

# Labor market competition, wages and worker mobility \*

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Incomplete, comments appreciated

## Abstract

When labor markets are not perfectly competitive, better outside options may raise workers' wages. I study how the labor market reacts to better outside options in a natural experiment where French border-commuters gained access to the high-wage Swiss labor market. I find asymmetric effects across skill groups. New commuters are highly skilled, but wages of remaining high-skill workers do not change. Instead, wages rise for low-skill workers. Low-skill employment rises, stemming from more immigration from other parts of France. Results from production functions show that low-skill workers did not become more productive. The evidence supports models of the labor market with search frictions: The integration increases the job-finding rate across regions, increasing competitive pressure on French firms. Wages rise more at more productive firms. There is no evidence of higher rents at affected firms. Several indicators suggest that the high-skill labor market is more competitive than the low-skill labor market, implying less scope for wage increases for these workers. The findings imply that employer competition raises workers' bargaining power. The results also suggest that facilitating worker mobility benefits movers and stayers alike because of pro-competitive effects on the labor market.

Keywords: wages, job search, commuting, monopsony, outside options

JEL classification: J31, J42, J64, R23

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# 1. Introduction

When labor markets are not perfectly competitive, workers are not paid their marginal product and their alternative income sources matter for their wages and labor supply decisions. The value of unemployment does not seem to be a relevant threat point in wage setting (Jäger et al., 2018). While job offers from competing firms may help some workers renegotiate their wages (Caldwell and Harmon, 2018), it remains unclear how better access to outside options affects labor market equilibrium: Who benefits from better access to jobs? How does it affect overall employment and the allocation of workers to employers?

Understanding these effects is important both for economic policy and for the understanding of labor markets more generally. Search frictions may prevent workers from moving to better-paying firms, which reduces competition among employers and allows them to pay workers below their marginal product. Policies that facilitate worker flows may then increase the competitiveness of the market and raise wages. In the United States, it is an open question if and how much mobility costs such as occupational licensing and non-compete agreements have contributed to the decline in labor market dynamism (Council of Economic Advisors, 2016; U.S. Treasury, 2016). For instance, the share of workers in licensed professions has increased from below 5% in 1950 to 35% in 2008 (Kleiner and Krueger, 2013). The concerns are grounded in economic models of search in the labor market that claim that information frictions prevent workers from earning what they produce. These predictions have, however, never been tested in a causal setting, possibly for lack of credible variation in the amount of search frictions. Minimum wage studies typically indirectly infer that labor markets are monopsonistic from how wages and employment respond to minimum wage hikes<sup>1</sup>. By design these studies are silent on the working of less-skill labor markets where the minimum wage does not bind.

I study how better access to nearby jobs affects how much workers earn, how many workers work, and who works where. I exploit the opening of Swiss labor market to French border-commuters as a shock to how many job offers French workers get. In 1998, Switzerland and the European Union (EU) announced an agreement to deepen the economic relationships between the two parties. As a side effect of the mutual opening of labor markets it became easier for firms to hire workers from across the border as bureaucratic cost were reduced.

Because of large wage disparities between France and Switzerland the policy increased employment opportunities particularly for French workers: accepting a job at the other side of the border would boost their hourly wage from 9 Euros to 15 Euros. This wage differential was highest for high-skill workers but all workers could ex-ante benefit from commuting to Switzerland. Moreover, there was no language barrier to overcome since spoken languages do not differ along the border<sup>2</sup>. This made it easier for French workers

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<sup>1</sup>Search frictions can be one of several reasons for monopsony.

<sup>2</sup>The majority of affected French areas neighbors French-speaking Switzerland. A Germanic minority language is spoken in areas that neighbor German-speaking Switzerland.

to transfer their skills to a job in Switzerland.

After 1998 more, and primarily highly educated workers and workers in managerial and engineering professions, commuted from the French border region to Switzerland. Most of the new commuters had been employed in the border area in the year before suggesting that the labor market integration mainly affected the contact rate for employed rather than unemployed workers.

In a model of labor market search following Bontemps et al. (2000) I study theoretically how the labor market integration affects French local labor markets at the border to Switzerland. Workers search for jobs on and off the job, and heterogeneous firms post wages for vacancies. I model the wage differentials across the border as there being more productive firms in Switzerland than in France. Job offers arrive at random to workers. A higher contact rate makes it easier for workers to move to better-paying jobs. To prevent excessive quits, firms increase wages and the wage distribution shifts to the right. The more competitive the labor market in the first place, the less room is there for wage increases in France and more workers transition to Switzerland. In contrast if the labor market is less competitive then French wages increase more and fewer workers accept jobs in Switzerland. The framework implies that wages increase more for low-skill workers, and that high-skill workers accept more jobs in Switzerland because French firms cannot increase wages much more for this worker type.

I compare the frictional model to a competitive framework where – in the spirit of Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987) – relative cost and benefits exogenously determine that high-skill workers start commuting to Switzerland. As this changes the relative supply of high-skill workers in France, it increases wages primarily of high-skill workers: In the canonical model to study labor supply shocks (Dustmann et al., 2013), wages of high-skill workers increase the most because their supply drops the most. In contrast, wages of low-skill workers might rise or fall depending on whether they are close substitutes to high-skill workers and on how elastic capital supply is.

In the competitive model, then, how wages adjust is endogenous to who commutes. In the frictional model, in contrast, who commutes is endogenous to how wages adjust. The models thus make differing predictions about whose wages increase in France conditional on the high-skill workers leaving. This disagreement helps infer about which model is more appropriate for the labor markets I study.

I then empirically study the effects of the labor market integration on French wages and employment using administrative data on French workers and firms. The main outcome for wages is wage growth of workers that stay at their firm in two consecutive years. As this exploits variation at the individual level it is robust to compositional changes of the workforce which itself could be a result of the labor market integration. Data limitations do, however, not allow me to draw any conclusions on whether job switchers also earn higher wages.

I compare affected French labor markets in the French-Swiss border region to similar but unaffected French labor markets in a difference-in-difference manner. I use a matching

strategy to find control labor markets that have similar employment structures and where wages grow at a similar rate three years before the labor market integration. I follow Imbens and Rubin (2015) to assess the quality of the matching strategy and show that the matching strategy improves the overlap in covariate distributions between the treatment and control group.

The econometric model then assesses whether outcomes evolve differently in the treatment region compared to the control region after the labor market integration. The model assumes that in the absence of the labor market integration, these two sets of labor markets would have evolved along parallel trends.

I find that the reform increases wages of incumbent workers on average by 1.6% after five years. The estimated effect becomes stable after three years. The average effect masks considerable heterogeneity across skill groups: The wage gains come, with similar magnitudes, primarily from wage gains of low- and mid-skill workers. Wages of high-skill workers remain unchanged throughout the sample period. I find that the labor market integration also increases low-skill employment in the short run, but the estimates are less precise.

The wage effects are robust to controlling for exposure to other nation-wide policies and to using an alternative matching strategy. When I control for labor markets' exposure to minimum wage hikes and a reduction in the mandated hours worked per week the estimated coefficient remain almost constant. When I use an alternative matching strategy that constructs a different control group I find that the estimated effects exhibit almost the same time pattern, but are a little less precise.

I also show that the wage gains do not stem from a reduction in the hours worked per day. If wages are downwardly rigid and workers start working fewer hours, hourly wages increase. I find on average no evidence of fewer hours worked per day. Only for low-skill workers I find some evidence of fewer hours per day after five years. But, the timing of the effect suggests that this is a result of the wage gain and not its cause.

I then show that the results do not stem from either firms or workers becoming more productive. If firms became more productive, rent sharing could increase the wages of worker (Card et al., 2018). I find no evidence that the wage gains result from higher rents at firms measured either by profit or value added per worker. If instead workers became more productive, their wages should increase even in the competitive model. I estimate production functions at the firm-level and test the hypothesis that the labor market integration increased the marginal product of low- and mid-skill workers. The estimates reject the hypothesis.

The results are thus hard to reconcile with competitive models of the labor market, but they support models of the labor market where search frictions prevent workers from moving to better-paying firms. An increase in the contact rate then reduces firms' labor market power which increases wages and possibly employment. From a policy perspective it suggests that fostering labor market competition has two distinct effects: it not only allows workers to move to better-paying jobs but it also benefits workers that stay put

because firms offer higher wages to prevent workers from quitting. Such policies can have a spatial dimension, e.g. better commuting access across neighborhoods in a city, but they can also apply to barriers that prevent workers from moving to other occupations.

This paper is related to studies that explore the effects of shocks to imperfectly competitive labor markets. The most similar is Beaudry et al. (2012) who show that industry-city specific wage growth spills over to other industries because workers can bargain higher wages. Caldwell and Harmon (2018) and Caldwell and Danieli (2018) exploit shocks to outside options at the worker-level and estimate their effect on wages and mobility between firms. Jäger et al. (2018) show that a change in workers' value of non-employment does not affect wages which implies that non-employment is not a relevant threat point in wage bargaining. These studies rely on exogenous variation in the flow value of alternative opportunities of workers, such as non-employment or labor demand at other firms, and keep labor market frictions constant. In contrast, the present paper assesses the effects of lower search frictions on the labor market, holding the flow values of other opportunities constant. In other words, variation comes from improved access to outside options, not from better outside options per se.

I study the labor market integration with a model of search frictions where firms post wages, and compare its predictions to the competitive model commonly used in the migration literature. While the search model has qualitatively similar predictions as the search and matching model in Caldwell and Harmon (2018), it nests the competitive model as a special case. I compare the implications of the frictional and the competitive model and find empirical support for the frictional, but not for the competitive model. The setting further allows me to study aggregate employment effects of labor market competition.

More generally the paper relates to the large literature on labor markets with search (Rogerson et al., 2005) and monopsony (Manning, 2011, 2003). The closest paper to mine are Van den Berg and Van Vuuren (2010) who estimate how search frictions affect wages in the cross-section and Hirsch et al. (2019) who show that search frictions explain a large share of the urban wage premium. In contrast the present study finds that an exogenous increase in the contact rate for employed workers increases wages, a mechanism common to many models with on-the-job search which has not been assessed in a causal setting before<sup>3</sup>.

I also show that workers can get wage gains at their employer. While this is inconsistent with the traditional search model with wage posting (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) it supports the view that posting firms may have an equal-treatment constraint as in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013, 2016). I find that this is the case even for low-skill workers and contrasts with the findings in Caldwell and Harmon (2018). The difference could arise because the labor market became tighter in the present setting while Caldwell and Harmon (2018) study shocks at the individual level.

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<sup>3</sup>In Beaudry et al. (2012) there is no on-the-job search and wage growth transmits across industries through the outside options of unemployed workers.

