

Building the Futuristic Blockchain Ecosystem

SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

PABLO



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Risk Findings

| Severity | Found | |
|---------------|-------|--|
| High | 1 | |
| Medium | 2 | |
| Low | 0 | |
| Informational | 2 | |

Centralization Risks

| Owner Privileges | Description | |
|----------------------------------|--------------|--|
| Can Owner Set Taxes >25%? | Not Detected | |
| Owner needs to enable trading? | Not Detected | |
| Can Owner Disable Trades ? | Not Detected | |
| Can Owner Mint? | Not Detected | |
| Can Owner Blacklist? | Not Detected | |
| Can Owner set Max Wallet amount? | Not Detected | |
| Can Owner Set Max TX amount? | Not Detected | |



TABLE OF CONTENTS

| 02 | Token Overview ———————————————————————————————————— |
|----------|--|
| UZ | Token Overview |
| 03 | Table of Contents |
| 04 | Overview |
| | |
| 05 | Contract Details ———————————————————————————————————— |
| 06 | Audit Methodology |
| | |
| 07 | Vulnerabilities Checklist ———————————————————————————————————— |
| 08 | Risk Classification |
| 09 | Inheritence Trees & Risk Overview |
| 40 | TaskashVausiau |
| 10 | Testnet Version ———————————————————————————————————— |
| 12 | Function Details ———————————————————————————————————— |
| 16 | Manual Review |
| .0 | |
| 17 | Findings ———————————————————————————————————— |
| 23 | About Expelee |
| 24 | Disclaimer |
| 4 | |



OVERVIEW

The Expelee team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analysed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the smart contract audit:

| Audit Result | Passed |
|------------------|--------------|
| KYC Verification | - |
| Audit Date | 25 June 2023 |



CONTRACT DETAILS

Token Name: Pablo Token

Symbol: PABLO

Network: Ethereum

Language: Solidity

Contract Address:

0xd8CB514834F3Af897A0b3Cdd7c9169Adea74A996

Total Supply: 99,000,000

Owner's Wallet:

0xAd7f334Cb8b2DA6Ec2E068EFd2D8775967e1D0d0

Deployer's Wallet:

0xAd7f334Cb8b2DA6Ec2E068EFd2D8775967e1D0d0



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Audit Details

Our comprehensive audit report provides a full overview of the audited system's architecture, smart contract codebase, and details on any vulnerabilities found within the system.

Audit Goals

The audit goal is to ensure that the project is built to protect investors and users, preventing potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities after launch, that lead to scams and rugpulls.

Code Quality

Our analysis includes both automatic tests and manual code analysis for the following aspects:

- Exploits
- Back-doors
- Vulnerability
- Accuracy
- Readability

Tools

- DE
- Open Zeppelin
- Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code
- Compiler
- Hardhat



VULNERABILITY CHECKS

| Design Logic | Passed |
|--|--------|
| Compiler warnings | Passed |
| Private user data leaks | Passed |
| Timestamps dependence | Passed |
| Integer overflow and underflow | Passed |
| Race conditions & reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions | Passed |
| Possible delays in data delivery | Passed |
| Oracle calls | Passed |
| Front Running | Passed |
| DoS with Revert | Passed |
| DoS with block gas limit | Passed |
| Methods execution permissions | Passed |
| Economy model | Passed |
| Impact of the exchange rate on the logic | Passed |
| Malicious event log | Passed |
| Scoping and declarations | Passed |
| Uninitialized storage pointers | Passed |
| Arithmetic accuracy | Passed |
| Cross-function race conditions | Passed |
| Safe Zepplin module | Passed |



RISK CLASSIFICATION

When performing smart contract audits, our specialists look for known vulnerabilities as well as logical and acces control issues within the code. The exploitation of these issues by malicious actors may cause serious financial damage to projects that failed to get an audit in time. We categorize these vulnerabilities by the following levels:

High Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

Medium Risk

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

Low Risk


Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.

Informational

Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.



INHERITANCE TREES






TESTNET VERSION

| Adding Liquidity | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| Tx: https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x0085911dbc2f06f09bf68 28a082c97289ba965ab32ea204c5ea8847fc87f33b | | | | |
| Buying when excluded from fees ⊘ Tx (0% tax): | | | | |
| https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x9d444d98c4fb29bbafea7 078171c0562561d56dc341f186ddff2c933636913ab | | | | |
| Selling when excluded from fees Tx (0% tax): | | | | |
| https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa2beab434bc1c5865542b 781ac4cab60bbe87d34ecf5fc2c675b70ce3659c21b | | | | |
| Transferring when excluded from fees | | | | |
| Tx (0% tax): https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x223c39cf7b059aff87fd3b11377258223b8042cfb06a87a8632bf40c0c82fb97 | | | | |
| | | | | |



