# Module 8: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Dynamic

**Decision-Making** 

#### So far in this class we have talked about:

- ▶ How to measure benefits from environmental protection
  - Revealed preference vs. stated preference
  - Use value, option value, and non-use value
- ▶ How to measure costs of environmental protection
  - Engineering cost vs. opportunity cost
  - Productivity effect
  - Employment effect

In this module, we are going to look at how to compare between benefits and costs. We will talk about:

- Benefit-cost analysis
- Discounting and present value
   Private vs. Public discount rates
- ► Dynamic decision-making
- Decision-making under uncertainty

One of the most important reasons to environmental benefits and costs is to evaluate public policy decisions:









# And these projects need to be funded by the public

- Free-riding problem: private entities will under-private public goods
- One of the major functionalities of the government is public good provision:
  - Education
  - Health
  - Environment

#### The Decision Rule

Let B be the benefits from a proposed policy, and C be the costs. The decision rule is:

If B>C, do it. Otherwise, don't do it.

Alternatively,

If the benefit-cost ratio B/C>1, do it.

# Benefit-cost Analysis

# Benefit-cost analysis provides a **normative** criteria to evaluate **public** policy **decisions**

- Normative: entails a value judgment
  - That the societal welfare is measured by the TOTAL economic benefits and costs
- Public: Benefit-cost analysis only applies to decisions that involves a public project
  - Private companies will automatically evaluate decisions based on revenue and cost
  - Public projects do not face the scrutiny of economic(accounting) calculus
- Decision
  - Whether to do the project or not
  - Need a decision rule that is clear-cut

# Of course, benefit-cost analysis is NOT the only decision rule:

- Impact analysis
  - What are the environmental impacts of a proposed action?
  - ▶ If there is harm, then could it be mitigated?
  - Environmental Impact Analysis, Wetland Permit, Endangered Species Act
- Cost-effectiveness
  - Wish to achieve some normative societal outcome (social justice, universal healthcare)
  - What is the way that involes the least cost to achieve the policy target?

#### And there is this

Executive Order 13771 (1/30/2017): "(c) . . . any new incremental costs associated with new regulations shall, to the extent permitted by law, be offset by the elimination of existing costs associated with at least two prior regulations."


- ► The Milton Friedman tradition: too much existing regulation are hurting businesses
- ► Total costs of the regulation should remain the same (or lower)
- ▶ But what about benefits?

# And benefit-cost analysis does not guarantee economic efficiency

- ▶ BCA essentially evaluates whether total benefit is larger than total costs
  - Or, whether net benefit is larger than zero
- ► That does not guarantee that the proposed policy MAXIMIZES societal welfare

# Mike Pompeo on the Paris Agreement, 11/4/2019

https://finance.yahoo.com/video/mike-pompeo-explains-why-us-002029088.html



# What does benefit-cost analysis look like? Estimated Annual US Benefits and Costs of

# the SO<sub>2</sub> Allowance Trading Program; Title IV, Clean Air Amendments of 1990

(billions of US 2000 Dollars)

Costs

Net benefits

Benefits	
Mortality	50-100
Morbidity	3-7
Recreational visibility	2-3
Residential visibility	2-3
Ecosystem effects	0.5

Total 59 - 116

0.5 - 2.0

58\_114

Table 1

## **Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations**

Mean benefits / mean costs

Share with benefits < costs

	water (1)	water (2)	Air (3)	gases (4)	other (5)	All (6)
A: Total US expenditures (t	rillions of 2017 dolla	urs)				
1970 to 2014	2.83	1.99	2.11	_	_	_
1973 to 1990	0.94	0.49	0.85	_	_	_

Drinbing

Δ 11

21.79

0.19

16.17

0.15

Crambouse

3.64

0.00

	1973 to 1990	0.94	0.49	0.65	
B:	Estimated benefits and costs of reg	gulations a	nalyzed in years	1992–2017	
	Total benefits / total costs	0.79	4.75	12.36	