A few papers study imperfectly competitive local labor markets. Manning and Petrongolo (2017) show that the search of the unemployed creates labor market linkages, and I show that a similar effect is at play for the search of employed workers. Schmutz and Sidibé (2019) analyse a system of cities where it is easier for workers to find jobs in nearby areas. My findings suggest that the wage offer distribution, which is exogenous in their model, reacts to workers' access to alternative locations.

Labor market frictions have also been assessed in the literature on place-based policies. Current studies focus on how hiring cost affect unemployment (Kline and Moretti, 2014), but the evidence on the effects of hiring credits in fostering employment and wage growth for low-income workers has been mixed (Neumark, 2011). The present paper, in contrast, studies a policy that mainly reduced the contact rate for employed workers and shows that it increases wages even of workers that do not take up the new opportunities. It suggests policies that encourage hiring from other firms, possibly coupled with the location of high-wage industries, as potential alternatives to hiring credits targeted at low-skill workers because of labor market competition between firms.

## **2. Background and main data**

### **2.1. Wage setting in France**

Wages are set at three different levels. The government defines a national minimum wage. Bargaining at the industry level between employers and trade unions defines minimum wages at the industry-occupation level<sup>4</sup>. In 1992 these agreements covered around 90% of workers. But for many workers these agreements are non-binding, and individual employers have considerable room to pay their employees more. As a result an important fraction of employees benefits from company-level bargaining (OECD, 2004, p. 151). For instance, in 1998 75% of large firms (above 50 employees) granted their workers individual pay rises (Barrat et al., 2007). Even though the French labor market is less decentralized than the American or British labor market, it is comparable to other European labor markets such as the German or Dutch market. This characterisation is consistent with the wage dispersion documented for instance by Abowd et al. (1999), and Cahuc et al. (2006) find that employer competition is important for French wages.

### **2.2. The integration of local labor markets**

The labor market integration was a side effect of a larger set of agreements between Switzerland and the European Union (EU) which were implemented in 2002 after Switzerland had demanded closer economic integration with the EU in various sectors in the 1990s. Switzerland intended to improve labor market access for both parties, standardize how products are approved to market and participate in European research programs. In contrast, the European Union put strong emphasis that all agreements became active

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<sup>4</sup>The majority of these agreements is at the national level.

simultaneously and were in line with the existing European norms ("acquis communautaire") (Bundesrat, 1999). In particular, access to the Swiss labor market had to be free for all EU citizens, which the European Commission repeated on several occasions (van den Broek, 1996; European Commission, 1995). The treaties were announced at the end of 1998. This will serve as the base year for the empirical analysis even though the reform was to be implemented only in 2002. Beerli et al. (2018) document anticipation effects as Swiss labor market authorities started approving more permits in 1999.

It was already possible to commute across the border but bureaucratic barriers remained. Residents from a set of "border municipalities" could work as commuters in the other country already before. This group of municipalities had been defined in a treaty between Switzerland and France in 1948 to facilitate residents' mobility in these border areas<sup>5</sup>. The general rules were symmetric for French and Swiss commuters. Commuters had to return to their residence every day, their work permits were valid for one year, and changing work location or profession needed to be authorised. In contrast, countries specified individually how they issued work permits. Swiss firms could only hire a worker from across the border when they could not find a suitable worker in Switzerland before (Beerli et al., 2018). The subnational entity issued the permits and they were bound to the applying employer (Swiss Federation, 1986).

The integration removed all bureaucratic costs and firms could freely hire cross-border workers. A permit has since been valid for 5 years and holding one allows for job switches and weekly instead of daily commuting (Bundesrat, 1999). Until 2007 only residents from the border municipalities could commute across the border. I will use the border area to assign labor markets to treatment status.

## 2.3. Data sources

### 2.3.1. Full-count worker records

The empirical analysis uses a matched employer-employee dataset from France provided by the Statistical Office (INSEE). The data contain annual declarations for social security filed by employers excluding the self-employed. I use the vintage called *DADS postes* (DADS = "Déclarations annuelles des données sociales"). The data report employment spells which are employment relationships between individuals and establishments<sup>6</sup>. Data on spells report total salary, total hours worked, gender, age, occupational category, municipality of work and residence, the start and end date, as well as an indicator whether it is the individual's main spell in that year. If the worker was employed at the same firm in the previous year, information on wages and hours from that year are also available. If the worker was employed at another firm in the previous year, the information on the preceding spell is not available, however.

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<sup>5</sup>It consisted of all municipalities within 10km on both sides of the border, as well as municipalities in the French *Haute Savoie* department and in *Pays Gex*.

<sup>6</sup>Eg, if an individual is employed at two different establishments, there are two spells.

I focus on the main employment spell<sup>7</sup> of each worker and keep those that are full-time employed as of June 30 in each year. I keep workers that are between 15 and 64 years old. I drop apprentices, interns and workers in the agricultural sector. I also drop workers with missing data on occupation or place of work which are around XX% of the workforce.

Employees in any year are either firm stayers or new hires. Firm stayers are workers that work at the same employer in two consecutive years. The remaining workers are new hires. They can come from non-employment or from other firms. I focus on firm stayers because I can calculate changes in outcomes at the individual level. It controls for unobserved individual heterogeneity, but does not allow me to study in detail how the wages of newly hired workers respond. I build a dataset of wages and employment at the skill  $\times$  year  $\times$  labor market cell. I winsorise wages at the first and 99th percentile and residualise them with respect to gender and age<sup>8</sup>. I calculate wage growth as the change in the log hourly wage between two consecutive years<sup>9</sup>. I assign workers to skill groups with the skill group reported in the first of the two years. I use the INSEE's definition of local labor markets ("employment zones") of which there are 297 in France<sup>10</sup>. Workers are assigned to skill groups based on their two-digit occupational classification<sup>11</sup> similar to Combes et al. (2012) and Cahuc et al. (2006)<sup>12</sup>. High-skill occupations are managers, executives, scientists, engineers, lawyers. Mid-skill occupations are technicians, foremen, skilled blue collar workers and administrative employees. Low-skill occupations are unskilled blue and white collar workers (craft, manufacturing, sales clerks).

### 2.3.2. Balance sheets from tax records

I combine these data with firm-level balance sheet data drawn from the *FICUS*. The data contain annual information on the total wage bill, the book value of capital, sales, material use as well as other observables such as the municipality of the headquarters, a unique firm identifier and the five-digit industry of economic activity (NACE classification).

The data are quasi-exhaustive and exclude very small firms with annual sales of less than 80'300 Euros<sup>13</sup> as well as finance and insurance companies. Because the data are only available at the level of the legal entity, I focus on single-establishment firms for the analysis of variables derived from this dataset. I follow Gopinath et al. (2017) to prepare and clean the data. I source employment by firm, year and skill type from DADS and join them to the firm-level data.

I use the data in two ways. In aggregate form I use them as separate outcomes similar

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<sup>7</sup>This definition is provided by INSEE and is based the spell's duration and total compensation.

<sup>8</sup>I estimate the regressions separately for each year and include a gender dummy and a quartic in age.

<sup>9</sup>Because individual growth rates exhibit large tails I winsorise them at the first and 99th percentile.

<sup>10</sup>Their size and commuting patterns are comparable to counties in the United States.

<sup>11</sup>There was a major revision of occupational classifications in 2002, but the 2-digit variable used for the skill assignment ("socioprofessional category") is reported with almost no change until 2008. It changes in 2002 for some managers, but both their old and their new two-digit socioprofessional category lie in the high-skill group.

<sup>12</sup>I pool skill groups 2 and 3 from Cahuc et al. (2006).

<sup>13</sup>This threshold is from 2010, but only changes marginally over time (Di Giovanni et al., 2014).



to the wage outcomes at the labor market  $\times$  year level. In individual form I use them to estimate production functions.

### 3. Descriptive analysis

I now describe the labor markets along the border in 1998 and show how French workers reacted to the new employment opportunities. I do this for three education groups separately: compulsory education or less, secondary education, and tertiary education. In the main analysis I group workers by skill based on occupation. I use education here because I can better compare wages across the border. Since the occupation is not defined for non-employed workers, it also enables me to assess transitions between labor market statuses.

In the first part I use data from the Swiss Employment Structure Survey (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2017) and from the 4% worker panel in France which both report the education of the workers<sup>14</sup>. In the second part I use the French Labor Force Survey from 1993 to 2002, a rotating panel survey of the French population. The survey samples individuals at the place of residence in March of three consecutive years. In each interview they report their labor market status for each of the 12 preceding months. I identify cross-border commuters by their country of work.

#### 3.1. All French workers could gain from commuting to Switzerland

Figure 1 shows that there were large wage differences between France and Switzerland in 1998. The Figure plots the average wages in Euros for three education groups. French wages are in red and Swiss wages are in green. Wages for highly educated workers were more than twice as high in Switzerland than they were in France: a French worker could increase her salary from 10 Euros per hour to more than 25 Euros per hour when switching to work in Switzerland. Workers of other education groups could also gain, but less so. Workers with mandatory education could increase their wage from around 7 Euros per hour to 13 Euros per hour.

The Figure suggests that all workers could have been better off by commuting to Switzerland once the border opened. Different preferences for commuting for the education groups could however make it less attractive for some groups, especially if it involves longer commutes. I assess this possibility in Appendix E following Van Ommeren et al. (2000) and do not find any evidence that some worker types dislike commuting more than others.

Appendix A.1 graphically documents other dimensions of the labor markets along the border. French labor markets are less dense than their Swiss neighbors. Wages do change discontinuously at the border for all education groups, supporting the conclusion drawn from comparing average wages in the two countries. French labor markets are between 13 and 96 minutes away from the next border crossing to Switzerland<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup>I harmonize education groups according to the ISCED-1997 classification.

<sup>15</sup>Data on the location of border crossings have been thankfully provided by Henneberger and Ziegler

### 3.2. Employees in high-skill professions reacted most strongly

How did French workers adapt to the new employment opportunities? For treated and control areas, Figure 2a shows the share of the labor force that commutes to Switzerland for 1993 to 2002. There are no border commuters from the control area. In the treatment area the share of commuters to Switzerland decreases from above 4% in 1993 to below 4% in 1998. The trend reverses after 1999<sup>16</sup> and in 2002 almost 6% of the labor force commutes to Switzerland<sup>17</sup>.

Figure 2b plots the same number for the three education groups in 1998 and 2002. The red bars refer to 1999, the green bars to 2002. All education groups commute more, but there is a strong education gradient: It is strongest for highly educated workers whose share increases from below five percent to more than eight percent in 2002. Workers with mandatory education react the least.

