

SESSION ID: PST-W07

# Security Posture for Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP)

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Government Affairs EMEA  
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EXECUTIVE REPORT: SMART CITIES

Transformational 'smart cities':  
cyber security and resilience



Confidence in a connected world. 

EXECUTIVE REPORT: ENERGY / SMART GRID

How to protect critical infrastructure,  
mitigate fraud and guarantee privacy



GO TO THE END

Towards Smart Grids and Smart Cities

Confidence in a connected world. 

EXECUTIVE REPORT: ENERGY / OIL &amp; GAS

Protecting critical systems while  
promoting operational efficiency



Confidence in a connected world. 

Imagine... you have to tell the Board of Directors,  
that your organization has been compromised by  
an attack...




*It took the attackers only **six minutes** to circumvent the perimeter defenses. From there, they achieved domain administrator privileges in **less than 12 hours**. In less than a week they **fully compromised** all 30 of our global domains.*

*They harvested **all our credentials**, giving them the ability to log in to the network **masquerading as any of us**. There was **no place** on our global network they could not go and only a handful of computers they did not have **easy access to**.*

*The attackers were in a position to electronically **transfer millions of dollars** out of our bank accounts through our accounts payable system.*

# Operational Tech. vs. Information Tech.

OT: The application of technologies to changes in plant operations are highly customized by industry of products and services an enterprise.



human interface.



Information Technology and computing technology and retrieve, transmit and store information. Functions are relatively consistent and support corporate functions through

# Critical Information Infrastructure: It all adds-up (1)

#RSAC

Hyper-Complexity +  
Hyper-Connectivity +  
Hyper-Volume of data =  
Hyper-Vulnerability

# Critical Information Infrastructure: It all adds-up (2) #RSAC

Lack of regulatory standards +  
Reluctance to disclose incidents +  
Insufficient preparedness to incidents +  
Limited infosharing/Collaboration =  
Industry risk assessment inadequate →  
Insufficient security posture & spending

Chatham House: Cybersecurity at civil nuclear facilities – C. Byron et al







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# 1. Cyber-attacks to Critical Information Infrastructure DO happen



# High-profile CII Attacks



1. Even isolated industrial control systems (ICS) are vulnerable AND
2. Cyber-attacks can inflict vast physical damage



# Other high-profile incidents



Country DDOS Estonia



Drugs traffickers using hacked port - Belgium



Water treatment plant disabled - USA



Steel mill hacked, severely damaged - Germany



Kaspersky  
Conference  
2015  
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# A noteworthy example: Dragonfly

## Energy Companies Under Sabotage Threat

- Ongoing cyberespionage campaign
- Targeting the **energy sector** in USA/Europe
- Hallmarks of **state sponsored** operation
- Priorities appear to be:
  - Persistent access to targets
  - Information stealing
  - Sabotage
- Sophisticated attack techniques and vectors
  - Spam emails with disguised malware as PDF attachment.
  - Watering hole attack
  - Compromising third party software/downloads



# A local-focused threat: Trojan.Laziok




Figure 1. Regions affected by Trojan.Laziok

## TROJAN.LAZIOK INFECTION CHAIN

TROJAN.LAZIOK USED IN TARGETED ATTACKS AGAINST ENERGY SECTOR WITH A FOCUS ON THE MIDDLE EAST



### FIRST PHASE...

TROJAN.LAZIOK STARTS ITS RECONNAISSANCE PROCESS BY COLLECTING CONFIGURATION DATA FROM THE COMPUTER TO DETERMINE IF IT IS AN INTERESTING TARGET

### TROJAN.LAZIOK

### SECOND PHASE...

TROJAN.LAZIOK INFECTS THE TARGETED COMPUTER WITH ADDITIONAL MALWARE

NO

INTERESTING TARGET?

YES



STOP INFECTION



BACKDOOR.CYBERAT

TROJAN.ZBOT

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## **2. Cyber-Intelligence as first step toward a sound security posture**



# Global Intelligence Network



Symantec Internet  
Security Threat  
Report, Vol20

*Worldwide  
Coverage*

*Global Scope  
and Scale*

*24x7 Event  
Logging*

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# Enterprise Threat Landscape

## Attackers Moving Faster



5 of 6 large companies attacked



317M new malware created



1M new threats daily



60% of attacks targeted SMEs

## Digital extortion on the rise



113% increase in ransomware



45X more devices held hostage

## Zero-Day Threats

24

24 all-time high



Top 5 unpatched for 295 days

## Malware gets smarter



28% of malware was Virtual Machine Aware

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# 3. Actors, motivations, objectives



