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2 **Cheating interactions favor modularity in mutualistic networks**

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34 **Conflict of interest statement**

35
36 All authors declare no conflicts of interests
37

38 **Authors contribution statement**

39 LAC conceived the original idea for the study. All authors provide
40 suggestions and contribute to the research design. LAC, CSA, and PRG
41 developed the original model. LAC ran the simulations with the help of CSA,
42 LPM, and IBB. LAC, LPM, IBB, and PRG analyzed the results and generated
43 the figures. CE and CR contributed to discussing the implications of the
44 results to empirical mutualistic systems. LAC wrote the first draft and all
45 authors substantially contributed to the final version of the manuscript.

46 **2. Abstract**

47 A fundamental fact about mutualisms relies on the fact that partner species
48 often harbor some individuals that benefit from the use of resources and
49 services of the interaction without providing any positive feedback to the
50 other player. The role of these cheaters on the evolutionary dynamics of
51 mutualisms has long been recognized, yet their broader consequences to the
52 community level, and beyond species they interact with, is still poorly
53 understood. Because mutualisms form networks that often involve dozens to
54 hundreds of species in a given site, indirect effects generated by cheaters may
55 cascade through the whole community, reshaping trait evolution. Here, we
56 study how harboring cheating interactions can influence coevolution in
57 mutualistic networks. We combine a coevolutionary model, empirical data on
58 animal-plant mutualistic networks, and numerical simulations to show that
59 the higher frequency of cheating interactions lead to the formation of groups
60 of species phenotypically similar to each other and distinct from other groups,
61 generating higher trait disparity. The resulting clustered trait patterns, in
62 turn, change the patterns of interaction in simulated networks, fostering the
63 formation of modules of interacting species. Our results indicate that cheaters
64 in mutualisms contribute to generate phenotypic clusters in mutualisms,
65 counteracting selection for convergence imposed by mutualistic patterns, and
66 favoring the emergence of modules of interacting species.

67 **Keywords:** Cheaters, Coevolution, Modularity, Mutualism, Network theory

68

69

70 **Introduction**

71
72 Selection imposed by ecological interactions is one of the main forces
73 impacting phenotypic patterns observed across levels of biological
74 organization (Thompson 2005). Selection imposed by ecological interactions
75 partially shapes trait matching among interacting individuals (Zhang *et al.*
76 2012), trait distributions within interacting populations (Bronstein *et al.* 2003),
77 trait variation across populations of the same species (Thompson 2005), and
78 trait patterns at the community level (Strauss & Irwin 2004). At the
79 community level, ecological interactions can be a driving force leading to trait
80 convergence (Wilson *et al.* 2012) and trait disparity (Siepielski & Benkman
81 2010). In this sense, theory and empirical results indicate that distinct
82 ecological interactions (e.g., mutualistic, antagonistic) may favor different trait
83 outcomes at the community level (Thompson 1994).

84 Mutualistic interactions, for example, can favor trait matching, which is
85 the trait similarity between interacting species. Although mutualisms may
86 also generate other trait patterns, such as intensification of traits (Anderson &
87 Johnson 2008), trait matching is an observed pattern in a variety of
88 mutualistic systems, such as pollination by flies and bees (Zhang *et al.* 2012,
89 Santamaría & Rodríguez-Gironés 2007), seed dispersal by birds and bats
90 (Galetti *et al.* 2013, Mello *et al.* 2011), and Müllerian rings in velvet ants
91 (Wilson et al 2012). Hence, trait matching is an expected outcome of reciprocal
92 selection that could favor higher interaction efficiency in mutualisms
93 (Thompson 1994, Zhang *et al.* 2012). In contrast, antagonisms, such as

94 parasites and hosts, favor trait mismatching between hosts and parasites,
95 leading to several coevolutionary dynamics such as coevolutionary
96 alternation and escalation, that favor the maintenance or the increase in trait
97 variation across and within species (Andreazzi *et al.* 2017).

98 Antagonisms and mutualisms are not isolated in nature but coexist in a
99 variety of ways. Studies have explored the effects of combining mutualisms
100 and antagonisms on population dynamics (e.g., Melián *et al.* 2009),
101 community stability (e.g., Wilson *et al.* 2003), and network structure (e.g.,
102 Genini *et al.* 2010), highlighting the importance of considering the multiple
103 outcomes that interactions may have at a single community and assigning the
104 extremes of a gradient between mutualism and antagonism (Fontaine *et al.*
105 2011, Rodríguez-Rodríguez *et al.* 2017). Individuals of the same species can
106 function as antagonists or mutualistic partners of the same interacting species,
107 e.g., seed-caching rodents acting as seed predators and seed dispersers of the
108 same plant species (Loayza *et al.* 2014). In other scenarios, individuals may act
109 as antagonisms of some species and as mutualisms of others (Gómez *et al.*
110 2018, Gómez *et al.* 2014, Montesinos-Navarro *et al.* 2017). Finally, there are
111 species in which individuals are specialized cheaters, exploring mutualistic
112 interactions without providing any benefit in return like fig wasps and yucca
113 moths (Bronstein 2001). Thus, in mutualistic interactions, selection may favor
114 the evolution of life histories that exploit the resources and services provided
115 by mutualistic partners without providing benefits, hereafter, cheating
116 interactions (Bronstein 2001, Vieira *et al.* 2003).

