

# Tamil CTF 2021 - Ransomware

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**TITLE** - Ransomware

## DESC

Tamil CTF is planning to organize their work, they are formatting a document. But a hacker got into their PC and installed a malware to jeopardize some important information and strip into pieces

Your senior analyst sends you to use your DFIR skills to analyse this

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Lets downlad the file,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ ls
ransomware.zip
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ file ransomware.zip
ransomware.zip: Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ unzip ransomware.zip
Archive:  ransomware.zip
  inflating: ransomware.raw
```

Its just a **zip** file, but when we extract it, we get a **memory image**

Analysing it in **volatility**

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

...

INFO      : volatility.debug      : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
           Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x86_23418, Win7SP0x86, Win7SP1x86_24000, Win7SP1x86
           AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
           AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/home/aidenpearce369/Ransomware/ransomware.raw)
           PAE type  : No PAE
           DTB       : 0x185000L
           KDBG      : 0x8295c378L
           Number of Processors : 1
           Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
           KPCR for CPU 0 : 0x83941000L
           KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000L
           Image date and time : 2021-09-24 09:40:03 UTC+0000
           Image local date and time : 2021-09-24 15:10:03 +0530
```

So its running in a profile **Win7SP1x86\_23418**

Lets see the process running in the RAM,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
```

...

Offset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	Thds	Hnds	Sess	Wow64	Start
Exit								
-----								
-----								
0x84233878	System	4	0	90	554	-----	0	2021-09-24 09:33:17 UTC+0000
0x851fa8a8	smss.exe	272	4	2	29	-----	0	2021-09-24 09:33:17 UTC+0000
0x8697c030	csrss.exe	352	344	8	416	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:22 UTC+0000
0x869cba58	csrss.exe	404	396	11	390	1	0	2021-09-24 09:33:23 UTC+0000
0x869cc6f0	wininit.exe	412	344	3	77	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:23 UTC+0000
0x86a0b3a0	winlogon.exe	448	396	5	114	1	0	2021-09-24 09:33:23 UTC+0000
0x85349330	services.exe	508	412	9	201	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:24 UTC+0000
0x85351030	lsass.exe	516	412	8	754	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:24 UTC+0000
0x85350b60	lsm.exe	524	412	10	148	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:24 UTC+0000
0x8538a1d8	svchost.exe	632	508	10	355	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:26 UTC+0000
0x8539d180	VBoxService.ex	692	508	13	124	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:26 UTC+0000
0x853aeaa8	svchost.exe	748	508	8	283	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
0x86b4c8f0	svchost.exe	840	508	23	574	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
0x86b4b718	svchost.exe	888	508	27	538	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
0x86b5a8a0	svchost.exe	912	508	18	492	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
0x86b5b030	svchost.exe	936	508	38	1038	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
0x86b6e8a0	audiodg.exe	1028	840	6	130	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:29 UTC+0000
0x86ba0d20	svchost.exe	1184	508	14	377	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:30 UTC+0000
0x8c0183d8	spoolsv.exe	1348	508	14	289	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
0x8c03a770	svchost.exe	1420	508	18	298	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
0x8c040aa0	taskhost.exe	1468	508	9	246	1	0	2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
0x8c064710	dwm.exe	1524	888	3	91	1	0	2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
0x8c07c030	explorer.exe	1564	1488	31	951	1	0	2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
0x8c0cd030	AnyDesk.exe	1660	508	9	221	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:34 UTC+0000
0x8c114af8	VBoxTray.exe	1856	1564	15	150	1	0	2021-09-24 09:33:37 UTC+0000
0x8c1172d0	AnyDesk.exe	1868	1564	9	180	1	0	2021-09-24 09:33:37 UTC+0000
0x8c137d20	svchost.exe	1936	508	10	147	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:38 UTC+0000
0x8c143580	svchost.exe	1980	508	20	281	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:38 UTC+0000
0x8c07f9d8	SearchIndexer.	2236	508	13	612	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:45 UTC+0000
0x8c299030	wmpnetwk.exe	2372	508	14	421	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:46 UTC+0000
0x8c206030	svchost.exe	2552	508	8	348	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:48 UTC+0000
0x8c34e688	WmiPrvSE.exe	2776	632	7	120	0	0	2021-09-24 09:33:52 UTC+0000
0x989cb5f0	calc.exe	2964	1564	4	77	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:09 UTC+0000
0x850e8030	chrome.exe	3108	1564	32	974	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:23 UTC+0000
0x98a26030	chrome.exe	3128	3108	9	90	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:23 UTC+0000
0x869d6d20	chrome.exe	3284	3108	12	195	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:25 UTC+0000
0x86b7cd20	chrome.exe	3320	3108	5	123	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:25 UTC+0000
0x85359d20	chrome.exe	3556	3108	10	180	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:28 UTC+0000
0x8539fa58	chrome.exe	3784	3108	5	108	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:35 UTC+0000
0x8c38c790	chrome.exe	3816	3108	13	190	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:36 UTC+0000
0x8c0cbd20	chrome.exe	2132	3108	13	220	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:46 UTC+0000
0x8c069bb0	chrome.exe	2284	3108	9	171	1	0	2021-09-24 09:34:50 UTC+0000

0x86b95678	chrome.exe	3276	3108	13	257	1	0	2021-09-24 09:35:00	UTC+0000
0x8c3567d8	chrome.exe	3680	3108	12	191	1	0	2021-09-24 09:35:02	UTC+0000
0x843af4e0	AnyDesk.exe	4080	1564	9	204	1	0	2021-09-24 09:35:22	UTC+0000
0x843a7d20	sppsvc.exe	2428	508	4	141	0	0	2021-09-24 09:35:46	UTC+0000
0x843ac900	svchost.exe	2952	508	13	342	0	0	2021-09-24 09:35:47	UTC+0000
0x84421850	notepad.exe	1516	1564	5	262	1	0	2021-09-24 09:35:56	UTC+0000
0x84400680	notepad.exe	2852	1564	5	259	1	0	2021-09-24 09:36:37	UTC+0000
0x843d8d20	cmd.exe	1636	1564	1	22	1	0	2021-09-24 09:37:31	UTC+0000
0x843f5680	conhost.exe	3652	404	2	52	1	0	2021-09-24 09:37:31	UTC+0000

Here `cmd.exe` , `chrome.exe` and `notepad.exe` may be doubtful

You can search for any signs of `malware` using

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 malfind
...
```

