Research Proposal MA Thesis: Emigration and Voting Behaviour in Central and Eastern European EU Member States

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Abstract

Emigration from Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU member states is notably high. This thesis seeks to understand its implications for citizens in sending countries. Drawing inspiration from Swedish research, I explore whether emigration-induced service cuts lead to an anti-incumbent vote. Specifically, this research will examine if service cuts in the form of school and hospital closures, as well as the shutdown of "third places" like bars and cafés, encourage anti-incumbent voting in CEE EU states. By confirming these hypotheses, the thesis aims to shed light on the broader impacts of the EU's Freedom of Movement and how future EU enlargement may shape voting behaviour in new member states.

Introduction

Central and Eastern European (CEE) European Union (EU) member states[1] have shown high levels of emigration in the past 20 years (see Figure 1). Their accession to the EU has spurred on emigration, facilitated by the EU's Freedom of Movement (FoM). How does emigration affect political behaviour in sending countries? Theory tells us that emigration leads to service cuts, which in turn create grievances amongst the remaining population (Dancygier et al. 2022). They then turn against the incumbent party (Bowler and Lanoue 1992). So which emigration-induced service cuts lead to an anti-incumbent vote?

This question is relevant for three reasons. First, emigration has a profound impact on sending countries (e.g., see Thaut (2009)). Second, emigration is a salient issue amongst the remaining population (Rice-Oxley and Rankin 2019). Third, the effects of emigration on CEE EU member states is a blind spot in political science research (Kyriazi et al. 2023).

The United Nations estimated a population decline of 18 million people in Eastern Europe between the early 1990s and 2015, with emigration being the main reason for the decline (Romei 2016). In one concrete example, Lithuania has lost a quarter of its population, with certain regions losing over 50% of residents (Ubarevičienė and van Ham 2017, 58). Intra-EU migration is driven by economic and labour market factors, as people emigrate to look for better job opportunities (Vasilopoulou and Talving 2019, 810).

Does a country's accession to the EU, and with it gaining access to the EU's Freedom of Movement (FoM), have an effect on emigration rates? Figure 2 displays a selection of countries that provided data on international emigration before and after the country's accession. The vertical blue line represents when the country joined the EU. The time span covers, when data are available, ten years before and after accession.

I perform a Chow-Test (Chow 1960) for each individual country to examine if EU accession creates a break in the rate of emigration over time. The results show that, apart from the Czech Republic, EU accession does create a break in the time series with conventional significance ($p < 0.05$). Because of these breaks in the emigration rates, I assume that there is a link between a country's accession to the EU and a change in emigration rate. This is because a country's membership in the EU makes emigration easier, due to the EU's FoM. The FoM transition period, that all EU member states were allowed to implement in order to adjust for immigrants from new member states, is not taken into account here.

Emigration has profound impacts on sending countries, e.g., population decline, lack of labour (Roos 2023, 187; Thaut 2009, 220) or a change in the population's ethnic profile (Vorländer 2021, 51). Emigration affects individuals through a sense of loss or by causing anger, distress and depression (Ivlevs et al. 2019, 135; Marchetti-Mercer 2012, 388).

Does emigration change the voting behaviour of the people left behind? Theory tells us that emigration creates grievances amongst the remaining voters (Dancygier et al. 2022, 2). I follow Flinders and Hinterleitner (2022, 673)'s definition of grievances, who see them to be negative emotions built around fear or anger against a specific "other".

Dancygier et al. (2022) show how these grievances lead to voting for populist and radical right (PRR) parties. I argue that these grievances can also cause a less radical shift in voting behaviour, e.g., an anti-incumbent vote. This argument is underlined by Bowler and Lanoue (1992), who tells us that grieving, dissatisfied voters are prone to casting a ballot against the incumbent (Bowler and Lanoue 1992, 489). Furthermore, Dancygier et al. (2022) focuses on Sweden. I argue that the phenomenon of emigration and vote behaviour change can also be applied to CEE EU member states. This is because the typical impacts of emigration, e.g., population decline or labour shortages, are not bound to a specific country.

[1] Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia



Figure 1: **Average Net Migration 2000–2021 at NUTS3 Level.** Source: Eurostat's CNMIGRATRT variable.

Therefore, this thesis asks the following research question: Which emigration-induced service cuts have a negative impact on the sending country's incumbent vote share?

