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Building the Futuristic Blockchain Ecosystem

# SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

## Oggy Floki

# TOKEN OVERVIEW

## Risk Findings

| Severity | Found |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Medium | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
| Informational | 0 |

## Centralization Risks

| Owner Privileges | Description |
|---|---|
| Can Owner Set Taxes >25% ? | Not Detected |
| Owner needs to enable trading ? | Not Detected |
| Can Owner Disable Trades ? | Not Detected |
| Can Owner Mint ? | Not Detected |
| Can Owner Blacklist ? | Not Detected |
| Can Owner set Max Wallet amount ? | Not Detected |
| Can Owner Set Max TX amount ? | Not Detected |

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# OVERVIEW

The Expelee team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analysed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the smart contract audit:

| | |
|---|---|
| **Audit Result** | **Passed** |
| **KYC Verification** | **-** |
| **Audit Date** | **17 November 2023** |

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# CONTRACT DETAILS

**Token Address:**
0x9ACBBad33B8d66CbFfD46C573E175ae923b17992

**Name:** Oggy Floki

**Symbol:** $OGF

**Decimals:** 18

**Network:** Binance smart chain

**Token Type:** BEP20

**Owner:** 0xD4545DdBC582e5d80bE8d11e9e6B46871Ea91566

**Deployer:** 0xea687d0144fd445ba695f96ffe76429163171a3f

**Token Supply:** 469690000000000

**Checksum:** b391b4a737a5cdfd0edf7de92a1b2764

**Testnet version:**
The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the Binance smart chain Testnet, which can be found at the following address:
https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x0f41e36972b5197015f6223b48dc409a92b1c1a5#readContract

# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

### Audit Details

Our comprehensive audit report provides a full overview of the audited system's architecture, smart contract codebase, and details on any vulnerabilities found within the system.

### Audit Goals

The audit goal is to ensure that the project is built to protect investors and users, preventing potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities after launch , that lead to scams and rugpulls.

### Code Quality

Our analysis includes both automatic tests and manual code analysis for the following aspects:

- Exploits
- Back-doors
- Vulnerability
- Accuracy
- Readability

### Tools

- DE
- Open Zeppelin
- Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code
- Compiler
- Hardhat

# VULNERABILITY CHECKS

| | |
|---|---|
| Design Logic | Passed |
| Compiler warnings | Passed |
| Private user data leaks | Passed |
| Timestamps dependence | Passed |
| Integer overflow and underflow | Passed |
| Race conditions & reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions | Passed |
| Possible delays in data delivery | Passed |
| Oracle calls | Passed |
| Front Running | Passed |
| DoS with Revert | Passed |
| DoS with block gas limit | Passed |
| Methods execution permissions | Passed |
| Economy model | Passed |
| Impact of the exchange rate on the logic | Passed |
| Malicious event log | Passed |
| Scoping and declarations | Passed |
| Uninitialized storage pointers | Passed |
| Arithmetic accuracy | Passed |
| Cross-function race conditions | Passed |
| Safe Zepplin module | Passed |

# RISK CLASSIFICATION

When performing smart contract audits, our specialists look for known vulnerabilities as well as logical and acces control issues within the code. The exploitation of these issues by malicious actors may cause serious financial damage to projects that failed to get an audit in time. We categorize these vulnerabilities by the following levels:

## High Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

## Medium Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

## Low Risk

Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.

## Informational

Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.