But no clues

Lets find it with sessions,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 sessions
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
```

...

\*\*\*\*\*

Session(V): 80e3e000 ID: 0 Processes: 25

PagedPoolStart: 80000000 PagedPoolEnd ffbfffff

```
Process: 352 csrss.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:22 UTC+0000
Process: 412 wininit.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:23 UTC+0000
Process: 508 services.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:24 UTC+0000
Process: 516 lsass.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:24 UTC+0000
Process: 524 lsm.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:24 UTC+0000
Process: 632 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:26 UTC+0000
Process: 692 VBoxService.ex 2021-09-24 09:33:26 UTC+0000
Process: 748 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
Process: 840 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
Process: 888 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
Process: 912 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
Process: 936 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:27 UTC+0000
Process: 1028 audiodg.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:29 UTC+0000
Process: 1184 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:30 UTC+0000
Process: 1348 spoolsv.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
Process: 1420 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
Process: 1660 AnyDesk.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:34 UTC+0000
Process: 1936 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:38 UTC+0000
```

```

Process: 1980 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:38 UTC+0000
Process: 2236 SearchIndexer. 2021-09-24 09:33:45 UTC+0000
Process: 2372 wmpnetwk.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:46 UTC+0000
Process: 2552 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:48 UTC+0000
Process: 2776 WmiPrvSE.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:52 UTC+0000
Process: 2428 sppsvc.exe 2021-09-24 09:35:46 UTC+0000
Process: 2952 svchost.exe 2021-09-24 09:35:47 UTC+0000
Image: 0x8696f3f0, Address 90130000, Name: win32k.sys
Image: 0x842a2a00, Address 903a0000, Name: TSDDD.dll
*****
Session(V): 8a668000 ID: 1 Processes: 24

```

