

Building the Futuristic Blockchain Ecosystem

SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

YEE



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Risk Findings

Severity	Found	
High	3	
Medium	1	
Low	0	
Informational	0	

Centralization Risks

Owner Privileges	Description	
Can Owner Set Taxes >25%?	Not Detected	
Owner needs to enable trading?	Not Detected	
Can Owner Disable Trades ?	Detected	
Can Owner Mint ?	Not Detected	
Can Owner Blacklist ?	Not Detected	
Can Owner set Max Wallet amount ?	Detected	
Can Owner Set Max TX amount?	Not Detected	



Maximum buy/sell/transfer

Category: Centralization

Status: Open Impact: High

Overview:

Owner is able to set maximum amount of buy/sell/transfer to zero.

```
function setMaxTxAmount(uint256 maxTxAmount) external onlyOwner {
  require(
    maxTxAmount <= (40 * 10 ** 6 * 10 ** 9),
    "Max wallet should be less or equal to 4% totalSupply"
  );
  _maxTxAmount = maxTxAmount;
}</pre>
```

Suggestion:

```
Put a lower bound for maximum amount of buy/sell/transfes.
function setMaxTxAmount(uint256 maxTxAmount) external onlyOwner {
  require(
    maxTxAmount >= totalSupply() / 1000,
    "Maximum Tx must be greater than 0.1% of total supply"
  );
  _maxTxAmount = maxTxAmount;
}
```



Updating router

Category: Centralization / Logical

Status: Open Impact: High

Overview:

Contract owner is able to update dex router which is used by contract to perform internal swap.

Updating router to a malicious contract causes internal swaps to revert the transaction.

```
function changeRouterVersion(
  address newRouterAddress
) public onlyOwner returns (address newPairAddress) {
  IUniswapV2RouterO2 _uniswapV2Router = IUniswapV2RouterO2(
    newRouterAddress
);
  newPairAddress = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory()).getPair(
  address(this),
  _uniswapV2Router.WETH()
);
  if (newPairAddress == address(0)) {
    newPairAddress = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory())
    .createPair(address(this), _uniswapV2Router.WETH());
}
  uniswapPair = newPairAddress;
  uniswapV2Router = _uniswapV2Router;
  isWalletLimitExempt[address(uniswapPair)] = true;
  isMarketPair[address(uniswapPair)] = true;
}
```

Suggestion:

Ensure that router address is immutable after deploying the contract and adding liquidity.



setting swap threshold to zero

Category: Logical Status: Open Impact: High

Overview:

Setting minimumTokensBeforeSwap to zero and enabling swapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly causes internal swaps to be reverted in an attempt for swapping 0 tokens to ETH.

```
function setNumTokensBeforeSwap(uint256 newLimit) external onlyOwner {
   minimumTokensBeforeSwap = newLimit;
}

function setSwapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly(bool newValue) public onlyOwner {
   swapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly = newValue;
}
```

Suggestion:

Ensure that minimumTokensBeforeSwap is always greater than 1 tokens.

```
function setNumTokensBeforeSwap(uint256 newLimit) external onlyOwner {
require(newLimit <= 10 ** decimals(), "swap threshold must be greater than 1
token");
minimumTokensBeforeSwap = newLimit;
}
```



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OVERVIEW

The Expelee team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analysed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the smart contract audit:

Audit Result	Passed with high risk
KYC Verification	-
Audit Date	4 August 2023



CONTRACT DETAILS

Token Name: Yeecoin

Symbol: YEE

Network: Ethereum mainnet

Language: Solidity

Contract Address: 0x009764D7Ab6BeFf7Cc8E61437c0879420E8E3f3B

Total Supply: 420,690,000,000,000

Owner's Wallet:

0x1c7919E6796f015ce216F46c5dEC62F813c90e1D

Deployer's Wallet: 0x3be96b568729B94cE91116bB9d53850316F21371

Testnet.

https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x2B17C5727d31454878 0156342547Ad7Cb5121c07



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Audit Details

Our comprehensive audit report provides a full overview of the audited system's architecture, smart contract codebase, and details on any vulnerabilities found within the system.