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# INHERITANCE TREES



# STATIC ANALYSIS

```
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
        - _mint(liquidityWallet,((_supply * liquidityPercent) / 100) * 10 ** 9) (OggyFloki.sol#848)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
        - _mint(presaleWallet,((_supply * presalePercent) / 100) * 10 ** 9) (OggyFloki.sol#849)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
        - _mint(burnWallet,((_supply * burnPercent) / 100) * 10 ** 9) (OggyFloki.sol#850)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
        - _mint(cexListingWallet,((_supply * cexListingPercent) / 100) * 10 ** 9) (OggyFloki.sol#851)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply
INFO:Detectors:
Contract locking ether found:
        Contract OggyFlokiToken (OggyFloki.sol#789-1029) has payable functions:
         - OggyFlokiToken.receive() (OggyFloki.sol#1026)
        But does not have a function to withdraw the ether
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#contracts-that-lock-ether
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.swapTokens(uint256,address,address) (OggyFloki.sol#989-1013) ignores return value by router.swapExactTokensForTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,addre
ss(this),block.timestamp) (OggyFloki.sol#1001-1007)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.transfer(address,uint256).owner (OggyFloki.sol#937) shadows:
        - Ownable.owner() (OggyFloki.sol#184-186) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[])._liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#834) lacks a zero-check on :
                - liquidityWallet = _liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#840)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[])._presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#835) lacks a zero-check on :
                - presaleWallet = _presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#841)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[])._burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#836) lacks a zero-check on :
                - burnWallet = _burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#842)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[])._cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#837) lacks a zero-check on :
                - cexListingWallet = _cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#843)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:Detectors:
```

```
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[])._liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#834) lacks a zero-check on :
                - liquidityWallet = _liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#840)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[])._presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#835) lacks a zero-check on :
                - presaleWallet = _presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#841)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[])._burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#836) lacks a zero-check on :
                - burnWallet = _burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#842)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[])._cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#837) lacks a zero-check on :
                - cexListingWallet = _cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#843)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in OggyFlokiToken.swapTokens(uint256,address,address) (OggyFloki.sol#989-1013):
        External calls:
        - router.swapExactTokensForTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (OggyFloki.sol#1001-1007)
        State variables written after the call(s):
        - super._transfer(msg.sender,_to,tokenAmount) (OggyFloki.sol#1010)
                - _balances[from] = fromBalance - amount (OggyFloki.sol#568)
                - _balances[to] += amount (OggyFloki.sol#571)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in OggyFlokiToken.swapTokens(uint256,address,address) (OggyFloki.sol#989-1013):
        External calls:
        - router.swapExactTokensForTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (OggyFloki.sol#1001-1007)
        Event emitted after the call(s):
        - Swapped(_token,tokenAmount,_to) (OggyFloki.sol#1012)
        - Transfer(from,to,amount) (OggyFloki.sol#574)
                - super._transfer(msg.sender,_to,tokenAmount) (OggyFloki.sol#1010)
Reentrancy in OggyFlokiToken.withdrawBEP20(address,uint256) (OggyFloki.sol#1015-1023):
        External calls:
        - IERC20(_token).transfer(owner(),amount) (OggyFloki.sol#1020)
        Event emitted after the call(s):
        - WithdrawnBEP20(_token,amount) (OggyFloki.sol#1022)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
INFO:Detectors:
Different versions of Solidity are used:
        - Version used: ['0.8.19', '^0.8.0', '^0.8.19']
        - 0.8.19 (OggyFloki.sol#747)
        - ^0.8.0 (OggyFloki.sol#12)
        - ^0.8.0 (OggyFloki.sol#39)
```

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# STATIC ANALYSIS

```
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) uses literals with too many digits:
        - _supply = 469690000000000 (OggyFloki.sol#845)
OggyFlokiToken.constructor(address,address,address,address,address[]) (OggyFloki.sol#833-874) uses literals with too many digits:
        - maxSwapAmount = 100000 * 10 ** 9 (OggyFloki.sol#855)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
INFO:Detectors:
Loop condition i < investors.length (OggyFloki.sol#967) should use cached array length instead of referencing `length` member of the storage array.
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#cache-array-length
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken._busd (OggyFloki.sol#826) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken._usdt (OggyFloki.sol#827) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.burnPercent (OggyFloki.sol#814) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.cexListingPercent (OggyFloki.sol#815) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.liquidityPercent (OggyFloki.sol#812) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.presalePercent (OggyFloki.sol#813) should be constant
OggyFlokiToken.uniswapV2Pair (OggyFloki.sol#825) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
INFO:Detectors:
OggyFlokiToken._busdpair (OggyFloki.sol#828) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken._usdtpair (OggyFloki.sol#829) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.burnWallet (OggyFloki.sol#801) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.cexListingWallet (OggyFloki.sol#802) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.liquidityWallet (OggyFloki.sol#799) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.presaleWallet (OggyFloki.sol#800) should be immutable
OggyFlokiToken.router (OggyFloki.sol#824) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
INFO:Slither:OggyFloki.sol analyzed (10 contracts with 93 detectors), 56 result(s) found
```

# TESTNET VERSION

**Update Tax Rates -**
https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x115e42d6fb42d03b5a8497a1644f4c1f536697e65377a08d277b4b4e7f000cdc

**Approve -**
https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x710ea59f9e68f683d44b9d63f7404d41fba18c3033bcb70e4d2b3dca81ca1196

**Add Investor-**
https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x9c7d3e462df42d2decf8c12443918c828836e6f7f47bc40363b9e3b01b0386e3

**Burn-**
https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xf7e9889ca3df65873d671dcfe61f5235692036eba5fe5977161ebdc7493c396d

**Set Max Swap Amount-**
https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x2807ee54233c07668c15e504ed4ac845fcb09892d640584a9da5f0a2fa846529

**Set Max Wallet Amount -**
https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xe44f90f2d20b72640b13fb184d6b073bade9eb8ce2bd7b3204023fd394002642

**Transfer -**
https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xbba9d9234af17719e6a7d439cdde03342cedf64e257a5bd2ceb25adb0e288715

**Transfer Ownership-**
https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa712c7acf7f41a18be622466673ee19b4d4baf954295632c92a82468ea8b6247

# MANUAL REVIEW

## Severity Criteria

Expelee assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to methodology based on OWASP standarts.

Vulnerabilities are dividend into three primary risk categroies:
High
Medium
Low

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

- Malicious input handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use

| Overall Risk Severity | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Impact | HIGH | Medium | High | Critical |
| | MEDIUM | Low | Medium | High |
| | LOW | Note | Low | Medium |
| | | LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
| | Likelihood | | | |

# ABOUT EXPELEE

Expelee is a product-based aspirational Web3 start-up. Coping up with numerous solutions for blockchain security and constructing a Web3 ecosystem from deal making platform to developer hosting open platform, while also developing our own commercial and sustainable blockchain.

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