Figure 3 shows that the new commuters<sup>18</sup> were primarily workers that lived and worked in the border area in the previous year. Figures 3a and 3b consider education groups (columns) and years (rows) separately. Figure 3a shows that on average roughly 75% of new border commuters did not migrate before they accepted a job in Switzerland. An exception is 1999 when almost 50% of new commuters with tertiary education did not live in the border area in the previous year. Figure 3b shows that among the non-migrating new border commuters, the vast majority worked in France in the previous year. It presents transition rates of workers by labor market status: employed<sup>19</sup>, unemployed, inactive. In each year between four and eight percent of highly educated employees accepted a new job in Switzerland. The number decreases by education: around 2.5% of workers with mandatory education accepted a new job in Switzerland. In contrast Swiss firms did not hire any French commuters from inactivity and very few from unemployment.

To bridge the current section to the main empirical part, I present some more evidence by occupation. Figure 4a shows that high-skill occupations were most affected by the outflow of workers. It plots the average transition rate for employed workers by their previous occupation from 1999 to 2002. On average, almost seven percent of managers and engineers left their jobs to work in Switzerland every year. The number drops steadily for less skill-intensive professions. Four percent of office employees and a bit more than two percent of manufacturing employees transitioned to Switzerland. Figure 4b shows how stayers (workers that remain employed in France) and new commuters distribute across the occupations. Most importantly, 60% of new commuters with tertiary education worked in managerial or engineering professions before they accepted a job from

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(2011).

<sup>16</sup>It is plausible that the trend only reverses after 1999 because the survey is collected in March 1999 and the market integration was only announced in December 1998.

<sup>17</sup>Swiss commuters in France are less well documented. In 2000 0.03% of the Swiss labor force in the border region worked in France (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2000).

<sup>18</sup>A new border commuter is a worker that works in Switzerland in the current, but did not work there in the previous year.

<sup>19</sup>This only includes workers that did not have any intermitted unemployment spell in the last 12 months

Switzerland compared to less than 40% of workers with the same education that did not start commuting. For workers with secondary education the distribution is similar for stayers and leavers.

In sum, the evidence shows that while all workers could earn higher wages from accepting a job in Switzerland, the new commuters were highly educated. Most of them had been living and working in the border area before accepting a job in Switzerland. The largest outflow was from managerial and engineering professions.

## 4. How do search frictions affect wages and employment across space?

In this section I describe a simple equilibrium framework with heterogeneous firms and workers based on Bontemps et al. (2000) and Engbom and Moser (2018). I show how wages and the allocation of workers across firms and space adjust when employed workers receive more job offers. I then discuss how workers and wages react in a competitive market, and highlight that the two frameworks disagree about how the composition of the commuting flow relates to wage gains.

### 4.1. Workers and firms

French workers live forever and maximize their expected lifetime income. They belong to a skill group  $\theta \in \Theta$  and only search within this market. They discount future income at rate  $\rho$  and can be employed or unemployed. When unemployed they receive flow utility  $b_\theta$  and receive new job offers at rate  $\lambda_\theta^u$ . When employed they receive wage flow  $w$  and receive offers for new jobs at rate  $\lambda_\theta^e$ . They are laid off at rate  $\delta_\theta$ . Job offers from French and Swiss firms are drawn randomly from the distribution  $F_\theta(w)$  on the support  $[\underline{w}_\theta, \bar{w}_\theta]$ . Workers know the distribution of job offers and take it as given. Denote the legal minimum wage  $w_{min}$ <sup>20</sup>.

The value function for an unemployed worker is

$$\rho W_\theta = b_\theta + \lambda_\theta^u \int_{\underline{w}_\theta}^{\bar{w}_\theta} \max\{S_\theta, W_\theta\} dF_\theta(w)$$

and the value function for an employed worker is

$$\rho S_\theta = w + \delta_\theta [W_\theta - S_\theta] + \lambda_\theta^e \int_w^{\bar{w}_\theta} [S_\theta(x) - S_\theta(w)] dF_\theta(x)$$

Unemployed workers follow a reservation wage strategy and accept any job that offers at least  $\phi_\theta$ :

$$\phi_\theta = b_\theta + (\kappa_\theta^u - \kappa_\theta^e) \int_{\phi_\theta}^{\bar{w}_\theta} \frac{\bar{F}_\theta(x)}{\beta + 1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{F}_\theta(x)} \quad (4.1)$$

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<sup>20</sup>I abstract from minimum wages at the skill level. If they exist, they lie above the legal minimum wage. Also see the discussion in Section 2.1

where  $\kappa_\theta^j = \lambda_\theta^j / \delta_\theta$  for  $j = \{u, e\}$ ,  $\beta_\theta = \rho / \delta_\theta$ , and  $\bar{F}_\theta(x) = 1 - F_\theta(x)$ . This implies that there is no wage below  $\phi_\theta$ . In a steady-state, flows into unemployment equal flows out of unemployment, and the unemployment rate is  $u_\theta = \frac{1}{1 + \kappa_\theta^u}$ . Unemployment is lower when unemployed workers find jobs more quickly.

The model assumes that workers do not search in markets of other skill types, and that job offers from France and Switzerland arrive at the same rate. These strong assumptions are necessary to keep the model tractable. For instance a model where workers receive job offers from two competing regions at different rates would complicate the exposition without giving many more insights. Hoffmann and Shi (2016) analyze a model of this kind and their simulation evidence yields similar predictions as the ones derived here.

To keep the model as simple as possible I also abstract from worker heterogeneity within segments. Worker heterogeneity is more important to explain unemployment durations (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1990; Bontemps et al., 1999; Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007) and less crucial for the effect of search frictions on the job on wages.

I further assume that wages are set unilaterally by firms as opposed to wage bargaining: Employer and worker cannot renegotiate wages of an on-going employment spell. The first reason why I make this assumption is that it is much simpler to incorporate search on the job in posting models as opposed to bargaining models (Manning, 2003, p. 996), and on-the-job search is an important feature of the setting I study. The second reason is that the search model nests the competitive model as a special case when the contact rate for employed workers tends to infinity and the highest-productivity firm is the representative firm in the market. I will compare theoretical predictions of the two models below and discuss the empirical evidence in light of the two models.

Firms in France or Switzerland produce with labor from the three worker types that are perfect substitutes:

$$y(p, \{l_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}) = p \sum_{\theta} l_\theta \quad (4.2)$$

The distribution of firm productivities is  $\Gamma(p)$ . Having heterogeneous firms helps to interpret the wage differentials across the border documented below: The average Swiss firm is more productive than the average French firm. In reality wages in Switzerland may be higher because of exchange rate differentials but this does not alter the incentives of French firms and workers.

For simplicity I assume that workers of all types are equally productive at the same firm. The assumption implies that wages in the same firm differ across worker types only because search frictions differ. Allowing worker productivity to vary by segment does not change the comparative statics.

Because the production function is linear, the firm maximizes profit flows  $\pi_\theta$  for each type separately. As a result, each segment of the labor market is a version of the model of Bontemps et al. (2000) and can be studied in isolation.  $K_\theta(p)$  are the (possibly multiple)

wages of a firm with productivity  $p$  in market  $\theta$  that maximize profits:

$$K_\theta(p) = \operatorname{argmax}_w \{ \pi_\theta(p, w) \mid \max\{\phi_\theta, w_{\min}\} \leq w \leq p \} \quad (4.3)$$

with

$$\pi_\theta(p, w) = (p - w)l_\theta(w).$$

It follows that the lowest firm type in market  $\theta$  is  $p_\theta = \max\{\phi_\theta, w_{\min}\}$  as any firm below would make losses. Changes in the minimum wage or in the reservation wage may affect the entry threshold for firms.

With on the job search, firms take into account the wages paid at other firms. The decision resolves a trade off between profit per worker and firm size (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998): A higher wage attracts more workers and keeps them longer at the firm but doing so decreases profits per worker. When the productivity distribution is continuous the productivity rank pins down the pay rank of the firm<sup>21</sup>. Loosely speaking, if two firms pay the same wage but their productivities differ by  $\epsilon$ , the more productive firm is better off by offering an  $\frac{\epsilon}{2}$  higher wage. Total profits increase because it poaches more workers from the other firm which more than offsets the lower profits per workers. It also follows that there is only one optimal wage for each firm type, and that more productive firms pay higher wages and are larger. Firm heterogeneity also implies that more productive firms have more monopsony power: even though on-the-job search induces wage sharing between firms and workers, it is limited at high-productivity firms because they face less competition from other firms.

## 4.2. Equilibrium effects of an increase in labor market competition

To simplify the comparative statics I make two further assumptions. I assume that the minimum wage is always binding in all segments of the labor market which implies that the productivity threshold for firm entry is fixed. As a result, the labor market integration does not affect entry and exit of firms.

I also assume that the market integration primarily affects the job finding rate of employed workers ( $\kappa_\theta^e$ ), but not unemployed workers ( $\kappa_\theta^u$ ). The assumption ensures that the reservation wage remains below the minimum wage.

The data are consistent with the implications of the assumptions. The minimum wage is binding in all segments of the labor market in 1998 in the treatment region. The descriptive analysis below suggests further that the policy primarily affected the job finding rate of employed workers and not of the unemployed.

I also assume a uniform distribution of firm productivities but this is merely to derive closed-form comparative statics.

**Proposition 1.** *Assume  $\phi_\theta < w_{\min} \forall \theta$  and  $\Gamma(p) \sim U[\underline{p}, \bar{p}]$ . Then an increase in the*

<sup>21</sup>See Bontemps et al. (2000) for a proof. Firms play mixed strategies when they are homogenous (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998).

contact rate  $\kappa_\theta^e$

1. *increases the wages at all firms except the lowest-productivity one. The effect is stronger at more productive firms and weaker in more competitive markets. In perfectly competitive markets the effect tends to 0.*
2. *has an ambiguous effect on firm size. The sign of the effect depends on a unique threshold of firm productivities. More productive firms expand and less productive firms shrink. The threshold is higher in more competitive markets.*

See Appendix D for details and a proof.

Because workers receive more job offers, all firms pay higher wages (except the least productive one) to prevent too many workers from quitting. More productive firms increase wages more because they can attract many more workers than less productive ones. From the workers' point of view, receiving more job offers increases bargaining power which allows them to extract more rents from their employer. Because rents are higher at more productive firms, wages increase more at those employers. This heterogeneity contrasts with bargaining models where bargaining power is fixed which shuts down the rent-sharing channel of an increase in degree of labor market competition. Moreover, as wages lie closer to the marginal product in more competitive markets, a further increase in the contact rate has a smaller effect on wages.

