



Step 1 - imageinfo

```
$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI3O3-20140203-123134.raw imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO      : volatility.debug      : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
          : Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x86_23418, Win7SP0x86, Win7SP1x86_24000,
Win7SP1x86
          : AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)
          : AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (...)
          : PAE type  : PAE
          : DTB       : 0x185000L
          : KDBG      : 0x82968c28L
          : Number of Processors : 1
          : Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
          : KPCR for CPU 0 : 0x82969c00L
```

...




Step 2 - psxview

```
volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI3O3-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 psxview
```

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
```

Offset (P)	Name	PID	pslist	psscan	thrdproc	pspcid	csrss	session	deskthrd
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
0x3e6ef030	msdtc.exe	840	True	True	True	True	True	True	True
0x3e400d40	LogonUI.exe	2516	True	True	True	True	True	True	True
0x3eeacb90	TPAutoConnSvc.	1688	True	True	True	True	True	True	True
0x3e74ab18	SearchIndexer.	1712	True	True	True	True	True	True	True
0x3fb36030	runddl32.exe	1524	True	True	True	True	True	True	False
0x3e8695a0	svchost.exe	844	True	True	True	True	True	True	True



What is ps*

- pslist** - Traverses PsActiveProcessHead
- Psscan** - EPROCESS pool scanning
- Thrdproc** - ETHREAD pool scanning, then reference parent
- Pspcid** - handle table for process and thread client IDs
- Csrss** - participates in thread/process creation
 - Has open handle to every thread/process
- Session** - Processes → sessions → processes
- Deskthrd** - Pools[tagDESKTOP] → threads → processes



Step 3 – Find Weird Process

```
volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI3O3-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 psxview
```

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
```

Offset (P)	Name	PID	pslist	psscan	thrdproc	pspcid	csrss	session	deskthrd
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
0x3e6ef030	msdtc.exe	840	True	True	True	True	True	True	True
0x3e400d40	LogonUI.exe	2516	True	True	True	True	True	True	True
0x3eeacb90	TPAutoConnSvc.	1688	True	True	True	True	True	True	True
0x3e74ab18	SearchIndexer.	1712	True	True	True	True	True	True	True
0x3fb36030	rundll32.exe	1524	True	True	True	True	True	True	False
0x3e8695a0	svchost.exe	844	True	True	True	True	True	True	True

Step 4 – List DLLs

\$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI303-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 dlllist -p 1524

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

runddl32.exe pid: 1524

Command line : "C:\Users\TEKDEF~1\AppData\Local\Temp\MSDCSC\runddl32.exe" - Weird path

Service Pack 1

Base	Size	LoadCount	LoadTime	Path
0x00400000	0xb2000	0xffff	1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000	C:\Users\TEKDEF~1\AppData\Local\Temp\MSDCSC\runddl32.exe
0x76dc0000	0x13c000	0xffff	1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000	C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
0x75c20000	0xd4000	0xffff	2014-02-03 12:27:18 UTC+0000	C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll
0x74f60000	0x4b000	0xffff	2014-02-03 12:27:18 UTC+0000	C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll



Step 5 – Is File in Memory

Filescan - scans for FILE_OBJECTs

```
volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI303-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 filescan  
| grep rundl32.exe
```

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```
0x000000003eee8690      4      0 R--r-d  
\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\TEKDEF~1\AppData\Local\Temp\MSDCSC\rundl32.exe
```

```
0x000000003fa2cc00      8      0 RWD---  
\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\TEKDEF~1\AppData\Local\Temp\MSDCSC\rundl32.exe
```



Step 5 – Dump .exe

```
$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI303-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86  
procdump -D . -p 1524
```

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Process (V)	ImageBase	Name	Result
0x84536030	0x00400000	runddl32.exe	OK: executable.1524.exe

```
$ ls -l
```

```
total 1049664
```

```
-rw-r--r-- 1 michael michael      674304 Feb 23 11:56 executable.1524.exe
```

You can do "strings executable.1524.exe"




Step 6 – Process Tree

```
$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI303-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 pstree
```

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Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
0x84536030:runddl32.exe	1524	3220	10	161	
. 0x84506480:notepad.exe	1896	1524	2	57	



Step 7 – MalFind

Find weird VADs - having executable permissions and not backed by a file

VAD tags "VadS"/"VadF" - not backed by file

```
$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI3O3-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 malfind -p 1896
```

Many string VADs

The code is in the last VAD

Process: notepad.exe Pid: 1896 Address: 0x160000

Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE

Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

0x00160000 54 65 72 6d 69 6e 61 74 65 50 72 6f 63 65 73 73 TerminateProcess

0x00160010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Process: notepad.exe Pid: 1896 Address: 0x190000

Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE

Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

0x00190000 57 61 69 74 46 6f 72 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 4f 62 6a WaitForSingleObj

0x00190010 65 63 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ect.....

Process: notepad.exe Pid: 1896 Address: 0x180000

Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE

Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

0x00180000 44 43 5f 4d 55 54 45 58 2d 4b 48 4e 45 57 30 36 DC_Mutex-KHNEW06

0x00180010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Process: notepad.exe Pid: 1896 Address: 0x1a0000

Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE

Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

Process: notepad.exe Pid: 1896 Address: 0x1a0000

Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE

Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

