timestamp) (CateCoin.sol#602-609)  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: charityETH}() (CateCoin.sol#617)  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: ethGained - (liquidityETH + charityETH)}() (CateCoin.sol#620)  
 - uniswapV2Router02.swapExactTokensForETH(toSell,0,sellPath,address(this),block.timestamp) (CateCoin.sol#585-591)  
 External calls sending eth:  
 - \_transfer(from,address(this),tax) (CateCoin.sol#566)  
 - (amountToken,amountETH,liquidity) = uniswapV2Router02.addLiquidityETH{value: liquidityETH}(address(this),liquidityToken,0,0,taxWallets[liquidity],block.timestamp) (CateCoin.sol#602-609)  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: charityETH}() (CateCoin.sol#617)  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: ethGained - (liquidityETH + charityETH)}() (CateCoin.sol#620)  
 State variables written after the call(s):  
 - \_approve(address(this),address(uniswapV2Router02),liquidityToken) (CateCoin.sol#600)  
 - \_allowances[owner][spender] = amount (CateCoin.sol#286)  
**Reentrancy in CateCoin.handleTax(address,address,uint256) (CateCoin.sol#593-633):**  
 External calls:  
 - \_transfer(from,address(this),tax) (CateCoin.sol#566)  
 - uniswapV2Router02.swapExactTokensForETH(toSell,0,sellPath,address(this),block.timestamp) (CateCoin.sol#585-591)

**INFO:Detectors:**  
 CateCoin.handleTax(address,address,uint256) (CateCoin.sol#593-633) uses timestamp for comparisons  
 Dangerous comparisons:  
 - tax > 0 (CateCoin.sol#558)  
 - tax > 0 (CateCoin.sol#568)  
 - taxDue == 0 (CateCoin.sol#570)  
 - ethValue == swapThreshold (CateCoin.sol#578)  
 - remainingTokens > 0 (CateCoin.sol#613)  
 - ethGained - (liquidityETH + charityETH) > 0 (CateCoin.sol#619)  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 Context.\_msgData() (CateCoin.sol#56-58) is never used and should be removed  
 ERC20.\_burn(address,uint256) (CateCoin.sol#179-190) is never used and should be removed  
 Pausable.pause() (CateCoin.sol#276-279) is never used and should be removed  
 Pausable.unpause() (CateCoin.sol#281-284) is never used and should be removed  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 solc-0.8.24 is not recommended for deployment  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 Low level call in CateCoin.handleTax(address,address,uint256) (CateCoin.sol#593-633):  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: charityETH}() (CateCoin.sol#617)  
 - taxWallets[charity].call{value: ethGained - (liquidityETH + charityETH)}() (CateCoin.sol#620)  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 Function IUniswapV2Pair.DOMAIN\_SEPARATOR() (CateCoin.sol#302) is not in mixedCase  
 Function IUniswapV2Pair.PERMIT\_TYPEHASH() (CateCoin.sol#303) is not in mixedCase  
 Function IUniswapV2Pair.MINIMUM\_LIQUIDITY() (CateCoin.sol#320) is not in mixedCase  
 Function IUniswapV2Router01.WETH() (CateCoin.sol#356) is not in mixedCase  
 Variable CateCoin.Router (CateCoin.sol#581) is not in mixedCase  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 Variable IUniswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountDesired (CateCoin.sol#361) is too similar to IUniswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountDesired (CateCoin.sol#362)  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 CateCoin.slitherConstructorVariables() (CateCoin.sol#489-702) uses literals with too many digits:  
 - swapThreshold = 500000000000 (CateCoin.sol#493)  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits>  
**INFO:Detectors:**  
 CateCoin.charityTaxBuy (CateCoin.sol#496) should be constant  
 CateCoin.charityTaxSell (CateCoin.sol#499) should be constant  
 CateCoin.denominator (CateCoin.sol#502) should be constant  
 CateCoin.liquidityTaxBuy (CateCoin.sol#505) should be constant  
 CateCoin.liquidityTaxSell (CateCoin.sol#508) should be constant  
 CateCoin.swapThreshold (CateCoin.sol#493) should be constant  
 Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant>

# STATIC ANALYSIS

```
INFO:Detectors:
Function EmissionV2Pair DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (CateCoin.sol#382) is not in mixedCase
Function EmissionV2Pair PERMIT_TYPEHASH() (CateCoin.sol#383) is not in mixedCase
Function EmissionV2Pair MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY() (CateCoin.sol#328) is not in mixedCase
Function EmissionV2Router01 WTHC() (CateCoin.sol#354) is not in mixedCase
Variable CateCoin.Router (CateCoin.sol#381) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/sliether/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
INFO:Detectors:
Variable EmissionV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountDesired (CateCoin.sol#361) is too similar to EmissionV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountDesired (CateCoin.sol#362)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/sliether/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar
INFO:Detectors:
CateCoin.slietherConstructorVariables() (CateCoin.sol#489-782) uses literals with too many digits:
- swapThreshold = 500000000000 (CateCoin.sol#493)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/sliether/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
INFO:Detectors:
CateCoin.charityTaxBuy (CateCoin.sol#496) should be constant
CateCoin.charityTaxSell (CateCoin.sol#499) should be constant
CateCoin.denominator (CateCoin.sol#492) should be constant
CateCoin.liquidityTaxBuy (CateCoin.sol#495) should be constant
CateCoin.liquidityTaxSell (CateCoin.sol#498) should be constant
CateCoin.swapThreshold (CateCoin.sol#493) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/sliether/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
INFO:Detectors:
CateCoin.initialSupply (CateCoin.sol#491) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/sliether/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
INFO:Sliether:CateCoin.sol analyzed (11 contracts with 93 detectors), 54 result(s) found
```