117 We are beginning to understand how cheaters interactions could drive
118 evolutionary patterns in mutualisms, as species acting as a cheater or
119 mutualist may affect coevolution and local adaptation. For example, the
120 interaction between the plant *Lithophragma parviflorum* (Saxifragaceae) and the
121 floral-parasitic moth *Greyia politella* changes from parasitism to mutualism if
122 the legitimate pollinators of *L. parviflorum* are absent in the community
123 (Thompson & Cunningham 2002). A fundamental challenge to study
124 evolutionary consequences of ecological interactions at the community level is
125 that pairwise interactions affect each other within ecological networks. A
126 cheating interaction happen with a negative effect on one partner and positive
127 effect on the other one. In this context, evolutionary changes can cascade via
128 indirect effects (Guimarães *et al.* 2017), affecting how species traits evolve and
129 ultimately shaping how species interact in the community. As a consequence
130 of the non-random patterns of interaction networks, central species play an
131 important role in maintaining the structure of networks and, consequently,
132 increasing the stability of selection pressures between species in the network
133 (Martín González *et al.* 2010). However, we still do not understand how
134 central cheaters affect mutualistic coevolutionary dynamics.

135 Here, we use a quantitative trait mathematical model, empirical
136 networks of species interactions, and numerical simulations to investigate
137 how cheaters interactions may affect coevolution in mutualistic networks.
138 Specifically, we explore three main questions *i)* How do different frequencies
139 of cheating interactions affect coevolutionary dynamics? Due to the arms race

140 dynamics favored by cheaters coevolution, we expect a higher trait mismatch
141 in scenarios with elevated frequencies of cheaters interactions. *ii)* Do central
142 cheater species amplify the effect of cheaters interactions on trait evolution?
143 Because central species can influence the trait evolution of several other
144 species, we expect that central cheater species will amplify the effect of
145 cheaters interactions on trait evolution in mutualistic networks. *iii)* What is
146 the effect of cheating interactions on the structure of mutualistic networks? By
147 assuming that cheaters interactions may favor arms race dynamics, one can
148 expect higher trait matching among species involved in arms races, but
149 increased trait mismatch with other partners, leading to the loss of
150 interactions. Thus, we expect that higher frequencies of cheaters interactions
151 will generate higher arms race dynamics and consequently, higher frequency
152 of interaction loss, generating networks with higher modularity (Figure 1b).

153

154 **4. Methods**

155 *Evolutionary model*

156 Our discrete-time, evolutionary model describes how the average trait of a
157 species i , Z_i , evolves due to selection imposed by ecological interactions and
158 other environmental factors (e.g., abiotic conditions). In our model, the
159 selection differential, S , and the additive genetic variance of the trait governs
160 trait change across generations (Lande 1976). We assumed S has three
161 components potentially affecting the evolution of the trait Z : the selection
162 imposed by (i) mutualisms, (ii) cheating interactions, and (iii) other

163 environmental factors. As a first approximation, we assume that, for a given
164 interaction, species are either mutualistic partners or cheaters, but the same
165 species may behave as a cheater for species j but as a mutualistic partner to
166 species k .

167 The mutualism component, S_{mi} is defined as the sum of selective effects
168 caused by all mutualistic partners of species i . We assume that selection
169 imposed by mutualism favors trait matching among mutualistic partners. We
170 also assume that perfect trait matching between partners i and j occurs if
171 $|Z_j^{(t)} - Z_i^{(t)}| = 0$ (Guimarães *et al.* 2011). A given species may have multiple
172 mutualistic partners and each partner may contribute differently to selection,
173 where the contribution of partner j to selection on species i is described by
174 $m_{ij}^{(t)}$. The total contribution of mutualistic partners to selection on Z_i is
175 defined as:

$$176 \quad S_{m_i} = \sum_j^N m_{ij}^{(t)} (Z_j^{(t)} - Z_i^{(t)}) \quad (1)$$

177 In the cheating component S_{ai} , selection favors trait matching for the cheater
178 species j (as in equation 1) but favors trait mismatch for the victim species i ,
179 defined as the species explored by the cheater. Like the mutualism
180 component, in our model, the magnitude of the trait change is dictated by the
181 evolutionary effect of species j on species i , $v_{ij}^{(t)}$. Selection for trait
182 mismatching between cheater on victim is dictated by ε_{ij} :

$$183 \quad S_{a_i} = \sum_j^N \delta_{ij} v_{ij}^{(t)} (Z_j^{(t)} \pm \varepsilon_{ij} - Z_i^{(t)}) \quad (2)$$