```

PagedPoolStart: 80000000 PagedPoolEnd ffbfffff
Process: 404 csrss.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:23 UTC+0000
Process: 448 winlogon.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:23 UTC+0000
Process: 1468 taskhost.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
Process: 1524 dwm.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
Process: 1564 explorer.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:33 UTC+0000
Process: 1856 VBoxTray.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:37 UTC+0000
Process: 1868 AnyDesk.exe 2021-09-24 09:33:37 UTC+0000
Process: 2964 calc.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:09 UTC+0000
Process: 3108 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:23 UTC+0000
Process: 3128 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:23 UTC+0000
Process: 3284 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:25 UTC+0000
Process: 3320 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:25 UTC+0000
Process: 3556 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:28 UTC+0000
Process: 3784 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:35 UTC+0000
Process: 3816 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:36 UTC+0000
Process: 2132 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:46 UTC+0000
Process: 2284 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:34:50 UTC+0000
Process: 3276 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:35:00 UTC+0000
Process: 3680 chrome.exe 2021-09-24 09:35:02 UTC+0000
Process: 4080 AnyDesk.exe 2021-09-24 09:35:22 UTC+0000
Process: 1516 notepad.exe 2021-09-24 09:35:56 UTC+0000
Process: 2852 notepad.exe 2021-09-24 09:36:37 UTC+0000
Process: 1636 cmd.exe 2021-09-24 09:37:31 UTC+0000
Process: 3652 conhost.exe 2021-09-24 09:37:31 UTC+0000
Image: 0x869c0b88, Address 90130000, Name: win32k.sys
Image: 0x851ab938, Address 903d0000, Name: cdd.dll

```

So there is something definitely up with `chrome.exe` and `notepad.exe`,

Registry hives can give `IE explorer` history,

Now we cant see `chrome` history, but we can `grep` it in `strings`

Lets check for `http`,

After tries like, `http://google` , `http://127.0.0.1`

```

aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ strings ransomware.raw | grep http://192.168

```

```
http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87/
    http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
Ahttp://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000,*
EGL_ANGLE_platform_ahttp://192.168.1.87:8000,*
http://192.168.1.87/
khttp://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
    http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
J*http://192.168.1.87:8000/
    http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/Directory listing for /
http://192.168.1.87:8000/favicon.ico
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/Directory listing for /
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
Hnamespace-f0265b5b_9b92_4ccf_9ee5_1835421d3964-http://192.168.1.87:8000/
Hnamespace-f0265b5b_9b92_4ccf_9ee5_1835421d3964-http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll(
6http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/Directory listing for /
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/http://192.168.1.87:8000/application/x-msdos-programapplication/x-msdos-program
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
$http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
$http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
```

```
$http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
$http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
8http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
8http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
8http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
8http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
http://192.168.1.87:8000
http://192.168.1.87:8000/favicon.ico
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/favicon.ico
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/favicon.ico
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87/
L9http://192.168.1.87:8000/original.txt.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
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http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/h
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
```

```
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/favicon.ico
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
_http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
M_http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87:8000/
[_http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87:8000/favicon.ico
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/favicon.ico
http://192.168.1.87:8000/favicon.ico
http://192.168.1.87:8000/Directory listing for /
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/http://192.168.1.87:8000/application/x-msdos-programapplication/x-msdos-program
/+P9].Nhttp://192.168.1.87:8000/http://192.168.1.87:8000/application/x-msdos-programapplication/x-msdos-
program
    http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
e-f0265b5b_9b92_4ccf_9ee5_1835421d3964-http://192.168.1.87:8000/
Hnamespace-f0265b5b_9b92_4ccf_9ee5_1835421d3964-http://192.168.1.87:8000/
Hnamespace-f0265b5b_9b92_4ccf_9ee5_1835421d3964-http://192.168.1.87:8000/
Hnamespace-ddd5e499_9945_4a2f_ac68_ecffe17e797b-http://192.168.1.87:8000/
8http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
Pnamespace-f0265b5b_9b92_4ccf_9ee5_1835421d3964-http://192.168.1.87:8000/
Pnamespace-f0265b5b_9b92_4ccf_9ee5_1835421d3964-http://192.168.1.87:8000/
Pnamespace-ddd5e499_9945_4a2f_ac68_ecffe17e797b-http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
|_http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
_http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87 http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
```