0.57

0.67

Surface

1970 to 2014	2.83	1.99	2.11	_	_	-
1973 to 1990	0.94	0.49	0.85	-	-	-
B: Estimated benefits and costs of r	egulations an	alyzed in yea	ars 1992–201	7		
Total benefits / total costs	0.79	4.75	12.36	2.98	1.97	6.31

8.26

0.20

15.18

0.08

Table 3.3 Summary Comparison of Benefits and Costs from the Clean Air Act 1990–2020 (Estimates in Million 2006\$)

Monetized Direct Costs: Low <sup>1</sup> Central \$20,000 \$53,000 \$65,000 \$ High <sup>1</sup> Monetized Direct Benefits:	990–2020 380,000
Costs: .ow <sup>1</sup> Central \$20,000 \$53,000 \$65,000 \$ High <sup>1</sup> Monetized Direct Benefits:	380,000
High <sup>1</sup> Monetized Direct Benefits:	380,000
Benefits:	,
.ow <sup>2</sup> \$90.000 \$160.000 \$250.000 \$	
	1,400,000
Central \$770,000 \$1,300,000 \$2,000,000 \$	12,000,000
High <sup>2</sup> \$2,300,000 \$3,800,000 \$5,700,000 \$	35,000,000
Net Benefits:	
ow \$70,000 \$110,000 \$190,000 \$	1,000,000
Central \$750,000 \$1,200,000 \$1,900,000 \$	12,000,000
High \$2,300,000 \$3,700,000 \$5,600,000 \$	35,000,000
Benefit/Cost Ratio:	
.ow <sup>3</sup> 5/1 3/1 4/1 4	/1

25/1

72/1

31/1

88/1

32/1

92/1

39/1

115/1

Central

Hiah3

## An inherent puzzle with public investments

- Many public projects involve a large sum of investment in the current period
  - ► Three-gorge dam
  - Superfund cleanup
  - Climate change mitigation
- The streams of benefit come at a later point
  - How do we evaluate benefits and costs over different time horizons
    - Do we sacrifice future generations?
    - Do we sacrifice current economic development opportunities?

2.24
2019. Starting from 2020, it provides economic benefits of \$10
million per year for the next three years, before another cleanup is
due.

Cleaning up a waste site near Kingslanding costs \$25 million in year

How to evaluate the benefits and the costs?

# Discounting the future

In general, we might want to value more heavily with money on hand. This is true for several reasons:

- Opportunity cost of money: investment generates returns
- ► Time preference: the desire to enjoy now more than later in the future
- Inflation: future money is less valuable

This leads to a positive discount rate of r

### Present value of benefits & costs

With the discount rate established, we can now evaluate the benefits and costs for the waste cleanup problem.

Assuming the base year is 2019, and a discount rate of 5%. Our problem is to put every benefit stream occuring in the future back into 2019 terms. For example, a benefit of \$10 million in 2020 is worth:

```
$10 million in 2020 = $10 million / (1+5\%) = $9.52 million in 2019 $10 million in 2021 = $10 million / (1+5\%)^2 = $9.07 million in 2019 $10 million in 2022 = $10 million / (1+5\%)^3 = $8.64 million in 2019
```

# The present value benefits and costs for the project is:

The present value benefits:

$$PVB = 10 * \frac{1}{(1+5\%)} + 10 * \frac{1}{(1+5\%)^2} + 10 * \frac{1}{(1+5\%)^3}$$

$$= 9.52 + 9.07 + 8.64$$

$$=$$
 \$27.23 million

The present value costs: PVC = \$25 million

### Present value net benefits

#### The present value net benefits is thus:

```
PVNB = PVB - PVC
=27.23-25 = $2.23 million
```

- PVNB is equivalent to the idea of net benefit in the one time-period problems
- Decision rule for a BCA becomes: \*\* PVNB > 0: do it; PVNB <0: don't do it\*\*</p>

#### Present value vs. current value

- Current value: economic values that are generated in the future(current) year, before discounting
- ► Present value: the equivalent economic values generated in the future to the present year

And we have the following formula:

$$PV = \frac{CV}{(1+r)^t}$$
$$CV = PV * (1+r)^t$$

where

PV: Present value of benefits CV: Current value of benefits

r: Discount rate

t: Number of periods

#### Present value benefits for the infinite horizon

In many circumstances, future benefit/cost streams will run for a long period of time, or indefinitely:

- ▶ Benefits from mitigating climate change
- Flood control and hydro-power generation from major dams
- Regulatory expenses to maintain a program

And how do we put that into account?