184 We assume if the trait difference between i and j is higher or equal to ε_{ij} ,
185 $|Z_j^{(t)} - Z_i^{(t)}| \geq \varepsilon_{ij}$, then $\delta_{ij}=0$, and the cheater species imposes no selection on

186 the victim. Thus, ε_{ij} represents a trait barrier preventing the interaction due to
 187 trait dissimilarity (e.g., Santamaría & Rodríguez-Gironés 2007). However, if
 188 $|Z_j^{(t)} - Z_i^{(t)}| < \varepsilon_{ij}$, then $\delta_{ij}=1$ and selection on victim i will favor the increase or
 189 decrease of trait values depending on $Z_j^{(t)} - Z_i^{(t)}$. If $Z_j^{(t)} - Z_i^{(t)}$ is positive, the signal
 190 of ε_{ij} will be positive. Contrarily, if $Z_j^{(t)} - Z_i^{(t)}$ is negative, the signal of ε_{ij} will
 191 be negative (Andreazza *et al.* 2017). Finally, we assumed that the environmental
 192 component S_{ei} is the combined effects of all other selective pressures favoring
 193 an optimum trait value for each species, θ_i :

$$194 \quad S_{ei} = \theta_i - Z_i^{(t)} \quad (3)$$

195 Combining the three selection components described above (equations 1, 2,
 196 and 3), the evolutionary change of Z_i in timestep $t+1$ is given by:

$$197 \quad Z_i^{(t+1)} = Z_i^{(t)} + \varphi_i [(1 - \gamma_i)(S_{mi} + S_{ai}) + \gamma_i S_{ei}] \quad (4)$$

198 in which, φ_i is a compound parameter formed by additive genetic variance
 199 and the slope of the adaptive landscape. The parameter γ_i dictates the
 200 importance of ecological interactions versus environmental factors as selective
 201 pressures. Thus, trait evolution, in our model, is defined as:

$$202 \quad Z_i^{(t+1)} = Z_i^{(t)} + \varphi_i \{ (1 - \gamma_i) [\sum_j^N m_{ij}^{(t)} (Z_j^{(t)} - Z_i^{(t)}) + \sum_j^N \delta_{ij} v_{ij}^{(t)} (Z_j^{(t)} \pm \varepsilon_{ij} - \\ 203 \quad Z_i^{(t)})] + \gamma_i \theta_i - Z_i^{(t)} \} \quad (5)$$

204 The evolutionary effects $m_{ij}^{(t)}$ and $v_{ij}^{(t)}$ that affect the magnitude of trait change
 205 due to the mutualism and cheating interactions, respectively, are defined as
 206 the relative effect of species j on i , such that $m_{ij}^{(t)} = a_{mij} q_{ij}^{(t)}$ and $v_{ij}^{(t)} = a_{vij} q_{ij}^{(t)}$. a_{mij}
 207 and a_{vij} depict, respectively, the presence of a mutualistic or a cheating
 208 interaction between species i and j . The term $q_{ij}^{(t)}$ is defined as:

209

$$q_{ij}^{(t)} = \frac{e^{-\alpha(z_j^{(t)} - z_i^{(t)})^2}}{\sum_{k,i \neq k} a_{ik} e^{-\alpha(z_j^{(t)} - z_i^{(t)})^2}} \quad (6)$$

210 where the parameter α controls the sensitivity of the evolutionary effect due
211 to trait matching between species i and j and $a_{ik}=1$ if there is a mutualistic or a
212 cheating interaction between i and k and $a_{ik} = 0$, otherwise.

213

214 *Mutualistic networks*

215 We use 24 empirical mutualistic networks available at the databases Web of
216 Life (<http://www.web-of-life.es/>) and Interaction Web Database
217 (<http://ecologia.ib.usp.br/iwdb/index.html>). These 24 networks include
218 eight plant-pollinator networks, eight plant-frugivore networks, and eight
219 ant-myrmecophyte networks. Each network is represented by an adjacency
220 matrix (A) in which each species is represented by a single row and a single
221 column of the matrix; each element of this matrix represents the presence or
222 absence of the corresponding animal-plant interaction. Ant-myrmecophyte
223 networks are commonly less connected, more modular, and less nested in
224 comparison to seed dispersal and pollination networks, while seed dispersal
225 networks are usually more nested and have a higher connectance than
226 pollination and ant-myrmecophyte networks (Supporting Information,
227 Guimarães 2020).