Because more productive firms increase their wages more, they attract more workers in the new equilibrium. They poach from less productive firms that do not increase wages as much. Because the less productive firms cannot hire more unemployed workers, they become smaller. On aggregate, workers reallocate to more productive firms. In a more competitive market the monopsony power of less productive firms is already low and they have less room to increase wages. In contrast, the most productive firms still enjoy more market power and a further increase in the contact rate makes them increase the wages further, attracting even more workers. In a perfectly competitive market there is no worker mobility because all workers are already at the most productive firm.

Consider two labor market segments that are initially differently competitive. Assuming that there are more productive firms in Switzerland than in France, the reallocation of workers to more productive firms makes more workers flow to Switzerland in the more competitive segment. In the less competitive segment, the threshold for a positive employment effect is lower and so some productive firms in France also become larger. Wages increase more in the less competitive segment<sup>22</sup>.

The comparative statics study two steady-states where the contact rate for employed workers varies. The model assumes that wages cannot increase at the current employer and is therefore silent on transitional dynamics between steady-states. One can circumvent

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<sup>22</sup>The present search framework also predicts wage gains in Switzerland. The prediction is also present in Hoffmann and Shi (2016): a higher cross-regional job finding rate increases wages in both regions even when the contact rate within region remains constant.

this problem by assuming an equal-treatment constraint for firms (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2013): firms have to pay the same wage to all their employees in a given market  $\theta$ , be it new hires from unemployment, new hires from other firms, or incumbent workers. I will implicitly make the same assumption when studying the effect of the labor market integration on wage growth.

### 4.3. Comparing the frictional and the competitive model

The main alternative framework to study the labor market integration is the competitive model of labor markets. It consists of two parts: cost and benefits of commuting to Switzerland first determine who accepts the new jobs in Switzerland (Borjas, 1987; Roy, 1951), and this in turn changes relative supply and demand of labor which affects wages (Borjas, 1999; Dustmann et al., 2017, 2015, 2013).

If it was more attractive for high-skill workers to commute to Switzerland then those workers should react more to the labor market integration. This can happen either because they are more productive in Switzerland than the low-skill workers, or because they find it easier to work there, for instance because job search in Switzerland is easier for high-skill workers. If that was the case then primarily highly educated workers start commuting to Switzerland. As this changes the relative supply of highly educated workers in the French border region it affects wages.

The wage effects can be understood in the model used in Dustmann et al. (2013). Capital and workers in different skill groups produce a single good at a representative firm. Wages equal the marginal product. Two parameters determine the effect of the supply shock on wages: the substitutability between worker types and the mobility of capital.

If workers are perfect substitutes, there is no wage effect on any of the skill types. This corresponds to the limiting case of the search model where all search frictions disappear. If workers are not perfect substitutes, wages react and the wage effect is proportional to the intensity of the supply shock. Wages increase for groups that experience the strongest outflows. The effect on wages of less-affected groups has the opposite sign because of imperfect substitutability. If in addition capital is not perfectly elastic, the demand curve for aggregate labor slopes downward and it is possible that wages of less affected workers also increase. Wages still increase more for groups with stronger outflows, however.

This exposition highlights that frictional and competitive labor markets react differently to the labor market integration. In the competitive model, how wages adjust is endogenous to who commutes. In the frictional model, who commutes is endogenous to how wages adjust.

As a result, in the two models worker flows relate differently to wage gains: For the market segment where most workers leave to Switzerland, they have the same sign in the competitive model and the opposite sign in the frictional model. To be specific, the competitive model predicts that wages of high-skill workers increase the most, while wages of low-skill workers could either increase or decrease, depending on how close substitutes

they are to high-skill workers and how elastic capital is. The frictional model, in contrast, implies that the market for high-skill workers is more competitive than for other workers. It thus predicts that wages increase more in less competitive markets, from which fewer workers leave to Switzerland. In more competitive markets, however, French firms are not able to increase wages much more and workers reallocate to Switzerland where wages and productivity are higher.

Figure 5 suggests that the labor market for high-skill workers is indeed more competitive than for other education groups. Following Manning (2003) it shows that the share of new hires from non-employment is around 60% for workers with tertiary education while it is close to 80% for workers with only mandatory education. In simple search models this measure depends on the job destruction rate and the job finding rate for the employed workers. When employers hire more from unemployment it suggests that there is less poaching among them and thus less competition.

## 5. Empirical design

### 5.1. Estimating the effect of the labor market integration

To estimate the effects of local shocks and policies one has to solve a trade-off between power and bias (Manning and Petrongolo, 2017): local labor markets are overlapping because workers search for jobs close to where they live<sup>23</sup>. A shock in one area can thus have ripple effects to neighboring areas that are not directly hit by the shock. While the effective treatment area increases, the size of the shock relative to the affected area shrinks and it becomes statistically harder to estimate the effect of the shock. In their model, Manning and Petrongolo (2017) find that ripple effects can reach up to ten times as far as the median commute.

I accommodate such concerns and define the effective treatment area as follows. There are 12 labor markets that are directly affected because they have at least one municipality in the eligible area as defined by the agreement. I calculate  $\bar{d} = 84$  kilometers as the maximum distance between the Swiss border and any point in the directly treated labor markets. Any labor market that is not directly treated, but is at most  $\bar{d}$  away from the Swiss border, is then assigned to be possibly affected by spillovers. The resulting 22 treatment labor markets<sup>24</sup> are represented in Figure 6a. The eligible municipalities are in navy blue, the directly treated labor markets are in red, and the labor markets affected by spillovers are in green.

The simplest model compares how outcome  $y$  in labor market  $i$  for skill group  $\theta$  changes

<sup>23</sup>Monte et al. (2018) also study commuting linkages.

<sup>24</sup>The maximum commuting time to Switzerland in these labor markets is 96 minutes, and the median commute in France in 2004 was 12 minutes. The treated area thus includes the plausible reach of ripple effects (Manning and Petrongolo, 2017).



from 1998 to year  $\tau$  in treatment and control areas in a difference-in-difference manner:

$$\Delta y_{i\tau}^\theta = \alpha_\tau^\theta + \beta_\tau^\theta \text{treat}_i + v_{i\tau}^\theta, \forall \tau \neq 1998 \quad (5.1)$$

with

$$\Delta y_{i\tau}^\theta = y_{i\tau}^\theta - y_{i1998}^\theta$$

First differences absorb time-constant heterogeneity at the level of the labor market  $\times$  skill group level.  $\alpha_\tau^\theta$  accounts for a skill-specific time trend that is constant across all labor markets. The coefficients of interest are  $\beta_\tau^\theta$  which estimate the effect of the labor market integration on workers with skill  $\theta$  for different years.  $v_{i\tau}^\theta$  is an error term orthogonal to the treatment assignment and possibly correlated across space. The hypothesis that  $\beta_\tau^\theta = 0$  for  $\tau < 1998$  allows me to test for pre-existing trends between the treatment and control areas before the labor market integration. Failing to reject this hypothesis will support the identification assumption of parallel trends in absence of the labor market integration.

To account for spatial correlation of the error term, I cluster the standard errors at the state level (*département*)<sup>25</sup> following Imbens and Kolesar (2016). Their procedure approximates the t-statistic by a t-distribution (instead of a normal) with a degrees of freedom correction that depends on the matrix of regressors. The procedure has, when there are not many clusters, lower rejection rates than all other conventionally used methods, including the wild-cluster bootstrap with the null hypothesis imposed (Cameron et al., 2008) (see Table 4 in Imbens and Kolesar (2016) and also Cameron and Miller (2015, p. 348))<sup>26</sup>.

## 5.2. Matching to find a suitable control group

Equation (5.1) compares the evolution of outcomes in affected areas with non-affected ones. Because the labor market integration was not randomly assigned across labor markets, differences between the treatment and control group may bias the estimated effect. One reason are differing labor market dynamics: wages in the control area could be growing slower than wages in the treatment area already before 1998. Another reason is that labor markets may have different sectorial structures which could therefore be exposed to different time-varying shocks. In both cases the regression in equation (5.1) would wrongly attribute differences in outcomes to the labor market integration when in reality they are driven by other factors.

It is therefore important to find control areas that are as similar as possible to the treated areas. To minimize the risk that spillovers across areas contaminate the control group, I only consider as potential controls labor markets that are at least 150 kilometers away from the Swiss border.

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<sup>25</sup>When a labor market lies in more than one state, I assign it the state where it has the largest employment share.

<sup>26</sup>In the present case standard errors are similar when using the wild-cluster bootstrap.

To find suitable control units I use Mahalanobis matching, which minimizes the normalized Euclidean distance between variables across the treated and control groups. It is relatively robust in different settings, in particular in small samples, but the set of included variable should not be too large (Stuart, 2010; Zhao, 2004). I therefore include a limited set of variables that I believe are related to the outcome<sup>27</sup>. I match on the cumulative growth rates of residual wages of firm stayers for the three skill groups between 1995 and 1998 to account for different trends in the outcome before the labor market integration. I match on the following covariates in the cross-section in 1998 to account for other unobserved heterogeneity that could affect wage growth after 1998: employment shares of four sectors (tradable, non-tradable, construction, other), and employment shares of three skill groups. I also match on the share of employees that live and work in the same labor market to account for heterogeneous responses to the labor market integration (Monte et al., 2018). I call it the own-commuting share. I loosely refer to the full set of variables as covariates even though some of them are pre-existing trends in outcomes.

I assess balance in the covariates following Imbens and Rubin (2015, Ch. 14). I measure how well their distributions in the treatment group overlap with the one in the control group. I consider three measures<sup>28</sup>. Normalized differences between treatment and control measure the position of the distributions. Log ratios of standard deviations between treatment and control measure the dispersion of the distributions. The fraction of treated (control) units that lies in the tails of the values of the control (treatment) units measures how well treatment and control areas overlap in the tails. To be specific, it shows the probability mass of the distribution for the treated units that is outside the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of the distribution for the control units, and vice versa. Intuitively it is more difficult to impute the counterfactual for those units because there are not many in the control (treatment) group. For reference, in a randomized experiment this number should be 0.05 in expectation, meaning that 5% of units have covariate values that make imputing missing potential outcomes difficult (see Imbens and Rubin (2015) for more details).

Figure 7 presents normalized differences and log ratios of standard deviations for the variables used for matching. The x-axis denotes the value of the measure and the y-axis denotes the variables. I compare the treated units to the set of controls before and after matching: the red dots use all potential controls, and the green diamonds use only the matched controls. The left panel shows the normalized differences and the right panel the log ratio of standard deviations. The red dots indicate that there is considerable imbalance in the overall sample. Treated areas have more employment in the tradable sector and a higher own commuting share. Especially wage growth, share high-skill employment and the own-ommuting share are less dispersed in the treatment group than in the potential controls. The green dots indicate that the matching strategy improves balance for most

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<sup>27</sup>I have also experimented with adding more variables but the overall match quality worsens.