TESTNET VERSION





```
Contract |
               Type
                            Bases
       | **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
| **IERC20** | Interface | |||
| L | totalSupply | External | NO | |
 L | balanceOf | External | | NO | |
 L | transfer | External | | | NO | |
| L | allowance | External | | NO | |
 L | approve | External | | | NO | |
 L | transferFrom | External | | | NO | |
| **IERC20Metadata** | Interface | IERC20 |||
| L|name|External | | NO | |
 L|symbol|External | |NO | |
 L | decimals | External | | | NO | |
**Context** | Implementation | ||
 L | msgSender | Internal 🔒 | | |
 L | msgData | Internal 🔒 | | |
 **Ownable** | Implementation | Context |||
 | L | owner | Public | | NO | |
 L | renounceOwnership | Public | | | | onlyOwner |
 L | transferOwnership | Public | | | | onlyOwner |
 **ERC20** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata ||
 L | <Constructor> | Public | | | NO | |
 L | name | Public | | | NO | |
 L | symbol | Public | | | NO | |
 L | decimals | Public | | | NO |
 L | totalSupply | Public | | NO | |
```



```
L|balanceOf|Public | | INO |
 | transfer | Public | |
                       NO | |
| L | allowance | Public | | NO | |
 L | approve | Public | | | NO |
 L|transferFrom|Public | | | NO |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public | |
 L | decreaseAllowance | Public |
 📙 transfer | Internal 🔒 |
 🕒 mint | Internal 🔒 | 🥮 | |
| L| bum|Internal 🔒 | 🛑 ||
| L|_approve|Internal 🔒 | 🥮 ||
| L| beforeTokenTransfer|Internal 🔒 | 🛑 ||
| L | afterTokenTransfer | Internal 🔒 | 🛑 | |
| **TUniswapV2Factory** | Interface | |||
| L|feeTo|External | | [NO | |
| L | feeToSetter | External | | NO | |
| L | getPair | External | | NO | |
| L | allPairs | External | | NO | |
| L | allPairsLength | External | | NO | |
| L | createPair | External | | 🛑 [NO | |
| L|setFeeTo|External | | 🛑 |NO | |
| L | setFeeToSetter | External | | | | NO | |
 **TUniswapV2Pair** | Interface | |||
| L | name | External | | NO | |
| L|symbol|External | NO | |
| L| decimals | External | | INO | |
| L | totalSupply | External | NO | |
 L|balanceOf|External | | NO
| L | allowance | External | | NO |
 L|approve|External | | | NO | |
| L | transfer | External | | | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | External | | 🛑 [NO |
 L | DOMAIN SEPARATOR | External | | NO | |
| L | PERMIT TYPEHASH | External
 L|nonces|External | | NO | |
| L | permit | External | | 🛑 [NO |
| L | MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY | External | | NO | |
 | factory | External | NO | |
 L|token0|External | | NO | |
 L|getReserves|External | | NO |
 | price0CumulativeLast | External | NO | |
 | price1CumulativeLast | External | NO | |
| L | kLast | External | | NO | |
```



```
L| mint | External | | | NO |
 L|bum|External | | | NO | |
 L|swap|External | | | NO | |
| L | skim | External | | | | NO | |
| L| sync | External | | | | NO | |
 L|initialize|External | | | | NO |
| **IUniswapV2Router01** | Interface | ||
 | factory | External | NO | |
 L|WETH|External | | NO | |
 L | addLiquidity | External | | | | NO | |
 | addLiquidityETH | External | | II | NO | |
 | removeLiquidity | External | | | | NO | |
 | removeLiquidityETH | External | | | | NO | |
 | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External | | | | NO | |
 └ | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External | | ● NO | |
 | swapExactTokensForTokens | External | | | | NO | |
 | swapTokensForExactTokens | External | | | | NO | |
 | swapExactETHForTokens | External | | III | NO
 | swapTokensForExactETH | External | | | NO |
 | swapExactTokensForETH | External | | | | NO |
 📙 swapETHForExactTokens | External 🚦 | 💶 | NO 📗 |
 L|quote|External | | NO | |
 L | getAmountIn | External | NO |
 | getAmountsOut | External | | NO | |
 | getAmountsIn | External | NO | |
 **IUniswapV2Router02** | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 |||
 | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | | | NO | |
 | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External
 📙 swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External 📗 | 🛑 | NO 📗 |
 | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | I NO | |
 💄 swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External 🚦 | 🛑 NO 📗
 **Pablo** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable |||
 L | Constructor> | Public | | | | | ERC20 |
 | startTrading | External | | | | onlyOwner |
 | getRouterAddress | Public | NO | |
 | claimStuckTokens | External | | | | onlyOwner |
 L|isContract|Internal 🔒 | ||
 L | excludeFromFees | External | | | | onlyOwner |
 | isExcludedFromFees | Public | | NO | |
 | setFees | External | | | | onlyOwner |
```





MANUAL REVIEW

Severity Criteria

Expelee assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to methodology based on OWASP standarts.