# TESTNET VERSION

1- Set Buy Tax (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x61a55272d95f689cf299e46d5b2c57367ae9438da9ce4836dd771297574bc973>

2- Set Sell Tax (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x29202e8a5e64b1acf79f44c0f1bbb3a484082ce20c7455f495987a843742a90b>

3- Set Tax Wallets (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xe1e331d2e8c8d4da595419c48ba8c5691991d50cda2bc9d89dd298abc722f373>

4- Disable Tax (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x8c8279378feca8aa0d7252dd5509cc02189752dda760f1dfa37b22c1c3542cac>

5- Enable Tax (passed):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x1a58b392eff33b4eda8589353b86819472c6122738c8b4c74802a5c5f0f37425>

# MANUAL REVIEW

## Severity Criteria

Expelee assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to methodology based on OWASP standards.

Vulnerabilities are divided into three primary risk categories:

High

Medium

Low

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

- Malicious input handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use

Overall Risk Severity				
Impact	HIGH	Medium	High	Critical
	MEDIUM	Low	Medium	High
	LOW	Note	Low	Medium
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
	Likelihood			

# MEDIUM RISK FINDING

**Centralization** – Liquidity is added to EOA

Severity: **Medium**

subject: handleTax

Status: Open

## Overview:

Liquidity is adding to EOA. It may be drained by the taxWallets.

```
(uint amountToken, uint amountETH, uint liquidity) =  
uniswapV2Router02.addLiquidityETH{value: liquidityETH}(  
address(this),  
    liquidityToken,  
    0,  
    0,  
    taxWallets["liquidity"],  
    block.timestamp  
);
```

## Suggestion:

It is suggested that the address should be a contract address or a dead address.



# LOW RISK FINDING

## Centralization – Missing Events

Severity: **Low**

subject: Missing Events

Status: Open

### Overview:

They serve as a mechanism for emitting and recording data onto the blockchain, making it transparent and easily accessible.

```
function setBuyTax(uint256 dev, uint256 marketing, uint256 liquidity,  
uint256 charity) public onlyOwner {  
    buyTaxes["dev"] = dev;  
    buyTaxes["marketing"] = marketing;  
    buyTaxes["liquidity"] = liquidity;  
    buyTaxes["charity"] = charity;  
}  
  
function setSellTax(uint256 dev, uint256 marketing, uint256 liquidity,  
uint256 charity) public onlyOwner {  
    sellTaxes["dev"] = dev;  
    sellTaxes["marketing"] = marketing;  
    sellTaxes["liquidity"] = liquidity;  
    sellTaxes["charity"] = charity;  
}  
  
function setTaxWallets(address charity) public onlyOwner {  
    taxWallets["charity"] = charity;  
}
```

### Suggestion:

Emit an event for critical changes.

# INFORMATIONAL & OPTIMIZATIONS

## Optimization

Severity: Informational

subject: Floating Pragma

Status: Open

### Overview:

It is considered best practice to pick one compiler version and stick with it. With a floating pragma, contracts may accidentally be deployed using an outdated.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

### Suggestion:

Adding the latest constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.



# INFORMATIONAL & OPTIMIZATIONS

## Optimization

Severity: **Optimization**

subject: Remove unused code.

Status: Open

### Overview:

Unused variables are allowed in Solidity, and they do. not pose a direct security issue. It is the best practice. though to avoid them

```
function _msgData() internal view virtual returns (bytes calldata) {  
    return msg.data;  
}  
function _pause() internal virtual whenNotPaused {  
    _paused = true;  
    emit Paused(_msgSender());  
}  
function _unpause() internal virtual whenPaused {  
    _paused = false;  
    emit Unpaused(_msgSender());  
}
```

# ABOUT EXPELEE

Expelee is a product-based aspirational Web3 start-up. Coping up with numerous solutions for blockchain security and constructing a Web3 ecosystem from deal making platform to developer hosting open platform, while also developing our own commercial and sustainable blockchain.

 [www.expelee.com](http://www.expelee.com)

 [expeleeofficial](https://twitter.com/expeleeofficial)

 [expelee](https://medium.com/expelee)

 [Expelee](https://t.me/Expelee)

 [expelee](https://in.linkedin.com/expelee)

 [expelee\\_official](https://www.instagram.com/expelee_official)

 [expelee-co](https://github.com/expelee-co)

expelee

Building the Futuristic **Blockchain Ecosystem**

# DISCLAIMER

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment. Team provides no guarantess against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document.

Always do your own research and project yourselves from being scammed. The Expelee team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools.

Under no circumstances did Expelee receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website. Alway do your own research and protect yourselves from scams.

This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token. The Expelee team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.

The logo for Expelee, featuring the word "expelee" in a stylized font. The "ex" is in white, and "pelee" is in orange. The "e" in "ex" has a small accent mark above it.

Building the Futuristic **Blockchain Ecosystem**