The construction of the Three Gorges Dam cost \$30 billion in year 0. Starting from year 1, it provides economic benefits of \$1 billion per year until the earth is occupied by the three-body civilization.

Assume a discount rate of 5%.

Current value costs: \$30 billion in year 0

Current value benefits: \$1 billion starting in year 1, indefinitely

Present value costs: \$30 billion Present value benefits:

$$1/1.05 + 1/1.05^2 + 1/1.05^3 + 1/1.05^4 + \dots$$

using the summation rule of geometric sequences:

$$\sum_{s=1}^{t} A * \frac{1}{(1+r)^{s}} = A * \frac{1}{1+r} * \frac{1 - (\frac{1}{1+r})^{t}}{1 - \frac{1}{1+r}}$$

When t goes to infinity, we have:

$$\sum_{s=1}^{t} A * \frac{1}{(1+r)^{s}} = A * \frac{1}{1+r} * \frac{1}{\frac{r}{1+r}}$$

$$A$$

Or:

PV of an infinite stream of payoff  $= \frac{\text{CV of each year's payoff}}{r}$ 

And the PVB for the project is: 1/0.05 = \$20 billion.

The PVNB is thus: 20-30 = \$-10 billion

### The influence of discount rate

Discount rate has a critical impact on benefit-cost analysis. Suppose for the same project (\$30B initial cost, \$1B indefinite benefit), different discount rates are chosen:

##	Discount	rate	PVB	PVC	PVNB
##		0.01	100	30	70.0
##		0.02	50	30	20.0
##		0.03	33	30	3.3
##		0.05	20	30	-10.0
##		0.10	10	30	-20.0
##		0.20	5	30	-25.0

## Internal Rate of Return

Another way to evaluate policy projects (or business ones) is to calculate the internal rate of return.

IRR = the discount rate when the project is just breaking even

	Α	В	С	D	Е
1	Period	Cash flow	PV		
2	Initial investment	-\$1,000	-\$1,000		
3	1	\$300	\$275.49	=B3/(1+\$E	3\$7)^A3
4	2	\$400	\$337.31	=B4/(1+\$B\$7)^A4	
5	3	\$500	\$387.20	=B5/(1+\$B\$7)^A5	
6					
7	IRR	8.90%	=IRR(B2:B5)		
8	NPV	\$0.00	=SUM(C2:C5)		

# Put it in another way

- ► Climate change is going to cause \$5 trillion (5,000,000,000,000) in damage by 2100
- ▶ With 3% discount rate, this is \$382 billion in NPV
  - Half of the annual US military spending
- ▶ With 5% discount rate, this is \$72 billion
  - How much China invests in its high-speed rail system
- ▶ With 7% discount rate, this is \$13 billion
  - 4 months of Netflix subscription for the entire US

- ► Higher discount rate: welfare for the present is relatively more valuable
- ► Lower discount rate: welfare for the future is relatively more valuable

# From the financial markets' perspective:

- Private markets establish equilibrium interest rates for savings and loans
  - ▶ 10-year treasury bill: 1.79%
  - ► Alipay's Tianhong Monetary Fund (Yu'e Bao): 2.25%
  - ▶ Prime-rate auto loan: 4%
  - Sub-prime mortgages: 8%
  - Average return on US stock market (S&P): 9.9%
- ► We call this **private discount rate**
- Risky assets will yield higher return
  - A "risk premium" for taking on extra risk

# From consumers' perspective

There are (at least) two main reasons why an individual values present wealth more than future wealth:

- Time preference (the impatient desire)
  - Between consuming now and consuming later, individuals almost always desire to consume now
  - Think about going to your favorite restaurant, or a concert from your favorite singer
- Economic growth (money growing on trees)
  - By saving instead of consuming, more wealth could be generated in the future

### Social vs. private discount rate

But the problem with a market-driven discount rate is, private discount rates are higher than the social discount rate

- Investors are more impatient than the society as a whole (higher time preference)
  - Make money in three years, otherwise I will not invest in your start-up
- Higher risk premium
  - Government can better shield institutional risks
  - Government can impose risks to private firms

By the same logic, developed countries may have lower interest rate than developing countries:

- Divergence in credit ratings of national debts (cost of raising capital)
- ► Divergence in institutional risks
- Divergence in growth rates

This is to say, while US should use a discount rate of 3%, Mozambique should use a discount rate of 8%.

What are the implications of this?

# Frank Ramsey and the Ramsey equation

Frank Ramsey is NOT an economist. He was a philosophy/mathematician working with the great Wittgenstein. He was encouraged by John Maynard Keynes and Arthur Pigou(!) though.

Ramsey wrote only three economics papers in his life:

- ➤ A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation (landmark in public finance)
- Truth and Probability (the foundation of modern statistics)
- ➤ A Mathematical Theory of Saving (first chapter in every advanced macroeconomics book)

Paul Samuelson: "three great legacies – legacies that were for the most part mere by-products of his major interest in the foundations of mathematics and knowledge."

John Maynard Keynes: "one of the most remarkable contributions to mathematical economics ever made, both in respect of the intrinsic importance and difficulty of its subject..."

# The Ramsey equation

Ramsey (1928): How to maximize present value benefits over time? Or rather, how should the society tradeoff current consumption with future ones?

#### 2.4.1 The Problem that Households Face

The problem that the household solves is therefore:

$$\max_{\{C(t)\}} U = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(C(t)) L(t) dt$$

subject to the following dynamic budget constraint:

$$\dot{B}(t) = r(t)B(t) + W(t)L(t) - C(t)L(t)$$
(5)

From the dynamic budget constraint (5), we can derive an *intertemporal budget constraint*. To see this, let's take the dynamic budget constraint (5) and pre-multiply each side by  $e^{-R(t)}$ , then integrate between time t and time T > t:

$$\int_{t}^{T} e^{-R(s)} \dot{B}(s) ds = \int_{t}^{T} e^{-R(s)} r(s) B(s) ds + \int_{t}^{T} e^{-R(s)} (W(s) - C(s)) L(s) ds$$

We can use the Integration by Part formula to replace the left hand side with

$$\int_{t}^{T} e^{-R(s)} \dot{B}(s) ds = B(T) e^{-R(T)} - B(t) e^{-R(t)} + \int_{t}^{T} e^{-R(s)} r(s) B(s) ds$$

where we use the fact that  $dR(s)/ds = d(\int_0^s r(u)du)/ds = r(s)$ .

Substituting this expression into the budget constraint and canceling terms, we obtain:

$$B(T)e^{-R(T)} - B(t)e^{-R(t)} = \int_{t}^{T} e^{-R(s)}(W(s) - C(s))L(s)ds$$

After some difficult (but elegant) math, it goes as simple as this:

$$r = \delta + \eta g$$

where:

r: discount rate

 $\delta$ : pure time preference

 $\eta \colon$  elasticity of marginal utility of consumption

g: growth rate of the economy

In other words, discount rate consists of two part:

- m other words, discount rate consists of two part.
- Pure time preference: δ
   Future economic growth, weighted by the diminishing marginal utility of consumption: ηg

### Some estimates of the social discount rate

- Obama Administration: 3% 5%
- ▶ Nordhaus: Observe parameters on the market
  - ▶  $\delta = 1.5; \eta = 2$
  - r = 4.5%-6.5%
- Stern: Choosing parameters from a moral stand point
  - ▶  $\delta = 0.1; \eta = 1$
  - ► r = 1.4%

### Consequences of discount rate choices

Drastic differences on the social cost of carbon (price of a carbon tax):