```
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
$http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
$http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
$http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
8http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
8http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
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http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
8http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/*
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/api-ms-win-core-path-l1-1-0.dll)
http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe,
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
fa583bea-7ca7-43fc-ae36-87c749cfe858192http://192.168.1.87:8000/
a52cbceb-318c-4453-87ab-496318bd9b5a192.168.1.87:8000http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/Directory listing for /
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/notepad.exe
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000BD1F630B479E7325E77504E9C908EB97
_---]---]---]lctf.com:443,*":{"expiration":"0","last_modified":"13276947761736356","model":0,"setting":
{"hasHighScore":false,"lastMediaPlaybackTime":0.0,"mediaPlaybacks":0,"visits":1}},{"https://www.google.com
:443,*":{"expiration":"0","last_modified":"13276947316417682","model":0,"setting":
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{},"password_protection":{},"payment_handler":{},"permission_autoblocking_data":
{},"permission_autorevocation_data":{},"popups":{},"ppapi_broker":{},"protected_media_identifier":
{},"protocol_handler":{},"safe_browsing_url_check_data":{},"sensors":{},"serial_chooser_data":
{},"serial_guard":{},"site_engagement":{"http://192.168.1.87:8000,*":
{"expiration":"0","last_modified":"13276949677295228","model":0,"setting":
{"lastEngagementTime":1.3276949677295186e+16,"lastShortcutLaunchTime":0.0,"pointsAddedToday":5.1,"rawScor
e":5.1}},{"https://anydesk.com:443,*":
{"expiration":"0","last_modified":"13276947383421526","model":0,"setting":
{"lastEngagementTime":1.3276947383421476e+16,"lastShortcutLaunchTime":0.0,"pointsAddedToday":2.1,"rawScor
```



```

e":2.1}}, "https://ctf.tamilctf.com:443, *":
{"expiration": "0", "last_modified": "13276949690187694", "model": 0, "setting":
{"lastEngagementTime": 1.327694969018768e+16, "lastShortcutLaunchTime": 0.0, "pointsAddedToday": 4.5, "rawScore": 4.5}}, "https://tamilctf.com:443, *":
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{}, "webid_share": {}, "window_placement":
{}}, "pref_version": 1, "created_by_version": "94.0.4606.61", "creation_time": "13276947282795333", "exit_type":
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{"0": {"5": ["13276949694"]}}, "metrics_last_log_time": "13276947283", "sessions": {"event_log":
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{"did_schedule_command": true, "first_session_service": true, "tab_count": 2, "time": "13276947761735387", "type": 2, "window_count": 1},
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{"DiceMigrationComplete": true, "allowed": true, "spellcheck": {"dictionaries": ["en-US"], "dictionary": ""}, "sync": {"requested": false}, "token_service":
{"dice_compatible": true, "translate_site_blacklist_with_time": {}, "unified_consent":
{"migration_state": 10}, "updateclientdata": {"apps": {"nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpiccgmieda":
{"cohort": "1:", "cohortname": "", "dlrc": 5380, "pf": "e6ea06b8-e107-4a66-99b5-4816d9496a63"}}, "web_apps":
{"did_migrate_default_chrome_apps":
[], "last_preinstall_synchronize_version": "94", "system_web_app_failure_count": 0, "system_web_app_last_attempted_language": "en-US", "system_web_app_last_attempted_update": "94.0.4606.61", "system_web_app_last_installed_language": "en-US", "system_web_app_last_update": "94.0.4606.61", "zerosuggest": {"cachedresults": ""}}]'\n["", [], [], [],
{"google:clientdata": {"bpc": false, "tlw": false}, "google:suggesttype":
[], "google:verbatimrelevan: yM
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
2http://192.168.1.87:8000/favicon.ico
http://192.168.1.87:8000/malware
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
_http://192.168.1.87:8000
f8c6a31http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
bae027c1-282a-4061-93aa-e76e257c40961http://192.168.1.87:8000/K
eef2a613-4455-41fa-9ce4-855ff07c4f5419http://192.168.1.87:8000/
d1c47ccc-62c7-4bd9-a5b8-368250bb587419http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
xsoftware\borland\delphi\tserverinfo\917744542394704404682954017491127.0.0.1:(net
disk)software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\runsoftware\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\windapptoolhelp32readprocessmemorychangeserviceconfig2ahttp://ip.aq138.com/getip.asp?
aquser=http://ip.aq138.com/setip.asphhttp://192.168.1.5/get.asp?user=http://192.168.1.5/set.asp

```