Dancygier et al. (2022) describe how emigration leads to voting for PRR parties. Regions with high emigration rates are prone to service cuts. These cuts cause grievances amongst the people left behind, who react by voting for PRR parties (Dancygier et al. 2022, 2). However, the authors do not show what exactly causes a change in voting behaviour and suggest that future research should look into what type of service cuts eventually lead to PRR voting (Dancygier et al. 2022, 35).

This thesis will examine three types of emigration induced service cuts that can cause grievances. These cuts are school closures, hospital closures and closures of places that foster community building, such as cafés, bars and restaurants. I put forward the idea that these service cuts cause grievances that in turn lead to an anti-incumbent vote.

There is a research gap when it comes to understanding the political repercussions of emigration on sending regions



Figure 2: **International Emigration and EU Accession (selected countries).** Blue line represents the country's year of EU accession. See Appendix 1 for sources.

(Kyriazi et al. 2023, 564). This despite the fact that, globally seen, the people who do *not* emigrate outnumber the people who do (Marchetti-Mercer 2012, 378). In the specific case of the EU, the FoM should be studied not only from the view of a right to enter, but also as a right to exit (Bruzelius 2021, 35).

FoM, a foundational aspect of the EU, affects voting behaviour in all member states, regardless if they are sending or receiving migrants. Understanding how FoM alters voting behaviour in emigration-hit regions will help understand the effects of future European integration, e.g., when further Balkan states or the Ukraine join the EU.[2]

A caveat of this thesis will be the difficulty of disentangling the effect of emigration on an anti-incumbent vote, as many factors can lead to a vote against the incumbent party.

State of the Field

The impact of emigration on voting behaviour and electoral outcomes varies by time and location. A variety of studies have explored this phenomenon, ranging from 19th-century Sweden (Karadja and Prawitz 2019, 2) to early 21st-century Mexico (Pfutze 2014, 295).

Emigration can affect electoral outcomes in two ways. First, emigration can change the composition of the electorate. Lim (2023, 39) shows that emigrants from CEE are disproportionately younger, cosmopolitan and politically progressive, resulting in a remaining population that is older and more conservative. As a result, electoral results are more likely to be conservative.

Second, emigration can affect the voting behaviour of the people left behind. This effect can be indirect and also direct.

[2] 2023 State of Union address by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at 1h 5min 41sec (https://www.youtube.com/live/3CodB7iohUI?si=xe06mS4q8qjeJYpi&t=3941, retrieved 6 October 2023)

The indirect effect occurs when emigration alters a voter's overall wellbeing. Family members or neighbours of emigrants have a higher life satisfaction and budget easing through remittances, but suffer from more depression and stress (Ivlevs et al. 2019, 135) and are more prone to anger and distress (Marchetti-Mercer 2012, 388), caused by people close to them who have left.

There are multiple direct effects of emigration on political behaviour. A wide range of literature explains how emigration causes a decrease in political interest. This can be caused by a decrease in political mobilisation and collective action (Sellars 2019, 1220), a decrease in civic engagement (Bravo 2009; Goodman and Hiskey 2008, 172), opposing voices leaving and thus resulting in a more supportive electorate (Peters and Miller 2022, 14) or through a loss of political actors (Lim 2023, 44).

Despite this decrease in political interest, some remainers still vote. If the number of people casting their ballot decreases, then it becomes all the more important to understand how the remaining voters are affected by emigration and how they thus cast their ballot.

One concrete example why this is important is shown by Barsbai et al. (2017, 36), who reveal a negative effect between emigration and votes for the Communist Party in the Moldovan elections of 2009 and 2010. Elections during those years brought significant political change to the ex-soviet country (Barsbai et al. 2017, 41), because voters cast a ballot against the Communist Party, who had gained electoral power in previous elections. Voters turned against the Communist Party because returning emigrants brought western social norms and political preferences to Moldova (Barsbai et al. 2017, 66). These preferences then diffused amongst the electorate.

A further reason why the effects of emigration on voting behaviour is important is its implications on voting for populist and radical right parties (Dancygier et al. 2022, 34; Herold and Otteni 2020, 19; Lim 2023, 56). However, there are two reasons why this link between emigration and radical parties can be questioned.