Vulnerabilities are dividend into three primary risk categroies:

High

Medium

Low

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

- Malicious input handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use

| Overall Risk Severity | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|------------|--------|--------|----------|--|--|--|
| Impact | HIGH | Medium | High | Critical | | | |
| | MEDIUM | Low | Medium | High | | | |
| | LOW | Note | Low | Medium | | | |
| | | LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH | | | |
| | Likelihood | | | | | | |



HIGH RISK FINDING

Category: Centralization

Subject: Trades must be enabled manually

Status: Resolved

Severity: High

Overview

Owner of the contract must call startTrading function in order for holders to be able to transfer/sell their tokens. If Owner refuse to enable trades for any reason, holders wont be able to transfer/sell their tokens and their assets will be locked in liquidity pool forever.

```
function startTrading() external onlyOwner {
require(!isTradingEnabled, "Trading already enabled");
swapEnabled = true;
isTradingEnabled = true;
startTradingAt = block.timestamp;
}
```

Suggestion

To resolve this issue you can:

- Enable trades prior to presale: this ensures investors about safety of their assets
- Transfer ownreship of the contract to pinksale: this ensures that trades will be enabled eventually at right time
- Create a time lock feature: this ensures that trades will be enabled automatically after a fixed amount of time.



MEDIUM RISK FINDING

Category: Numerical

Subject: Numerical

Status: Open

Severity: Medium

Overview

At _transfer function, walletLimit and txLimit are expected to be a number in range 0-10_000, but this variables are initialized to a percentage of total supply at constructor.

```
constructor() ERC20("Pablo Token", "PABLO") {
    //rest of the code..
   // Set the wallet limit as 2% of the total supply of tokens
   // Set the transaction limit as 2% of the total supply of tokens
   if (!_isExcludedFromFees[from] && !_isExcludedFromFees[to] && !swapping)
{
     if (!isExcludedFromTxLimit(from) && !isExcludedFromTxLimit(to)) {
       require(
         amount <= (totalSupply() * txLimit) / denominator, "Amount transaction
cannot more than tx limit"
       );
     if (!isExcludedFromWalletLimit(to)) {
       require(
balanceOf(to) + amount <= (totalSupply() * walletLimit) / denominator,
"Balance of to user cannot more than wallet limit"
   }
```



MEDIUM RISK FINDING

Suggestion

walletLimit and txLimit should be a number between 0-10000, otherwise this limitations are disabled.

```
constructor() ERC20("Pablo Token", "PABLO") {
   //rest of the code..

// Set the wallet limit as 2% of the total supply of tokens
   walletLimit = 200;
   // Set the transaction limit as 2% of the total supply of tokens
   txLimit = 200;
}
```



MEDIUM RISK FINDING

Category: Centralization

Subject: EOA receiving LP tokens

Status: Open

Severity: Medium

Overview

stakingpoolWallet is receiving LP tokens generated from autoliquditiy. This LP tokens can be used to remove a portion of tokens and BNB from the liquidity pool

```
uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: newBalance}(
address(this), otherHalf, 0, 0, stakingpoolWallet, block.timestamp
);
```

Suggestion

There are multiple ways to resolve this issue:

- Burn new LP tokens
- Lock new LP tokens
- Distribute new LP tokens to token holders using a dividend tracker



INFORMATIONAL

Category: Logical

Subject: stakingpoolWallet receiving Wrapped BNB

instead of BNB

Status: Open

Severity: Informational

Overview

stakingpoolWallet is receiving LP tokens generated from autoliquditiy. This LP tokens can be used to remove a portion of tokens and BNB from the liquidity pool

```
uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(
tokenAmount,
0, // accept any amount of ETH
path,
address(stakingpoolWallet),
block.timestamp
);
```

Suggestion

In order to receive BNB use "swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens' function uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens

```
tokenAmount,
0, // accept any amount of ETH
path,
address(stakingpoolWallet),
block.timestamp
);
```



INFORMATIONAL

Category: Missing Logic

Subject: Fixed walletLimit and txLimit instead of BNB

Status: Open

Severity: Could be Low - High

Overview

walletLimit and txLimit variables are cosntant meaning that their value can not be changed later using a setter function.

Impact of this issue can be Low – High.

A High impact case could be when txLimit is so little proportional to liquidity pool size

Suggestion

Its highly recommended to create a setter function for updating txLimit and walletLimit depending on different market conditions



ABOUT EXPELEE

Expelee is a product-based aspirational Web3 start-up.
Coping up with numerous solutions for blockchain security and constructing a Web3 ecosystem from deal making platform to developer hosting open platform, while also developing our own commercial and sustainable blockchain.

www.expelee.com

- 🔰 expeleeofficial
- expelee

Expelee

- in expelee
- expelee_official
- 👩 expelee-co



Building the Futuristic Blockchain Ecosystem



DISCLAIMER

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment. Team provides no guarantess against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document.

Always do your own research and project yourselves from being scammed. The Expelee team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools.

Under no circumstances did Expelee receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website. Alway do your own research and protect yourselves from scams.

This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token. The Expelee team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.



Building the Futuristic Blockchain Ecosystem