228

229 *Simulations*

230 Our simulations describe how the mean trait Z evolves in time (Figure 1a).
231 The values and the description of the model parameters are depicted in Table

232 1. Each simulation ends after 1000 timesteps, an amount of time that is
233 sufficient to generate asymptotic trait values. In most simulations, however,
234 the equilibrium was reached before 1000 timesteps. To reduce computational
235 time, we assumed the equilibrium is achieved if $|Z_i^{(t+1)} - Z_i^{(t)}| < 10^{-4}$ for every
236 species i , ending the simulation. We run 72.000 simulations, 3.000 per
237 empirical network, where each simulation tracks how species traits change in
238 time due to coevolution and the selective pressures from the environment
239 (Figure 1a). All the simulations were performed in R v. 3.5.3 (R Core Team
240 2018). In what follows, we explain how we used this modelling approach to
241 explore each of our three questions.

242
243 *i) How do different frequencies of cheating interactions affect coevolutionary
244 dynamics?*

245 We evaluated the impact of the emergence of cheating interactions on the
246 coevolutionary process. For each simulation, we define a probability p that an
247 interaction within a “mutualistic network” is not a mutualism *per se* but a
248 cheating interaction. We explore values of p ranging from 0.01 to 1 to test how
249 different frequencies of cheating interactions change the outcome of the
250 coevolutionary process. Thus, in this first analysis, we assume that cheating
251 interactions are randomly distributed across all interactions in the mutualism
252 network, whereas the frequency of cheating interactions in the network is
253 fixed in each simulation. This process of defining the outcome of interactions
254 based on p generates a network with both positive and negative effects,
255 merging the effect of mutualism and cheaters in a single network (Melián *et*

256 *al.* 2009). Because we are defining a cheating interaction as interactions with a
257 negative effect on one partner and positive effect on the other one (i.e., an
258 antagonism), we prohibit the occurrence of double-negative effects between
259 two species. For this purpose, we only apply the transformation from positive
260 to negative effect based on p in the lower triangle of the adjacency matrix,
261 therefore maintaining cheating interactions as a combination of positive and
262 negative effects. We also assumed that the outcome of the interaction did not
263 change across time. Such an approach does not allow us to explore the effects
264 of conditional outcomes of many interactions, but it is a starting point to
265 unravel how cheating interactions changes the outcome of coevolution. We
266 performed a set of sensitivity analyses in which we relaxed the assumption of
267 fixed outcomes of interactions in time, allowing interactions to shift from
268 positive and negative outcomes during simulations. Our sensitivity analyses
269 suggest that temporal variability on the interaction outcome does not
270 influence our main results (Supporting Information).

271 We characterized the coevolutionary dynamics by describing patterns
272 in trait distributions across species. We first measure the average trait
273 distance between species as a proxy for trait disparity in the network. We
274 computed the mean pairwise distance (D), which is the sum of the Euclidean
275 distances of species traits between all possible pairwise combinations between
276 all species divided by the total number of pairwise combinations (Ciampaglio
277 *et al.* 2001):

$$278 D = \frac{\sum_i^N \sum_{j \neq i}^N \sqrt{(Z_i^{(t)} - Z_j^{(t)})^2}}{N(N-1)} \quad (7)$$

279

280 to characterize the trait matching generated by the coevolutionary dynamics,
281 we used Ward's hierarchical clustering analysis (Ward 1963) along with the
282 GAP validation index, a pre analysis of the clustering algorithm for
283 evaluating the optimized number of clusters in a given dataset (Tibshirani *et*
284 *al.* 2001). We used this approach to compute the number of trait clusters
285 between interacting species.

286 *ii) Do central cheater species amplify the effect of cheaters interactions on trait*
287 *evolution?*

288 Some species do not provide benefit for any of their interaction partners,
289 relying exclusively upon cheating interactions (Bronstein 2001). We
290 hypothesize that exclusive cheaters species could amplify the effects of
291 cheating interactions, *i.e.*, leading to effects on trait distributions that are
292 higher than observed in simulations with the same number of cheating
293 interactions in the network but randomly distributed across all ecological
294 interactions (see previous set of simulations). We expected that this effect
295 would be even stronger if the exclusive cheaters species are highly connected
296 or perform central roles in the network structure. To explore the role of these
297 exclusive, highly connected cheaters species in affecting the coevolutionary
298 outcome, we selected the most connected species of the network and assumed
299 these species are only involved in cheating interactions. To do so, we calculate
300 the degree centrality (Newman 2018), which is a standardized measure of the
301 number of interactions of a given species on the mutualistic network. The