<sup>28</sup>Imbens and Rubin (2015) use them instead of t-statistics because they are invariant to scale and sample size.

covariates. Normalized differences shrink in all cases except for the share of high-skill workers. The covariates also have more similar variability after matching even though some imbalances remain.

Table 1 presents more detailed numbers for the sample before and after matching. For each variable Panel A compares the treated units to all potential control units, and Panel B compares them to the matched control units. The first four columns show the means and standard deviations of the variables by treatment status. The last four columns show the different overlap measures: columns (5) and (6) contain the same information as Figure 7, and columns (7) and (8) show the overlap measures in the tail of the distributions. The second-last row in each panel measures the overall distance between the covariates of the treated and control units. It is the variance-weighted distance between covariate means of treated and controls. The matching reduces the distance from 1.19 to 0.22. I am not aware of benchmarks for these measures, so I refer to those reported in Imbens and Rubin (2015). They refer to substantial imbalance for a sample with overall distance of 1.78, and to excellent balance for a sample with overall distance of 0.44. These numbers suggest that my matching strategy, at least on average, reaches a good balance between the treated and the control units. As the covariates are less dispersed in the treated than in the control group, a substantial fraction of control units lies outside the tails of the distribution of the treated units before matching (Panel A, column (7)). The matching brings the tails of the control units closer to the treated units (Panel B, column (7)).

As an alternative matching strategy I also use Entropy Balancing (Hainmueller, 2012)<sup>29</sup>. It finds weights for all potential control units such that the weighted covariate means of the control coincides with the equi-weighted covariate means of the treated units. I then estimate equation (5.1) on all labor markets and weight observations by the entropy weights.

### 5.3. Identifying assumptions

Input or output markets could transmit the local shock to the rest of the French economy. By comparing labor markets close to the Swiss border with units located elsewhere in France, I assume that the matched control areas are not affected by the labor market integration.

The market reforms which accompanied the labor market integration could affect the French border regions in other ways than through the labor market if their effects were more or less concentrated at the border than in other parts of France<sup>30</sup>. Table B.1 shows the content of the agreements and associated changes in column (2). I give here a short overview of these agreements<sup>31</sup>. An agreement on product certifications reduced the fixed

<sup>29</sup>I do not use Synthetic Controls because the three pre-treatment period are insufficient to find appropriate weights

<sup>30</sup>Tariffs between Switzerland and the EU had been abandoned already in 1972.

<sup>31</sup>I drop the agreements on agriculture because this sector is dropped from the analysis. I also drop the agreement on research cooperation for which it seems unlikely to have had a direct effect on the economy.

cost of trade in some manufacturing sectors. Evidence from Switzerland shows that the agreement had the strongest effects on imports (Hälg, 2015), suggesting that French firms in the border region could have benefitted from more sales opportunities. An agreement on transport reduced the cost of freight crossing Switzerland by motortrucks by 8.3%. This could have increased profit margins of transportation firms. An agreement on air transport possibly made it cheaper to fly. An agreement on public procurement made it easier for French firms to sell to Swiss municipalities<sup>32</sup>. I argue that it is unlikely that the agreements other than the labor market integration had any differential effect on French border region: Transporting people is much more costly than transporting goods (Monte et al., 2018) suggesting that the effect of the labor market integration decays much more quickly across space than the (possible) effects of the other agreements.

The identifying assumption is also violated when labor markets were differentially exposed nation-wide policies around 1998 because they can affect labor market outcomes. One possibility is that the French government substantially increases the legal minimum wage. This could violate the identifying assumption when French-Swiss border regions employ more workers at the minimum wage than the control regions. Similarly, the French government announced a reform to reduce the hours worked per week from 39 hours to 35 hours (Askenazy, 2013). Firms with 20 employees or more had to comply by the year 2000, and compliers received tax cuts. The law wanted to increase the hourly wages of workers by lowering hours worked per week but keeping monthly wages constant. In robustness checks I try to control for these changes and the results remain unaffected.

Another concern is that exchange rate variations made it easier or harder for French employers at the border to sell to or buy from Switzerland. Figure A2 shows that the exchange rate between France and Switzerland did not exhibit a clear upward or downward trend during the sample period.

## 6. Results

### 6.1. Effect on wage growth of firm stayers

Figure 8 presents the main effect of the labor market integration on wage growth of firm stayers. For instance, the effect in 2000 is the sum of wage growth from 1998 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2000. Panel A in Table 2 contains detailed results for selected years.

Panel 8a shows the average effect across all skill groups. The regressions from 1995 to 1997 do not indicate any pre-existing differential trend in wage growth in the treatment group. This is by construction as I match on these trends. Wages start increasing in 1999 and by 2001 they have grown 1.8% more in the treatment region. The effect remains on the level until 2003 and is statistically significant.

Panels 8b to 8d show the estimated treatment effects by skill group. All cases suggest that treatment and control groups are on parallel trends before 1998. Wages of mid-skill

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<sup>32</sup>French municipalities and Swiss districts and cantons had already been bound to do so by a WTO agreement since 1996.

workers grow more in the treatment than in the control area from 1995 to 1996 but not significantly so. There is no effect on wages of high-skill workers, and the point estimate turns negative towards the end of the sample period. In contrast wages of mid- and low-skill workers grow significantly after 1998. The point estimates are similar for both groups and range between 1.8% for low-skill workers and 2% for mid-skill workers, but they are statistically indistinguishable from each other.

Panel B in Table 2 shows that the estimated effects are robust to the workweek reduction and to minimum wage hikes at the national level. It presents estimates from a regression where I additionally control for exposure to these policies. I measure exposure to changes in the minimum wage by the share of workers with wages around the minimum wage. I measure exposure to the workweek reduction as the share of employees that work in firms with at least 20 employees. The point estimates become marginally smaller but remain significant.

Panel C in Table 2 and Figure A3 show that results also hold when using Entropy Balancing. In the Figure the estimated coefficients follow closely the ones from the baseline sample, except for the high-skill workers where it remains close to zero. The standard errors are slightly larger than in the baseline sample but in most cases the results remain statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.

## 6.2. Effect on total employment and hours worked

I now assess how the labor market integration affected employment of the different skill groups. I estimate the effect on employment because in models of monopsony – including, but not limited to the one described above – firms face an upward-sloping labor supply curve: A higher wage attracts more workers and firms expand. I estimate the effect on hours worked because the increase in hourly wages may arise when workers work fewer hours but their earnings are downwardly rigid.

Figure 9 shows the main results for total employment. In the Figure, Panel 9a shows that overall employment increases in the short-run after 1998 by 2.8%. The effect is, however, imprecisely estimated. The remaining panels show that it is low-skill employment that increases significantly in the short-run but again becomes imprecise after the year 2000. Detailed results are in Panel A of Table 3.

Panel B of Table 3 and Figure 10 shows the effect on hours worked per day of firm stayers. I calculate this in the same way as wage growth. Hours worked by all workers do not change throughout the sample period, suggesting that hourly wages do not grow because of downwardly rigid earnings and a reduction in hours worked. For high-skill workers Panel 8b shows that hours worked seem to increase after 1999 even though the confidence intervals quickly become large. A possible explanation for this pattern is that remaining high-skill workers partly substituted the high-skill workers that left to Switzerland with more hours. For mid-skill workers hours worked per day do not change (Panel 8c). For low-skill workers hours worked per day show a negative trend after the year 1999 (Panel

8d). The point estimate is, however, only significant in 2003. Comparing the timing of the effect on low-skill wages and low-skill hours suggests that the hours response is a consequence of the higher wages rather than a cause. For instance, in the year 2000 there is already a significant positive effect (estimate 0.009, se 0.003) but no effect on hours worked (estimate -0.001, se 0.005). This interpretation is also consistent with Audenaert et al. (2014) who find little evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity in France.

### 6.3. Effect on firm-level rents and worker productivity

I investigate whether the labor market integration made low-skill workers more productive and estimate output elasticities with a Cobb-Douglas production function for firms in the treated and control areas<sup>33</sup>. A firm  $j$  in sector  $s$  and located in labor market  $i$  at time  $t$  produces value added  $y$  with capital and three labor inputs:

$$y_{jits} = \alpha + x'_{jit}\delta \quad (6.1)$$

where  $x'_{jit}$  is a vector of production inputs capital and three skill types (high, mid, low-skill):  $x'_{jit} = (k_{jit}, h_{jit}, m_{jit}, l_{jit})'$ . I interact all inputs with treatment and time indicators and estimate the following production function:

$$y_{jits} = x'_{jit}\delta_0 + post_t \times treat_i \times x'_{jit}\beta_1 + post_t \times x'_{jit}\delta_1 + treat_t \times x'_{jit}\delta_2 + post_t \times treat_i + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \alpha_s + u_{jits} \quad (6.2)$$

where  $\alpha_i$ ,  $\alpha_t$  and  $\alpha_s$  account for labor-market, time and two-digit sector fixed effects.  $u_{jits}$  is an unobserved productivity shifter.  $post_t$  indicates the period after 1998,  $treat_i$  indicates treatment labor markets.  $\delta_0$  estimates the production function parameters from 1995 to 1998,  $\delta_1$  estimates how technology changes after 1998.  $\delta_2$  estimates the permanent technological difference between the treatment and the control region.  $\beta_1$  is the main coefficient of interest and estimates whether the technology changes differentially in the treatment region than in the control region after 1998. If the marginal product of workers increases after 1998 the elements in  $\beta_1$  should be positive. I cluster the standard errors at the state level.

Table 5 presents the results. For brevity I only report the estimated  $\delta_0$  and  $\beta_1$ . Column (1) uses the firms from all sectors. The coefficients on the labor inputs interacted with time and treatment are all statistically insignificant. The point estimate is negative and small for high-skill (-0.005, se 0.007) and low-skill workers (-0.005, se 0.003), and positive and larger for mid-skill workers (estimate 0.013, se 0.008). The remaining columns present similar results separately for firms in the tradable, non-tradable, construction and for firms in other sectors. Thus, even if the point estimate is positive for mid-skill workers,

<sup>33</sup>An obvious concern is the endogeneity of inputs (Olley and Pakes, 1996). As far as I am aware existing methods that account for this (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Akerberg et al., 2015) are not well suited for more than one or two proxy variables. The specification below has four state variables and thus requires four proxy variables.

the results are inconsistent with higher wages for both mid- and low-skill workers.

The discussion so far suggests that the effects of the labor market integration are hard to explain with competitive model of the labor market commonly used. If, in contrast the labor market is not perfectly competitive, then there is rent-sharing between firms and workers, and higher rents at the firms could explain the wage gains.

