

Scalable Multi-Party Computation Protocols for Machine Learning in the Honest-Majority Setting

Fengrun Liu, Xiang Xie, Yu Yu

Machine Learning and Privacy

Product Recommendation




Image Processing




Language Model: generate human-like responses



More data —> Better models


Privacy-preserving Machine Learning (PPML)

Client-Server Model



hospitals (data)

split into
secret shares



MPC Protocols for PPML

2PC: [SecureML] [Ezpc] [Chameleon] [Delphi] ...


3PC: [ABY3] [SecureNN] [Falcon] [DEK20] ...

4PC: [Flash] [Trident] [Fantastic Four] [Swift] ...

How about MPC Protocols for arbitrary n parties?

General-purpose MPC:
[DN07] [DPSZ12] [SPDZ] [Mascot] ...

Scalability from Shamir's Secret Sharing




$$f(x) = s + a_1x + a_2x^2$$

$$f(x) = s + a_1x + a_2x^2 + \dots + a_tx^t$$

- distributed to **n** parties as shares
(denoted by $[s]$)
- can be reconstructed from $\geq \mathbf{t + 1}$ parties


t-privacy

Two Obstacles in Oblivious Inference on a Neural Network




- Decimal number
- Non-linear function

$$\text{DReLU}(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & x \geq 0 \\ 0, & x < 0 \end{cases}$$



↑ $\text{ReLU}(x) = \text{DReLU}(x) \cdot x$

↑ $\text{Max}(a, b) = \text{ReLU}(a - b) + b$




Decimal Multiplications in Integer Ring \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ}


- Represent an integer $\bar{x} \in [-2^{\ell-1}, 2^{\ell-1})$

$$x = \bar{x} \pmod{2^\ell} = \begin{cases} \bar{x}, & \bar{x} \geq 0 \\ 2^\ell - \bar{x}, & \bar{x} < 0 \end{cases}$$


(2's complement)



- Truncation on c : performing $\bar{c}/2^d$




shift the bits down by d positions
and fill the top d bits with MSB of c



Decimal Multiplications in Mersenne Field \mathbb{F}_p ($p = 2^\ell - 1$)

- Represent an integer $\bar{x} \in (-2^{\ell-1}, 2^{\ell-1})$

$$x = \bar{x} \pmod{2^\ell - 1} = \begin{cases} \bar{x}, & \bar{x} \geq 0 \\ 2^\ell - 1 - \bar{x}, & \bar{x} < 0 \end{cases}$$



Truncation in $\mathbb{F}_{2^\ell-1}$ = Truncation in \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ}

shift the bits down by d positions
and fill the top d bits with MSB of c

Previous Truncation Protocol with A Large Gap

Preprocess: a pair $([r], [\text{Trunc}(r)])$ where $r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^\ell-1}$

Online:

1. $[a] = [x] + [r]$

2. Reveal a


3. $[\text{Trunc}(x)] = \text{Trunc}(a) - [\text{Trunc}(r)]$

A Large Gap !!

only holds w.h.p. for small $x \ll 2^\ell - 1$

Our Truncation Protocol with Only 1-bit Gap

For example, we have $a = x + r$ in \mathbb{F}_{2^9-1} .



Our Truncation Protocol with Only 1-bit Gap

For example, we have $a = x + r$ in \mathbb{F}_{2^9-1} .

x=162	<div>010100010</div>	$\bar{x} > 0$
+		+
r=161	<div>010100001</div>	$\bar{r} > 0$
=		≠
a=323	<div>101000011</div>	$\bar{a} < 0$

truncation
d=3

Trunc(x)=20	<div>000010100</div>
+	
Trunc(r)=20	<div>000010100</div>
≠	
Trunc(a)=488	<div>111101000</div>

just remove the
misfilled top d bits

- Δ

(Actual Result)

truncation
d=3

0000101000

(Expected Result)

filled with the correct sign bit

Expected Truncation:

0101000011

correct sign bit

Our Truncation Protocol with Only 1-bit Gap

For example, we have $a = x + r$ in \mathbb{F}_{2^9-1} .

x=162

010100010

+

r=161

010100001

=

a=323

101000011

$\bar{x} > 0$

$\bar{r} > 0$

$\bar{a} < 0$

x is always positive

truncation
d=3

Trunc(x)=20

000010100

+

Trunc(r)=20

000010100

\neq

Trunc(a)=488

111101000

positive overflow happen

Our Truncation Protocol with Only 1-bit Gap

Preprocess: a triple $([r], [\text{Trunc}(r)], [\text{MSB}(r)])$ where $r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^\ell-1}$

Online: for positive input $x \in [0, 2^{\ell-1})$ 1-bit Gap


1. $[a] = [x] + [r]$

2. Reveal a

3. $[e] = (1 - [\text{MSB}(r)]) \cdot \text{MSB}(a)$ $e = 1$ indicating positive overflow happens


4. $[\text{Trunc}(x)] = \text{Trunc}(a) - [\text{Trunc}(r)] + [e] \cdot (2^{\ell-d} - 1)$

holds for any $x \in [0, 2^{\ell-1})$
representing positive numbers



[DN07]

$(\langle r \rangle, [\text{Trunc}(r)], [\text{MSB}(r)])$



1-round Fixed-point Multiplication
Protocol with Only **1-bit Gap**

Non-linear Function via Bitwise Comparison

arithmetic comparison ($x < 0$)

$$\text{DReLU}(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & x \geq 0 \\ 0, & x < 0 \end{cases}$$

Fact: $\text{MSB}(x) = \text{LSB}(2x)$ holds in odd rings

1. $y = 2x + r$
2. Reveal y
3. $\text{LSB}(2a) = \text{LSB}(y) \oplus \text{LSB}(r) \oplus (\text{y_B} < \text{r_B})$

bitwise comparison

bitwise comparison ($y_B < r_B$)

look for the first different bit

(public) y_B 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1

(secret) r_B 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0

XOR
(secret) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1

* Prefix-OR
(secret) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

(secret) e_B 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

$$(y_B < r_B) = \langle e_B, r_B \rangle = 1$$

* **Prefix-OR** involves ℓ multiplications: $b_j = \bigvee_{i=1}^j a_i$ for $j = 1, \dots, \ell$


Round-Efficient Prefix-OR Protocol via Prefix-AND

Online Complexity of [N007]: 5 rounds

Online Complexity of Prefix-Mult[BB89]: 1 round

* Prefix-OR: compute $b_j = \bigvee_{i=1}^j a_i$ for $j = 1, \dots, \ell$

* Prefix-AND: compute $b_j = \bigwedge_{i=1}^j a_i$ for $j = 1, \dots, \ell$




- 1. locate the first **1-bit's** position
- 2. set all the following bits to **1** by **OR operation**

Dual Problem



- 1. locate the first **0-bit's** position
- 2. set all the following bits to **0** by **AND** (zero out all the following bits)

Other Building Blocks




Round Complexity in Online Phase

Performance: Oblivious Inference

Stimulate 3-63 parties on 11 servers

LAN: 15Gb/s, delay 0.3ms

WAN: 100Mb/s, delay 40ms




online runtime (s) from 3PC to 63PC in the LAN setting

Performance: Oblivious Inference

Stimulate 3-63 parties on 11 servers

LAN: 15Gb/s, delay 0.3ms

WAN: 100Mb/s, delay 40ms



online runtime (s) from 3PC to 63PC in the WAN setting

The End, Questions?