302 weighted degree centrality C_i for a species i from a given set (e.g., floral
303 visitors) is:

304
$$C_i = \frac{k_i}{N_0} \quad (8)$$

305 in which k_i is the number of interactions of species i and N_0 is the species
306 richness from the opposite set of i (e.g., if species i is a floral visitor, the
307 opposite set is formed by flowering plants). We computed a z-score to detect
308 extreme values of species centrality and identify the most central species,

309
$$S_i = \frac{C_i - \bar{C}}{\sigma} \quad (9)$$

310 where \bar{C} is the average value of degree centrality of the network and σ is the
311 standard deviation of the degree centrality values. To test the effect of central
312 cheaters species on trait evolution, we set all species with $S_i > 1$ as exclusive
313 cheaters. Thus, we will have a network with central species as obligate
314 cheaters - our Central scenario.

315 Finally, we compare the coevolutionary dynamics of the Central
316 scenario with the scenario in which cheating interactions were randomly
317 distributed across the network (the Random scenario). To create the Random
318 scenario, we measure the frequency of negative effects in networks (f_{Ch}) in the
319 Central scenario, as shown in Equation 10, and use this value of frequency as
320 a p in the networks of the Random scenario. We considered $n(-+)$ as the
321 number of cheating interactions and $n(++)$ as the number of mutualistic
322 interactions in the network.

323
$$f_{Ch} = \frac{n(-+)}{n(-+) + n(++)} \quad (10)$$

324 Thus, in the Random scenario, negative effects are not concentrated in central
325 species but distributed across the network. For each combination of empirical
326 networks ($n = 24$) and scenarios (Random and Central), we performed 1.500
327 simulations, leading to a total of 72.000 simulations. We ran all simulations
328 until the equilibrium.

329 *iii) What is the effect of cheating interactions on the structure of mutualistic
330 networks?*

331 In our baseline coevolutionary model, the trait barrier ε_{ij} indicates that the
332 evolutionary effects of a cheater species on a victim became negligible. To
333 explore the effect of cheating interactions on the network structure, we
334 changed our baseline coevolutionary model to add an additional trait barrier,
335 b_{ij} , defining the maximum absolute trait mismatch between two species traits
336 so they can interact:

$$337 \quad \begin{cases} |Z_i^{(t)} - Z_j^{(t)}| > b_{ij}, a_{ij} = 0 \\ |Z_i^{(t)} - Z_j^{(t)}| \leq b_{ij}, a_{ij} = 1 \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

338 Note that ε_{ij} represents a trait barrier which dictates if there is a
339 selection on a victim by a cheater species. In contrast, b_{ij} describes that a
340 potential mutualism or cheating interaction cannot occur because of a large
341 trait dissimilarity between partners. By incorporating b_{ij} in our model we
342 explored how network structure changes through time as an outcome of the
343 coevolutionary process. With this approach, in each simulation timestep, we
344 verified if there were interacting species with differences in trait values higher
345 than b_{ij} . Following equation 11, we disconnected those interactions generating

346 an interaction loss. Since we are focusing on how the network changes due to
347 interaction loss, once the interaction is lost, it remains lost and cannot
348 reconnect during the simulations. Thus, at the end of a simulation, we may
349 have an interaction network with a different structure generated through the
350 removal of links. We then compared the initial and final network structure in
351 each particular simulation.

352 We characterize the structure of the networks calculating two common
353 measures of network structure: nestedness and modularity (Almeida-Neto *et*
354 *al.* 2008, Blondel *et al.* 2008). For each simulation, we computed the number of
355 interactions loss generated by the coevolutionary dynamics at the end of the
356 simulation, F . We computed the indexes describing structural change
357 between the final and initial network. We used two indexes of network
358 structure change: $\Delta NODF$ (Almeida-Neto *et al.* 2008) and ΔQ (Blondel *et al.*
359 2008). For each network, these measures are calculated as the difference
360 between the network nestedness (NODF) and modularity (Q) at the end and
361 at the beginning of the simulations:

$$\begin{cases} \Delta NODF = NODF_{final} - NODF_{initial} \\ \Delta Q = Q_{final} - Q_{initial} \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

362 Coevolutionary dynamics, in our model, therefore, may reduce the total
363 number of interactions, favoring specialization. We then explored if the
364 removal of interactions by coevolutionary dynamics deviates from random
365 removal of interactions from the initial network. To do so, for each
366 simulation, we created a third network generated by removing F interactions
367 from the initial network. This network, therefore, has the same number of
368

369 interactions than the coevolved network but the set of interactions removed
370 was randomly defined. We then compared how network structure changes
371 with random loss of interactions and loss of interactions due to trait
372 dissimilarity of coevolution outcomes.

