



Building the Futuristic **Blockchain Ecosystem**

SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

StakingContract

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OVERVIEW

Contract Address: not deployed yet

Network: ---

Contract Type: Staking

Owner: ---

Deployer: ---

Checksum:

c5517d39c653012ea3a7da25b49dc8fd14e55b7c

Testnet version:

The tests conducted were performed on the contract deployed on the Binance Smart Chain (BSC) Testnet.
<https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x808886660ec773ea5d4b4e3645bdcd5c4afa3a59>

OVERVIEW

Key points:

- **Contract owner is able to adjust unstake fees within 0-10%**
- **Contract owner is able to withdraw all type of tokens from the contract**
- **110% rewards per month**
- **staked tokens will be locked for 30 days**

OVERVIEW

Risk Findings

Severity	Found	Pending	Resolved
● High	2	0	0
● Medium	0	0	0
● Low	0	2	0
● Informational	8	0	0
● Total	10	0	0

```

Contract | Type | Bases | | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
|||||
| **IERC20** | Interface | |||
| | totalSupply | External | ! | | NO ! |
| | balanceOf | External | ! | | NO ! |
| | transfer | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| | allowance | External | ! | | NO ! |
| | approve | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| | transferFrom | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
|||||
| **IERC20Permit** | Interface | |||
| | permit | External | ! | ● | NO ! |
| | nonces | External | ! | | NO ! |
| | DOMAIN_SEPARATOR | External | ! | | NO ! |
|||||
| **Address** | Library | |||
| | isContract | Internal | 🔒 | | |
| | sendValue | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | functionCall | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | functionCall | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | functionCallWithValue | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | functionCallWithValue | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | functionStaticCall | Internal | 🔒 | | |
| | functionStaticCall | Internal | 🔒 | | |
| | functionDelegateCall | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | functionDelegateCall | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | verifyCallResult | Internal | 🔒 | | |
|||||
| **SafeERC20** | Library | |||
| | safeTransfer | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | safeTransferFrom | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | safeApprove | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | safeIncreaseAllowance | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | safeDecreaseAllowance | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |
| | safePermit | Internal | 🔒 | ● | |

```

FUNCTION DETAILS

```

|  | _callOptionalReturn | Private 🔒 | ● | |
|||||
| **Context** | Implementation | |||
|  | _msgSender | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | _msgData | Internal 🔒 | | |
|||||
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context |||
|  | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | NO ! |
|  | owner | Public ! | | NO ! |
|  | renounceOwnership | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
|  | transferOwnership | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
|  | _transferOwnership | Internal 🔒 | ● | |
|||||
| **ReentrancyGuard** | Implementation | |||
|  | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | NO ! |
|||||
| **SafeMath** | Library | |||
|  | tryAdd | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | trySub | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | tryMul | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | tryDiv | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | tryMod | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | add | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | sub | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | mul | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | div | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | mod | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | sub | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | div | Internal 🔒 | | |
|  | mod | Internal 🔒 | | |
|||||
| **StakingContract** | Implementation | Ownable, ReentrancyGuard |||
|  | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | NO ! |
|  | setFeeWallet | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
|  | _getNextDepositID | Private 🔒 | | |
|  | _incrementDepositID | Private 🔒 | ● | |
|  | setLockPeriod | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
|  | deposit | External ! | ● | nonReentrant |
|  | setApr | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
|  | claimAllReward | Public ! | ● | nonReentrant |
|  | withdraw | Public ! | ● | nonReentrant |
|  | getOwnedDeposits | Public ! | | NO ! |
|  | getAllClaimableReward | Public ! | | NO ! |
|  | getApr | Public ! | | NO ! |
|  | getBalance | Public ! | | NO ! |
|  | getTotalRewards | Public ! | | NO ! |

```

FUNCTION DETAILS

```
|  | sendRewards | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
|  | rescueTokens | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
|  | setWithdrawFee | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
|  | changePoolStatus | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
|  | getTotalInvests | Public ! | | NO ! |
```

Legend

[Symbol | Meaning]

|:-----:|-----|

| ● | Function can modify state |

| 🏠 | Function is payable |

TESTNET VERSION

Staking ✓

Tx:

- 2% sent to referrer
- Rewards saved after staking again

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xd722c205aa9096411b451fe4e9ce31dd8b904ef8d72bffa99d94c9d27eaea290>

Claiming rewards ✓

- 795700% APR
- Rewards reset after claiming

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xaa0e652faab4f5d8a8b9e3ca1bd5c502d6acbaac4e7fd10d1f43b212cc961663>

Withdrawing ✓

- Withdraw available after locking period
- 2% fee (currently) sent to fee receiver
- Rewards sent to staker
- Could not double withdraw same ID

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x376a3f2585ae8cc93a3c63ce9122c60a054840d0abd97c36589084556b46b870>

RISK CLASSIFICATION

Risk Classification

High

Exploits, vulnerabilities or errors that will certainly or probabilistically lead towards loss of funds, control, of the contract and its functions. Must be fixed as soon as possible.

Medium

Bugs or issues with that may be subject to exploit, though their impact is somewhat limited. Must be fixed as soon as possible.

Low

Effects are minimal in isolation and do not pose a significant danger to the project or its users. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed nonetheless.

Informational

A vulnerability that have informational character but is not affecting any of the code

RISK FINDING

Category: Centralization

Subject: Withdrawing ERC20 tokens

Status: Open

Impact: High

Overview:

Owner is able to withdraw any kind of token from the contract. A malicious owner may withdraw all staked tokens.

```
function rescueTokens(
    address token,
    address to,
    uint256 amount
) external onlyOwner {
    IERC20(token).transfer(to, amount);
}
```

Suggestion:

Ensure that staked tokens will not be withdrawn by a malicious owner

```
function rescueTokens(
    address token,
    address to,
    uint256 amount
) external onlyOwner {
    require(token != address(this));
    IERC20(token).transfer(to, amount);
}
```

or only allow withdrawal of tokens deposited by owner (as reward pool):

```
uint256 public totalRewardsDeposited;
```

```
function sendRewards(uint256 _amount) public onlyOwner {
    IERC20(TokenContract).safeTransferFrom(
        msg.sender,
        address(this),
        _amount
    );
    totalRewardsDeposited += _amount;
}
```

```
function rescueTokens(
    address token,
    address to,
    uint256 amount
) external onlyOwner {
    require(amount <= totalRewardsDeposited);
    IERC20(token).transfer(to, amount);}
}
```

RISK FINDING

Category: Logical

Subject: Referrer rewards are not deducted from deposited amount

Status: Open

Impact: High

Overview:

A referrer gets 2% of deposited tokens by staker, but this 2% is not deducted from deposited amount, hence, there will be an inconsistency between total staked tokens by investors and total available tokens:

total staked tokens = actual balance of contract + 2% of balance of contract

Suggestion:

deduct referrer reward from deposited amount

```
if (investors[msg.sender].referrer != address(0)) {  
    uint256 referrerAmount = (_amount * ref).div(percentRate);  
    investors[investors[msg.sender].referrer].referAmount = investors[  
investors[msg.sender].referrer  
].referAmount.add(referrerAmount);  
    IERC20(TokenContract).transfer(  
investors[msg.sender].referrer,  
referrerAmount  
    );  
    _depositAmount -= referrerAmount  
}
```

RISK FINDING

Category: Informational and gas optimizations

Subject: Several improvements and gas optimizations

Status: Open

Impact: Low

Overview:

- **withdraw** and **claimAllReward** functions are not emitting any events
 - use **Indexed** keyword for all events to ease query of this events
 - **TokenContract** can be declared as immutable
 - **totalInvested** is not updated after unstaking tokens
 - **totalInvestors** is not updated after unstaking all tokens
 - increasing and assigning id can be done in one step
 - create a function to allow emergency withdraw of tokens (without rewards and in locking period) but with considering a fee as penalty
- uint256 Id = ++_currentDepositID;**
- Referrer can be any arbitrary wallet, even a wallet that did not staked before

ABOUT EXPELEE

Expelee is a product-based aspirational Web3 start-up. Coping up with numerous solutions for blockchain security and constructing a Web3 ecosystem from deal making platform to developer hosting open platform, while also developing our own commercial and sustainable blockchain.

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Building the Futuristic **Blockchain Ecosystem**

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