If the labor market integration increased quasi-rents at the firm, then wages could increase because of rent-sharing. This could happen if the labor market integration makes firms more productive and workers earn some rents. If the labor market integration increased the marginal product of low- and high-skill workers, then their wages should increase even if the labor market is perfectly competitive. For instance, firms could invest in technologies to make low-skill workers more productive if they expect low-skill workers to become more abundant after the labor market were integrated (Acemoglu, 2002).

To explore whether the labor market integration increased quasi-rents, I estimate the effect on rents per worker. The existing literature on rent-sharing estimates the relationship between rents at the firm and wages, using either profits per worker or value added per worker (see the review in Card et al. (2018)). I use both measures.

Table 4 presents the estimated effects on firm-level rents. Value added per worker (columns (1)–(3)) increases in year 2000 but the point estimate is statistically not significant (estimate 0.013, se 0.015). In the following years the point estimate is even negative and remains statistically indistinguishable from zero. Likewise the estimated effects on profits (columns (4)–(6)) is not significant in either of the years considered.

## 7. Discussion and Conclusion

Does labor market competition raise wages? Restrictions to worker mobility have become to be seen as possibly lowering labor market dynamism (Council of Economic Advisors, 2016). The claim has been founded on models of oligopsonistic labor markets where workers cannot freely move across employers. Yet to date a causal assessment of how mobility restrictions affect labor market equilibrium has been missing.

I study the effects of improving workers' access to high-wage jobs and exploit the opening of the Swiss labor market to French border commuters as a natural experiment to the contact rate. I document that even though more skilled workers take up the new opportunities in Switzerland, their wages in France do not change. Yet, the less skilled workers stay behind and higher wages. I also find that the policy slightly increases employment of low-skill workers. I argue that a model of competitive labor markets cannot explain these patterns, but a model of frictional labor markets can: as low-skill labor markets are less competitive their wages can adjust more strongly to the labor market integration. High-skill wages cannot sufficiently adjust and these workers accept the new jobs more often. A number of additional exercises support this interpretation: I do not find any evidence that workers become more productive nor that there are more rents available that firms share with their employees.

The results in the present paper support the view that labor market frictions lead to some market power for firms over their workers. It suggests that removing barriers to worker mobility can have two distinct effects: it not only helps workers move to better jobs but also increases wages of those that stay behind because labor market competition raises workers' bargaining power. While I exploit spatial variation in access to jobs, it is conceivable that policies that increase occupational mobility can have similar effects. It is important to assess such policies in future work.

I stress that the focus of this study is on the short- to medium run effects of higher labor market competition. Since the labor market integration decreased the availability of highly educated workers the longer-run effects might differ from the short-run effects.

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## Figures





Figure 1: Average wages in the French-Swiss border area in 1998

The figure shows average wages by education group in the labor markets along the border. *Data: DADS Panel, Bundesamt für Statistik (2017).*



(a) All

(b) By education

Figure 2: Commuters as share of labor force

The Figures show the number of residents that work in Switzerland as share of the total labor force. The solid line in Panel 2a refers to the treated region, the dashed line to the matched control areas. Panel 2b shows the share for three education groups in 1998 and 2002 in the treatment region. *Data: French Labor Force Survey.*




Figure 3: Previous place of residence and labor market status of new border commuters

The data refer to the treatment region. In both panels rows refer to years and columns refer to education groups. Panel 3a shows where the new border commuters came from geographically: whether they lived in the same area, in other parts of France or abroad in the previous year. Panel 3b shows transition rates for people that previously lived in the area by labor force status: Employed, Unemployed, Inactive. *Data: French Labor Force Survey.*




Figure 4: New commuters and their previous profession

The data refer to the treatment region. In both panels "Mid-skill prof." are middle-skill occupations such as X and Y and "Manufct. employees" are employees in manufacturing. New border commuters are residents in France that work in Switzerland in the current year but did not do so in the previous year. Panel 4a plots the average transition rates 1999 to 2002 by occupation. Panel 4b shows, by education, the distribution of all stayers and new commuters across their last occupation from 1999 to 2002. Stayers are workers that remain employed in France in two consecutive years. *Data: French Labor Force Survey.*




Figure 5: Labor market competition in France

The figure shows the share of workers that are hired from non-employment as opposed to employment in 1998 by education group. Transitions between employment are recorded when the worker worked at two different firms in March of two consecutive years, and did not have any intervening spell of non-employment in between. Remaining transitions are recorded as from non-employment. *Data: French Labor Force Survey.*




Figure 6: Commuting zones in France

Panel 6a shows the treated labor markets. The navy blue area are the municipalities eligible to send commuters. Labor markets are colored by whether they are highly exposed to the market integration (red) by lying directly at the border to Switzerland or less exposed (green). Panel 6b shows all labor markets in France and their matching status. *Border Region* are the treated labor markets. *Excluded Inland* are those not included for the matching strategy. *Matched Inland* and *Non-matched Inland* are the labor markets selected and not selected in the matching procedure. Details: see text.




Figure 7: Balance before and after matching

The Figure shows the normalized differences and log ratio of standard deviations between the treatment group and the control group for each variable as indicated on the y-axis. Controls are all potential controls for the red dots and the matched controls for the green diamonds. The variables refer to: log employment, employment share of workers in high, mid and low-skill occupations, employment share in tradable, non-tradable construction and other sector, all in 1998. Wage growth for high, mid and low-skill is cumulative residual wage growth of firm stayers in two consecutive years from 1995 to 1998. Own commuting share is the share of employees in the labor market that also live in that market in 1998. See the text for details.






Figure 8: Main effects on wage growth of firm stayers

The figure shows annual estimates of the treatment effect in equation (5.1) on cumulative growth in hourly wages of firm stayers relative to 1998. Units are weighted by their skill-specific employment in 1998. Hourly wages are residualized for gender and age. The error bars show the 95% intervals around the point estimate using standard errors clustered at the state level. *Data: DADS.*




Figure 9: Main effects on total employment

The figure shows annual estimates of the treatment effect in equation (5.1) total employment. The error bars show the 95% intervals around the point estimate using standard errors clustered at the state level. See text for details. *Data: DADS.*




Figure 10: Main effects on hours worked per day

The figure shows annual estimates of the treatment effect in equation (5.1) total employment. The error bars show the 95% intervals around the point estimate using standard errors clustered at the state level. See text for details. *Data: DADS.*

## Tables

	Controls		Treated		Overlap measures			
	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Nor Dif	Log ratio SD	pi c	pi t
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<b>Panel A. Controls: All</b>								
Log employment	2.34	(0.1)	2.36	(0.07)	0.23	−0.32	0.12	0.00
Share high-skill	0.09	(0.03)	0.09	(0.01)	0.08	−0.85	0.30	0.00
Share mid-skill	0.62	(0.04)	0.61	(0.04)	−0.31	0.10	0.07	0.00
Share low-skill	0.29	(0.05)	0.30	(0.04)	0.21	−0.04	0.12	0.00
Share tradable	0.42	(0.12)	0.49	(0.13)	0.59	0.11	0.05	0.18
Share non-tradable	0.13	(0.04)	0.12	(0.03)	−0.35	−0.06	0.10	0.14
Share construction	0.12	(0.03)	0.11	(0.03)	−0.26	0.10	0.06	0.14
Share other	0.33	(0.08)	0.28	(0.08)	−0.68	0.02	0.08	0.14
Wage growth high-skill	0.06	(0.02)	0.06	(0.02)	−0.04	−0.12	0.12	0.00
Wage growth mid-skill	0.06	(0.02)	0.06	(0.01)	0.29	−0.39	0.17	0.00
Wage growth low-skill	0.05	(0.02)	0.06	(0.01)	0.28	−0.53	0.23	0.00
Own commuting share	0.78	(0.12)	0.83	(0.06)	0.52	−0.67	0.15	0.05
Overall distance					1.19			
N	238.00		22.00					
<b>Panel B. Controls: Matched</b>								
Log employment	2.34	(0.07)	2.36	(0.07)	0.23	0.05	0.05	0.05
Share high-skill	0.08	(0.02)	0.09	(0.01)	0.64	−0.08	0.18	0.09
Share mid-skill	0.62	(0.03)	0.61	(0.04)	−0.13	0.30	0.00	0.14
Share low-skill	0.30	(0.04)	0.30	(0.04)	−0.13	0.15	0.00	0.14
Share tradable	0.48	(0.11)	0.49	(0.13)	0.11	0.14	0.00	0.14
Share non-tradable	0.12	(0.03)	0.12	(0.03)	−0.04	0.17	0.05	0.14
Share construction	0.11	(0.03)	0.11	(0.03)	−0.05	0.12	0.09	0.00
Share other	0.29	(0.07)	0.28	(0.08)	−0.14	0.06	0.05	0.09
Wage growth high-skill	0.06	(0.02)	0.06	(0.02)	−0.10	0.14	0.05	0.05
Wage growth mid-skill	0.06	(0.01)	0.06	(0.01)	0.28	0.36	0.00	0.18
Wage growth low-skill	0.06	(0.01)	0.06	(0.01)	0.06	0.22	0.00	0.18
Own commuting share	0.83	(0.07)	0.83	(0.06)	0.02	−0.10	0.09	0.00
Overall distance					0.22			
N	22.00		22.00					

The table shows balancing statistics between treatment and control for two samples. In Panel A controls are all potential controls. In Panel B controls are the matched controls. The overlap measures are: normalized differences, log ratios of standard deviations, and pi for control and treated units. pi measures the probability mass of units of the treatment (control) group that lie outside the interval between the 0.025th and 0.975th quantile of the control (treatment) group. The overall distance is the variance-weighted difference between the vector of means for the treated and for the control group. See Section 5.2 for details

Table 1: Balance before and after matching

	Skill: all			Skill: high			Skill: mid			Skill: low		
	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A: Baseline												
beta	0.01 (0.004)	0.017 (0.006)	0.016 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.011 (0.004)	0.021 (0.007)	0.018 (0.007)	0.009 (0.003)	0.016 (0.004)	0.017 (0.004)
N	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44
R2	0.195	0.267	0.219	-0.018	0	-0.006	0.223	0.313	0.232	0.164	0.242	0.238
B: Controls												
beta	0.009 (0.004)	0.016 (0.006)	0.014 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.01 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.012)	0.011 (0.004)	0.02 (0.007)	0.017 (0.007)	0.009 (0.003)	0.016 (0.004)	0.016 (0.005)
N	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44
R2	0.191	0.261	0.212	-0.042	-0.015	0.034	0.188	0.294	0.249	0.316	0.329	0.257
C: EntBal												
beta	0.009 (0.005)	0.016 (0.005)	0.015 (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.01 (0.005)	0.019 (0.006)	0.018 (0.007)	0.007 (0.005)	0.014 (0.005)	0.014 (0.006)
N	260	260	260	260	260	260	260	260	260	260	260	260
R2	0.059	0.12	0.099	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	0.073	0.151	0.116	0.038	0.102	0.088

The columns present estimates from equation (5.1) different specifications for years as indicated in the second row. *Baseline* is the baseline specification, *Controls* controls for exposure to the reduction in the workweek and to minimum wage hikes, *EntBal* uses Entropy Balancing for matching. Regressions are weighted by skill-specific employment in 1998 except for Entropy Balancing which uses the entropy weights. Standard errors robust to clustering at the state level are in parentheses. Details: see text. *Data: DADS*.