373

374 **5. Results**

375 *i) How do different frequencies of cheating interactions affect coevolutionary
376 dynamics?*

377 The higher the proportion of cheating interactions, the higher the trait
378 disparity observed across animal species and across plant species in the
379 network (Fig. 2a-c). The effect of cheating interactions is similar for the three
380 types of networks studied here, leading to increased trait disparity (Table 2).

381 Thus, cheating interactions increase the trait disparity across species (Fig. 2),
382 and this effect is not dependent on the structure of the ecological network.

383 Following our results, we develop an analytical approximation which relates
384 the importance of evolutive effects and the trait disparity of species. Both
385 simulations and analytical approximation points to an increase in trait
386 disparity due to cheating interactions (Supporting Information).

387 We observed that cheating interactions affect the number of species
388 trait clusters. At low levels of cheating interactions ($p = 0.01$, with p being the
389 frequency of cheating interactions in the networks), we found a low number
390 of clusters in simulations (2.43 ± 0.62 , Fig. 2d-f). At intermediate levels of
391 cheating interactions, the number of trait clusters increased ($p = 0.5$,

392 3.03 \pm 0.79). Finally, if most of the network is formed by cheating interactions
393 then, on average, we saw the formation of lower numbers of species trait
394 clusters, similar to when there is low frequency of cheating interactions ($p =$
395 0.9, Fig. 2d-f). Thus, increasing the frequency of cheating interactions fuels
396 trait disparity in mutualistic networks by promoting the emergence of trait
397 clusters. However, these trait clusters disappear under higher frequencies of
398 cheating interactions.

399 *ii) Do central cheater species amplify the effect of cheaters interactions on trait
400 evolution?*

401 Our results do not support the prediction that highly connected species
402 would have a stronger effect on trait evolution in mutualistic networks (Table
403 3). In fact, there is high variability in mean trait disparity within scenarios and
404 types of interactions across simulations shown by the 0.05 and 0.95 quantiles
405 from our simulation results represented by the vertical bars in Fig. 3a-b. Thus,
406 highly connected cheaters species do not promote higher levels of trait
407 diversity than those promoted by cheating interactions distributed across the
408 network in our simulations (Fig. 3a). Similarly, the number of trait clusters of
409 species between scenarios are also variable (Fig. 3b).

410 *iii) What is the effect of cheating interactions on the structure of mutualistic
411 networks?*

412 In our simulations, coevolutionary dynamics assuming $p = 0$ (no cheating
413 interactions) led to almost no change in network structure [$\Delta Q \cong 0$; $\Delta NODF$
414 $\cong 0$]. As we increase the frequency of cheating interactions, mutualistic
415 networks become more modular and less nested (Table 4). This increasing

416 modularity and reduced nestedness observed was not reproduced by simply
417 randomly removing interactions. Moreover, the increase in modularity and
418 reduction in nestedness was not equally distributed across mutualisms. In
419 mutualisms that the empirical network was initially very modular and not
420 nested (e.g., ant-myrmecophyte networks) changes in network structure were
421 weaker than in mutualisms showing higher nestedness (e.g., pollination and
422 seed dispersal). Hence, empirical networks under the effect of cheaters shift
423 its network structure towards high modular and low nested patterns (Table
424 4).

425

426 **6. Discussion**

427 We explored the coevolutionary outcomes of cheating interactions in
428 mutualistic networks. Our results show how trait evolution and network
429 structure could change due to cheating lifestyles that emerge in mutualisms.
430 Previous studies already explored the effect of mutualisms and cheating
431 interactions on population dynamics (Law *et al.* 2001, Bronstein *et al.* 2003,
432 Wilson *et al.* 2003, Lee 2015) and phenotypic evolution (Ferriere *et al.* 2002). In
433 this context, our work contributes to further our understanding on
434 coevolutionary dynamics of multispecies assemblages in three different
435 ways.

436 First, cheating interactions promote higher community-level trait
437 disparity in mutualistic networks. By imposing selection favoring trait
438 mismatching, the presence of cheating interactions leads to an increase in
439 species trait disparity. This arms race dynamics partially offsets selection

440 favoring convergence and trait matching in mutualisms (Guimarães *et al.*
441 2011, Zhang *et al.* 2012). Therefore, cheating interactions may allow us to
442 understand one of the mechanisms preventing the perfect trait matching in
443 empirical mutualistic communities (Law *et al.* 2001); yet trait disparity cannot
444 increase indefinitely due to factors related to the environmental pressures and
445 distinct selection regimes (Andreazza *et al.* 2017). For instance, limited genetic
446 variation or limited anatomical and physiological mechanisms restricts fruit
447 sugar content and flower size (Jordano 1995), which could limit the potential
448 for trait matching. Also, annual variation in soil nutrients limit the pulp
449 composition of fleshy fruits and, consequently, represents a restriction for the
450 development of sugar-rich fruits that are be highly attractive to frugivores
451 (Herrera 1998), limiting trait matching in plant-frugivore systems.