```
3,*":{"expiration":"0","last_modified":"13276947387247814","model":0,"setting":
{"hasHighScore":false,"lastMediaPlaybackTime":0.0,"mediaPlaybacks":0,"visits":1}},{"https://ctf.tamilctf.c
om:443,*":{"expiration":"0","last_modified":"13276947761744925","model":0,"setting":
{"hasHighScore":false,"lastMediaPlaybackTime":0.0,"mediaPlaybacks":0,"visits":1}},{"https://tami
http://192.168.1.87:8000/
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt
```

It seems like he viewed `companyleaks.txt` , downloaded `notepad.exe` and `DLLs`,  
`notepad.exe` ??

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 filescan | grep
notepad.exe
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
0x0000000000e4c988      1      1 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\en-US\notepad.exe.mui
0x0000000007d4dae0      1      1 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\en-US\notepad.exe.mui
0x000000000381b2a80      8      0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\en-US\notepad.exe.mui
0x000000000384f3038      4      0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
0x0000000003d746738      8      0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
```

Everything seems legit

Lets check for command history,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 cmdscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

...

*****
CommandProcess: conhost.exe Pid: 3652
CommandHistory: 0x420588 Application: cmd.exe Flags: Allocated, Reset
CommandCount: 11 LastAdded: 10 LastDisplayed: 10
FirstCommand: 0 CommandCountMax: 50
ProcessHandle: 0x5c
Cmd #0 @ 0x41e328: dir
Cmd #1 @ 0x41dd18: cd ../../
Cmd #2 @ 0x41dd38: net user
Cmd #3 @ 0x4164d0: whoami
Cmd #4 @ 0x41dd98: cd Windows
Cmd #5 @ 0x41ddb8: cd system
Cmd #6 @ 0x41e358: dir
Cmd #7 @ 0x4181e8: .\malware.exe
Cmd #8 @ 0x402190: echo "Yay Got flag!!"
Cmd #9 @ 0x4206f0: echo "Congrats(Evil Smile)"
Cmd #10 @ 0x464b80: type .\malware.exe
Cmd #19 @ 0x310030: ??? ?????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????????? ??
Cmd #29 @ 0xff82a6bc: ???????????
```

```
Cmd #36 @ 0x3f00c4: B?F??????  
Cmd #37 @ 0x41d158: B?B???????A
```

So he ran `malware.exe` renamed from `notepad.exe`,

Lets find that,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 filescan | grep  
malware.exe  
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1  
0x0000000016b6aac8      9      0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\system\malware.exe  
0x000000003fee21c8      8      0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\system\malware.exe
```

Lets dump that `malware.exe`,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 dumpfiles -Q  
0x0000000016b6aac8 -D .  
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1  
  
...  
  
ImageSectionObject 0x16b6aac8 None \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\system\malware.exe  
DataSectionObject 0x16b6aac8 None \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\system\malware.exe
```

Checking the `file` type,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ ls  
file.None.0x850e3768.dat file.None.0x8c235008.img ransomware.raw ransomware.zip  
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ file file.None.0x850e3768.dat  
file.None.0x850e3768.dat: PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows  
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ file file.None.0x8c235008.img  
file.None.0x8c235008.img: PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
```

Trying to run it,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ wine file.None.0x850e3768.dat  
TamilCTF{v0latility_1s_n0t_2_3a5y}
```

After trying many attempts, it displays the same ...

Applying little bit of reversing skills to (BTW Forensics is not only about using tools, you need a little bit of reversing too, If you are not.. you need to tune up)

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ strings file.None.0x850e3768.dat | grep company
companyleaks.txt
```