- Obama Administration: \$40 per ton
- Nordhaus (DICE): \$8 per ton
- ► The Stern Report: \$200 per ton

### Discount rate as a political tool

And of course, discount rate is a power weapon if politicians want to "play with the numbers":

- ▶ The Trump administration revisited the social cost of carbon
- ▶ Among other things, they chose a discount rate of 7%(!)
- Leads to a social cost of carbon of less than \$1 per ton
  - ▶ Almost no climate policy will pass the BCA with that
  - Basis for revoking existing climate regulations

#### Nordhaus vs. Weitzman vs. Stern

- Nordhaus: simulation modeling
  - ▶ Investment in climate change has relatively low rate of return
  - Resource better spent on other projects with higher return: Child education, fighting poverty
  - Favors a carbon tax
- Weitzman: the fat tail problem
  - Need to avoid potential catastrophic events (with small probability, but fat tails)
  - Favors a cap-and-trade
- Stern: Discount rate should be a moral choice
  - Discount rate as low as possible

# What do you think the discount rate should be?

- ► How should it be determined?
- ► How high should it be?
- Any problems with discounting in this way?
  - ▶ What about catastrophic risk in the future?
  - What about future growth rates?

# Decision-making under uncertainty

In the real world, it is hard to state the consequence of a policy with certainty.

- Exposure to radioactive substances from the Fukushima Nuclear site is lethal to human 1 in 10,000 time, and non-lethal for the rest 9999 times.
- Climate change may cause massive damage to the society, or it may cause relatively small damage
- ▶ Mars-landing may cost NASA 100 billion dollars if everything goes right, but it may cost up to 1 trillion

# How does benefit-cost analysis incorporate uncertainty?

A government can implement one of the three programs to restore a migratory bird habitat. Three plans have the same cost of \$1000. The economic benefits from each strategy is the following:

	Outcome A	Outcome B	Outcome C
Economic Benefits	500	1000	2000
Plan A	30%	50%	20%
Plan B	10%	65%	25%
Plan C	20%	40%	40%

Which plan should the government pick?

### Dominant policy

A **dominant policy** is one that confers higher net benefits for every outcome.

Also, a dominated policy is a policy that confers lower net benefits for every outcome comparing to another policy.

Is there a dominant strategy there? Is there a dominated strategy there?

### Expected value maximization

If there is no dominant strategy, then we will have to rely on something else: maximize the expected value of net benefits

Expected Net Benefit of Choice  $j = \sum_{i=1}^{I} p_i NB_{ij}$ 

Plan A: E(NB) = 500 \* 30% + 1000 \* 50% + 2000 \* 20% = 1050 Plan B: E(NB) = 500 \* 10% + 1000 \* 65% + 2000 \* 25% = 1200

Plan B: E(NB) = 500 \* 10% + 1000 \* 65% + 2000 \* 25% = 1200Plan C: E(NB) = 500 \* 20% + 1000 \* 40% + 2000 \* 40% = 1300

### Another example

Honduras is thinking of a national climate change adaptation plan that costs \$70 million. There is a 70% chance that the plan is successful, and create an annual benefit of \$4 million indefinitely. There is a 30% chance that the plan is unsuccessful, creating only \$1 million indefinitely.

Assuming a discount rate of 5%, should the government go through with the plan?

# Maximizing expected present value net benefits

```
E(PVNB) = 4,000,000/5\% * 70\% + 1,000,000/5\% * 30\% - 70,000,000 = -\$8,000,000
```

Honduras should not go through with that plan.

- ▶ Using expected net value maximization implicitly assumes that the society is risk-neutral
  - i.e., the society is indifferent between a certain \$50 payoff and a 50% chance of getting \$100
- This may be a simplificationWhat if there is a catastrophic risk that we cannot bear?

### Takeaways from the module

- ► Benefit-cost analysis
  - ► Normative, public decisions
- Dynamic decision-making
  - Present value vs. current value
- Discount rate
  - The Ramsey formula
  - Private vs. social discount rate
  - Implications for climate change # Decision-making under uncertainty