452 Cheating interactions promote, in a certain frequency, trait disparity in
453 mutualistic networks by generating clusters of species traits. In intermediate
454 frequencies of cheating interactions, the joint effect of mutualistic selection
455 favoring trait matching and cheaters interactions favoring trait mismatching
456 create clusters of species traits. There is theoretical evidence that the
457 proportion of positive and negative effects between species is close to 1:1 in
458 real communities (Dodds 1997). Thus, it is possible that our results showing
459 higher trait disparity due to the formation of trait clusters in intermediate
460 levels of cheating interactions could be empirically tested. The presence of
461 cheaters may be underestimated in empirical networks (Genini *et al.* 2010),
462 partially because there is great behavioral plasticity among interacting

463 individuals (Bronstein 2001). Thus, intraspecific variation generating
464 behavioral plasticity may play an important role in individual fitness and lead
465 to occasional cheating. This indicates that trait disparity may be higher than
466 expected in mutualistic interactions and future studies would benefit from
467 trait disparity measurements in empirical communities.

468 Second, the centrality of a cheater species does not change the trait
469 disparity pattern that results from mutualisms with cheating interactions.

470 Although species centrality is one of the best measures to identify important
471 species in ecological networks (Martín González *et al.* 2010), it is not the only
472 force driving the structure and dynamics of networks. For instance, the
473 distribution of mutualistic and antagonistic interactions between component
474 species within a network has an impact in maintaining the network structure
475 when facing perturbations (Montesinos-Navarro *et al.* 2017). A next step for
476 our work is to explore how the position of certain cheating interactions could
477 change the coevolutionary dynamics.

478 Third, the presence of cheating species in mutualistic networks may
479 lead to the reorganization of network patterns due to the increased trait
480 dissimilarity. We found that cheating leads to increased modularity and
481 reduced nestedness in mutualistic networks. The emergence of modularity
482 was also observed as an outcome of coevolutionary dynamics in antagonistic
483 networks and depends on the selection intensity between victim and cheater
484 species (Andreazza *et al.* 2017). Our results propose an alternative path to the
485 emergence of modularity in mutualistic networks, which depends on how

486 much cheating interactions the mutualistic networks support. The structure of
487 interaction networks is explained by several factors, such as species
488 abundance distribution (Dátillo *et al.* 2014), mismatch between traits of plants
489 and animals (Stang *et al.* 2007) and phylogenetic and phenology-based
490 constraints (Jordano 1995, Jordano *et al.* 2003). Here we show that cheating
491 interactions could also change the structure of mutualistic networks through
492 the coevolutionary process. Future studies could test the influence of cheating
493 interactions in cascading co-extinctions in mutualistic networks.

494 By now, our results suggest that the incorporation of the selection
495 imposed by the cheating interactions that naturally emerge from mutualisms
496 is pivotal to a deep understanding of the coevolutionary dynamics in species-
497 rich mutualisms. Cheating interactions change the outcomes of mutualistic
498 coevolution, leading to increased interspecific trait variation and clustering.
499 We provide insights on the effect of multiple interaction types in a network
500 and how it may shape trait diversity by the contrasting selective forces
501 favoring convergence and disparity across interacting species (Sauve *et al.*
502 2016). The structure of simulated networks significantly changed when we
503 increased the frequency of cheating interactions, and this result opens new
504 questions on which is the balance of positive and negative effects that
505 maintains the structure of empirical networks. Our theoretical predictions
506 may also help us to understand how networks might evolve under a rapidly
507 changing world, in which interactions are vanishing due to several

508 anthropogenic impacts, with unknown consequences for ecosystem
509 functioning.

510

511 **7. References**


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
681 **Figures and Tables**



682

683 **Figure 1:** Interplay between mutualism and cheating interactions may drive
 684 the coevolutionary process in mutualistic networks. (a) Using a binary matrix
 685 of interactions, we define two types of interactions: mutualism, as a double


686 positive effect between partner species, and cheating, as a positive effect for
687 the cheater and a negative effect for the victim species. The positive or
688 negative effect occurs from the species in columns to the species in rows
689 (respectively, i and j) and the effects that define those interactions are the
690 elements of the matrix (1 or -1). Then, we simulate how the species mean trait
691 value Z changes in time due to coevolution, as shown in the central plot. (b)
692 We show our expectations for trait matching considering i) the frequency of
693 cheating interactions, ii) species role, and iii) network structure and test these
694 predictions with numerical simulations using a trait-based coevolution model
695 and empirical mutualistic matrix of interactions.