# Actors, motivations, objectives (not exhaustive)

Attackers	Underlying Motivations	Industrial Espionage	Intelligence (Data Exfiltration)	Financial	Sabotage (ICT)	Sabotage (Physical infrastructure)
Solitary hackers	Personal credit with hacker community		<i>Expose sensitive or embarrassing information</i>	<b>Money theft from operators</b>	<b>Newsworthy action</b>	
Criminals (organised crime or individual)	Financial gain	<b>Commerce of sensitive information</b>		<b>Ransom</b>		
State Military	Undeclared conflicts Various stages	<b>Support national industry</b>	Military Espionage		<b>Neutralise enemy's ICT -</b>	<b>Inflict physical damage to enemy State or organisation</b>
State-sponsored groups	Paid support of State activity		Espionage in various domains		<b>Inflict damage to enemy State</b>	
Terrorism	Political, Religious		Acquire info for attacks	<b>Group Funding</b>	<b>Damage to State ICT &amp; reputation</b>	
Hactivists	Political campaigns on specific themes	Expose sensitive or embarrassing information				

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## 4. Policy and regulatory aspects



# Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive

- ◆ EU Governments need to build national cyber-security capabilities
  - ◆ Create/Equip national CERTs (Computer Emergency Readiness Team)
  - ◆ National Cybersecurity Strategies
  - ◆ Responsible Authorities
  - ◆ Exchange information
- ◆ Operators of Critical infrastructure
  - ◆ Need to develop a risk management approach
  - ◆ Are subject to audit and supervision by national authorities
  - ◆ Need to report security incidents
  - ◆ Need to share information
- ◆ Current Status
  - ◆ Discussion at Parliament and Council – Active usually 18 months after adoption



# NIST framework to improve CII security

“The national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of critical infrastructure. A voluntary framework for reducing cyber risks to critical infrastructure. Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure systems, placing the Nation’s security, economy, and public safety and health at risk”.

Based on the EO and outcome-based, the Framework provides guidelines on:

- Standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes
- Align policy, business, and technological approaches
- Governance of cybersecurity risk
- Incorporate international voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices to the fullest extent possible
- Provide a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach
- Information security measures and controls
- Identify, assess, and manage cyber risk for CI



# Cybersecurity Roles

## Government:

- ◆ Develop, implement, enforce cybersecurity policies and strategies with industry and civil society input
- ◆ Encourage adoption of industry-led consensus standards and best practices
- ◆ Promote market-driven technology innovation
- ◆ Raise awareness and education
- ◆ Serve as regulator for critical sectors of economy

## Industry:

- ◆ Innovate, build and maintain security of technologies and services
- ◆ Coordinate on incident response and vulnerability management
- ◆ Participate in public-private partnerships



Raise awareness and education




# PPP Fundamentals for Success (W-W-W)

- ◆ Cybersecurity is a “shared responsibility” across society
- ◆ Aligns industry and government priorities, goals, objectives
- ◆ Embraces core aspect of inclusiveness
- ◆ Provides the structure, processes, and environment for trusted collaboration and repeatable consultation
- ◆ Flexible and adaptable to address the changing risk landscape
- ◆ Clear objectives, limits and deliverables – Manageable size
- ◆ Identify “critical infrastructure at greatest risk” - where a cybersecurity incident could have catastrophic effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security



# What should each side aim to get?

- ◆ Not for profit and not for free riding
- ◆ Industry usually aims to get
  - ◆ Useful information on threats
  - ◆ Recognition as a good corporate citizen
  - ◆ Deeper understanding of the organisations participating
  - ◆ A community of trust
- ◆ Government usually aims to get
  - ◆ Better threat awareness
  - ◆ A better collective defense capability
  - ◆ Raise the bar
  - ◆ Participate in a community of trust



# PPP considerations

PPPs are not easy but....

- ◆ Industry sees value and comes in good faith
- ◆ Necessary in the current threat environment
- ◆ Public perception critical after recent facts
- ◆ Clarity will drive trust, participation and result
- ◆ Manageable size matters
- ◆ Keep it open and transparent but be selective
- ◆ Don't re-invent the wheel
- ◆ Begin with small but focused steps



# Norms

UN's [Group of Governmental Experts](#) (GGE) agreed in June on a set of norms.

- ◆ Three key commitments:
  - ◆ Nations should not attack each other's critical infrastructure
  - ◆ Nations should not target each other's cyber emergency responders
  - ◆ Nations should help investigate cyber attacks launched from their own territory
- ◆ Limiting norms:
  - ◆ States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs;
  - ◆ States should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure;
  - ◆ States should take steps to ensure supply chain security, and should seek to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT and the use of harmful hidden functions;
  - ◆ States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm the information systems of another state's emergency response teams (CERT/CSIRTS) and should not use their own teams for malicious international activity;
  - ◆ States should respect the UN resolutions that are linked to human rights on the internet and to the right to privacy in the digital age.