Table 2: Effect on wage growth of firm stayers

	Skill: all			Skill: high			Skill: mid			Skill: low		
	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A: Employment												
beta	0.014	0.028	0.016	0.02	0.029	0.042	0.005	0.024	-0.001	0.029	0.031	0.041
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.046)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.026)
N	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44
R2	0.042	0.155	0.018	0.037	0.053	0.015	-0.02	0.058	-0.024	0.08	0.035	0.038
B: Hours per day												
beta	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.009	0.015	0.016	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001	-0.004	-0.008
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
N	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44
R2	-0.01	-0.016	-0.015	0.143	0.168	0.151	0.012	-0.001	-0.012	-0.021	0.001	0.039

The columns present results from estimating equation (5.1) for different years. *Employment* measures the aggregate change in local employment, *Hours* measures the cumulative change in hours worked per day for firm stayers. Regressions are weighted by skill-specific employment in 1998. Standard errors robust to clustering at the state level are in parentheses. Details: see text. *Data: DADS.*

Table 3: Effect on employment and hours

	Value added per worker			Profit per worker		
	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
beta	0.013 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.019)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.009)
N	44	44	44	44	44	44
R2	-0.002	-0.023	-0.004	0.004	-0.014	-0.018

The columns present results from estimating equation (5.1) for different years as reported in the second row. The outcomes are profit per worker (columns (1)–(3)) and value added per worker (columns (4)–(6)). Regressions are weighted by skill-specific employment in 1998. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *Data: DADS, Ficus.* See text for details.

Table 4: Effect on measures of rents

	All	Tradable	Non-tradable	Construction	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	1.706 (0.088)	1.666 (0.027)	2.205 (0.049)	2.228 (0.044)	2.35 (0.103)
k	0.205 (0.006)	0.171 (0.008)	0.268 (0.01)	0.149 (0.008)	0.19 (0.008)
h	0.215 (0.008)	0.248 (0.012)	0.169 (0.01)	0.232 (0.015)	0.225 (0.011)
m	0.358 (0.007)	0.373 (0.012)	0.267 (0.012)	0.442 (0.012)	0.378 (0.012)
l	0.131 (0.004)	0.152 (0.007)	0.16 (0.005)	0.106 (0.004)	0.111 (0.008)
k x post x treat	0.003 (0.007)	0.008 (0.01)	0.021 (0.011)	0.011 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)
h x post x treat	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.015 (0.014)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.013)
m x post x treat	0.013 (0.008)	0.005 (0.015)	0 (0.012)	0.001 (0.014)	0.027 (0.013)
l x post x treat	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.011)
N (firm x year)	181454	67224	41911	31632	40520
R2	0.852	0.881	0.758	0.873	0.812

Results from estimating equation (6.2). Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. The columns refer to sectors: (1) – All sectors, (2) – Tradable sector, (3) – Non-tradable sectors, (4) – Construction sector (5) – Other sectors. The coefficients are: K – capital, H – high-skill labor, M – mid-skill labor, L – low-skill labor and the double-interaction with treatment status and year > 1998. Single-interactions with treatment and with time are not reported for brevity. The number of observations refer to firm-year observations. Sample: single-establishment firms with non-negative inputs. See text for details. *Data: Ficus.*

Table 5: Results from production functions



## A. Additional figures

### A.1. Descriptive analysis

Figure A1 illustrates the situation in labor markets along the French-Swiss border in 1998. The units are local labor markets as defined by the statistical offices of the two countries. The colors refer to quantiles of the distribution of the variable depicted<sup>34</sup>. Panel A1a shows the employment density per square kilometer. French labor markets along the border are less dense than their Swiss neighbors. There are two Swiss cities in the west (Geneva) and in the north (Basel). Panel A1b shows the travel time by car from French labor markets to Switzerland. The time is the population-weighted average time between all municipalities in the labor market and their closest border crossing to Switzerland. Travel times are sourced from Project OSRM (2018), refer to 2018 and are net of congestion time. Labor markets immediately at the border are between 13 and 33 minutes away from the next border crossing to Switzerland. The maximum time to the next border crossing is 96 minutes. Panel A1c plots mean log wages in the labor markets. Wages change discontinuously at the border: average wages in France are lower than in Switzerland. Panels A1d to A1f show the wages by education level and labor market. The numbers in the panels by labor market and education should be interpreted with caution because some of them rely on a small number of observations.

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<sup>34</sup>The light blue areas are lakes.




Figure A1: Labor markets at the border in 1998

The black solid line in all panels is the border between Switzerland and France. Colors refer to quantiles. Panel A1a shows employment per square kilometer in 1998. Panel A1b plots the mean travel time (minutes) to the next border crossing. The mean is calculated as the population-weighted average time between a municipality's centroid and the next border crossing to Switzerland. Travel times are for car and not of congestion. Panel A1c shows mean log wages by labor market. Panels A1d to A1f show mean log wages by education and labor market. Data: DADS Panel, DADS Postes, Bundesamt für Statistik (2017), Projet OSRM (2018).




Figure A2: Exchange rate between France and Switzerland

The figure shows the exchange rate index between France and Switzerland (eg, EUR / CHF). The solid line shows the nominal, the dashed line the real exchange rate based on consumer price inflation. 2000-Q4 = 100. *Data: Swiss National Bank (SNB).*




Figure A3: Main wage effects with different matching strategy

The figure shows annual estimates of the treatment effect in equation (5.1) on cumulative growth in hourly wages of firm stayers relative to 1998. There are two samples. "Baseline" refers to the main matched sample used in the text, "EntBal" uses Entropy Balancing following Hainmueller (2012). Results from the baseline have a solid line and a dot, results from the entropy balancing have a dashed line and a diamond. Baseline weights units by their skill-specific employment in 1998. Entropy Balancing weights the units by the entropy weights. Hourly wages are residualized for gender and age. The error bars show the 95% intervals around the point estimate using standard errors clustered at the state level. See Section 6.1 for details. *Data: DADS.*

## B. Additional tables

Agreement	Change	Effects
Free movement of people	Access to labor markets without restrictions	Expansion of local labor markets
Mutual recognition agreement	lower administrative costs for approval of products for some manufacturing sectors	Cost savings of 0.5 –1 % of product value per year. Corresponds to less than 0.2% of trade volume between EU and Switzerland. Increased mostly imports to Switzerland at the intensive margin
Land traffic	Higher weight limit on carriages, tax on alp-crossing transport	By 2006, accumulated reduction in cost for transports between Switzerland and EU of 8.3%
Air traffic	More competitive pressure for airlines	More and cheaper connections from Geneva Airport
Public procurement	Swiss purchasers (municipalities, utilities, rail, airports, local traffic) need to tender internationally	Unknown (10% of bidders for municipal purchases were foreign)

Sources: Staatsekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO) (2008), Eidgenössisches Aussendepartement (EDA) (2016), Hälgi (2015).

Note: the treaties on cooperation on research and on agriculture were excluded from the table.

Table B.1: The content of the bilateral treaties between Switzerland and the EU.

## C. Data appendix

### C.1. Treatment group and matching

**Defining the treated labor markets** Labor markets consist of municipalities. Denote the municipalities of labor market  $i$  as  $j_i$ ,  $j \in \{1, \dots, J_i\}$ . Define the set of eligible municipalities  $E$ . This is the navy blue area in Figure 6a. A labor market  $i$  is eligible if  $\{j_i\}_{j=1}^{J_i} \cap E \neq \emptyset$ , eg, if at least one municipality is in the eligible area. This gives 12 eligible labor markets and denote this set as  $L_E$ . Assign to each labor market the distance between the municipality that is furthest away from the next Swiss border crossing, formally  $d_i = \max_{j \in J_i} \{dist_{j_i, Switz}\}$ . Then define  $\bar{d} = \max_{i \in L_E} \{d_i\}$  and a labor market is in the treatment group if  $d_i \leq \bar{d}$ . In the present case I have  $\bar{d} = 84km$ .

## D. Theory appendix

This Section derives the labor market equilibrium from Section 4 in detail and largely follows Bontemps et al. (2000). The segmentation by skill type is based on Engbom and Moser (2018).

### D.1. Worker flows

In any market  $\theta$ , there are  $N_\theta$  active firms  $M_\theta$  active workers of which  $U_\theta$  are unemployed. Let  $G_\theta(w)$  denote the fraction of employed workers in skill group  $\theta$  that earn at most wage  $w$ . In a steady state, the number of workers earning at most wage  $w$  does not change over time: there are as many unemployed workers that find jobs paying at most  $w$  as there are workers leaving the same jobs because of layoffs or because they find a higher-paying job. Formally we have

$$\lambda_\theta^u U_\theta F_\theta(w) = [\delta_\theta + \lambda_\theta^e \bar{F}_\theta(w)](M_\theta - U_\theta)G_\theta(w) \quad (D.1)$$

Solving this equation at  $w = \bar{w}_\theta$  gives the unemployment rate  $u_\theta = \frac{1}{1+\kappa_\theta^u}$ . With this result, one can also show that the observed wage distribution relates to the offer distribution as follows:  $G_\theta(w) = \frac{F_\theta(w)}{1+\kappa_\theta^e \bar{F}_\theta(w)}$ . The more quickly workers climb the job ladder, the more employment is concentrated among higher-paying firms.

### D.2. Firms

Since workers meet firms at random, the average firm size for firms paying wages in the interval  $[w, w + \epsilon]$ , where  $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$  is

$$l_\theta(w) = \frac{M_\theta - U_\theta}{N_\theta} \frac{dG_\theta(w)}{dF_\theta(w)} = \frac{M_\theta - U_\theta}{N_\theta} \frac{1 + \kappa_\theta^e}{[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{F}_\theta(w)]^2} \quad (D.2)$$

where  $\frac{dG_\theta(w)}{dw}$  was taken from the relation above. As in the model with homogenous firms, high-wage employers are larger because they can attract more workers and fear less poaching from other firms.

