

# Mercury Chat Service

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# The Problem

Alice wants to send confidential messages to Bob without any third party, Eve, being able to read them.

# The Solution

## Mercury (server)

- Allows users to share messages

## Quicksilver (client)

- Encrypts & passes messages to Mercury
- Receives & decrypts messages from Mercury
- Manages keys

# Assets & Stakeholders

- Message contents - Users
- User passwords - Users
- Service availability - Users & Server Admins

# Assumptions & Adversaries

- All traffic to and from the server is TLS encrypted
- Outsiders are capable of sending arbitrary HTTP requests in high volume
- Server admins are capable of reading/writing to the database

# Messaging Protocol

## Messages Table (Server-Side)

**sender INT,**

**recipient INT,**

**timesent TIMESTAMP,**

**message BLOB**

# Encryption With ECDH (Sending a Message)

1.  $\text{Secret} = \text{ECDH}(\text{myPrivate}, \text{yourPublic})$
2.  $\text{Key} = \text{KDF}(\text{Secret})$
3.  $\text{Cipher} = \text{Encrypt}(\text{Key}, \text{Message})$
4.  $\text{newPrivate}, \text{newPublic} = \text{NewEllipticKeys}()$
5. Send (Cipher, newPublic) to peer
6.  $\text{myPrivate} = \text{newPrivate}$



# Decryption With ECDH (Fetching a Message)

1. Get (Cipher, newPublic) from peer
2. Secret = ECDH(myPrivate, yourPublic)
3. Key = KDF(Secret)
4. Message = Decrypt(Key, Cipher)
5. yourPublic = newPublic

# Message Structure

- **Sid** The id of the sender's key that was used to encrypt this message
- **Rid** The id of the receiver's key that was used to encrypt this message
- **Nxt** The next public key to use (encrypted)
- **IV** The AES initialization vector used for encryption
- **Msg** The encrypted message
- **Key** Encrypted HMAC key
- **Tag** HMAC integrity tag
  - $\text{HMAC}(\text{Nxt} \parallel \text{Msg}, \text{Decrypt}(\text{Key}))$

Alice

Alice's	Bob's
Private	Public
Keys	Keys
0	0
1	



Sid: 0  
Rid: 0  
Msg: XXX  
Nxt: XXX

Bob

Bob's	Alice's
Private	Public
Keys	Keys
0	0
	1

Alice

Alice's	Bob's
Private	Public
Keys	Keys
0	0
1	
2	



Bob

Bob's	Alice's
Private	Public
Keys	Keys
0	0
	1
	2

Sid: 1  
Rid: 0  
Msg: XXX  
Nxt: XXX

Alice

Alice's Private Keys	Bob's Public Keys
0	0
1	1
2	



Sid: 0  
Rid: 2  
Msg:  
XXX  
Nxt: XXX

Bob

Bob's Private Keys	Alice's Public Keys
0	0
1	1
	2

Alice

Alice's Private Keys	Bob's Public Keys
0	0
1	1
2	2
3	



Sid: 1  
Rid: 2  
Msg:  
XXX  
Nxt: XXX



Sid: 2  
Rid: 1  
Msg:  
XXX  
Nxt: XXX

Bob

Bob's Private Keys	Alice's Public Keys
0	0
1	1
2	2
	3

# Shortcomings

# Lost Messages Prevent Communication

If one message gets lost, the conversation cannot continue because the receiver does not have the sender's newest key, and cannot decrypt future messages.



# Timestamp Manipulation

- Message timestamps are created by the server
- Server admins can manipulate timestamps so messages have the wrong times or appear in the wrong order

# Exchanging Public Key Files Sucks

- Users are likely to use some insecure channel such as email to exchange initial keys
- It is inconvenient and cumbersome
- A mobile version of Quicksilver could fix this by using QR codes to exchange keys

# Users Limited to One Device Per Conversation

- Keys are stored locally