First, Vorländer (2021, 36) shows that far-right parties only profit from emigration in economically weak regions. Second, there are three points to be made that non-extreme parties, e.g., a mainstream opposition party, may also benefit from emigration. One, a voter does not necessarily have to cast a ballot for an extreme party. Instead, they can simply critique the incumbent government or status quo parties if emigration becomes politicised (Vorländer 2021, 91). Two, voters receive remittances which realigns their party preferences closer to their personal ideological preferences (Pfutze 2012, 161). This realignment does not necessarily have to lead to voting for an extreme party. Three, voters cannot cast a vote for an extreme party if there is no such party on the ballot. For these reasons I will examine anti-incumbent voting in general and not focus on voting for radical right parties.

Dancygier et al. (2022, 35) uncover a correlation between emigration and the rise of PRR parties. The authors suggest that emigration decreases an area's quality of life, e.g., through cuts in public services. These service cuts create grievances amongst voters. These grievances then affect voting behaviour. Voters turn against incumbents and cast a ballot for PRR parties.

The causal mechanism according to Dancygier et al. (2022) can be summarised as follows:

$$Emigration \rightarrow Service\ Cuts \rightarrow Grievances \rightarrow Vote\ for\ PRR \tag{1}$$

I argue that Dancygier et al. (2022)'s grievances are different to the ones described by Ivlevs et al. (2019, 135), who's grievances are more personal and intimate, caused by family matters. Dancygier et al. (2022)'s grievances are less intimate and of more general and economic nature. Because they are less intimate, I argue that a person is more likely to voice them in public, e.g., by changing their voting behaviour. This claim is supported by Kapur (2014, 488), who underlines the importance of understanding the reason behind a person's emigration when examining the impact of emigration in the sending country. Emigration from CEE EU member states is primarily

due to economic reasons (Vasilopoulou and Talving 2019, 810), thus I assume the grievances of the people left behind to be closely linked to economic factors and less to family matters.

It remains unclear which service cuts cause grievances that in turn change voting behaviour (Dancygier et al. 2022, 35). The authors leave this aspect open for future research. My thesis sets out to detect which emigration induced service cuts cause grievances and thus anti-incumbent votes.

Project Description

Key (1966) states that voters evaluate a government's past performance and their policy outcomes (Key 1966, 35, 58–59, 61). They vote retrospectively and their voting behaviour is influenced by salient issues (Key 1966, 73), such as the described service cuts. These cuts affect citizens' daily lives and cause grievances. Such grievances will give the incumbent party a poor performance record. Grieving voters that are dissatisfied with the incumbent party will not support them in the next election (Bowler and Lanoue 1992, 489).

Based on Dancygier et al. (2022)'s assumption that service cuts lead to grievances which then lead to PRR voting, this thesis asks the following question: Which emigration-induced service cuts have a negative impact on the sending country's incumbent vote share?

Dancygier et al. (2022, 2) state that emigration is linked to service cuts such as schools and business closures. Also, emigration strains the healthcare system. Based on this, I assume that emigration has a negative effect on the number of schools, the number of hospitals and the number of "third places", i.e., local "informal public gathering places" such as cafés, bars and restaurants that foster community building (Oldenburg 1999, 16). Following Dancygier et al. (2022)'s theory, a decrease in the number of these institutions will cause grievances amongst the remaining population for the following reasons.

Schools contribute towards community feeling (Sageman 2022, 964). Closing a school will reduce a community's cohesion and negatively impact the lives of families with school-aged children. They must either travel further to reach the next school or must put up with classes that have increased in size due to the consolidation of schools.

Hospitals are important for the population who do not emigrate. Because emigrants tend to be younger (Lim 2023, 39), the remaining population is likely to be older. The elderly are more reliant on hospitals, thus I argue that a hospital closure can cause distress and thus grievances amongst the remaining population. Hospital closures in CEE are spurred on by the emigration of medical professionals (Vorländer 2021, 13; Walker 2019).

To underline the importance of school and hospital closings, Dancygier et al. (2022, 32) show how newspapers report on such closings in Swedish emigration-heavy regions. This indicates that there may exist a link between these closures and grievances.

Schools and hospital closings are services made available by the state. In contrast, "third places" are supplied by the private sector. Their closure can erode a communal sense of belonging and push people towards populist parties (Bolet 2021, 1653).

Does emigration cause these service cuts? I perform a brief analysis on exemplary CEE EU member states to uncover a potential correlation between these service cuts and emigration.

Figure 3 shows a general decline in the younger population and a corresponding rise in the older population within CEE EU member states from 1990 to 2019. This supports my approach that the demographic composition of CEE EU member states has changed towards an older population, where the demand for schools may decrease and the demand for hospitals may increase.