Firms maximize profit flows  $\pi_\theta(p, w) = (p - w)l_\theta(w)$ .  $\underline{p}_\theta$  is the productivity threshold for active firms and profits are negative for any  $p < \underline{p}_\theta$ . Denote the distribution of active firms by  $\Gamma_\theta(p)$  which is the probability of being a firm of at most productivity  $p$  conditional on being active in the market:

$$\Gamma_\theta(p) = \frac{\Gamma_0(p) - \Gamma_0(\underline{p}_\theta)}{\overline{\Gamma_0}(\underline{p}_\theta)} \quad (\text{D.3})$$

The number of active firms is therefore  $N_\theta = N_0 \overline{\Gamma_0}(\underline{p}_\theta)$ , eg the number of all possibly active firms multiplied by the fraction of firms above the threshold productivity.

The optimal strategy of a firm with productivity  $p$  maximizes profits subject to the wage constraint:

$$K_\theta(p) = \underset{w}{\operatorname{argmax}} \{ \pi_\theta(p, w) \mid \max\{\phi_\theta, w_{\min}\} \leq w \leq p \} \quad (\text{D.4})$$

where

$$\pi_\theta(p, w_\theta) = (1 + \kappa_\theta^e) \frac{M_\theta - U_\theta}{N_0 \overline{\Gamma_0}(\underline{p})} \frac{p - w}{[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \overline{F}_\theta(w)]^2} \quad (\text{D.5})$$

follows from equations (D.2) and (D.3). For future reference, define  $A_\theta \equiv (1 + \kappa_\theta^e) \frac{M_\theta - U_\theta}{N_0 \overline{\Gamma_0}(\underline{p}_\theta)}$  and therefore  $\pi_\theta(p, w_\theta) = A_\theta \frac{p - w_\theta}{[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \overline{F}_\theta(w_\theta)]^2}$ .

Because firms are indifferent between all strategies that solve (D.4), define  $F_\theta(., p)$  as the probability distribution of firm type  $p$  over all optimal strategies. Thus the overall wage distribution in the economy is  $F_\theta(.) = \int F_\theta(., p) d\Gamma_\theta(p)$

### D.3. Market equilibrium

An equilibrium is a set  $(\phi_\theta, \underline{p}_\theta, \{F_\theta(., p), p > \underline{p}_\theta\})$  such that

1. The distribution of wage offers is  $F_\theta(.) = \int F_\theta(., p) d\Gamma_\theta(p)$ .
2. Only firms with at least productivity  $\underline{p}_\theta$  are active and their distribution is given by (D.3).
3.  $\phi_\theta$  satisfies (4.1).
4.  $F_\theta(., p)$  is a distribution over all strategies that satisfy (D.4).

Bontemps et al. (2000, Proposition 3) show that there exists a wage function  $K_\theta(p)$  such that the wage distribution reflects the productivity distribution, if this distribution is continuous. Firms play pure strategies because only one strategy is optimal for a given type. As a result, firms with higher productivity pay higher wages, the wage distribution is continuous and  $\underline{w}_\theta = \max\{\phi_\theta, w_{\min}\}$ .

The first-order condition of a firm of type  $p$  is  $\frac{\partial \pi_\theta(p, w_\theta)}{\partial w_\theta} = 0 \Leftrightarrow -l_\theta(w) + (p - w)l'_\theta(w) = 0$  which results in

$$- [1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{F}_\theta(w)] + 2\kappa_\theta^e f_\theta(w)(p - w) = 0 \quad (\text{D.6})$$

Firms with the lowest productivity pay the lowest wages:  $K(\underline{p}_\theta) = \underline{w}_\theta$ .

Consider the marginal increase of profits for a marginal increase in productivity,  $\frac{\partial \pi_\theta[K_\theta(p)]}{\partial p}$ :

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial p} [p - K_\theta(p)] l_\theta[K_\theta(p)] = \overbrace{l_\theta[K_\theta(p)]}^{\text{output incumbents}} - \overbrace{l_\theta[K_\theta(p)] K'_\theta(p)}^{\text{wage incumbents}} + \overbrace{p l'_\theta[K_\theta(p)] K'_\theta(p)}^{\text{output new hires}} - \overbrace{K_\theta(p) l'_\theta[K_\theta(p)] K'_\theta(p)}^{\text{wage new hires}} \quad (\text{D.7})$$

which simplifies to

$$\pi'_\theta(p) = l_\theta[K_\theta(p)] \quad (\text{D.8})$$

This follows because when a firm increases productivity, its wage increases. The optimal wage equalizes marginal labor cost with marginal profits. Labor cost increase because of higher wages for incumbent workers and because of new hires that are attracted by the higher wage. The new hires increase output further. The three last terms exactly offset each other, and the marginal profit is just the marginal increase in output from the incumbent workers.

The marginal profit in (D.8) is a differential equation with initial condition  $\pi_\theta(\underline{p}) = (\underline{p}_\theta - \underline{w}_\theta) l_\theta(\underline{w}_\theta)$ . Therefore

$$\pi_\theta(p) = (\underline{p}_\theta - \underline{w}_\theta) l_\theta(\underline{w}_\theta) + \int_{\underline{p}}^p l_\theta[K_\theta(x)] dx \quad (\text{D.9})$$

and since  $\bar{F}_\theta[K_\theta(x)] = \bar{\Gamma}_\theta(x)$ , we have  $l_\theta[K_\theta(x)] = \frac{A_\theta}{[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{\Gamma}_\theta(x)]^2}$ , and using  $\underline{p}_\theta = \underline{w}_\theta$ :

$$\pi_\theta(p) = A_\theta \int_{\underline{w}_\theta}^p \frac{1}{[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{\Gamma}_\theta(x)]^2} dx \quad (\text{D.10})$$

Using  $\pi_\theta(p) = [p - K_\theta(p)] l_\theta[K_\theta(p)]$ , rearrange for  $K_\theta(p)$ , substitute (D.10) for profits and (D.2) for the firm size and use  $F_\theta(x) = \Gamma_\theta(x)$  gives the wage as a function of the distribution of productivity, the contact rate, firms' productivity and the reservation wage:

$$K_\theta(p) = p - [1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{\Gamma}_\theta(p)]^2 \int_{\underline{w}_\theta}^p \frac{1}{[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{\Gamma}_\theta(x)]^2} dx \quad (\text{D.11})$$

The number of equilibria depends on the parameters of the model. The equilibrium exists for  $\bar{p} < \infty$  (see Bontemps et al. (2000) for details). The interdependence of the reservation wage  $\phi_\theta$  and the threshold productivity  $\underline{p}_\theta$  make the model non-recursive.

#### D.4. Equilibrium with uniform productivity and proof of proposition

Assume now that firm productivity is distributed uniformly on the interval  $[p, \bar{p}]$ . The assumption allows me to derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium wage function



and assess comparative statics. Also assume that the minimum wage is binding in all markets:  $\phi_\theta < w_{min} \forall \theta$  and  $\underline{p}_\theta \equiv \underline{p} \forall \theta$ . The assumptions imply that the entry threshold does not change when the contact rate for employed worker changes. Since the entry threshold is constant across markets, we also have  $N_\theta \equiv N \forall \theta$ .

The wage offered by a firm with productivity  $p$  is then

$$K_\theta(p) = p - \frac{(\bar{p} - \underline{p})(p - \underline{p}) + \kappa_\theta^e(\bar{p} - p)(p - \underline{p})}{(1 + \kappa_\theta^e)(\bar{p} - \underline{p})} \quad (\text{D.12})$$

I first show that a reduction in the search friction on the job (an increase in the contact rate for employed workers) increases the wages at all firms except the with the lowest productivity.

$$\frac{\partial K(p)}{\partial \kappa_\theta^e} = - \frac{(\bar{p} - p)(p - \underline{p})(1 + \kappa_\theta^e)(\bar{p} - \underline{p}) - [(\bar{p} - \underline{p})(p - \underline{p}) + \kappa_\theta^e(\bar{p} - p)(p - \underline{p})](\bar{p} - \underline{p})}{(1 + \kappa_\theta^e)^2(\bar{p} - \underline{p})^2} \quad (\text{D.13})$$

Simplifying and collecting terms yields

$$\frac{\partial K(p)}{\partial \kappa_\theta^e} = \frac{(p - \underline{p})^2}{(1 + \kappa_\theta^e)^2(\bar{p} - \underline{p})} \geq 0 \quad (\text{D.14})$$

As the numerator is increasing in  $p$  and the denominator is increasing in  $\kappa_\theta^e$ , we have  $\frac{\partial^2 K(p)}{\partial \kappa_\theta^e \partial p} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial^2 K(p)}{\partial \kappa_\theta^e \partial \kappa_\theta^e} \leq 0$ , and  $\lim_{\kappa_\theta^e \rightarrow \infty} (\frac{\partial}{\partial \kappa_\theta^e} K(p)) = 0$ . ■

Now consider how the employment of a firm with productivity  $p$  responds to a reduction in search frictions on the job.

$$\frac{\partial l_\theta[K_\theta(p)]}{\partial \kappa_\theta^e} = \frac{M_\theta - U_\theta}{N} \frac{[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{\Gamma}(p)]^2 - 2(1 + \kappa_\theta^e)[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{\Gamma}(p)]\bar{\Gamma}(p)}{[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{\Gamma}(p)]^4} \quad (\text{D.15})$$

Simplifying yields

$$\frac{\partial l_\theta[K_\theta(p)]}{\partial \kappa_\theta^e} = \frac{M_\theta - U_\theta}{N} \frac{1 - \bar{\Gamma}(p)(2 + \kappa_\theta)}{[1 + \kappa_\theta^e \bar{\Gamma}(p)]^3} \quad (\text{D.16})$$

The sign of the effect only depends on  $1 - \bar{\Gamma}(p)(2 + \kappa_\theta)$ , and all the remaining terms are positive. Because  $\bar{\Gamma}(p)$  is monotonically decreasing in  $p$ , there exists a unique threshold  $\underline{\tau}_\theta^l$  above which the term is positive:

$$\frac{\partial l_\theta[K_\theta(p)]}{\partial \kappa_\theta^e} \Leftrightarrow p > \bar{p} - \frac{\bar{p} - \underline{p}}{(2 + \kappa_\theta^e)} \equiv \underline{\tau}_\theta^l.$$

The threshold  $\underline{\tau}_\theta^l$  is increasing  $\kappa_\theta^e$ . ■

## E. Commuting cost appendix

To assess this possibility I estimate the willingness to pay for longer commutes of French workers following Van Ommeren et al. (2000). On an outflow sample of French workers I

estimate a duration model that relates the length of an employment spell to the hourly wage, the commuting distance and other worker characteristics. The econometric model can be derived from a economic model of on-the-job search where jobs differ by wages and by the commuting distance (Van Ommeren et al., 2000).

To be completed