```
0x001a0000  43 3a 5c 55 73 65 72 73 5c 54 45 4b 44 45 46 7e  C:\Users\TEKDEF~
0x001a0010  31 5c 41 70 70 44 61 74 61 5c 4c 6f 63 61 6c 5c  1\AppData\Local\
0x001a0020  54 65 6d 70 5c 4d 53 44 43 53 43 5c 72 75 6e 64  Temp\MSDCSC\rund
0x001a0030  64 6c 33 32 2e 65 78 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  dl32.exe.....
```

=


Process: notepad.exe Pid: 1896 Address: 0x1c0000

Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE

Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

```
0x001c0000 55          PUSH EBP
0x001c0001 8bec        MOV EBP, ESP
0x001c0003 83c4ac      ADD ESP, -0x54
0x001c0006 53          PUSH EBX
0x001c0007 56          PUSH ESI
0x001c0008 57          PUSH EDI
0x001c0009 8b5d08      MOV EBX, [EBP+0x8]
0x001c000c 8b4340      MOV EAX, [EBX+0x40]
0x001c000f 50          PUSH EAX
0x001c0010 8b4338      MOV EAX, [EBX+0x38]
0x001c0013 50          PUSH EAX
0x001c0014 ff13      CALL DWORD [EBX]
```

...




Step 8 – Handles

```
$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI303-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 handles -p 1524  
-t Mutant
```

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Offset (V)	Pid	Handle	Access	Type	Details
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
0x84a71de0	1524	0x58	0x1f0001	Mutant	
0x84a9c670	1524	0x150	0x1f0001	Mutant	DC_Mutex-KHNEW06
0x85333c40	1524	0x1dc	0x1f0001	Mutant	
0x8459e298	1524	0x1e4	0x1f0001	Mutant	



Step 9 – Strings

```
$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI303-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 memdump -D . -p 1524

$ strings -a 1524.dmp | less

#BEGIN DARKCOMET DATA --
MUTEX={DC_Mutex-KHNEW06}      SID={Guest16}      FWB={0}      NETDATA={test213.no-ip.info:1604}
GENCODE={F6FE8i2BxCpu}      INSTALL={1}      COMBOPATH={10}      EDTPATH={MSDCSC\runddl32.exe}
KEYNAME={MicroUpdate}      EDTDATE={16/04/2007}      PERSINST={1}      MELT={0}
CHANGEDATE={1}      DIRATTRIB={6}      FILEATTRIB={6}      SH1={1}
CHIDEF={1}      CHIDED={1}      PERS={1}      OFFLINEK={1}
#EOF DARKCOMET DATA --
```



DarkComet (from Wikipedia)

- DarkComet is a remote access trojan (RAT)
- DarkComet allows a user to control the system with a graphical user interface. It has many features which allows a user to use it as administrative remote help tool; however, DarkComet has many features which can be used maliciously. DarkComet is commonly used to spy on the victims by taking screen captures, key-logging, or password stealing.



Step 10 – Reading Strings Carefully

```
$ strings -a 1524.dmp | grep dclogs
```

```
dclogs\
```

```
dclogs\
```

```
dclogs\
```

```
dclogs\
```

```
C:\Users\Tek Defense\AppData\Roaming\dclogs\2014-02-03-2.dc
```



Step 11 – Reading Files

Is open? If not, we need the HD image

```
$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI303-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 filescan | grep dclogs
```

```
0x000000003eee9330      8      0 -W-r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Tek Defense\AppData\Roaming\dclogs\2014-02-03-2.dc
```

```
$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI303-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 dumpfiles -D . -Q 0x000000003eee9330
```

Not every file will be currently active or in the VAD

such files will not be dumped unless -Q is used



What's in the file?

:: Temp (7:28:22 AM)

:: MSN.com - Windows Internet Explorer (7:28:37 AM)

mail.google.com


:: Gmail - Windows Internet Explorer (7:29:04 AM)

notarealuser@gmail.com not a real password

:: New Tab - Windows Internet Explorer (7:29:16 AM)

tr[<-]ekdefense.com

:: TekDefense - News - Windows Internet Explorer (7:29:18 AM)





Step 12 – Persistence

```
$ volatility -f WIN-TTUMF6EI303-20140203-123134.raw --profile Win7SP1x86 printkey -K "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
```

```
Registry: \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT
```

Values:

```
REG_EXPAND_SZ Sidebar : (S) %ProgramFiles%\Windows Sidebar\Sidebar.exe /autoRun
```

```
Registry: \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT
```

Values:

```
REG_EXPAND_SZ Sidebar : (S) %ProgramFiles%\Windows Sidebar\Sidebar.exe /autoRun
```

```
Registry: \??\C:\Users\Tek Defense\ntuser.dat
```

Values:

```
REG_SZ MicroUpdate : (S) C:\Users\TEKDEF~1\AppData\Local\Temp\MSDCSC\runddl32.exe
```