Audit Goals

The audit goal is to ensure that the project is built to protect investors and users, preventing potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities after launch, that lead to scams and rugpulls.

Code Quality

Our analysis includes both automatic tests and manual code analysis for the following aspects:

- Exploits
- Back-doors
- Vulnerability
- Accuracy
- Readability

Tools

- DE
- Open Zeppelin
- Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code
- Compiler
- Hardhat



VULNERABILITY CHECKS

Design Logic	Passed
Compiler warnings	Passed
Private user data leaks	Passed
Timestamps dependence	Passed
Integer overflow and underflow	Passed
Race conditions & reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Possible delays in data delivery	Passed
Oracle calls	Passed
Front Running	Passed
DoS with Revert	Passed
DoS with block gas limit	Passed
Methods execution permissions	Passed
Economy model	Passed
Impact of the exchange rate on the logic	Passed
Malicious event log	Passed
Scoping and declarations	Passed
Uninitialized storage pointers	Passed
Arithmetic accuracy	Passed
Cross-function race conditions	Passed
Safe Zepplin module	Passed



RISK CLASSIFICATION

When performing smart contract audits, our specialists look for known vulnerabilities as well as logical and acces control issues within the code. The exploitation of these issues by malicious actors may cause serious financial damage to projects that failed to get an audit in time. We categorize these vulnerabilities by the following levels:

High Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

Medium Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

Low Risk


Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.

Informational

Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.