696

697 **Figure 2.** How do different frequencies of cheating interactions affect
 698 coevolutionary dynamics? Each point in the plot is the average values
 699 depicting the D and the number of species trait clusters in different
 700 frequencies of cheating interactions (p). Each error bar is the 0.05 and 0.95
 701 quantile from our simulation results. Ant-myrmecophyte interactions are
 702 represented by the green plots, pollination by orange plots and seed dispersal


703 interactions are represented by purple plots. Each histogram illustrates the
 704 distribution of trait values in one simulation with a given frequency of
 705 cheating interactions (p).



706
 707 **Figure 3.** Do exclusive cheater species amplify the effect of cheating
 708 interactions on trait evolution? Using the species degree centrality, we
 709 estimated the frequency of cheating interactions in the Central scenario and
 710 used it as a p in the Random scenario. Theoretical bipartite networks were
 711 used to illustrate both scenarios; cheating interactions concentrated in a single
 712 central species and randomly distributed in the network. Two points
 713 connected with a line are paired comparisons between scenarios
 714 parameterized using the same empirical network and the error bars are the
 715 0.05 and 0.95 quantile from our simulation results. Ant-myrmecophyte

716 interactions are represented by the green plots, pollination by orange plots

717 and seed dispersal interactions are represented by purple plots.



718

719 **Figure 4.** What is the effect of cheating interactions on the structure of

720 mutualistic networks? Each point in the plot is the average values of ΔQ and

721 $\Delta NODF$ in different frequencies of cheating interactions (p). Each error bar is

722 the 0.05 and 0.95 quantile from our simulation results. The black points are

723 values of ΔQ and $\Delta NODF$ from networks where we removed interactions

724 randomly. Ant-myrmecophyte interactions are represented by the green

725 plots, pollination by orange plots and seed dispersal interactions are

726 represented by purple plots. The matrices above the graphs are examples of

727 binary adjacency matrices to compare the loss of interactions in simulations

728 from different scenarios.

729

730 **Table 1.** Variables and parameters of the model and their baseline values.

Parameter	Description	Baseline values
$Z_i^{(t)}$	Initial mean trait value of specie i	$Z_i^{(t)} \sim U(0, 10)$
φ_i	Parameter composed of the additive genetic variance and phenotypic variance of Z	0.2
ε_{ij}	Trait barrier to happen the cheating interaction between species i and j	5
γ_i	Strength of abiotic selection for trait change of species i	0.1
θ_i	Z_i optimum value for the environmental selection	$\theta_i \sim U(0, 10)$
A	Sensibility of evolutionary effect due to the trait matching between interacting species	0.2
P	Probability of a positive effect become negative in a mutualistic network	$0.01 \leq p \leq 1$
b	Trait barrier for any interaction happen between species in the network	7

731

732 **Table 2.** Average \pm SD values of D and statistical fit of a linear model between
 733 D and frequency of cheating interactions in the networks for three types of
 734 mutualisms.

Mutualisms	Average D \pm SD	Slope	R ²
Ant-Myrmecophyte (n = 8)	12.94 \pm 6.68	19.12	0.68
Pollination (n = 8)	10.86 \pm 6.37	18.89	0.73
Seed dispersal (n = 8)	9.82 \pm 6.66	19.39	0.70

735

736 **Table 3.** Average difference and paired t-test between Central and Random
 737 scenarios in D for three types of mutualisms.

Mutualisms	Average SD difference from scenarios	t-test value	P
Ant-Myrmecophyte (n = 8)	-1.40 ± 0.78	-5.05	0.001
Pollination (n = 8)	-2.01 ± 1.58	-3.60	0.009
Seed dispersal (n = 8)	-1.71 ± 1.71	-2.83	<0.025

738

739 **Table 4.** Average ± SD ΔQ and $\Delta NODF$ for random interaction removal and
 740 trait barrier interaction removal for three types of mutualisms

	$\Delta Q \pm SD$		$\Delta NODF \pm SD$	
	Random	Simulations	Random	Simulations
Mutualisms				
Ant-Myrmecophyte (n = 8)	0.007 ± 0.035	0.037 ± 0.056	-1.65 ± 2.52	-2.96 ± 3.39
Pollination (n = 8)	0.058 ± 0.072	0.14 ± 0.12	-14.9 ± 13.5	-19.4 ± 15.4
Seed dispersal (n = 8)	0.095 ± 0.081	0.18 ± 0.14	-23.06 ± 17.02	-26.3 ± 19.0

741

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