I model the effect of emigration on service cuts at the NUTS3 level. Using linear regression models and panel data, I measure the association between net migration and number of primary schools in Croatia, the number of



Figure 3: **Population size by age at country level, 1990–2019.** Source: Eurostat's DEMO_R_PJANAGGR3 variable.

hospital beds in Romania and the number of "third places" in the Czech Republic. All three models are significant at conventional levels and show a positive coefficient for lagged net migration. This means that negative net migration, i.e., emigration, is associated with a decrease in the number of schools, hospital beds and "third places". This decrease is lagged by several years, under the assumption that emigration does not have an immediate effect. See Appendix 2 for details.

Further following Dancygier et al. (2022)'s causal chain, emigration should (indirectly) cause grievances. I use the European Social Survey ("European Social Survey Cumulative File, ESS 1-9" 2020) to measure happiness levels in NUTS3 regions and correlate them with net migration rates. Results point towards a positive correlation between the two. A decrease in net migration, i.e., an increase in emigration, is associated with a decrease in a region's happiness. Three of the four models show significant results at conventional levels. See Appendix 3 for details.

This is the updated causal chain of events, based on the causal chain displayed in (1):

$$Emigration \rightarrow Service\ Cuts \rightarrow Grievances \rightarrow Anti\text{-}Incumbent\ Vote \tag{2}$$

Using this causal chain as a reference, I set up the following empirical specification:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\textit{Anti-Incumbent Vote}_{region,\ year} = \beta_0 &+ \beta_1 \textit{Service Cuts}_{region,\ year} \\
&+ \beta_2 \textit{External Emigration}_{region,\ year} \\
&+ \beta_3 \textit{Remittances}_{region,\ year} \\
&+ \beta_4 \textit{Electoral Volatility}_{region,\ year} \\
&+ \varepsilon
\end{aligned} \tag{3}
$$

I will control for the following variables. First, external emigration from a region, which entails the crude number of citizens emigrating abroad from the region. Second, I take the inflow of remittances in a region, because remittances can realign a voter's party preferences in favour of ideological preferences, thus changing their voting behaviour (Pfutze 2014, 306). Third, I control for general electoral volatility. CEE states show higher levels of electoral volatility than states in Western Europe, Latin America or the United States (Epperly, 2011, p. 831). This volatility most often hits incumbent parties in government (Bochsler, 2019, p. 1).

As a general relation between dependent and independent variables, I assume an increase in service cuts leads to a higher share of anti-incumbent votes. I define the following three hypotheses:

H1: Service cuts to schools lead to an increase in the region's anti-incumbent vote.

H2: Service cuts to hospitals lead to an increase in the region's anti-incumbent vote.

H3: Service cuts to "third places" lead to an increase in the region's anti-incumbent vote.

Research Design

I differentiate between internal and external migration and focus on the latter, as I want to examine the effect of the EU's FoM on emigration and voting behaviour.

I will measure the effect of service cuts on a subnational, NUTS3 level, data permitting. I do this for the following two reasons. First, measuring subnational regions instead of countries will increase sample size and thus provide more accurate results. Second, regions within countries have different levels of emigration (see Figure 1), allowing for differentiated measurements.

I measure $\textit{Anti-Incumbent Vote}$, my dependent variable, by examining the vote share loss experienced by the incumbent party after they assume power. To achieve this, I calculate the difference between the incumbent party's vote share in the subsequent election t_1 and their vote share in the initial election t_0 where they first gained power.

$\textit{Service Cuts}$, the main independent variable, are operationalised as ratios to their respective target audiences. The first service cut is the ratio of children per school in a region. The second is the ratio of people to hospital beds in a region. The third is the ratio of people to "third places" in a region.

I operationalise $\textit{Electoral Volatility}$ by taking a region's economic performance into account. Powell and Tucker (2014, 139, 143) show that economic downturns, specifically shifts in GDP since the fall of Communism, lead to a higher likelihood of the electorate switching to a new party. This observation aligns with Bertus et al. (2022, 77)'s study, highlighting that in smaller Hungarian settlements, socioeconomic dynamics and labour market conditions explain electoral shifts. Therefore I will incorporate controls for economic performance to single out the impact of emigration on anti-incumbent voting.