# Information sharing

- ◆ Easier said than done
- ◆ Private sector recognizes the mutual benefit but is impeded...
  - ◆ By public perception
  - ◆ Lack of reciprocity
  - ◆ Lack of legal clarity
  - ◆ Lack of structures
  - ◆ Question of trust
- ◆ Models of effective partnership
- ◆ Effective PPP require clearly defined limited, specific operational goals



# How does Symantec work with governments?

- ◆ Other than providing them with capabilities.....
- ◆ PPP = Public-Private Partnership
- ◆ Historically Symantec has:
  - ◆ Participated in PPP and info-sharing groups for cyber threats and policy
  - ◆ Provided strategic insight to policy makers (e.g., testimony, white papers)
  - ◆ Cooperated in education and awareness raising programs
  - ◆ Led capacity building initiatives in Countries
  - ◆ Participated on expert committees and working groups
  - ◆ Participated in cyber exercises
  - ◆ Participated in jointly funded R&D




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## **5. Security posture for critical infrastructure ecosystems**



# Full Threat Protection life cycle



Source: Gartner

# Approach to Industrial Systems – ‘Four Pillars’

#RSAC

Not just the device: data flows device to system, network, data center/NOC & Cloud

## Operations Security (Network + Endpoint)

Utility



- Provide a strong view of events happening in the network and the anomalies

- Control network = compliance + threat perspective
- Anti-malware valuable, but system hardening, code signing are other important technologies which can help strengthen the network

## Manage Devices (Endpoints)

Field



- Manage Windows sub-station automation systems
- Securely update device firmware e.g. AMI collectors
- Securely invoke SSL services through trusted mechanisms resident on device



## Manage Data Explosion (Data)



### Information Infrastructure


- Storage management
- Data protection
- Archiving
- Legal discovery
- Data Loss Prevention



### Information Governance

- Compliance
- Control access
- Regulatory & auditing
- Customer Privacy
- Reporting

## Embed Security with Data (Channel)



- Encrypt information
- Authenticate devices
- Manage keys
- Manage certificates at scale
- Managed / hosted PKI & device level certificates
- Controlling and securing systems

# Recommendations for a secure critical infrastructure (1)

...in order to deliver service continuity and 24x7 availability of the critical infrastructure.

## Establish the governance framework

- ◆ Fulfil Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC)
- ◆ Deliver Service Continuity
- ◆ Identify and protect vital information proactively
- ◆ Balancing traditional versus cloud delivery
- ◆ Authenticate users (Strong authentication)
- ◆ Manage security services
- ◆ Developing an information management strategy

# Recommendations for a secure critical infrastructure (2)

#RSAC

## Fulfilling Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC)

- ◆ Policies and processes, standards and regulations, enabled by ad hoc IT tools
- ◆ Ensure that IT departments monitor their environment against the evolving regulation scenarios
- ◆ Stay compliant and mitigate risks.

## Delivering service continuity

- ◆ Adopt solutions and methodologies for security, backup, data loss prevention, archiving and disaster recovery
- ◆ Ensure 24x7 availability of the critical infrastructure and resilience in case of an incident through solid backup and recovery software or appliances, policies, processes and tools
- ◆ Able to protect and manage heterogeneous environments
- ◆ Legacy systems and newer deployments, Open Source, managed mobile devices, virtualised systems, etc.

# Recommendations for a secure critical infrastructure (3)

## Identify and protect vital information proactively

- ◆ Adopt an information-centric approach: embed security within data
- ◆ Encryption and white/black-listing
- ◆ Strong authentication policies and tools.

## Managing security services

- ◆ Consider outsourcing security services to providers who can leverage extensive, global expertise in the field of cyber security
- ◆ Choose a partner with worldwide visibility of threats and attacks trends, able to address the complete range of security challenges described in this report.
- ◆ ICT leadership to focus on the functional duties of running the city
- ◆ Rely on national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT)

# Cyber-security: NOT just a technological problem

- ◆ Critical Infrastructure → Country's national security, economic wellbeing and public safety as well as Geopolitical considerations

...and therefore

Cyber-security (and CIIP) are a:

- ◆ Political problem.
- ◆ Business problem.
- ◆ Individual's problem.
- ◆ That technology will help solving.



# Apply Slide

- ◆ Next week you should:
  - ◆ Identify the leadership team that should engage in enhancing the security posture of your organisation
- ◆ In the next three months:
  - ◆ Assess your intelligence capabilities and identify an appropriate source
  - ◆ Assess readiness (skills, tools, general posture people, processes, compliance) and adapt accordingly, including training staff and building posture
- ◆ Within six months
  - ◆ Put in place a CERT
  - ◆ Keep assessing readiness against evolving threats



A decorative graphic in the background features a grid of overlapping squares in various shades of gray and yellow, creating a pixelated or abstract pattern across the slide.

# Thank you!

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