INHERITANCE TREES





```
| Contract |
                 Type
                               Bases
    L | **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
| **Context** | Implementation | || | | | | |
| L | msgSender | Internal | | | |
| L | msgData | Internal | | | |
| **IERC20** | Interface | |||
| L | totalSupply | External | NO | |
| L | balanceOf | External ! | NO! |
| L | transfer | External | | | NO | |
| L | allowance | External | | NO | |
| L | approve | External | | | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | External | | | NO | |
| **SafeMath** | Library | |||
| L | add | Internal | | | |
| L | sub | Internal | | | |
| L | sub | Internal | | | |
| L | mul | Internal | | | |
| L | div | Internal | | | |
| L | div | Internal | | | |
| L | mod | Internal 🔒 | ||
| L | mod | Internal | | | |
| **Address** | Library | |||
| L | isContract | Internal | | | |
| L | sendValue | Internal | | | | | | |
| L | functionCall | Internal | | | |
| L | functionCall | Internal | | | | |
| L | functionCallWithValue | Internal | |
| L | functionCallWithValue | Internal | |
| L | functionCallWithValue | Private | | | | |
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | | | NO | |
| L | owner | Public ! | NO! |
 | waiveOwnership | Public | | | | onlyOwner
```



```
| L | transferOwnership | Public | | | left | onlyOwner |
| **IUniswapV2Factory** | Interface | |||
| L | feeTo | External ! | NO! |
| L | feeToSetter | External ! | NO! |
| L | getPair | External | | NO ! |
| L | allPairs | External | | NO | |
| L | allPairsLength | External | | NO ! |
| L | createPair | External | | | NO | |
| L | setFeeTo | External | | | NO | |
| L | setFeeToSetter | External | | | NO | |
| **IUniswapV2Pair** | Interface | |||
| L | name | External | | NO | |
| L | symbol | External | | NO ! |
| L | decimals | External | | NO | |
L totalSupply | External | NO |
| L | balanceOf | External ! | NO! | | | |
| L | allowance | External | | NO | |
| L | approve | External | | | NO | |
| L | transfer | External | | | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | External | | | NO | |
L DOMAIN SEPARATOR | External | NO |
| L | PERMIT_TYPEHASH | External | | | NO | |
| L | nonces | External | | | NO | |
| L | permit | External | | | NO | |
| L | MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY | External ! | NO! |
| L | factory | External | | NO | |
| L | token0 | External | | NO | |
| L | token1 | External | | NO | |
| L | price0CumulativeLast | External | | NO | |
| L | price1CumulativeLast | External | | NO | |
| L | kLast | External | | NO ! |
| L | burn | External ! | Po ! |
| L | swap | External | | | NO |
```



```
| L | skim | External ! | | NO! | | |
| L | sync | External | | | NO | |
| L | initialize | External ! | | NO! |
| **IUniswapV2Router01** | Interface | |||
| L | factory | External | | NO | |
| L | WETH | External | | NO ! |
| L | addLiquidity | External | | | NO | |
| L | addLiquidityETH | External | | I NO | |
| L | removeLiquidity | External | | | NO | |
| L | removeLiquidityETH | External | | | NO ! |
| L | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External ! | | NO! |
| L | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External | | | NO | |
| L | swapExactTokensForTokens | External | | | NO | |
| L | swapTokensForExactTokens | External | | | NO | |
| L | swapExactETHForTokens | External | | 1 NO | |
| L | swapTokensForExactETH | External | | | NO | |
| L | swapExactTokensForETH | External | | | NO | |
| L | swapETHForExactTokens | External | | 1 NO | |
| L | quote | External ! | NO! |
| L | getAmountOut | External ! | NO! |
| L | getAmountIn | External ! | NO! |
| L | getAmountsOut | External | NO | |
| **IUniswapV2Router02** | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 ||
| L | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | NO | |
| L | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | NO |
| L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | | NO! |
| L | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | M | NO | |
| L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | NO | |
| **Yeecoin** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, Ownable ||
| L | name | Public ! | NO! |
| L | symbol | Public | | NO | |
```



```
| L | totalSupply | Public | | NO | | | | | |
| L | balanceOf | Public ! | NO! |
| L | allowance | Public ! | NO! |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public I | | NO I |
| L | approve | Public | | | NO | |
| L | approve | Private | | | | | |
| L | addMarketPair | Public ! | Public | onlyOwner |
| L | setIsTxLimitExempt | External | | | onlyOwner |
| L | setIsExcludedFromFee | Public | | | onlyOwner |
| L | setMaxTxAmount | External | | | onlyOwner |
| L | setIsWalletLimitExempt | External | | | onlyOwner |
| L | setNumTokensBeforeSwap | External | | | onlyOwner |
| L | setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled | Public | | | | onlyOwner |
| L | setSwapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly | Public | | | onlyOwner |
| L | transferToAddressETH | Private | | | | | | | |
| L | changeRouterVersion | Public | | | onlyOwner |
| L | < Receive Ether > | External | | M | NO | |
| L | transfer | Public ! | | NO! |
| L | transferFrom | Public | | | NO | |
| L | transfer | Private | | | | | |
| L | basicTransfer | Internal | | | | |
| L | swapAndLiquify | Private | | | | lockTheSwap |
| L | swapTokensForEth | Private | | | | | | | |
| L | addLiquidity | Private | | | | | |
| L | takeFee | Internal | | | | |
### Legend
| Symbol | Meaning |
|:-----|
       | Function can modify state |
       | Function is payable |
```



TESTNET VERSION

Adding Liquidity Tx: https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xc66a3a58ed21da9e9cb814fc3d30f17892756c193a80bebdc7cab9d0549680
Buying when excluded from fees Tx (0% tax): https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xd177f2e7b2b740719f2ae1a8d4182af9b5bddebe77a9a2d20be28873d57879
Selling when excluded from fees Tx (0% tax): https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa0ec588140c521ea0d3ed97542a3e6f7f710b41482ba3b69025b9bdf4a4343e
Transferring when excluded from fees \(\sigma\) Tx(0% tax): https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x9e81192b55cf85b960d530c1ae6c3dc19a0184b76 101c1b8712a840199ba1ea
Buying 🗸

Buying
Tx(2% tax):


https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xba2909063e3f88077abf1dc27a7c36f3088feb718e1 065381e9fcf9801e79129



TESTNET VERSION



https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x94d996be708a52e1eaf2e58768a0bf74b25cbf67e6 c7d07f1fb7890432844d35



https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x26853a1fa5d964b48617a56e2a9b5db67fb3b0190b80d94373b67a63157e4f67

Internal swap (BNB to marketing wallet | reward token to dividend tracker | reward distribution)

Tx:

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x88d9d55f4a7ec3c0e4f00eedeadbe13a53967d6da7 52e55e17004f6b42615703



MANUAL REVIEW

Severity Criteria

Expelee assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to methodology based on OWASP standarts.