I will examine CEE EU member states because emigration in this region has not been studied in detail and I see an opportunity to measure the political impact of FoM on the region. In order to measure an effect of a country joining the EU, I will focus on a time span around the country's accession, e.g., ten years before and after joining, if

data are available for the time span. The time span will only go up to and include the year 2019, because I assume the COVID-19 pandemic to have a strong influence on emigration in 2020 and beyond.

A potential disadvantage of the case selection could be cultural differences between CEE EU member state NUTS3 regions, leading to inaccurate results. I have chosen a very broad definition of CEE countries, possibly making a comparison between regions difficult. It may make sense to narrow down the selection, e.g., by excluding the three Baltic states. A further disadvantage is missing data in emigration time series.

I will use quantitative methods to answer my research question. In order to gain a general overview, I will perform a subgroup analysis, e.g., by analysing NUTS3 regions within a country. I will then build simple regression models that uncover potential correlations between emigration and anti-incumbent voting. Data quality permitting, I can then focus on regions that show promising results.

Such a focus may involve mediation analysis. Due to the chain of causal events described in (2), service cuts act as a mediator between emigration and anti-incumbent voting. This analysis can help explain how the three service cuts influence anti-incumbent voting in different ways.

A further deep dive will involve applying the Regression Discontinuity Design method in order to compare regions in EU member states with regions in non-EU states, such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia or Serbia. Using EU accession as the treatment, this allows to measure the impact of FoM on emigration and the subsequent effects on anti-incumbent voting.

NUTS3 level international emigration data are provided by the national statistics agencies of the respective countries.[3] As a fallback, NUTS3 level migration data is also provided by Eurostat.[4] However, these data do not differentiate between internal and external migration.

NUTS3 level data for the dependent variable are provided by the EU-NED European NUTS-Level Election Dataset.[5] National data on schools, hospitals and "third places" are provided by Eurostat and by the national statistics agencies of the respective countries. See Appendix 2 for sources. Data on remittances seems not to exist at NUTS3 level. As an alternative, I will use data on remittances on the national level provided by the World Bank's KNOMAD.[6]

Conclusion

This thesis sets out to explore the effect of emigration on voting behaviour in CEE EU member states. Dancygier et al. (2022) show how emigration-induced service cuts lead to grievances in regions with high levels of emigration in Sweden. These grievances then turn into a vote for a PRR party. Based on these findings, this thesis will attempt to uncover which emigration-induced service cuts lead to an anti-incumbent vote in CEE EU member states.

Three types of service cuts are examined: School and hospital closings, as well as shutting down "third places", such as bars, cafés and restaurants. Based on panel data provided by the national statistical offices of CEE EU member states and Eurostat, I build regression models to approximate the effect of these service cuts on anti-incumbent voting.

If successful, this thesis will provide further insights into the dynamics between migration spurred on by the EU's FoM, community disintegration and political outcomes. It can also contribute to understanding how future EU enlargements will affect the voting behaviour of citizens in new member states.

[3] See sources in Appendix 1.

[4] Variable: CNMIGRATRT; Online data code: DEMO_R_GIND3; Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMO_R_GIND3__custom_7113680/default/table?lang=en (retrieved 4 September 2023)

[5] https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/IQRYP5 (retrieved 5 September 2023)

[6] https://www.knomad.org/data/remittances (retrieved 9 October 2023)

Appendix 1: Sources of Figure 2

- **Croatia**
  - https://podaci.dzs.hr/2021/en/10485 (retrieved 3 September 2023)
  - https://podaci.dzs.hr/2022/en/29029 (retrieved 3 September 2023)
  - https://podaci.dzs.hr/2023/en/58062 (retrieved 3 September 2023)
- **Czech Republic**
  - https://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo2/faces/en/index.jsf?page=vystup-objekt&pvo=DEM11D&z=T&f=TABULKA&katalog=all&c=v3~8__RP2002&&str=v66 (retrieved 3 September 2023)
- **Poland**
  - https://stat.gov.pl/download/gfx/portalinformacyjny/en/defaultaktualnosci/3289/2/2/1/main_directions_of_emigration_and_immigration_in_the_years_1966-2020_for__permanent_residence.xlsx (retrieved 3 September 2023)
- **Romania**
  - http://statistici.insse.ro:8077/tempo-online/#/pages/tables/insse-table → emigrants with a change of permanent address (definitive emigrants) → POP309A (retrieved 3 September 2023)
- **Slovenia**
  - https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStatData/pxweb/en/Data/Data/05N1042S.px/table/tableViewLayout2/ → International migration by citizenship, statistical regions, Slovenia, annually → Citizens of RS (retrieved 3 September 2023)