So it does some operation with `companyleaks.txt`

On reversing the `ELF` in `Ghidra`, you would get

```
undefined4 FUN_00401639(void)

{
    undefined *puVar1;
    undefined auStack279 [255];
    int iStack24;
    int iStack20;

    FUN_00401840();
    puVar1 = &DAT_00411044;
    iStack20 = FUN_0040ea98();
    if (iStack20 == 0) {
        FUN_004015fd("TamilCTF{v0lat1lity_1s_n0t_2_3a5y}", puVar1);
        FUN_0040eaa0();
    }
    FUN_004015d0(iStack20, &DAT_0041107b, auStack279);
    iStack24 = FUN_0040ea08();
    if (iStack24 == 0x13) {
        toupper(0x66);
        FUN_0040ea28();
    }
    else {
        FUN_004015fd("TamilCTF{v0lat1lity_1s_n0t_2_3a5y}");
    }
    return 0;
}
```

This `if (iStack24 == 0x13)` condition checks for the length of the variable whether its size should be `19` or not

If `true` perform some operation, if `false` return `fake flag`

So it reads `companyleaks.txt` which contains 19 chars

Lets confirm it,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ cat companyleaks.txt
aidenpearce369
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ wine file.None.0x850e3768.dat
TamilCTF{v0lat1lity_1s_n0t_2_3a5y}

...
```

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ cat companyleaks.txt
aidenpearce369foren
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ wine file.None.0x850e3768.dat
lvnnAz9n3éf0réDFic}X²f
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$
```

The user would have copied the text from <http://192.168.1.87:8000/companyleaks.txt> and would have pasted in **Notepad**, since it can be viewed only

Lets try dumping the **memorydump** of **notepad.exe**,

Since there are two **notepad.exe** process,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 memdump -p 1516 --
dump-dir .
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

...

*****
Writing notepad.exe [ 1516] to 1516.dmp

aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ vol.py -f ransomware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 memdump -p 2852 --
dump-dir .
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

...

*****
Writing notepad.exe [ 2852] to 2852.dmp
```

Finding any useful data in it..

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ strings 1516.dmp | grep Tam
Tam%Tam@Tam
TamQTamQTam;TamFTam
ExGetLicenseTamperState
ExSetLicenseTamperState
TamilCTF{ I deleted it :(
Tamil_Default
Tamil_Default
Tampa1
ExSetLicenseTamperState
ExGetLicenseTamperState
TamilCTF{RaM_1s_t00
_dk_https://tamilctf.com https://tamilctf.com https://tamilctf.com/assets/TamilCTF/TAMIL-CTF-
LOGO_BGTRNS_CRP.png
```

```
M_dk_https://tamilctf.com https://tamilctf.com https://tamilctf.com/assets/TamilCTF/TAMIL%20CTF.png
_dk_https://tamilctf.com https://tamilctf.com https://tamilctf.com/assets/TamilCTF/favicon.ico
```

So there seems a part of flag (hint)

TamilCTF{RaM\_1s\_t00

Its length is of 19 bytes

Lets try using it,

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ echo "TamilCTF{RaM_1s_t00" > test.txt
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ ls
1516.dmp  2852.dmp  file.None.0x850e3768.dat  file.None.0x8c235008.img  ransomware.raw  ransomware.zip
test.txt
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ wine file.None.0x850e3768.dat
TamilCTF{v0lat1lity_1s_n0t_2_3a5y}
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ mv test.txt companyleaks.txt
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ wine file.None.0x850e3768.dat
_v0l4z1l3_f0r_DFIR}X²f
```

So this **malware.exe** simply performs some operations and gives the second part of the flag out from the first part where the user copied **companyleaks.txt** from website

You would get the first part of the flag here itself

```
aidenpearce369@amun:~/Ransomware$ strings ransomware.raw | grep TamilCTF{
TamilCTF{ I deleted it :(
TamilCTF{ I deleted it :(
TamilCTF{RaM_1s_t00
TamilCTF{v0lat1lity_1s_n0t_2_3a5y}
TamilCTF{v0lat1lity_1s_n0t_2_3a5y}
TamilCTF{v0lat1lity_1s_n0t_2_3a5y}
```

Completing the whole flag for this challenge,

TamilCTF{RaM\_1s\_t00\_v0l4z1l3\_f0r\_DFIR}

I made this challenge to prove that a Good forensic analyst must have little bit of reversing skills too...

Its not always about Forensic tools you use