Vulnerabilities are dividend into three primary risk categroies:

High

Medium

Low

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

- Malicious input handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use

Overall Risk Severity							
Impact	HIGH	Medium	High	Critical			
	MEDIUM	Low	Medium	High			
	LOW	Note	Low	Medium			
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH			
	Likelihood						



Maximum buy/sell/transfer

Category: Centralization

Status: Open Impact: High

Overview:

Owner is able to set maximum amount of buy/sell/transfer to zero.

```
function setMaxTxAmount(uint256 maxTxAmount) external onlyOwner {
  require(
    maxTxAmount <= (40 * 10 ** 6 * 10 ** 9),
    "Max wallet should be less or equal to 4% totalSupply"
  );
  _maxTxAmount = maxTxAmount;
}</pre>
```

Suggestion:

```
Put a lower bound for maximum amount of buy/sell/transfes.
function setMaxTxAmount(uint256 maxTxAmount) external onlyOwner {
  require(
    maxTxAmount >= totalSupply() / 1000,
    "Maximum Tx must be greater than 0.1% of total supply"
  );
  _maxTxAmount = maxTxAmount;
}
```



Updating router

Category: Centralization / Logical

Status: Open Impact: High

Overview:

Contract owner is able to update dex router which is used by contract to perform internal swap.

Updating router to a malicious contract causes internal swaps to revert the transaction.

```
function changeRouterVersion(
  address newRouterAddress
) public onlyOwner returns (address newPairAddress) {
  IUniswapV2RouterO2 _uniswapV2Router = IUniswapV2RouterO2(
    newRouterAddress
);
  newPairAddress = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory()).getPair(
  address(this),
  _uniswapV2Router.WETH()
);
  if (newPairAddress == address(0)) {
    newPairAddress = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory())
    .createPair(address(this), _uniswapV2Router.WETH());
}
  uniswapPair = newPairAddress;
  uniswapV2Router = _uniswapV2Router;
  isWalletLimitExempt[address(uniswapPair)] = true;
  isMarketPair[address(uniswapPair)] = true;
}
```

Suggestion:

Ensure that router address is immutable after deploying the contract and adding liquidity.



setting swap threshold to zero

Category: Logical Status: Open Impact: High

Overview:

Setting minimumTokensBeforeSwap to zero and enabling swapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly causes internal swaps to be reverted in an attempt for swapping 0 tokens to ETH.

```
function setNumTokensBeforeSwap(uint256 newLimit) external onlyOwner {
   minimumTokensBeforeSwap = newLimit;
}

function setSwapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly(bool newValue) public onlyOwner {
   swapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly = newValue;
}
```

Suggestion:

Ensure that minimumTokensBeforeSwap is always greater than 1 tokens.

```
function setNumTokensBeforeSwap(uint256 newLimit) external onlyOwner {
  require(newLimit <= 10 ** decimals(), "swap threshold must be greater than 1
  token');
  minimumTokensBeforeSwap = newLimit;
}</pre>
```



MEDIUM RISK FINDING

EOA receiving LP tokens

Category: Logical

Status: Open

Impact: Medium

Overview:

an EOA is receiving LP tokens which are generated from auto-liquidity, this causes more centralization power over liquidity pool overtime.

```
function addLiquidity(uint256 tokenAmount, uint256 ethAmount) private {
    _approve(address(this), address(uniswapV2Router), tokenAmount);
    uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(
        address(this),
        tokenAmount,
        O,
        O,
        owner(),
        block.timestamp
    );
}
```

Suggestion:

its suggested to burn or lock new LP tokens.



ABOUT EXPELEE

Expelee is a product-based aspirational Web3 start-up.
Coping up with numerous solutions for blockchain security and constructing a Web3 ecosystem from deal making platform to developer hosting open platform, while also developing our own commercial and sustainable blockchain.

www.expelee.com

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Building the Futuristic Blockchain Ecosystem



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