Appendix 2: Service Cuts and Emigration in CEE EU Member States Panel Data Regression Results

Table 1: Net Migration and Number of Primary Schools at NUTS3 Level in Croatia (2005–2019)

	Dependent variable:
	Primary Schools
Net Migration (Lagged)	0.105**
	(0.051)
Observations	147
R^2	0.033
Adjusted R^2	−0.129
F Statistic	4.293** (df = 1; 125)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Sources

- Net migration: Eurostat's CNMIGRATRT variable[7]
- Number of primary schools: Croatian Bureau of Statistics[8]

Note: Lag is set to eight years, as this is the duration of primary school in Croatia.[9]

Table 2: Net Migration and Number of Hospital Beds at NUTS3 Level in Romania (2011–2019)

	Dependent variable:
	Number of Hospital Beds
Net Migration (Lagged)	1.804**
	(0.780)
Observations	328
R^2	0.018
Adjusted R^2	−0.122
F Statistic	5.344** (df = 1; 286)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Sources

- Net migration: Eurostat's CNMIGRATRT variable[10]
- Number of hospital beds: National Institute for Statistics - ROMANIA[11]

Note: Lag is set to one year.

[7] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMO_GIND/default/table?lang=en (retrieved 9 October 2023)
[8] https://podaci.dzs.hr/en/statistics/education/basic-and-upper-secondary-schools (retrieved 9 October 2023)
[9] https://web.archive.org/web/20100625203546/http://www.ecml.at/documents/members/CroatiaNR.pdf (retrieved 9 October 2023)
[10] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMO_GIND/default/table?lang=en (retrieved 9 October 2023)
[11] http://statistici.insse.ro:8077/tempo-online/#/pages/tables/insse-table Infrastructure of Health → SAN102C (retrieved 9 October 2023)

Table 3: Net Migration and Number of "Third Places" at NUTS2 Level in the Czech Republic (2010–2019)

	Dependent variable:
	Number of Third Places
Net Migration (Lagged)	58.783**
	(22.366)
Observations	64
R^2	0.112
Adjusted R^2	−0.018
F Statistic	6.908** (df = 1; 55)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Sources

- Net migration: Eurostat's CNMIGRATRT variable[12]
- Number of "third places": Eurostat's SBS_R_NUTS06_R2 variable, filtered for "Food and beverage service activities"[13]

Note: Lag is set to two years.

[12] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMO_GIND/default/table?lang=en (retrieved 9 October 2023)

[13] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/SBS_R_NUTS06_R2__custom_7738572/default/table?lang=en (retrieved 9 October 2023)

Appendix 3: Grievances and Emigration in CEE EU Member States Regression Results

Sources for all models

- Net migration: Eurostat's CNMIGRATRT variable[14]
- Variable "happy" from European Social Survey Rounds 1–10 ("European Social Survey Cumulative File, ESS 1-9" 2020)

Table 4: ESS 6 (2013)

	Dependent variable:
	weighted_avg
Net Migration 2012	0.111***
	(0.035)
Constant	6.334***
	(0.114)
Observations	83
R^2	0.113
Adjusted R^2	0.102
Residual Std. Error	0.984 (df = 81)
F Statistic	10.291*** (df = 1; 81)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: ESS 8 (2017)

	Dependent variable:
	weighted_avg
Net Migration 2016	0.058***
	(0.021)
Constant	7.031***
	(0.077)
Observations	47
R^2	0.140
Adjusted R^2	0.121
Residual Std. Error	0.517 (df = 45)
F Statistic	7.324*** (df = 1; 45)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

[14] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMO_GIND/default/table?lang=en (retrieved 9 October 2023)

Table 6: ESS 9 (2019)

	Dependent variable:
	weighted_avg
Net Migration 2018	0.018
	(0.013)
Constant	6.785***
	(0.081)
Observations	112
R^2	0.017
Adjusted R^2	0.008
Residual Std. Error	0.850 (df = 110)
F Statistic	1.947 (df = 1; 110)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: ESS 10 (2021)

	Dependent variable:
	weighted_avg
Net Migration 2019	0.019**
	(0.010)
Constant	6.926***
	(0.058)
Observations	137
R^2	0.028
Adjusted R^2	0.021
Residual Std. Error	0.680 (df = 135)
F Statistic	3.951** (df = 1; 135)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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